



Europe in Discourse

2nd International Conference

Agendas of Reform

Conference Proceedings



Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference

Europe in Discourse: Agendas of Reform

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Editorial Foreword

This volume contains the proceedings of the *Second International Conference Europe in Discourse: Agendas of Reform* which took place in Athens, Greece from September 21st to 23d, 2018. The conference is a sequel to the highly successful 2016 First International Conference Europe in Discourse: Identity, Diversity, Borders. The Second Conference was again hosted by Hellenic American College. Unlike its predecessor, this conference focused on agendas of reform and thus on solutions for both continuing and new problems facing the European Union. The conference featured keynote speeches, plenary panels on values-based Reform, from enlargement to legitimization, Completing the EMU, Greece and the EU, Franco-German Relationship, The Transatlantic Dimension, EU Security and Defence, and EU and Islam. Last but not least, the conference also featured many oral presentations of papers by international scholars dealing in one way or another with the overall theme of reform agendas for the EU.

We have in this volume put together the proceedings of the conference based on the submission of papers that were presented at the conference and that passed the reviewing process. In line with the major topics of the conference, we have divided the papers in this volume into the following broad 4 sections:

Section 1: Values, Identity, Enlargement and Integration

Section 2: Migration, Refugees, Brexit, EU Crisis

Section 3: Regional EU issues: Greece, France-Germany, Turkey, Western Balkan, Romania

Section 4: EU and Islam, Climate Change, Energy Security

We hope that readers of this volume will appreciate the rich variety of the topics discussed in the papers united here.

Juliane House and Themis Kaniklidou

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Values, Identity, Enlargement, Integration

On the interaction of values and policies: a perspective from the discipline of the History of International Relations

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ABSTRACT

This short intervention attempts to point to the principles of a moderate realism, which would take into account the international trends but also the need to win legitimization in European public opinion. It is argued that the moderate forces, political and intellectual, are heavily losing the battle for the European hearts and minds. In order to win this crucial battle, the EU and its member-states, but also the West more generally, will need to show a little more certainty on the cultural level. Moreover, statesmen and intellectuals will also need to remember that the European project aimed from the start to combine national and supranational identities. In this context, it is important that education in EU countries as well as the EU's educational activities recognize this need. This will serve as an assurance to the European public that the European project does not endanger or disregard their identity – a fear that lies at the roots of the present intra-European upheaval. In short, it is crucial not to overlook the importance of processes from “below” in the shaping of contemporary European trends.

Keywords: legitimization, realism, culture, certainty, doubt, education, nation, supranationalism

The interaction of values and policies

Political theory, many academic disciplines and important public figures have always pointed to the crucial, interactive relationship between the implementation of reforms and the necessary point of reference offered by a clear value system. This author serves the discipline of the history of international relations, one of the oldest academic subjects. Its methodology appears to many, these days, somehow traditionalist or even outdated; however, it is based on long and accumulated experience that societies cannot ignore. This short intervention will attempt to point to a series of fundamental principles of moderate realism and their possible application in today's European Union.

It is self-evident that every societal venture needs to take into account the realities of its era, economic, social, political, international. At the same time, it also has to win the hearts and minds of the people – namely, to win legitimization. In older eras, the latter challenge involved the mere acquiescence, often tacit, of the governed; but especially since the Industrial Revolution and the rise of mass politics, social legitimization presupposes and demands a more active support from public opinion. In other words, ideas are a part of the realities of an era. An extremist “realism” ignoring ideas and popular dispositions, and striving to settle problems only from “above,” is, in the end of the day, another form of extremist idealism – it merely draws lines in the sand. Strong values link popular opinion with the projected policies, and also provide a backbone (and an evaluation system) that protects political action from degenerating into a crude opportunism. Without being based on a strong value system, legitimization may perhaps be superficially attainable during the good times of material affluence, but usually dissolves in times of hardship. Enlightened policies must be based both on hard facts and on ideas. Today's West should be in a position to understand this well: it is an attitude that has ensured the Western civilization's survival during successive and relatively recent struggles against totalitarianism, from the 1930s until the late 1980s.

The trouble is that in the past decade or so, we are losing the battle for legitimization in the European Union (EU). We are losing the hearts and minds of its peoples. In recent years, the older and much-debated problem of the democratic deficit of the EU, has been combined with a new and arguably stronger challenge: a growing number of EU citizens believe that their elites – political and intellectual, European and national – scorn their nations and therefore their own people. These accusations are unjust; but they are a reality of our time, and we need to address them and win back our peoples.

The need for certainties

In an attempt to project a viable policy, the first guiding line should be that the European Union, but also its member-states and their societies, must show more certainty in their stance, especially on cultural issues.

This is a painful problem for the liberal West, a problem that authoritarian or totalitarian regimes never face. Liberalism and representative democracy needs to provide a functional mixture: it needs both “certainties,” but also a reasonable space for “doubt,” allowing for freedom, evolution and change. But what is the exact composition of this necessary mixture of certainties and doubt? Clearly, it is difficult to tell, and in all probability there is no general rule, applicable to all societies and eras, no users’ manual to consult and find easy answers.

It was a sign of liberalism, when, after the end of the Cold War, the EU and the West generally embraced a certain degree of relativism; this was meant to encourage tolerance of the Other, a necessary feature especially in an era of globalization. But we may have pushed this cultural relativism a little too far. In the almost 30 years since the end of the Cold War – driven, perhaps, by the mistaken assumption that globalization meant the prevalence of Western values everywhere – we seem to be afraid to invoke fundamental notions of the West, afraid perhaps that we will be accused of orientalism or for displaying a mentality of “white supremacy.” It is possible to point to many relevant examples; many cases in which our public debates do not deal with the essence of the problem, but with appearances. Often, we are reluctant to use the very word “West” to describe ourselves. To the average citizen we appear timid and irrelevant, and most of all indifferent for their priorities.

It is important to make it clear that it is imperative for modern societies to embrace tolerance. Thus they must also accept a *measure* of relativism. But we may have done some mistakes in the mixture. To give an indicative example: let us imagine a political leader who, during an electoral campaign says that he/she is right, but maybe he/she is not right; would one vote for him/her? Is it possible to send troops to the battlefield telling them that they may – but they may not – be fighting for the right cause? Let us not be shocked by the military example: the balance of opinion is that, after a happy era of relative international tranquility, we are now moving on from a period of “crisis management” to one of “security crises.” Our societies may have to deal with such eventualities in the future, perhaps not the very distant one; it could even be argued that they are dealing with them even today, in the form of a blind and indiscriminate terrorism. The war of the liberals, Sir Michael Howard reminds us, must be a “just war.” But it has to be that – “just.” And it cannot be that, if anything goes.

Leadership, at any rate, presupposes certainty; this is a basic rule and a fundamental reality. If one is only full of doubt, one may appear melancholically pensive, a romantic, a noble figure; but no one will follow him/her. In Shakespeare’s masterpiece, Henry V spends the night before the battle of Agincourt with his doubts: a profoundly contemporary image of the sensitive warrior, who is tormented by his inner thoughts at the time of the darkest night. But next morning Henry V speaks to his troops in a very clear manner: “we few, we happy few, we band of brothers,” he says, who in our old age will show our wounds and say “these wounds I had on Crispian’s day;” giving them faith, facing the might of the numerous French heavy horse. This – the image of Henry V *both* during the night and in the morning of the battle, not the one without the other – is a model of leadership. It is what we do not offer to our audiences and to our peoples.

The nation, supranationalism, and education

A second point involves another mixture of an arguably more explosive nature: national, international and transnational identities, and education. The EU was launched in the 1950s as a venture that aimed to *combine* national identities with the European orientation. The European project rose as the way to respect all national identities in terms of coexistence and cooperation, without allowing nationalism to destroy the continent once more. The European project thus required a *mixture* of national and supranational ideas. And yet, during the past decades there has been a visible tendency, in many educational systems or in EU educational activities, to downplay the national perspective, as if it were hostile to European integration. As for the “international” dimension, this appears to many as a conservative or even reactionary notion, and is being brushed aside. Our education has become fragmented; it tries to encourage the critical thought of the pupil or the student, who however are not given a full picture of what Marc Bloch used to call the “historical continuum.” And yet, it is impossible to develop critical thinking without knowing basic facts, and without having a basic backbone of accurate knowledge. Our pupils and students know *what is technically needed* to write an

essay, but they often do not know what to say in it. Unsurprisingly, these young people are easy prey for the populists.

I am not suggesting a return to a narrower national – let alone to a nationalist – education. In fact, the whole point is to prevent exactly this. However, it largely was this orientation of formal education that has convinced many people that their elites despise their own nations. It is exactly that, which lies at the basis of the Brexit vote or Donald Trump's electoral victory. And it is not a coincidence that these occurred in countries where education had moved towards these directions, whereas other countries, such as France, which had held their ground on the level of formal, public education, did not suffer to the same extent. The truth is that, if we do not give responsible knowledge to the citizens about their national identity or international politics, they will not remain without information; they will acquire it *outside* the educational system, from irresponsible, extremist sources. This is what we are witnessing these days. And it was not just on the level of formal education: for example, many British intellectuals, very light-heartedly, have argued over a period of years that national narratives are incompatible with European supranational structures; who would doubt what the answer of a people will be, if we place them in front of such a crude and superficial dilemma? And, unsurprisingly in this context, the answer of the British people was the Brexit vote.

In other words, in a rather dogmatic mood, many Western countries, and the EU as an international entity, have made a major mistake: they have assumed that if their citizens were given a less national education, they would be more receptive to the overcoming of nationalism. It was wrong, of course; this is the surest way to arouse nationalism. Moreover, there was another major notional mistake in all this: to put it simply, there was an assumption, not always unspoken, that elites and intellectuals can shape identities. But elites, intellectuals or educators are not social mechanics. And societies grow, they are not made from above, as the leaders of the Soviet Union in the end were surprised to discover. It is a bitter thought that we, the West of today (namely, the victors of the Cold War), make the same mistake as the Soviets. Identity and consciousness is the result of an interactive process, both from above and from below, and we are currently losing heavily in processes from below.

It is therefore imperative that European educational systems try to combine national and European identities, emphatically showing that they respect both; they must give to the European peoples a solid backbone of knowledge about their nations. This will not solve the problem automatically; after all, formal education is only one of the many sources from where a citizen is being informed, and (as noted above) it is not a tool of social mechanics. However, it is crucial to offer to these citizens a backbone of serious and comprehensive knowledge, that will act as a deterrent and will offset tendencies (which are inevitable in our era, chaotic from the point of view of communication) to look for "information" in other irresponsible sources.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In retrospect

In conclusion, in order to protect the gains of globalization and the European project itself, and also in order to resist populism, we need to return to more realistic approaches. We need to remember that leadership presupposes certainty. Solutions cannot come through simplistic social mechanics, or through dogmatic theoretical concepts; and a measure of functionalism and pragmatism – namely, the ability to interact with the real world – is necessary. We need to reconnect with our peoples. Without this, it is very doubtful that there could be the necessary legitimization for EU policies. On the contrary, we will simply remain passive and watch the tide of the anti-systemic forces which will, in the end, endanger the European venture.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have had almost 30 years of peace and affluence – at least in the developed world. This is very unusual in world history, and no miracle lasts forever. There are signs that this happy period may now be coming to an end – or at least that there will be a new period in which our tranquility and affluence will not be taken for granted in all eventualities. We have not signed a pact with God that we will not encounter difficulties in our lifetime. And if we are good only for the easy times, we are not good at all. A difficult period is probably beginning. We must fasten our seat belts, and be prepared to go out fighting for what we, and the Union, stand for.

Revisiting and reviving European values to ensure a sustainable future for the EU: the case of the Erasmus+ project “Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo”

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ABSTRACT

The European Union is a unique economic and political union created in the aftermath of the Second World War. The idea was that countries which trade with one another become economically interdependent; thus, are more likely to avoid conflict. Undoubtedly, the European integration project has gone far beyond its original purpose. However, since its inception, its legitimacy has been questioned. Nowadays, the rise of Eurosceptic parties, Brexit and referenda show that a prominent issue relating to legitimacy is people's consent and a true European identity. This paper presents an Erasmus+ project, “Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo”, which fosters an innovative approach towards European citizenship focusing both on the common cultural values and the awareness of the cultural heritage which is particular to each member state. Can this values-based approach to EU citizenship lead to the development of a community of people who share a common cultural background and overcome the integration obstacles?

Keywords: values, legitimacy, Euroscepticism, Erasmus+, citizenship, narrative, identity

INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that since its inception, the legitimacy of the European Union (EU) has been questioned. It is also true that this scepticism about the European Union and the European integration project comes from different sides of the political spectrum. For instance, to the European Communist parties the historic foundations of the EU lie in an attempt to reorganize Western European capitalism after the destruction of the Second World War and the rise of the Russian controlled bloc in Eastern Europe (“European Union Referendum – More Capitalist”, 2015). Left-wing Eurosceptics argue that the EU drives capitalism and destroys solidarity; thus, only nation states can protect their people against unregulated capitalism and individualism (Oomsels, n.d.). Right-wing Eurosceptics, on the other hand, claim that the EU drives globalization and threatens national or individual freedoms; therefore, it is right to withdraw to the nation states as only they can protect people against globalization and guarantee such freedoms (Oomsels, n.d.).

These arguments, whether left-wing or right-wing, reject the very idea of the European integration. However, there are different types and degrees of opposition to the European integration process covered by the term Euroscepticism (Beneš, Lenčák Chalániová, & Eberle, 2016, p.24). There is strong or hard Euroscepticism, for example, which is anti-systemic because it criticizes the existence of the EU as a supranational entity on the grounds that it poses a threat to national sovereignty and national democratic institutions (Beneš, Lenčák Chalániová, & Eberle, 2016, p.24). Anti-systemic Euroscepticism proposes an exit from or dissolution of the EU and fine examples of such Eurosceptics are political parties such as the UKIP in Britain, the Front National in France, etc. (Beneš, Lenčák Chalániová, & Eberle, 2016, p.24).

There is another type of Euroscepticism that criticizes daily practices of the European politics claiming that the EU is an elite project, led by self-serving political elites distant from the lives of ordinary citizens (Beneš, Lenčák Chalániová, & Eberle, 2016, p.25). This kind of Euroscepticism can be characterized as populist. Yet, another type of Euroscepticism may be policy oriented, that is, targeting specific EU policies i.e. the measures taken by the EU to tackle the Eurozone crisis. This type of opposition may also lie in political or ideological positions (Beneš, Lenčák Chalániová, & Eberle, 2016, p.25).

Regardless of the type or the degree of opposition to the European integration, the Eurozone crisis and the rising migration have increased Euroscepticism and intensified the salience of the legitimacy of the EU (Thorn, 2015). When the EU was founded, its main goal was to safeguard peace and unity in Europe. After the Second World War, material interests, and security needs brought the European nation states together (White, 2010, p. 105). Thus, at that time, the heads of states did not worry about the populist sovereignty and ideological opposition, but then again, the policy sectors, in which the EU

was granted authority were limited. The EU was considered to be working alongside the nation states and consequently, there was no fear of replacing them. At that stage, democratic input was not given priority and problems of democratic legitimacy were not taken into consideration (Innerarity, 2014, p. 309). They were addressed indirectly, through the “accountability of the democratically elected member state governments” (Lord and Beetham, as cited in Thorn, 2015). Since then, however, steps have been taken through the successive amendments of the Treaties and especially, through the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The strengthening of the European Parliament, the enhanced involvement of national parliaments and the introduction of more elements of direct democracy were among the reforms introduced to reinforce the EU’s input legitimacy (Emmanouilidis & Stratulat, 2010).

Yet, democratic legitimacy for the EU remains problematic if it is compared to the ideal of the nation state (Schmidt, 2004, p. 1.) The EU, however, is not a nation state. It is a *sui generis* organization. Despite its unique character, in discussions about democratic legitimacy, it is compared to the nation state; thus, it is found deficient (Schmidt, 2004, p.2). Such discussions mainly focus on the two concepts Scharpf delineated (as cited in Schmidt, 2010, p.6): output legitimacy and input legitimacy. According to Scharpf (as cited in Thorn, 2015) in democratic nations input and output legitimacy exist side by side and even complement each other. Input-oriented legitimation requires that in a democratic polity the powers of government be exercised in response to the articulated preferences of the governed (government by the people) whereas output-oriented legitimation demands that democratic governments should advance the common good by dealing effectively with problems which are beyond the reach of individual action (government for the people) (Scharpf, 2001, p.358). However, when applying these concepts to the EU, a deficit in input legitimacy seems to appear, which the EU has sought to balance with its drive for effectiveness and output legitimacy (Thorn, 2015). The balance between input and output legitimacy is critical. Input legitimacy is important as it democratizes participation whereas output legitimacy urges people to agree that a particular structure should exist because of the benefits it brings (Curtin & Meijer, 2006, p. 112). In other words, output legitimacy leads to and ensures social acceptance.

Scharpf (as cited in Schmidt, 2010, p.6) claims that the EU lacks the constructive components for input legitimacy, that is, collective identity and a European demos. The Eurobarometer survey findings show that the economic crisis has led many supporters of the EU to become critics or even sceptics (Nanou & Verney, 2013). This increase in negative attitudes towards the EU could result in a crisis of “output legitimacy”; the fact that the EU can no longer guarantee prosperity and growth for its citizens could cause a crisis of “input legitimacy” by affecting way in which the citizens assess EU membership and the future of the integration process (Nanou & Verney, 2013; Bargaoanu, Radu, & Negrea-Busioc, 2016).

It is true that the economic integration has been sought much more than social or political union; this form of expansion, however, cannot be sustainable in the long run as Helmut Kohl, the former German chancellor, had highlighted in 1991: “sustaining an economic and monetary union over time without political union is a fallacy”. A decade later, Eriksen and Fossum (2004, pp.440-441) questioned “output-oriented legitimation” arguing that cooperation and membership cannot be premised on an ongoing calculation of costs and benefits, advocating that a political order cannot be reduced to the pursuit of self-interests as interests generate unstable equilibria; thus, a common identity and common norms and values are required.

There is no doubt that the Eurozone crisis has made citizens aware of the interdependence of European economies and the role of EU institutions in determining the future of individual national economies (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015, p. 238). Evidently, the Eurozone austerity cuts and bailouts have made the consequences of monetary union felt in the pockets of citizens, from the Spanish unemployed to the German taxpayers, thus, giving rise to the politicization of the integration process (Statham & Trenz, 2012, p.2). This increase in politicization is both beneficial to European democracy and desirable. Nevertheless, it can prove harmful if it leads “to an increase in populist, reactionary, and in some cases xenophobic responses –a nationalist politics built on people’s fears and insecurities– and an overall decline in political trust among the community” (Statham & Trenz, 2012, p.2). This development can, thus, be seen as a critical step in the ongoing process of integration passing from the “permissive consensus” of the early years, when the political elites could make decisions without public consultation, to a period which can be characterised by “constraining dissensus”, when the role of public opinion is critical and decisive (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015, p. 238).

This criticism would not be an issue if the EU policies in response to the crisis have proved effective. It seems that the Eurozone still struggles. As a result, if membership is evaluated in terms of costs and

benefits and not as an emotional commitment, then, it is obvious that there is no sustainable future for the EU (“The roots of Euroscepticism”, 2016). The cost-benefit analysis may account for Eurosceptic attitudes, however, the rise in Euroscepticism, is not limited to those who have suffered economic losses. Feelings of national identity and sovereignty can also have an impact on Eurosceptic attitudes as happened in the UK (Böttger & VanLooven, 2012, p.329). Identity is an important and contentious issue in the discourse about the legitimacy of the EU (Thorn, 2015). The EU has been extensively criticized for lacking identity and it is believed that without a true European identity, it will always struggle to legitimize itself (Thorn, 2015). Hence, a common European identity among the citizens of Europe and a European demos is a necessary requirement for a legitimate political society. It has been asserted that a major obstacle to the “creation of a European identity is the limited amount of shared history, culture and tradition between Europeans” (Thorn, 2015). Undoubtedly, any discussion on European identity today is closely related with the creation of a European demos and the future of the European integration process.

The Erasmus+ project “Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo” introducing a values-based approach to EU citizenship and a bottom-up narrative for the EU

The official narrative of the EU: a peace project

In the European Union, a union of democracies, democracy is one of its fundamental values together with human rights and the rule of law, equality and freedom (Article 2 TEU). The EU fosters democratic values beyond its borders in trade negotiations and, of course, as a membership prerequisite. Membership to the EU requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities. There is, however, growing concern among scholars and policymakers over the decline of democracy in Europe. Nowadays, in certain EU member states, there is a gradual erosion of democracy and a departure from the rule of law, that is, there are signs of democratic backsliding (Salmi, 2017). In the face of migration surge and slow economic growth, and the rise of populist parties, European values such as democracy or solidarity are under threat. Public support for the EU is declining and many of the EU’s major achievements – the euro, enlargement, Schengen – are in danger. The EU’s greatest achievement, however, has been peace among nations for more than 60 years and the official narrative which the EU seeks to communicate to the world is that of a peace project (Rasmussen, 2009, p. 9). With respect to the self-image of the EU as a model for peace, this narrative has been pervasive since its inception in the 1950s. But how successful is this narrative? According to the findings of the Standard Eurobarometer 88 which was conducted in autumn 2017, “the free movement of people, goods and services within the EU” (57%), was slightly ahead of “peace among the Member States of the EU” (56%) followed by “the euro” (25%) and “student exchange programmes such as ERASMUS” (25%) which were ranked jointly in third place (EB88, European Commission, 2017a, p.19). If we pay attention to the first option mentioned rather than the aggregated answers (maximum three answers per respondent), “peace among the Member States of the EU” topped the list (34%), eight percentage points ahead of “the free movement of people, goods and services within the EU” (26%). What is interesting, however, is that, in terms of evolutions, in the Eurobarometer survey of autumn 2017, compared to that of spring 2017, the percentage of respondents mentioning “peace among the Member States of the EU” decreased in 17 countries, most remarkably in Luxembourg (EB88, European Commission, 2017a, p. 25). It increased (by no more than three percentage points) in nine countries and remained stable in Slovenia and Austria. Another important finding, in the Eurobarometer survey of autumn 2017, is that “peace among the Member States of the EU” reached its highest score among Europeans who studied up to the age of 20 and beyond, and those who self-define themselves as upper middle class and managers, but also among retired people and those who never or almost never have economic difficulties (60% in all of these categories) (EB 88, European Commission, 2017a, p.27). While peace was ranked in first place by those born before 1946 (59%) and the generation born between 1946 and 1964 (58%), freedom of movement topped the list for members of generation born between 1965 and 1980 (61%) and generation born after 1980 (60%) (EB 88, European Commission, 2017a, p.27). This finding is really interesting as it brings to the fore a generational difference: it seems that for younger generations who have not experienced war, peace is regarded as less important.

The European Union, however, is mostly referred to as a peace project, with the EU being awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2012. In justifying its decision, the Norwegian Nobel Committee (2012)

recognized as the EU's most important result "the successful struggle for peace and reconciliation and for democracy and human rights" and acknowledged how the prospect of accession to the EU has contributed to the settling of ethnically based conflicts and to the progress of reconciliation in the Balkans. It also praised the EU for consolidating democracy in countries which experienced authoritarian political regimes such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, and in ex-communist Eastern European countries (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2012). Finally, the Committee compared the EU to a "peace congress", a forum for resolving disputes and preventing conflict" (Birchfield, Krige, & Young, 2007, p.4-5). Peace, for the committee, was more than the absence of war; it also signified the reduced prospect of conflict (Birchfield, Krige, & Young, 2007, p.5). As Birchfield et al. (2007, p.5) note, in the Nobel Committee speech the EU appeared as a victim of its own success; since war among its members is now unthinkable, its role in preventing conflict is no longer considered important. Tony Judt (2011), the renowned postwar historian, voiced the same concern:

The past, having once happened, leaves a record and a memory, and that memory is one of the reasons why the things it recalls will not simply be repeated. But it is also true that people can forget to remember—or, perhaps forget to forget—and that as we move further away from 1945 the reasons why it seemed so important to build something different will be less pressing. That is why we must remind ourselves not just that real gains have been made, but that the European community which helped to make them was a means, not an end (p.140).

As the actors and witnesses of the war gradually age and die, the memories of the Second World War are fading. Thus, there are concerns that the present young generation in Europe "may cast a colder gaze at the future of the Union" (Bouchard, 2016, p.18). Although the EU has accomplished a lot in various areas, the narrative used so far can no longer convince the young generations of European citizens of the virtues of the EU and especially, of its role in peace (Rasmussen, 2009, p.9).

The need for a new narrative and the values-based approach of Erasmus+ project "Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo"

Indeed, in 2013, the European Parliament together with the European Commission identified the need for a new narrative for Europe and launched an initiative under the name "A New Narrative for Europe" (NNfE).

The New Narrative initiative invited intellectuals, artists, scientists and all European citizens to give their contribution by bringing new ideas and reflections for the creation of a new narrative for Europe so as to continue writing 'the book' of Europe because according to, the then President of the European Commission, José Barroso (2013, p.4), Europe is neither technocratic nor bureaucratic. It has a "soul, and that soul is its civilisation in all its rich creativity, its unity in diversity and, even, its contradictions"[...] "Culture is a core value and a strong unifying element in European integration" (Barroso, 2013, p.3). In response to this call of the European Parliament and of the President of the European Commission, about twenty people from the cultural sphere which formed a Cultural Committee submitted the declaration "New Narrative for Europe: The Mind and Body of Europe" in 2014 in which they emphatically stress the need for a narrative tying Europe's distant and recent past to the present and providing a vision for the future.

In 2014, the current President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, in the press conference he gave in order to present his new team of Commissioners, recognized as one of the biggest challenges the EU faces convincing citizens that things will change. He announced significant changes in the Commission's structure and focus by re-allocating portfolios and supporting devices between Directorates General. As a result, the part of Unit COMM C2 (Citizens Programme) covering the management of the Europe for Citizens Programme, and the responsibility for the Preparatory Action "New Narrative on Europe" moved from DG COMM to DG Education and Culture (EAC) (Agostini & Natali 2015, p. 157-158). These changes show that the European Commission has acknowledged the role of education and culture in strengthening European identity. As a matter of fact, in November 2017, the European Commission contributed to the informal meeting of heads of state and government that took place in Gothenburg in light of the 30th anniversary of the Erasmus programme and in the framework of the Social Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth with the communication titled "Strengthening European Identity through Education and Culture", a document which outlines the Commission's vision for the role of education and culture in reinforcing a shared European identity, in all its diversity, while making key policy suggestions to EU leaders. In this document, the role of education and culture emerge as pivotal because they offer people the

opportunity to “(i) know better each other across borders, and (ii) experience and be aware of what it means to be “European””(European Commission, 2017b, p.3).

The new narrative that ties Europe’s distant and recent past to the present and provides a vision for the future, which intellectuals have rightly pointed out as essential, is important not to be imposed through a top-down approach but created by Europeans themselves, especially the young people, through their own experiences as happens in the Erasmus+ project “Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo” (2016-1-IT02-KA201-024417). The project “Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo” is a KA2 Strategic Partnership which makes it possible for organizations from different participating countries to work together, develop and share best practices and innovative approaches in the field of school education. The project, which brings together secondary and primary schools from France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain and two important organizations: the Historical Archives of the European Union and the Opera of Santa Croce in Florence, aims to enable young Europeans:

- to know and understand the European integration process through the resources of the EU's historical archives (recent memory) and
- to know and understand the formation of the idea of citizenship in each participant country from experiences traced in time (deep memory).

The project seeks to promote the understanding of 7 European values: peace, freedom, democracy, dialogue, equality, solidarity and secularism having as an ultimate goal to foster European citizenship by focusing not only on the common cultural values but also on the awareness of the cultural heritage which is particular to each EU member state, proposing, thus, an innovative approach to building European identity. It seeks to change the participants’ perspectives of the European Union by raising their awareness of its origins and enabling them to see it as the result of a historical effort which is rooted in lessons learned from two world wars.

Functional to the project’s objectives are five training activities for teachers and another five training activities for students which take place in Florence, Biarritz, Onesti, Valencia and Piraeus (the participant schools are IISS G. Peano, IISS Machiavelli and Liceo Castelnuovo in Florence, Le Lycée André Malraux in Biarritz, Colegiul National Grigore Moisil in Onesti, the IES Serpis in Valencia and Zanneio Peiramatiko Gymnasio in Piraeus). The project, which lasts three years (2016-2019) and is still in progress, enables teachers and students to research by themselves the 7 European values mentioned above in the history and memory of the European continent. During the training activities, students learn about the socio-political structure of the EU, understand its history and the way declared values and goals are pursued by its institutions as well as by important political figures (from each participant country i.e. Italy, France, Romania, Spain and Greece) whose contribution to the idea of European unity and their country’s course into the EU is enshrined in the documents provided by the Historical Archives of the EU. This is the recent memory pathway. Then, students turn to discover the profound way these values have made it through time in Europe and more specifically, in the towns where the participant schools are located, that is, they follow the deep memory pathway. By visiting monuments, museums or other sites, students find out the European values or “key words” hidden therein, that is, they discover the intangible European values in the tangible heritage and this is one of the most innovative features of this project: its methodology, the challenging journey that students take in order to “dig out” the European values, like “historians” from primary sources.

At the end of each of the five training activities for students, the latter are asked to produce, through the use of a whiteboard animation software programme called VideoScribe, two videos: one on the deep memory and another one on the recent memory. They are actually explainer videos. The students create animation videos made up of images, music and narration. The narration is based on a script, which is the most important part of the project as it is the outcome of creative collaboration between students from five member states. The script, which students write, emerges “from joint thinking, from significant conversations, and from sustained, shared struggles to achieve new insights by partners in thought” (John-Steiner, 2000, p. 3). Based on what they have seen and lived with regard to the values in the host country following a training activities program (designed by the host school) which aspires to offer students a variety of stimuli related to the values, students write a script and create a video. In preparing this video, students, besides their creative skills, have to use other high order skills such as critical thinking, problem solving and decision making. Although students are not experts and have not known their peers before the mobility, they have to cooperate and work together in order to reach a common goal, that is, a video which reflects their shared vision. John-Steiner (2000, p. 5), who studied the dynamics of creative collaboration, drawing on Vygotsky, stresses the dynamic interdependence of social and individual processes that leads to “co-construction of knowledge, tools, and artifacts”.

Focusing on aspects like shared visions and shared growth, John-Steiner (2000, p. 196) introduces the term ‘thought communities’ made up of expert thinkers whose objectives are to develop a shared vision as well as achieve jointly negotiated outcomes”. As a matter of fact, in her theory, John-Steiner (2000, p. 203) identifies four patterns of “thought communities”, one of which is integrative collaboration. In the latter which entails long term collaboration, interestingly, people who work together may even construct a common set of beliefs or ideology, which sustains them in periods of opposition or insecurity. What is important is that this project as a collaborative activity requires that students capitalise on each other’s resources and skills, depend on and become accountable to one another, meaning that young people from different national and cultural backgrounds must overcome their differences and work together in order to achieve a common goal. They understand how important dialogue, tolerance and cooperation are and they get an insight into how the European integration project actually works. It is a lifetime experience. As a matter of fact, the existing literature and studies provide evidence that university students who took part in Erasmus exchange programmes show “an improvement in their soft skills, such as knowledge of other countries, their ability to interact and work with individuals from different cultures, adaptability, foreign language proficiency and communication skills” (European Union, 2014, p.17). With regard to school partnership projects, international studies have shown that they contribute to the development of all individuals in the project team and more particularly, they are reported to “develop the relationships between students and teachers as well as between teachers and administrators, to increase parents’ interest in school, to let students participate in the process, to develop students’ self-confidence and to provide participants with the opportunity to recognize and investigate their own cultures” (Karakuş, Uyar, & Balbağ, 2017, p.33). According to Karakuş, Uyar, & Balbağ (2017, p.32), the activity area of Strategic Partnerships in the field of School Education, within which falls the project “Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo”, enables the education staff and high school students to recognize different cultures and to acquire the life skills necessary not only for personal development but also for becoming effective European citizens. In other words, they have a multilevel impact.

Writing a script: creating a new narrative for the European Union. Narrative and identity construction

A political community such as the EU, as already mentioned in the introduction, needs a true European identity, an integrative force that binds people together. It has also been asserted that “a major obstacle to the creation of a European identity is the limited amount of shared history, culture and tradition between Europeans” (Thorn, 2015). Identity, according to Anthony Giddens (1991, p.54), is constituted through the continuous formulation and re-formulation of narratives of the self. But, what is a narrative?

A narrative is nothing more than a story, a “spoken or written account of connected events” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2018). It can be found in literature, films, history textbooks, in the news, in the speeches of leaders, in the conversation of a community group, or in the telling of an individual life story (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012, p.76). Last but not least, it can be found in monuments, sites, collections conserved and managed by public and private bodies such as museums, libraries and archives.

In the Erasmus+ project “Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo”, as already mentioned, students are called to create two narratives by using primary sources which include documents from the Historical Archives of the European Union (speeches, interviews, etc.) and artifacts (works of art, objects, monuments, etc.) which, in a way, also become documents that narrate their own story. This approach to fostering European citizenship is deeply experiential, which is one of the added values of the project, as it engages students in a meaningful exploration of European history and culture and active construction of knowledge. Interestingly, by visiting the local monuments in the host country and looking into the values they incorporate, not only the “guest” students find out about the history and culture of the “Other” but what is equally important is that the students of the host country have the opportunity to understand and learn better the “Self”. In Piraeus, for instance, Greek students find out why a particular street is named “National Resistance” street or why a particular statue is put up in a square, etc. The use of primary sources provides students with a window on history which is much more interesting than history textbooks and gives them the tools to think critically about human societies (Sandwell, 2008, p.295). Thus, students come to realise that nearly every community has some type of monument or memorial commemorating wars, fallen heroes, etc. and that a war memorial is important as it does not only commemorate war. It is also a constant reminder that peace has a price and the values of freedom

and peace are not to be taken for granted. In addition, by visiting places such as the Athenian Agora, students understand that democracy has evolved since antiquity; however, it has always faced challenges and threats. In other words, students find out that these seven words are dynamic, their meaning can change according to the social, historic and cultural environment but still they express in all context the deep need and longing of mankind for a better society.

Hence, why are narratives so important? According to Jerome Bruner (as cited in Hammack & Pilecki, 2012, p.77), the narrative mode of thought is primary and we interpret the social world through the construction of narratives. For Bruner (2007), the richest learning experience comes from narratives.

When Giddens (1991, p.54) argues that identity is constituted through the continuous formulation and re-formulation of narratives of the self, he refers to the processes of personal identity construction. However, a similar process applies to collective identities which are continuously reconstituted in both individual and collective narratives (Mottier, 1999, p.4). According to Yuval-Davis (1997, p.43), “individual and collective identities are specific forms of narrative which constitute commonalities and differences between self and others”. Collective identities, therefore, stem from an ongoing process of construction and reproduction of shared understandings about a group’s self (Hülse, 1999, p.2). As Plummer (1995, p.19) explains, “stories mark out identities; identities mark out differences; differences define ‘the other’; and ‘the other’ helps structure the moral life of culture, group, and individual”. Thus, it can be argued that “national identities are narratives which are concerned with the drawing of boundaries between members of the nation and non-members, between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Mottier, 1999, p.4). These boundaries are closely related to political processes (Mottier, 1999, p.4). They often become major tools of ethnic projects (Yuval-Davis, 2001, p.61). Narratives construct identities and identity boundaries can serve as discursive mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion from a political community (Mottier, 2008, p.192). In this context, in an inclusive identity, the possibility exists that the Other may eventually become part of the Self whereas in an exclusive identity, this possibility does not exist (MacMillan, 2016, p.18).

In the existing literature, national identity has been identified as a barrier for European integration and as a source of Euroscepticism; especially, if citizens identify themselves with the nation exclusively (Weber, 2013, p.2). McLaren (2002, p.555) argues that citizens in Europe are “socialized to accept the power and sovereignty of the nation-state”. As a result, the transfer of loyalty or sovereignty is considered as a political and cultural threat (Weber, 2013, p.2).

At the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the idea that there is or should be compatibility between identity and nation-state is being challenged and contested in three ways: first of all, although nations are still the most important sources of political authority, nation-states as primary institutions of governance are being eroded; secondly, in many parts of Europe state-based national identities are challenged by regionalist identities and thirdly, international migration has amplified cultural diversity (Painter, 2002, pp.96-98).

Identities, therefore, are no longer considered as single but multiple, not as fixed but fluid, not as static but as transforming (Vincent, 2003, p.5). In this context, through a process of identification, a person can “orient himself or herself to one or more aggregate groups or collectivities (either real or imagined)” (European Commission, 2012, p.8). Ruth Wodak (2009, p.16) uses the term “multiple identities” and considers the identity of individuals and of groups to be layered. More particularly, Morley and Robins (as cited in Painter, 2002, p. 9) identify three scales of identity and argue that “to be European now is to be implicated in all three - continental, national and regional - and being European is about managing some amalgam of these”. Similarly, Leonard (1998, p. 30) claims that “if there is to be a true Euro-identity, it will be a supplement to national identity, and other regional, local and associational affiliations, not a replacement for them”. As the European Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, Tibor Navracsics (2016), admits in his speech titled ‘A crisis of identity-and how to tackle it’:

“contrary to what many people in Britain – as elsewhere in the EU – seem to feel that different identities are antagonistic, that a European identity threatens their national one, as well as their regional, local, cultural, ethnic, religious identities, [...] it is perfectly possible to construct a European identity that does not replace the ones we already have, but complements them and enhances the diversity, the traditions and the personality of each community”.

He sees himself as an original example of such an amalgam of identities, by being European, Hungarian and a citizen of his hometown. He further argues that without a European identity, the

European project will not survive and that federalist, artificial notions of a European identity imposed from above will not work. He stresses the need for another approach and points out “that the tool is right there in our hands and has been working extremely well for decades, referring to the Erasmus programme which since 1987 has helped mostly young people to develop a European identity that sits comfortably alongside their other identities” (Navracsics, 2016).

However, with regard to the effect of the Erasmus programme on the development of a European identity, there are contradictory studies (Bergmann, 2015, p.6). While most research findings show that the former has a positive effect on the latter, there are researchers who question the impact of the Erasmus on the construction of a European identity (Bergmann, 2015, pp.6-7). Theresa Kuhn (as cited in Bergmann, 2015, p.9), for instance, argues that the Erasmus programme is “preaching to the converted”, that is, it involves those students who are already interested in other cultures and have a more European or cosmopolitan way of thinking; thus, they are the ones who choose to apply for an Erasmus programme. Kuhn (as cited in Bergmann, 2016, p.24) does not, however, object to the fact that international interaction and communication can contribute to the establishment of a feeling of less exclusive nationalism. On the other hand, there are research findings (van Mol, 2013; van Mol & Timmermann, 2014; Mitchell 2015) which illustrate the effect an Erasmus experience has on the feeling of European identity and provide evidence that the students who spend time abroad feel more European than those who did not study in a foreign country (Bergmann, 2015, p.20-21).

In the Erasmus+ “Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo” the participants are mainly upper secondary students (with the exception of the students of Zanneio Peiramatiko Gymnasio who are lower secondary students) whose parents have consented to their children’s mobility. Since the project has not been completed yet (it will end in August 2019), there is no quantitative data available on its impact on the construction of a European identity. However, when a group of Greek students was asked to produce a photo diary from their mobility in Florence, their ten-day stay abroad was titled as a “life story”. The majority of the lower secondary students of Zanneio high school have not been in Europe before and cross-border travelling, knowing foreign cities, cultures, working and socialising with other Europeans at the age of fourteen has been an experience with an unprecedented affective load. Even those who have been abroad before admitted that this experience did not resemble any other type of travelling i.e. with their families abroad. Thus, it would be interesting to investigate the experiences of the participant students before and after this Erasmus (van der Weele, 2014, p.24). Such a research carried out by Mitchell (2015, p.345) with university students revealed that there is a clear relationship between Erasmus participation and enhanced European identity: identity change does occur during the sojourn and it persists even after the exchange has ended.

This identification with Europe is important because it can guarantee a further aspect of citizenship, namely citizenship as active participation in society. Citizens are expected to contribute to society and to participate in its political processes “if they have an emotional identification with the wider community, developed through cultural affiliation” (Painter, 2002: 96). Thus, legitimacy for the EU which has been greatly debated in this paper can be achieved.

The Erasmus+ “Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo” as an innovative approach to fostering European citizenship and identity: Discussion and Conclusions

Although it is difficult to measure identity and a quantitative assessment of the impact that the project “Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo” has had on secondary students with regard to the development of European identity is not available yet, the Erasmus+ project “Europa: ti vedo e ti vivo”, as its title suggests, offers young people from different national and cultural backgrounds the opportunity to “see and live” Europe and create their own narratives about the European Union, not through a top-down artificial approach, but bottom-up, based on authentic experiences of their own. During this project, which is still in progress and thanks to its values-based approach to citizenship, young Europeans get in touch with the intangible heritage of Europe, that is, the European values, which are embedded in the tangible heritage. Thus, these values cease being abstract notions but take shape and become concrete. Students come to realise that there are certain values that we share (peace, freedom, democracy, dialogue, equality, solidarity and secularism) and that despite our differences those that unite us are in reality more than those that divide us. They understand that these seven words are dynamic, their meaning can

change according to the social, historic and cultural environment but still they express in all context the deep need and longing of mankind for a better society. Through this values-based approach, the particular project encourages the appreciation of Europe's cultural heritage as a shared resource, raises young Europeans' awareness of the common history and values and reinforces a sense of belonging to a common European cultural and political space. By combining the deep and recent memory pathways, the students have the opportunity to discover not only the distant past but also, through the documents provided by the Historical Archives of the EU, the modern history of their countries and of the other partner countries. In other words, young people get a comprehensive overview of European history.

To sum up, the state of the art of this project is the use of primary sources as it provides students with a window on history which is not only more interesting than history textbooks and deepens their understanding. By getting in contact with primary sources, students form their own conclusions based on evidence and actively construct their own understanding and knowledge of European history. By comparing what they already know with what they learn and interacting with each other, young Europeans decide on their own what to preserve and what to challenge. This Erasmus+ project provides a space where European citizenship and identity can truly be developed, not aiming to replace national or regional identities in any way but by supplementing them. As already mentioned in this paper, education and culture can play a critical role for people to know better each other across borders and experience and be aware of what it means to be 'European'. Especially, the Erasmus+ programmes can keep the European community together as they offer young Europeans the opportunity to get to know each other, not only in all their diversity but also with all that they have in common. Through this project and the approach it adopts, young people are empowered to engage themselves and contribute to the building of a Europe based on solid foundations: values and lessons learned from the past. There is no doubt that the EU is a work still in progress and the concept of EU citizenship is likely to evolve further only thanks to programmes like the Erasmus+. Only education, training, mobility and cooperation across national borders can give Europeans the knowledge, skills and competences they need in order to develop not only as European citizens but as human beings in general.

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European Integration or Europeanization? Europe at a crossroads in 21st century: The civilizational approach of Gerald Delanty

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ABSTRACT

In this paper I explore the philosophical and theoretical discussion regarding the potential ontological guises and trajectories of Europe in the 21st century, placing emphasis on either the prevalent argument for European integration and intergovernmentality or the alternative civilizational approach of Europeanization, many 'Europes' and cosmopolitan citizenship through the seminal work of the prominent British sociologist and prolific writer Gerard Delanty.

Keywords: European integration, critical cosmopolitanism, Europeanization, civilizational approach

EUROPE AS A DISCOURSE STRATEGY AND THE QUESTION OF CITIZENSHIP

In the last decades, an interesting and lively philosophical and theoretical conversation has been held within political science academia regarding the thorny question of European identity, i.e. the specific route Europe should follow in the 21st century. As a matter of fact, this highly-qualified academic discussion concerns to a great extent the values and agendas that Europe could choose in the near future to make the dream of a 'common European house' come true. The scholarly debate and research is usually articulated around two main diametrically opposed arguments or approaches that reflect not only the two potential alternative perspectives on the architecture of European institutions, but also two totally different ontologies and phenomenologies regarding Europe as a socio-political and above all cultural project (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 1-27).

On the one hand, there is the argument of European integration and intergovernmentalism, so famous and dominant within the disciplinary ranks of traditional political science and conventional international relations theory. Consistent with this argumentation, Europe is perceived as a one-sided process. Ontologically and phenomenologically speaking, this means that Europe eventually leads to a unique socio-political and cultural identity. To put it in a nutshell, Europe looks like a huge European demo which is chiefly highlighted by the value of constitutional patriotism and moreover by the principle of European citizenship (Makris, 2018).

On the other hand, there is a sociological theory of society and especially a constructivist approach to Europeanization in which Europe is regarded as an open-ended, pluralistic, multifaced and therefore, phenomenologically speaking, contingent socio-political and most of all cultural procedure (Mikelis, 2017). When considered ontologically, this approach brings to light a kaleidoscopic Europe or the idea of a multiple Europe, full of identities, cultures, customs and traditions. From this viewpoint, Europe looks like the mythical Proteus. Thus, in this perspective, it is proper to speak about many 'Europes' (Delanty, 1995, p. 156). Without doubt, Europe is at a crucial crossroads. The European institutional and societal 'giant' seems like a Janus or a double-faced enormous entity which looks in two absolutely different directions. Metaphorically speaking, Europe seems like a Hercules who is at a historical point when critical decisions with far-reaching consequences must be made (Delanty, 2006).

According to the civilizational approach of Europeanization, Europe must not be seen as a mere intergovernmental venture but as an entire cultural phenomenon at the beginning of a new millennium. In this vein, Europe is no longer an institutional architecture, articulated around the spirit of Brussels, but is much more a collective cultural concept where her identity is determined by the dynamic process of European and global history itself (Delanty, 1995, pp. 16-114). According to Gerard Delanty, in this case it is appropriate to speak about many 'Europes' to the extent that we are looking at Europe from a global perspective. Since the end of the Cold War, the so-called 'little' Europe has been replaced step-by-step by a cosmopolitan and globalized Europe. So, if the new question concerns the confrontation

between North and South, then we are ready to speak about a post-Western Europe. At this point in his analysis, with an amazing prophetic tone, the British sociologist foresees the whole malaise of xenophobic nationalism and Eurosceptic populism that predominates the last decades within the rhetorical framework of European politics (Delanty, 1995, p. 156; Makris, 2018).

Since the mid-1990s, Delanty has formulated a very specific sociological theory about Europe in the meaning of Europeanization. From the very beginning, his entire argumentation, concerning either Europe or in particular the European Union (EU), is based on the theoretical position that both are not political and/or institutional phenomena but, first and foremost, a civilizational construction in the sense of a flexible cultural identity (Delanty, 2013). In that respect, Europe is always constructed and reconstructed throughout long-term European history (Delanty, 1995, p. 1). Hence, Europe, as a long historical process, signifies a complex multicultural venture that appears as an open-ended and ongoing process that could be properly identified with the notion of Europeanization. The defining feature of Delanty's approach of Europeanization is that Europe must not be identified in the sense of a political identity but as a cultural phenomenon. Therefore, in order to both analyze and define the European social ontology in the proper way, it is better to use the terminology of discourse analysis. Europe is more a discourse strategy, i.e. a complex body of ideas, ideals, customs and rhetorical schemes, than a tangible ensemble of political institutions (Delanty, 1995, p. 157).

Unquestionably, the end of the Cold War constitutes the turning point for old Europe. According to Delanty, Europeanization has been raised as a question exactly in order to signify the ontological potentialities of Europe in the new millennium. At the heart of this new European identity crisis the question of the nation state is posed and by extension the thorny question of nationalism (Delanty, 1995, p. 157; Delanty and Kumar, 2006). The idea of a cultural Europe is by definition opposite to the traditional idea of a nationalistic Europe. For Delanty, if the conventional approach of a nationalistic Europe has been lost forever beneath the tragic ruins of Totalitarianism (Arendt, 2004), then we owe it to ourselves to reinvent Europe as a post-national venture. The Balkan Wars throughout the 1990s have shown in a tragic manner the 'way out' of this historical impasse (Delanty, 1995, p. 158). As far as the British sociologist is concerned, the riddle regarding the construction of a new European identity in the 21st century could be solved through a critical, discursive, deconstructionist and reconstructivist reflection on the important notion of citizenship (Delanty, 1995, p. 159).

The reinvention of Europe as a post-national Europe in the post-Cold War era must be linked to a twofold procedure: i) a multi-cultural process at the level of European society and ii) a post-national citizenship process at the political level. Both processes are based on the reasonable abandonment of the chauvinistic norms of nation-state and nationalism (Delanty, 1995, p. 159). Delanty adopts here an anti-essentialist and therefore a post-foundational social ontology (Marchart, 2007; Marttila, 2015, pp. 3-6). In other words, he unconditionally accepts the ontological and ethical principles of cultural relativism as well as cultural pluralism. In a way, he shifts the theoretical center of gravity from ethno-culturalism to multi-culturalism (Delanty, 1995, p. 159). This is a very critical ontological transition which could be cited as a real paradigm shift. The ontological break always denotes an epistemological revolution and vice versa (Kuhn, 2012; Delanty, 2002, pp. 152-158). Europeanization as a civilizational approach can be understood only within the ontological, phenomenological and epistemological framework of anti-essentialism and post-foundationalism. Otherwise, it remains entrapped in the conventional wisdom of traditional political science and international political theory.

With a quasi-aphoristic rhetoric, Delanty claims that the thorny question of European identity in the 21st century can be properly perceived as a question of citizenship (Delanty, 1995, p. 160). More specifically, he supports the position that the critical stake in the new era of cosmopolitanism and globalization concerns our ability to create a post-national sort of citizenship (Delanty, 1995, p. 159; Delanty, 2002a, pp. 107-122). Undoubtedly, this is a difficult venture in a very risky era full of atavistic obsessions and primordial moods (Delanty and Kumar, 2006, pp. 1-4). In this step of his analysis, Delanty tries to underline the republican and democratic origins of his civilizational approach. Contrary to the nationalistic version of citizenship, the idea of democratic citizenship is rooted in the discursive territory of the French Revolution. Democratic citizenship does not concern nationality but rather the radical ideal of popular sovereignty (Delanty, 1995, p. 160). In fact, this kind of citizenship is based on the relevant ideal of active political participation (Delanty, 1995, p. 163). As Hannah Arendt has clearly shown, citizenship is a spatial phenomenon that presupposes the existence of a residential space. This is the ideal of Greek polis (Arendt, 2005, p. 170; Makris, 2017). Apart from residence and participation, Delanty posits as a crucial prerequisite of post-national citizenship the feature of cultural autonomy or cultural pluralism (Delanty, 2002b). Hence, post-national citizenship has a triple

character: i) residence, ii) democratic participation and iii) cultural pluralism (Delanty, 1995, p. 163; Delanty, 1997).

Drawing his inspiration from theories of citizenship, Delanty asserts that citizenship is one of the main spheres of democracy. At present, democratic citizenship concerns political participation in public affairs (Delanty, 2002, p. 47). By doing this, he uses democratic citizenship as an anti-essentialist base for the sake of social difference, cultural particularism and a so-called 'politics of voice' (Delanty, 2002a, p. 46). The theoretical project of democratic citizenship disengages the identity of the citizen from the problem of nationality. The central criterion of citizenship is no longer birth or blood but residence and a discursive identity politics (Delanty, 2002a, p. 67).

The spatial character of democratic citizenship, on the one hand, disconnects citizenship from nationality and, on the other hand, paves the way for a cosmopolitan and post-national kind of citizenship, especially within the context of Europe (Delanty, 2002a, p. 106). Post-national citizenship within the European context leads to a multilayered model of citizenship (local, subnational, supranational) in which both residence and participation constitute the pillars of European identity (Delanty, 2002a, pp. 120-122). This democratic-led model of European citizenship advances political equality and cultural difference beyond the typical scope of nation-state, creating the ontological, phenomenological and civilizational preconditions for a multi-leveled European public sphere (Delanty, 2002a, p. 132; Risse, 2015). Looked at from this specific point of view, we can clearly see that post-national Europe functions on different layers and levels by reducing social exclusion and political marginality (Delanty, 2002a, p. 136). In Cornelius Castoriadis' terms (Castoriadis, 1997, pp. 319-337), this civic-inspired model of cosmopolitan citizenship creates a discursive space of a radical imaginary in which political difference and cultural particularity can bring to the fore absolutely new ontologies of the Other (Makris, 2015; Makris, 2017a; Makris, 2018a).

Therefore, instead of a Habermas-inspired formalistic model of European citizenship, which concerns a European polity in the sense of a constitutional patriotism (Makris, 2018) and which privileges a route of European integration that is based on a strict republican European citizenship (Delanty, 1995, p. 1), Delanty explores in-depth an alternative radical democratic cosmopolitan and post-national model of European citizenship in which cultural and civilizational criteria dominate (Rumford and Buhari-Gulmez, 2014). From this (re)constructivist perspective that combines spatial and discursive methodologies (Delanty, 2007), Europe does not follow a concrete roadmap of predetermined integration steps but rather a dynamic, open-ended, contingent and sometimes very ambivalent route of ontological coexistence. Neither specific normative horizons nor concrete collective identities can identify for sure and eternally Europe's profile as a political entity or a *sui generis* modern polity. Europe, in the sense of Europeanization as a multi-cultural process, is perceived as a cosmopolitan and post-national Europe, i.e. a multi-cultural society (Delanty, 2005). It is apparent that, for the philosophical requirements concerning the construction of this theoretical model, Delanty uses the entire 'raw material' of the so-called cosmopolitan tradition (Delanty, 2009; Rumford, 2005).

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND CRITICAL COSMOPOLITANISM

This sociological approach concerning European identity perceives Europe as a dialectical society that is constructed from bottom to top (Roche, 2010). It concerns first and foremost Europe from below, contrary to the approach of European integration that sees Europe from above as an intergovernmental phenomenon within the institutional environment of the dominant political and bureaucratic elites of Brussels (della Porta and Caiani, 2007; Scalise, 2015). At first glance, it could be said that here there is a typical disciplinary confrontation between sociology and political science. However, this is not the proper explanation to the extent that the cosmopolitan, post-national and civilizational approach must be considered as an interdisciplinary interpretation of EU and European integration within a linguistic, discursive, poststructuralist and postmodern framework (Delanty, 2006a; Delanty, 2011; Delanty, 2012). Hence, Europe is perceived more as an ensemble of social transformations than as a one-sided political procedure (Immerfall and Therborn, 2010).

As far as Delanty is concerned, the question of European integration and especially the critical dilemma concerning European integration or Europeanization concern first and foremost the sociology of knowledge (Delanty, 2002, pp. 12-17). Both ontology and epistemology formulate a phenomenological field within which Europe emerges as a discursive strategy. Therefore, every possible answer to the thorny question of European integration as well as Europeanization presupposes the profound exploration of social knowledge itself. More specifically, the investigation of European

identity as a multi-cultural phenomenon in the 21st century presupposes the thorough examination of social theory in Europe today (Delanty, 2006a). At present, Delanty urges us to reexamine and in a sense to reinvent contemporary Social Theory as a New Critical Theory (Keucheyan, 2013, p. 32) or as a New Political Sociology (Rumford, 2000; Rumford, 2002, pp. 1-14). Paraphrasing the title of the book that he wrote jointly with Chris Rumford, it can be claimed that the rethinking of Europe presupposes the rethinking of social theory as such (Delanty and Rumford, 2005).

To put it differently, for Delanty the proper investigation of the European question in the new millennium presupposes the attentive exploration of the ontological, cognitive and epistemological shifts of both modernity and the social theory of modernity (Delanty, 2002, p. 17). Unquestionably, the ontological image of many 'Europes' and the theoretical project of multiple modernities both exemplify this new phenomenology and sociology of knowledge and Continental Philosophy in general in the last quarter of 20th century (Delanty, 2006b). Mainly, it concerns the intensive theoretical, cognitive and analytical presence of so-called cultural studies in the interdisciplinary domain of the social sciences (Barry, 2002; Smith, 2005; Storey, 2018). The model of culture as well as of cultural analysis has taken the place of traditional political and social analysis. According to Delanty, the cultural model gives us the capability to explore in-depth the European process beyond the conventional wisdom of an institutional procedure with a tangible bureaucratic surface but without a structural depth. In particular, the cultural model offers possibilities of an extensive discourse analysis of European phenomenology and rhetoric as a whole (Delanty, 2002, p. 18).

Insofar as the social, political and cultural transformations in Europe challenge the epistemological and cognitive contents of contemporary social theory, it could be said that European multi-culturalism enriches further and deeper the diversity of European social theory or the social theory about European integration (Delanty, 2006a, p. xvi). It goes without saying that the ontology of many 'Europes' as well as the phenomenology of multiple modernities have activated a real scientific revolution in the domain of the social sciences by chiefly reducing the traditional dominance of the grand theories and/or grand narratives (Delanty, 2006a, p. xvi). Increasingly in the last decades, the social sciences are experiencing the opening towards a geocultural academic and theoretical diversity that brings to light the epistemological power of the so-called 'middle range' social and political theories (Acharya and Buzan, 2010).

Therefore, this new epistemological and methodological shift in social theory in Europe or in social theory about Europe since the 1980s signifies the presence of cosmopolitan diversity at the heart of social knowledge itself (Delanty, 2006a, p. xvii). The classical social theory that was dominated for almost a century by the great intellectuals of traditional sociology and critical theory (Delanty, 2007a) now becomes an open terrain of new critical social theory approaches and relevant analytical methodologies without the predominance of a great thinker or a grand narrative. Cultural plurality has brought to light an amazing epistemological diversity. It goes without saying that a critical part of the background leading towards this cognitive opening has been played by feminist (Gandhi, 1998, pp. 81-101) and post-colonial studies (Ashcroft et al., 2006; Nayar, 2016). The project of European integration has been challenged first and foremost as being a Eurocentric venture (Ashcroft et al., 2013, pp. 107-108). By contrast, the idea of Europeanization is conceived, according to our new perspective, as an opening of Europe towards cosmopolitanism and globalization (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 7-10).

If a cosmopolitan kind of social theory could be developed in the 21st century, without doubt this should be a social theory concentrating on the major social transformations that are taking place both in Europe and on a global scale (Delanty, 2006a, p. xxiv). Paraphrasing Delanty's words, it could be claimed that, without a relation to such major and even historical transformations in European modernity and around the globe, a new critical social theory is meaningless (Delanty, 2006a, p. xxi). The reinvention of social theory primarily in relation to the critical challenge of Eurocentrism signals the rejuvenation of the social sciences as a whole and especially the regeneration of European modernity as such. The opening towards a post-Western Europe presupposes a parallel epistemological and geocultural opening towards a post-Western social theory. If there is a global modern condition or a post-European world, claims Delanty, then we strongly have a responsibility to lead contemporary social theory, particularly the branch that concerns EU and Europe in general, towards this new continent of knowledge or towards this new *locus classicus* of post-European ontology and epistemology (Delanty, 2006a, p. xxv).

Despite the fact that Europe – from its very first beginning until the current phase of the EU – is perceived as a gigantic economic, financial and monetary organization, the specific steps of European integration from the end of the World War II until the 21st century denote a huge social transformation beyond the initial intentions of its founding fathers. This is an interesting and enlightening paradox that

brings into focus the enormous social and cultural powers and propensities that are developed within the European social body. According to Delanty, this paradox, on the one hand, explains to a great extent the failures, shortcomings and predicaments of European integration as a political venture. It also connotes the real ontological potentialities of European society as a dynamic, inventive and imaginative discourse strategy (Delanty, 2002a, pp. 109-110).

The question of Eurocentrism is very critical with respect to the framework of European integration analysis, especially when it is connected to the relevant problems of xenophobic nationalism and Eurosceptic populism. Delanty poses the thorny question of Eurocentrism at the heart of his cosmopolitan studies project concerning EU and European integration. In this vein, he defines his approach as critical cosmopolitanism and wants to show how Europe as a historical heritage is permeated by different cultural, social and political forces which are either cosmopolitan or anti-cosmopolitan. Critical cosmopolitanism must be seen as an interdisciplinary and, by definition, theoretical framework from within which the prolific British sociologist places the question of Eurocentrism next to that of transnational analysis. To be a critical cosmopolitan in regard to European integration means first and foremost to be an open-minded, prudent and dialogical social analyst. A critical perspective opens Europe up beyond herself towards the ontologies of the Other. For Delanty, being critical denotes also an ethical and normative stance reducing the possible risks of cultural relativism and particularism. It is obvious that every social analysis presupposes a minimum of humanistic universalism. Critical cosmopolitanism not only reduces Eurocentrism, but it at the same time gives Europe the chance for both self-assessment and self-knowledge. Once again, the contributions of feminism and post-colonial studies are absolutely significant for this European critical and broad-minded self-reflexivity (Delanty, 2018, pp. 72-75).

The main advantage of critical cosmopolitanism when compared to even the most radical post-colonial approaches is seen in relation to the self-reflexive forces that traverse the European heritage. This immanent European self-critique is the reason why Delanty finally keeps his distance from the mainstream post-colonial theories (Delanty, 2018, p. 76). On this point, he refers to the strong European tradition of a 'radical Enlightenment' from within which European colonialism has been challenged from the very first moment. In this regard, a European-led critical cosmopolitanism opens up the threshold of an honest and dialogic conversation between 'the West and the Rest' and beyond the conventional analytical categories of superiority and inferiority. For Delanty, critical cosmopolitanism properly prepares the soil that will allow us to clearly see the European integration process in the cultural terms of Europeanization. As he explicitly points out, both critical cosmopolitanism and transnationalism give Europe a unique chance to have a bold dialogue with other cultures, and first of all within the European context. In accordance with this approach, Europe continues its path in a long historical arc, keeping her eyes open towards both universalism and particularism (Delanty, 2018, pp. 77-83).

RETHINKING THE EU OR THE METATHEORETICAL QUESTION OF EUROPEANIZATION

In Delanty's lexicon, Europeanization must be seen first and foremost as a conflict of cultural interpretations (Delanty, 2013, p. 287). On the one hand, this radical approach reduces the problem of Eurocentrism to the minimum while, on the other, enriches the theoretical debate about EU and European integration with the ontological and epistemological concepts of critical cosmopolitanism. This means that culture is not a closed ontological or normative entity or, in other words, a system of common values. It is rather an open field of conflicting interpretations in the sense of being a cultural threshold in which the meaning of the public sphere comes as the result of a discursive and dialogical confrontation.

It is apparent here, as we have analytically seen above, that critical cosmopolitanism is based on the model of a civic cosmopolitanism where democracy is perceived as a spatial system of political participation and cultural difference. Therefore, as Delanty explicitly claims, Europeanization must be seen as a process of the creation of a European polity without, however, involving a coherent political, social and cultural identity. To put it simply, for him, Europeanization is a process consisting of the characteristics of difference, conflict and self-problematization. The cultural model for Europe concerns an open-ended dialogic procedure of critique and reflection. No doubt, as has been pointed out earlier, Europeanization, as a pure civilizational phenomenon, is seen as an anti-essentialist process full of interrogations. Delanty defines this cultural model of Europeanization in to a threefold manner:

i) normative content, ii) cognitive forms and iii) imaginary significations. Thus, it is obvious that, contrary to those who fiercely criticize cultural relativism, this is a moderate kind of constructivism in which the deconstructive elements are combined in a balanced way with the features of normativity (Delanty, 2013, pp. 288-292).

Europeanization is developed as a difficult and long-term procedure of major social transformations on the triple basis of either universalism/particularism or unity/diversity or integration/differentiation. For Gerand Delanty, European heritage has inherently these pluralistic characteristics of conflicting forces, discourses and interpretations (Blokkeer and Delanty, 2010). Contrary to the pessimists and especially the Eurosceptics, he strongly believes that this pluralistic, cosmopolitan, post-national, anti-essentialist, post-foundational and constructivist immanence must be optimistically considered as the comparative advantage that of Europe has in the sense of an entire ontological and historical entity (Delanty, 2006c). Taking this assumption seriously into account, Europe must be analyzed from within the epistemological and methodological framework of an interdisciplinary social theory instead of with a one-dimensional approach like the perspective on European integration coming usually from the ranks of traditional political science and/or international relations.

Delanty and Rumford have outlined this theoretical framework in an excellent treatise about Europeanization they published in 2005 (Delanty and Rumford, 2005). In this enlightening book, they describe Europeanization as an open-ended social and cultural process which is taking place within the wider historical context of globalization (Rumford, 2016). In their opinion, only a social theory has the analytical power to appropriately express the deepest social transformations beneath the institutional surface of the EU. Social theory can provide us at least three level of analysis: i) the normative level that is always necessary when the discussion concerns a societal phenomenon, ii) the cultural level which reveals the broader transformations of European modernity itself and iii) the spatial level, which is very critical of the process of Europeanization as a globalization effect, to the extent that it demonstrates European spatiality and/or European social space beyond functionalist approaches which concern themselves with a supposedly homogenized European society (Rumford, 2008; Rumford, 2014). It is no coincidence that these two eminent British sociologists dare to speak about a meta-theoretical approach which is eventually defined as a constructivist theory of society (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 2-6).

Within this specific and unquestionably radical theoretical framework, Europeanization takes on a quite different meaning compared to the conventional terms of European integration. From the very beginning, this framework also clarifies that Europeanization is not so much about the interactions that are taking place between Brussels and national states as it is about the placement of Europe in the global context. To summarize, this new concept of Europeanization could be specified as follows:

- A tendency to go beyond European institutionalism towards the new social transformations;
- A strong and clear concern about the cultural factor of European processes;
- An eager awareness of the conflicting interpretations and/or perspectives within the European heritage;
- A big challenge concerning the simplistic approaches to the EU from the side of the mainstream disciplines of political science and/or international relations;
- Above all, of course, a conscious recognition that Europeanization is just a dynamic part of the broader process of globalization (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 6-7).

In this regard, Europeanization overcomes even the question of transnationalism by paving the way for a 'deprovincialization' of Europe or, to put it simply, for an opening of Europe to the rest of the world (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, p. 7). It is worth noting here that this approach to the EU does not see the creation of Europe as a step to be taken against the economic dangers of globalization but as a parallel phenomenon within the global context. Hence, Delanty and Rumford build an interdisciplinary social theory of Europe in the sense of an Europeanization process placed within the wider environment of globalization. Only in this sense is the ontological and epistemological rejection of the conceptual and institutional architecture of European integration understandable. What is at stake here is neither the transnationalization of state nor the integration of societies. The critical point is to grasp Europe in pure societal, cultural and global terms. Both Delanty and Rumford believe that this widening of the European perspective is an integral part of the long-term European heritage (Delanty, 2013; Delanty 2108). After the end of the Cold War (1989 onwards), step by step Europe, on the one hand, is liberated from her previous Western 'straightjacket' and, on the other, she returns back (but obviously as a 'back to the future') towards a global orientation, and not naturally in the sense of European colonialism, but rather in the spiritual and civilizational manner of the so-called 'radical Enlightenment'. Without doubt, Kantian cosmopolitanism explicitly echoes this outward-looking European mentality and can be

claimed as a reasonable nomenclature for their steady argument about a post-Western Europe (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 7-9).

According to the jargon of classical sociology, Europeanization could be considered as an integration process but not as a systemic or a functional one. By contrast, it can be seen as a kind of social integration in a broader sense. In this case, integration does not mean homogenization but an open-ended and dynamic process of major social transformations within a global context. In their own words, “social integration (...) refers to integration through the media of cultural and social structures” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, p. 10). From this point of view, integration and differentiation, unity and diversity, and universalism and particularism are articulated and disarticulated in perpetuity alongside each other and alongside European phenomenology itself (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, p. 11). By strongly connecting Europeanization with this radical constructivist social theory, Delanty and Rumford conceive Europe as a self-reflexive process in the sense of a self-creation or a discursive strategy that brings to the fore the European social spaces as really emergent ontologies. It goes without saying that here is detected a Castoriadean perception about the way in which a society is created and recreated ad infinitum as a radical social imaginary or as a social magma exploding ex nihilo and unstoppably (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 16-17; Castoriadis, 1997, pp. 290-318).

Summarizing and outlining the basic characteristics of constructivist social theory, Delanty and Rumford provide the following guidelines for further analysis:

- The constructivist approach to Europe in the sense of the Europeanization process denotes first and foremost the self-transformative and self-creative forces and capacities of European societies;
- This assumption brings into focus the abyssal potentialities (for the best but unfortunately sometimes for the worst) of the European social imaginary;
- This approach emphasizes further the discursive dimension of European ontology, that is to say the increasing significance of public spheres, cultural tendencies and democratic demands in the construction of the so-called European social space;
- In addition, Europeanization is perceived now as an ongoing societal interpretation. This feature echoes the various multi-cultural and ideological features of the living European heritage (Delanty, 2006d);
- Europeanization connotes at the same time a transformation of the modern nation state. The traditional institutional approaches are no longer enough to explain efficiently the changes at the level of the national state (Delanty and Kumar, 2006a);
- In cognitive and discursive terms, Europeanization signifies also a really productive explosion of conflicting interpretations, narratives and discourses about Europe in the future ‘to come’ (Derrida, 2006);
- At the end, as far as constructivist social theory is concerned, Europeanization denotes the transformation of modernity itself. Apart from the conception of many ‘Europes’ or the approach of multiple modernities, this perspective discloses, on the one hand, the dynamic character of European modernity and, on the other hand, the different and numerous views about modernity that are included and coexist within the European heritage as a whole (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 17-20).

TOWARDS A POST-WESTERN EUROPE? THE CIVILIZATIONAL APPROACH

In fact, the theoretical perspective oriented towards a European civilizational constellation signifies the actualization of the constructivist problématique concerning the argument for a post-Western Europe (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 28-49). The position favoring a European civilizational constellation is based on the civilizational approach (Delanty, 2006e, p. 57). From this standpoint, Europe is perceived as a pluralistic ontological, cultural and discursive phenomenon. According to Delanty and Rumford, it is proper to speak about many ‘Europes’ in the sense of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2000). The civilizational approach leaves aside the traditional and conventional Western-centric view concerning not only the EU and Europe, but European civilization as a historical, continental, geographical and regional whole. By civilizational approach, they mean a ‘family’ of European societies that are firmly articulated and rearticulated around three at least civilizations: i) the Western Judaeo-Christian, ii) the Russian-Slavic and iii) the Islamic-Turkish. Despite the fact that the European cultural heritage has been influential largely through the Judaeo-Christian civilization, describing in

this way its dominant Western orientation, Delanty and Rumford assert that the entire European civilization is the historical result of a dynamic political and societal unity via a clear cultural difference (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 36-37).

Contrary to a culturally homogenized Europe, Delanty perceives the European ontology and phenomenology as a constellation of civilizational encounters. Leaving aside the epistemological conception of instrumental rationality, he advances an idea of a Europe that is constituted as a civilizational complex. The entire cognitive and reflexive analysis concerns not a one-dimensional European civilization but, by contrast, a pluralistic civilizational constellation developing through cultural encounters, communicative exchanges and constant discursive borrowings and learning. Methodologically speaking, the civilizational approach must be seen as a hermeneutical and interpretative analysis concerning the European entity as a whole (Delanty, 2006e, p. 47).

Delanty defines further this theoretical approach of a new and/or critical cosmopolitanism by using the notion of critical hermeneutics. It is well-known that critical hermeneutics draws its inspiration from the Habermasian communicative and critical theory of an emancipated rationality (Makris, 2018). Delanty uses this hermeneutical approach of Europe in order to move his radical analysis a step further towards the recognition of an inherently plural European modernity where the European heritage is the outcome of a constant 'travel' along the route of non-European sources (Delanty, 2006e, pp. 50-52). Paraphrasing Jacques Derrida, it could be argued here that the European heritage is culturally and discursively shaped always through an encounter with the Other, i.e. the constitutive outsider (Makris, 2015; Makris, 2017a; Makris, 2018a). Therefore, the civilizational approach concerns first and foremost cultural transmission (Delanty, 2006e, p. 52). By viewing ourselves through the eyes of the other, we finally formulate our identity via a continuous cultural translation. Delanty dares to support on this point the position that "culture is itself a mode of translation" (Delanty, 2006e, p. 55). In this vein, European modernity takes on the ontological, phenomenological and symbolical character of a cultural encounter, a transmission or translation between self and other. By the same token, globalization can be considered as a process of globality or, in other words, as the 'principal motor' of European heritage as such (Delanty, 2006e, pp. 54-55).

In Delanty's view, the civilizational perspective of Europe, taking seriously into account all these aspects mentioned above, could be summarized as follows: First, Europe is not a fixed cultural organism but, as an absolutely dynamic and liquid entity, consists of several civilizations interconnected to each other. Second, the historical diversity of the European civilizational constellation reflects the multiple dimensions, routes and trajectories of modernity within Europe. Hence, it is reasonable to speak about many 'Europes' or multiple modernities within the European venture. Bearing in mind this specific approach, Europe is something more complex and sophisticated than the West. Whereas in the latter case, the center of analytical gravity essentially is entrapped in the self-image of European integration, in the former case, instead of a mere economic and institutional combination between nation states and intergovernmentalism, Europe is conceived as a juxtaposed cultural entity full of civilizational encounters, exchanges, interpenetrations, interactions, diffusions and above all cross-fertilizations. In Delanty's words, "modernity in Europe must be regarded as both multiple and hybrid" (Delanty, 2006e, pp. 54-56).

The radical idea of a post-Western Europe is located in the heart of civilizational analysis. More specifically, as Delanty and Rumford point out, at present Europeanization draws our attention to the progressive idea of a post-Western Europe. Post-Western Europe is no longer a singular identity but, as we have seen above, is a whole civilizational constellation; a multiple modernity; a plural entity. In the final analysis, Europe is perceived as an ontological 'threshold' in which the phenomenon of culture is formed as a process of unity through differentiation (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, p. 49). For Delanty, the critical turning point concerning Europeanization as a post-Westernization procedure is the historical/symbolical fact of the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequently the end of the Cold War (1989 onwards). Seen from this perspective, Europe is no longer a simple geopolitical component of the West but is instead transformed into a multi-faced phenomenology that runs between East and West. Now Europe looks like a Janus. It can reasonably be argued that Europe seems like an ontological face with two very clear facades (Delanty, 2006f, pp. 1-2). The main argument for the civilizational approach could be articulated as follows: Europeanization does not mean that Europe is ceasing to be Western but that Europe must no longer be understandable only within the conception of Westernization and/or Americanization (Delanty, 2006f, pp. 3-4).

By articulating the radical position that Europe is taking more and more a post-Western shape, in essence Delanty transforms his argument about unity in differentiation into a strong critical sociological approach about an inter-civilizational European perspective. This means not only that we

do leave aside the conventional wisdom of an international (i.e. interstate) or transnational (i.e. intergovernmental EU) Europe, but that it is necessary to move imaginatively towards the assumption of an inter-civilizational European heritage. Critical to this shift from a geopolitical to a cultural analysis is the fact of European enlargement to the Balkan zone. From now on, Europe must be seen as an inter-civilizational constellation amongst at least three regional and cultural spaces: a Western Europe, an Eastern Europe and a South-eastern Europe. However, the inter-civilizational model of 'three Europes' does not mean that Europe is moving away from her Western heritage. By contrast, it means that Europe, via the Europeanization process, is returning (see 'back to the future') to her multiple and plural 'Self'. But this time, this multiple 'Self' presupposes the presence of 'Other'. The inter-civilizational character of Europe, Delanty claims, strongly refutes the well-known argumentation for a clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1997). Contrary to Huntington, this is an approach which opens up the ontological, phenomenological and discursive opportunity for an inter-cultural dialogue in a post-Western world. From this point of view, the inter-civilizational approach can be regarded as a new radical theory about cultural diplomacy in the 21st century. In a sense, the inter-civilizational approach brings Europe once more, but this time without the inhumane meaning of colonialism, back to the wider context of globality. In this case, globality does not mean the traditional Western universalism or a Western type of globalization. Delanty terms this perception of Europeanization and post-Westernization a post-universalistic cosmopolitanism. The inter-cultural dialogue is nothing but the basic theoretical and practical vehicle of this post-universalistic cosmopolitanism (Delanty, 2009, pp. 241-262).

Blokker and Delanty assert that the European integration project, ontologically and symbolically speaking, 'locks up' Europe in a Cold War image that is now absolutely out of the date. The question of European identity is no longer about East and West but is a step beyond this binary fallacy towards a multiple and inter-civilizational Europe. More specifically, they support the view that Europe is now increasingly perceived, especially in the interdisciplinary fields of both New Political Sociology and Critical Social Theory, as a reflexive narrative full of conflicting interpretations. This critical hermeneutic approach to Europe brings to the fore, as an alternative to Western Europe, the idea of a post-Western Europe. In their words, the emphasis of theoretical and empirical analysis is on "a recognition of the cultural plurality and the pluri-civilizational background of Europe" (Blokker and Delanty, 2010, p. 117). As we have seen earlier, this critical assumption, on the one hand, changes the cultural content of the European ontological heritage itself, and, on the other hand, helps us to renew traditional political and social theory by using the epistemological image of 'paradigmatic shift' (Kuhn, 2012). In other words, the critical reflection of the phenomenology of both the EU and West pushes us more and more towards a critical reflection on classical political and social theory (Blokker and Delanty, 2010, p. 118). This means that now, in the face of a completely new ontology and phenomenology of Europe, we need absolutely new conceptions of theoretical and empirical analysis. We need a new 'sociological imagination' as the strong cognitive, epistemological and methodological foundation of this New Critical Theory (Mills, 2000).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

New Critical Theory and Cosmopolitan Imagination

From the mid-1990s onwards, the thorny question of European integration has ceased to be a critical, theoretical and empirical stake only for mainstream political scientists and specialists of international relations, and has gradually become a social and/or cultural question par excellence. Especially, as can be seen in the thriving relevant literature, Europe as a whole venture has been treated not so much as an institutional and/or political process but chiefly as a complicated and multi-dimensional social and cultural phenomenon. From the very beginning, and as has been enhanced further by the quick development of so-called Cultural Studies, social scientists and mainly political sociologists formed a radical conceptual, cognitive, epistemological and methodological approach which strongly dominates the argument of a European civilizational constellation (Delanty, 2009, pp. 8-9)

Drawing its inspiration from the new critical theories, Delanty's inter-civilizational approach about the EU, Europe and European heritage has made evident that the intergovernmental idea of Europe has been placed into under question. To put it simply, it could be said that, according to this approach, Europe is perceived more and more as a discursive strategy which gets deconstructed, constructed and reconstructed via a constant and dynamic hermeneutic and narrative procedure (Delanty, 1995, p. 157). It is obvious that the crucial question regarding European social and cultural identity has increasingly

replaced the conventional interrogation about the institutional architecture of European integration at the first ranks of relevant bibliography. Especially in the disciplinary field of new and/or critical social theory, even given the gloomy conjuncture of authoritarian intergovernmentalism, Euroscepticism, right-wing populism and Brexit (Makris, 2018), during the last decades there has formed a systematic approach concerning contemporary Europe that considers ontological and phenomenological phenomenon as a whole, and beyond the theoretical naivety about European integration as a supposed teleological, deterministic and therefore nearly monolithic and one-sided political project and/or direction (Delanty, 1995, p. 159).

Initially, the entire academic discussion focused on the significant question of European citizenship (Delanty, 1995, p. 162) in the sense of a post-national citizenship that goes beyond birth and nationality giving particular emphasis to the matters of residence, participation and cultural plurality (Delanty 2002, pp. 125-136; Delanty 2002a, pp. 152-158; Delanty, 2006c, pp. 41-43). In a sense, from the year 2000 onwards the academic debate about the EU, European integration and Europe in general has virtually been transformed into a sub-question of the broader theme of globalization and globality. From this specific point of view, step by step, the conventional concept of European integration has been substituted by the dynamic, open-ended, ambiguous and contingent notion of Europeanization (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 1-27). It must be noted here that, if there is something remarkable in this new social and cultural approach of Europe, it concerns first and foremost a paradigmatic shift that has taken place within the ranks of the contemporary social sciences. Usually, we speak about either a New Political Sociology of Europe (Rumford, 2002) or, in more radical terms, about a constructivist theory of European society (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 12-20) or, in a broader disciplinary framework, of a critical cosmopolitanism (Delanty, 2012a, pp. 43-45).

Insofar as the theoretical approach concerning European integration is focused on the political, state, institutional and, above all, inter-governmental architecture of the EU, Europeanization puts the emphasis on the societal and cultural dimensions of Europe as a historical, ontological and phenomenological ensemble. In this regard, the Europeanization approach could be considered as a disciplinary branch of so-called historical sociology (Delanty and Isin, 2003). To make a long story short, the former continues to explore the EU from the viewpoint of it being a nearly metaphysical and thus transcendental political and institutional unity, whereas the latter investigates the European heritage from an open-ended perspective in the sense of an ongoing civilizational process which in the final analysis is post-foundationally oriented towards social and cultural diversity (Delanty, 2010, pp. 71-84). To put it simply, in the first case the EU is studied from above (i.e. a quasi-theological approach) whereas in the second case Europe is approached from below (i.e. a secular and republican approach).

As a matter of fact, according to the aforementioned, two quite different, and in most cases, clearly opposite, conflictual and competing theoretical approaches have been formed in the last decades around the analysis of the European phenomenon. On the one hand, there is a well-known approach that is steadily promoted by the disciplinary area of mainstream political science emphasizing the basic features of European intergovernmentalism. This is the famous and academically speaking dominant disciplinary field of 'European Studies', according to which intergovernmentalism "treats states, and national governments in particular, as the primary actors in the integration process" (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergovernmentalism>). On the other hand, as we have seen earlier, there stands an entire approach that is coming straight from the interdisciplinary area of poststructuralist and postmodern-inspired social and political theory which chiefly advances the local, the subnational, the transnational, the regional, the global, the multi-cultural and, above all, the cosmopolitan aspects of European ontology (Delanty, 2000; Delanty and Turner, 2011; Makris, 2018b).

Amongst the most eminent thinkers of the Europeanization process is undoubtedly the British sociologist and professor at the University of Sussex Gerard Delanty. Since 1995, Delanty has been exploring in-depth the entire epistemological context of the so-called 'public sociologies' of the contemporary era, pointing out that "the cosmopolitan turn in citizenship represents an important subject for public sociology; it draws attention to the existence of social relations that are not primarily shaped by the nation-state. One of the main contributions such a sociology can make is to examine the impact of global developments on the lives of individuals" (Delanty, 2006c, p. 49). This 'cosmopolitan turn' brings to the fore the phenomenon of cosmopolitan imagination. Paraphrasing the famous expression of C. Wright Mills about the 'sociological imagination' (Mills, 2000), Delanty defines 'the social' in the global age within a four-dimensional framework:

- i) 'the social' is analyzed on the ontological and phenomenological basis of cultural difference and plurality;

- ii) ii) the ‘cosmopolitan moment’ combines the local with the global aspect of society (see glocalism and glocalization);
- iii) iii) the territorial space of the nation-state is displaced by a new type of social space which is transnational and characterized by the spatiality of cosmopolitan borders (Rumford, 2008; Rumford, 2014);
- iv) iv) to the extent that this kind of ‘social’ paves the way to a new kind of political community (see ‘the political’), the republican morality is replaced by a global ethics which emphasizes the elements of care, rights and hospitality (Delanty, 2009, p. 7; Makris, 2015; Makris, 2017a; Makris, 2018a).

However, as far as Gerard Delanty is concerned, this flourishing new academic revival of cosmopolitanism (Delanty, 2012a, p. 41-43), particularly in the case of a European cosmopolitanism or a theory regarding a cosmopolitan Europe (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, pp. 184-195), no longer concerns the Jürgen Habermas-like universalistic cosmopolitanism or the David Held-inspired cosmopolitanism of a global governance or even the case of the national cosmopolitanism of Will Kymlicka. Drawing his theoretical inspiration more from the postmodern sociology of the famous German sociologist Ulrich Beck, Delanty refers to a critical, radical, constructivist and almost hybrid cosmopolitanism which has greatly affected by the globalization process. In this respect, the defining feature of Europeanization is not merely the European cultural mix in the age of globalization but the conscious consideration of the ontological, phenomenological, civilizational and cultural plurality as the constituent component of Europe as an entire social phenomenon (Delanty, 2006b, p. 366).

In 2006, in a very important collective volume concerning the crucial relationship between Europe and Asia, Gerard Delanty and Ulrich Beck develop further and in a very detailed way the key concepts surrounding the cosmopolitan idea of post-Western Europe (Beck and Delanty, 2006; Delanty, 2009, pp. 241-245), that is to say a Europe considered from a cosmopolitan perspective or, in other words, a European modernity reconsidered at the highest deconstructive level of European ontological phenomenology. In this seminal chapter, it can be clearly seen that Europeanization does not simply concern the strict globalization effect but Western modernity as such. From this standpoint, what is really at stake is not anymore the Europeanization process itself but the complicated and multi-dimensional way that contemporary Europe is rapidly changing as a major social and cultural phenomenon in the 21st century. Therefore, it is no coincidence that outstanding thinkers such as Beck and Delanty are perceived as sociological pioneers who thoroughly explore the role and significance of Asia and especially China both in Europeanization and in globalization processes (Delanty, 2006f).

“With the spread of Western civilization throughout the world”, Delanty writes emphatically, “that civilization has ceased to be Western, but has become globalized. It is also ceased to be specifically European. One of the consequences of the globalization of Western civilization is that there is nothing essentially distinctive about the West in a cultural sense” (Delanty, 2006f, p. 1). As Europe becomes enlarged and moves eastwards, Europeanization has been transformed into a long-term changing course for Western modernity itself. European integration did not lead Europe to a transcendental state of homogenization but, by contrast, opened up the possibility for the creation of the so-called many ‘Europes’ entity, i.e. the ontological and phenomenological potentiality of ‘multiple modernities’ first of all within the European context. In this vein, the European crisis of today and the subsequent phenomena of Euroscepticism and right-wing populism could be seen as the integral ideological and rhetoric part of this hard and sometimes ‘barbarian’ controversy (see the refugee crisis) over the empirical and discursive meaning of Europe in the turbulent era of globalization (Delanty, 2006f, p. 2).

Delanty, with theoretical courage, dares to claim that eventually Europeanization signifies the end of both the Westernization and Americanization of postwar Europe (Delanty, 2006f, p. 4). However, as he strongly clarifies, this means neither anti-Americanism nor a gradual disengagement from NATO but rather a new historical phase of self-understanding or, to put it differently, of a self-problematised European identity which is “no longer exclusively determined by the relation with the United States” (Delanty, 2009, p. 245). To sum up, Delanty and Beck outline the Europeanization process by emphasizing four major developments which are closely connected with the phenomenon of European cosmopolitanism:

- First, contrary to the mainstream theories of European integration which advance the notion of a supra-state, Delanty and Beck provide the idea of a mixed polity where Europeanization transforms both state power and national sovereignty. In conventional terms, this could be considered as a reflexive or a social form of integration.

- Second, the ontological existence of this European mixed polity does not automatically imply a single European society. By contrast, it signals the advent of different or multiple societies and identities that are articulated around common concerns and common modes of communication.
- Third, Europeanization is understandable only within the broader framework of globalization. In this respect, Europeanization is no longer a rigorous political bulwark against globalization but just “an instance of globalization”. As we have seen above, Europe now seems more like an interface with undefined boundaries or a threshold rather than a strictly enclosed region.
- Last but not least, Europe, as a geopolitical phenomenon, has no longer one centre but several. By the same token, Delanty and Beck speak about many ‘Europes’. In fact, Europe is seen as a wider geopolitical space where quasi-centres and quasi-peripheries are organically interconnected, and interpenetrate and interact with each other (Beck and Delanty, 2006, pp. 12-14).

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Enlargement Costs

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LSE IDEAS

Ultimately, among the most deleterious sociopolitical legacies of the Global Financial Crisis must be included the waxing distrust of authority and institutions, the unexpectedly volatile and emotional inputs by electorates in democratic politics and the ushering in of a period of chaotic global change holding the prospect of a more nationalistic or even violent future. According to Donald Cameron Watt international history has its roots in ‘disaster studies’¹ and its purpose lies not only in examining the history of diplomacy and the international relations of nation states but also in ‘comprehending ... the strategic, economic and sociological aspects of international developments’.² Perhaps the lens of international history with its almost forensic approach to examining the convergence and effects of complex and dynamic historical events can provide of a key to unraveling and appraising the confluence of the long-term forces that have shaped the predicament the European Union (EU) is facing right now.

This chapter will reflect on how the EU arrived at a juncture of deep existential crisis at the heart of which lies a tangled web of unfulfilled expectations and a perception that it lacks accountability and democratic legitimacy. In doing so, it will trace briefly, the origins of the EEC, it will outline how enlargement became a crucial tool in widening European integration and unifying the continent that succeeded in creating the world’s largest economy encompassing 28 countries and nearly half a billion people – an enviable success. It will end by looking at the issues, including enlargement, that have conspired to tarnish its appeal and indicate the most problematic areas for the survival of the European project.

Since the financial crisis of 2007 the world has become more fragile. The economic effects of the crisis have been patched up but not fixed and have infected democratic politics.³ The hope that underscored Fukuyama’s *End of History*⁴ thesis that the spread of liberalism and democracy would be unstoppable now appears to be hopelessly idealistic, as China and Russia prove reluctant to adopt the values of a world they had no input in making.⁵ The rise of human rights regimes, one of the main achievements of the post-1945 world order, seems to have come at a halt. For Sam Moyn, the aspiration to sustain international justice is *The Last Utopia*.⁶

From 2016, the world has been undergoing unprecedented volatility and uncertainty of the kind it has not experienced since 1945. The international relations rulebook happens to be being torn apart by a resurgence of nationalism, authoritarianism and terrorism. Trade wars are here..⁷ Multilateralism is in retreat or at any rate going into hibernation as it is ditched in favour of an unprincipled unilateralism.⁸ Russia’s revisionism can have the potential to severely destabilise the ‘old continent’ by taking advantage of the isolationist impulses of the US and by using ghost social media accounts and fake news to subvert democratic politics.⁹ The cornerstones of international cooperation, stability and

¹ Donald Cameron Watt, *What about the People? Abstraction and Reality in History and the Social Sciences* (Inaugural Lecture, LSE, London, 1983).

² Donald Cameron Watt, ‘What is Diplomatic History?’, *History Today*, 35:7, 1985, 34.

³ Philippe C Schmitter, *The Crisis of the Euro, the Crisis of the European Union, and the Crisis of Democracy in Europe*, in Ferenc Mészlivetz and Jody Jensen (eds), *Reframing Europe’s Future: Challenges and Failures of the European Construction*, (London: Routledge, 2014), 181–188.

⁴ Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’ *The National Interest*, 16, 1989, 3-18.

⁵ Richard Sakwa, *Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order*, (Cambridge: CUP, 2017); Alexander Lukin, *China and Russia: The New Rapprochement*, (London: Polity Press, 2018).

⁶ Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*, (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 2010.

⁷ *The New Yorker*, 19 September 2018; *The Financial Times*, 19 September 2018.

⁸ Matthew Willner-Reid, ‘The Rise of Referendums: A Death Sentence for Multilateralism?’, *The International Spectator*, 53:2, 2018, 1-20;

⁹ Roy Allison, ‘Russia and the post-2014 international legal order: revisionism and *realpolitik*’, *International Affairs*, 93:3, 2017, 519–543; Edward Lucas, written testimony to the House of Commons Foreign

security, are being shaken, and in the case of NATO not just by smaller allies such as Greece in Denmark in the 1970s and 1980s, but by the hegemon of the alliance that for the first time since its creation in 1949, now has a leader who has disputed its worth, however obliquely, even during the icy grip of the Cold War in 1987.¹⁰ To focus excessively on the destabilising impact the election of a mercurial leader in the US has had on international affairs can be counterproductive as it disguises America's long search for a new global policy. Since the implosion of the USSR, successive American presidents have sought to balance the complex network of America's worldwide alliances and commitments with domestic isolationist impulses rekindled among many sections of American society by the triumphalism evinced at the end of the Cold War.

The election of Donald Trump in the US like the result of the Brexit referendum of 2016 are symptoms of the general malaise afflicting societies deeply traumatised and divided by the effects of austerity, deindustrialisation, lack of opportunity and the transitioning to a post-work world. These developments have taken place in a world of cash strapped state coffers, escalating insecurity and terrorist attacks carried out often, by disaffected home-grown terrorists. The 'squeezing' of the middle and lower middle class has bolstered the rise of a politics of anger creating an accommodating space in the political sphere for emotive politics where demagogues thrive.¹¹ These trends have evolved in an environment of 'fake news', cyber and 'hybrid' warfare and are amplified by the grip of the social media on contemporary society which act as echo chambers for the uncritical validation of one's own emotional prejudices and intolerance.¹²

In such a feverish environment 'the other' is readily rejected and perceived as a threat when those who have lost out hark back to an imaginary benign world and homogeneity that never really existed. The refugee crisis of 2015, quickly dubbed by many media outlets as a migration crisis, tested further an already unstable order and exposed the fault-lines on which the EU edifice is built. Suddenly, some Europeans seem willing to revisit the horrors of Mazower's *Dark Continent*. Levels of anti-semitism, xenophobia and illiberalism have risen.¹³ Over a decade or so, the 'unloved union'¹⁴ has found itself beset with internal and external threats necessitating action to be taken to preserve not only its essence, but also to safeguard the survival of liberal order. A hard task indeed, especially when the EU, as currently constituted, can function effectively only in an international environment based on rules and liberal norms.

The historical roots of the process that gave birth to the EU lie in the carnage of two world wars and the Cold War. In the immediate years after WWII, the ravaged and divided continent was unable to provide the means for its reconstruction. The leaders of the major European powers, therefore, accepted the United States' vision for a Western Europe based on the US guarantee to defend it as exemplified by NATO. The Marshall Plan and NATO created the preconditions for devastated Western European countries to embark on building a common market free of national trade barriers. The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 by the Six created the EEC, an ostensibly economic institution, which aimed at ensuring peace, stability and prosperity in Western Europe while becoming a pivotal block in strengthening transatlantic relations. Although, as Piers Ludlow has pointed out, 'nothing in the historical record indicates ... of how central the expansion of the European Community would be to the integration process',¹⁵ the truth is that the 'Six' had the foresight to allow for the possibility of

Affairs Committee, 3 September 2014, <https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news/russia-and-ukraine/>.

¹⁰ AP NEWS, 2 September, 1987, accessed on 31 August 2018,

<https://www.apnews.com/05133dbe63ace98766527ec7d16ede08>.

¹¹ Effie G. H. Pedaliu, 'Greece and the Crisis: A Historical Perspective' in Pol Morilas and Thanos Dokos, *Greece and the EU: Lessons from a Long-Lasting Crisis*, (Barcelona: CIDOB Monograph Series, May 2016), http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/monographs/monographs/greece_and_the_eu_lessons_from_a_long_lasting_crisis.

¹² Janna Anderson and Lee Rainie, 'Trust, Facts and Democracy: The Future of Truth and Misinformation Online', *Pew Research Centre Report*, Washington DC, 19 October 2017, accessed on 20 October 2017, <http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/10/19/the-future-of-truth-and-misinformation-online/>.

¹³ Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1999).

¹⁴ *The Economist*, 'The Unloved Union', 24 May 2014.

¹⁵ Piers N. Ludlow, 'Hard-won but vital: EU enlargement in historical perspective' in the Luc Brunet (ed) *The Crisis of EU Enlargement*, LSE IDEAS Special report, SR18, November 2013, 12-18.

widening membership to the EEC. The preamble of the Treaty stipulated that all the signatories should undertake 'common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe' and in article 237, that 'any European State may apply to become a member of the Community'.¹⁶ Such levels of flexibility were dictated because of the 'problem of Britain' and the ambitious course the Treaty of Rome had set in motion, namely, to pose to Western Europeans the ideal of 'European unification' as an alternative ideology to communism. It was also motivated by the desire of the Western part of a split continent not to embrace division as permanent, but to search for avenues to breach the ideological divide by spreading its values to the other side of the Cold War border.

By 1961, the EC received applications to join from other European nations. Enlargement became the process by which other states could join the EEC. It proved to be an elastic strategic tool utilised successfully not only as a means to embrace people sharing common values and priorities, but also to ensure that the EEC's neighbourhood developed in ways that would increase the security and prosperity of all EEC member states. Nearly all the EEC enlargements were to be determined by security and economic imperatives. The first enlargement in 1973, brought into the community Britain, Denmark and Ireland. The second enlargement came at a time when, as Daniel Mockli has shown, the community was trying to create a political identity, but was also suffering from fatigue which was dubbed 'euro-sclerosis'.¹⁷ It also came at a time of increased Mediterranean volatility, concerns that Italy may succumb to the attraction of Euro-communism, a rising anti-Americanism and diminished American sway because of the impact of the Vietnam War and the protests against the Mediterranean dictators had domestically and on its international reputation.¹⁸ In the mid to late 1970s, applications for accession came from members of the Southern Flank of NATO, now rid of their dictatorships, and transitioning towards democracy. Greece was the first to apply in 1975. The acceptance of Greece into the EC in 1981 was based on calculations that had to do with more than just economics, as Eirini Karamouzi has stated convincingly, it 'clearly involved political and strategic reasons', it 'created expectations for future conduct and became a reference point for subsequent enlargements'. The Mediterranean enlargement of the EEC upgraded the Community's international role as a stabilising force and also as a beacon for democracy.¹⁹

The Northern Mediterranean countries were accepted into the EEC for reasons of legitimacy too. By the mid 1960s, the notions of the 'West' and the 'Free World' had began to diverge under the cumulative strains of Vietnam and the advent of the Greek dictators. Like enlargement, the upholding of fundamental rights had not been one of the primary aims of the Treaty of Rome and it had been addressed only obliquely in articles 7 and 119. For the EEC, human rights, however, became in time a powerful tool to discriminate against countries it wished to exclude from membership, such as Franco Spain. By contrast, the United States, as a global power engaged in a bipolar conflict, had adopted elastic criteria on the kind of state or regime that was eligible for inclusion in the anti-Communist bloc. The Western European NATO allies increasingly came to refer to the defence of 'the West' rather than America's 'Free World' and their definition of this was based partly on the exclusion of all those states and regimes that did not embrace Western values and did not respect human rights. They were responding to pressures from their own electorates for whom governmental responses to the Greek military dictatorship, for example, were becoming the yardstick by which they judged their governments' sincerity in upholding human rights.²⁰

¹⁶ Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome, 25 March 1957), accessed on 1 August 2018, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_economic_community_rome_25_march_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e.html, 3, 69.

¹⁷ Daniel Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Short Dream of Political Unity* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009); Maria Gainar, *Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne: Les Neuf et la coopération politique européenne de 1973 à 1980* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012).

¹⁸ Effie G. H. Pedaliu, "'A Sea of Confusion': The Mediterranean and Détente, 1969-1974", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 33 (4), September 2009.

¹⁹ Eirini Karamouzi, *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974-1979: The Second Enlargement*, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan: 2014); Emma de Angelis and Eirini Karamouzi, 'Enlargement and the Historical Origins of the European Community's Democratic Identity, 1961-1978', *Contemporary European History*, 25/3, 2016, 439-458.

²⁰ Effie G. H. Pedaliu, 'Human Rights and International Security: The International Community and the Greek Dictators', *International History Review*, 38/5, 2016; 'Transatlantic Relations at a Time When "More

The Southern European enlargement and Europeanisation process was facilitated by the fact it was undertaken in a Cold War environment and because the new members had aspired to and had been imbued by Western values. Both took place at a time of ebbing nationalism, rising internationalism and growing tolerance and were also smoothed by economic largesse, the prospect of economic growth and the acceptance of its limits. The Europeanisation process was underpinned by generous Integrated Mediterranean Programmes and Cohesion Funds and growth, which stabilised the Northern Mediterranean shore, bolstered democratic politics and transformed it, gradually, into Southern Europe.²¹ The new members' accession was also followed by a bout of deepening as typified in the Single Act and the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 which promoted further legitimization of the European project. By 1993, when the EEC was renamed the EU, it was endowed with a set of core values: respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.²²

At the end of the Cold War, the tool of enlargement came out of the drawer once again. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined in 1995 and there was a further push to unify the European continent. Again, the decision to go ahead with widening had not been a foregone conclusion. There was soul searching at the time. Should the EU go for deepening or enlargement? Since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht, the deepening process had stumbled. The Amsterdam and Nice treaties of 1997 and 2001 respectively, failed to adopt accompanying institutional reforms. Successive British Prime Ministers from Thatcher to Major and Blair pushed for widening to put a brake on moves towards federalism and 'ever closer union' as well as for geostrategic reasons.²³ Widening through enlargement won the day because of Germany's unstoppable attraction to Eastern Europe and the considerable prodding from the US that hoped that NATO and the EU would be able to underpin democracy in Eastern European countries and strengthen them to avoid intimidation by Russia.²⁴

In parallel, the EU embarked on monetary Union and the Euro-Zone (EZ) was set up in 1999. Deepening was eschewed once again. Thus, the creation of the EZ was riddled with structural faults which made it a 'fair weather only' institution. Warnings that currency unions of economically mismatched countries rarely work unless they are also accompanied by fiscal unions with common budgets, common taxation and are supplemented by common monitoring, auditing and redistributory mechanisms, went unheeded. A messianic fervour had gripped the core members of the Union.²⁵ From the first moment of its existence the Eurozone was beset with suspicions that the cards had been stacked up against the smaller members of the project. Pride, however, always comes long before a fall.

The EU embarked on a new bout of expansion without having digested the implications of the EZ. On 22 November 2000, Christian Noyer, the Vice-President of the European Central Bank (ECB), in a speech at Oxford, warned prophetically of 'hard decisions' ahead and problems in the political and also decision making fields because the large number of 'newcomers' who may interpret their legitimate interests as diverging significantly from those of the existing members, given their different 'stages of development and their specific historical experiences which undoubtedly shape their views on Europe'.²⁶

Flags" Meant "No European Flags": The US, its European Allies and the War in Vietnam, 1964-1974', *International History Review*, 35/3, 2013.

²¹ Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 27-56.

²² Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 7 February 1992), accessed on 3 September 2018, https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaen/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.

²³ Anand Menon and John-Paul Salter, 'Brexit: initial reflections', *International Affairs*, 92:6, 2016, 1297-1318.

²⁴ Tereza Novotná, *How Germany Unified and the EU Enlarged*, (London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2015)

²⁵ Paul De Grauwe (ed) *Economics of Monetary Union* (Oxford: OUP, 2012); 'Animal spirits and monetary policy', *Economic Theory*, 47: 2, 2011, 423 - 442; 'The Return of Keynes', *International Finance*, 13:1, 2010, 157 - 163; 'The Fragility of the Eurozone's Institutions', *Open Economies Review*, 21:1, 2010, 167 - 174; 'What have we learnt about monetary integration since the Maastricht Treaty?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44:4, 2006, 711 - 730.

²⁶ 'How to combine a deepening and widening of the European Union', Speech delivered by Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the Oxford University European Affairs Society, Oxford, 22 November 2000, accessed on 30 August 2018, <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2000/html/sp001122.en.html>.

The enlargement of 2004 was to take place in a different environment than the previous enlargements. Suspicion and disillusionment were setting in and Brussels sensed that EU institutions lacked the 'legitimacy' European voters accorded to their own national political systems. As Jürgen Habermas put it, the institutions of European integration were unable to keep pace with 'post-national democracy'.²⁷ A European Constitution was drafted that aimed at suggesting ways on how the European institutions could be 'brought closer to the citizen.' Such actions had little resonance with EU citizens.²⁸ Even the promise of strengthening the European Parliament drew little applause. Many were more exercised by concerns over the shape of bananas, the expensive bureaucratic Brussels edifice, the costly new building of the ECB, the democratic deficit of the EU and the impact migration from Eastern Europe was having on their lives.

In Eastern Europe too, the path of 'economic shock' chosen to reconstruct the post-communist economies and prepare them for entry into the EU, did indeed cause shock. It was paved with draconian IMF programmes in accordance to the wishes of the local post-Communist political class. The Copenhagen criteria had been offered in 'a take it or leave it' fashion and the EU made no concessions to the specific needs or aspirations of individual countries. This rapid deconstruction, reconstruction and harmonization approach resulted in pushing well-qualified and hugely motivated East Europeans to migrate to Western Europe as cheap labour resulting in rising socio-economic hardship and inequality. In such conditions, Europeanisation had been taking place just on the administrative level but not on the civil society and values level. The EU was not the cure-all the East Europeans had hoped for after enduring Communist rule for nearly 45 years. In time, this disaffection has turned into nationalism and a nostalgia for pre-communist authoritarian solutions.²⁹

The crisis of EU legitimacy had become evident just a year after the 2004 enlargement. In May 2005, the French referendum result on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, killed it off. It was a victory for the 'No' campaign, with 55% of voters rejecting the treaty on a turnout of 69%. The new 'Polish plumber', it seems, was at the heart of French discontent. On 13 December 2006, a clearly alarmed Manuel Barroso admitted openly 'Enlargement cannot proceed bureaucratically, or not even diplomatically ... it has to be done democratically'.³⁰

Enlargement without deepening combined with austerity undermined the legitimacy of the EU, and it pushed aside the commitment to an 'ever closer union'. It also weakened traditional political forces and especially social democracy. The failure of the political class to protect the most vulnerable in Western societies was internalised as a betrayal and was externalised as support for the politics of anger that populists exploited successfully through pushing simple emotive messages and simple solutions to complex problems. Finally, it allowed the nation state, with all its positive and negative connotations, to grow much stronger - more than anybody in Brussels had imagined or expected after so many years of integration. It seems that not many politicians and commentators had read Alan Milward's book *The European Rescue of the Nations State*. They had failed to see that the European integration process as pursued by its founding fathers Paul Henri Spaak, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and Jean Monnet had been a deliberate decision to pool sovereignty to rescue their states. They had wished to create shared values and institutions and strove to achieve cooperation and peace, something singularly lacking in the pre-WWII period that had led to two fratricidal wars. It was not about replacing nation states or as Milward states emphatically, 'to supersede the nation-state would be to destroy the Community'.³¹ After the fall of communism, such sentiments, aims and aspirations had applied to the Eastern European states that joined the community in 2004, but quite understandably, the Twelve were at a different stage of 'Europeanisation' than the ten new incomers. Suddenly, Brussels

²⁷ Jürgen Habermas, 'Why Europe Needs a Constitution', *New Left Review*, 42:11, 2001, <https://newleftreview.org/II/11/jurgen-habermas-why-europe-needs-a-constitution>.

²⁸ Finn Laursen, *The Rise and Fall of the EU's Constitutional Treaty*, (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2008), 181-200.

²⁹ Nina Bandelj and Katelyn Finley, 'East European Discontent: Economic Attitudes across Class, Ethnicity, and Time', *Problems of Post-Communism*, published online: 17 July 2018.

³⁰ European Parliament Debate on 'Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2006-2007', 13 December 2006, accessed on 1 September 2018, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/seance_pleniere/compte_rendu/traduit/2006/12-13/P6_CRE\(2006\)12-13_DEF_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/seance_pleniere/compte_rendu/traduit/2006/12-13/P6_CRE(2006)12-13_DEF_EN.pdf).

³¹ Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, (London: Routledge, 1992), 3.

appeared to have become a tower of Babel that lacked a common shared narrative. Timothy Garton Ash's prophetic warning 'Europe has lost the plot'³² went unheeded.

It was in this climate that the global financial crisis erupted in 2007. For a while, the EU viewed it to be just an Anglo-Saxon malaise and remained complacent until 2008. Joaquín Almunia, the EU's Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner stated smugly, on 5 September 2007, that 'the EU's economic fundamentals are solid and should not be significantly affected by the recent turbulence'.³³ But the 'Anglo-Saxon crisis' did cross the Atlantic and it shook the foundations of the EZ exposing its structural weaknesses. Its aftermath bequeathed a lost decade for European economies that stoked the rise of populist anti-establishment political movements. The fears that had been expressed at the time of the birth of the euro became a reality as weaker members stagnated and suffered severe recessions, unsustainable unemployment rates and unprecedented levels of debt, whilst the EZ's stronger members run excessive surpluses. The dynamic of relations within the EU changed turning essentially collaborative relationships into those of creditors and debtors.

It hit Greece hardest due to its heavy reliance on external debt and its inability, in the new conditions of the crisis-ridden world banking system, to refinance debts it had accumulated over decades. A default on its loans could have affected badly overexposed French and German banks. The subsequent, seemingly generous, Greek bail-outs were an unmitigated disaster for the people of Greece, but more significantly they also chipped away further at the already compromised legitimacy of the EU. They brought into sharp focus enlargement, the democratic deficit of the EU and the ad-hoc nature of the EZ's decision-making body, the Eurogroup.³⁴

The EZ had been unprepared to deal with the financial crisis and the EU, similarly, proved unable to understand how precipitous falls in public spending and wage freezes³⁵ affected the attitudes of its citizens.³⁶ The Greek crisis occurred in a period of austerity in Europe accompanied by declining welfare state provision, escalating insecurity and terrorist attacks. Greece's economic agony was soon followed by that of Ireland, Spain and Portugal whilst everyone hoped that Italy would not implode too. Initially these countries were seen and judged through the stereotypical, even racist prism of PIIGS and Grexit. As austerity bit however, such views came to be attenuated. The whole system appeared to many Europeans to have been designed to make the strong stronger, feeding the weak with ever more loans and obligations. Crisis-ridden Greece became a metaphor in the hands of Eurosceptic populists and eurosceptics. It was used by all those who despised the EU as a means to attack and delegitimise it further. International public opinion shifted to perceive Greece as a weak victim suffering at the hands of the 'bad Germans' and the mighty Eurocrats, who on top of everything else, even tried to stymie Greek democracy.³⁷ British demagogues weaponised the Greek crisis, to harness English anger with Westminster and its economic and social policies from the 1980s onwards. Abetted by a Eurosceptic

³² Timothy Garton Ash, 'Europe's true stories', *Prospect*, 25 February 2007, accessed on 10 September 2018, <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/europestruestories>.

³³ European Commission, Press Release Database, Joaquín Almunia, Speech, 5 September 2007, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-507_en.htm?locale=en.

³⁴ Effie G. H. Pedaliu, 'Greece and the Crisis: A Historical Perspective' in Pol Morilas and Thanos Dokos, *Greece and the EU: Lessons from a Long-Lasting Crisis*, (Barcelona: CIDOB Monograph Series, May 2016), http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/monographs/monographs/greece_and_the_eu_lessons_from_a_long_lasting_crisis.

³⁵ Thiemo Fetzer, 'Did Austerity Cause Brexit?', Working Papers Series, no. 381, University of Warwick and CAGE, June 2018, accessed on 31 August 2018, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/381-2018_fetzer.pdf; Eric Arias and David Stasavage, 'How Large Are The Political Costs of Fiscal Austerity?', New York University, Department of Politics, 2016, accessed on 31 August 2018, <https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyuas/politics/documents/AriasStasavageAusterity.pdf>.

³⁶ Leonardo Morlino and Mario Quaranta, 'What is the impact of the economic crisis on democracy? Evidence from Europe', *International Political Science Review*, 37:5, 2016, 618-633.

³⁷ Michael Mitsopoulos and Theodore Pelagidis, *Understanding the Greek Crisis. From Boom to Bust*, (London: Palgrave, 2011); Ioanna Ntamoudi, 'The Eurozone Crisis and the Politics and Blaming: The Cases of Germany and Greece', *Political Perspectives*, 18:2, 2014, 1-10; George Pagoulatos, and Christos Triantopoulos, 'The Return of the Greek Patient: Greece and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis', *South European Society and Politics*, 14:1, 2009, 35-54.

Press this was transformed into deep dissatisfaction with the EU and in the end eased the path to Brexit. Or as Fintan O'Toole has put it 'It was never about Europe. Brexit is Britain's reckoning with itself'.³⁸ During the 2016 referendum the 'Leave' campaign used resentment to cast the EU into the role of a German dominated tormentor. The strategy continued even after the victory of 'Leave' in the referendum. Boris Johnson, the current British Prime Minister and other members of the European Research Group - who sought a 'no deal Brexit' and to prevent a widespread understanding of the EU as the 'glue that holds the UK together', as Vernor Bogdanor has put it,³⁹ - continued to compare Theresa May's 'Chequers Deal' as being akin to the 'humiliation' of Greece.⁴⁰ The hardship the Greek people are still undergoing at present has been employed by the BBC, for example, as a 'reminder' to their audience when Brexit is discussed.⁴¹

As international public opinion wallowed in the twittersphere in July 2015 over the tragedy of the Greek referendum, a real humanitarian crisis began late that summer which was to have unimaginable consequences for the EU. The refugee crisis of 2015, would come to test its core values and plunge it into a protracted crisis over issues of legitimacy and identity. The EU could not agree and decide on how the migration crisis ought to be handled and the crisis revealed that integration and Europeanisation had not taken root in Eastern Europe. The more extreme the reactions of Hungary and the other Visegrad group states became towards the migrants, the more the electorates of liberal states became agitated by fake news and populists who were able to spin migration with the terrorist attacks in Belgium, Germany and the UK. The financial crisis and the populist onslaught it unleashed, had hit hard the compromised foundations of the European Union. In was this heated environment that Brexit was delivered.

If the EU survives the ambush by populism, the challenge of migration and Brexit, it will have to embark on recovering lost ground and legitimacy by undertaking measures that result in profound deepening in the following areas:

1. to strengthen civil society in its member states;
2. to defend the Union by enhancing its foreign and security policy institutions and capabilities. The EU can only function effectively in an international environment based on rules and shared norms;
3. to stop appeasing Russia while not alienating it;
4. to rebuild a European identity on the foundation stones of the EU's core values.

In order to do so, it will have to undertake major reform in the following areas:

1. Political Leadership: Due to its failure to deepen, the EU lacks a transparent and coherent leadership structure and this is a huge handicap in situations of crisis when immediate responses are required, especially in a period of increased uncertainty.⁴² The problem of leadership is compounded by German reluctance to assume a level of political leadership within the EU commensurate to its economic size. Germany will have to rise above its dread of its past and lead. The EU needs economic and political leadership to go in tandem. Germany also needs to be cured of its paralysing fear of inflation, overcome its Weimar experiences and realize that while Heinrich Winkler's *The Age of Catastrophe*⁴³ interpretation of the period 1914-1945 is an excellent historical account, in no way does it constitute a blueprint for policy making;
2. EZ Reform: The EZ will need to become a monetary and fiscal union. The Union cannot survive in the economic climate of zero hour contracts and rising socio-economic inequality unless it creates a 'balanced collective' – I borrow this term from Dean Acheson.⁴⁴ Economic

³⁸ *The Guardian*, 18 January 2019.

³⁹ *The Guardian*, 18 January 2019.

⁴⁰ *The Independent*, 30 August 2018, accessed on 31 August 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-greece-bailout-leave-support-uk-eu-european-economy-a8514701.html>.

⁴¹ BBC Radio 4, *The World Tonight*, 18.1.2019.

⁴² 'Political Leadership in the EU', *Journal of European Integration*, 39:2, 2017, 103-252.

⁴³ Heinrich Winkler, *The Age of Catastrophe: A History of the West, 1914–1945*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015).

⁴⁴ Harry S Truman, Presidential Library, Acheson Papers, Secretary of State File - May-June, 1950, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, June 5, 1950,

prosperity cannot be attained in a climate of insecurity. However, neither prosperity nor security can be achieved unless policies can attract popular support and parliamentary approval. The current cleavage in the EU and the EZ with the North acting as a creditor to the indebted and impoverished South is neither functional nor sustainable as it risks perpetuating the notion that the key principles of equality, solidarity and confidence among states are no longer salient. The embedding of such a notion can only lead to a further weakening of the EU and the EZ and lead to rampant euroscepticism throughout the EU area. The May 2019 European elections did not produce any exciting initiatives to capture the minds and hearts of EU electors. These were ‘make or break’ elections for the continuation of the EU as it is now constituted, especially as they were the first since the rather disastrous 2014 elections, the Greek and migration crises in 2015, the Brexit referendum in 2016, the German elections in 2017 that resulted in the Eurosceptic *Alternative für Deutschland* party assuming the role of the main opposition party and the Italian elections in 2018 that until August 2019, resulted in power being held by a coalition of populists, eurosceptics and racists..⁴⁵ The evident unity of the EU with regards to negotiations with the UK over Brexit has been remarkable however, it should not lull any one to the rise of strong anti-EU narratives and dark political forces around Europe. The EU should embrace its diversity and channel it towards ‘an ever closer union of the willing and like-minded’. The least favourable option would be for the EU to opt for development *à la carte* or what a recent Bruegel Policy Brief has called ‘a Europe of clubs’.⁴⁶ Such a solution would represent a timid and unimaginative approach and would be tantamount to ditching the EU’s substance and core aspirations and principles. It would represent an amputated EU that would continue to exist but as an empty shell with no apparent *raison d’être*.

3. Defence of European Values: The EU cannot and should not accommodate the behaviour of any member states that contravene its core principles and undermine its cohesion and legitimacy. The slovenly and arcane procedures of Article 7 are inadequate.⁴⁷ Errant governments will need to be checked as soon as an infraction has occurred. The sanction of immediate expulsion is not implied here. The democratic process in various member states must not be penalised but democratic decisions will have to be based on the understanding that they are not free of consequences. Membership comes with responsibilities, not just entitlement, and presupposes the capacity to arise above national egotisms to collaborate for the common good. Member states will have to understand that EU membership does not bring just largesse and entitlement. Therefore, access to the coffers of the Union ought to be stopped as soon as an infraction has occurred. A degree of automaticity needs to be introduced.
4. Education: For far too long European leaders and Eurocrats have assumed that eventually, the merits of integration will pass through to new generations by osmosis and an endless intellectual diet of cultural studies. In Article 128 (151), of the Maastricht Treaty ‘the Community’ undertook to ‘contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore’.⁴⁸ European identity however had been in danger even before the end of the Cold War. This failure partially lies with the educational systems of member states which got caught up in ideological polemics, cuts, cramming and targets to the detriment of in depth knowledge. In such an environment the thought-provoking interdictions of Foucault and Derrida were politicised, resulting in ‘the canon wars’/ ‘cultural wars’ of the

https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/achesonmemos/view.php?documentVersion=transcript&documentid=71-4_15&documentYear=1952.

⁴⁵ *The Financial Times*, 20 October 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/9b324788-d4b2-11e8-ab8e-6be0dcf18713>.

⁴⁶ Maria Demertzis, Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir, Thomas Wieser and Guntram Wolff, ‘One Size Does Not Fit All: European Integration by Differentiation’, *Bruegel Policy Brief*, 3, 2018, accessed on 5 October 2018, http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/PB-2018_03_final3.pdf.

⁴⁷ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - Title I - Common Provisions - Article 7, accessed on 1 September 2018, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012M007>.

⁴⁸ Treaty establishing the European Community (Amsterdam consolidated version); Part Three: Community policies; Title XII: Culture; Article 151; Article 128 - EC Treaty (Maastricht consolidated version); Article 128 - EEC Treaty, accessed on 10 January 2019, http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tec_1997/art_151/oj.

1980s and 1990s and were used by governments as a means to enfeeble humanities provision in tertiary education. With the end of the Cold War 'the Western Canon' was deemed not fit for the purpose of accommodating the enlargement of East Europe.⁴⁹ The corpus of Western literature, European classical music, philosophy, and works of art, however, did not just represent the 'high culture' of the West. Its pan-European content was also a potent tool for reinforcing commonalities among Europeans. The factions warring over what the educational provision in the humanities ought to include and emphasize failed to find common ground. There was to be no emergence of 'a humanist historical canon' with multicultural/transcultural/inclusive perspectives that would make it more representative, flexible and able to link the diverse cultural traditions existing in Europe as well as able to absorb the impact from the collapse of Communism. In contrast what emerged was heaping scorn on 'the canon'. A gap emerged that was speedily filled with the ephemeral, whimsical and even divisive preoccupations of poststructuralists with 'the local', 'the small' and 'the narrowly focused'. This came at the cost for a sense of history, open-mindedness and a notion of what bound Europeans together. These developments were accompanied by the internet boom that has propelled a new kind of capitalism through the culture of celebrity and glamour instead of more cerebral activities.⁵⁰ The avoidance of grand narrative approaches, the lack of an all pervasive common threat and the effects of the internet have affected the common European memory and resulted in what Arthur Marwick was warning against as early as 1970 when he wrote: 'try to imagine what every day would be like in a society in which no one knew history. Imagination boggles because it is only through knowledge of history that a society memory can have knowledge of itself. As a man without memory and self-knowledge is a man adrift, so is a society without memory (or more correctly without recollection) and self-knowledge would be a society adrift'.⁵¹ Decision-making over education and culture resides with the member states of the EU. This however, does not mean that they should ignore in their curricula the teaching of European civics. The way forward must be contextualise 'the local and narrow' within grand narratives that underpin a liberal resistance against totalitarian solutions and promote a unified European consciousness and identity - or to borrow Stuart Woolf's agonising concern that: 'the move away from political-institutional and economic history towards the social and the cultural, the retreat from explicatory models based on *grandes thèses* to the detailed and the micro-reconstruction, the influence of methods of literary, linguistic and philosophical textual analysis applied to the traditional sources of historians, have all rendered more problematic what we understand by a history of Europe'.⁵² Moments of 'rapture' must be studied in the context of the long-term forces that led to them otherwise understanding of continuity and commonality gets lost. In this way the idea of Europe can be framed in order to promote a mutual recognition of the differences among nations that is parcelled with respect and openness. Sometimes realism facilitates survival.

5. Demography and Immigration: The European Parliament has clearly acknowledged that 'demography matters'.⁵³ And how could it not when the Union faces severe demographic challenges that are likely to have severe socio-economic effects. The population of the EU is shrinking and aging, probably, unsustainably. The year 2010 signified the first time that the EU's working population shrank and it is expected to continue to decline until 2060. The aged population is expected to double by 2050. Basically, the EU's workforce is projected to go on shrinking whilst economies will be gaining record numbers of retirees. Neither birth nor life expectancy rates are amenable to swift changes in developed countries. At the same time, nearly 2m non-EU migrants entered into the member states of the EU in 2016 mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa and half of them are below the age of 28. Such an inflow can affect both

⁴⁹ Harold Bloom, *The Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages*, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994).

⁵⁰ Shoshana Zuboff, *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for the Future and the New Frontier of Power*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2019); Anand Giridharadas, *Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World*, (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2018).

⁵¹ Arthur Marwick, *The Nature of History*, (London: Macmillan, 1970), 13.

⁵² Stuart Woolf, 'Europe and its Historians', *Contemporary European History*, 12:3, 2013, 323-337.

⁵³ European Parliament, Think Tank, 'Demographic Outlook for the EU', 21 December 2017, accessed on 10 September 2018, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_IDA\(2017\)614646](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_IDA(2017)614646).

the age composition as well as the population growth rates of the EU. It can replenish its diminishing workforce and maintain its pension and social provision systems.⁵⁴ Such a development is replete with problems as it may antagonise native populations, increase xenophobia and the appeal of racist parties and it also comes in tandem with security concerns. Migration has proven to be a deeply contentious and even destabilising issue for the EU as a whole as well for individual member states. Integration of non-EU migrants may prove to be rather difficult as a decade of austerity has decreased the incomes of the middle and lower middle class and has increased feelings of uncertainty, alienation and disaffection.⁵⁵ Such emotions are further accentuated by the insecurity arising from terrorist outrages that has been inflicted in too many European cities by people who were born in Europe or have been given preferential treatment as refugees seeking asylum. It is in these circumstances that the EU is faced with the three contradictory and unenviable tasks: to encourage immigration, to inhibit illegal trafficking and immigration and to ensure its own security. There is no simple prescription here but there are some broad principles that need to be applied. Migratory flows should be managed but cannot be stopped especially when they can be beneficial in the long term and the EU must find the means to communicate this fact to its member states and citizens. The EU borders need to be protected. Trafficking must be curbed. The EU's investment in and engagement with Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa needs to be directed towards the benefit of the peoples of the region by promoting good governance; re-skilling; family planning; good health; reinforcing the rule of law and the protection of human rights, as well as major infrastructural projects. So far, the legacy of EU investment in the area is less than impressive as inadequate due diligence has been exercised over the EU's generous humanitarian and development aid while its resources have been used not to build robust civil societies but to prop up unacceptable regimes.⁵⁶ The EU needs to build regional partnerships with the Maghreb, increase coastguard and air-reconnaissance capabilities to protect its borders and devise means to ensure that the Southern European countries are not left alone to deal with an emergency that is not of their making. The EU will have to develop the institutions to regulate and handle migration without relying on hard pressed national governments or shady NGOs. If the EU needs migration it needs to show that it is in control of the whole process. This way, it may be able to convince its citizens that it is in their best interests. Basically, on migration the EU needs to go back to the drawing board and design a policy that will promote the interests of its citizens, its economic growth and security. Anything less will have a detrimental effect on its wellbeing, especially as migratory pressures from Africa are likely to increase over the medium and long term.

Can the EU survive the effects of enlargement without deepening? Can it survive 'losing the plot', the mangled EZ, unprecedented refugee/migration crises, rising nationalism, rampant populism and Brexit? The answer is a probable 'yes', because in a world of globalised political power, American isolationism, and the rise of China and India, any European country including Germany is just too small to safeguard its interests alone. The EU is the only means European nation states have to influence developments in the global order and to safeguard their national interests in a world where American largesse, multilateralism, liberalism, pluralism and peace are not guaranteed any more. This does not mean that the EU can wait for history to prove it right. By that time and without deep institutional reform it may end up a mere footnote to history. A good starting point to avert this would

⁵⁴ EU Commission, Eurostat, 'Migration and Migrant Population Statistics, March 2018, accessed on 10 September 2018 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics .

⁵⁵ Emilio Di Meglio, 'Population and Conditions: Living Standards Falling in Most Member States', *Eurostat Statistics in Focus*, 8, 2013, 1–8; Guy Standing, *The Precariat: The new dangerous class*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2011); Joseph Stiglitz, *The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers our Future*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012).

⁵⁶ Paolo Campagna, 'Out of Africa: The organization of migrant smuggling across the Mediterranean', *European Journal of Criminology*, 15:4, 2018, 481-502; Maurizio Carbone (ed), *The European Union in Africa: Incoherent policies, asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance?*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); Anna Triandafyllidou and Thanos Maroukis, *Migrant Smuggling: Irregular Migration from Asia and Africa to Europe*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2012); Sarah Wolff, *The Mediterranean Dimension of EU Internal Security*, (New York: Palgrave, 2012).

be to learn to identify how the various socio-psychological sources of illiberalism affect individual and group political conduct.

Europe at a critical legitimacy juncture: which people, whose values?

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the discursive nexus of ‘the people’ drawing from the mediatisation and institutionalisation of Brexit. It focuses on how metadiscourses of popular sovereignty have been instrumental in the legitimisation of Brexit and on how such discourses are now more widely echoed in different populist and nativist political projects across Europe that are seeking consensus through a delegitimation of the EU. The discussion draws attention to the emergence of counter discourses of the people but also to the structural conditions that prevent or limit the consolidation of robust transnational forms of European citizenry. This scenario will arguably define the next European elections as a critical juncture where the legitimacy of the European project will be contested in the name of different ‘peoples’ and “values”.

Keywords: Brexit, institutionalization, mediatisation, populism, legitimacy chain, discourse analysis

The European project and *the people* at a critical legitimacy juncture

The European project stands at a critical juncture. In the last decade, there has been a gradual shift from ‘permissive consensus’ - whereby citizens have accepted further integration while showing low levels of political involvement - to an overt legitimisation challenge of the European project (see, for example, Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Bouza and Oleart, 2018). This challenge has been largely compounded by a complex interaction between financial and social crises and has been articulated along different discursive axes, not least in the recent surge of populist and sovereignist discourses that have increasingly brought *the people* to the forefront of such legitimisation struggle.

For sure, *the people* has always been a key discursive element of political processes. The term has been invoked by all democratic and populist narratives and it has often been politically mobilised for different projects. In this sense the idea of the people, albeit inevitably semantically vague, is a powerful one which, since the *volonté générale* (the will of the people) celebrated by the French Revolution, has been widely taken for granted as the basis of legitimacy in any modern democratic system. The idea of the ‘will of the people’ moving up the metaphorical chain of legitimacy to be exercised at the national level by citizens’ representatives and through nationally organized institutions is a well established tenet of constitutional democracies (Schneider et al. 2016). However, in relation to a wider conceptualization of the EU and its member states as organized along a national/transnational hierarchy, such metaphorical chain of legitimacy has been at its weakest in enabling the transfer of power from the nation to the EU (Nulmeier and Pritzlaff, 2010). So while a European demos has, at best, only manifested in embryonic forms (Zappettini, 2017; Zappettini, 2019a) we are now increasingly seeing an overt challenge to any transnational form of legitimacy of the European project coming from bottom up. This ideological struggle is likely to consolidate and to polarize discourses of *the people* in the forthcoming election for the European Parliament in May 2019.

This paper discusses the current legitimisation struggle from the ontological perspective that *the people* as a political subject does not exist a priori but it is constituted in and through discourse (Laclau, 2005). As a way of example, I will first focus on the ideological and discursive arena of Brexit to show how populist discourses have been key in the unfolding of Brexit and how evoking *the people* has been instrumental in its mediatisation and institutionalisation (see Zappettini and Krzyzanowski, 2019 and articles in the Special Issue ‘Brexit as a Social & Political Crisis: Discourses in Media & Politics’ in Critical Discourse Studies (2019:4) for an extensive discussion of these dimensions). Following this, I will briefly discuss potential wider implications of Brexit for the European project in light of populist movements and the forthcoming elections of the European Parliament.

Brexit as a Discursive Chain of Legitimacy

The critical juncture of Brexit

The etiology of Brexit has been widely discussed from a variety of perspectives. In this paper, I draw from an interpretation of Brexit as the accumulation of path-dependent historical discourses and socio-political contingencies (Zappettini and Krzyzanowski, 2019) that has been instrumental in building up and sustaining a legitimacy chain of public and institutional discourses. Taking a critical-discursive stance, Zappettini and Krzyzanowski (2019) contend that Brexit represents a ‘critical juncture in the making’ and that the Brexit referendum was the result of

“different historical and contingent discursive nexuses and trajectories ... [and] a variety of context-dependent, ideologically-driven social, political and economic imaginaries that were attached to the idea/concept of Brexit”

Among such discursive trajectories one must consider historical forms of Euroscepticism - in some cases rooted in British imperialism, see Maccaferri (2019) - as well as contingent forms of political opportunism whereby the Prime Minister David Cameron aimed to solve the ongoing ‘question’ of Europe inside the Conservative Party by calling a referendum in 2016 on whether the United Kingdom should leave or remain in the European Union. As Zappettini and Krzyzanowski (2019) argue, different ‘imaginaries’ were associated with the signifier Brexit in the simplistic antagonism of the in/out referendum binaries. In a sense, the institutionalisation of the ‘European question’ into the referendum options framed the Leave/Remain binary choices as floating signifiers that the two opposed camps could fill with specific ideological signifieds/meanings (Zappettini, 2019b). For example, Brexit was represented by the Leave campaign as an ‘escape route’ for Britain *“from an ‘unavoidable’ supranational path inside the EU back to a ‘safer’ (inter)national system of relations”* (Zappettini and Krzyzanowski, 2019). At the same time, however,

“the Leave campaign ‘take back control’ slogan often represented a floating signifier that instrumentally legitimised both a logic of global deceleration rejecting neoliberalism and austerity [...] and a logic of global acceleration advocating further liberalisation and international free trade” (Zappettini and Krzyzanowski, 2019: see also Zappettini, 2019b for further arguments of trade and mercantile logics as well as the moral panic over immigration).

Significantly, discourses that had circulated on the fringe of politics (and consolidated primarily within the UKIP party) were allowed to become semi-institutionalised through the referendum set up and subsequently taken up in the public sphere and at an institutional level. Since the referendum result, we have seen for example how certain discourses related to free trade escalated and were rapidly seized upon by the Government to construct the rhetoric of ‘Global Britain’. As I have discussed elsewhere (Zappettini, 2019c) the trope of ‘Global Britain’ has become a catalyst around which different legitimising narratives of Brexit as *rupture and continuity* with the ‘continent’ (or, contradictorily both) have been articulated as the ‘bottom logics’ of Britain leaving the EU.

Krzyzanowski and Zappettini (2019) also point to the unfolding of political crises (both external and internal to the UK - see also Bennet, 2019 and Krzyzanowski, 2019) – and different populist and nationalist ideologies (see also Tolson, 2019; Ruzza and Pejovic, 2019) as a powerful discursive drivers through which the critical juncture of Brexit has been constructed. I will discuss these dynamics in the following section with specific reference to their discursive normalisation and the role of the media.

The politicization and mediatization of Brexit and the people

¹The discursive node of *the people* has been a key tool in the legitimacy chain of Brexit. For example, as the early Brexit referendum polls were announced on the morning of 24th June 2016 UKIP's leader Nigel Farage claimed the Leave victory with the follow statement "*this will be a victory for real people, a victory for ordinary people, a victory for decent people*" (The Independent, 24/6/2016). Similarly, the British Government has discursively appropriated the result of an advisory referendum where 37% of all potential voters chose to Leave the EU as a mandate to implement Brexit (however unclear its form still is) by legitimizing it as the 'will of the people' (and through the tautology of 'Brexit means Brexit').

Through this typical *argumentum ad populum* different meanings of Brexit have been retrofitted to an imagined *volonté générale* expressed by what effectively was a minority of citizens, but which, nevertheless has been discursively constructed as a homogeneous monolith. As the discursive articulation of the will of the people has gone up the institutional chain it has sustained and legitimized harder forms of Brexit for example through the argument that 'the British people have spoken' and the Government must deliver for them (Patel, 2016 reported in Freedon, 2017) and amidst warnings that any legal scrutiny over the process is "an attempt to frustrate the will of the British people" (Javid, 2016 reported in Freedon, 2017) and that Brexit could be 'stolen from the people' by its very own MPs (The Guardian, 5/12/18).

In addition to and arguably in synergy with the institutional legitimisation of Brexit in the name of the people, one must also consider the role played by the media, in framing the debate in the run up to the referendum and afterwards. One can hardly overstate the media's ability to instigate public debates by setting the news agenda along populist logics. While this can be a force for good when the 'fourth estate' performs its function of democratic guardian in a pluralised public sphere, the media's power can equally serve commercial logics and a newspaper's own political and ideological agendas. News is not simply circulated in/by the media but that it can also be actively framed through a newspaper's ideological lens. Few examples of the instrumental role of the press in constructing public perceptions could be more relevant than how the British tabloids have historically covered the EU-UK relationship and, more recently, Brexit. The British tabloid press has a long tradition of Eurosceptic to Europhobic editorial stances, including the promotion of various 'crusades' around different Euro-myths and infamous headlines such as the Sun's 'Up yours Delors'. Overall, tabloids have been responsible for the trivialisation (some would call it 'tabloidization') of European politics, a process that most certainly has contributed to the British written press being considered as the least trusted in Europe (Press Gazette, 2017). For years, titles such as The Daily Mail, the Sun and The Daily Express have been particularly active in portraying the UK as a victim of a Brussels 'cosmopolitical' conspiracy plot that, according to some headlines, would result for example in the British Parliament being forced to adopt bans on traditional British kettles and light bulbs to comply with EU rules (see the EU Commission's myth-debunking website for a full list).

As most tabloids entered coverage of the Brexit referendum campaign as prominent advocates of the Leave side (with the exception of labour-friendly Daily Mirror, the Mail on Sunday, which took an opposite stance to its daily sister publication, and the politically disengaged Daily Star) they could therefore bank on an established priming of their audiences through which they had already been able to effectively pre-legitimise Brexit even before the referendum was called. What we saw during the referendum campaign was a de facto consolidation of such populist discourses (Zappettini, 2018). Here, I use the term populist (an otherwise much debated proposition between academics) in its basic meaning i.e. referring to the people (see for example Laclau, 2005; Canovan, 2005). Of course, in most

¹ Parts of this section have been reproduced in the following blogs:

Zappettini, F. (2019). From Euroscepticism to outright populism: the evolution of British tabloids. London School of Economics Blog on Brexit. Available from:

<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/01/04/from-euroscepticism-to-outright-populism-the-evolution-of-british-tabloids/>

Zappettini, F. (2019). How Tabloids Were Able To Frame The Debate Over Brexit. European Journalism Observatory. Available from: <https://en.ejo.ch/media-politics/how-tabloids-were-able-to-frame-the-debate-over-brexit>

political discourses the term ‘people’ tends to be invariably invoked in semantically vague and rhetorical ways. But what makes a populist discourse different from a democratic one is that the former portrays the people in opposition to its imagined enemies and typically in exclusionary rather than inclusionary terms. As an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2016) the British nation had to reify its ‘imagined enemies’ both externally - in the EU as a dominant power - and internally as the ‘corrupt’ elites, etc. supporting the European project. A linguistic analysis of how the term ‘(the) people’ was used in a corpus of tabloids during the referendum campaign, suggests that the language of tabloids has been consistent with such populist views of the world in binary terms (Zappettini, 2018). Throughout the campaign, tabloids typically tended to portray the ‘British people’ (sometimes also qualified as ‘ordinary’ or ‘hard-working’ people) as a distinct group who were antagonised by other groups of ‘people’ who, in turn, were often characterised as either (EU) migrants and ‘free to move’ to the UK or as ‘detached’ elites. The tabloid press further identified the latter as international (e.g. EU, Brussels, Eurocrats, the IMF, President Obama) or domestic (e.g. Westminster, ‘experts’ and Remainers) enemies of the ‘British people’. These characterisations played a pivotal role in how tabloids were able to frame the debate over the Brexit referendum around typical populist dynamics. Notably, the coverage tapped into the politics of loss and resentment over migration through arguments of social pressure and resources sharing, but also through arguments of risk and security which, in some cases, straddled into explicit xenophobic moral panic. For example, The Daily Express on 6th June 2016 reported Nigel Farage’s comment that mass sex attacks like those that had happened in Cologne would occur in the UK unless the country voted to leave. Similarly, in relation to the pitting of the ‘ordinary British people’ against the elites, the dominant dynamic in the corpus analysed was one of reaffirming a sense of national pride akin to the defiant sovereignism that has characterised recent Euroscepticism across many democracies. Standing up to the ‘bullying’ of the IMF, of Remainers David Cameron and George Osborne, or the EU ‘corrupt’ bureaucrats was common currency in many Daily Mail articles, for example.

A key point worth making here is that tabloids did not simply act as communicative platforms by amplifying (or silencing) the main actors and arguments of the referendum campaign but, rather, that they effectively (de)legitimised Brexit along a populist logic as well as according to their own ideological agenda. Furthermore, one should not see this populist thrust limited to the contingency of the Brexit referendum campaign. As I have argued above, a large section of the British press has had a historical role in producing anti-EU propaganda based on spurious news and anti-foreign sentiment. Plenty of evidence suggests that this historical path has not stopped with the referendum result but, in fact, that the populist thrust has steadily driven the post-referendum coverage of Brexit. Appeals to the ‘people’s will’ (and delegitimation of supporters of softer or no Brexit as ‘enemies of the people’) have been key drivers of public and institutional discourses. The longer-term coverage of Euronews in the tabloid press and the populist discursive articulation of Brexit have been instrumental in creating the chain of legitimisation that has institutionalised extreme Eurosceptic discourses that originally emerged on the fringe of the British political spectrum and now seem to be at the core of the implementation of Brexit. Right-wing tabloids have been key in close down any dissent to softer forms of Brexit, for example through the characterization of any opposition as ‘betrayal of the people’ and of such opponents as ‘enemies of the people’ (see for example The Daily Mail). Of course, the term ‘people’ has equally been appropriated by other actors to construct counter-discourses for example around the ‘peoples’ vote’ referendum. At the moment, this seems to be the extremely volatile nodal point where the struggle over the Brexit debate is taking place as we come up to the expected Brexit date (29th March 2019).

Wider implications of Brexit and the articulation of the people for the European project

Anticipating what the long term ramifications of Brexit will be for member states and EU politics is just as difficult as predicting any further development of Brexit in British domestic politics. However, in relation to the former, two opposite discursive trends seem to have been playing out on the European political stage. On the one hand, the immediate ‘domino effect’ that some had envisaged happening in the immediate aftermath of Brexit has not materialized. Indeed, for governments and other political actors in many EU member states, rather than representing a political model, Brexit seems to have acted as a warning on the consequences of playing into sovereignist discourses and it is arguably deterring the many anticipated ‘exits’ (e.g. Frexit, Swexit, etc.). For example, the Swedish Left Party is dropping its long-standing quest to leave the EU and Italian Five-Star Movement has been increasingly shying away from its early day’s flagship policy of calling for a referendum on Italy exiting the Euro which helped paving its way into the Government coalition with Lega.

On the other hand, however, the question of *the people* and their values remains highly mobilised across Europe. Undoubtedly, public and political discourses that invoke *the people* have increasingly become common currency and are seized upon by different far-right political projects whether it be Sweden's Democrats, Italian Lega, French Front National, Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid, German Alternative für Deutschland, Finland's True Finns, Spain's Vox, etc. These discourses are likely to escalate in the run up to the European Elections in May 2019 since votes for the Euro Parliament tend to be instrumentally used as protest platforms as exemplified by the case of UKIP topping the last EP election in 2013. Here, again, we are seeing another critical juncture in the making as, if predictions have it right, both the two major political families in the Strasbourg (the European People's Party and the European Socialist Party) are expected to lose some of their current seats and, for the first time, this election will see neither of them having a clear majority (Schaart, 2019). This will mean that new alliances and balances within and across groups will have to be sought at a time when sovereignist parties are expected to increase their seats. It is also unclear whether such sovereignist will consolidate into a homogenous alternative coalition capable of undermining the Europeanist front. There has been much speculation over what might be shaping up as the 'peoples of Europe' umbrella, a coalition supported by Trump's former chief strategist, Steve Bannon's new foundation ("The Movement") whose explicit aim is to dismantle the EU and restore 'traditional' values (Cerulus, 2018). This could lead to the paradoxical situation where parties which found their legitimacy on discourses of national sovereignty will Trojan-horse supranational institutions in order to delegitimise them. Even if the alleged umbrella of sovereignist parties does not consolidate as predicted, some impact from sovereignist parties is expected on the European balance of power as, for example, a shift could occur in the presidency of the European Parliament and the Commission towards figures more ideologically sympathetic to populist moods. In this scenario, according to Soros (2019) "the cleavage that matters most today is no longer between capital and labour but between pro- and anti-European forces". Meanwhile, however, a transnational conceptualization of the people that could counteract sovereignist discourses is struggling to emerge due to a series of weak structural conditions and the self-reinforcing nature of national discourses.

So what are the opportunities and the limitations for a non-national conceptualization of the people? Of course Europe cannot be defined in culturally and ethnically homogenous terms and the European people can only be conceived of as a transnational demos, that is a civic community beyond national remits. But, so far the European demos has been weak (some would say hardly existent) for a number of reasons. For example, a truly transnational European Public Sphere is still underdeveloped as European elections campaigns are still framed around nationally domesticated themes and participation is weak as elections for the European Parliament are seen as 'second order' elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1997). The nation is still a key actor in the EU system; for example formal EU citizenship relies on national citizenship in the first place and the Council, which is still a key player in decisions making, will prioritise national interests 'by default'. Moreover, we see national discourses and national structures mutually reinforcing each other. For example a strong discursive naturalisation exists that equates popular sovereignty with national sovereignty. These discourses are constantly being reproduced. For example, the 73 British EP seats that will be no longer available following the UK's expected departure from the EU will be redistributed nationally to other countries as the proposal to use these seats to create transnational lists was voted down (Barbière, 2018). Whilst this could have been an opportunity for transnationalising and deterritorialising EP voting system by allowing EU citizens to vote beyond their national constituencies, one could argue that the 'British people' have symbolically been renationalised under different country labels.

A true reconfiguration of the concepts of the people and their sovereignty is a nodal point that should really be addressed by an agenda of European reforms. As Habermas (quoted in von Bogdandy, 2013) has argued "we cannot just project the familiar national design of liberal institutions onto the supranational level. The same principles, if they ever can be implemented on a global scale, will assume a different institutional format". If we think of popular sovereignty as separate from national sovereignty (the latter being a much more modern concept) maybe we can conceive of popular sovereignty at the European level. But how could such European popular sovereignty be achieved and legitimised? Answering these questions is clearly beyond the scope of this paper but some suggestions that have been put forward both at top-down and bottom-up levels are worth exploring and pursuing. At an institutional level, for example, we can think of greater role for European Parliament as the legitimate sovereign body. For example, French President Emmanuel Macron (reported in Banks and Levy-Abegnoli, 2018) floated these ideas by stating: "The European Parliament should elect and control a European government. Every European Commissioner has to convince people by running for the European parliamentary elections."

In public discourse, transnational and deterritorialised ideas of people (Zappettini, 2017; 2019) can be promoted as well as representations of *citizens over peoples*. This could lead to a transnationalised and deterritorialised understanding of the European demos and arguably promote a voting system whereby EU citizens were allowed to vote beyond their national constituencies based on European programmes rather than specific national agendas. In addition, from a bottom up perspective, we can encourage active citizenship ('imagining' and 'doing' Europe) where European identities would emerge within a networked community and through engagement, participation and investment with Europe as a democratic project (McEntee-Atalianis and Zappettini, 2014).

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European and global identity through the scope of Palaeolithic Archaeology

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ABSTRACT

The rise of nationalist and populist rhetoric, the separatist movements, and the subsequent tensions within and between nations evidence an identity crisis in Europe. It is thus of paramount importance for social cohesion and future peace that we develop a sense of common belonging and a shared past. Educational systems and cultural institutions, such as museums or galleries, primarily focus on local history, mainly of the last 2-3 millennia. Palaeolithic Archaeology can illustrate the fundamental values that define all humans, while at the same time emphasise the importance of mobility, interaction and admixture of cultures.

Keywords: European Identity, Diversity, Education, Public Archaeology, Palaeolithic

INTRODUCTION

Europe has recently witnessed a rise of nationalist parties such as UKIP in Britain, Rassemblement national, formerly known as Front National in France, and Golden Dawn in Greece, to name but a few, and populist rhetoric by parties such as Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain or the Five Star Movement in Italy, separatist movements in Britain (Scottish independence and Brexit referendum) and Spain (Catalonia independence referendum) as well as unrest in the borders of the European Union (Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014, Turkish *coup d'état* attempt in 2016). It is apparent that as a result of the influence of such political movements Euroscepticism is gaining ground (MacMillan, 2017), whereas the construction of a common European identity and the idea of European completion are subsequently losing ground in favour of a renewed sense of nationalism which is spreading across Europe. In this context, the reinforcement of a European identity becomes vital for European social cohesion and the survival of the EU.

These issues often derive from the foundations of what is perceived as European identity, which are national history, the widely acceptable cultural markers of 'Europeanness' such as the Christian religion, Graeco-Roman antiquity, the colonial empires of Western Europe, and the Caucasian racial identity, and the perceived contrast between Western culture and the rest of the world. These stereotypes are reproduced by the educational system, cultural entities such as museums or galleries, and the media. It is proposed that a shift in focus should be made from contemporary history to early prehistory both in the educational curriculum of public schools and in the content of museum exhibitions, as well as increased collaboration between European scholars of the Palaeolithic in order to produce an accessible database of the archaeological record of the Pleistocene and the early Holocene, thus facilitating future research and public access to knowledge of our shared past on a European level.

Defining European Identity

European identity has been described as a paradox, as it is neither fully accepted nor understood in a similar way by the citizens of all member states. The concept of a supranational identity was shaped decades after the foundation of the European Union, and it is a creation of the institutions of the EU rather than the people. In addition, the historical and political differences between the member states have never been fully bridged, with the Iron Curtain separation of Western and Eastern Europe still very much evident in the perspective of the peoples of Europe (Levonian, 2017, p. 48). More than ever, Europe is a contested concept, defined between the ideas of a common culture along the nations-states and the construction of a European identity (Ifversen, 2002). These contrasting models, the "culturalist" and the "structuralist", have influenced scholarly research, official EU rhetoric and policies, with the latter becoming more dominant institutionally and academically in recent years,

generally expressed through the motto of *unity in diversity*. This EU rhetoric has been documented in the 2014 European elections campaign, where the audiovisual corpus of advertisements portrayed a unison image of the different European countries portrayed (Picciuolo, 2017). It has thus been shown that European identity has not spread very far, as only 12.7 per cent of the people in Europe view themselves as Europeans (3.9 per cent view themselves as Europeans exclusively, while another 8.8 per cent view themselves as Europeans while also having a national identity) whereas national identities, and in many cases nationalism, still hold strong (Fligstein *et al.*, 2012).

The European continent is actually a historical convention and not an actual continent like Africa, the Americas or Oceania, and geologically belongs to the Eurasian continental mass (Chapman & Solomon, 1976). What is more, mountain ranges, major rivers, lakes and marine frontiers separate regions within the European continent, such as the Balkans, the Carpathians, or the Baltic region to name a few, thus creating ambiguities concerning the European identity of peripheral countries within them. Therefore, it is particularly difficult to clearly define European identity based on European geographical borders which are redefined from time to time according to the political situation. Nevertheless, people of Asian or African descent are sometimes excluded from the concept of European identity which is often associated with Caucasians (Ifversen, 2002, p. 9).

The linguistic diversity of the European population further complicates the issue, even if for the greater part European languages are derived from the Indo-European linguistic family (Haak *et al.*, 2015). European legislation is translated in 24 languages spoken by the 28 Member States of the European Union constituting the largest multilingual database, testifying to the multilingualism of Europe (Maslias, 2017). The *European Cultural Convention* (1954) of the Council of Europe acknowledged this multitude of languages as well as the need to encourage the study of these across the nation states to promote tolerance and acceptance between the member countries. Taking this notion a step further, the *Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society* (2005) of the Council of Europe specifies the need for foreign language learning in education “to promote European mobility, mutual understanding and co-operation, and overcome prejudice and discrimination.” It is often suggested that without a common language, the means to nation state formation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, European social integration would be impossible (Wright, 2000).

In terms of a cultural identity it has been suggested that a historical borderline exists between the West and the East, where European identity is defined by the Protestant and Catholic Christian values and cultural traditions, a division derived from the dichotomisation of the Roman Empire in the 4th century, which was consolidated in the 16th century (Huntington, 1996). This notion has been disproved twice; firstly with the inclusion of Orthodox countries in the European Union, and secondly with the social integration of large numbers of Muslims within the member countries. In the late 90s the trend in the EU indicated a slow ebbing of the influence of religion and a subsequent increase in the importance of economic performance in the process of European integration was predicted (Nelsen *et al.*, 2001). However, as the economic performance of the EU has been contested in the eyes of a large portion of Europeans, it comes as no surprise that the place of Christianity in European politics and its role in defining ‘Europeanness’ has made a come-back in recent years (Schlesinger & Foret, 2006). Political controversies surrounding Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam have served as obstacles rather than stepping stones towards further integration of Europe, as it has been shown that religious traditions promote European identity in ways not intended by the founders of the European project. Such perceptions of political elites resist the EU enlargement to Turkey and regard immigration from non-EU countries as a threat to European identity (Matonyte & Morkevicius, 2012, p. 107). In fact, it has been argued that the idea that Europeans share a common Christian identity serves a source of right-wing political sentiment across Europe, which excludes non-EU foreigners and immigrants from processes of integration and citizenship (Holmes, 2009).

Another proposed cultural indicator of European identity is a perceived shared Graeco-Roman background, as manifested in the history, literature, architecture, political and humanitarian values that are thought to be found across the members of the European Union. The Ancient Greek, Roman and Byzantine cultures have been recognised as fundamental themes for European history in secondary education at an official meeting organised by the Council of Europe in 1965 (Stobart, 1999, p. 153). European imperialism has also heavily drawn from the Hellenistic and Roman Empires to draw analogies and to assume a similar role of a civilising power within the global community, using the dichotomy ‘civilization/barbarians’ in colonial and imperialist discourse. International thinking of the 19th and 20th centuries put civilisation forward as a criterion for progress, forming a ‘European ideology’ which in many cases was a synonym for ‘colonial ideology’ and a justification of imperial violence with the underpinned notions of imperialism, scientific racism and Eurocentric

institutionalism which focuses on the differences between rational western and irrational oriental institutions (Mikelis, 2017).

Diversification of the European Population

The influx of immigrant and refugee populations from Africa and Asia into Europe, with a recent culmination that has led to a subsequent refugee crisis (Holmes & Castañeda, 2016), has transformed European countries from generally homogenous nation states, as these were formed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, into multicultural societies with vast linguistic and cultural diversity, especially in urban centres, posing new challenges to European societies (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). This complexity between languages and cultures which create and cross new boundaries and rules within the European major cities has coined the term “metrolingualism” to describe the linguistic diversity and mobility as witnessed in these urban centres (Pennycook & Otsuji, 2015).

The diversity of languages and cultures within European cities has also been met with racist and xenophobic reactions by a part of the population. Refugees and immigrants are often portrayed negatively in the press and in advertisements, often falsely accused of being responsible for increased crime rates, and in any case as a major problem for the indigenous population (Sakellariou, 2017, Klein *et al.*, 2017). In the contents of integration policies of many European member states, diversity has negative semantics, whereas minority groups are often discriminated or isolated, and sometimes even their languages and cultures are not officially recognised by the authorities. What is more, in the education systems of many of the member states, minority languages are either not taught, or perceived as less important than the officially recognised languages¹ or English, which is the most commonly spoken second language in Europe. In this context plurilingualism, a diachronically fundamental characteristic of European identity cannot be fostered without bottom-up educational reforms that will foster tolerance and acceptance of diversity (Colaiuda, 2017).

National identity through historical education in Europe

Although a decrease in the significance of national identity in favour of a collective focus of citizenry has been documented in the school curricula of European countries, with an emphasis on the Europeanization of the nation and the re-interpretation of historical events such as the French Revolution (Schissler & Soysal, 2005, p. 5), the greatest percentage of history taught involves European themes, leaving a small part for non-European civilisations. What is more, history teaching in primary and secondary education mainly focuses on medieval and contemporary history, whereas antiquity and prehistory are less important in terms of teaching time. Between 1953 and 1958 a cycle of six international conferences organized by the Council of Europe on the improvement of history textbooks, dealing with the European Idea in History Teaching, the Middle Ages, the 16th Century, the 17th and 18th Centuries, and the periods 1789-1871 and 1870-1950, with the exclusion of ancient history (Stobart, 1999, pp. 150-1).

After unification in 1871, German education was influenced by the ideas of national character and destiny, which was echoed in the profoundly nationalistic school history textbooks (Green, 1997, pp. 178-9). Nowadays, in many of the German history book series, the nation is valorized negatively, and emphasis is placed in contemporary history, stressing the erroneous path of the Weimar Republic and the Nazi period, leaving very little time for the study of the past, from Ancient Greece and Rome to the Christian Middle Ages (Soysal *et al.*, 2005, p. 15), and obviously very little or no teaching time left for the study of prehistory. In Lower Saxony, Germany, national history covers about 40% of the history program for the first year of secondary school, whereas 50% of teaching time is allocated to European themes, leaving a mere 10% for non-European civilisations (Soysal & Wong, 2007, p. 76).

¹ The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers issued a recommendation on “The training of teachers in education for intercultural understanding, notably in a context of migration” in 1984, to promote open-mindedness and an understanding of cultural differences. An international treaty for the Protection of National Minorities was opened for signature in 1995, clearly stating the parties’ obligation to provide adequate opportunities for teacher training and access to textbooks, as in some countries minorities were not allowed to import and use foreign textbooks (Stobart, 1999, pp. 157-8).

The French educational system of the Third Republic was the means to instil the sense of national inclusion to the majority of the French population-the ‘peasants’-who did not become ‘Frenchmen’ and ‘Frenchwomen’ before they had gone through the mass education system (Smith, 1998, p. 163). Citizenship and secularism are still prominent in the definition of the nation in French history textbooks, with an emphasis on Europeanism in the curriculum. Certain periods of twentieth-century French history, such as the *Resistance*, appear to be given more attention, while others, such as the birth of the French Kingdom, seem to have lost their symbolic significance (Soysal *et al.*, 2005, p. 14).

The British educational system and its approach towards national identity are a complex issue and one that can be seen as a paradox in a number of ways, especially in light of the recent rise of nationalism in the UK and the subsequent separation from the European Union. Traditionally English schools have hardly at all been used as a means of nationalist propaganda (Reisner, 1922, p. 317) and even though a concerted effort has been made since 1979 by central government to promote a greater sense of national unity in state schools, the major trend in British education is not one that focuses heavily on the construction of a national identity as is the case in Continental Europe where deliberate efforts of nation-building through education played an important part (Green, 1990, p. 124). The limitations of the nationalistic element in the national curriculum introduced under the 1988 Education Reform Act and recent retreats have seen a further scaling down of the national curriculum, and government recognition of cultural diversity within the United Kingdom has allowed the separation of syllabuses in England and Wales, allowing for different ethnic groups in the UK to study their own language and history (Green, 1997, p. 131).

The processes of ‘harmonization’ of European national states in the European Union are uneven, contested, and in the eyes of many ‘incomplete’ (Smith, 2009, p. 103), despite the continuous effort of European policy makers for the construction of a European identity (Nóvoa & Lawn, 2007, pp. 2-3). The nation-states have been built through a transition from a ‘low’ culture, one of an agroliterate society, to a ‘high’ culture of an industrial society, a rich and complex society replicated by a system of public, mass education which trains every member of this society to be able to participate in it (Gellner, 1983, pp. 50-2). The public mass education systems of the member states are still to this day based in the concept of national identity, which often leads to nationalism, and industrialism with the purpose of sustaining a ‘high’ culture for an industrial society. This modernist approach to education of ‘building’ nations through mass public education systems (Smith, 1998, p. 20) has been challenged by educational reforms, both European and nation-state, but to this day remains as the core of teaching history, culture and the past. As such, the content and method of teaching history and the past in its wider sense in public mass education systems across Europe can only serve as an obstacle to the process of European completion and the formation of a European identity.

The Palaeolithic past in European education systems

The majority of school curricula in Europe either exclude or devote minimal teaching time to the Palaeolithic, Mesolithic and Neolithic periods of human history. Whereas what can be defined as European history spans approximately 3500 years, prehistory covers more than 3 million years of documented human activity, with the presence of early hominids in the European continent starting at about 1.5 million years BP (Messager *et al.*, 2011, Manzi *et al.*, 2011, Abbate & Sagri, 2012, Duval *et al.*, 2018). This long period of human activity, which includes a number of advances and adaptations that have defined our species, is consistently overlooked by the educational systems of Europe, with the implication that it is unimportant to modern society.

The absence of the Palaeolithic in the curricula of European primary and secondary education can be clearly illustrated by the example of Greece. The Palaeolithic, Mesolithic and Neolithic periods are covered in about six pages in the textbook of the first grade of junior high school, and three lines in the textbook of the first grade of high school (Lyceum), proving that historic periods not immediately connected with Greek culture are considered unimportant and are assigned a very limited teaching time, despite the long time span and the multiple transitions that they cover (Touloumis, in press). Not only is the Palaeolithic underrepresented in the education system of Greece, it is also incompletely and inaccurately taught, summing up the 1.5 million-year-presence of *Homo erectus* in two sentences, and completely ignoring the existence of *Homo heidelbergensis* and *neanderthalensis*, who are the only species apart from our own found in the Greek peninsula. There are only two pictures to present the material culture and life ways of humans in the Palaeolithic, one depicting six artefacts described as ‘the main tools of Palaeolithic man’ (a hand axe, three lithic points, one bone barbed point, and a bone

needle), and one depicting an illustrated reconstruction of life in the Palaeolithic (Katsoulakos *et al.*, 2017, pp. 6-7). The school history textbooks issued between 1937 and 1974 included frequent references to the relation between prehistory and national identity and superiority, not only of Greeks over other nations, but also of Europe as a continent central to the advancement of civilisation. School textbooks issued between 1974 and 2006 included somewhat less references to prehistory in relation to national identity and superiority, although early prehistory is still minimally represented, with the stone age being almost completely absent from most textbooks, and usually portrayed as an 'underdeveloped' or 'savage' period in human history. Emphasis is still placed on the idea of cultural continuation which documents the direct lineage of Modern Greek populations with Ancient Greece and even the Mycenaean and Minoan civilisations of the Bronze Age (Hadjidaki, 2006, pp. 69-85).

A somewhat different, yet equally problematic in my opinion, case is the representation of Prehistory in the history textbooks of Portugal. The transition from the Palaeolithic to the Neolithic is presented in the section 'From the hunter gatherer societies to the first civilizations', a title very much indicative of the underlying notions expressed in it. Although the origin of humanity is, quite rightly so, placed in Africa, the onset of 'civilization', as mentioned in the title, takes place in Egypt, as if it weren't a part of the same continent. Furthermore, the processes of sedentarisation and of complex social differentiation, the agricultural techniques, and the construction and drainage techniques that are documented in Egyptian prehistory are paralleled to the ones used today in our scientifically advanced societies. In contrast, the existing populations of hunters who live in Amazonia (an analogy with multiple meanings as the Amazon belongs to a region colonized by the Portuguese) are compared to the peoples from the Stone Age. This representation of time and space 'turns history into a moral success story', that of modernization which is seen as a linear process (Araújo & Maeso, 2012, pp. 8-9). The Palaeolithic in the textbooks of Portugal is part of a narrative that serves as an indirect justification of the country's colonial history, and is, very much like the Greek textbooks, part of Eurocentrism and Eurocentric notions of racism.

It is not only school textbooks that sometimes present a biased image of the Palaeolithic. Educational books, comic books and other children's publications illustrate earliest prehistory in a number of clichés that influenced by contemporary gender and sometimes even racial stereotypes. The pictures through which children come into contact with the Palaeolithic depict our male ancestors as technological innovators, responsible for the provision of food to the family or the group, and rituals. Arts, crafts and religion all fall within their sphere of influence. Their female contemporaries are connected with reproduction, cooking and the processing of the prey and its by-products, and sometimes as assistants to foraging, reproducing the cultural and gender western stereotypes of the 19th and 20th centuries (Galanidou, 2007). In this way, the prehistoric past becomes a powerful visual validation of the modern male dominance status, underpinning the notion that 'things have always been that way'.

Human societies would not even exist without an understanding of the past, and European identity cannot be fully formed without a shared past. The distant past is equally important as the more recent, and children's understanding of it is of increased importance, as their cognitive abilities are different from those of adults and for that reason past narratives are of fundamental importance in the process of understanding their self and others according to the rules of their culture, and integrating the individual in society and the world (Galanidou & Dommasnes, 2007, p. 2). Incorporation, expansion and improvement of the teaching of Palaeolithic, Mesolithic and Neolithic periods in European education curricula is vital for a better understanding of the past, and increased awareness of the diversity of human nature and cultural identities. As long as the teaching of early human history is separated from the teaching of human evolution, students' understanding of prehistory and the origins of humankind is bound to remain incomplete. The fragmentation of knowledge and disciplines like history, geography and biology which is expressed in the textbooks and curricula of European public education is bound to limit our understanding of the past. In contrast, the unified and multidisciplinary perspective to the past that Palaeolithic archaeology is inviting us to adopt can provide a holistic view of human history (Galanidou, 2008, p. 183).

Palaeolithic Archaeology as a foundation of European Identity

Palaeolithic Archaeology can illustrate the fundamental values that define all humans, while at the same time shed light on the mobility, interaction and admixture patterns of people and cultures, their adaptations to new habitats and climate change from the earliest period of history. These topics, ever

increasing in importance, are at the centre of public discourse across Europe, often defining the political agenda and the European countries' stance on immigration, borders, integration and climate change. A better understanding of prehistory can potentially affect the attitudes of both the current and future generations towards the 'otherness' of people around us, and environmental change.

The complex genetic history of our species, *Homo sapiens*, who originated in Africa (Hublin, *et al.*, 2017), subsequently spreading across the globe can be a constant reminder of our roots both as Europeans and, most importantly, as humans. Recent studies have confirmed that some present-day humans derive up to approximately 5% of their ancestry from archaic Denisovans, whereas other population groups have an approximate 2% of their genetic make-up derived from Neanderthals (Sankararaman *et al.*, 2016) proving interaction between completely different populations was common even in the sparsely populated Eurasia of the Palaeolithic. Moving forward in time from the Middle Palaeolithic, to the Upper Palaeolithic, Mesolithic, Neolithic and the Early Bronze Age, Europe has witnessed multiple episodes of population replacement (Reich, 2018). In a context of increased nationalist, xenophobic, and racist ideologies, rhetoric (Sakellariou, 2017) and actions in Europe (Strani, *et al.*, 2017), a better understanding of the complexity of human ancestry and our genome can eradicate racist stereotypes of race, and through education construct a future where racial discrimination would be considered illogical.

The Palaeolithic stands as an undeniable witness to environment change, human adaptation to diverse habitats and climates, as well as population extinction and replacement, possibly due to climate change among other factors. The first indigenous European population, *Homo neanderthalensis*, lived in a completely different climate and environment, that of the Ice Age, (Roebroeks & Tuffreau, 1999) from the one that Europeans have witnessed in the past 15 thousand years BP. These ancient populations, including *Homo heidelbergensis* who was probably the first species to occupy Europe and subsequently evolve into *Homo neanderthalensis*, showed quite a large environmental tolerance as well as high mobility, possibly even crossing water to inhabit islands in the Aegean and Ionian seas (Papoulia, 2017), adapting to a variety of cold and open environments, and dense forests, glacial and interglacial periods, during which temperature drops of up to 10°C were possible within 10 to 20 years, for several hundred millennia (Roebroeks & Tuffreau, 1999, p. 128). Nowadays climate change is once again a reality that humanity must face, and it is important to understand the natural process of climate circles, the effect of human activity, and the steps that need to be taken to adapt to these changes, that were partly responsible for the extinction of an ancestral species.

The Palaeolithic can be more meaningful to students, museum goers and the wider public, as it is focused on the individual rather than the history of cities, nations and their peoples. In its pursuit to answer questions about the origins of modern humans, the origin of arts and culture, Palaeolithic archaeology has shifted its focus on the individual as a centre of causality and an active agent in the historical process (Gamble & Porr, 2005). The history taught in textbooks across Europe, from WWI & II, to the colonial empires, the Roman Era, or even that of the late prehistoric periods such as the Bronze or, in some cases, the Iron Age, is the detailed account of battles, wars, the rise and fall of civilizations and the actions of leaders who made all, or at least most of, the important decisions. These accounts have shaped the national identities of the European nations, but have ceased to be meaningful for the diverse population of modern Europe, and in many cases have re-ignited tensions that had been forgotten or, as it has been proven by the facts, suppressed. The expansion, or in some cases the addition, of the earliest prehistory in European public education curricula can provide European students, who are very often of different cultural backgrounds, a common point of reference in the study of the human past and a different perspective on the importance of later historical periods, which usually focus on the Past of the dominant national group, and have up till now been assigned much more teaching time.

It must not be forgotten that the past is not, and should not be, only taught in schools, but also in museums and other public places, such as archaeological sites or monuments. These are the places where children, and adults, acquire a three dimensional perspective of the ancient world under the guidance of educators, archaeologists, and guides, making the past meaningful within a social context (Galanidou & Dommasnes, 2007, p. 9). The Palaeolithic past must be included in this context, and so far there are not enough museum exhibitions or accessible archaeological sites of this period. It has been shown that, especially in smaller communities, a museum can enrich children's knowledge of prehistory, while at the same time revive traditional crafts and ultimately transform into an asset that offers employment opportunities and structures a new identity (Sârbu & Gheorghiu, 2007).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although it studies the earliest human past, Palaeolithic Archaeology can be very relevant to the present and serve as an educational tool for the future. It is in no way confined to the boundaries of traditional archaeology and the study of monuments and material culture within a certain cultural context, nor is it a strictly theoretical science. Modern archaeology is a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary science which embraces the latest developments in genetics, oceanography and GIS mapping in order to reconstruct the environment in which our common ancestors lived, travelled, bred and eventually spread across the globe, and can thus be relevant to students and people of different academic, or not academic, backgrounds and interests. More importantly, it is a science that studies the essential elements of human life, cognition and society, and the long history of our interaction with nature and the environment. As such, it can offer valuable life lessons on environmental awareness, provide a different perspective on the place of man in the history of the planet on a timescale of millions of years. In fact, it has the potential to reconcile racial and national conflicts and tensions by showing the long history of human migrations, interactions and admixtures which led to the existing populations, who have been proven to share much more genetically than expected by the racial stereotypes that are still very much widespread.

It is proposed that three steps be taken at a European scale: a) Inclusion and expansion of Palaeolithic studies in the education curriculum, in order to construct a sense of common identity especially for younger students (Morin, 2002, pp. 22-25), b) Establishment of a European database of Palaeolithic artefacts, so as to facilitate scientists to compare different assemblages and produce a unified Pleistocene record, c) Public exhibitions of Palaeolithic art and material culture, especially in countries where there are no relevant collections. Educational reforms that will incorporate a larger part of prehistory can make teaching of the past more meaningful to students of African or Asian origin, and shape a global point of reference for the beginning of human identity. A European database for the Palaeolithic is a necessity for both scholars, who would benefit from an open access corpus of lithics - with the establishment of a common vocabulary for raw material (Karkazi, in press), typology and dating- bone and other artefacts for comparison and productive discussion on the Pleistocene record, but also for educational institutions, museums and archaeological services across the continent. Such initiatives have been suggested in the past², but have been left incomplete, or have been accessible only to a small audience. Finally, a European initiative for temporary and permanent Palaeolithic exhibitions especially in countries where such exhibitions are absent or very limited and preferably in rural areas and smaller cities can improve the public's understanding of the importance of the distant past to the shaping of today's society, the high mobility and migration patterns of human populations since the very beginning of mankind, and the common genetic links of all modern people.

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² The [PaMELA](#) (Palaeolithic and Mesolithic Lithic Artefact) database is one such example, which consists of a literal digital transcription of Jacobi's card index (the Jacobi Archive); and a searchable database with typological and chronological keys (the Colonisation of Britain database).

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The European Union as a *Lovemark*

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ABSTRACT

Lovemarks is a marketing concept that was developed by Kevin Roberts, CEO of global advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi, as the “Future of brands” in 2004. The concept provides a simple explanatory scheme; companies can generate two emotions to their customers: respect and love. In the framework of the present paper, the European Union is perceived as a unique brand. It has its own distinctive characteristics e.g. flag, legislative and institutional bodies etc. The European Union is an unprecedented political and economic entity; therefore, “a new brand”. As is the case with all brands, people relate to them, or not, based on their needs, beliefs, social, cultural, political and educational background. This paper attempts to apply the Lovemarks concept to the European Union brand. Examining Europeans’ perceptions on the EU as expressed in the Standard Eurobarometer, the EU is placed on the Love/Respect axes.

Keywords: Lovemarks, European Union, brand, repositioning, Eurobarometer

INTRODUCTION

It is hardly impossible to assess European Integration history without referring to the numerous crises and challenges this project has faced along the way of its more-than-60-year-course. As the second decade of the 21st century comes to an end, the European Union seems to be on the verge of making important decisions that will determine its future. There are two elements that compose the extremely thorny background against which these decisions will be made: Euroscepticism and the number of open challenges that need to be addressed.

EUROSCEPTICISM

Even though some early signs of skepticism towards the European Integration process can be traced to the very first Eurobarometer polls¹, the term “Eurosceptic” is mentioned for the first time by British scholars in the mid-80s. The era of Margaret Thatcher, who is considered by many as the “spiritual mother of Euroscepticism” in British politics, provided the propitious environment for the birth of the concept. It initially described the fraction within the Conservatives Party that expressed their concerns regarding the increased authority of Brussels at the expense of the national sovereignty of Member States. The “official introduction” of “Euroscepticism” in European Studies takes place in 1992 as an aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty (Sorensen, 2005). According to Verney, “This treaty was seen as an event that caused to opposition because of its challenges to national sovereignty, its economic prescriptions, and the fears of the erosion of national identity aggravated by the project for European citizenship. The ratification of the treaty affected the positive belief in a ‘permissive consensus’ in public opinion” (2011, p. 1). Denmark’s marginal rejection of the Treaty and France’s marginal approval in the respective referenda put an end to the idea of a “permissive consensus” among the public in Member States regarding the progress of European Integration.

Euroscepticism today, deriving from “opposition and doubt to the process of European Integration” (Taggart, 1998, p. 365), is a broad concept that extends from a principled opposition to the EU which is expressed as a call for withdrawal (Hard Euroscepticism), to concerns over the trajectory of the EU which threatens Members’ “national interest” (Soft Euroscepticism) (Ultan & Ornek, 2015). Moreover,

¹ In the first Eurobarometer surveys, there were questions on whether member states’ public consider Common Market sufficient to serve its purpose or how they assess Community action in certain sectors. (Commission of the European Communities)

“Euroscepticism” is not a marginal trend in European politics, since openly Eurosceptic parties have entered not only European, but also National Parliaments².

EU IN CRISIS

Challenges are inherent in the European Integration course; however, in the last decade the EU had to cope with a number of issues that generally gave the impression of a constant crisis. To begin with, the debt crisis in the Eurozone brought to surface both the structural deficiencies in the design of the common currency as well as the EU's profound limitations in immediately taking action to handle the crisis. Also, the Migration crisis made evident the EU's inability to shape a joint stance towards such a grave issue. Brexit is the first practical drawback of the European Integration course which puts an end to the perception of the EU's linear progress.

The background is complemented by the long lasting challenges the European Union faces. For instance, the impression that the EU's governance system is complicated, obscure and with no direct accountability to the European people whom it is supposed to serve – the so-called democratic deficit. Further challenges could be considered the inability of the EU to act as a single and unified entity, especially in matters of security and foreign policy, as well as issues related to inequalities in terms of social, political and economic development amongst Members.

Given this background, the demand of reforms that would revive the European Integration project and inspire the European people to reaffirm their commitment to the ultimate goal of the EU is imperative. Academic scholars, think tanks and politicians have been engaged in an ongoing debate regarding the direction of reforms and the specific actions the EU should take.

In this context, this paper aims at contributing to the discussion through the introduction of a Marketing Communications' concept on a purely political issue. Based on the Lovemarks (the Marketing Communications' concept that is going to be employed) idea, the paper proposes that the EU should focus not only on its efficiency to provide Europeans with economic wealth, but also on communicating its purpose and success stories in a way that would revive the bond between the people and the EU's vision.

The paper is divided in three main parts. The first introduces the reader to the concept of Lovemarks: its content in comparison to other similar concepts, its added value for the companies as well as the methodology it applies in order to determine how it can be employed by the companies. The second part applies the Lovemarks methodology to the case of the European Union in order to both identify its current status and define towards which direction EU actions should be taken. The third and last part, presents a number of successful Lovemarks examples from the market and focuses on the lessons that can be drawn by these successful case studies in order to formulate proposals for specific steps that the EU could make.

LOVEMARKS

From Products to Lovemarks

Products

Products are the basis of any daily transaction. According to Kotler et al. a product is “anything offered to a market for attention, acquisition, use or consumption that might satisfy a want or need. Products include more than just tangible goods. Broadly defined, products include physical objects, services, persons, places, organizations, ideas or mixes of these entities” (2008, p. 500). Taking this definition into consideration, it is evident that products can have various forms and constitute the foreground for any business and personal transactions as well as for any marketing practices.

Trademarks

As the number of products available in the market, both national and international, is immense, trademarks are used to make each product distinguishable to customers. The European Union Intellectual Property Office (2017) defines trademarks as “signs used in trade to identify products”. Trademarks are usually long-term oriented and aim at a product's differentiation and recognition in the

² After 2019 EU elections there are 3 “euro-sceptic” political groups: Identity & Democracy (Euro-sceptic) with 73 seats, European Conservatives & Reformists (soft euro-sceptic) with 62 seats and European United Left – Nordic Green Left (soft euro-sceptic) with 41 seats.

market. Moreover, within the market; these distinguishable product signs influence and shape customers' buying behavior.

Brands

Trademarks are related to the visual distinctive characteristics of a product. In the fast-paced growth and development of national and international markets, the need for further differentiation based mainly on the emotional connection that customers have with the product becomes evident. Brands are integrally linked to a person's subjective perception of the product, organization or service. According to Cohen (2011)

Brands are shorthand marketing messages that create emotional bonds with consumers. Brands consist of intangible elements related to their specific promise, personality, and positioning as well as of tangible components that possess identifiable representation such as logos, graphics, colors and sounds. A brand creates perceived value for consumers through its personality in a way that makes it stand out from other similar products. Its story is intricately intertwined with the public's perception and consistently provides consumers with a secure sense that they know what they're paying for.(n.d.)

That being the case, customers have become brand - conscious. However, as the number of brands is increasing in the globalized market, customers need a point of reference they can relate to. Logos, slogans and pictures as part of a brand ceased to be significant for customer recognition and buying behavior. The last few years the emotional connection to a brand is what distinguishes a brand for consumers. The personal feelings that a customer has, and are associated with a brand, are what make loyal customers. In other words, customer experience is of paramount importance for brands to thrive and establish themselves in the international market. Hence, brands build or should build strong relationships with customers. In cases where love is the main/core/key feeling that forges the relationship between consumer and brand, a *Lovemark* is created.

Lovemarks

According to the founder of Lovemarks, "Brands are running out of juice" (Roberts, 2005, p. 35) suggesting that love is needed for a brand to remain high in customers' selection. Therefore, Lovemarks are based on a simple idea: consuming behavior is rather an emotional than a rational matter. In this context, enterprises should invest on building an emotional connection between their brand and customers. Companies should set Lovemarks as a target and focus their efforts on its achievement. Three elements are essential to accomplish this goal: the starting point (i.e. how close or far a company is in becoming a Lovemark), the direction (i.e. what actions should be taken in order to achieve the desired outcome) and the ending point (i.e. how the company will know that it has reached its goal).

Additionally, Roberts (2005) suggests that mystery, sensuality and intimacy constitute the triggering powers for the development and sustainability of a Lovemark. As far as mystery is concerned, it is the creation of great stories that connect the present with the past and the future. Mystery allows consumers to create their personal myths and inspirations in alignment with the ones promoted by their beloved brand. Along with mystery, Lovemarks have sensuality; they stimulate all five human senses (sound, sight, scent, taste and touch). Even though packaging, colors and design contribute to consumers' perception and imagery of a product or service, what should be of paramount importance, are the feelings triggered by this product. Last but not least, intimacy is a Lovemarks trigger; people need to feel an intimate connection such as compassion and empathy when they relate with a product. By experiencing such positive and emotional feelings, people turn into loyal customers.

Lovemarks vs Brands

Having defined and analyzed the characteristics of both brands and Lovemarks, it is significant to examine the relationship between the two. Brands have established themselves in the world of marketing making them the predecessors of Lovemarks. However, it is important to highlight that not all brands become Lovemarks. Some attributes that illustrate the differences between the two are discussed below.

Brand awareness is based on the information communicated to the consumer via its logo, colors etc., so brands become recognizable to both existing customers and potential new ones. On the other hand, Lovemarks attribute their success to the relationship they create with the customer. That is why they are loved by people and form stronger emotional bonds than just being easily recognizable among products. Moreover, brands present a narrative and a statement creating a more generic image of the

product, whereas Lovemarks create love stories, i.e. stories that people can relate to and project themselves toward their context and content. Statements produced by brands might focus on the quality of the product and/or service, providing a defined meaning, and restricting the personal engagement and contribution of customers. On the contrary, lovemarks are based on stories which stimulate customers' engagement while the meaning is infused with feelings. Sensuality is a fundamental characteristic of storytelling and by extension of Lovemarks.

Neurologist Donald Calne (1999) perhaps said it best: "The essential difference between emotion and reason is that emotion leads to action while reason leads to conclusions." This is the case as far as brands and Lovemarks are concerned. Brands are based on values, statements and quality as they are the outcome of a profession. People perceive the reasonable message sent to them via the logo, colors and branding leading them to conclusions. Lovemarks, on the other hand, are interwoven with emotions as they are an outcome of passionately creative people who manage to trigger feelings in message recipients through storytelling. Thus, the emotions lead customers to choose the product-lovemark without taking into consideration the existence of substitutes. Such emotional aspects of marketing lead to customer loyalty.

Cambridge Dictionary defines customer loyalty as "the fact of a customer buying products or services from the same company over a long period of time". Another distinguishing feature between brands and Lovemarks, is customer loyalty. Customers buy products – lovemarks not just because they need them but because they love them. Mistakes of the Lovemarks can be forgiven, but for brands, a mistake can be irreversible (Roberts, 2005). According to Roberts, CEO of Saatchi & Saatchi, Lovemarks are defined by customer loyalty beyond reason (2005).

Love/Respect Axes

As has been extensively described, Lovemarks are based on the principle that people are powered by emotion rather than logic or reason. As neurologist Donald Calne (1999) argues, logic can lead people to conclusions but emotion leads to actions. This is why enterprises, contrary to what the conventional economic theory on the rational consumer dictates, should focus on building emotional bonds with customers in order to increase loyalty and, consequently, their development and prosperity.

For a company to establish itself as a Lovemark within the globalized market, it must ask itself two questions: where does the company stand today and how can it reach the desirable point/outcome. The first question requires assessing the relationship the firm has built with its customers in order to determine both what its current status is, and, how much further to the Lovemark goal. The second question is important for defining the course that the company should take to achieve this goal; more precisely, which areas require the most effort.

The answer to both questions according to Roberts (2005) lies in the Love/Respect Matrix (see Appendix 1) which shows both how far a company is from becoming a Lovemark and which areas the company has to focus on in order to accomplish this goal. The matrix contains two axes: the Love axis (horizontal) and the Respect axis (vertical). The former reflects the connection between the company and the consumers. As the number of customers attached to a company increases, the company moves to the right side of the matrix. The latter mirrors/presents a concept greatly admired by managers, as it sounds earnest and professional while it can be measured in practical terms, thus providing a sense of objectivity. For the purpose of this matrix, respect is based on a company's performance and reputation among consumers as well as the trust consumers bestow on the company that it would cover their needs in the best possible way. The more the customers show regard for a company, the higher it stands in the vertical axis. There are four quadrats in the Love/Respect Matrix that include all possible combinations of the two elements. The four quadrats are:

- Products: low love, low respect

This is a place where no private corporation of a free economy wishes to be. Consumers do not respect a firm and they have no emotional attachment to it. The only reason consumers continue buying such products is because they have to or they do not have any other alternatives. The most common example of this category is "Public Utilities": a commodity that is provided solely by a sole provider (which is probably state - owned).

- Fads: high love, low respect

Even though emotion leads to action, while reason leads to conclusions, no consumer behavior can be sustainable when it depends exclusively on love. The course that a fad follows is similar to Viral Videos on YouTube: for a certain period of time they gain extremely high popularity but after the

frenzy subsides, the products are left with no sales at all. A famous fad in business history is the Hoola Hoop that overwhelmed markets from 1958 until 1961 and then its trend faded away. No one can argue that Fads are harmful for businesses; on the contrary, they are a great source of profit as long as enterprises keep in mind that the success of this commodity is ephemeral with an immediate expiration date. To conclude, Fads are intense but with short lifespan features that could be deemed a great disadvantage, especially for companies seeking long - term development.

- Brands: low love, high respect

In the previous chapter, Brands as a concept vis-à-vis Lovemarks has been extensively reviewed. Brands are the exact opposite of Fads: they are highly respected but not loved. Consumers prefer Brands because they are trustworthy and of high quality, covering customers' needs in the most satisfactory way. One could argue that high respect is a condition sufficient for a company to thrive. However, Brands could be considered as vulnerable to competition, especially in times of sheer technological advancements that allow little or no space for differentiations between similar products. Since consumers are willing to try other similar products, the result is a decrease in loyalty and unavoidable decline in growth and profit.

- Lovemarks: high love, high respect

Lovemarks meet both criteria: their quality is high enough to gain ultimate trust among their customers and this strongly forged emotional bond leaves no room for anyone to dare try a substitute product. It is the combination of love and respect that creates loyalty beyond reason and secures the company's appeal.

Lovemarks Matrix is a tool that indicates both current status and the areas of improvement. The next question is how a company can define its exact position in the Matrix in order to identify the areas it should focus on. The answer will be given by the customers themselves. Companies make use of an extremely large amount of data (either by sales, polls, focus groups etc.), in order to formulate their strategies and policies. If that data is properly structured, then the company's position in the Matrix can be estimated.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A BRAND

The European Union is an international organization comprised of 28 member states. It is a unique economic and political union founded (as it is today) by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. As stated in the EU's official website, the core values of the Union are to promote and secure human dignity and rights, freedom, democracy and equality governed by the rule of law. Some of the main goals of the EU are to promote peace, security and stability between its member states. "United in Diversity" (www.europa.eu) is the motto of the EU verifying its values and goals. The motto is a distinguishable characteristic of the EU which was introduced in 2000, signifying that the Europeans come together to promote peace and security irrespective of cultural, historical and educational backgrounds.

The economic and monetary union was established to promote sustainable development and economic growth via the single currency, the Euro. The Euro is another distinct trait of the EU. The common currency promotes the notion of belonging to a unified community, since the economy both of the EU and the member states becomes more stable as they have to abide by a common monetary and fiscal policy. Moreover, the rules of the free market are in effect, giving various options to customers while promoting healthy competition. Despite the above, it is broadly accepted that the Euro has profound structural deficiencies, as was proven during the recent financial crisis.

The common identity of the EU member states and its people is also forged through its flag. The European flag with the blue background and the twelve gold stars dates back to 1955. The stars do not represent the number of member states, but as is mentioned on the EU official website (www.europa.eu), "They stand for the ideals of unity, solidarity and harmony among the peoples of Europe". The European ideals of solidarity, freedom and peace are further endorsed in the EU's anthem, the "Ode to Joy" by Ludwig Van Beethoven as part of the Ninth Symphony. The aim of the anthem is to unite all member states under the common values of the Union without superseding their national ones.

Furthermore, the European Union enhances the bonds of its member states and its citizens with Europe Day, which is held on May 9th. On that day in 1950, the French Prime Minister, Robert Schuman, in a speech inspired by Jean Monnet, made the statement of a political cooperation within Europe. The

Schuman Declaration, as it is called, suggested to place French and German production of coal and steel under one common High Authority. The incentive was the cooperation and membership of additional states that would lead to unity. In that way, the tense relationship between France and Germany would be pacified and a war between Europe's nations would be unthinkable. This significant day is commemorated every year on May 9th by member states through various events.

The motto, the Euro, the flag, the anthem and Europe Day are features of the European Union that consist the bonds between the member –states and its peoples. All the above lead to the forging and enhancement of a common European identity which coexists with the national identity. Moreover, this distinctive, common and more tangible representation of the EU creates and adds value to the sense of belonging to a community.

However, during the last decades the EU faces expressions of Euroscepticism and feelings that contradict those of unity and solidarity. These symbols currently represent a distant, complex institutional structure as well as the bureaucratic nature of the EU. Heads of State or Government and the Presidents of the EU Institutions came together in Rome on March 25, 2017, to mark the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome that laid the foundations for the European Union as we know it today. What was said several times by EU leaders during that occasion was that Europe needs to change.

Research Methodology

The aim of this paper is to examine the European Union as a brand and identify its position in the Love/ Respect Axes. In order for the research to be objective and the conclusions to be safe, the methodology employed is the following:

Questionnaires and focus groups are the means used in the business world in order to assess the perceptions their customers have about their products and/or services. When a product and/or service has a dominant position in the market, it leads to the perception that it is well-established. The position of the product might also lead to the rational conclusion that consumers have deeper feelings about it, making them adopt the behavior of loyal customers.

In the framework of the European Union, it is not easy neither to create and disseminate questionnaires to an indicative population nor to make focus groups so that safe conclusions be drawn. That being the case, for research purposes the Eurobarometer was used as a pool of data to be examined. Each survey of the Standard Eurobarometer (ec.europa.eu) “consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country.” The questions of the Eurobarometer expand to a great spectrum of citizens' beliefs and opinions on the EU's operations, functions, governing bodies and policies. Additionally, since the Eurobarometer was published since 1974, the available data provided the necessary time frame for this research, showing trends and tensions throughout the years. The Eurobarometer Reports are biannual.

Since the aim of the research is to place the European Union on the Love/Respect Axes, the chosen Eurobarometer questions are on the basis of Love and Respect. Questions relevant to the efficiency of the EU and its institutions, the perception of their efficiency and in peoples' perspectives formed the groundwork for the analysis made in order to place the EU on the Respect axis. Questions related to the feelings and emotional bonds that European citizens have toward the EU, its functions, goals and values as well as how they feel as members of this community, are the basis of the analysis, in order to place the EU on the Love axis.


Having chosen the questions, a brief analysis is yielded on the reasons why each was selected. Additionally, a graph representing the trends of the question is provided. In that way, the time parameter is taken into consideration and the evolution of beliefs and opinions throughout the years is analyzed. The data analysis is depicted on a table indicating the positive, negative or neutral stance of Europeans on the questions. Finally, the data extracted from the analysis are utilized for the placement of the European Union on the Love/Respect Axes.

EU on the Love Axis

On the Love axis the questions chosen assess the feelings that Europeans have about the EU as an institution, as well as their emotions and perceptions as community members. The position of the EU on this axis is determined by the level of intimacy people feel towards the EU. For the needs of this research, six (6) Eurobarometer questions were chosen that are relevant to the emotions of Europeans vis-à-vis the community they belong to.

Question No1: For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion: You feel you are a citizen of the EU (2010-2018)


The sense of belonging and sharing a common identity stands at the heart of the European Union. A common identity co-existing with the national identity of Europeans is the fundamental principle of the EU's existence. It is important, though, for the feeling of coexistence and the sharing of a common identity to be examined based on the citizens' perception.



The majority of respondents feel, to some extent, as citizens of the EU. It is notable that the percentage throughout the years remains stable with some slight deviations. Before 2014 the number of Europeans who did not feel like citizens of the EU was higher than those who definitely accepted this identity. However, since 2014, there is an increase in the percentage of Europeans acquiring and declaring their European citizenship, while the rate of those who do not feel European citizens is decreasing. It seems that people become more accustomed to their dual citizenship and develop sentiments of acceptance and intimacy to the broader community in which they have rights and obligations.

Question No2: Do you ever think of yourself as not only (nationality), but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never? (1990-2006)

This question comes in conjunction with Question No1. It is not only important for people to feel like citizens of the EU but also to acquire a sense of belonging in a greater community, while maintaining their nationality. This question examines the frequency in which people think and perform with their dual identity.




It is evident from the above graph that a very slight percentage of respondents have answered “don’t know”. The majority of people never felt European in the past decades but this percentage changes. Since 1992, the number of people who sometimes feel European is steadily increasing, while at the same time the number of those who never feel European is decreasing. The percentage of those who often feel European in addition to their national identity are less than those who never feel and sometimes feel European. However, there is also a slight increase in that percentage. People steadily acquire their European identity and share the sentiment of belonging with other people with whom they

might not share the same language and cultural background. European citizens steadily seem to embrace the motto of the EU “United in Diversity” and define themselves with their European identity.

Question No3: People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to...European Union. (2002-2014)


This question might be considered as one of the parameters that would play a constructive role in the placement of the EU on the Love axis. The Love axis is based on the feelings and emotions that people have about the European Union; feelings such as intimacy, love, compassion would give important insights to the hereby research. Thus, this Eurobarometer question would influence EU’s position on the Love/Respect axes.



Based on the above graph, it could be suggested that the majority of Europeans feel fairly attached to the EU. The percentage and the sentiment of attachment had a slight decrease in 2007 which was followed by a gradual increase since 2014. It can be assumed that the financial crisis shook peoples’ emotional ground on which their relationship with the EU was built. Since 2012 the percentage of people who do not feel attached to the EU decreases while the percentage of those who feel much attached to it increases. Europeans after 2012 evidently are developing and forging stronger bonds with the EU. The EU, having surpassed the crisis, managed to trigger the sentiment of attachment to its citizens, and as a two-way process, the Europeans trust the community they belong to.

Question No4: Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the European Union...? Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the EU is...? (1973-2011)


Not only is it significant to examine if and to what extent people have acquired their European identity and citizenship, but also it is of paramount importance to investigate how the citizens assess their country’s membership in the EU. The perception they have about their country’s membership is fundamental for the acquisition of the feeling of intimacy with the rest Europeans.



The great majority of respondents think that their country's membership in the EU is "a good thing". There are deviations in the rates throughout the years but the Europeans' positive perception remained higher compared to a negative answer, i.e. that the membership "is a bad thing". During the past few years, however, there is a short decline on the positive percentage, while the neutral answer of neither good nor bad starts increasing. Europeans assess their countries' membership as an important and valuable decision thanks to various benefits they can acquire, such as free market benefits, a common currency, free movement of people and goods. Despite that, and that the bureaucratic practices seemed to increase, Europeans have acquired a more skeptical attitude.

Question No5: Does the European Union give the feeling of...? (Multiple answers possible) (2003-2005)


For the Love axis it is not only important how customers think about a product but also what the denoted message of the product is. In the framework of the current research, it is important to examine which is the message that the EU, e.e. the product, projects and signals to the Europeans, i.e. its customers. Taking that into consideration, this question was selected in order to provide insight on the feelings that the EU triggers to its citizens.



According to the graph, the main feeling that the EU gives to its citizens is that of hope. Europeans seem to feel close to the Union. It might be the case that they are not satisfied with the situation in their countries and believe that the EU will provide the necessary pathways towards growth, development, stability and improvement. It should also be noted that some years ago the strongest feeling that the EU triggered to its citizens was inefficiency. Since 2003 though, this percentage started declining leaving room for the feeling of trust to increase. Therefore, the two strongest feelings that the EU enhances in its citizens are the ones of hope and trust. Europeans seem to trust the policies, procedures and values that the EU promotes to its member states. In that way, Europeans expect that the EU would be the paradigm for their national states.

Question No 6: What does the EU mean to you personally? (Rotate – Multiple answers possible) (2005-2018)

The aim of this question is to provide insight on the personal perception of each European citizen vis-à-vis the European Union. Europeans' opinion is fundamental for the placement of the EU on the love axis as it signifies the emotions that they have about the community in which they live, work and co-exist with other people.



As it is depicted in the graph, the most common answer throughout the years is “Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU”. One of the core values of the European Union, i.e. free movement of goods and people among the members –states, is perceived by Europeans as the definition of this community. In the second position, a great number of people correlate the EU with the euro. The common currency seems to be an integral part of the EU, proving that it is one of its distinctive attributes. In the third place, with notable deviations throughout the years though, is peace. Europeans strongly believed that the EU offered the sense of peace and could secure it among its member states. However, since 2009, when the terrorist attacks were more frequent, there is a significant decline of people that linked the EU with peace. Despite that, it seems that the last five years the percentage gains ground. Thus, the EU means for the majority of Europeans, freedom of movement for educational and professional reasons, economic unity through the common currency, and peace.

To sum up and having taken into consideration all the above graphs, none of the answers provided by Eurobarometer's respondents signify neither the feeling of a strong love nor the feeling of hate. It seems though that the majority of answers have a positive emotional inclination or are related to positive values.


Question No1	Positive
Question No2	Negative
Question No3	Positive
Question No4	Positive
Question No5	Hope
Question No 6	Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU

EU on the Respect Axis

In the respect axis all questions that assess the EU's effectiveness and performance in its core role and competences are analyzed. In other words, the position of the European Union in this axis will be determined by the level of trust Europeans have on the EU as an entity that is capable of serving their

interests. In this regard, six (6) questions were chosen from the Eurobarometer that serve the purpose of identifying what people think about the EU's performance.

Question No1: For the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. The EU has sufficient power and tools to defend the economic interests of Europe in the global economy (2009 -2018)




It is widely accepted that the economic aspect in the European integration process has been developed extensively compared to the political aspect. As a single market and an advanced trading block, the EU has its own interests and objectives which it has to defend effectively. In these terms, peoples' opinion on how effectively the EU can pursue its economic goals in the global sphere is an undeniable indication on the respect people have to the EU.

The majority of Europeans agree or tend to agree with the statement in an almost stable manner throughout the almost ten years this question is asked. In early 2010, the share of those who agree experienced a significant fall while both negative answers recorded an equal rise. This development coincides with the outbreak of the Greek debt crisis which tested both the ability of the European mechanisms to prevent crisis and the reluctance of member states to take a decisive action. However, from that point onwards, both positive answers gain gradually and steadily their previous shares. Overall, positive answers represent more than half of the Europeans' opinion, therefore it can be concluded that the general impression among European citizens is that the EU is capable of promoting its interests globally.


Question No2: What are your expectations for the year to come: will next year be better, worse or the same, when it comes to... The economic situation in the EU (2007-2018)

Expectations are a complicated matter since they are affected both by sentiments (i.e. hope) as well as estimations and predictions that require reason and rationality. The question asks people for a mini-assessment: how the situation is today and how they expect it to be in the next years. The answer is heavily dependent on the trust people have in the EU regarding its ability to take the proper action so that its economic situation can be improved.



The course of the data seems to be in accordance with the course of the Eurozone economic crisis. From the second half of 2011 until 2013 the “worse” answer shows a sharp increase to reach an almost four (4) times higher than the “better” answer. During this period, four countries have joined the European bailout mechanism: Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus. Being at the crisis’ peak, people would not be optimistic about the future of the economic situation in the EU. However, the negative answers experience a gradual de-escalation trend that continues up to the most recent available data. In fact, the positive answers are marginally more than the negative ones in the last poll, which resembles to some extent, the situation prior to the outbreak of the crisis. Overall, “Same” answer is the dominant one during most of the time period examined (with the sole exception of a semester). That is why it can be concluded that the attitude of Europeans in this question is not neither purely negative nor positive, but rather neutral.

Question No3: What are your expectations for the year to come: will next year be better, worse or the same, when it comes to... The economic situation in (our country) (1996 -2018)




This question is identical to Question no2; however, the scope is limited to the national level. The reason why this question was selected is because people- most of the time- consider the EU membership as a way to improve the economic conditions in their countries. Therefore, it is essential to understand whether people agree that the EU serves the purpose of elevating economic standards in the countries that decide to join.

Even though the first half of the period showed in the graph is beyond the scope of this paper, it is interesting to note that in the first decade of the 21st century, expectations regarding the economic situation in member states are clearly pessimistic. The forthcoming great EU's enlargement of 2004 raised concerns in many member states regarding the competition they would face from the new members and these concerns are reflected in their perceptions for the future. Given that, the last three years the neutral answer of “Same” is dominant among people (double compared to both “Better” and “Worse” answers). Thus, the assessment of these data could not be characterized as purely negative but as slightly negative with concrete prospects for improvement.

Question No4: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)? Would you say you are...? How about the way democracy works in the European Union? (1993 - 2018)

Despite the fact that the economic dimension is asymmetrically developed in the European integration process, no one should neglect that the EU is a political union that advocates a certain package of democratic rules, as it is noted in the definition of enlargement and accession criteria provided by the European Commission³. In this regard, it is important to identify how Europeans assess the effectiveness of the European Union in both operating as a democratic entity and promoting quality of democracy in member states.


³ Copenhagen criteria, for instance, require clearly that in political terms an aspiring member states has to enjoy stability of the political institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.



Contrary to the discourse of the “democratic deficit” for which EU is accused of, Euro-barometer shows a quite different picture since the “fairly satisfied” citizens represent the relative majority of the answers. Undoubtedly, the 2010s when the issues described in the Introduction part occurred, the two moderate answers (“fairly satisfied” and “not very satisfied”) tend to experience converged shares. However, the last two years the gap has widened again to reach the levels it recorded in the greatest part of the 00s. Overall, the sum of positive answers (“Very satisfied” and “Fairly satisfied”) outnumbers the negative answers (“Not very satisfied” and “Not at all satisfied”) by a slight difference, so we can consider the answer as positive.

Question No5: Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree? I feel I am safer because (OUR COUNTRY) is a member of the European Union. (2004 -2012)



Security is a matter of great importance for the citizens and one of the core functions of any state. The selection of this question serves the purpose of understanding whether people consider that the EU membership had any positive (or negative) impact in the sense of security. In other words, it is a proper indication of how people perceive the EU's performance in a crucial issue.



While the opinions seem to be to a large extent divided, one will notice that the “Total agree” answers represent almost constantly the absolute majority. Even in the times when the economic crisis reached a peak point (2011-2013), negative answers approached, but never surpassed, the number of positive answers. That is why, we can consider as positive the overall perception of European citizens towards this question.

Question No 6: Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?

- The European Commission
- The European Parliament, and
- The European Central Bank



As it was argued in previous parts of this paper, trust is the cornerstone of Respect in the concept of Lovemarks because it reflects the quality of a company's product and how it is perceived by customers. Eurobarometer makes a direct question to Europeans as to whether or not they trust the wide list of institutions that compose the EU's system. Moreover, three widely known institutions of the EU were selected, so that the perceptions under examination would reflect a more solid and detailed opinion.

All institutions examined (European Central Bank, European Commission and the European Parliament) seem to follow the same trajectory: A series of consecutive years with high levels of trust, followed by a gradual reduction which is escorted by a parallel increase in negative answers. As the debt crisis intensifies dis-trust prevails; however, the latest data indicate a trend that the previous status of positive answers returns. Taking into consideration the whole period under examination, it can be assumed that the overall answer is positive.

Summing up, none of the questions selected provided us with an extremely positive or extremely negative answer. However, there is an overall prevalence of positive answers.

Question No1	Positive
Question No2	Neutral
Question No3	Negative
Question No4	Positive
Question No5	Positive
Question No 6	Positive

EU on the Love/Respect Axes

The graphs and the answers provided by the Eurobarometer's questions shed light on the position of the EU on the Love/Respect axes (see Appendix 2). As far as the Love axis is concerned, the EU seems to be loved by its citizens. Europeans believe in the values of the EU and have acquired to a certain extent the European identity. The EU has partly become part of their self-definition and characterizes the membership of their country in the community as a positive decision. However, it seems that people can live without the EU although reactions may be raised. Europeans love the community in which they belong, but this is not the case throughout the years making that feeling a fact. Taking into consideration the above mentioned, the EU would be placed on the third quadrant of the Love – Respect axis. It is loved but further steps need to be made in order for Europeans to acquire the attitude of “Loyalty beyond Reason”.

Furthermore, given the answers above, it can be concluded that the position of the EU in the Respect axis is in the third quadrant. This is justified by the fact that Europeans show trust to the EU as an organization in its totality. Moreover, despite the crucial and thorny years of the financial crisis that affected either directly or indirectly the members –states, Europeans recognize the efforts made and the steps taken by the EU and its bodies. Being that the case, it can be concluded that the citizens estimate and respect the community in which they belong.

The coordinates on the Love/Respect Axes indicate that the European Union can be perceived as a brand; it is recognizable by its unique characteristics and people trust it. It is promoted in a professional and stiff manner by providing data and information that might not be understandable and useful to the daily lives of its citizens. In order for the European Union to become a Lovemark, further steps need to be taken so as its people respect it more and cannot live without their national states being members. The following section provides some examples of established Lovemarks in the market that could work as guiding lines for the EU.

SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLES AND LESSONS THAT CAN BE DRAWN

- **Coca Cola**

Probably the most commercially successful soft drink globally, and one of the most recognized brands around the world, Coca Cola is maybe the first thing that comes to mind when someone wants to give an example of Lovemarks. It seems like Coca Cola has made use of the Lovemarks concept in its advertisements in which the emphasis is placed mainly on delivering or conveying emotions to consumers rather than promoting the advantages compared to other beverages.

One of the most noticeable actions to be mentioned, is that Coca Cola sponsors all major sports events: Olympic Games, World Football Cup and European Football Cup etc. What the Company accomplishes through these sponsorships is that it associates itself with all these events which provide people with strong and intense emotions. In other words, it becomes a part of the whole experience people get from these events. Moreover, most of its advertisements show family moments around the table or happy times with friends. All these marketing communications efforts are based on a very solid principle: Coca Cola is a part of the moments in life that make you happy and excited. In that way consumers build an emotional bond with the beverage since they associate it with positive emotions. A look at its advertising mottos is enough for someone to grasp this principle: “Taste the feeling”, “The Coke side of life”, “You can’t beat the feeling”.

Summing up, Coca Cola’s success in becoming a Lovemark relied heavily on its effort to prove that every happy moment in someone’s life is accompanied by this beverage.

- Nike

Nike is one of the leaders in athletic footwear, apparel and sports equipment. The quality of its products is undeniable; however the substantial elements that make this company stand out from the competition are that it sells qualitative products; it has managed to match high quality with a strong message that addresses directly people's heart. Sports is all about people overcoming the physical limitations they have and this process demands courage, insistence, strong motivation and even stronger support. Nike's motto "Just do it" presents a promise to consumers that they will get the best equipment in order to accomplish what they want. Other important initiatives, such as the NikeRun application and community, Nike ID as well as Nike+ iPod are perceived by customers as genuine support by the company in a way that exceeds its main scope of sport clothes and equipment manufacturing.

To conclude, the Nike approach to the attempt of becoming a Lovemark included a strategy that would make consumers consider the company as a major contributor in achieving the sports goals they set.

- Dove

Their personal care products are considered of top quality while this fact is affirmed by a number of dermatologists, thus leaving no doubt about their status on the Respect axis. The first advertising campaigns of the company emphasized its radical difference from regular soap that dehydrated people's skin. However, the marketing communications strategy was completely transformed when the company decided to adopt the concept of "Real Beauty". Instead of extraordinarily beautiful models, regular women were called to advertise the products. The careful selection of women guaranteed that diversity (in height, body types, color of skin etc.). The ultimate target was to re-define beauty standards by demonstrating the view that all women are beautiful in their own unique way and what Dove products do, is help each woman highlight her unique beauty. Consumers warmly welcome this idea, since it makes them feel secure and confident on a very delicate matter.

In conclusion, Dove presented itself as a brand that accepts everyone the way they are and doesn't attempt to impose any external stereotypical standards. Consumers admired this concept and immediately created an emotional connection.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The working hypothesis of the hereby paper is that the EU enjoys the respect of its citizens, although there is no targeted focus on communicating effectively, and within a strategic framework, the achievements and positive impact it has on the day-to-day lives of its citizens. This idea was to a very significant extent verified by the data of the Eurobarometer: EU citizens respect the EU even on issues that the conventional wisdom dictates they should be more skeptical; i.e. the trust in democracy and EU institutions as far as the discourse for the democratic deficit in the EU's operation is concerned. However, there seems greater room for improvement in the field of establishing an emotional bond with citizens. In other words, the EU should put an effort on both Respect and Love with greater and immediate emphasis on the latter. The examples from the market described are similar cases: companies that are respected and admired by their customers and the essence of their strategy for gaining their love. Coca Cola, Nike and Dove have followed different approaches but all aimed at the same target.


The EU can draw valuable lessons from their experience and apply them to its case. In particular, Coca Cola has communicated the message that it's a part of happy moments in its customers' lives. In this regard, the EU should communicate all the great moments in its history but also promote the experiences, actions, policies, rights and even events that have improved the day-to-day life of its citizens (i.e. the reduction of costs in intra-EU calls). Nike has advertised itself as an ally of its customers' effort to achieve their athletic goals. In this sense, the EU should draw attention to all its actions that provide people the tools to realize their goals (i.e. funding for training and studying). Dove, didn't follow the conventional way of promoting a certain beauty standard that would highlight its effectiveness, but it promoted the idea that anyone, no matter their appearance, is considered beautiful. Given this example, the EU should continue to promote diversity. Furthermore, any emotional bond requires close and meaningful contact; so it is important for the EU to adopt a "language" that is understood by everyone. The stiff and bureaucratic language used, does not allow Europeans to feel attached to the EU and its institutions due to the fact that it is likely for the citizens not to understand the terminology used.

To conclude, the challenging environment in which the EU operates demands reforms in every possible dimension. This paper proposes a reform which is not about structure, policies or processes. The hereby paper advocates a reform on the approach the EU adopts in order to communicate its results in a way that would maximize their impact in people's minds and hearts. Building such a bond, would provide the most effectual response to Euroscepticism and would allow the EU to put forward the radical reforms the project needs in order to accomplish its currents and ultimate goals.


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Appendix 1



Appendix 2



Establishing common ground and raising cultural intelligence within the borders of Europe

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ABSTRACT

The present study analyzes firstly the two notions of Common Ground and Cultural Intelligence (CQ) and secondly examines the correlation of Cultural Intelligence to the Big Five personality traits. Then, it combines these notions to explain why it is important to establish Common Ground and raise Cultural Intelligence to help people from different backgrounds to adjust to new environments by developing new social skills and assume new social roles. The blending of the two notions, since they can complement each other, could help businessmen, international students or immigrants integrate in multi-cultural contexts.

Key words: Common Ground, Cultural Intelligence, the Big Five, multi-cultural contexts.

INTRODUCTION

Europe consists of many different ethnicities who have distinct cultural backgrounds based on their language, history or religion. There are 24 official EU languages, semi-official like Catalan or Scottish Gaelic, minority languages like Venetian or Sami (in Finland and Sweden) and main immigrant languages. Moreover, people who inhabit Europe have different religious beliefs; there are Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews or Atheists. All these people have different history, cultural backgrounds, norms, behaviors, attitudes and values but they need to interact during business encounters, meetings for political reasons, travelling or studying. Moreover, migration of people either within or outside the borders of Europe who possess diverse knowledge, beliefs and suppositions brings together individuals who need to intermingle in the same surroundings.

Due to all these differences Europe could be considered a '*cultural blend*'. The word 'blend' indicates the mixture of various components but at the same time it has the positive connotation of harmony. Europe needs this harmonious effect in order for communication among its inhabitants to be successful and not cause problems or misunderstandings. It is important for the individuals to adjust to these varied cross-cultural environments, otherwise conflicts and tensions may surface. The question which arises is: How can this adjustment be successful?

To overcome the problems created in intercultural contexts, the notions of "Common Ground" and "Cultural Intelligence" need to be examined separately and then blended. Based on the fact that individual characteristics differ as far as their cognitive ability, emotional intelligence, extraversion and international experience are concerned, assumptions, presuppositions, norms and procedures are not the same in every culture that is why people have to develop a common ground for certain social skills, social roles and joint activities which will offer interlocutors the aid to act and communicate in a mutually recognized way. Establishing common ground needs culturally intelligent interlocutors because individuals tend not to be willing to cooperate with outgroup members.

Cultural Intelligence (CQ) is defined as the ability to adapt effectively to situations of cultural diversity. It consists of four different components being the *meta-cognitive CQ*, *cognitive CQ*, *motivational CQ* and *behavioral CQ*. Research has shown that individuals with higher CQ make more accurate cultural judgements, are integrated easier into multicultural environments and have higher epistemic motivation.

This study first aims at presenting the notion of Common Ground and the concept of Cultural Intelligence and then it examines and explores why it is important to establish Common ground and raise people's Cultural Intelligence in the diverse environment we live in. To my knowledge, Common Ground and Cultural Intelligence have only been researched separately. The second aim of the study is to combine them and show how their combination can help people lower their cultural barriers and enjoy intercultural interaction. Blending these two notions can have many applications for business, education and migration of people.

Common ground

When people communicate they must have something in common. The first would be the language. But is sharing the same language enough to have a successful communication? Whatever people do or say is based on the information they have about their surrounding world; whatever they do or say with other people is also based on the same information but this information must be shared among the interlocutors. Accessing the same information refers to the notion of Common Ground.

The notion of Common Ground is not new but it can be considered contemporary as it is needed in the world of unified Europe so that people from different cultures can communicate successfully. Interlocutors must coordinate their personal knowledge in order to create and interpret linguistic expressions (Hanna, Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 2003). Clark (1986) defines Common Ground of two people as the sum of their mutual, common or joint knowledge, beliefs and suppositions and categorizes common ground in *communal* and *personal*. The first type is evidence about the cultural communities people belong to and the second is people's personal experiences with each other.

It is very important to examine further communal common ground because people are categorized by the language they speak, the religion they believe or the profession they have. The information people have about a community depends on whether they are insiders or outsiders. Clark (1986) describes *inside information of a community as the particular information the members of the community mutually assume is possessed by members of the community*. On the other hand, *outside information of a community is types of information that outsiders assume is inside information for that community*. If this information is expanded further, it could be graded from *central* (shared by all) to *peripheral* (shared by some). In any case, by using this information, people form the cultural communities they belong to.

Communal common ground is also divided into subcategories to help classify the information perceived. People possess a folk psychology in general, *human nature*. Everybody has senses and sensations, responds to motion or sound and knows the basic laws of nature. These basic concepts are seen as common ground to everyone. If the information is narrowed down, then certain features as phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics of the language form the *communal lexicons* of a community. Further down, there are *cultural facts, norms and procedures* when people assume certain skills and social roles for groups or individuals (Clark, 1986). Of course, all this information is not always ubiquitous or infallible. It is what people assume or believe based on their perceptions.

Personal common ground, on the other hand, is based on joint personal experiences that two or more people share. This shared information can be used as a basis of common ground. Of course people may perceive the information differently and in that case there are discrepancies of interpretation. Clark (1986) distinguishes personal common ground in two categories: *joint perceptual experiences and joint actions* through which two people manage to attend to the same things and establish *perceptual copresence* which serves as the shared basis for mutual beliefs.

Based on the explanations of communal and personal common ground there is a lot of room for error because what people believe might be shared does not necessarily represent reality. A lot of times people presuppose something which is not true and take for granted this false assumption. This false assumption may or may not change in the course of interaction. It could also lead to prejudice against certain communities or individuals which could even result in violent manifestations.

Stalnaker (2002) also states that what is presupposed may diverge from what is mutually known or believed between the speaker and hearer. In that case, although common belief is the model for common ground, it may deviate from what is mutually known. In order to establish common ground, both parties involved should identify it as such and in turn, common ground can act as the domain of interpretation of what has been said. Interlocutors can collaborate and communicate successfully if they use the common knowledge effectively.

The participants of a conversation must coordinate their individual knowledge in order to communicate successfully because the initial interpretation of anything said is egocentric. Common ground can be used as a filter to avoid incorrect interpretations; it is updated constantly by gathering information about each other's beliefs in the course of interaction and it includes knowledge coming from community membership, physical co-presence and linguistic co-presence (Hanna, Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 2003). In order to accomplish this interlocutors must be open-minded, able to accept that other people are different and capable of adjusting to various contexts.

Horton and Keysar (1996) also state that common ground acts as a correction mechanism when an utterance is not fully communicated but does not play a role in the initial plan of utterances in the *Monitoring and Adjustment model* because the initial plan is not designed for the specific knowledge of the addressee. On the contrary, in the *Initial Design model* the utterance plan is tailored made and common ground contributes to the very planning of the utterance. The difference of the two models is the role that common ground plays during the initial planning of the utterances. In their study, the authors highlight that their results suggest that the speakers used the first model especially when pressed with time and used common ground as a correction mechanism so that they could be fully communicative.

So far, common ground is analyzed at the level of utterances, beliefs and assumptions that people have for each other. Manzo & Perkins (2006) focus on the importance of place in which individuals operate. The emotional connections to the place are overlooked, still play an important role in finding common ground. The particular preferences, perception and emotional connections to place relate to community social cohesion; the notion comes from the field of environmental and community psychology which states that place attachment is an affective bond between people and places and influences individual and group behavior. *Place identity* (the term coined by Proshansky in 1978) suggests that the bond that people have with a place helps form their beliefs, preference, feelings, values and goals. This approach advocates that the place where people live can become the common ground among diverse residents.

Taking under consideration all these different aspects of common ground based on the studies that different researchers have conducted, it can be understood how difficult it is to combine all these traits so that speakers and listeners from the same or different cultural backgrounds can establish the notion of common ground to effectively communicate and avoid misunderstanding. Especially in Europe when seen as a *cultural blend* of so many different identities, it is vital to establish common ground in the contexts that arise every day in numerous settings. In order to establish common ground it is crucial a cross-disciplinary analysis to understand people's beliefs and assumptions so that they can have successful communication. In this case it is important to analyze first the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis and then the notion of Cultural Intelligence (CQ) because it is a further step to help adjust to various cultural situations.

The cultural intelligence hypothesis

The definition of intelligence is complex, being defined differently by researchers. It could be described as a mental ability that involves reasoning, understanding and perceiving new and complex situations, learning quickly, planning, problem solving, adapting in new situations, thinking abstractly, flexibly responding to new situations and so much more. Etymologically speaking the verb *intelligere* means comprehend or perceive; in that sense it could mean how people comprehend and perceive the world around them. People are not isolated that is why intelligence has been associated strongly with social learning which means that the individual learns in a social environment by observing and interacting with others.

The idea of cultural intelligence started with experiments on animals and scientists saw that animals with opportunities for social learning boosted their skills. The cultural intelligence hypothesis advocates that social learning is much more efficient than asocial (individual) learning and in that way individuals acquire skills that would take them much longer to acquire on their own. Moreover, social learners need less time to find a solution to a problem than asocial ones. Learning through social interaction is one step beyond the sheer serendipity of asocial learning (van Schaik & Burkart, 2011).

The cultural intelligence hypothesis makes two evolutionary predictions; the first being that social-learning abilities and asocial-learning ones show correlated evolution and the second being that intelligence and frequency of opportunities for social learning also show correlated evolution. Based on that the most intelligent species should be highly cultural species (van Schaik & Burkart, 2011). Species that devise novel solutions, solve social problems, learn quickly and from experience or construct tools are high performers of intelligence; these qualities are mainly attributed to humans. Still, human intelligence may rely on characteristics such a language which is a unique human capability (Reader, Hager & Laland).

Interpreting this hypothesis in the case of Cultural Intelligence (using capital letters) means that individuals should be exposed to social learning and in turn to intercultural learning to expand their cognitive abilities, to enhance their skills, to adapt quickly in different situations and to be able to find effective solutions to problems. Combining culture and intelligence entails blending the descriptions of

both words (see tables below) resulting in a complex (and maybe incomplete) definition of Cultural Intelligence which explicitly takes into consideration the cultural context.

Description of culture

Culture									
language	<i>history</i>	music	art	religion	food	values	<i>beliefs</i>	habits	festivals
traditions	fashion	dances	ceremonies	alphabets	environment	attitudes	<i>identities</i>		

Description of intelligence

Intelligence									
Logic	understanding	self-awareness	planning	emotional	knowledge	reasoning	creativity		
			comprehend	complex	ideas	<i>think abstractly</i>			
		solve	problems	learn quickly	goal-directed	adaptive	behavior		

Cultural Intelligence

Etymologically speaking, the term Cultural Intelligence (CQ) comes from the words culture and intelligence. These two words as seen in the tables above have many aspects and meanings. In people's minds they can be interpreted as one or many words but what remains is that the term combines both the aspects of culture and intelligence and becomes much more complicated than the two words separated especially when it involves two or more different cultures and individuals whose intelligence vary.

The notion of Cultural Intelligence comes from the business field. Nowadays that the trade with other countries is much more developed than ever before because of the advances of technology (goods are transferred easily in planes and ships) and companies have become international and opened branches all over the world, people have realized that sometimes a different culture may act as hindrance to business so they needed to adapt to different customs and new ways of doing business. Moreover, the diversity of the workforce within the border of Europe forces individuals to frequently interact with people from diverse cultures. Cross-cultural interactions are common resulting in either successful or unsuccessful communications. Interlocutors unfamiliar with the norms of the other culture have to cope with situations in everyday or business life.

The need of being able to negotiate effectively across cultures where cultural barriers exist made researchers explore whether awareness of the differences would make communication easier. Individuals tend to be willing to cooperate with ingroup members rather than outgroup (Imai & Gelfand, 2010). People feel much more comfortable within their own culture than in other cultures; maybe because they are afraid of the unknown and unfamiliar. The idea of globalization and the advances of technology especially the Internet, tend to diminish and weaken the barriers that different cultures may have. Moreover, the cultural diversity that exists in almost every country in the world because of migration helps people be aware of the differences and adapt. Nowadays, people are strongly motivated to expand their intercultural knowledge because interaction in cross-cultural settings is recurrent.

Earley & Ang in 2003 defined Cultural Intelligence as the individual's capability of adapting effectively to intercultural situations. In 2003, Thomas & Inkson added that it involves understanding

the fundamentals of intercultural interaction developing a mindful approach. Then, in 2004 Earley & Mosakowski expanded the definition saying that CQ is a seemingly natural ability to interpret unfamiliar gestures in the way their compatriots would. In 2004, Earley & Peterson stated that CQ reflects the person's capability to gather, interpret and act upon radically different cues. In 2006, Earley & Ang redefined the term as a person's capability for successful adaptation to new cultural settings that is for unfamiliar settings attributable to cultural context. Individuals with higher CQ tend to enjoy interacting with people from different cultures, be more agreeable, be open-minded and enjoy learning new things. They also make more accurate cultural judgments and integrate into multicultural work teams (Thomas, Stahl, Ravlin, Pelmans, Pekerti, Maznevski, Lazarova, Elron Ekelund, Cerdin, Brislin, Aycan & Au, 2008). All these definitions have the same ultimate goal: to make people understand how important is to raise their Cultural Intelligence to handle intercultural situations concerning everyday life or business and develop new skills to make cultural judgements and assessments while adapting in novel conditions.

The need of understanding individual characteristics when people try to adapt to cross-cultural situations conceptualized Cultural Intelligence as a multi-faceted quality consisting of *meta-cognitive, cognitive CQ, motivational CQ and behavioral CQ aspects*. The meta-cognitive aspect refers to the person's awareness during intercultural interactions, the cognitive CQ refers to the acquired knowledge of similarities and differences, the motivational CQ refers to the ability to adapt to new cultures (intrinsic motivation) and the behavioral CQ refers to the repertoire of behavioral skills that someone possesses and can act appropriately using verbal or non-verbal behaviors (Imai & Gelfand).

The above mentioned dimensions of CQ are expanded into sub-dimensions so that the more general becomes more specific. The sub-dimensions of metacognitive CQ are *planning, awareness and checking*. Planning is defined as strategizing before an intercultural encounter. It involves thinking and developing action plans according to the situation. Awareness is defined as knowing about cultural thinking and knowledge of self and others in real time. It involves mental processes of self and others and the intercultural situation itself. Checking is defined as reviewing assumptions and adjusting mental maps when actual experiences differ from expectations. It questions assumptions and adjusts mental models based on new information (Van Dyne, Ang, Ng, Rockstuhl, Tan & Koh, 2012).

The sub-dimensions of cognitive CQ are *culture-general knowledge and context specific knowledge*. Culture-general knowledge is defined as knowledge of the universal elements that constitute a cultural environment while context specific knowledge is defined as the insider understanding in a specific domain in order to be effective. Motivational CQ could have an *intrinsic or extrinsic interest and self-efficacy to adjust*. Intrinsic interest values culturally diverse experience because it is inherently satisfying. Extrinsic interest values the tangible, personal benefits that can be derived from intercultural experiences. Self-efficacy to adjust is having task-specific confidence and deals with the stress to adjust to new cultures and includes a sense of confidence to interact with people from different cultures (Van Dyne et al., 2012).

The sub-dimensions of behavioral CQ are *verbal behavior, non-verbal behavior and speech acts*. Verbal behavior is the flexibility of vocalization including speaking faster or slower, louder or softer, changing the amount of warmth, enthusiasm and using pause or silence. Non-verbal behavior is conveyed via gestures, facial expressions and body language. Speech acts is the flexibility in manner of communication concerning requests, invitations, apologies, gratitude or disagreement expressed appropriately according to the local culture (Van Dyne et al., 2012). The choice of behaviors is influenced by the person's temperament, therefore, some personality traits should be related to CQ. Still, it is distinct from stable personality traits because it describes what a person does across cultures. (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008).

All dimensions and sub-dimensions cover different knowledge and capabilities that people interacting in intercultural settings should take into account. Traveling, studying or working in international environments, even interacting with immigrants in people's own countries involve more or less cultural knowledge; the higher CQ one has, the more capable of adjusting to new cultures is. Although European intercultural encounters might be the oldest phenomenon since Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, today citizens are becoming global facing intercultural situations every day.

Correlation of cultural intelligence to personality (the Big Five)

Ang, Van Dune and Koh (2006) researched the correlation of the Four-Factor Model of CQ to personality traits. The five personality traits, called the Big Five, are conscientiousness, agreeableness, emotional stability, extraversion and openness. Their five hypotheses were as follows:

H1: Conscientiousness will be positively related to metacognitive CQ

H2: Agreeableness will be positively related to behavioral CQ

H3: Emotional stability will be positively related to behavioral CQ

H4: Extraversion will be positively related to (a) motivational and (b) behavioral CQ

H5: Openness to experience will be positively related to (a) metacognitive (b) cognitive, (c) motivational and (d) behavioral CQ

Their first hypothesis was supported by findings. Conscientious individuals are responsible, careful, efficient, punctual and disciplined. Those who are high in conscientiousness think about cultural preferences, consider cultural norms before and during the interaction. Their second hypothesis was also supported by findings. Agreeable individuals are friendly, good-natured, non-hostile, helpful and flexible. Behavioral CQ needs these traits in an intercultural environment to avoid social conflicts.

Contrary to their hypothesis emotional stability was not related to behavioral CQ possibly because emotionally stable individuals may be less expressive in their verbal and nonverbal expressions and this makes them believe that they do not possess a wide repertoire of social behaviors in new cultural settings.

The fourth hypothesis was supported by findings; extraversion is positively related to motivational CQ and behavioral CQ. What they also found is that extraversion is also positively related to cognitive CQ. Extraverted individuals are sociable, active, energetic, talkative and spontaneous. They seek opportunities to interact with individuals of other cultures and they exhibit flexible behavior.

The last and most important hypothesis was supported by their findings; openness to experience was related to all four facets of CQ. Those with high openness to experience are imaginative, creative, cultured, broad-minded, intelligent and artistically sensitive. They question their own cultural assumptions and analyze the norms of others. Openness is closely associated with adaptive performance (the person's proficiency in altering their behavior according to new, uncertain and unpredictable situations).

Personality and individual characteristics should be taken into consideration in cross-cultural studies because they are factors that play an important role when coping with unfamiliar situations. Open-minded individuals have the flexibility to interact with people from different cultural backgrounds. Responsible individuals tend to be more dependable and effective and friendly ones are more emotionally supportive. Moreover, extraverted individuals are more sociable and assertive, just to name a few examples.

Cultural Intelligence is based on the sphere of individual differences (abilities, personality and interests) but it is conceptualized as a specific construct because it focuses on culturally relevant capabilities. CQ is not specific to a particular culture, it is easily shaped through experience, education and training and increases when individuals are exposed to multicultural contexts (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008). As such CQ can become the basis of finding Common Ground with individuals of other cultures and facilitate their communication. Blending the traits that these two notions have is important for everyone exposed to intercultural situations so that they can cope successfully with them.

Blending Common Ground and Cultural Intelligence

Common Ground traits	Cultural Intelligence traits
Coordination of personal knowledge	Successful adaptation to different customs
Mutual knowledge	Effective cross-cultural interaction
Common/ joint knowledge	Effective negotiations across cultures
Common beliefs	Mitigation of fear for the unknown
Shared suppositions	Lessening of culture barriers
Mutual assumptions	Intercultural knowledge

Common procedures	Understanding of intercultural norms
Shared norms	Interpretations of unfamiliar gestures
Joint experiences	Interpretations of linguistic patterns
Joint actions	Successful adaptation to new settings
Physical co-presence	Accurate cultural judgments
Linguist co-presence	Integration in multi-cultural teams
Common preferences	Adjustment of social behavior
Mutual feelings	Accomplishment of intercultural goals
Correction mechanism	Development of cultural capabilities

So far, to my knowledge, the two notions of Common Ground and Cultural Intelligence have been examined separately. Now, it is important to investigate how they can be blended and why it is important to do so. Common Ground and Cultural Intelligence can complement each other so that the individual can adapt effectively in novel situations of cultural diversity. The above tables show the traits that Common Ground and Cultural Intelligence have (the lists are not exhaustive). Considering how these two concepts can be blended, there could be numerous combinations; the fact remains that the one complements the other.

Cultural Intelligence is correlated with personality and individuals who are open-minded and flexible can use Common Ground knowledge effectively. People with high CQ can apply better their knowledge and establish Common Ground in intercultural situations so that better communication is accomplished. They take into account the feelings of the interlocutor and act accordingly. They have interpersonal skills and change their behavior so that the other person does not feel anxious nor embarrassed and offended. In that way the cultural barriers diminish and the intercultural goals are more easily accomplished.

Cultural Intelligence can be raised in a multi-cultural environment where Common Ground can be established more easily. When people have something in common, they feel more relaxed and calm to handle any difficult situation that might occur. The emotional stability they feel is related to their personality and how culturally intelligent they are. People who are anxious and insecure are likely to fail when encountering cross-cultural difficulties. Their objectives collapse and in turn they feel disappointed and discouraged to continue their efforts. On the other hand, high culturally intelligent individuals successfully adapt their verbal and non-verbal behavior through their physical and linguistic co-presence in order to effectively interact and negotiate in novel situations.

Another trait of Common Ground is that it can act as correction mechanism and Cultural Intelligence can complement it by adapting the individual's behavior. As there is always room for error and something said is not always fully communicated, Common Ground can act as a correction mechanism by people who are culturally intelligent and adjust their behavior according to the situation. Cultural barriers do exist but they can be overcome by people with high CQ who have the flexibility and cleverness to be able to establish Common Ground in various contexts. The first steps may be difficult to achieve but in the process when common knowledge is shared and intercultural obstacles reduce, the successful adaptation and integration in the novel settings can help accomplish the intercultural goals. Joint actions can facilitate the process because they give people common experiences which affect positively their intercultural interaction.


Physical and linguistic co-presence can help the interpretations of unfamiliar gestures and linguistic patterns. Learning a language in a school for foreign languages is completely different than putting the language into use in the real world. Although while learning English students can be exposed to the language through the Internet (watching movies, playing video games etc.) and in that way they are exposed to the different cultures of Englishes, this may not happen with other languages that are considered rarer. Therefore, especially when individuals are exposed to rare intercultural situations, they have to be culturally intelligent individuals so that they can mitigate their fear by sharing experiences and develop mutual feelings.

The understanding of cultural norms needs a lot of effort by both parties involved. Their mutual knowledge can help despite not being enough all the times. But it could be a start to the adjustment of the social behavior and successful adaptation to new settings of individuals. Lessening of culture barriers could be done through common procedures followed during different interactions. Someone could imagine all possible combinations of the traits of Common Ground and Cultural Intelligence that enable individuals to create effective intercultural communication and interaction. Of course, personality is interrelated to Cultural Intelligence and thus to the establishment of Common Ground. Individuals who are narrow-minded and introverted cannot accomplish effective intercultural

interactions. They are prejudiced against the people of other cultures and cannot adapt to novel situations. Individuals have to be open to new experiences in order to exhibit flexible behavior to adapt and solve problems that culture presents.

In the following graph, the two notions and personality are presented as circles that are intertwined because the one complements the other and all three are interconnected. The various combinations of the concepts can have numerous applications concerning the contexts of business, political negotiations, education and migration of populations.

Graphic representation of the two notions and personality



Applications

The first and foremost application is the adjustment of professionals in the living conditions of a foreign country because when performing ineffectively they suffer the cost. These people have an intrinsic motivation to engage themselves in cross-cultural experiences. In this case, individuals with high motivational CQ have higher levels of adjustment either their adjustment is general (the general living conditions), interaction (in interpersonal relations) or work (Templer, Tay & Chandrasekar, 2006). Their effective adjustment is critical for their social and business life in the foreign country; if they cannot communicate effectively their social life suffers and their business goals fail. Either managers or mere workers, they have to adapt so that they are not excluded socially. Of course, their personality plays an important role; open-minded individuals are more likely to respect and accept other cultures. Open-minded individuals are open to new experiences which is crucial for adapting in the foreign culture.

Effective negotiations in business or political contexts are based on finding a common ground and accepting the norms of other cultures. Groves, Feyerherm and Gu (2015) studied how cultural intelligence is connected to cross-cultural negotiation effectiveness. They support that negotiation failures are linked to deficiencies in intercultural capabilities of the negotiator and limited knowledge of the cultures participating in the transactions. For negotiators to be effective, they have to possess cultural knowledge and skills to work the nuances of communication. They have to understand the behavioral cues of people who come from different backgrounds to successfully interact with them. Effective negotiators and leaders can use the mediating effects of negotiation behaviors and meet both parties' expectations.

International students also have to adapt to new environments academically, socially, psychologically and culturally. Attending university in a foreign country means that these students need to adjust and

overcome obstacles that they would not have if they studied in their own country. Since the educational system differs from country to country, the process of adapting in the new system might cause them anxiety. The more distant the cultures are the more anxiety is caused. Wang, Heppner, Wang and Zhu (2015) in their study examined the role of cross-cultural competence in the adjustment of Chinese international students studying in the United States. The student's difficulties such as navigate in the new social environment or adapt in the new educational system may be overcome when they possess higher CQ. Increased CQ over a period of time was positively associated with the students' psychological well-being. It is important to mention that Asian countries and the United States have a large cultural distance but the same applies to European and Asian countries.

A lot of Asian students come to Europe to study and face more or less the same difficulties as in the United States. European universities have a distinct educational system which for Asians sometimes means anxiety and frustration. The protected environment of their home is replaced by the unfamiliar surroundings of the university. Culturally intelligent students can find some Common Ground to start with and in the process they increase their intercultural competence and ethnocultural empathy. The same would apply for a Greek studying in Germany or an English studying in Italy. Another factor that plays a crucial role in adjusting in the new culture is that students are young and as such they can more easily develop cultural competences and find common norms. Moreover, language proficiency assumes higher CQ because through language learning some parts of culture are taught (course books include cultural information or the teacher can expose the students to cultural differences).

Mesidor and Sly (2016) drawing on research conducted by Trifonovitch in 1977 present the cultural adjustment as four stages. The first stage is the *honey moon stage* when students first go to the foreign land and they are excited to do so. This stage is also characterized by discord due to cultural differences. The second stage is the *hostility stage* in which students experience culture shock followed by feelings of frustration, confusion, anxiety and depression. Over time, when students are slowly adjusting to the novel situation, there is the *humor stage*. During this stage the students overcome difficulties and start socializing. The final stage is called the *home stage* in which students have settled in the new environment and feel at ease. Cultural maladjustments are more likely to occur during the first two stages. Cultural intelligence and emotional intelligence can help during the cultural adjustment process.

What presents utmost importance for Europe is the migration of people from non-European countries. These people either by choice or by force (due to wars) come to Europe for a better future. They have to face the difficulties of finding a job and a place to stay in an unfamiliar setting. Adjusting to a new culture is not easy for them, especially if they have totally different beliefs. That is why Europeans have to raise their Cultural Intelligence in order to find Common Ground to communicate with the migrants. What applies for Europeans who are the people of the host countries, also applies for the people who receive their hospitality; migrants should make a step forward if Common Ground is to be established. Being either a migrant, ex-patriate or international student, what is advisable is that people have to be culturally educated. Training is a major factor for people to adapt in unfamiliar situations.

Suggestions for Future Research

Individual differences of the ability to act effectively in a cross-cultural environment are measured through self-reports, observer-reports and performance-based measures (Ang, Rockstuhl & Tan, 2015). Self-reports are based on the 20-item four-factor Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) developed by Ang, Dyne, Koh, Ng, Templer, Tay and Chandrasekar in 2007 after reviewing the intelligence and intercultural competencies literatures. The items were assessed and pilot studies were conducted. The final CQS contains 20 items (Ang et al.) The problem with self-reports is that the respondents think that they do or do not do something but the reality could be different; some tend to overestimate or underestimate their abilities or skills. To triangulating the same authors developed an observer's report that can identify people's capabilities when interacting in different cultural settings. Moreover, with the help of technology the Intercultural Situational Judgment test (iSJT) was developed in 2014 by Ang, Rockstuhl and Ng. This presents the respondents with multimedia vignettes of challenging work-related intercultural situations and they have to respond what they would do in such situations.

Most research done is business-oriented to cover work-related problems due to the need of international companies to solve problematic situations of the diverse workforce and manage business negotiations effectively. I would suggest that a scale be developed for the specific academic and educational context that the international students have to face because their number is increased every

year. The European program Erasmus has contributed to the increase of international students. The development of a scale related to their needs would help prepare some training so that they can adjust better in the novel environment. Shannon & Begley (2008) tested the hypothesis that language acquisition is positively related to cognitive CQ and behavioral CQ. Their results supported that language acquisition is related to cognitive CQ but not to behavioral CQ. This direction of studies, which would benefit international students, needs further research.

The development of Business English Lingua France (BELF) may solve some communication problems as some may argue that it is a “cultureless language” but the danger of ignoring that people who use it come from diverse cultural orientations lurks. Even English-speaking countries have so many differences concerning spelling, vocabulary and connotations of words (Rogers, 2008). Similarly, as there is a number of Spanish-speaking countries, there are variances of the language. Therefore, research towards that path would help both students and businessmen.

Another suggestion for future research is how people can be trained to learn what Cultural Intelligence can offer them in combination with establishing Common Ground. Training is important for people before being exposed to intercultural situations in order to learn to avoid misunderstandings and respect other cultures. Moreover, adaptation programs for immigrants should be established so that they can know what to expect in the host country.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study is trying to show how important it is to establish Common Ground and raise Cultural Intelligence globally and especially in Europe which consists of so many different countries whose languages, religions and customs differ. Everyone carries their own beliefs, traditions and habits and there are individuals from varied backgrounds who think and interact differently or solve problems in a number of ways. One solution to the problem of cultural barriers is to blend the notions of Common Ground and Cultural Intelligence in a fruitful combination. By establishing Common Ground and Raising Cultural Intelligence the citizens of the different countries of Europe can become European citizens.

Raising cultural intelligence means developing certain competencies; CQ is similar to social and emotional intelligence and general cognitive ability. It is a form of interpersonal intelligence but broader in sense applied in intercultural contexts. The competencies that individuals develop facilitate their effectiveness across different cultural environments. CQ as a multidimensional intelligence resides in different loci within an individual as it concerns cognition, metacognition, motivation and behaviors. It affects intercultural personality traits, intercultural attitudes and worldviews (Ang, Rockstuhl & Tan, 2015). When blended with the notion of Common Ground, it expands its effects and applications forming more ubiquitous competencies to face intercultural problems.

By combining common ground and cultural intelligence, collaboration and communication among individuals of multi-cultural environments can be successful. The basis of common ground, either communal or personal, can serve as the first step towards the initial planning of utterances. Since, there is a lot of room for error (due to different assumptions of the individuals) common ground can also act as a correction mechanism. Common Ground and Cultural Intelligence complement each other to facilitate intercultural interaction. The dimensions and sub-dimensions of CQ can be exploited and raised in order for individuals to interact in different cultures successfully and enjoy it at the same time.

New generations raised in a globalized world have to be open to new experiences and sensitive to the norms of others. They have to focus on similarities and learn from the differences. In that way

- the adjustment of international students will be facilitated
- the mobility of labor across cultural boundaries will be simplified
- the incorporation of immigrants or refugees in culturally unfamiliar environments will be stress-free
- intercultural negotiation processes and outcomes will be less complicated
- and travelling for business or pleasure will be without problems

A lot of intercultural problems that people face today would be easier to solve if individuals are more open-minded towards the cultures of others. Through establishing Common Ground and raising Cultural Intelligence individuals will develop new competencies that will help them diminish cultural distance among people of different backgrounds.

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Migration, Refugees, Brexit, EU crisis

And then there were twenty – seven...Analysing the impact of Brexit on European attitude towards the European Union

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ABSTRACT

This article attempts to create a “favorability profile” of the European Union (EU) in light of the British referendum concerning whether the United Kingdom (UK) should remain or, on the contrary, whether it should leave the EU. Where European attitudes come into play, we should keep in mind that EU’s maladjusted management of economic issues during the recession and its proposed solutions to the more recent refugee crisis represent points of contention for European citizens in various regions of the EU. Yet, they are not so critical as to be schismatic. The present analysis will examine the attitudes towards the EU in the Member States (MSs) prior and after the Brexit based on Eurobarometer data collected between 2015 and 2018.

Keywords: Brexit, support for the EU, EU Member States, Eurobarometers, Euro-enthusiasm, Euroscepticism, United Kingdom

INTRODUCTION

While the European Union (EU) has weathered its fair share of crises since its inception, none of them have rattled the EU’s foundations as much as the crisis triggered by the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (hereafter referred to as the Brexit referendum). That no one – not even the supporters of the *Leave* camp – expected the results of the referendum to take the turn they took, speaks about how volatile the combination between mainstream Euroscepticism, populist demagogery, and political disenfranchisement is. The results of the Brexit referendum created a precedent so that other potential “exits” no longer seem as unconceivable as they once were given the right circumstances. Yet maybe precisely because we have the Brexit blueprint, policy-makers at the national and European levels as well as European citizens alike may be able to better prepare themselves in the likelihood of another “exit” crisis so that the Brexit case remain an exception to the rule.

In this article, we are interested in analyzing what are the attitudes of the European citizens towards the EU in light of the British referendum. Our underlying hypothesis is that in Member States (MSs) where the attitude towards the EU registered poor or middling percentages prior to the Brexit, we will find that the favorability ratings will have improved during the post-Brexit period. As a corollary, the analysis also shows that there are MSs where support for the EU remains high or constant irrespective of the crises that affect the European block (see the Appendix: Tables 3, 4, 5, 6). A poll from the Pew Research Center released in June 2017 found that in MSs where a year earlier the support for the EU had been low, in the following year the attitudes had somewhat rebounded (Stokes et al., 2017). In assessing the validity of our hypothesis, we analyze the data provided by standard Eurobarometers (EBs) released between 2015 and 2018 and we also examine several special Eurobarometers. Prior to addressing these issues, it is imperative to have a look at the context in which this latest crisis originated by providing a brief overview of the Brexit referendum.

A crisis to end all crises? The curious case of the Brexit referendum

Since the enlargement waves from 2004 and 2007, the EU has been traversing various internal and external crises which have had lasting effects that are felt even to this day. Inside the EU, the response to the international economic crisis and more specifically to the European sovereign debt crisis saw the welfare of millions of European citizens being apparently disregarded and become a subsidiary affair in the

implementation of an austerity agenda. Outside the EU, the brewing military conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and, specifically, the Syrian civil war, spilled over on European shores where millions of refugees sought to escape the war torn areas in search of safety. Against this background, populists of a radical right orientation started to become more and more vocal – though not necessarily more politically successful – in multiple MSs (Italy, Austria, Poland, Denmark).

In the UK, the right-wing and Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) had also stocked the flames of discontent. Prior to the Brexit referendum from June 2016, UKIP attracted the votes of over four million of eligible voters at the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections which marked an exponential rise in its electoral support compared to the 2009 EP election (where UKIP was supported by almost two million and half voters, obtaining the second place behind the Conservative Party). In the aftermath of the 2014 EP election, UKIP secured the first place with a voting share of 26.6%, followed closely by the Labor Party coming in second (with over four million votes and a voting share of 24.4%), and the Conservative Party in third (receiving closely to four million votes and a voting share of 23.1%) (European Parliament, 2014).

Where the EU and British parties are concerned, it is important to bear in mind that both the Conservative Party and UKIP are at the forefront of the Eurosceptic trend not only in the UK but also in the EU, where the two parties are the founding fathers of the two main Eurosceptic political groups in the EP, namely, the European Conservatives and Reformist group (ECR) and the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (EFDD). It is undeniable that in recent years, radical right parties have made inroads into mainstream politics, but what the British referendum shows is an apparent victory for a Eurosceptic contingent in British politics that was hubristically initiated by the mainstream Conservative Party that held the reins of government. Former Prime-Minister David Cameron had touted the idea of a referendum on British membership as far back as 2009, during the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, when he talked about the Tory support for such a referendum (Lochocki, 2014, p. 10). Since then, Cameron had went back and forth on the idea of the referendum, at times rebutting his Tory colleagues who were adamant about the idea like in 2011 (Watt, 2011). In June 2012, Cameron declared that: “[T]he British people are not happy with what they have – and frankly neither am I. Put simply, for those of us outside the eurozone, far from being too little Europe there is too much of it. Too much cost, too much bureaucracy, too much meddling in issues that belong to nation states or civil society or, indeed, individuals” (Helm, 2012). Meanwhile, in a speech from January 2013, Cameron’s rationale for holding a referendum was again tied to the issue of EU’s struggle with the democratic deficit in the context of a deeper and deeper integration: “Today, public disillusionment with the EU is at an all-time high.[...] People feel that the EU is heading in a direction that they never signed up to. They resent the interference in our national life by what they see as unnecessary rules and regulation. [...] [P]eople also feel that the EU is now heading for a level of political integration that is far outside Britain’s comfort zone” (Cameron, 2013). In the former prime-minister’s view, the referendum was not meant to be a one way street – an “in or out” situation – but a means to negotiate a better position for the UK in the EU where the British citizens’ concerns would have been more aptly addressed: “That is why I am in favour of a referendum. I believe in confronting this issue – shaping it, leading the debate” (Cameron, 2013). Lockhocki (2014, p. 11) notes that at the end of 2013, the Conservative Party’s position on the EU was divided between anti-EU hardliners and Cameron’s camp which argued in favor of Britain remaining “in a reformed EU”. The author notes how: “The prime minister tried to cater to the anti-EU faction of his own party by accompanying his admittedly clear pro-EU standpoints with a plan to limit welfare benefits to migrants from Eastern Europe” (Lockhocki, 2014, p. 11).

What we see in the British case is that while there was a radical right element that also supported the idea of the referendum (see UKIP’s leader Nigel Farage position on this issue), the main driving force that led credence to the referendum was the Conservative Party or at the very least, various factions inside the party. When the date of the referendum came (June 23, 2016), both the *Leave* and *Remain* sides believed that the results will support the position of the Remainer camp: that the UK should remain in the EU. In reality, a small but critical majority (51.9%) voted that UK should leave the EU (The Electoral Commission, 2016).

Eurobarometers and the British Attitude towards the EU

In looking for pre-existent signs of warning, the Standard Eurobarometer (EB) 85 from Spring 2016 shows that a relative majority of respondents (little bit over the fifty percent mark) considered that the situation of the economy was “good” (53%)¹ and that it will remain the same in the following 12 months (45%). In terms of the most important issues facing the UK at that time, four issues registered higher percentages in the UK compared to the EU average: immigration (38%), health and social security (26%), terrorism (23%) and housing (21%). By comparison, the most important issues facing the EU were considered to be immigration (51%), terrorism (38%), and the economic situation (23%). In terms of the EU average, the UK numbers on immigration and economic situation surpassed the EU average by three and four percentage points respectively. Where trust in institutions is concerned, the gap between the British response and the EU average is not very severe especially in terms of trust in the EU: 59% of the British respondents tend not to trust the EU as compared to the 55% of the EU respondents overall. Compared to Autumn 2015, the distrust in the EU had dropped by four percentage points (from 63% to 59%) while trust rose by seven percentage points (from 23% to 30%). Meanwhile, in terms of the type of image British respondents had about the EU, the percentages skew slightly negative (36% have a negative view of the EU compared to 31% who have a positive / neutral view of the EU). The numbers show a five percentage point increase compared to Autumn 2015 and a difference of almost ten percentage points compared to the European average (36% versus 27%) (Standard Eurobarometer (EB) 85 – United Kingdom, Spring 2016, pp. 1-3).

A majority of UK respondents also support “the free movement of EU citizens who can live, work, study and do business anywhere in the EU” (63%); “a common defence and security policy among EU Member States” (58%); “a common energy policy among EU Member States” (54%); “a common European policy on migration” (50%); “a free trade and investment agreement between the EU and the USA” (64%); “a digital single market within the EU” (40%). On the other hand, British respondents oppose “a European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the Euro” (76%) as well as the idea concerning the further enlargement of the EU (54%). A solid majority (40%) also opposes proposals about a common European migration policy or a common foreign policy (EB 85 – United Kingdom, Spring 2016, p. 3).

It is interesting to note that while a majority of respondents (53%) regard themselves as EU citizens, it is noticeably smaller than the European average (66%), and that a considerable minority (45%) do not identify as EU citizens, especially when compared to the European average (33%). In terms of knowing or wanting to know more about their rights as citizens of the EU, the results are split somewhat in the middle (49% know what their rights are compared to 50% who state that they do not know them while 52% would like to know more compared to 46% who wouldn't). Lastly, and somewhat in step with the EU average, the British respondents find that “the free movement of people, goods, and services within the EU” (44% in the UK compared to 56% in the EU) and “peace among the Member States of the EU” (52% in the UK compared to 55% in the EU) are the most positive results of the EU (EB 85 – United Kingdom, Spring 2016, p. 4).

Moreover, the only aspect which registered a higher percentage in the UK compared to the EU, in terms of positive results, concerned the level of social welfare (healthcare, education, pensions) in the EU (23% in the UK versus 17% in the EU). The least positive aspects concern the Euro (5% in the UK compared to 25% in the EU), followed by the Common Agricultural Policy (7% in the UK compared to 8% in the EU), student exchange programs such as Erasmus (14% in the UK compared to 23% in the EU), the economic power of the EU (16% in the UK compared to 18% in the EU) or the political and diplomatic influence of the EU in the rest of the world (17% in the UK compared to 19% in the EU) (EB 85 – United Kingdom, Spring 2016, p. 4).

All in all, the results of the last Eurobarometer whose data was collected prior to the Brexit in May 2016 do not seem to anticipate the outcome of the referendum, nor do they differ significantly from the results registered in earlier EBs from 2015 (EBs 83 and 84). The state of the economy is considered to be overall “good”. National and European institutions are more distrusted than trusted, but not more acutely than the European average, though the EU is slightly more distrusted than the national institutions (four percentage

¹ Same number was registered in EB 84 from Autumn 2015.

points more in UK compared to the EU). Immigration is seen as an important issue at both the UK and EU levels, but it also registers high percentages when correlated to the EU average. The euro has always been an issue from which the UK had opted out in a bid to affirm its national sovereignty. Overall, there are slight differences, but they appear to be mostly borderline rather than critical. In the end, issues concerning sovereignty and immigration proved to be decisive in the voting outcome. A poll released in July 2018 found that for the Leave voters, the issue of sovereignty surpassed immigration and even economic growth. For these voters, the main priority for the UK is to regain “control of its laws and regulations” over the next five years. Other priorities concerned “the ability for the UK to make its own trade deals”; “[l]imiting immigration only to high-skilled workers”; “economic growth”; and “reduc[ing] the overall numbers of immigrants to the UK” (Pagel & Cooper, 2018).

The EB 86 from Autumn 2016 did not show significant changes in the British attitudes towards the EU. A similar percentage of respondents considered that the economy was “good” (51%), but compared to Spring 2016, only 29% (a drop of fifteen percentage points) considered that the economic situation will remain the same. Additionally, if in Spring 2016 only 18% thought that the economic situation will worsen, by Autumn the percentage had almost doubled (34%). The most important issues continued to be immigration (albeit reduced to 25% compared to 38% in Spring 2016), health and social security and housing. Compared to spring, the issue that witnessed the most notable increase was the one referring to “rising prices/ inflation/ cost of living” (23% in Autumn 2016 compared to 14% in Spring 2016). Regarding the most important issues concerning the EU, the topic of immigration dropped below the European average (45%) compared to EB 85 (42% versus 51% in Spring), followed by terrorism (26%), and the economic situation (which slightly exceeded the European average) (EB 86 – United Kingdom, Autumn 2016, pp. 1-2).

Regarding the trust in European and national institutions, the changes were minimal: 56% of the British respondents tended not to trust the EU compared to 59% in Spring. In terms of the image of the EU, 34% considered that its overall “positive” (an increase of three percentages compared to EB 85), while for those who have a negative image, the results were lower compared to Spring by four percentage points (32%). While slightly lower than earlier, a majority of UK respondents were still against “a European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the Euro” (67% in Autumn 2016 compared to 76% in Spring) and they were also against the idea of further enlargement in the future (45% in Autumn 2016 compared to 54% in Spring). Minor differences are found in relation to those who do not perceive themselves as EU citizens (43% in Autumn 2016 compared to 45% in Spring) (EB 86 – United Kingdom, Autumn 2016, pp. 3-4).

Based on the comparative analysis of the two standard Eurobarometers applied to the UK case, five aspects will be analyzed further in relation to the other MSs: 1) trust in EU; 2) the direction of the EU; 3) the future of EU and of the MSs; 4) the economy; and 5) immigration.

Member states’ attitudes towards the Eu in Light of Brexit: Pew Research polls overview

A Pew Research poll released on June 7, 2016 revealed that at the time of the Brexit referendum, the EU was witnessing a wave of Euroscepticism across multiple MSs. While the poll surveyed only ten MSs, it revealed that in the aggregates, the EU was seen in a favorable light by just 51% while 42% considered that Brussels had too much power and that some of this power should be returned to the national governments (Stokes, 2016, p. 2). The research also highlighted the fact that the public was split “along partisan lines” and that in MSs like France, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the UK, supporters of Eurosceptic parties had an unfavorable attitude towards the EU (Stokes, 2016, p. 2). Of the ten MSs analyzed, significant majorities in Greece (71%) and France (61%) had an unfavorable view of the EU and the same position was held by smaller majorities in UK (48%) and Spain (49%). In terms of the other six MS which have a favorable image of the EU, high majorities are found in Poland (72%), Hungary (61%), and somewhat in Italy (58%), while in the remaining three MSs, the majorities that have a favorable image of EU were balanced by significant minorities which hold an opposite view: Germany (50% versus 48%), Netherlands (51% versus 46%), and Sweden (54% versus 44%) (Stokes, 2016, p. 3).

In the following year, another Pew Research poll released on June 15, 2017, found that of the ten MSs surveyed previously, only Greece maintained an unfavorable view of the EU (65%). The remaining nine

MSs had a favorable view of the EU though strong minorities were still present in UK (40%) and France (44%). Significant changes in attitude were remarked in Spain (62% – up 15% compared to 2016), Germany (68% – up 18% compared to 2016), Sweden (65% – up 11% compared to 2016), and the Netherlands (64% – up 13% compared to 2016). In Poland and Hungary, the favorability percentages remained stable at 74% and 67% respectively, while Italy (57%) had been superseded by Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany (Stokes et al., 2017, p. 6). Another notable aspect that the survey brought to the fore concerns the relatively strong support in favor of the idea of “holding a national referendum on our country’s EU membership” (from 65% in Spain to 42% in the Netherlands) even though there is little support for the idea of leaving the EU, ranging from 36% in Greece to 11% in Germany and Poland (Stokes et al., 2017, p. 4).

Member states’ attitudes and Eu crisis moments

Where the Eurobarometers are concerned, our analysis shows (see Appendix) that there are certain aggregate tendencies that are more or less influenced by the Brexit referendum. In reviewing the data provided by seven Eurobarometers over a period of three years, we can assess how crises can influence European attitudes. It is important to note that crises that produce immediate negative effects (like the refugee crisis) provoke equally immediate negative reactions as seen when comparing Eurobarometer 83 with Eurobarometers 84 and 85. For example, in Spring 2015 (EB 83), a majority of states (18) tend to trust the EU while in Autumn 2015 (EB 84) – in the aftermath of the refugee crisis – we find that 20 MSs tend not to trust the EU. Similarly, where the direction of the EU was concerned, half of the MSs considered that the EU was headed in the right direction in Spring 2015, while in Autumn 2015, 20 MSs considered that things were going in the wrong direction. Certain trends remain stable throughout the period analyzed especially as concerns: 1) the future of the EU where majorities of MSs are generally optimistic; 2) succeeding outside the EU where majorities of MSs do not agree with the idea that it would be easier as a non-EU MS; 3) immigration – perceived as one of most important issues at both the national and European level; and 4) freedom of movement – majorities of MSs have positive feelings about immigration from other MSs, but negative feelings about immigration from outside the EU.

Member States’ Attitudes towards the EU Prior to the Refugee Crisis

The report “Europeans and the European Union” – an Eurobarometer Qualitative Study (EQS) based on data collected in May and June 2014 from focus groups across 19 MSs² – found that “participants presented very mixed associations with the EU”, which was regarded as “bureaucratic and distant”, “responsible for austerity in Europe”, and that it lacks “a clearer message” (European Commission – Public Opinion, June 2014, p. 7). In terms of positive aspects, the respondents appreciated that *unity* was “the most important perceived value” while the free movement of goods, services and people was thought to be “the main perceived success of the EU” (European Commission – Public Opinion, 2015, p. 7). The euro received a mixed feedback: for some, it was “another great success [...] [that] made travel easier”, for others, it was “a failure” because of a perceived increase in their cost of living (Eurobarometer Qualitative Study (EQS), June 2015, p. 7). Despite the EU’s various shortcomings, most of the respondents considered that their country was not “better equipped to face the global challenges outside of the EU” and that it was “better placed as part of the EU” (EQS, June 2015, p. 8). Meanwhile, immigration was perceived to be one of the main challenges facing the EU (EQS, June 2015, p. 8).

The quantitative Special Eurobarometer 430 (SEB) – “Europeans in 2015” (see Tables 1 and 2) – released in March 2015 can be used as a favorability baseline for the conduct of the present analysis. SEB 430 found that majorities in 20 MSs regarded the current situation of the national economy to be total “bad” as opposed to majorities in eight MSs (including the UK at 52%) that perceived the situation to be total “good” (SEB 430, 2015, pp. 10-11). In terms of whether the economic situation would improve, worsen or stay the same over the next 12 months, only in five MSs did respondents consider that it will improve,

² Of the 19 MS analyzed, seven were from Western Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden, the United Kingdom), four were from Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Greece, Malta), and eight were from Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia).

while in the rest of the MSs (including the UK – 44%), the majority considered that it will remain the same (SEB 430, 2015, pp. 12-13). A majority of respondents in 17 MSs – including the UK – also believed that things are going in the wrong direction and that their voice did not count in the EU (SEB 430, 2015, pp. 28-29, pp. 50-51). On trust, the MSs were split rather equally (SEB 430, 2015, pp. 34-35). Things begin to improve where the image of the EU is concerned: 24 MSs have an overall positive image of the Union. In the minority group, we find the UK, Austria, Greece, and Cyprus (SEB 430, 2015, pp. 36-37). In terms of the future of the EU, respondents in 24 MSs, including the UK, declare to be overall optimistic while majorities of pessimists tend to be found in Cyprus, Greece, France, and Austria (SEB 430, 2015, pp. 48-49).

Another pro-EU majority (21 MSs) supports the idea of “a European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro”. Notably, with the exception of Italy, Cyprus, and Croatia, in most MSs the percentages in support of the economic union rank above the 60% threshold. On other hand, the UK (74%) is among those that oppose the idea (SEB 430, 2015, pp. 38-39). Immigration is considered to be one of the most important issues facing one’s country and several MSs, including the UK (32%), surpass the EU average (18%) with high results being registered in Malta (58%), Germany (38%), Denmark (32%), Sweden (30%), Italy (25%), and Austria (19%). Immigration is perceived to be a bigger issue at the EU’s level: the average rises to 25%, coming third, behind issues concerning the economic situation (28%) and the state of MSs’ public finances (26%), but ahead of issues such as terrorism (24%) or unemployment (22%)³ (SEB 430, 2015, pp. 23-24).

The data reported in the Special Eurobarometer 430 provides a snapshot into the attitudes towards the EU during a moment (February 28th – March, 9th, 2015) when, on one hand, the effects of the economic crisis had already began to subside and, on the other hand, the refugee crisis had not yet reached critical levels (Summer 2015). The results of the Special Eurobarometer are somewhat of a mixed bag. On the economic front, a majority of MSs (19 and 17 respectively) consider that the state of the national economy is bad and also that the MSs are headed in the wrong direction. The UK is part of the minority group of MSs which consider that the state of economy is good and that they are headed in the right direction. Meanwhile, on the EU front, a majority of MSs consider that the EU is headed in the wrong direction. This majority of 17 (mostly Western) MS⁴ also includes the UK. In terms of whether MSs trust the EU, the results are split with the UK placed in the half that distrusts the EU. Moreover, both halves contain a mix of states from multiple regions of the EU.

Regarding whether “one’s voice counts in the EU”, the UK is again part of the majority group (17) that does not believe it has a say in EU matters. What is notable about this group is that with the exception of Ireland, Austria, and the UK, the rest of the MSs are either from Southern Europe (five MSs) or from CEE (nine MSs). Where the image of the EU is concerned, the UK is found in a minority group composed of three other MSs that have a negative image of the EU. Similarly, the UK is once again found in a minority group composed of seven MSs that reject the idea of “a European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the Euro” (including the other members of the “opt out” group: Denmark and Sweden). On the other hand, the UK is part of a majority group that is optimistic about the future of the EU. Finally, on the topic of immigration, UK considers it to be one of the main issues affecting both the country and the EU, but overall, finds itself in minority groups (six and eight MSs, respectively, consider that immigration is one of the most important issues at the national and European levels). In the case of the relation between MSs and the EU, we have this paradoxical result where a majority of 17 MSs considers that the EU is headed in the wrong direction, but at the same time, a higher majority of 24 MSs are optimistic about the future of the EU. Only four out of eleven MSs from the first category are pessimistic about the future of the EU: Cyprus, Greece, France, and Austria.

Standard Eurobarometer 83 (Spring 2015 – Fieldwork: May 2015)

The EB from May 2015 provides a similar attitudinal profile of the MSs. A majority of MSs tend to trust the EU (18) and are optimistic about the future (26), but only half of them consider that things are going in the right direction (EB 83, Spring 2015, p. 108, p. 85, p. 191). In the pro-EU spirit, we can also add that a

³ Only eight MSs – including the UK (31%) surpass the EU average (SEB 430, 2015, pp. 23-24).

⁴ The notable exceptions are from Central and Eastern Europe: the Czech Republic (33%), Slovenia (31%) and they occupy the last two positions in this group.

strong majority of MSs (25) disagree with the idea that it “would be easier to face the future outside the EU” (EB 83, Spring 2015, p. 99). The MSs that stand out in particular are the UK (where a majority of respondents distrust the EU), Greece (which is pessimistic about the future), Slovenia (which considers that it “would be easier to face the future outside the EU”), and Cyprus (which is both pessimistic and share the same minority position as Slovenia) (EB 83, Spring 2015, p. 108, p. 191, p. 99).

Where the issues that might bolster Eurosceptic and anti-EU feelings are concerned – namely the state of the economy and immigration – several aspects stand out. A majority of MSs (20) consider that the state of the national economy is overall “bad”⁵, but the attitudes are split when it comes to the condition of the European economy (EB 3, Spring 2015, p. 30, p. 32). At the national level, immigration is the first most frequently mentioned issue in three MSs (Germany, Denmark and UK) and high percentages are also registered in five more MSs. Meanwhile, at the EU level, immigration is seen as “the second national concern” after “the national economic situation” particularly among the Euro area MSs: “Immigration is the key issue facing the European Union for the respondents in 20 Member States” (EB 83, Spring 2015, p. 48). Moreover, a recurrent trend that is maintained throughout the EBs is that MSs have different feelings on this topic depending on whether we are talking about immigration from other MSs or from outside the EU. In the former case, a majority of MSs (20) – including the UK – have positive feelings about it while in the latter instance, we find the opposite situation: 23 MSs have negative feelings about that form of immigration (EB 83, Spring 2015, p. 153, p. 154). It also important to highlight the MSs comprising the minority groups since their numbers are susceptible to change: the eight MSs that have negative feeling about the first type are the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, Belgium, Greece, and Hungary, while the five MSs that have positive feelings about the second type are Sweden, Romania, Ireland, Spain, and Croatia (EB 83, Spring 2015, p. 153, p. 154).

Member States’ Attitudes towards the EU prior and after the Refugee Crisis

Eurobarometer 84 (Autumn 2015 – Fieldwork: November 2015)

To better understand the MSs’ attitudes towards the EU prior and after the Brexit referendum, we can observe that the events of 2016 happen in a context where EU’s favorability was already depressed. After the refugee crisis from Summer 2015, the positive attitudes from Spring had dropped significantly by the time EB 84 is released (Autumn 2015), especially where “trust” and the “direction of the EU” were concerned. Now, a majority of MSs (20), including the UK, tended neither to trust the EU nor to “consider that things are going in the right direction” (EB 84, Autumn 2015, p. 109, p. 88). However, 24 MSs remained optimistic about the future and rejected the idea that “it would be easier to face the future outside the EU”. Notably, UK (47%) becomes one of the three MSs (next to Cyprus and Slovenia) that agrees with the assessment (EB 84, Autumn 2015, p. 102).

While the views on the state of the national (+4) and European economy (-2) do not change drastically (EB 84, Autumn 2015, p. 30, p. 32), not the same thing can be said about immigration: it “is now the main concern” at the national level. At both the national⁶ and European level, the average rises either by 13 or by 20 percentage points respectively (EB 84, Autumn 2015, p. 48, p. 56). Where freedom of movement is concerned, the pattern identified in Spring holds steady: a majority of MSs (23 and 25 respectively) have positive feelings about one type of immigration (intra-EU) and negative feelings about the other. The exceptions are the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, and Slovakia in the former case and Sweden, Spain, and Ireland in the latter (EB 84, Autumn 2015, p. 49, p. 50).

Member States’ Attitudes towards the EU Prior to the Brexit Referendum

Eurobarometer 85(Spring 2016 – Fieldwork: May 2016)

By the time the results of EB 85 are published, we find that the downwards attitudinal trend remains somewhat constant: it does not worsen and in some cases, it even slightly improves. In other words, one or two MSs move in one direction or another. Majorities still tend not to trust the EU (18) and to consider that

⁵ As opposed to eight MSs (Germany, Denmark, Malta, Luxembourg, Sweden, the Netherlands, UK, and Austria) that have positive views on the economy (EB 3, Spring 2015, p. 30).

⁶ Notably, Germany (76%) registers “the highest percentage per item” (EB 84, Autumn 2015, p. 48).

the EU is headed in the wrong direction (21), but remain optimistic about the future (22) and would not want to be outside the EU (25) (EB 85, Spring 2016, p. 86, p. 60, p. 157, p. 75). In the pessimistic camp, we find Hungary, the UK, and the carryovers from November: Cyprus, France, and Germany (EB 85, Spring 2016, p. 157). Meanwhile, Slovenia, Cyprus, and the UK agree with the idea that it would be easier outside the EU (EB 85, Spring 2016, p. 75).

The economy indicator upholds the same patterns as previously stated: a majority of respondents in 17 and 16 MSs respectively are dissatisfied with the state of the economy at either level (EB 85, Spring 2016, p. 169, p. 171). Compared to EB 84, the percentages concerning the issue of immigration have dropped in both instances: “Immigration, the leading national concern in autumn 2015 [...], has dropped sharply to second place” but “remains at its second highest level ever recorded” in both instances (EB 85, Spring 2016, p. 26, p. 56). The European average has dropped by eight percentage points at the national level (from 36% to 28%) while at the European level it decreased by ten percentage points (from 58% to 48%), but was exceeded in 15 MSs (EB 85, Spring 2016, p. 26, p. 56). The patterns are maintained where the two types of immigration are concerned: there are no significant fluctuations registered in the number of MSs that support (23) or reject (5) immigration from inside the EU (EB 85, 2016, 50). The only change is that Greece was replaced by Latvia in the minority group (EB 85, 2016, 50). In terms of immigration from outside the EU, the topic still “evokes negative feelings” for 24 MSs (-1 compared to Autumn 2015). Luxembourg joins Sweden, Spain, and Ireland in the group of states that are not against such a type of immigration (EB 85, Spring 2016, p. 49, p. 51).

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES IN LIGHT OF THE BREXIT REFERENDUM (AUTUMN 2016 – SPRING 2018)

In both EB 84 and EB 85, we can identify the MSs’ backlash at the EU’s response to the refugee crisis. As we have seen, the reaction is rather severe since the refugee crisis produced swift and visible effects. Moreover, the management of the crisis on the part of the EU triggered a reactionary and Eurosceptic wave in multiple MSs. On the other hand, the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU does not cause a similar virulent reaction though the immediate Eurobarometer post-Brexit (EB 86 – Autumn 2016) appears to continue the negative trend established a year earlier. For all intents and the purposes, the data relayed by EB 86 would seem to outright reject our hypothesis. Yet, beginning with Spring 2017, a wind of change seems to have passed through several of the analyzed indicators. As such, the Eurobarometers begin to present a staggered, but overall upward trend. When analyzing the attitudes post-Brexit, it is important to note that as the effects of the 2015 crisis subside, the British crisis induces over a period of two years a positive reaction in relation to the EU. It remains to be seen how this attitudes will hold up pending the EU’s negotiations with the UK as well as in terms of the Brexit’s overall effects on the EU and its remaining MSs.

Eurobarometer 86 (Autumn 2016 – Fieldwork: November 2016)

In Autumn 2016, EB 86 shows that some of the trends identified previously remain in place while others change incrementally. Trust and direction are still overall negative with only slight differences when compared to Spring 2016: 11 MSs tend to trust the EU (+ 2), only five MSs consider that the EU is heading in the right direction while future remains optimistic for a majority of MSs (21)⁷ (+ 1) (EB 86, Autumn 2016, p. 92, p. 66, p. 159). A single state defects to the camp that entertains the likelihood of a future outside the EU (EB 86, Autumn 2016, p. 81). Who are the standouts? Italy and Austria join Greece, Cyprus, France, and the UK in the pessimistic camp and Italy has also switched to the minority group (next to Slovenia, Cyprus, and UK) that is optimistic about the future outside the EU (EB 86, Autumn 2016, p. 159). In all four categories, the UK is present in the groups that exhibit a negative view of the EU.

Similar patterns are also maintained in terms of the economy and immigration: the moderate downturn from Spring 2016 remains constant (17 MSs consider that the state of the national economy is “bad”). On

⁷ The one notable difference is that two MSs have switched from one side to another: Italy and Austria are now in the pessimistic group while Germany and the Czech Republic are in the former group (EB 86, Autumn 2016, p. 159).

the other hand, a more clear improvement is registered at the European level: 18 MSs (as opposed to 12 MSs in Spring 2016) have a positive image of the European economy, reversing the negative trend established in the previous two EBs (EB 86, Autumn 2016, p. 169, p. 173). Immigration wise, EB 86 notes that the topic remains “the second most important national issue” at the national level, but is down by two percentage points where the European average is concerned and “confirm[s] a downward trend”. Meanwhile, at the EU level, “[i]mmigration is seen as the main issue currently facing the EU (45%)” and continues the downturn trend that began in Spring 2016 (EB 86, Autumn 2016, p. 22, p. 28). Minor improvements are seen in terms of the freedom of movement: only four MSs now have a negative image about immigration from other MSs (-1): Cyprus, Italy, the Czech Republic, and Latvia – the same four as in EB 85. Meanwhile, in terms of immigration from outside the EU, while the negative majority holds steady, the minority group continues to add MSs in incremental doses: in addition to Sweden, Ireland, Spain, and Luxembourg, now Portugal and, more notably, the UK (49%) have positive feelings about this issue (EB 86, Autumn 2016, p. 50, p. 46).

Eurobarometer 87 (Spring 2017 – Fieldwork: May 2017)

By Spring 2017, the rather timid increases registered in the previous semester transform into a more prominent positive trend. For the first time since Spring 2015 – though not yet reaching those exact levels – a majority of MSs (15) tend to trust the EU. Meanwhile, another majority (20) still considers that the EU is headed in the wrong direction. Notably, the minority group has increased by three MSs: Portugal, Finland, and Luxembourg join Romania, Bulgaria, Ireland, Lithuania, and Malta (EB 87, Spring 2017, p. 96, p. 66). Optimism in the future of the EU continues to grow: compared to the previous year, three more MSs join the majority group, for a total of 24. Greece, Cyprus, UK, and the Czech Republic⁸ remain in the pessimist camp (EB 87, Spring 2017, p. 170). The future outside the EU looks uncertain for 25 MSs. Aside from the UK, Slovenia and Cyprus are the only other two MSs where a majority of respondents agreed with the idea that it would be easier to face the future alone (EB 87, Spring 2017, p. 84).

EB 87 shows a significant improvement in terms of the economy: at the national level, the 28 MSs are now equally split⁹ while in terms of the European economy, the positive trend registered in Autumn 2016 continues to expand by three MSs (21). Positive trends are also maintained in terms of immigration: at the national level, the European average has dropped by four more percentage points (22%) while at the EU level, the average returned to the pre-refugee crisis levels from Spring 2015 (38%) (EB 87, Spring 2017, p. 25, p. 31). Stable trends are found when analyzing the attitudes concerning the two types of immigration: with the exception of the Czech Republic and Cyprus, all the other MSs (+2) have positive feelings about intra-EU immigration while support for non-EU immigration remained the same as in the previous year (Sweden, Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal, and the UK¹⁰) (EB 87, Spring 2017, p. 59, p. 60).

One year after the Brexit referendum, the UK is among those MSs that tend not to trust the EU (51%); that think that the EU is headed in the wrong direction (52%); that are pessimistic about the future of the EU (49%); and that consider that it would be better to be outside the Union (46%). In terms of the economy, the state of the national economy is perceived as “good” (51%) while the state of the European economy showcases the opposite view (44%). As regards the issue of immigration, UK’s percentages fall below the European average at both levels (19% and 33% respectively). Notably, UK is one of the few MSs that have positive feelings about immigration from both inside and outside the EU (59% and 52% respectively).

Eurobarometer 88 (Autumn 2017 – Fieldwork: November 2017)

By November 2017, trust levels return to those from Spring 2015: 18 MSs (+3) tend to trust the EU. Interestingly, with the exception of Croatia replacing Germany, the other nine MSs from the minority group are the same as those from EB 83: Greece, UK, France, Italy, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Austria, Slovenia, and Spain (EB 88, Autumn 2017, p. 96). A majority of 21 MSs (+1) still consider that “things are

⁸ In the case of Czech Republic, the attitudes towards the future were almost evenly split: 49% were optimistic versus 47% that were pessimistic (EB 86, 2016, 159).

⁹ The number of MSs that consider that the national economy is “good” has increased by four.

¹⁰ In the case of the UK, the percentages in support of outside immigration exceed 50% of the respondents (51%).

going in the wrong direction”¹¹, while 26 MSs (+2) are optimistic about the future of the EU. The remaining pessimistic holdouts are Greece and UK (EB 88, Autumn 2017, p. 66, p. 154). Similarly, Italy and the UK consider that it would “be easier to face the future outside the EU” (EB 88, Autumn 2017, p. 84).

As regards the national economy, the situation from Spring (14-14) carries over into Fall while the attitudes towards the European economy continue to improve: out of 28 MSs, only five MSs have a contrary opinion (Italy, Greece, France, Spain, and the UK) (EB 88, Autumn 2017, p. 165, p. 167). The Eurobarometer notes that “[f]or the first time in ten years, a majority of Europeans now see the European economic situation as good” (EB 88, Autumn 2017, p. 163). Attitudes on immigration also appear to have stabilized at both levels: “[w]orries about immigration peaked in autumn 2015 (36%) and lost 14 percentage points during the period to spring 2017” (EB 88, Autumn 2017, p. 33). The issue registers the highest percentage per item in Germany (40%) and Austria (28%), the second highest in Italy (33%), Denmark (32%), Malta (32%), Hungary (28%), and France (17%) and the third highest in Sweden (27%), the Netherlands (24%), and Finland (21%). At the European level, the average continues to be higher (39%) than at the national level. In terms of freedom of movement, with the exception of Cyprus, all the other 27 MSs have positive feeling about immigration from inside the EU. Meanwhile, no changes are registered where it comes to immigration from outside the Union: the same six MSs as in the previous two Eurobarometers continue to have positive feelings about this issue (EB 88, Autumn 2017, p. 45, p. 46).

Like in EB 87, UK is present in all the attitudinal groups that reflect a negative view of the EU. Unsurprisingly, for the first time during the period analyzed, the UK no longer has a positive image about its national economy. In terms of immigration, no changes are registered: UK’s percentages are below the European average at both levels (20% and 32% respectively), while at the same time, UK is once again part of a minority of states that have positive feelings about the two types of immigration analyzed.

Eurobarometer 89 (Spring 2018 – Fieldwork: March 2018)

The last Eurobarometer analyzed shows that attitudes are in flux. Trust drops again and returns to Spring 2017 levels (15 MSs), but views on EU’s direction while still negative in the aggregate, show signs of improvement: the minority group that sees the EU heading in the right direction (Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria, Malta) picks four more MSs for a total of 10 (Croatia, Poland, Latvia, and Estonia) (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 105, p. 61). While this indicator has not recovered to the Spring 2015 levels (where half of the MSs considered that things were headed in the right direction), the trend post-refugee crisis and post-Brexit has been positive. Things remain constant where positive attitudes towards the future are concerned: respondents in only two MSs (Greece and UK) are pessimistic, while when confronted with the certainty of a future outside the EU, the UK remains the only MS where respondents consider that it would be easier to not be an EU member (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 175, p. 80).

Stable attitudes are also found when looking at the economy: according to the last three EBs (87, 88, 89), half of the MSs consider that the state of the national economy is “good”, while at the European level the results continue to reaffirm the upward trend (+2) that began with EB 86 in November 2016. Negative feelings remain only in three MSs: Italy, France, and Spain¹² (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 186, p. 190). In terms of immigration, EB 89 points out that immigration is no longer the main concern for MSs: “[a]t the national level, concern about health and social security and pensions has become more widespread. In third place among national concerns comes immigration” (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 19). Nine MSs exceed the European average (21%) and it is notable that in all these MSs immigration is either the first most frequently mentioned item (Germany, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, Malta) or the second most (Italy, Sweden, Finland, and Hungary) (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 22). At the European level, “immigration and terrorism remain the two main issues facing the EU” (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 25). Case in point: the European average (38%) is exceeded in 18 MSs (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 30). More importantly, EB 89 notes that MSs from the Euro

¹¹ The seven MSs that consider that things are going in the right direction are: Ireland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Malta (EB 88, Autumn 2017, p. 58).

¹² Besides, these three MSs (Italy, Spain, and France) are ever-present in this category across all seven Eurobarometers.

and non-Euro areas have similar preoccupations: “Immigration is mentioned the most in both areas”¹³. (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 28). Finally, EB 89 registers somewhat of a rare achievement: the trend analyzed over seven EBs has reached its anticipated conclusion: all 28 MSs have positive feelings about immigration from other MSs (+1) with “[n]early-two thirds of Europeans feel[ing] positive” about this phenomenon (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 35). Similarly, the trend holds steady on the other side too: a majority of MSs (20) – specifically, over half of Europeans – still have negative feelings about immigration from outside the EU (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 37). Having said this, the minority group of MSs continues to grow and has expanded by two MSs: aside from the six MSs mentioned before (Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, Luxembourg, and UK), the Netherlands and Croatia have also joined in¹⁴ (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 37).

With one notable exception where the UK finds itself in a majority group that has negative feelings about the EU (the one concerning the direction of the EU – 41%), it continues to remain either in minority groups that have negative feelings about the EU (trust – 57%; future of the EU – 48%) or even as a singular exception (future outside the EU: 44%¹⁵). In a reversed situation from earlier EBs, the UK considers that the state of the national economy is “bad” (47%), while the European economy is “good” (39%). On the topic of immigration as an issue that affects both the MS and the EU, UK registers below average results on either item (17% and 29% respectively). This reassessment of the views on immigration is also present in the attitudes towards the two types of immigration mentioned throughout the study: the UK is among a relatively small number of MSs (8) that have positive feelings about both forms of immigration (64% and 54%).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The analysis has shown that in the post-Brexit referendum period, the attitudes towards the EU have improved in certain regards: a majority of MSs trust the EU, are optimistic about the future and reject the idea that they would fare better outside the EU. Paradoxically, another majority considers that things are going in the wrong direction. With the exception of the first indicator, the other three tend to remain stable and not suffer major overhauls.

In terms of the economy, the Eurobarometers have shown that at the national level, while views on the state of the economy have improved since Autumn 2016, almost half of the MSs still have a negative opinion on this topic. On the other hand, not the same thing can be said about the state of the European economy where majorities of MSs have had a positive view of it across multiple EBs. This indicator is important because the state of the economy influences people’s attitudes and shapes their views of the national and European actors that are held responsible for their hardships.

Immigration is seen in contentious terms at both national and European levels, but after a spike in Autumn 2016, it drops in intensity at the aggregate level. Moreover, as remarked multiple times throughout multiple Eurobarometers, majorities of MSs are favorable towards immigration from inside the EU, but unfavorable towards immigration from outside the EU.

It is important to note that, as we mentioned earlier, prior to the 2016 referendum EU’s favorability credit had been depleted in certain MSs in the aftermath of the refugee crisis and that since Autumn 2016 and more prominently since Spring 2017, we are witnessing a return to more positive attitudes especially at the aggregate level. The study has also noted that there are clusters of MSs that remain constant irrespective of what happens during the time period between one Eurobarometer and another. Outside the UK, among the MSs that stand out, we can refer to Italy, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Italy, France, Germany, Hungary the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Austria, that are shown to be pessimistic about the future during 2016 and 2017, only so that in the EB from 2018 the only MS left in this category is Greece. Similarly, in the case

¹³ The average remains unchanged in the euro area countries (38%) and drops by five percentage points to reach parity (38%) in non-euro area countries (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 28).

¹⁴ It is important to note that both the Netherlands and Croatia are separated by only one percentage point when it comes to this issue: 49% have positive feelings as opposed to 48% in the Netherlands, while 47% have positive feelings as opposed to 46% in Croatia (EB 89, Spring 2018, p. 37).

¹⁵ EB 89 shows that even though 44% of the British respondents consider that it would “be easier to face the future outside the EU”, 43% disagree with this assessment.

where respondents are asked about whether their MS would be better off outside the EU, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Italy are also present in the minority group at various points throughout 2015-2017, yet by Spring 2018, the only MS left is the UK. We see that the MSs that took the brunt of either the economic (Greece) or the refugee crisis (Greece, Italy) react accordingly. We can also see that MSs in Central and Eastern Europe that have not had the smoothest economic recoveries tend to support the EU since, so far, the EU remains the most credible opportunity for development.

How stable this trend is remains to be seen. The latest EBs would appear to indicate that while it would not be prudent to talk about a wave of Euro-enthusiasm, at the very least we cannot talk about an outright rejection of the EU, either. On the contrary, the vast majority of MSs prefer staying in the EU even though they might disagree with some of its policies. While this present article does not provide a qualitative analysis regarding the MSs' feelings on Brexit, it has sought to illustrate that in the post-Brexit referendum period, the attitudes of the respondents towards the EU have improved. How much can be attributed to the current state of the economy and how much has been dependent on the Brexit, remains a research topic for future studies. As things stand so far, the Brexit referendum seems to be a case where the *Caveat emptor* principle applies: it warns those who would entertain and pursue the idea of another "exit" that while the EU is not without its faults, the world outside is far more uncertain and filled with risks¹⁶, potentially too high to be weathered alone. The results of the elections for the European Parliament (EP) from Spring 2019 will be a much better indicator of where the EU stands in relation to its citizens. It will also show if the Eurosceptic wave that had swept multiple Western MSs during the previous electoral cycle, has passed – especially in light of the disappearance of the British Eurosceptic parties – or, on the contrary, whether it will make its presence felt once more.

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¹⁶ See the collapse of the Pound in the aftermath of the referendum.

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APPENDIX¹⁷

Table 1: Europeans in 2015 (Part I)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (March 2015). Special Eurobarometer 430 (SEB) – “Europeans in 2015”. Retrieved from

<http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/yearFrom/1976/yearTo/2018/surveyKey/2097/p/2>.

	Direction of the MS	Direction of the EU	Trust in the EU	(My) Voice in the EU	Image of the EU	Future of the EU
	“Wrong direction”	“Wrong direction”	“Tend not to trust”	“Does not count”	“Negative”	“Pessimistic”
France	64%	54%	54%	<u>46%***</u>	36%	50%
Spain	62%	44%	63%	67%	34%	57%
Croatia	57%	33%	46%	59%	41%	64%
Slovenia	56%	<u>35%**</u>	50%	52%	36%	61%
Cyprus	53%	56%	71%	78%	43%	55%
Hungary	50%	<u>38%**</u>	45% vs 44%	53%	36%	53%
Bulgaria	49%	43%	49%	43% vs 42%	50%	55%
Italy	49%	36%	49%	73%	35%	50%
Finland	49%	47%	49%	51%	30%	63%
Belgium	46%	45%	47%	55%	43%	60%
Portugal	46%	35%	53%	68%	40%	54%
Slovakia	45%	<u>33%**</u>	51%	52%	40%	63%
Sweden	42%	46%	50%	73%	37%	59%
Poland	40%	<u>35%**</u>	41%	51%	48%	67%
Austria	39%	47%	60%	47%	40%	50%
Czech Rep.	36%	33%	52%	69%	31%	54%
Latvia	31%*	33%	45%	66%	33%	58%
<u>UK</u>	37%	44%	57%	61%	32%	47%
Lithuania	37%	42%	61%	52%	52%	71%
Greece	40%	59%	70%	75%	36%	51%
Luxembourg	41%	35%	57%	55%	52%	69%
Germany	41%	37%	48%	56%	42%	58%
Estonia	43%	32%	55%	66%	50%	70%
Romania	44%	55%	59%	54%	55%	76%
Netherlands	45%	43%	46%	55%	33%	63%
Ireland	55%	39%	43%	51%	51%	75%
Malta	57%	<u>39%**</u>	53%	52%	41%	67%
Denmark	57%	37%	52%	67%	36%	69%
	“Right direction”	“Right direction”	“Tend to trust”	“Counts”	“Positive”	“Optimistic”

¹⁷ Percentages in bold reflect the opposite position.

*In Latvia, 31% believe that the country is heading in the right direction

**In Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, the percentages reflect that the EU is headed neither in the right, not in the wrong direction.

*** In France, the percentages are split.

Table 2: Europeans in 2015 (Part II)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (March 2015). Special Eurobarometer 430 (SEB) – “Europeans in 2015”. Retrieved from

<http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/yearFrom/1976/yearTo/2018/surveyKy/2097/p/2>.

	State of national economy	Future of the economy	Support of economic and monetary union	Common European policy on migration
	Total Bad	“Remain the same”	“In favor”	“In favor”
Greece	97%	35% vs. 34%	74%	70%
Spain	93%	54%	63%	78%
Portugal	91%	49%	63%	70%
Cyprus	90%	45%	52%	60%
Croatia	90%	43%	49%	58%
Italy	89%	39%	56%	70%
Bulgaria	88%	49%	48%	66%
Slovenia	87%	47%	75%	60%
France	85%	56%	65%	66%
Romania	79%	45%	62%	70%
Slovakia	76%	48%	79%	63%
Hungary	76%	45%	48%	55%
Finland	74%	57%	75%	51%
Latvia	73%	66%	74%	53%
Czech Rep	64%	54%	75%	48%
Poland	60%	42%	55%	65%
Belgium	60%	49%	76%	77%
Lithuania	55%	52%	71%	75%
Ireland	55%	48%	77%	68%
<u>UK</u>	52%	44%	74%	53%
Austria	50%	49%	62%	51%
Estonia	55%	49%	84%	48%
Netherlands	61%	44% vs 43%	72%	75%
Malta	76%	42%	72%	78%
Luxembourg	79%	56%	81%	80%
Sweden	82%	57%	68%	75%
Germany	84%	63%	75%	74%
Denmark	84%	50%	68%	52%
	Total “Good”	“Improve”	“Against”	“Against”

Table 3: Trust in the EU (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018). Standard Eurobarometers 83-89 (Public Opinion in the European Union). Retrieved from

<http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&yearFrom=2015&yearTo=2018&search=eurobarometer>

Member States	EB 83	EB 84	EB 85	EB 86	EB 87	EB 88	EB 89
EU average – Tend to trust	40%	32%	33%	36%	42%	41%	42%
Lithuania	68%	59%	58%	55%	65%	64%	66%
Romania	68%	58%	47%	52%	57%	51%	52%
Malta	62%	46%	52%	52%	56%	51%	52%
Finland	58%	44%	48%	51%	59%	53%	53%
Denmark	57%	47%	45%	46%	56%	52%	57%
Bulgaria	56%	44%	49%	49%	54%	57%	56%
Hungary	56%	51%	53%	50%	49%	49%	50%
Estonia	55%	40%	44%	44%	55%	49%	53%
Latvia	51%	47%	44%	45%	48%	45%	49%
Croatia	51%	46%	45% (tied)	50%	47%	51%	49%
Luxembourg	49%	46%	43%	51%	61%	56%	56%
Poland	48%	39%	43%	45%	44% (tied)	43%	46%
Slovakia	48%	51%	50%	47%	48%	48%	45%
Sweden	48%	46%	49%	48%	48%	52%	51%
Belgium	48%	54%	53%	49%	51%	53%	49%
The Netherlands	47%	46%	50%	51%	49%	50%	50%
Portugal	47%	48%	47%	48%	54%	51%	57%
Ireland	44%	52%	44%	49%	51%	50%	54%
Greece	73%	81%	82%	78%	76%	73%	69%
Cyprus	69%	72%	66%	63%	57%	56%	55%
Austria	59%	65%	56%	58%	52%	55%	51%
<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>55%</u>	<u>63%</u>	<u>59%</u>	<u>56%</u>	<u>51%</u>	<u>59%</u>	<u>57%</u>
Spain	54%	61%	56%	54%	51%	47%	49%
Slovenia	52%	61%	54%	57%	52%	55%	50%
France	51%	63%	59%	65%	49%	56%	55%
Germany	48%	63%	60%	53%	47%	47%	49%
The Czech Republic	45%	63%	62%	66%	63%	56%	56%
Italy	44%	52%	54%	58%	48%	52%	51%
EU average – Tend not to trust	46%	55%	55%	54%	47%	48%	48%

Table 4: The Direction of the EU (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018). Standard Eurobarometers 83-89 (Public Opinion in the European Union). Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&yearFrom=2015&yearTo=2018&search=eurobarometer>

Member States	EB 83	EB 84	EB 85	EB 86	EB 87	EB 88	EB 89
<i>EU average – Right Direction</i>	28%	23%	17%	23%	30%	30%	31%
Romania	60%	52%	34%	46%	51%	47%	47%
Bulgaria	51%	41%	36%	43%	46%	47%	44%
Lithuania	51%	42%	33%	39%	41%	47%	48%
Ireland	46%	42%	38%	47%	46%	52%	58%
Croatia	42%	40%	32%(tied)	49%	42%	42%	46%
Hungary	41%	38%	43%	53%	52%	47%	51%
Latvia	38%	34%	39%	40%	35%	33%	33%
Poland	35%	33%(neither)	37%	42%	40%	40%	44%
Denmark	34%	48%	57%	66%	46%	50%	46%
The Czech Republic	34%	52%	57%	62%	60%	52%	54%
Slovakia	34%	45%	46%	53%	57%	49%	49%
Portugal	33%	35%	29%(tied)	37%	44%	46%	47%
Estonia	32%	33%(neither)	34%	37%	31%	30%	28%
Slovenia	32%	42%	41%	47%	47%	40%	41%
Greece	64%	69%	76%	82%	75%	69%	65%
France	52%	57%	62%	72%	46%	52%	52%
Austria	47%	56%	52%	61%	52%	48%	47%
Belgium	45%	48%	61%	63%	61%	59%	56%
Sweden	42%	55%	61%	66%	56%	49%	49%
Luxembourg	41%	50%	51%	60%	37%	42%	40%
Cyprus	39%	44%	43%	49%	48%	43%	42%
The Netherlands	39%	52%	55%	63%	47%	41%	41%
Spain	38%	37%	51%	52%	49%	46%	46%
Germany	38%	56%	60%	53%	56%	51%	52%
<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>37%</u>	<u>44%</u>	<u>46%</u>	<u>56%</u>	<u>52%</u>	<u>45%</u>	<u>41%</u>
Italy	35%	32%	42%	58%	49%	49%	49%
Finland	36%(tied)	47%	43%	56%	42%	41%	40%
Malta	38%(neither)	38%(neither)	39%(neither)	34%	36%	38%	34%
<i>EU average – Wrong direction</i>	35%	43%	50%	56%	49%	47%	45%

Table 5: The Future of the EU (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018). Standard Eurobarometers 83-89 (Public Opinion in the European Union). Retrieved from

<http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&yearFrom=2015&yearTo=2018&search=eurobarometer>

Member States	EB 83	EB 84	EB 85	EB 86	EB 87	EB 88	EB 89
EU average – Optimistic	58%	53%	50%	50%	56%	57%	58%
Ireland	77%	76%	77%	77%	77%	80%	84%
Romania	75%	73%	70%	67%	67%	66%	65%
Croatia	74%	69%	65%	59%	61%	56%	63%
Denmark	74%	65%	61%	57%	70%	68%	70%
Lithuania	74%	67%	66%	70%	67%	68%	70%
Malta	73%	69%	67%	67%	71%	70%	70%
The Netherlands	71%	58%	57%	54%	62%	68%	68%
Estonia	68%	56%	51%	56%	62%	60%	66%
Poland	67%	70%	63%	66%	69%	66%	69%
Finland	65%	57%	60%	58%	66%	69%	66%
Slovenia	63%	53%	55%	62%	58%	64%	63%
Sweden	63%	58%	55%	49% (tied)	55%	57%	57%
Luxembourg	63%	60%	62%	65%	73%	72%	71%
Bulgaria	62%	57%	58%	55%	59%	61%	61%
Slovakia	62%	51%	54%	59%	56%	59%	61%
Hungary	61%	50%	52%	53%	49%	58%	56%
Belgium	60%	56%	54%	56%	63%	61%	63%
Germany	60%	48%	51%	50%	59%	64%	64%
Spain	59%	60%	57%	57%	63%	66%	60%
Latvia	59%	51%	56%	55%	60%	58%	62%
The Czech Republic	57%	51%	50%	49%	51%	53%	55%
Portugal	55%	57%	56%	54%	64%	65%	71%
Italy	52%	52%	49%	50%	49%	50%	54%
France	50%	52%	51%	56%	55%	49%	48%
Austria	49%	56%	50%	49%	55%	58%	59%
<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>49%</u>	<u>46%</u>	<u>46%</u>	<u>51%</u>	<u>49%</u>	<u>48%</u>	<u>48%</u>
Greece	57%	63%	70%	68%	69%	60%	53%
Cyprus	54%	58%	54%	56%	52%	52%	54%
EU average – Pessimistic	36%	45%	44%	44%	38%	37%	36%

Table 6: Would it be easier outside the EU? (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018). Standard Eurobarometers 83-89 (Public Opinion in the European Union). Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index?p=1&yearFrom=2015&yearTo=2018&search=eurobarometer>

Member States	EB 83	EB 84	EB 85	EB 86	EB 87	EB 88	EB 89
EU average – Total “Disagree”	58%	50%	55%	58%	60%	60%	61%
The Netherlands	77%	76%	76%	79%	83%	85%	85%
Lithuania	74%	72%	65%	68%	68%	67%	72%
Luxembourg	70%	68%	72%	76%	67%	72%	74%
Denmark	70%	71%	72%	75%	78%	77%	78%
Germany	70%	57%	66%	74%	75%	75%	81%
Malta	69%	65%	64%	73%	69%	77%	69%
Estonia	66%	64%	62%	68%	73%	71%	72%
Finland	66%	59%	65%	67%	69%	71%	65%
Belgium	65%	66%	57%	65%	66%	69%	63%
Slovakia	64%	61%	56%	62%	63%	60%	58%
Ireland	63%	65%	65%	67%	69%	66%	70%
Sweden	62%	61%	67%	67%	69%	69%	67%
France	61%	57%	62%	58%	62%	63%	61%
Spain	60%	62%	59%	65%	71%	73%	66%
Hungary	59%	54%	56%	61%	60%	58%	56%
The Czech Republic	59%	47%	47%	50%	51%	55%	54%
Portugal	56%	59%	52%	61%	60%	63%	67%
Latvia	55%	54%	56%	57%	57%	59%	61%
Greece	55%	57%	50%	57%	56%	59%	61%
Croatia	54%	50%	49%	51%	49%	50%	48%
Romania	52%	56%	49%	49%	54%	58%	52%
Bulgaria	51%	49%	52%	51%	55%	53%	53%
Austria	50%	45% (tied)	47%	47%	49%	53%	49%
Italy	49%	47%	46%	45%	45%	46%	48%
Poland	47%	51%	51%	53%	58%	54%	54%
United Kingdom	43% (tied)	47%	45%	48%	46%	49%	44%
Cyprus	48%	55%	50%	49%	48%	54%	56%
Slovenia	47%	47%	53%	50%	48%	48%	50%
EU average – Total “Agree”	30%	38%	33%	32%	30%	30%	44%

Table 7: The State of the National Economy (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018). Standard Eurobarometers 83-89 (Public Opinion in the European Union). Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index?p=1&yearFrom=2015&yearTo=2018&search=eurobarometer>

Member States	EB 83	EB 84	EB 85	EB 86	EB 87	EB 88	EB 89
EU average – Total “Good”	38%	40%	39%	41%	46%	48%	49%
Germany	86%	86%	83%	87%	90%	91%	90%
Denmark	83%	83%	77%	79%	86%	86%	89%
Malta	81%	85%	80%	81%	86%	89%	82%
Luxembourg	78%	85%	88%	90%	90%	88%	93%
Sweden	78%	76%	76%	78%	88%	90%	86%
The Netherlands	72%	79%	78%	81%	91%	91%	93%
<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>56%</u>	<u>53%</u>	<u>53%</u>	<u>51%</u>	<u>51%</u>	48%	<u>47%</u>
Austria	56%	51%	59%	59%	68%	77%	81%
Greece	97%	97%	97%	97%	98%	98%	98%
Spain	93%	90%	91%	89%	85%	79%	83%
Portugal	89%	91%	89%	84%	64%	63%	55%
Italy	89%	85%	84%	86%	86%	80%	81%
Slovenia	89%	80%	80%	72%	64%	52%	50%
Cyprus	89%	85%	74%	70%	60%	55%	49% (tied)
Bulgaria	88%	88%	83%	82%	80%	74%	72%
Croatia	88%	80%	83%	85%	88%	87%	89%
France	84%	83%	85%	82%	72%	68%	63%
Romania	79%	73%	78%	71%	69%	76%	71%
Finland	78%	76%	72%	59%	59%	71%	77%
Slovakia	77%	66%	65%	62%	62%	56%	55%
Latvia	73%	72%	74%	77%	74%	70%	65%
Hungary	69%	69%	72%	67%	56%	50%	54%
Lithuania	60%	61%	71%	66%	72%	65%	60%
Poland	56%	47%	48%	47% (tied)	57%	62%	66%
The Czech Republic	55%	51%	50%	60%	62%	68%	70%
Belgium	52%	51%	61%	50%	60%	60%	58%
Estonia	51%	47%	48%	48%	54%	59%	62%
Ireland	51%	57%	53%	64%	68%	72%	79%
EU average – Total “Bad”	59%	57%	57%	56%	51%	49%	47%

Table 8: The State of the European Economy (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018). Standard Eurobarometers 83-89 (Public Opinion in the European Union). Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&yearFrom=2015&yearTo=2018&search=eurobarometer>

Member States	EB 83	EB 84	EB 85	EB 86	EB 87	EB 88	EB 89
EU average – Total “Good”	37%	38%	38%	39%	42%	48%	50%
Lithuania	74%	71%	68%	68%	72%	72%	75%
Bulgaria	68%	63%	54%	61%	65%	61%	59%
Romania	64%	60%	52%	59%	60%	51%	59%
Hungary	62%	53%	47%	49%	56%	62%	64%
Croatia	59%	59%	56%	56%	53%	52%	60%
Poland	56%	57%	52%	59%	61%	62%	66%
Latvia	56%	43%	49%	51%	57%	59%	61%
Estonia	54%	44%	56%	47%	52%	53%	60%
The Czech Republic	48%	50%	46%	51%	53%	61%	60%
Slovenia	48% (tied)	49%	47%	55%	57%	65%	69%
Germany	46%	52%	50%	50%	54%	61%	64%
Denmark	46%	48%	46%	50%	56%	53%	61%
Malta	46%	52%	49%	44%	57%	64%	54%
Slovakia	45%	51%	48%	49%	47%	55%	54%
Ireland	42%	45%	45%	54%	56%	61%	68%
Italy	67%	62%	66%	66%	69%	58%	55%
France	65%	68%	66%	67%	59%	50%	49%
Sweden	64%	54%	56%	49%	51%	57%	61%
Belgium	64%	59%	65%	58%	51%	51%	53%
Finland	63%	60%	56%	55%	56%	59%	65%
Spain	61%	62%	64%	63%	59%	46%	48%
Austria	59%	58%	49%	49%	53%	63%	67%
<u>United Kingdom</u>	58%	57%	51%	51%	44%	43%	39%
Portugal	58%	68%	66%	61%	47%	58%	63%
Cyprus	57%	59%	55%	51%	44%	48%	45%
Greece	57%	56%	64%	63%	55%	52%	47%
The Netherlands	50%	51%	47%	53%	61%	66%	71%
Luxembourg	49%	47%	48%	49%	54%	55%	58%
EU average – Total “Bad”	51%	50%	50%	50%	50%	39%	37%

Table 9: The Importance of Immigration at the National Level (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018). Standard Eurobarometers 83-89 (Public Opinion in the European Union). Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index?p=1&yearFrom=2015&yearTo=2018&search=eurobarometer>

Member States	EB 83	EB 84	EB 85	EB 86	EB 87	EB 88	EB 89
EU average	23%	36%	28%	26%	22%	22%	21%
Malta	76%	65%	50%	46%	33%	32%	39%
Germany	46%	76%	56%	45%	37%	40%	38%
Denmark	35%	60%	57%	41%	38%	32%	34%
<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>35%</u>	44%	<u>39%</u>	25%	<u>19%</u>	<u>20%</u>	<u>17%</u>
Italy	31%	30%	28%	42%	36%	33%	35%
Austria	31%	56%	41%	36%	32%	28%	29%
Sweden	28%	53%	44%	35%	29%	27%	25%
Estonia	24%	45%	30%	19%	14%	14%	10%
Belgium	23%	38%	27%	27%	26%	29%	26%
The Netherlands	23%	56%	46%	34%	37%	24%	21%
The Czech Republic	18%	47%	32%	25%	23%	17%	17%
Luxembourg	15%	35%	21%	21%	18%	19%	16%
Hungary	13%	34%	28%	30%	27%	28%	24%
Lithuania	13%	12%	11%	15%	10%	10%	11%
France	12%	22%	14%	19%	14%	17%	17%
Greece	11%	20%	20%	15%	12%	18%	13%
Latvia	10%	22%	13%	8%	7%	7%	7%
Poland	9%	17%	16%	11%	16%	13%	8%
Bulgaria	8%	21%	13%	29%	15%	12%	10%
Ireland	7%	11%	7%	10%	8%	9%	7%
Spain	6%	9%	9%	8%	7%	7%	6%
Finland	6%	41%	23%	17%	18%	21%	22%
Cyprus	4%	5%	9%	6%	10%	12%	11%
Slovakia	4%	19%	17%	10%	8%	11%	9%
Croatia	3%	11%	6%	6%	6%	5%	7%
Portugal	3%	5%	3%	4%	2%	4%	2%
Romania	3%	6%	6%	5%	7%	6%	4%
Slovenia	1%	48%	13%	14%	14%	9%	6%

Table 10: The Importance of Immigration at the European Level (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018). Standard Eurobarometers 83-89 (Public Opinion in the European Union). Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&yearFrom=2015&yearTo=2018&search=eurobarometer>

Member States	EB 83	EB 84	EB 85	EB 86	EB 87	EB 88	EB 89
EU average	38%	58%	48%	45%	38%	39%	38%
Malta	65%	74%	64%	65%	52%	54%	55%
Germany	55%	76%	57%	50%	40%	47%	42%
Estonia	54%	79%	73%	70%	62%	62%	62%
Denmark	50%	76%	71%	59%	56%	52%	54%
The Netherlands	49%	75%	62%	56%	51%	50%	45%
Sweden	48%	74%	59%	57%	45%	45%	42%
Luxembourg	45%	55%	43%	42%	34%	37%	35%
The Czech Republic	44%	76%	67%	63%	54%	58%	58%
Italy	43%	49%	44%	49%	40%	38%	41%
Hungary	43%	68%	67%	65%	60%	58%	56%
Belgium	39%	61%	41%	43%	36%	37%	42%
Latvia	38%	66%	67%	57%	48%	51%	47%
Bulgaria	37%	61%	57%	62%	51%	48%	46%
Austria	37%	66%	48%	39%	34%	38%	38%
<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>36%</u>	<u>61%</u>	<u>51%</u>	<u>51%</u>	<u>33%</u>	<u>32%</u>	<u>29%</u>
Slovakia	35%	72%	59%	51%	40%	43%	44%
France	34%	49%	35%	36%	27%	32%	39%
Lithuania	31%	64%	53%	53%	39%	40%	35%
Slovenia	31%	74%	54%	58%	45%	43%	41%
Greece	27%	52%	40%	41%	32%	37%	37%
Spain	25%	39%	34%	32%	31%	26%	27%
Poland	24%	54%	51%	50%	53%	54%	45%
Finland	24%	58%	48%	38%	33%	35%	40%
Ireland	23%	48%	44%	41%	34%	32%	30%
Croatia	22%	52%	44%	43%	30%	29%	26%
Romania	21%	47%	42%	36%	33%	36%	29%
Cyprus	20%	49%	46%	47%	39%	41%	41%
Portugal	16%	31%	17%	23%	18%	20%	16%

Table 11: Feelings about immigration from other EU Member States (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018). Standard Eurobarometers 83-89 (Public Opinion in the European Union). Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index?p=1&yearFrom=2015&yearTo=2018&search=eurobarometer>

Member States	EB 83	EB 84	EB 85	EB 86	EB 87	EB 88	EB 89
EU average – Total “Positive”	51%	55%	58%	61%	63%	64%	65%
Sweden	79%	80%	78%	83%	81%	84%	83%
Luxembourg	76%	77%	81%	82%	85%	81%	82%
Finland	69%	74%	77%	76%	75%	78%	78%
Denmark	65%	61%	63%	62%	69%	68%	71%
Ireland	64%	71%	77%	81%	83%	83%	87%
Croatia	63%	65%	64%	66%	66%	59%	65%
Germany	59%	57%	62%	71%	71%	73%	72%
Portugal	59%	61%	66%	68%	67%	77%	77%
Spain	59%	66%	69%	69%	71%	72%	77%
Lithuania	58%	69%	70%	72%	75%	75%	77%
The Netherlands	58%	65%	63%	66%	67%	70%	73%
Estonia	58%	61%	64%	69%	67%	70%	73%
Slovenia	57%	60%	61%	68%	65%	68%	67%
Romania	54%	53%	51%	57%	50%	53%	55%
Austria	53%	54%	60%	62%	62%	65%	68%
Poland	51%	60%	62%	69%	70%	73%	75%
Malta	49%	57%	55%	60%	57%	56%	55%
Bulgaria	48%	59%	61%	61%	62%	66%	61%
<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>48%</u>	<u>51%</u>	<u>49%</u>	<u>58%</u>	<u>59%</u>	<u>63%</u>	<u>64%</u>
France	45%	51%	56%	55%	57%	56%	56%
The Czech Republic	64%	56%	49%	51%	48%	52%	50%
Cyprus	60%	56%	58%	54%	49%	50%	50%
Italy	55%	49%	51%	51%	47%	49%	48%
Latvia	55%	49%	51%	49%	52%	51%	50%
Slovakia	55%	45%	49%	54%	50%	49%	52%
Belgium	51%	59%	57%	60%	64%	61%	65%
Greece	51%	50%	55%	61%	60%	58%	64%
Hungary	47%	49%	54%	57%	60%	66%	65%
EU Average – Total “Negative”	40%	38%	35%	33%	30%	30%	29%

Table 12: Feelings about immigration from outside the EU (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018)

Source: European Commission – Public Opinion (Spring 2015 – Spring 2018). Standard Eurobarometers 83-89 (Public Opinion in the European Union). Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&yearFrom=2015&yearTo=2018&search=eurobarometer>

Member States	EB 83	EB 84	EB 85	EB 86	EB 87	EB 88	EB 89
EU average – Total “Negative”	56%	59%	58%	56%	54%	54%	52%
The Czech Republic	81%	81%	77%	82%	81%	81%	80%
Latvia	78%	86%	86%	83%	82%	81%	80%
Greece	78%	75%	73%	70%	72%	76%	74%
Slovakia	77%	86%	84%	79%	81%	77%	83%
Estonia	73%	81%	77%	81%	78%	76%	73%
Malta	72%	73%	71%	69%	68%	71%	67%
Cyprus	72%	70%	74%	75%	69%	71%	75%
Italy	70%	66%	65%	69%	59%	59%	63%
Hungary	70%	82%	83%	81%	78%	77%	81%
Lithuania	70%	76%	72%	71%	67%	62%	59%
Belgium	68%	64%	58%	59%	51%	54%	56%
Austria	60%	64%	58%	56%	53%	56%	57%
Bulgaria	59%	70%	72%	77%	68%	71%	67%
France	58%	64%	57%	57%	58%	58%	55%
Denmark	57%	62%	63%	63%	62%	62%	58%
Finland	57%	64%	61%	59%	56%	57%	58%
Slovenia	57%	76%	68%	68%	69%	66%	64%
The Netherlands	56%	54%	51%	53%	51%	51%	49%
<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>55%</u>	<u>55%</u>	<u>53%</u>	<u>49%</u>	<u>52%</u>	<u>53%</u>	<u>54%</u>
Germany	54%	58%	58%	53%	51%	53%	50%
Poland	53%	62%	65%	64%	71%	68%	62%
Portugal	49%	50%	46%	48%	49%	50%	61%
Luxembourg	48%	52%	53%	49%	55%	50%	58%
Sweden	66%	70%	62%	64%	64%	65%	62%
Romania	44%	54%	64%	59%	61%	57%	59%
Ireland	46%	49%	53%	57%	62%	58%	64%
Spain	45%	53%	50%	52%	55%	58%	63%
Croatia	45%	53%	45%	53%	48%	52%	47%
EU Average – Total “Positive”	34%	34%	34%	37%	38%	39%	41%

Turkey - EU relations in an era of mass movement of refugees

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ABSTRACT

Turkey has always been in a relation with the European Union and recently with a perspective of becoming a full member. The Justice and Development Party's rise to power in 2002 brought a new vision to the Turkish foreign policy, making the commitment to European values. However, 2009 has become a turning point for Turkey after a change in the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy. The rise in Kurdish problem and the conflicting nature of the Middle East has pushed Turkey beyond the EU line and Justice and Development Party government has decided to postpone the EU membership negotiations and leaned to become a regional power. This paper will, therefore, seek to highlight how these forces were and are still at play.

Keywords: JDP, European Neighborhood Policy, Enlargement, Syrian Conflict

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to explore the differences between the Turkish government's democratic values and procedures and the prospect for its accession to the European Union. The EU promotes democracy in countries that aspire to join the union by imposing conditionality to their accession. Since the beginning of Turkish-EU relations, the accession of Turkey to the European Union has been hooked to implementing democratic reforms in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party (JDP), which sees itself as "Conservative Democrats," won the November 2002 general election. The aim of this study is to concentrate on the role of party leaders in building the democratic values of Turkey in the four terms JDP has since been the governing party. The JDP leaders have made an effort within their perceptive framework to determine the new traditional democratic structures. This has created constraints and discrepancies with the EU's conditions for accession. This study identifies the reasons behind Turkey's prolonged EU membership candidacy.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this study, Gramsci's theory of hegemony is used to explain the role of JDP party leaders in forming the Turkish society's views on particular problems. The concept of hegemony refers to the dominance of one group over others. It implies that the subordinate groups accept the opinions of the dominant groups as common sense. Gramsci understood hegemony as the social basis of class alliance. This alliance is needed to gain consent on different issues and as a consequence ease collaboration.

There were two kinds of bourgeois alliances: the industrial bourgeois-proletarian alliance, and the rural bourgeois-peasant-landowner alliance. According to Gramsci, a coalition can be reached through the integration of workers with the system. JDP leaders, including Recep T. Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, have organized new policies in domestic and foreign affairs that have shaped the political, social and economic values of Turkey during their term in office. The application of new rules and procedures has been at the center of Turkey's EU accession process; however, these rules and standards have changed in each of the four terms that the JDP has been in power. The Gramscian perspective makes it possible to analyze the role of JDP in formalizing its influence on Turkey's values. The use of media and other institutions accelerates the formation of the values of society. Furthermore, the administrative processes of the JDP indicated that structure and values are highly focused on the practices of the party and its leader.

Gramsci's Hegemony Concept

Antonio Gramsci, who was the Italian Communist Party's General Secretary, was arrested in 1926 and convicted to twenty years in prison. Gramsci died in prison in 1937. He is considered to be an important contributor to the Marxist literature because of his conceptualization of hegemony. Gramsci's most famous texts are known as Prison Notebooks (Cox, 1983). The core premise of hegemony theory is that force not only is used as a control mechanism but also stands for the ideas that can rule people. According to Gramsci, ideas are essential to creating ideological unity in society. Ideas are recognized as a means of silencing. Dictatorship and hegemony are distinct methods of political rule. The concept of hegemony is based on controlled consent and refers to the dominance of a particular class over the other. Gramsci emphasized that hegemony was found in Russian revolutionaries, but hegemony as a term was produced by Plekhanov, Lenin, and Axelrod (Bates, 1975).

Gramsci mentioned that hegemony is a mechanism of control used by the dominant class towards other classes in society. These classes are subordinate groups of the society. Gramsci did not use the language of Marxism. According to Gramsci's class division, the bourgeoisie is the leading class, i.e. owners of social manufacturing, and the proletariat is the subordinate group in society. According to Gramsci's approach, the concept of hegemony refers to the state in which intellectuals control other classes. The control of the dominant ideology is at the center of this theory. This concept is used to identify the values, political practices, and norms of the dominant class. The values of the dominant class help the domination of the ruling class (Katz, 2010).

The mixture of coercion and consent, therefore, generates class dominion and the ruling class becomes hegemonic where the ruling class compels its subordinates. This objective is achieved by leading and persuading the dominant class. Contrary to using force to repress classes a dominant class has a collective ideological logic, which gives orderliness within it (Katz, 2010).

Changes are feasible but restricted according to the concept of hegemony. Major power shifts rarely, if ever, happen in society. While weaker groups argue that change is conceivable, this change is a controlled process termed as a passive revolution by Gramsci. By participating in institutions, the hegemonic elites participate in social interaction. This has led to particular institutions gaining a hegemonic status within the civil society. These institutions and the numerous institutions that are responsible for maintaining the hegemonic ideology are managed by hegemonic elites. Transformism is the term Gramsci has used for this process (Katz, 2010).

Gramsci's Historic Bloc

Gramsci examines the hegemony of politics, law, and ideology through super-structures and analysis. The superstructure is formalized by structural change. The superstructure, which has a shared impact within the superstructure and structure, determines the structural changes accordingly (Dural, 2012). Civil society belongs in this sense to the superstructure of an ideological world. Gramsci's idea was explained through moral organizations in the broadest sense in *Etica e Politica*. The Gramsci superstructure provides examples of moral organizations, religious institutions, and radical sections. Church and civil society, for example, can be seen as intellectuals.

This formation comprises moral, religious and radical organizations. The sentiments, customs, fantasies, and myths of a practical tendency and contents are the given examples of moral institutions in Gramscian hegemony (Bates, 1975, p.357). Intellectuals control the church and civil society.

The historic block, defined as "a coalition of groups, designed to bridge the differences between the myriad groups disadvantaged by the relations of force in society at a specific historical moment" (Katz, 2010, p.7), achieves hegemonic change. Gramsci's revolutionary project, however, is essentially democratic and helps to build an intellectual bloc. The historic bloc is crucial for social change. Group homogeneity speeds up societal transformation. It also indicates hegemonic control over society. Gramsci called this "United Front". Instead of being passive, the parts of the counter-hegemonic historic bloc must be engaged in action. Gramsci argues that "... if yesterday the subaltern element was a thing, today it is no longer a thing but a historical person, a protagonist ... an agent, necessarily active and taking the initiative" (Katz, 2010, p.8).

Historical Bloc and Civil Society in Turkey

Some scholars argue that civil society and political society in Turkey do not have any separate cleavage since the historical development has still not reached the desired level. During the Ottoman Era, the sultan, patrimonial democracy, and “ulema” were at the center of the civil society. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the central power was balanced in the relation between the military-bureaucratic institutions and Civil-Political society (Kasapoğlu, 2017). The competition for authority between the various parties, organizations, and intellectuals has continued under the Kemalist ideology. The military, bureaucracy and the intellectuals formed the historical bloc in which the strike in 1980 happened. The post-modern strike that took place on 28th September 1997, however, re-divided the intellectuals. Some of these intellectuals consented to the status quo.

In many cultures, religion plays a key and important role, and relations between religion and politics may vary in each nation, according to Kasapoğlu. Turkey is a country with unique religious and secular characteristics. Although most of the Turkish individuals are Muslim, Turkey has no state religion. Based on the declaration of secularism in 1937, politics and religion should be separated. However, state and politics, in today's Turkish politics, are highly engaged with religion. Religious Affairs (the Diyanet) are under the control of the Turkish state through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). Religion is built and controlled by the government in Turkey. The State supports the realization of Islam and fosters domestic unity and collective solidarity (Kasapoğlu, 2017).

State policies promote the redefinition of the country's position on faith and secularism. Religion falls into the definition of Hegemony as defined by Gramsci. Islam is Turkey's primary religion; more than 95% of the population is Muslim. Well-known political figures linked to Islamic values are more likely to make policies that are supported by the Muslim majority. The Muslims, who comprise the majority of the population, therefore, are more likely to vote for politicians who advocate Islamic values (Kasapoğlu, 2017). On the other hand, these politicians become capable of supervising religious affairs upon their election to the office.

The definition of hegemony by Gramsci can explain how JDP came to power and earned the support of the society's Muslim majority. By reinterpreting Islam and politics and wanting to be a regional power, JDP has increased the number of individuals who favor Islam. Considering the Turkish-EU ties in light of the Gramscian idea of hegemony and religion, it could be argued that the growing differentiation between the Eastern and the Western blocs in world politics and the increase in Islamophobia following the 9/11 attacks in the US have also increased the fear of terrorist groups and Muslims. Turkey which is a Muslim country known for its tendency towards the West and its desire to join the EU has been harmed due to the outcomes of the 9/11 attacks. Turkey's accession to the European Union has faced problems due to the growing Islamophobia caused by terrorist attacks around the world as well as the stalemate in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. The Republic of Cyprus's unilateral request, on behalf of the whole island, to join the European Union and its subsequent unilateral accession caused a deadlock to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. In 2004, following the Republic of Cyprus' unilateral accession to the EU and the refusal to recognize any other State in Cyprus except the RoC the negotiations came to a halt. Turkey, by contrast, relied on Muslim states and chose to behave as an intermediary between them, and Turkey chose, in that sense, to be a regional power.

Background of Relations between Turkey and the EU

Turkey's integration with Europe is a painful process. The Association Agreement of 1963 forms the basis of Turkey's relations with the EU. Turkey has always been recognized as a major partner of Western countries for security reasons. The end of the Cold War in 1989, was one of the many reasons that led to the reassessment of Turkey's strategic value by Europe.

In 1995, although some groups did not support Turkey's full accession, Turkey and the EU agreed to a Customs Union (Tekin, 2005). For more than a decade, Turkey has been acknowledged as a Europe country by European states. The EU has, however, since then been reluctant to recognize Turkey as a member of the European Union. The EU rejected Turkey's application in 1989 stating that Turkey was not yet prepared for EU accession for both political and economic reasons. Turkey was excluded from the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 that laid down future enlargement plans. The 1999 Helsinki Summit has been

recognized as a turning point for the membership process based on which candidates have to meet the Copenhagen criteria (Tekin, 2005).

The Helsinki Summit welcomed Turkey's candidacy for accession to the Union. This decision showed Turkey's importance for Europe's security. Turkey would start accession negotiations after satisfying the Copenhagen Criteria that included the rule of law and guaranteeing democracy, among other conditions (Tekin, 2005).

Turkey entered an important phase of the accession process in 2000. Eight sub-committees were established to ensure Turkey's compliance with the *acquis communautaire*. Turkey's reform process was included in the National Program. Turkey's Constitution was amended on October 3, 2001, and particular constitutional articles were changed. The constitutional amendment includes enhancing human rights, rule of law, and rearranging democratic institutions. Legal and administrative processes accelerated constitutional amendment (Aybey, 2004).

Many legislative changes and nine harmonization schemes have been endorsed by the Turkish government. The statutory modifications were made in the nineties and were a sign of potential political change.

These modifications marked the possibility of success in the potential phase of wide policy modifications. However, the fifth harmonization scheme was a difficult process by which Turkey granted its non-Turkish speaking population (i.e. Kurds) the right to TV programs in their native language. In addition, in some private schools, those individuals were also authorized to teach their own languages.

The acceleration of reforms was clearly demonstrated by adopting a new law on associations, the civil code and a new press law, the abolition of the death penalty and facilitating the acquisition of real estate by non-Muslim population.

Turkey ratified International Covenants on Civil, Political, Cultural, Social and Economic rights in 1999. In addition, the death penalty has been abolished and the military's role was limited in 2003 and 2004. Particular reforms were discussed during Turkey-EU negotiations in 2005. Giscard d'Estaing suggested that Turkey capital was not situated in Europe. Furthermore, Helmut Schmidt stated that the ethnic differences between Turkey and the European Union are of determining significance. It seems, however, that the EU has no hurry to acknowledge Turkey's accession and social and religious considerations have begun to rise concerning Turkey's inclusion to Europe (Dixon, 2008). The European nature of the Turks and the Islamic nature of Turkey have begun to be considered. Turkish skepticism and Islamophobia over the political personality of Turkey have led to the rejection of Turkey's membership by European leaders, including Germany, France, and Austria. Instead, a privileged partnership was established in Turkey for the first time. Turkey's role in the Cyprus problem is yet another critical barrier to Turkey's EU accession.

In the meantime, the EU immediately connected the issue of Cyprus with Turkey and announced that Turkey's accession would not be feasible without the resolution of the Cyprus problem. At the time that the Republic of Cyprus gained unilateral acceptance to the EU, Turkey was asked to extend the Ankara Agreement to the new ten members of the EU including the RoC. In October 2005, Turkey and the EU began negotiations under Chapter 25, which contains a Chapter on Science and Research. However, this Chapter was discontinued, since Turkey had to satisfy, in order to begin other chapters, the Additional Protocol of the Association Agreement. Turkey's reluctance to open its ports and airports to the RoC led to a temporary suspension of talks. The unhappiness of the Turkish people with the negotiation process boosted anti-European feelings and reduced the EU's popularity in Turkey (Phinnemore&İçener, 2016).

According to Dixon, the EU's political socialization is absent in Turkey. A discrepancy between the EU and Turkey is therefore acknowledged. Economic modernization is the cause of this divide. However, some academics argue that the political system of Turkey is different from other Islamic countries and that Turkey and the EU embrace similar principles, including liberal-democratic principles (Dixon, 2008).

According to Vardan, the EU has not properly helped to create the right environment for conservative Turkish people with respect to many freedoms including the issue of head-scarves and education. Neither the EU progress reports nor the documents on Partnership have mentioned the demands of conservative Turks. More specifically, unity in diversity is promoted by Europe (Vardan, 2009). According to Romano Prodi, the former President of the European Commission, the EU has focused on uniting people and the establishment of common nationality is thus avoided. In addition, the European identity has a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic character. The norms and values of Europe are employed in formal texts and in

institutional reports. The EU standards and principles have been enumerated in Article (6)1 of the TEU and the Copenhagen criteria. They deal with the administrative, financial and political methods in which the EU identity is formalized (İçener&İçener, 2011).

In 2013, France removed its veto on Turkey's accession and since then the key phase of implementing Chapter 22 (Regional strategy and organizational tools cooperation) has started. Chapter 17 was launched in subsequent years. Some chapters were conditionally closed during this era. In 2015, the European Council declared that Turkey's membership process needs to be given a further push. The economic and monetary policy chapter and five other sections were opened for negotiation. The negotiation process has mainly been a dead end so far (Phinnemore & İçener, 2016). The Copenhagen criteria brought political reforms to the Turkish government. These changes include safeguarding the political, religious and social freedoms of individuals (Bac, 2005).

Turkey and the EU Relations in Mass Migration Era

Migration to Europe increased considerably in 2015. This was the largest migrant crisis after World War II. The increase in terrorist attacks since 9/11 adversely affected this condition. Security issues and deaths have increased worldwide, making migration a priority in the EU (Bal, 2016).

"Refugee is a person who meets the criteria of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Statute and qualifies for the protection of the United Nations (UN) provided by the High Commissioner, regardless of whether or not s/he is in a country that is a party to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, or whether or not s/he host country has recognized him as a refugee under either of these instruments" (Sadık&Zorba, 2017, p. 12).

The starting point of the migration flow was the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War. These caused a rise in the number of refugees from the Middle East and African nations to the point that exceeded the capacity of host nations to deal with the issue. This excessive number of refugees entered the EU borders and countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey as host nations. Syria's internal conflict transformed into a conflict of hegemons pushing millions of people to abandon Syria and ask Turkey for asylum (Bal, 2016).

Throughout history, wars have triggered mass migration and, as a consequence, have modified the demographic structure of countries. Population mass movement affects not only restricted regions but also wider regions. There are other migrant groups like temporary employees, and guest workers besides war refugees. Today, by creating new legislation and implementing and signaling the implementation of that legislation in EU institutions, Europe is attempting to address the issue of housing the great number of foreigners within the borders of the European Union. According to the statistics in 1992, the number of refugees was eighteen million whereas, in 2009, the number of refugees was nine million (Akin&Akin, 2017). In 2016 it reached sixty-five million (DW, 2017). A big proportion of Syrian people had to relocate to neighboring countries and become refugees. Turkey is a desired destination for many of these refugees. The term refugee refers to "an individual who suffers from oppression due to various social, economic, cultural, religious or political reasons within her / his homeland, or who is worried that she/ he will suffer the same in the future, and who leaves her / his homeland for such reasons and who takes refuge in other countries, who cannot or does not want to return to her / his homeland" (Bostancı, 2017, pp.22).

The geopolitical position of countries influences their openness to migration. Throughout history, Turkey has faced refugee flows because of regional instability. Therefore, since the beginning of the protests in the Middle East in 2010, there has been a massive flow of refugees to Turkey. The flow of refugees has turned into a political issue since the Civil War in Syria. The Syrian internal conflict made the environment unsafe for the Syrian people to live in and caused an inevitable mass movement. Because of the security threat in the country persists, the displaced Syrian population sought a secure settlement in the region (Tunç, 2015, p. 37).

International migration is an essential component of public policymaking. The movement of people affects border policies. It affects socio-political institutions. Meanwhile, political and cultural aggression like racism dominates the globe (Köşer, 2017). Various types of political and cultural animosities, including xenophobia, Islamophobia, and racism that are dominant worldwide, pose difficulties for maintaining a healthy domestic and global order (Akçapar, 2017).

Migration serves different purposes in international relations; Thiollet, for example, illustrates some of these functions in reference to labor migration. This study shows migration diplomacy generates a connection between nations. An example of such connection is the U.S.-Chinese ties, in which migration diplomacy regarding Chinese Americans created clashes among citizens. Migration policies are considered to reshape international relations, and Akçapar pointed out that US and China used irregular migration, student exchange, household remittances, asylum plans, and dissident deportation to achieve an agreement. Migration diplomacy thus becomes a means of recognizing other nations' foreign policy objectives by adjusting migration laws (Akçapar, 2017).

Migration is one of the prominent subjects in international politics. According to the migration studies the most preferred countries are the USA, Germany, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Europe is at the center of migration flows. In EU countries, Turks are regarded as significant immigrant communities. Thus the Turkish-EU relations are influenced by immigration. Turkey's attitude to migration has evolved since the 1980s. Between 1945 and 1973, European countries accepted a great number of guest workers from Turkey.

The guest workers were not permanent. Instead, they were predicted to return back to Turkey by the end of the agreement. The government had to persuade Turkish workers to return to Turkey after unemployment rose in Germany. Turkey is seen, particularly after the 1990s, as a way for irregular migrants to reach European territory. Citizens of countries such as Russia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Georgia, Ukraine, Germany as well as Middle Eastern countries migrate to Turkey. Turkey is appealing to migrants, particularly because of its geographical situation. However, most migrants use Turkey as a gate to Europe, while some choose to stay in Turkey (Cankaya, 2016).

European countries have agreed to adopt restrictive policies on admission into their countries as an essential step in controlling the flow of immigrants. Refugees from the above-mentioned nations use Turkey as a transit country. Turkey, therefore, has an important role in the region. European leaders have considered Turkey's contribution to migration problems. Restricting immigration has, therefore, created shared interests for Turkey and the EU. According to the EU, Turkey must improve border control to prevent illegal migration and improve immigration rules. European states have advocated extending European visa regulations and implementing EU visa requirements in Turkey (Cankaya, 2016).

Turkish- EU Relations under the JDP Rule

Over the past twenty years, Turkey has made a tremendous effort to achieve EU accession. In recent years, the European Parliament and Turkey have had political conversations. The European Parliament acted to encourage Turkey to adapt and implement European principles. However, the EP-Turkey relationship has deteriorated. Between 2011-2015, reflecting the JDP's third term, Turkey experienced democratic degradation. According to the European Parliament, Turkey has distanced itself from European values by its political decisions and actions (Gürkan, 2018).

Turkish-EU relations could progress in a positive manner. Both sides are frustrated by the negotiation process and the downward relations. As a unitary actor, the EU represents the member states and their people. The Turkish government made no reforms at that time. Being an EU member lost its attraction to the Turkish government. Therefore, Turkey's accession came to a halt. Meanwhile, Turkey's political and social structure changed. The Turkish government concentrated on improving foreign policy objectives, but not on Turkey's accession. Reforms were postponed during that period, and the country's character changed. However, economic ties were reestablished and the foreign-policy discourse improved (Wood, 2016).

It could be said that, at the time when relations were suspended between Turkey and the EU, the instability in the external and internal environment, including the Arab Spring, had a direct influence on Turkey-EU relations. According to Öniş, Turkey had a more active role over conflict management in the region to decrease instability and support the re-establishment of the order. In addition, the JDP witnessed a national increase in authority, and the EU's view of JDP changed because of its authoritarian practices (Ertuğrul&Yılmaz, 2018). In Turkey, the authority of the executive increased in relation to judicial appointments. This change enhanced the JDP's power. The growing JDP power led to worries about its legitimacy and its willingness to follow the EU norms and values. JDP's policies caused complications in Turkey-EU relations. This has damaged their collaboration. The reason for this problem is the difference

between Turkey's attitude towards regional conflicts and the EU's policies. Islamic and religious figures have taken a stand in politics since 2010. The tensions especially escalated because of how the government reacted to the Gezi Park protests (Ertuğrul and Yılmaz, 2018).

Since 2010, Turkey has changed its position in the region. The JDP concentrated on stabilizing the region. The party elites identified Turkey as a leading nation. Moreover, Recep T. Erdoğan suggested that Turkey should find its place among Islamic countries (Ertuğrul&Yılmaz, 2018). Former Foreign Minister Davutoğlu argued that the EU was not their main objective. Instead, their objective was to become a peripheral region of the EU. Turkey has intended to concentrate on the Balkans which, in their opinion, would be an important determinant of Europe's future (Ertuğrul&Yılmaz, 2018).

With regard to Turkish-EU ties, eliminating visa requirements gained momentum in 2012 when the EU Commissioner for Enlargement traveled to Turkey to resume comprehensive EU accession negotiations. However, negotiations were postponed. These negotiations addressed problems of visa-free travel and illegal migration. Candidate states must satisfy 35 policy areas to become complete EU members. One section was accomplished and resolved by 2016, and 14 sections were further negotiated. The other eight chapters did not open. Jean-Claude Juncker, former President of the European Commission, and Martin Schulz, former President of the European Parliament, ensured that Turkey would not be a full member of the EU during their term in office. Schulz also claimed that Turkey's democratic principles are incompatible with EU norms. For the next five years, it was agreed that the EU will not accept new members (Ferguson, 2016).

Democratic Values and Practices of the JDP

During the first years in office, JDP's political tendency was pro-EU. EU membership was viewed as a prominent goal for the governing elites. Therefore, the Copenhagen Criteria, which is a requirement for Turkey's admission to membership, was seen as vital for Turkey's modernization. The Erdoğan Camp is functionally dependent on the Copenhagen criteria. JDP's view is regarded as role strain. This is the result of Turkey's competing cultural issues and the attempts to get engaged in the phase of Europeanization and democratization. Political Islam has turned out to be a reference in the relationship between them today. There's no organized religion in Europe. Turkey, however, is experiencing the resurgence of conflicts between religion and politics, more accurately between laicist and Kemalist adherents. For instance, the JDP government introduced stronger educational reforms in 2004. This reform allows Islamic high school students to engage in higher education. There are around 68,918 female students in religious high schools today (Aghsan, 2011).

In time, the JDP has become more anti-West. By collaborating with the army, elite organizations and the media, the JDP has accomplished this objective. According to the results of the 2009 study in Turkey, 13% of citizens said that democracy is their most important value, and 62% described Islam as an important factor. Moreover, while only 13% of individuals endorsed Turkey's cooperation with the EU in 2010, the number was 22% in 2009 (Aghsan, 2011).

JDP's reactive reform agenda was shown in 2007; the party focused on, encroaching on Islamic freedoms and Islamic schools. It indicates that Turkey has abandoned the EU requirements for membership (Aghsan, 2011). In democracy laicism is essential. It is the guarantee of religious freedom and dignity. On the other hand, conservatism derives from the defense of certain beliefs. JPD's approach to secularism should go hand in hand with democracy because democracy protects fundamental rights. The JDP sees religion as a societal value and uses it as a political tool. This, however, damages political and religious pluralism (Turunç, 2007). Economic liberalism has affected JDP's economic policy. The fundamental human rights are essential to party ideology based on JDP's agenda. The JDP's conception of human rights is based on the international treaties, like the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act (Turunç, 2007).

EU-related reforms started declining in 2005. Some reforms met legal obstacles. Turkey created an ombudsman in 2006. This was supposed to help increase transparency and decrease corruption. However, the law relating to the Ombudsman's office was nullified by the Constitutional Court reversing the reforms in 2008. The EU Commission asserted that changes were insufficient in 2007 and that Turkey had to focus on problems like freedom of speech, in line with the Copenhagen Criteria. Therefore, the problem of diversity was dealt with by the JDP in 2009.

The issue of the Kurdish minority was a significant problem and one of Turkey's critical barriers to EU accession talks. With regard to the Kurdish issue, the JDP took a further move and made positive measures towards the Kurdish minority, including creating a Kurdish channel. The JDP was unsure about rejecting Article 301. According to Article 301, insulting Turkey and Turkish values is illegal. Orhan Pamuk, a Nobel laureate, was put to trial for the content of an article he had written. The RPP (Republican People's Party) proposed the removal of Article 301, and then the article was modified in 2008 (Avci, 2011).

The JDP suggested constitutional amendments in 2010; the package included issues like eliminating obstacles to progressive gender non-discrimination, recognizing the freedom of civil servants and approving participation in collective bargaining. A referendum was held on constitutional amendments, resulting in 58 percent of votes in favor of the amendments (Avci, 2011).

In 2012, the EU condemned Turkey for breaching fundamental human rights. According to the progress report, the status of fundamental rights in Turkey have not improved. In addition, a progress report in 2014 suggested that internet censorship is an indicator of freedom of speech. Since 2014, therefore, democratic values in Turkey do not conform to the EU's perception of democracy. Although the Progress Report was delayed in 2015 due to the migrant problem, the statement indicated that refugees and foreigners who used Turkey as a route to go to Greece would return to Turkey. European leaders, who refused to shelter refugees and migrants in their own countries, would provide economic assistance. They also promised that if Turkey received more refugees and migrants, there would be some initiatives to enhance Turkey's visa-free travel regime within the European Union (Adam, 2017).

Chapter 33 was also agreed to be opened for the continuation of the negotiation that included budgetary topics. The supporters of democracy argued in favor of postponing the opening of further Chapters. The progress reports in 2015 and 2016 affirmed a reversal in the democratic institutions, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Turkey. As a result, the pace of changes has decelerated, judicial independence has been compromised, and some party leaders have been detained, all of which was stated in the 2016 study and were seen as a result of the poor implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights. With respect to the exercise of law, Turkey had failed in terms of freedom of speech and the freedom of the media (Üstün, 2017).

The post-2006 period has shown that Turkey has had a distinct view of EU membership. Religious freedoms were widening, and because of this growth, the EU was not confident in Turkey's democratization process. In Turkey, the credibility of the EU's commitments has weakened, and the EU has begun to ask for various new reforms. As a result, the JDP's foreign policy goal has moved away from EU accession. It became difficult for the JDP and the EU to collaborate. This slowed the social reforms in Turkey, including the freedom of speech. Another significant problem is the discrepancy in the Turkish government's secular framework. JDP's Islamist background affected Turkey's reforms and damaged the secular framework (McDonald, 2011). Moreover, Turkey encountered a coup attempt in 2016 which caused a negative impression in the EU, and subsequently, the JDP government proposed the restitution of the death penalty. These trends badly affected Turkey's EU accession process; hence the EU started to question Turkey's democracy.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion, the relations between Turkey and the EU have never been stable. The political conditions in Turkey have changed since the beginning of Turkey's EU accession process. However, when JDP took office in Turkey, new policies and values in line with the JDP party's ideology were introduced. Gramsci's theory is based on the idea that a certain group, based on ownership interests, dominates a less powerful group in society. According to Gramsci, the dominant class uses education, religion, and commerce to manipulate society and spread its ideology. Gramsci claims that hegemony is established when a particular group creates a common interest with long-term benefits. The JDP has gained ideological dominance by using different political scenarios. The JDP has introduced a new political area and new values. It has mobilized the masses based on moral and intellectual unity. Turkey's democratic practices have been modified in line with this unity. It was used by the JDP government to formalize the values and changes in Turkey's democratic framework. EU accession criteria consist of elements like guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. The JDP made a genuine effort to implement these criteria between 2002 and 2005.

However, the Turkish government began to act according to its Islamic origin and focused on the extension of religious freedom that brought about non-secular reforms including in education.

In addition, the Turkish government restricted freedom of expression, arrested journalists and censored social media. In the last negotiations, the death penalty was put on JDP's agenda, but the government did not approve it. It did, however, have a negative impact on Turkish democratic values. Turkey's democratic values and practices slowed down its EU accession process. At this point, Turkey diverged from the EU reforms.

When the Gramscian concept of hegemony is applied to religion, it can be said that as a political organization with religious values, JDP came to power and gained the sympathy of the Muslim majority in the society. Because of their Islamic reinterpretation of political events and the desire to be a regional power, the number of people who favor Islam has doubled. The growing gap between the Eastern and the Western blocs in world politics and the rise of Islamophobia following the 9/11 attacks on twin towers in the US has doubled the fear of terrorist groups and Muslims. The 9/11 attacks have had adverse consequences for Turkey as a Muslim country known for favoring the West and wishing to join the EU. The Cyprus problem has created an additional obstacle to Turkey's way to become an EU member state. The unilateral acceptance of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union on behalf of the entire island and the difficulty of reaching a just solution to the problem has led to a deadlock. In 2004, the talks were suspended after the Republic of Cyprus was accepted to the EU without a solution to the Cyprus problem. Turkey, on the other hand, tended towards Muslim countries and decided to act as an intermediary between them in the capacity of regional power.

In many societies, religion plays a significant and central role, and the relationship between religion and politics differs in each country. Turkey is a country with unique characteristics in terms of the role of religion in society and the official secularism. Although the majority of the Turkish people are Muslims, Turkey is a country that has no state religion.

The role of Turkey's foreign policy has changed since 2002. This change is the result of Turkey's active international policies promoted by the JDP foreign policy elite.

Turkey is torn between being a member of the European Union and leading Islamic countries. Thus, the ruling elites of the JDP and their party ideology have shown that if it were not for Turkey's will, Turkey would not be able to make further sacrifices. Instead, becoming the leader of the Muslim countries by using their Islamic predicaments is more likely based on the Gramscian concept of hegemony.

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Ordoliberalism and European Governance

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ABSTRACT

The paper examines the role of ordoliberal discourse within the context of the EU's economic governance. This is done with emphasis on the management of the crisis of the Eurozone and on the latter's prospects. Firstly, a conceptual history is offered concerning the content of 'ordoliberalism' and its historical context, followed by an analysis of its role in governmentality and by a discussion on how it has often been considered as strongly affecting or reflecting the EU's economic order. In this respect, the paper offers a multi-disciplinary and reflexive consideration of varied issues, highlighted in the relevant literature. These are the influence of the German economic tradition, order construction, hegemony, and a possible connection with authoritarian liberalism.

Keywords: European Union (the EU), (economic) governance, ordoliberalism, discourse

INTRODUCTION

The paper examines the role of ordoliberal discourse within the context of the European Union's (EU) economic governance, emphasizing the management of the crisis of the Eurozone and the latter's prospects. The analysis involves a multi-disciplinary and reflexive consideration of varied issues; the influence of the German economic tradition, order construction, hegemony, and a possible connection with authoritarian liberalism. In the relevant literature, an ordoliberal (re)turn in European governance or the EU's ordoliberalization involves a sizeable and intricate discussion of ordoliberalism's role or capacity as being dangerous, dominant, hijacked, influencing, an iron cage, a myth, overused, pervasive, returning or a shadow.

Succinctly stating the paper's argument, the diverse answers to the question about the strength of this intellectual tradition can be schematically conceptualized as the dictums of 'ordoliberalism evidently matters significantly' and 'the overstated relevance of ordoliberalism'. A paradox is ironically raised. The tradition's preponderance or impact, in current and crucial facets of the EU project, has often been affirmed by 'hostiles' rather than by proponents or 'sympathizers'. Yet, both dictums underscore the validity of the rising discussion in respect to the implications for the EU's trajectory. At the very least, those implications do not necessarily refer to actual policy responses which are presumably informed solely by the aforementioned perspective in a straightforward fashion. Nevertheless, they may refer to the emergence of a specific rationality, especially via the 'rules are rules' and the 'you had better be careful' premises.

As elaborated below, ordoliberalism is a distinct strand of economics originally and primarily developed in a specific country, Germany (Beck & Kotz, 2017), not unlike the case of the French Regulation School with which interesting comparisons can be made (Labrousse & Weisz, 2001). Particularly, it is a system of ideas centrally forged during the Weimar period and principally associated with the 'Freiburg School'. It was reflected in the work of political economy or law scholars, such as W. Eucken, F. Böhm or H. Großmann-Doerth as well as others (see Biebricher & Vogelmann, 2017a, part1). It includes the basic view that society's material reproduction impinges upon market functionality which in turn is related to specific social preconditions. What is needed is an interdisciplinary analysis of the various sectors as well as of their interdependency. Practical orientation informs policy and decision making, while rational stabilization is the ultimate aim. The adherence to the superiority of markets vis à vis alternate forms of societal coordination, along with the normative and functional opposition to collectivist or interventionist variants, gives ordoliberalism a broadly liberal veneer. This approach thus adopts the dictum of 'restrictions on individual freedom are wrong, while central planning simply does not work'. It is yet distinguished from other liberal versions, because it explicitly adopts a social ontology based on 'order'. It conceptualizes society in terms of interdependent orders regarding multiple sectors, e.g. the economy, politics or law. The viability of the price mechanism is therefore deemed imperative but also crucially linked to the characteristics or structure of orders (namely economic competition) and *ordnungspolitik* ('the politics of

ordering'). Here, markets are neither to be just left to themselves nor to be passively or stoically viewed. While not being subject to direct intervention, they crucially entail economic policies which enable a regulatory framework and ensure the proper function of price mechanism or competition (Biebricher & Vogelmann, 2017b, pp. 4-5). In a nutshell, ordoliberalism reflects a liberal appraisal and defense of markets in terms of market order. The interesting and EU-related fact is that this system of ideas has had an important presence in a member state (Germany) that has undeniably played a crucial role in the European project as well as during the management of the crisis of the Eurozone.

With regard to the paper's structure, a conceptual history is offered, concerning the content of 'ordoliberalism' and its historical context. This is followed by an analysis of its role in governmentality and a discussion on how it has often been considered as strongly affecting the EU's economic order. The final section offers the conclusions.

Conceptual History

In the very words of the authors of the "Ordo Manifesto of 1936" (Böhm et al., 2017), their program includes the following features (pp. 35-38):

- The explicit connection of rational thought and creative action: "we wish to bring scientific reasoning, as displayed in jurisprudence and political economy, into effect for the purpose of constructing and reorganizing the economic system" (p. 35).
- The consideration of individual economic questions as part of a greater whole, with the aim of tackling historicist relativism: "[T]he treatment of all practical politico-legal and politico-economic questions must be keyed to the idea of the economic constitution. In this way relativist instability and fatalist acceptance of facts are overcome" (p. 36).
- The appreciation of the historical facts through central questions and the focus on how the former are failed by prophetic ideologies or dogmas: "[W]e must push forward through the mist of intangible ideologies to the constituent facts and the requirements of the subject matter... Facts and not legal or economic concepts must be studied. The problems that must be solved are practical ones" (p. 36).
- The emphasis on economic constitution through the thorough consideration of not only the legal framework but also of the economy's structure: "[T]he problem of understanding and fashioning the legal instruments for an economic constitution... can only be solved if the lawyer avails himself of the findings of economic research" (p. 37).

According to a vivid summary of the postulations of ordoliberalism, those tenets include the following (Wohlgemuth, 2001, pp. 205-206; Gertenbach, 2017, p. 244):

- The primary task of a legal design is the advancement of an institutional framework, enabling order in terms of the decentralized coordination of actors. This design is supported by the state, which would be both 'strong' and constitutionally limited.
- The politics of ordering (*ordnungspolitik*) addresses power, in respect to both the economy (that of cartels or monopolies) and politics (that of governments or special interest groups).
- The issue of economic order is tackled through firmly forging competition in terms of either a crucial source of economic progress or a means for holding economic power positions (*wettbewerbsordnung*).

Political power is managed via legal commitments established on the rule of law (*rechtsstaatlichkeit*).

The comparison between the liberal F. Hayek (who also taught in Freiburg, later on) and the ordoliberal Eucken (one of the authors of the aforementioned manifesto), regarding the state and the market economy, illustrates ordoliberalism's particular contribution (Bönker and Wagener, 2001. Cf. Wohlgemuth, 2001, pp. 214-216). The former scholar perceived markets in terms of spontaneous orders and evolutionary outcome. The latter scholar regarded the markets as both competitive orders and political creations (p. 185). Despite the agreement on constraining the state, the former put forward formal criteria for state intervention concerning economic policy, namely the conformity with the rule of law. The latter offered substantive ones, i.e. the conformity with the principles of a competitive order. He thus allowed for more extensive and

outcome-oriented interventions (p. 191). As far as the political preconditions for a functioning market economy are concerned, both economists acknowledged the close relations between the economic system and the political system as well as the perils of economic planning to freedom or to democracy. Yet, Hayek warned of the dangers of majoritarianism and insisted on ruling out (negative) state interventions. Eucken warned of the weakening of the state caused by powerful interest groups (p. 192).

Ordoliberalism is not monolithic. This is particularly evidenced by the existence of the Cologne School as a mode of *ordnungstheorie*. That specific school of thought was led by A. Muller-Armack, i.e. a chief contributor to the ‘social market economy’/*sozialer Marktwirtschaft* concept. Compared to the Freiburg School, it was less skeptical “towards attempts of combining individual freedom on markets with social balance through government intervention” (Wohlgemuth, 2001, p. 203. See pp. 209-210; Broyer, 2001, p. 107; Young, 2015a, pp. 9-10). Furthermore, the notion of *ordnungstheorie* crucially reflects the Freiburg emphasis on “the coordination pattern of economic agents’ decision-taking”. ‘Ordoliberalism’ refers to the exchange economy as an ideal-type, proposing economic policy principles that would bring an actual economic order into this ideal-type (Broyer, 2001, p. 123. See pp. 94-114). In turn, ‘new *ordnungstheorie*’ reflects the departure from the initial theory in terms of either *ordnungsökonomik* –i.e. a synthesis of standard *ordnungstheorie*, Hayekian theories and new institutionalism (M. Streit)–or the detachment of the concept of order from neoclassical mechanisms (B. Schefold) (Broyer, 2001, pp. 114-123). It is equally important to note that current analysis stresses how the post-war period has marked a departure from the Interwar emphasis on the strong state authority (Bonefeld, 2013), underscoring the need for a constitutional framework which would ensure economic stability and freedom (Young, 2017, p. 227). Consequently, “[R]ather than a ‘strong state’, the notion of a ‘light state’ may come closer to the ordoliberal concept of the economic constitutional order (the rules of the game) both in the economic arena and in politics” (p. 228; Berghahn and Young, 2013. Cf. Bonefeld, 2012). In any case, early ordoliberal thinkers were aware of C. Schmitt’s political theology and they considered the state as being powerful in its relations with the market. Because of this, and also by viewing the liberal state as the concentrated force of the social order required for the free economy, ordoliberalism is considered to be associated with authoritarian liberalism (Bonefeld, 2017, esp. pp. 749-753). On the whole, “[O]rdoliberalism reminds us... that liberalism does not necessarily have to mean absence or even ‘minimization’ of state intervention in the economy” (Siems & Schnyder, 2014, p. 391).

Notably, the *Ordo* yearbook has served as the chief journal of the ordoliberal movement, providing a forum for the respective thought and reflecting the rather dense social and cognitive ties of a group of scholars. The journal has heavily focused on economic order(s) and on economic systems, although not in a uniform fashion across time as the explicitly ordoliberal presence in the journal was not constant. Emphasis has been put to competition policy, regulation, and monetary policy without, though, a total disregard of social policy. Despite the ordoliberals continuing as a relatively closed group, the respective system of ideas has been subject to an opening-up and to the erosion of its distinctiveness (Bönker et al. 2001).

Currently, the tradition’s influence, within Germany, has less to do with its strong presence in classrooms or in research (given the fact that it does not constitute a rigorous research paradigm) and more with its use as a source of inspiration. This is the case with economists who offer amendments towards a pro-Austrian/Hayekian direction (in terms of ‘competition as a discovery procedure’ or ‘spontaneous order’) but also towards evolutionary economics (Wohlgemuth, 2001, p. 213; Young, 2017, p. 229). There was not a symmetric intellectual transfer. The greater discussion and integration of ideas of Anglo-saxon scholars within the *Ordnungstheorie* framework is a fact. Yet the opposite, i.e. the transmission of the German version to the Atlantic coast, did not respectively occur (Wohlgemuth, 2001, p. 212; Joerges, 2017, p. 197).

Consequently, it has become commonplace to believe that “the theory supporting ordoliberalism can be reduced to a Hayekian type of thought” (Delorme, 2001, p. 1). The reasoning of the founding fathers, i.e. the writers of the respective manifesto, entails the distinction between two antagonistic ideal types; the centrally directed economy vs the exchange economy. It also includes the justification of the moral or functional superiority of the competition order. This is a modern understanding of standardized ordoliberalism. Yet, ordoliberalism crucially “proceeds from a radical interrogation concerning the scientific character of economics and proposes an original answer to the problem of its scientific foundations”. Nowadays, that fact is usually neglected (Weisz, 2001, p. 131).

There are several claims arguing for not overstating the actual impact of ordoliberalism, in respect to policies and politics during both the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. This is so, at least in the sense that actual policy decisions have not necessarily received the approval of key ordoliberal scholars (Wohlgemuth, 2001, p. 222; Young, 2017, pp. 227, 231; Joerges, 2017, p. 201; Hien & Joerges, 2018, pp. 14-18). For example, though ordoliberalism informed the policies of the German minister of economic affairs and chancellor L. Erhard, it often contrasted with them (Berghahn, 2015). Nevertheless, that does not negate the persistent and strong influence of the tradition on the economic policy at present times. In fact, the aforementioned impact is attributed to an ideological bias of influential economists, who are firmly organized in networks of neoliberal think tanks and institutions in Germany. They also have close personal and institutional links to core actors (Pühringer, 2016).

Summing up the historical development of the ordoliberal system of ideas and its political repercussions, the following stages were bluntly identified (Joerges 2017, pp. 197-8):

The ordoliberal tradition was put forward during the Weimar period in order to deal with Germany's organized capitalism by means of a competitive order. This involved protection from political interventions, through non-majoritarian institutions.

Ordoliberalism established itself as the Freiburg School since the mid-1930s and continued in the Cold War period, gaining attractiveness, while allying with proponents of the concept of the social market economy.

The advancement of organized capitalism had important repercussions for that alliance. New backing was sought for the concepts of *ordnungs politik* in the European Economic Community (EEC).

The aforementioned cooperation scheme was strongly supported on behalf of ordoliberalism, until it was caught up by the dynamics of the integration process, through the Delors Commission's internal market policy.

Since then, the European project has also been regarded as a threat to *ordnungs politik* and not only as its stronghold.

Ordoliberalism and Governmentality

An analysis of the degree of the relevance of ordoliberalism for European governance essentially involves an initial reference to the notion of governmentality. Three to four decades after the birth of ordoliberalism as an intellectual tradition, M. Foucault (2008/1979) was preoccupied in *The Birth of Biopolitics* with how the emerging biopolitics entailed a general regime of governmental reason. He also tackled the place of economic truth within it, i.e. a regime of liberalism which would modify the *raison d'État*, without necessarily questioning the respective bases (pp. 21-22). In this regard, he deemed it necessary to present the rise of ordoliberal thought as an important feature of the whole process of the regime's emergence (pp. 75-213). More specific, German ordoliberals presumably believed that "the present historical chance of liberalism is defined by a combination of law, an institutional field defined by the strictly formal character of interventions... and the unfolding of an economy whose processes are regulated by pure competition" (p. 179).

While acknowledging the prominence of the neoliberalism of the Chicago School, Foucault's understanding of ordoliberalism included the conceptualization of the latter as an earlier form of neoliberalism. Most crucially, this German tradition was seen not merely as an economic doctrine but as a "governmental form that is directed towards specific objectives, which regulates itself through continuous reflection and, essentially, aims to ensure that capitalism works". Ordoliberalism thus constitutes a form of governmentality. It involves a political ontology, necessitating and rationalizing a specific way to reflect on those practices (Oksala, 2017, pp. 182-3). A crucial element is how governmentality involves vigilance and intervention. Ordoliberalism "has to intervene everywhere in order to create effective competition and to actively oppose all inferior methods of coordinating individual efforts... Planning is required, but it has to be planning for competition, not against it, or instead of it". The respective intervention is – at the very least – equally dense and active compared to other systems of governmental rationality. It focuses on making competition the prominent principle guiding human behavior rather than on merely dealing with

market effects. Even state violence is not excluded, as long as it is deemed to be an effective means for the continuing operation of the market's spontaneous logic (p. 189).

In liberal governmentality, as Foucault sees it, the economy functions both as a major principle for governing and as a particular realm of reality with its own laws. This reflects a crucial change in the 20th century's political rationalities. The state derives from a liberal conceptualization for statehood, rather than being confined by the economy (Gertenbach, 2017, pp. 246-7). His interpretation of ordoliberalism includes the renunciation of laissez-faire, the shift from exchange to competition, the denaturalization of the market, and the birth of liberal interventionism (p. 248). The neoliberal rationality is thus about "a constant pampering and 'cultivation' of the market" rather than merely a politics of laissez-faire and a general disengagement of the state. The market is turned against government, while essentially everything can be economized. Every aspect of society can be rendered governable through the market mechanism. In this way, the retreat of the state is not the intended consequence of a program but the "effect of a broader development to readjust the political logic of government as such" (p. 253).

The important issue here is to be open to the unfolding of ordoliberalism as a governmental rationality. It should be kept in mind, though, that this does not automatically mean its prevalence in terms of policy, if one takes into account both other counterparts of orthodox economics and outright adversaries (Kenyesianism). According to a systematic research of neoliberal *ordnungstheorie*'s contribution to economic transition and transformation policy, the following points are stressed (Leipold, 2001):

This specific theory provided a thorough analysis of the impact of institutions, i.e. how a market economy functions.

It offered a firm basis for how an efficient and socially acceptable market economy is established and sustained.

It gave the theoretical framework for the 'social market economy' concept, serving as the *officialleitbild* of the German economy.

In the German unification process, there was a partial correspondence between the economic or social order and the respective economic policy.

In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the transformation process was characterized by varied initial conditions. Neoliberal principles were followed, particularly during the early reform programs, in most Central European countries.

Neoliberal *ordnungstheorie* did not adequately analyze the political process and the role of informal rules, rendering *ordnungspolitik* an idealized concept.

In this line of reasoning, the direct political influence of neoliberal principles or ideas in the German unification was rather small. The general framework for economic transition in the other countries was provided more by neoclassical economics rather than by ordoliberalism. In that sense, "the contribution of the neoliberal *ordnungstheorie* to the practical transformation policy was quite modest" (Leipold, 2001, p. 334). This results in the refutation of the simplistic view that ideas are fully employed by actors in a conscious way (Biebricher, 2014, p. 19). One should not neglect how a deeper and philosophical level frames individuals. More specifically, it is not enough to denote alternative policy measures as proof of ordoliberalism's obsolescence. The EU governance serves as a respective example, as far as that perspective is perceived in terms of a political rationality or a pervasive mode of thought. It is a shared discursive practice which includes aspects like the centrality of competitiveness, the advancement of entrepreneurial citizenship, the reduction of social policy measures, and the central focus on price stability. This is the case despite competing truth claims and a sometimes uneven articulation, i.e. ordoliberalism's failure to become a strategically enforced and totalizing framework (Oksala, 2017, p. 190). But that is exactly the focus of the next section.

An Ordoliberal Footprint in European Governance?

The adoption of ordoliberal principles, at least in Germany's competition and monetary policies, was reflected in the consolidation of politically independent agencies (*Bundeskartellamt* and *Bundesbank*) that served as an example for other economies. Their replacement by European substitutes has triggered a varied response on behalf of the proponents of ordoliberalism. From an optimistic vantage point, the

European continuation and replication of the ordoliberal mentality would constitute a triumph. From a pessimistic point of view, though, the institutional/policy and cultural differences between Germany and others reflect this strand's demise. From a middle ground, the deviation from ordoliberal standards is counterbalanced by "the internationalized acceptance of even somewhat compromised principles of *Ordnungspolitik*... the advantages of European economic integration (the common market) would more than compensate for the disadvantages of European political cartelization" (Wohlgemuth 2001, pp. 224-5). Features such as guaranteed liberties, the economy's opening, the banning of discriminations, the commitment to undistorted competition, and the EEC/EU's emergence as a legal order for preserving economic freedoms, seem to be compatible with an economic framework advocated by ordoliberalism. Such a compatibility is not to be confused with causality. The former may not grasp the complexity of power-based negotiations or decisions and the imperatives of economic necessity (Joerges, 2017, pp. 201-202).

Eventually, ordoliberalism became a participant in a "battle of ideas in the Eurozone crisis management" in respect to whether the fiscal austerity and competitiveness dictums followed suit from its underpinnings (Young, 2015b). Accordingly, it made sense to introduce the variety of aspects of that intellectual tradition's "return", deeming a thorough normative assessment (Biebricher, 2014). Notably, caution was raised to "the hijacking of German ordoliberalism" (Young, 2015a). The growing references to the latter in relation to European governance took place in such a way that it was often "overused and undertheorized" (p. 9). However, discussing its role in times of crisis should cause no surprise. From a philosophical viewpoint, ordoliberalism gets down to underscoring the political character of a free labor economy. The recognition that the state could not have enough power turns the demand for a strong state into one for an effective market police. At the same time, economic crises signify a failure of political interventionism. Strong state, crises, and the free economy are connected. An economic crisis is at the same time a crisis of political intervention (Bonefeld, 2015: esp. pp. 24-26).

From a highly critical point of view, ordoliberalism provided the very basis for the politics of austerity which in turn constituted a danger in the European economic governance and in the management of the Eurocrisis. Ordoliberalism was accused of being a contributor to the "dangerous idea" of (extreme) austerity and the respective politics (Blyth, 2013, esp. ch. 5), by casting a "long shadow" (Dullien & Guérot, 2012. Cf. Cerny, 2016). As M. Blyth (2013) succinctly put it "[A]ustrian school economists continued to give austerity a globalized intellectual home, while German ordoliberals... gave austerity a national base of operations" (p. 131). From other vantage points, it was noted that the response to the crisis was linked to Germany's hegemonic –albeit reluctant– position, as evident in the institutional design of asymmetrical interdependence. It is not surprising, then, that the response reflected Germany's values regarding a culture of fiscal stability (Bulmer, 2014; Schimmelfennig, 2015). As a result, the ordoliberal prescription for fiscal austerity has led to the exacerbation of the crisis, thus coming at odds with keeping the Eurozone intact, namely as part of a grand political project (Olender, 2012: esp. p. 1). Bluntly stated, ordoliberalism got entangled in a "governing by panic" process by helping the European Central Bank (ECB) threaten that it would allow financial panics to continue, hence advancing policies and institutional changes which aimed at austerity or deflation (Woodruff, 2016).

Ordoliberal scholars have refuted the connection of ordoliberalism with rigidity on behalf of Germany and ultimately Troika/the 'institutions', during the application of austerity policies in the name of economic prudence. This was characteristically postulated in the colloquium "Ordoliberalism: A Chance or Danger for Europe?", which was held by the University of Freiburg in Autumn 2016. The participants claimed that German behavior was explained in terms of national interests or egotism. This debate is compromised by the ambiguity of what exactly constitutes an ordoliberal perspective (Young, 2017, p. 222). Still, the crux of the matter ultimately gets down to the nature of two major choices; a rule-based monetary union or the refutation of joint liability/responsibility reflected in a narrow version of solidarity. From a certain vantage point, the theoretical grounding of those choices related less to the Freiburg School than to the economic orthodoxy as a whole, particularized in applied monetary economics: "neither the distinct set-up of the EMU [European Monetary Union] nor the logic of the Eurozone monetary union is the outcome of specifically ordoliberal principles". An economic constitution, however, entailed such a rejection of common responsibility (p. 229; White, 2017, pp. 14-5).

In this regard, it is remarkable how ordoliberalism's intricacies are demonstrated by its evocation on behalf of such diverse figures as the neoconservative scholar N. Ferguson and the left-leaning politician S.

Wagenknecht (Siems & Schnyder, 2014, pp. 377-378) or even German Eurosceptics, like the supporters of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party. The latter's concern is how the EMU lacked a political framework and how it had not constituted an optimal currency area, leading to the central bank being compromised in light of political pressure (Grimm, 2015). The 'ordoliberalism as weak' thesis (evaluated negatively in the AfD case) is ironically affirmed by a distinctively different ideological strand, with a non-sympathetic stance towards the concept, on the basis that the relevant debate distracts attention from the real forces which influence policy. In this way, ordoliberalism functions as a "myth" with crucial diversionary effects (Storey, 2017).

Similarly, and despite the compatibility of ordoliberalism with Germany's actual decisions to reluctantly accept the establishment of stability mechanisms or to not support Eurobonds, the country's economic policy involved a pragmatic stance to the crisis management (Feld et al., 2015). In relation to how responses to the crisis confirm or refute the respective premises, the 'sticking to the rules' postulation and the rejection of *ad hoc* measures are associated with ordoliberalism, without being unique to it. The *haftungsprinzip* (principle of liability) and the moral hazard of addressing bank bailouts are typical of it. On the other hand, this is not the case with extensive funding of loans via stability mechanisms (e.g. European Financial Stability Facility, European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, and European Stability Mechanism), the European Fiscal Compact, bond purchases by the ECB, and the suggestion of turning the ECB into a last resort lender. The turn to emergency loans reflects a pragmatic stance regarding the emerging necessity of dealing with the crisis. The latter had not been averted by ordoliberal dictums in the first place. Concomitantly, the degree of (non)revival of Keynesianism was a matter of politics. The crisis also revealed a split in terms of priorities; e.g. Germany's focus on fiscal discipline, price (and currency) stability, and the need for debt limit/break juxtaposed to an emphasis on economic growth. On the one hand, seeing the former (and prevailing) priority as reflecting ordoliberalism is plausible, to the extent that this perspective opposes short-term Keynesian responses to economic crisis. On the other hand, attributing Germany's position towards the crisis exclusively to ordoliberalism misses aspects like the interaction of the government with the electorate or the commitment to the European project (Siems & Schnyder, 2014, pp. 388-390. Cf. Beck & Kotz, 2017, pp. 79-164).

The adjustment of ordoliberalism and neoliberalism to the global and European crisis, through the acceptance of *ad hoc* regulation, constitute an intriguing development. In specific, they reflect a *de facto* more regulatory and interventionist turn, which may well be defined as "post-ordoliberalism" (Cerny, 2016). The latter relates to a hegemony of neoliberal discourse which is yet mitigated by the fluid predicament of "ineffective *ad hoc* incrementalism and improvisation, indebtedness and increasing inequality". This predicament relates to pro-competitive constitutive rules rather than to an effective regulation of sovereign states. The ideal of a neoliberal society or an economy comprised of individuals with an entrepreneurial spirit, in light of either human nature or a strong regulatory competition state, may be viewed as a myth. Nevertheless, it is one which is based on economic actors, consequently constituting "the paradox of neoliberalism" (p. 91).

As already stated, ordoliberalism's presence is affirmed by the German support for price stability, the independence of the ECB, and the primacy of currency policy (reflected in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact). Nevertheless, a sound monetary system was justified in terms of not only guaranteeing price stability (through sanctions towards transgressions) but also of preventing a discretionary space for central bankers to intervene in monetary policy. So in light of proposals such as buying bonds on the secondary market, it is no coincidence that the German bankers –informed by ordoliberalism– objected on the grounds that it was a risky measure, exceeding this way the ECB's mandate (Berghahn & Young, 2013, p. 775). However, "using the only justifications that *ordo-liberals* could accept, interventions anathema to their instincts have been employed, to handle challenges that their own ideas allowed to develop, with the aim of reconstituting the economic system to be immune to such threats in future" (White, 2017, p. 14).

Concerning this issue, an analysis in terms of comparative cognitive mapping, on how serious the French (presumably Keynesian) and German (presumably ordoliberal) divide/debate was, revealed a fairly ambiguous and flexible set of policy views by leaders. During the crisis, those views converged towards a mild ordoliberal view. Particularly, ordoliberal ideas were upheld by the German leaders but also by the French central bank governor. The most consistent and uncompromising stance was presented by the German central bank governor. The policy ideas of others, including the German Chancellor, were

somewhat more fluid. A common ground lied in the definition of the Eurozone crisis as one of ‘sovereign debt’, thereby conforming to the prevailing European discourse and moving towards a modestly ordoliberal position (Van Esch 2014, esp. p. 299). This may be seen not as the triumph of a dominant partner (Germany) but as the shift of the group consensus towards a more compromising position (ibid.). Still, the ‘hard fact’ remains that the direction of that consensus was ordoliberal.

This conundrum of the degree of ordoliberalism’s influence may be given analytical impetus if this impact is considered not as a necessarily immediate one but as one that consists of unintended consequences. Even if one accepts that a respective influence was not the direct or explicit intention of German policy-makers, processes of unintended consequences have well been at play, in respect to ignorance, error, immediacy of interests, and being at the mercy of basic values. It is one thing to claim that ordoliberal assumptions or premises served as a basic framework for certain actors and another to acknowledge the fairly messy and unpredictable results, brought to the fore through interaction, which concern not only Germany but other states as well (Nedergaard & Snaith, 2015). In effect, “the ordoliberal transformation of Europe” (Biebricher, 2013, p. 343) or the “ordoliberalization of the EU” consists less of the actual set of policy prescriptions than of the very existence of a coherent political rationality and a consistent ideational framework impinging upon EU governance, no matter the occasionally uneven articulation or implementation of such a framework (Oksala, 2017, p. 189). By (dis)encouraging certain courses of action, ordoliberalism has helped the establishment of “a sensibility, possibly largely tacit, for certain kinds of response” (White, 2017, p. 15). Even from a standpoint arguing for its overestimation, it is acknowledged that, despite the rare presence (if not absence) of scholars expressing a genuinely ordoliberal approach, ordoliberalism is alive and vivid as part of popular culture. It is related to a deep ordoliberal-Protestant grammar of the people, which is used by politicians for analyzing the crisis and rationalizing strict measures (Hien & Joerges 2018, pp. 18-21).

Despite the degree or the function of (un)intentionality, the ordoliberal impact well consists of a narrow conceptualization of the very idea of solidarity, i.e. some sort of ‘restricted solidarity’. Proximity and homogeneity in economic and political or cultural terms, along with the main aim of sustaining macro-economic stability, have deeply influenced decisions about bailout (Verde, 2011, pp. 157-161). Regardless of the validity of the claim about Germany’s contribution to the management of the Greek financial crisis, the obsession with stability contributed to the transformation of a nation’s fiscal problem into a systemic sovereign debt crisis (Matthijs, 2016). This was achieved via strengthening and forcing the ‘rules are rules’ and the ‘you had better be careful’ premises. The latter were targeted towards a state facing “character assassination” (Aspriadis & Samaras, 2019) and are part of the broader issue of the role of asymmetrical and hierarchical power relations. That is important because the EU economic governance reflects the ‘civilizing’ feature, characteristically found in the EU’s search for an international role (Mikelis, 2017a). It may succinctly be conceptualized in terms of a ‘civilizing governance’ even within the EU itself, insofar as it is premised on a new (financial) civilizing mission. The latter is reflected in a ‘comply to certain standards or suffer the consequences’ logic and the demarcation between insiders and outsiders, within the Eurozone. This demarcation is achieved through the repositioning of a member state as a negative signifier, in the context of civilizational discourses, and through the collective pressure of a possible exit (Mikelis & Stroikos, 2017, p. 136).

Bluntly put, this case study affirms the importance of an ‘unbound’ executive coming to power. Unlike liberal democracy, “law is made by executive decision, from fiscal retrenchment to loss of fiscal sovereignty”. It was the decision of others that Greece “had to restructure the entirety of its social contract as a condition of punitive bail-out agreement. In effect, the Greek state transformed into an executive state of council decisions” (Bonefeld, 2017, p. 756). That system combines supranational economic constitution and executive law-making with the implementation of the agreed rules. As a result, democratic influence on the conduct of monetary policy is removed. Also, fiscal policy is restricted to the pursuit of sound money, while freedom of competition between territorialized labor markets is enabled. Finally, the democratic member states are brought under a regime of imposed liberty (p. 757).

The removal of crucial economic decisions from the democratic and political decision making, for the sake of privileged (even if non-elected) economic experts, evidently relates to the infamous democratic deficit. It constitutes neither an accidental development nor a design fault. It is rather an inherent feature of the emerging governance pronounced by ordoliberalism (Oksala, 2017, pp. 191-192. Cf. Vanberg, 2015). Thus, it should be kept in mind that “[T]he ordoliberal state is to monopolize the political, depoliticize socio-

economic relations, and embed the moral values and norms of market liberty into society at large, dissolving resistance to austerity and transforming querulous proletarians into individualized and willing participants in the market price mechanism” (Bonefeld, 2012, p. 652. See White, 2017). From a political philosophy standpoint, ordoliberalism’s tenets reflect a technocratic and authoritarian or undemocratic view of politics. This is affirmed in actual decisions, as far as competitiveness remains the central aim of all reforms, but also in the structural and institutional modalities of their implementation, i.e. the economic governance regime (Biebricher, 2013: pp. 339-340). Boldly stated, the prospect of ‘authoritarianism lurking’ is thus left open.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

An examination of the role of ordoliberalism was offered, taking into account the case study of the EU’s economic governance. It was demonstrated that the seemingly simple question over the strong presence of this intellectual strand has brought to the fore a variety of multiple and even diverse, yet still relevant, answers. Schematically categorizing these answers into broader directions, they can be succinctly characterized as the dictums of ‘ordoliberalism evidently matters significantly’ and ‘the overstated relevance of ordoliberalism’. Those dictums, seen together, reflect the validity of the rising discussion in respect to the ordoliberal implications for the EU’s trajectory.

The aforementioned variety can, at first glance, be attributed to the very complexity of governance, especially the European one. Indeed, such a complexity can hardly be missed; for example, when regarding the normative intricacies of network and multilevel governance (e.g. Mikelis, 2017b, 2018). This is further complicated by not only the varied ordoliberal stance towards the EU project, but principally by the elusiveness of the concept of ordoliberalism. One needs not address the characterization of the latter as an empty signifier in order to accept and stress the mere conceptual diversity, even within the ranks of past and current advocates of the concept, let alone other discussants.

The notable irony of the issue lies in a certain paradox that ordoliberalism’s preponderance in current and crucial facets of the EU project has often been affirmed by ‘hostiles’ rather than by proponents or ‘sympathizers’. Thus, it is a matter of perspective: the ‘overstated relevance of ordoliberalism’ viewpoint tends to underscore the absence of a purely ordoliberal dominance within the discipline of Economics or within the EU economic governance in respect to policy prescriptions. The ‘ordoliberalism evidently matters significantly’ viewpoint does not necessarily deny the aforementioned lack of dominance. Yet, it underscores the entanglement of ordoliberalism in a political rationality with serious effects and challenges.

Even if the peril of overestimating causal relations in policy making is considered a valid one, the actual or potential political relevance of this system of ideas, at times of both crisis and reform in Germany and other EU countries, is hardly or rarely denied. However, by stressing the fact that policy responses were not exclusively or particularly ‘ordoliberal’ and that they complied to other variants of ‘orthodox’ economics, there is no necessity to negate the unfolding of such relevance. The latter is about how ordoliberalism particularly informs policy making but also about whether and how it informs and strengthens a specific rationality, especially through the ‘rules are rules’ and the ‘you had better be careful’ premises. By ignoring or underestimating this aspect, along with the contribution of the ordoliberal perspective to the whole process of the economic regime’s emergence, little room is left for critical thinking as well as for a comprehensive understanding of both practical issues and their serious normative consequences.

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Return to the country of origin via the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programme: Informing third-country nationals not in contact with the authorities

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ABSTRACT

The Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) Programme is a core activity of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The Programme is addressed to third-country nationals (TCNs) who do not have the appropriate documentation to stay in Greece or do not desire to stay in Greece, to asylum seekers who have withdrawn their application for international protection and to asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected. Focusing on the results of in-depth interviews carried out with TCNs not in contact with the authorities, the implications emerging from the repercussions of their employment in precarious, low-status/low-paid jobs and on how these affect their decision to return to their countries of origin via the AVRR Programme are examined. Regardless of their legal and socioeconomic conditions in their country of origin, migrant workers' decisions are negatively affected due to the extended stay, entrapment and isolation in precarious, low-status/low-paid jobs.

Keywords: third-country nationals, voluntary return, reintegration, integration, decision, precarious employment, Greece

INTRODUCTION

This chapter centers on how entrapment in precarious employment, low-status/low-paid work of third-country nationals (TCNs), affects their decision to return to their countries of origin via the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) Programme. Focusing on the results of in-depth interviews carried out, the qualitative analysis examines the cases of workers from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Iran, Morocco, Nigeria and the Philippines and how their decision to participate in the AVRR Programme in order to return to their country of origin is negatively affected due to precarious, low-status/low-paid employment. Since 2010, the AVRR Programme, implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Greece, has provided various forms of support to individuals willing to return to their country of origin, including social and labor reintegration (IOM – Office in Greece, 2017a; Grizis, et al., 2015). AVRR is favored in comparison to other return models for TCNs, since under this Programme the rights of migrant returnees are respected, which results in effective migration management (Hatzopoulos, Fouskas, Pechlidi, de Maio, and Novak, 2017; IOM – Office in Greece, 2017a). In labor markets globally, migrant workers mainly depend on the informal economies, employed in precarious, low-status/low-paid posts, on undeclared employment and on the underground/shadow economy, which demands a cheaper, uninsured, mobile, temporary and flexible workforce (Portes, Castells and Benton, 1989; Williams and Windebank, 1998; Campani and Pajnik, 2011; Schneider and Williams, 2013). Even in these times of deep economic recession, southern European countries are considered places of hope and opportunity by impoverished populations (Fouskas and Tseverenis, 2014; Hatzopoulos, et al., 2017; Fouskas, 2017). Violent conflicts and population explosion in the developing world have also increased the orientation of large numbers of migrants and their families to western countries, in search of a better life. Immigration and refugee population movements in Greece – e.g. for economic reasons, seeking jobs or looking for shelter, as they are involuntarily migrating due to warfare and sociopolitical instability, or trying to reunite with their families – have increased rapidly over the past several years, with over one million migrants having arrived in Greece over the course of three decades by crossing its borders (Fouskas and Tseverenis, 2014; OECD, 2016; Crawley, et al., 2016; Fouskas, 2017; Skleparis, 2018). In Greece, the phenomenon of migration has affected both the natives and the migrants, putting pressure on multiple social sectors, such as: demographic data, employment, sectors of public health and social security, education, border control, institutions of law enforcement and security (Fouskas and Tseverenis, 2014).

In Greece, immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees have become part of a cheap workforce reserve that is continuously renewed, while the division of labor prompts and entraps migrants into wage labor and low-status/low-paid jobs, distinguishing them on the basis of class, gender, race-nationality, religion and of the way of entrance into the country. In Greece, commonly used expressions such as “you work like a Filipina live-in maid or a black or a Pakistani laborer,” are merged in the popular culture, referring to a woman who performs multiple heavy chores at home and to an African or Asian man who works in low-paid jobs and performs hard manual labor (Fouskas, 2014, 2016a, 2016b). The jobs in which migrants are largely employed are paid or non-paid occupations, outside the margins of formal employment and unregistered. They are considered unattractive, lacking social prestige and inferior by the workforce of the reception society, however, they do provide economic profits and attach high social status to the customer or employer (Psimmenos, 2007; Fouskas, 2014, 2016a, 2016b; Psimmenos, 2017). The labor that migrants are exposed to is characterized not only as precarious, low-status and low-paid for its level of exploitation, flexibility and instability, isolation and individualization, but also by decollectivization (Fouskas, 2014, 2016a, 2016b), or in other words by alienation from the family, communal and collective networks and labor rights. Precarious work is employment that lacks all the standard forms of labor security, it typically takes the form of wage work and is characterized by exceptionally limited social benefits and legal rights, job insecurity, low pay and high risk to the health (Sassen, 1996; Vosko, 2006:3-4; Fouskas, 2018).

Precarious work creates enormous and complex barriers to labor organization strategies due to the isolated, atomized and non-unionized nature of migrant employment (Choudry and Thomas, 2012:180-181, Fouskas, 2014, 2016a, 2016b). It is estimated that there are more than 244 million international migrants living abroad and at least 21.3 million are refugees, 3.2 million asylum seekers and 65.3 million individuals forcibly displaced, as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence or human rights violations, while most of them are employed, voluntarily or not, in precarious, low-status/low-paid jobs in the sector of personal services (UN, 2015, UNHCR, 2015). Out of these, approximately 45.8 million people are under some form of modern slavery (Walk Free Foundation, 2016:8). Greece comes first, among the 21 OECD country-members, where 24% of Greek GDP is formed by the underground/shadow economy (Williams and Schneider, 2013:52-57). Moreover, the percentage of uninsured workers is among the world’s highest (37.3%), along with the percentage of irregular migration workers (4.4%) (Williams and Schneider, 2013:52-57). In relation to domestic work worldwide, more than 67.1 million women and men of different ages, classes and nationalities are nowadays pushed to work in businesses, households and for individual employers, undertaking various tasks such as cleaning and providing care, companionship and supervision (ILO, 2015:13). To the above, one could add all types of helpers/assistants in the care and safety of persons and properties, beauty care, entertainment, agricultural work, manual labor, constructions, crafts, food services, entertainment industry, itinerant trade and in the street economy, all of which are characterized by inequalities, deregulation of labor rights, shattering of collectivities and by incapacity to tackle labor market exploitability.

The chapter will offer an analysis of the impact of entrapment in precarious, low-status/low-paid employment on the decision of migrants to return to their countries of origin via the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programme. The main question of the research is: Can third-country nationals leave precarious, low-status/low-paid jobs and enter the formal labor market? If not, are they willing to return to their country of origin?

Methodology

The research is aimed at the examination of the effects of precarious, low-status/low-paid jobs on workers from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Iran, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, as well as at perceptions and attitudes towards their decision on returning or not to their country of origin, via the AVRRI Programme. In this context, qualitative research in Greece, in Attica and in other cities in Greece among which Patras, Thessaloniki, Mytilene/Lesvos, Chios, Heraklion/Crete, was conducted through in-depth interviews, in Greek and in English, with TCNs of both genders who have resided in Greece for 10 years and have acquired legal documents (Table 1). The choice of the representative and non-statistical sample of the interviews was conducted using snowball sampling, according to which every participant who took part in the research led the researcher to others from his/her broader social network. In the process of collecting information, total anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed via a consent form. Interviews reached

saturation point, i.e. until interviews did not provide any new information. A semi-structured interview guide with three sections was used to collect the qualitative material. Twelve TCNs with the ability to access the research population operated as informants. Word-by-word analysis provided an in-depth, analytic reflection of the transcribed data by breaking it down into segments, thus uncovering ideas, meanings and understandings by creating codes for data that summarize and classify similar phenomena, emphasizing their frequency, intensity and similarity, i.e. by saturating a set of concepts with indicators of their properties. Moreover, through this, it became possible to identify the reasons, perceptions, strategies and practices of the interviewees.

Table 1. The Demographic and Social Characteristics of Third-Country Nationals

Country of origin	Bangladesh	Ethiopia	Iran	Morocco	Nigeria	Pakistan	Philippines
Total Interviews	22	16	13	14	21	24	25
Gender*	Males	Males	Males	Males	Males	Males	Females
Age*	43	44	38	39	45	41	49
Entry date in Greece*	2000	1999	2005	2005	1998	2000	1998
Education*	Compulsory	Compulsory	Compulsory	Compulsory	Compulsory	Compulsory	Higher
Hours / day*	13	10	12	10	13	13	14
Days / week*	7	6	6	6	6	7	6
Income / month*	350	330	240	240	350	350	650
Years in Greece*	12	14	10	10	15	12	15

*Average from interviews

Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) Programme

Since 2010, IOM, as the main body implementing Assisted Voluntary Return Programmes for migrants living in Greece, under the financing of the European Return Fund that was set up under the Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Programme of the European Commission and the Hellenic Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform/Hellenic Ministry for Migration Policy, has helped numerous migrants return to their countries of origin (IOM – Office in Greece, 2017a, 2017b). More specifically, in 2010, 337 migrants returned voluntarily to their home country, 760 in 2011, 7.289 in 2012, 9.334 in 2013, 7.350 in 2014, 3.794 in 2015, 6.153 in 2016 and 3.852 in 2017 (IOM – Office in Greece, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e). The main countries of origin of the returnees during the reference period were Pakistan, Georgia, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iraq and Egypt. The Programme is funded 75% by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund of the European Union (AMIF) and 25% by the Hellenic Ministry of Interior/Hellenic Ministry for Migration Policy. The AVRR Programme is a core activity of the IOM and has provided vital assistance to tens of thousands of migrants returning home every year, for the last four decades (Fonseca, Hart and Klink, 2015; Hart, Graviano and Klink, 2015; European Migration Network, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Nguyen, Graviano, Quillet, et al., 2017). During the last decade, IOM has helped more than 400,000 people return in a safe and dignified manner (Koser, 2001; Koser and Kuschminder, 2015). AVRR reassures the financial and social reintegration of individuals and the cooperation between all stakeholders in origin and reception countries (IOM – Office in Greece, 2017b). The decision of returning back home is 100% voluntary and based on the migrant's request; i.e. voluntary decision encompasses two elements, freedom of choice and an informed decision which requires the availability of sufficient, accurate and objective information upon which to base the decision (IOM – Office in Greece, 2017c). According to the IOM's definition, reintegration can be defined as the re-inclusion or re-incorporation of a person into a group or process, for example, of a migrant into the society of his or her country of origin or habitual residence

(IOM – Office in Greece, 2017c). Reintegration is therefore a process that enables the returnee to participate again in the social, cultural, economic and political life of his/her country of origin (IOM – Office in Greece, 2017c). Beneficiaries of AVRR are informed by specialized personnel and cultural mediators, in order to follow personalized reintegration plans, customized to their needs and implemented in cooperation with the IOM offices located in origin countries, benefiting the returnees, the local societies and the reception countries (IOM – Office in Greece, 2017c). AVRR Programme is addressed to third-country nationals who do not have the appropriate documentation to stay in Greece or who do not desire to stay in Greece, to asylum seekers who have withdrawn their application for international protection and to asylum seekers whose application has been rejected. Special care is provided to vulnerable migrants, such as victims of trafficking, unaccompanied minors, single-parent families and individuals with medical needs etc. (IOM – Office in Greece, 2017c). AVRR procedure includes information and pre – departure counseling sessions, assistance to obtain all appropriate documents (i.e. travel documents) and air-tickets and escorting the individuals to the airport.

Greece is in close cooperation with the IOM offices in transit countries and in countries of origin in order to assist the returnees upon arrival and for the successful implementation of reintegration plans (IOM – Office in Greece, 2017c). A new reintegration package has been created in order to enhance voluntary returns from the Greek islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos. In particular, the new reintegration package will be provided to non-vulnerable returnees that will be registered in the project in one of these islands. This new reintegration package is given in cash and an additional amount of €500 per returnee will be given at the airport on the day of departure (Poularakis, 2017). This provision does not replace the cash grant that all project beneficiaries receive prior to their departure in order to address their basic needs after leaving Greece, it doubles the assistance provided to the returnees (Poularakis, 2017). For example, if a non-vulnerable beneficiary has been registered in the project in Lesbos, he/she will receive €500 as reintegration cash assistance and €500 as one-time cash grant, i.e. €1,000 in total (Poularakis, 2017). With the support of the IOM Reintegration Counselors, they can construct a reintegration plan, tailored to their needs, which will contribute to achieving sustainability back in the countries of origin.

How does Entrapment in Precarious, Low-Status Employment of Third-Country Nationals Affect their Decision to Return to their Countries of Origin?

In Greece, TCNs are employed as precarious, low-status/low-paid workers in the Greek labor market, which enables them to support themselves and/or their families back in their countries of origin. Many enter the country via migrant smuggling networks, facing extremely risky circumstances, especially at the sea borders, as well as detention and abuse by the Authorities. TCNs experience extremely precarious labor conditions and are poorly paid. Male migrants are mostly used in unskilled manual labor, in any available precarious, low-status/low-paid job in the sector of services provision e.g., painters, craftsmen, technicians, ironsmiths, in the food, restaurant and hotel sector, in agricultural work and less often in construction, with limited working rights and without compatriots at the workplace. In general, they follow a horizontal advancement from unskilled laborers to craftsmen. Their daily wage varies between €5-€25/day (around €330/month), 6-7 workdays per week, 11-12 hours/day with inadequate social security and health insurance.

Female migrants work as live-in domestic workers performing multiple duties (maids, maidservants, babysitters, housekeepers, carers, nurses), depending on their employers' demands: household cleaning and chores (e.g. laundry, cooking meals) and/or caring, nursing of an elderly person and/or caring of child/children (childcare), while they reside in the residences of their employers six days a week. Generally, live-in domestic workers work from Monday to Saturday, usually for 13 hours a day with a 1-hour break but without fixed working hours, precise tasks or job description (around €450/month). Female migrants also work as live-out domestic workers, cleaning offices and residences without residing in the residences of their employers, approximately for €120/week not including social security contributions which they have to pay themselves or health insurance. Furthermore, they work as private nurses for patients at hospitals and clinics and in any precarious, low-status/low-paid employment in services provision e.g. saleswomen in clothes stores and bakeries, for less than the minimum national pay on a rotation basis and in extremely precarious conditions. There are multiple cases where an employer treats male and female migrant workers inhumanly, by shouting and gesticulating at them, by exercising physical

and verbal abuse as well as by hiring them under false contracts or labor contracts that the worker has never read, thus becoming exposed, vulnerable and susceptible to various forms of exploitation. The situation is further burdened by the control that employers exercise over the worker, which results in the prolonged stay in precarious, low-status/low-paid employment, as they are unable to access other jobs. At the same time, although some interviewees were also not considering returning to their countries of origin via the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programme, as they were hoping to move to another EU country, this prolonged stay in precarious, low-status/low-paid employment discourages them as it is transformed into entrapment in such jobs and contexts. Employers confiscate their documents, keep them under constant surveillance and threaten to report them to the Authorities, resulting in further exploitation. They exercise discipline, keep them subordinate, expect obedience and silent consent and make the migrant workers depend on them, giving rise to pseudo-friendships with employers, thus pseudo-family relationships and pseudo-mothering feelings and roles emerge. Sheryl (46 years old from the Philippines) says:

I do not have time to go to a doctor. I take care of a baby and a grandmother, my employer's mother. To do a Pap Test I have to leave the house and I can't, because I am alone all day and I am responsible for the grandmother and the baby and the house. If I decide to go to the doctor, it won't take a few hours but a whole day due to bureaucracy and delays. Both the boss and the madam work and I cannot leave. Once, I got the flu and he took me to a private clinic. They took good care of me. It is important to have a good employer. This is why I left my country. Why would I go back? The AVR has nothing to offer to me.

Migrant workers rarely claim their employment rights, as they are in an isolated work space or work alone e.g., as street vendors. They often leave their employment without having received full compensation and blame themselves for not looking into the details of their employment conditions beforehand. Through this attitude, they try to maintain a low-profile, as hard laborers, in order to gain employers' trust and improve the reception society's perception of them, or even in order to achieve higher wages. The majority of the interviewed migrants came to Greece between 1995 and 2005, have more than 10 years of residence in the country and generally, for the biggest part of their life, have been employed in precarious, low-status/low-paid work. As to their family situation in Greece, there are those who are alone in Greece, constituting the majority, those who have a relative or a network of friends (brother/sister/cousin/uncle/aunt), those who are married and have a spouse and children in the country of origin, those who are married and have their family (spouse/children) in Greece and those who were married and divorced while residing in Greece. Many, due to delays and difficulties in acquiring residence or work permits or loss/expiry of their permits, have been unable to travel and visit their family in their country of origin and thus have grown apart from their spouses and children, resulting in the breakup of family relationships in the country of origin. There are some who have not seen their families for decades. Zahid (38 years old from Pakistan) states:

It is very sad to say that until now, I have not visited my family in Pakistan. I have not been back, not yet. When I decided to come here that was not my goal. I wanted to get to Barcelona in Spain. I wanted to leave my country, because of the financial difficulties and I wanted to earn more for my family. But now I cannot return. I know the IOM's AVR Programme. I cannot go back; I have to fight here to earn more. I try to survive as a tailor here in Greece. I work as street vendor as well. There is no future for me in Pakistan.

The reasons that forced them to leave their countries of origin and seek jobs, exclusively as unskilled manual workers, low-status/low-paid service laborers and domestic workers, were the economic problems they faced and the state of unemployment of their spouses, which led to their inability to raise their children and provide them with a better life. Many interviewed migrant workers did not have relations with others migrants or Greeks in the neighborhood or area where they lived. Their personal consumer needs were limited, as their income was devoted to sending clothes or shoes to their children in their country of origin. Due to the recession, many migrant workers receive lower pay, which has had various consequences. Jobs have become scarcer, so change of employer has been more difficult and remittances to the family in the country of origin are for smaller amounts and more infrequent, while the geographical distance cuts them off from the intimacy of their family in the country of origin, adding to feeling of isolation and loneliness. However, they are unwilling to return to their countries of origin via the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programme.

This, along with the unemployment of the spouse in the country of origin, has led to strained family relationships and estrangement. Moreover, these migrant workers sooner or later feel intense physical, emotional and mental exhaustion, feelings that are compensated only by the fact that they derive pleasure from earning money, being dependent on their employer as a means of protection, bonding with the children or elders in their care, as if they were their own children or elder parents or grandparents, developing pseudo-friendships with the employers, a pseudo-family belonging and by adopting a pseudo-mother-to-child relation. At the end of the day, they are regarded as pseudo-members of the employer's family or enterprise. The above breaks family bonds and deepens the rift between the migrant worker and his/her family in the country of origin and further isolates the worker due to the demands of the employer in the context of precarious employment, low-status/low-paid work and servile labor. This rift isolates the worker and makes him/her develop self-centered and individualistic perceptions and behaviors based on atomization, which results in them being reluctant to participate in the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programme.

The recession seems to have created greater insecurity and increased dependency on their employers, out of their need to achieve some level of social protection. This dependency further isolates migrants and could possibly undermine their relationships with their families in their country of origin but also with compatriots, colleagues and community associations.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The AVRR Programme is extremely significant, as it assists in improving the lives of third-country nationals, the conditions in the host societies and in the countries of origin. However, regardless of the socioeconomic conditions in their country of origin, Bangladeshi, Ethiopian, Filipino, Iranian, Moroccan, Nigerian and Pakistani workers' decisions are negatively affected due to prolonged stay and isolation in such jobs and to specific occupations with low or zero social and labor mobility, which promote their entrapment in precarious working conditions and their identification on the basis of the characteristics of these occupations. The main conclusion of the research is that there is an urgent need to design a more effective policy in the field of migration, by implementing the European Return Directive and completely adapting it to national requirements. Migrants are trapped in a form of modern slavery and forced labor conditions and given that they are invisible or hidden from view, they are in increasingly vulnerable positions and face exploitative practices. Prompted and entrapped by ethnic, racial and gender division of labor, interviewed migrant workers are alienated from primary and secondary solidarity groups and from ties to their country of origin, i.e. family, community associations and compatriots and develop indifference towards them. The fragmentation of migrant solidarities and communities, the breaking down of labor and collective mobilization, of values and actions of solidarity as resistance at the workplace, the unmaking of social and labor solidarity networks of immigrants and refugees, the loss of belonging and the growing indifference towards association membership, have resulted in decollectivization and atomization. Moreover, inequalities in the context of crisis and austerity as well as deeply racialized and precarious social and labor conditions continue to grow, while inequality between migrants and non-migrants is increasing, deterring social and labor integration. Isolated working environments and the development of atomized behavior shatter the solidarity of family and community members, who are entrapped in precarious, low-status/low-paid jobs, scattered across various countries and socially segmented in this context of non-existent communal and association setting, all of which have decreased the migrant workers' sense of family responsibility and have weakened community belonging, the initial bonds and significance of family and community.

The AVRR information campaigns for migrant populations that have been conducted and continue to take place until today, have the form of distribution of printed material (leaflets) translated in sixteen languages, with institutions for the provision of services to third country nationals and are placed in locations where migrants gather and in migrant community associations (Grizis et.al., 2015). There are also posters at central points of daily transit, while face-to-face meetings take place among the executive staff of the IOM, interpreters and potential beneficiaries in places where migrants frequent (Grizis et al., 2015). Despite the focused actions, in the review of the actual numbers of returnees, the drawn conclusions indicate that the number of returnees is very low compared to the number of entries into the country. The provision of information on voluntary return to TCNs who are not in contact with the Authorities and want or need to

return to their countries of origin, which has been identified as successful, takes the form of face-to face contacts of the IOM executive personnel with migrants, with contact meetings at the offices of the Organization and the dissemination of information throughout the country via Mobile Information Units (Grizis et al., 2015). The instruments used were IOM specialist personnel and professional interpreters, who provided the information in the mother tongue of the interested individuals, assisting the TCNs in overcoming any fear when approached and at the same time earning their trust (Grizis et al., 2015). The challenges encountered by the Greek Authorities providing information to TCNs, and especially to those who reside irregularly in the country, lie in the lack of data on TCNs, information that is not available to the Authorities, such as contact details and addresses that have changed over time or are false, due to fear of imminent detention by the Authorities or constant movement in the country (Grizis et al., 2015). Moreover, irregular migrants, victims of human trafficking and sexual exploitation, unaccompanied minors, undocumented migrant workers, hidden laborers and migrant workers providing services (e.g. live-in domestic workers, care workers, precarious laborers, bonded/unfree/exploited workers) and individuals who are disabled or face health problems, are groups of people difficult to be approached by the Authorities (Grizis et al., 2015). Thus, migrant workers are led to the formation of atomized beliefs, detached from their family and community networks and alienated from social and labor solidarity groups and from the potential to get informed by collective organizations in communities, migrant associations, trade unions, and by worker centers or other migrant workers.

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Regional EU issues

‘Always a part of Europe’: Interpretations of the past in the discursive construction of Romania’s collective identity

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ABSTRACT

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This paper investigates how historical events are interpreted in the political discourse of contemporary Romania and how these interpretations influence the discursive construction of both the national and European identity. The corpus consists of the speeches delivered in the Romanian Parliament between 2016 and 2018 in order to commemorate May 9th, as Europe Day, Victory Day, and also Romania’s Independence Day. The results show that most speakers focus on the celebration of Europe Day instead of the events in national history, highlighting Romania’s commitment to European values. As Romania’s collective identity is defined through its European membership, national history is interpreted as a century-long struggle to escape the Ottoman rule and the Russian influence.

Keywords: Romania, national identity, European identity, political discourse, Romanian history

INTRODUCTION

Current phenomena such as migration and globalization, besides the enlargement of the European Union, invite us to rethink the relation between nationality, ethnicity and identity. A few decades ago, scholars still believed in the relevance of national belonging for both individual and collective identities: “In the contemporary world, to be without nationality is to be perceived as almost without identity” (Bloom, 1990, p. 74). More recent viewpoints highlight the dynamism and fluidity of identities, contesting the assumption that identities are primarily tied to the nation-state (Goff & Dunn, 2004). However, the process of identification always implies a distinction between ‘self’ and an ‘other’. De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999) note that “the discursive construction of nations and national identities always runs hand in hand with the construction of difference / distinctiveness and uniqueness” (p. 153). This characteristic can have both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, national identities may give the individuals the sense of belonging to the “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991) which is the nation. On the other hand, the differentiation from other individuals or groups may lead to conflicts and maintain boundaries (Joseph, 2004, p. 46).

How national identities can relate to a European identity as a supranational or transnational form of identification is still under debate. For some scholars, national belonging represents a possible obstacle in the construction of a European public sphere (e.g. Eriksen, 2005, p. 351; Smith, 1991). Similarly, Eder (2014) argues that the contemporary “crisis of Europe increases the visibility of the tensions between national sentiments and transnational connectedness” (p. 230). The difficulties in defining the relation between national and European belonging may stem from the tendency of understanding the European collective identity as a unitary construct. In contrast, the results of a study conducted on seven European nations indicate that people tend to separate political identity from cultural identity (Robyn, 2005, p. 12). European integration is manifest at the political and economic levels, but a truly European society has not yet come to existence (Eder, 2014, p. 220). Kantner (2006, pp. 511-512) also observes that EU citizens already have the “experience of living in a common legal space and having a common market”, but an identity founded on such elements can only be a weak one. A strong collective identity necessarily implies shared values and “a shared self-understanding” which also influences discourses of the past, the interpretations of history and the selection of past events to be commemorated (Kantner, 2006, p. 513).

This paper explores how national history is evoked and interpreted in the public discourse of an EU member-state, Romania. Further, it analyzes how these interpretations influence the discursive construction of the national and the European identity. The corpus is formed by the speeches delivered in the Romanian

Parliament on a special occasion, the commemoration of May 9. For the European states, this day represents both Europe Day and Victory Day, the moment when the German Instrument of Surrender was signed, bringing the Second World War to an end. For Romania in particular, 9 May also carries a third meaning. On 9 May 1877, the Romanian state declared its independence, bringing the Ottoman domination to an end. Commemorative speeches on 9 May are expected to recall these moments of the past, which may shed light upon the discursive relations between the Romanians' collective identity as a nation and the newer identity, that of European citizens.

POSTSOCIALIST NATIONAL IDENTITIES

Research on the construction of collective identities needs to pay attention not only to the relation between the 'self' and the 'other', but also to the evolution of identities over time, be they self-claimed or assigned by other actors, rejected, negotiated or enforced. In the case of former socialist countries, their collective identities tend to evolve slowly, "building on past discourses, legitimate expressions of identity, and often deep-seated mentalities" (True, 2004, p. 49). A common tendency for these countries is to distance themselves from their communist past. For instance, the new collective identity assumed by the Czech Republic involves the rejection of the former communist regime (True, 2004). Krzyżanowski (2009, pp.96-97) distinguishes between two tendencies in Polish political discourse: either to assume a pragmatic view of Europe, in order to achieve national goals, or to transform it into a "key object of (political) identification". As regards Romania, Kaneva and Popescu (2011, p. 194) note that it provides "perhaps the most striking example of the urgency to reject communist symbols as they related to nationhood". The example given by the authors regard the cutting of the communist state anthem from the national flag during the 1989 revolution. "The 'emptied' flag became a symbol of the new Romanian nation – one that no longer wanted to identify itself as communist and was, therefore, in need of a new emblem and a new mythology of national unity" (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011, p. 194). The quest for new symbols is visible in the strive for providing coherent interpretations of the past, glossing over the communist regime. Similar to the cut in the flag, this leaves an empty space which needs to be filled in by other narratives, by a return to earlier moments in national history, and by new interpretations of these moments, in order to motivate the Romanians' Europeaness.

The justification of the Europeanisation process was also necessary, because Romania, like Bulgaria, faced serious challenges when accessing the EU: economic difficulties, "problems with corruption, poverty and their need for legal reform" (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011, p. 193). Like other post-socialist states, Romania viewed the EU access as "a guarantee of long-term economic stability and prosperity similar to that enjoyed by many Western EU members" (Krzyżanowski & Galasińska, 2009, p. 4). Still, EU membership did not automatically trigger unanimous acceptance of Romanians and Bulgarians as Europeans with the same rights as the citizens of former EU member states (Eder, 2014, p. 230). This led to the need for the newcomers to "demonstrate" their commitment to the European status, and distance themselves from the communist past (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011, p. 196). As Stråth (2002, p. 394) points out, to depict postsocialist European countries only in terms of economic setbacks would be a reductive approach, which misses their efforts to re-construct "a sense of their own community and reconsidering the past in order to be able to move ahead".

BACKGROUND TO THE CASE

The process of nation-building in the region of Central and Eastern Europe has been different from that of West European states. This characteristic may be attributed to the loss of independence and the incorporation of these countries into the Ottoman, the Habsburg and the Russian empires (Berend, 2005, p. 402). In Romania's case, the Ottoman domination, which began in the Middle Ages, ended in the 19th century, when the newly formed Romanian state claimed its independence.

In June 1876, the Romanian Liberal government asked the Ottoman Empire to acknowledge the name of "Romania" and its "individuality". The diplomatic approach failed due to lack of support from the great European powers (Hitchins, 2014, p. 116). The Romanian government ordered full mobilization of the troops in March 1877. Romania's diplomatic ties with the Ottoman Empire were suspended and Russian

troops were allowed to transit Romanian territory in order to fight the Ottomans south of the Danube. The Minister for Foreign Affairs Mihail Kogălniceanu delivered the Declaration of Independence in the Parliament, on 9 May 1877. Romania's participation in the war continued until January 1878, when the Ottoman army surrendered.

Although the independence was fully acknowledged by the main European powers, only later was the date of 9 May 1877 officially considered to be Romania's Independence Day. This date is also a reminder of the heroic involvement of the Romanian army in the war, and of the victories obtained, such as the conquest of the Plevna fortress in the autumn of 1877, after the Russian army had failed to conquer it. Hitchins (2014, p. 117) considers that, through this victory, the Romanian army played a decisive role in the defeat of the Ottomans. However, despite "the Romanian army's heroism at Plevna, Russia refused to allow Romania to participate in peace negotiations" (Sudetic, 1991, p. 28). Although Romania had obtained its independence, it also lost the region of southern Bessarabia to Russia (Hitchins, 2014, p. 118).

Another territorial loss was triggered by Romania's involvement in the Second World War. At the beginning of the war, Romania remained in a state of neutrality. In June 1941, during Ion Antonescu's office as Prime Minister, Romania entered the war as an ally of Germany, Italy and Japan (Deletant, 2006). After Ion Antonescu was arrested on August 23, 1944, Romania changed sides and became a member of the United Nations against Germany. Like Bulgaria, Romania was also involved in the last stage of the war against Germany (Mihaylova, 2017, p. 667). Nevertheless, "both countries were refused the desired status of co-belligerent states, regardless of their contribution and the victims suffered in the last stage of the war" (Mihaylova, 2017, p. 685). At the Peace conference in Paris, Romania was treated as a defeated state and lost the regions of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union and Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria (Mihaylova, 2017, p. 685; Scurtu, 2007, p. 106).

The end of the Second World War also marked the beginning of the communist dictatorship in Romania, which lasted almost half of the century, until the revolution in 1989. This still represents another traumatic moment, as Romania was "the only communist country to suffer a violent revolution" (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011, p. 196). Romania joined NATO in 2004, and accessed the EU three years later.

CORPUS AND METHODOLOGY

The corpus is formed by 40 political statements, totaling 21,054 words. All the texts have been presented in plenary sessions held by the Chamber of Deputies of the Romanian Parliament. The texts forming the corpus have been identified within the stenograms from the public archive from the website of the Chamber of Deputies. The speeches have been delivered on 9 May 2018, 9 May 2017 and 10 May 2016. Since no plenary meeting of the Deputy Chamber was held on 9 May 2016, the texts selected for the present study were retrieved from the stenograms of the meeting held on 10 May 2016. Only political statements addressing the historical and/or political meaning of 9 May have been included in the corpus. The distribution of the speeches is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Distribution of the commemorative speeches between 2016 and 2018 (Source: the official website of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies, www.cdep.ro)

Year	2018	2017	2016
Number of speeches selected	19	19	2

The main theoretical framework applied is grounded in Van Leeuwen's (2008) theory of social actor representation, within the broader field of critical discourse analysis. The discursive representation of social actors and social actions, of legitimating practices and of spatio-temporal coordinates are the central points of this approach. The representation of social actors investigates how individual or collective actors are explicitly or implicitly nominated and characterized in a discourse. The analytical categories ideated by Van Leeuwen focus on the presence or absence of certain actors (inclusion / exclusion), on the representation of actors as being active or passive in regard to certain actions (activation / passivation), as individuals or as groups (individualization / assimilation), as persons or as abstract entities (personalization / impersonalization) (Van Leeuwen, 2008, pp. 23-54). The detailed classification and the broad categories

allow for Van Leeuwen's theory to be applied to a wide range of texts and to account for the discursive representation of individuals as well as collective actors such as institutions, peoples or states.

Additionally, the analysis will take into account the work of Wodak et al. (2009) regarding the discursive construction of national identity. Wodak et al. (2009) have identified five main thematic areas which are recurrent in political speeches and contribute to the construction of the national identity. Two of these topics, the narratives about a common past and the narratives constructing a common present and future, regard the temporal dimension. The other three topics are the idealized description of the people, the construction of a common culture and of a "national body" (Wodak et al., 2009).

The aims of the analysis are: (1) to identify which events are mentioned in the commemorative speeches, (2) which actors are nominated and characterized in connection to these events and (3) how the past events are connected to Romania's collective identity at present.

COMMEMORATIVE STATEMENTS

The parliamentary interventions forming the corpus are called "political statements", according to the rules of the Romanian Parliament. Such statements can be delivered by MPs from all parties, even if they are not necessarily connected to the issues on the parliamentary agenda. MPs recur to these interventions in order to draw attention to an issue which they consider important or urgent, to mark an important event, or to criticize the actions of their political opponents. Each MP is allocated a limited slot of time for these interventions. Consequently, the statements need to be brief and meaningful.

The commemorative statements analyzed have a similar structure. The speakers first announce the solemn occasion and then explain the reasons for the collective celebration. Most often, the explanation takes the form of a narrative, as the speakers evoke the main historical events which have taken place on 9 May. The moral teaching of the narrative is presented in a brief evaluation. Similar to the introduction, the closing of the statements is also ritualized, consisting in the expression of congratulations to the Romanian people and/or to the 'European citizens'.

A general characteristic of the statements consists of the high degree of repetition, regardless of the political affiliations of the texts' authors. This suggests that the commemorative statements fulfill a ritual function, that of forging cohesion around a collective identity, be it national or European.

The quantitative analysis reveals a consistent difference between the speeches analyzed, in regard to the topics addressed. The findings are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Frequency of the topics addressed

Topic	Number of speeches mentioning it	Percentage
Topic 1 (9 May 1877)	16	40%
Topic 2 (9 May 1945)	15	37,5%
Topic 3 (Europe Day)	39	97,5%

The events of the past were mentioned by less than half of the 40 speakers. Only 15 politicians made any references to the events of the Second World War. In contrast, almost all speakers addressed topics connected to the European Union and to Romania's status as an EU member. Only one speech in the corpus glossed over the topic of the EU and focused instead exclusively on Romania's participation in the Independence War.

NARRATIVES AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PAST

The number of statements referring to Romania's history is considerably lower than the number of texts addressing EU issues. This suggests that the commemoration of past events is not viewed as a priority by contemporary politicians. Another possible explanation for this partial silence regarding national history may be due to the politicians' attempt to avoid accusations of nationalism and lack of interest for European affairs. Romania's participation in the two wars represents a delicate topic for the speakers, as it triggers collective memories of dramatic events and of territorial losses.

The number of texts mentioning the events of 1877-1878 is almost equal to that of the texts mentioning the Second World War, which might lead to the conclusion that the speakers assign a similar degree of importance to both events. The qualitative analysis of the texts shows, however, that a significant difference emerges in regard to the construction of the social actors involved in these historical events. The speeches discussing the Independence War present Romanians as the main actors, and foreground their role as fighters for a right cause. In contrast, Romania's participation in the Second World War is most often glossed over, as the speakers focus on the defeat of the Nazi German army.

Topic 1: The Independence War

Through the narrative of the Independence War, the speakers advance an ideal portrait of the Romanians, as brave people, willing to give their lives for freedom and for the fatherland. All the statements mentioning the Independence War of 1877-1878 include at least one reference to the Romanian people. Various kinds of individual or collective actors are foregrounded, as the speakers recall the events of the war.

The most frequent terms (15 occurrences) designating Romanians are plural or collective nouns referring to the Romanian army or to specialized army branches. The discursive strategy employed is functionalization, which represents the actors in terms of what they do (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p.42). For some speakers, the detailed enumeration of the different army branches in the 19th century enhances the idea of loss of human lives:

(1)... soldiers and officers from the infantry, from the permanent cavalry, from the regional cavalry have died in the Bulgarian fields for this goal (Meirosu, 2018).

References to the Romanian army are also made through the strategy of aggregation (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 37). Some politicians recur to definite quantifiers, in order to highlight the loss of human lives in the Independence War:

(2.a.) Romania's independence has been achieved with the sacrifice of more than 10,000 soldiers (Teis, 2018)

(2.b.) ... a sacrifice of over 4,300 Romanian soldiers and officers killed and over 3,300 wounded in the Independence War (Cosma, 2017).

The Romanian soldiers are represented as the main active force in the narrative about the achievement of the independence. Most often, the references to them are accompanied by an adjectival premodifier, such as *viteaz* ("brave"), which highlights their heroism:

(3)... this independence has been sealed by the blood shed at Plevna, at Rahova, by the brave Romanian soldiers (Stragea, 2016).

In other cases, the soldiers' sacrifice for the country is implied by expressive terms such as *jertfe de sânge* ("blood sacrifice"). The Romanian term *jertfă* can also refer to religious sacrifices, which suggests that the soldiers' sacrifice is viewed as an almost religious act or duty. In order to evoke the events of the Independence War, the speakers also mention frequently the names of the Ottoman fortresses conquered by the Romanian army. These places have been engraved in the collective memory as places where the Romanians have obtained dramatic victories.

(4) Romania's independence was obtained through blood sacrifices at Rahova, Vidin, Smârdan and Plevna, and sealed through the peace treaties in San Stefano and Berlin, 1878 (Meirosu, 2018).

In the examples above, the independence of the Romanian state appears in a focal position, as the subject of passive construction, while the human agent is backgrounded, reduced to a metonymy, through the term

sânge (blood). The country appears to be a creation of its people, which, at the same time, outranks individual human lives as importance.

Another collective characteristic of the Romanians is their solidarity in their fight for freedom. Through the strategy of collectivization (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 38), the Romanian ‘people’ are presented as a homogeneous unit, characterized by their commitment to the fatherland and their common endeavor of achieving the independence. In this manner, a “mythology of national unity” (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011) is constructed. In order to achieve this aim, some speakers attribute the delivery of the Declaration of Independence to the people, and not to the real actor, Minister Kogălniceanu. The achievement of the independence is not presented as a project of the elites only, but of all Romanians.

(5) On 9 May 1877, the Romanians proclaimed the independence of their state, after an effort made by all the people, in order to escape the Ottoman domination (Holban, 2018).

In order to emphasize the unity of the people and their opposition to the Ottoman rulers, another speaker introduces two postmodifiers to the noun Romanians (“from all the historical provinces, from all the social categories”). The achievement of state independence is here presented not only as a heroic endeavour, but also as a democratic act, as the Romanian Parliament respected the will of the people:

(6) Romanians from all historical provinces, from all social categories, expressed in various ways their strong desire to fight in order to make the wish for national independence come true. [...] On 9 May 1877, according to the will of the citizens, of the army, of the public opinion, of the political groups and of the Government, the Parliament proclaimed Romania’s independence (Drăghici, 2016).

Only one individual actor, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mihail Kogălniceanu, is mentioned through the strategy of nomination, with his name and title (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 41). His name appears 14 times in the political statements, almost as frequently as the Romanian army. Most usually, the action attributed to Kogălniceanu is the delivery of the Declaration of Independence in the Romanian Parliament. The complex and difficult role played by Kogălniceanu in Romania’s emancipation from the Ottoman domination is glossed over by most politicians and no evaluative terms are employed in order to characterize his actions. In a few cases, though, the speakers express appreciation in regard to this statement itself, but not to the 19th century politician:

(7) On 9 May 1877, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mihail Kogălniceanu spoke these memorable words in the Parliament of the country: We are independent, we are a self-standing nation (Meirosu, 2018).

Although the Declaration of Independence was delivered in front of the Parliament, the assembly of the representatives of the Romanian people is rarely mentioned in the corpus. Only 7 references regard the Romanian politicians of the 19th century as a group or as political representatives of ‘the people’. The contribution of the Parliament to the achievement of the state independence is viewed as a mere accomplishment of a duty or a stage in a more complex process:

(8) “... on 9 May 1877, The Chamber of Deputies proclaimed the State Independence of Romania, thus opening the road towards the international acknowledgement of the right of the Romanian nation to decide its own fate” (Teis, 2018).

In contrast to the Romanian actors, other states are rarely mentioned as collective agents, directly involved in the events of 1877-1878. When foreign states are assigned the role of an agent, the general meaning is a negative one. A relation of opposition is constructed between the Romanians and the main European powers which approved the Declaration of Independence and thus influenced Romania’s fate. In the excerpt below, the relation of opposition is sustained by the actions associated with each collective actor. The verb *a decide* (“to decide”), associated with the main European powers of the 19th century, is placed in contrast with the verb *a muri* (“to die”), expressing in a harsh, brutal way the losses of human lives on the Romanian side.

(9) “Even if, in 1878, the Great Powers decided the independence of Romania, although our infantry and cavalry died in the Bulgarian Fields for this goal, let us not forget that at that moment we have also lost three districts – Cahul, Bolgrad and Ismail – in the south of Bessarabia” (Meirosu, 2018).

Other speakers background the foreign states even more, by avoiding the term “states” or “powers” and substituting it with the more abstract and vague construction “the international public opinion”, which lessens the importance of other states’ involvement in the achievement of the independence:

(10) The international public opinion approved the fight of the Romanian people. Yet we have not obtained our independence in the diplomatic offices of other states, but on the battlefield, with a blood sacrifice (Holban, 2018).

While the Romanian people or soldiers are presented as human beings, through the strategy of personalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 46), the Ottomans are never a real presence in the commemorative speeches analyzed. The politicians employ various forms of impersonalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008, pp.46-47), as they speak about Turkish military units (“the Turkish military forces”), about an “empire” or an oppressing regime (“the Ottoman domination”). The terms naming the main actors in the war create a marked relation of opposition. In example (11), the Romanians are named through the term *oameni* (“people”, “human beings”), which is repeated two times, accompanied by adjectival premodifiers (*simpli*/simple, *adevărați*/real [people]). The opposing side, the Ottomans, is referred to by means of an abstract noun, *imperiu* (‘empire’). The speaker thus creates a connection between the audience and the ancestors who have given their lives for the country.

(11) “[...] those who, in the south of Danube, made all possible efforts in order to make the name ‘Romanian’ known to the entire continent; the army formed by simple men, the army formed by real men, who have defeated an empire [...]”

In the simplified narrative of the Independence War, the ‘Other’ is usually represented by foreigners. For example, in the following excerpt, the syntagma *strămoșii noștri* (‘our forefathers’) is contrasted with another syntagma, *cotropitorii străini* (‘the foreign invaders’). The reference to Romanians is made through personalization and also a relational identification, as the speaker highlights the connection between the ancestors and the present generations. In contrast, the ‘enemies’ are represented through functionalization, as ‘invaders’, or through impersonalization:

(12) ... our forefathers fought hard battles (...) against the foreign invaders, against the kingdoms and empires of those times.

The examples discussed above reveal that the narrative regarding the act of obtaining Romania’s independence is formed by two parts. The first part refers to the military dimension of this act, which is mentioned by almost all speakers. The courage of the Romanian soldiers and their sacrifice for the country contribute to the construction of national self-pride and solidarity. Romania’s independence is presented as a hard-earned value, which needs to be treasured and safeguarded for the future. The politicians who mention this event tend to present the military conflict as a battle between Romania and the Ottoman Empire, thus suppressing Romania’s alliance with Russia in this war.

The second part of the Independence War narrative recalls the efforts of the Romanian diplomacy in order to obtain the acknowledgement of the state independence by the European main powers. This part is not constructed as a narrative of solidarity or as a “happy end” to a right cause. On the contrary, the speakers construct a relation of opposition between Romania and other states, by evoking a negative outcome of the war for the Romanian side: the loss of a part of its territory to Russia.

The common past (Wodak et al., 2009) is presented here as an example of intra-national solidarity against an external threat, represented first by the Ottoman Empire and, afterwards, by Russia. A relation of asymmetry emerges between the positive presentation of the ‘Romanians’, as a brave people, fighting a legitimate war for their freedom, and the ‘penalty’ imposed to Romania at the end of the Independence War: the cession of three Romanian districts to Russia. As a consequence of these themes, the ‘body’ of the country is presented as mutilated, through the territorial loss but also because of the Romanian soldiers’ sacrifice on the battlefield.

Topic 2: Victory Day

The second topic identified in the analyzed speeches referred to Victory Day and thus to the end of the Second World War. Most politicians who included this topic in their commemorative speeches discussed it briefly, focusing instead on the period of peace which succeeded the Second World War.

The collective actor most frequently mentioned in regard to this topic was 'Germany' (12 occurrences), usually accompanied by the adjective *nazist* as a premodifier of the noun. The speakers thus highlight the distinction between the German state of 1945 and contemporary Germany:

(13) Again, on 9 May, but in 1945, after years of hard-fought battles, the Allies in the Second World War obtained the victory against Nazi Germany (Intotero, 2018).

A common tendency of the speakers is to background Germany's role as an actor in the war and use abstract nouns in order to refer to the Nazi regime. For example, the Allied Forces are presented in opposition to the Nazi ideology instead of another European state. In excerpt (14), the reference to Germany is made in form of an adjective, serving as a postmodifier for the noun *nazism* ("Nazism"):

(14) ...the victory of the allied armies against the German fascist Nazism in the Second World War (Meirosu, 2018).

The Allied Forces as a collective actor were mentioned 10 times in the corpus; the role allocated to this actor was most often that of the agent and it was associated with the victory. However, a common tendency of the speakers is to employ passive constructions in the narratives about Victory Day, thus foregrounding certain events like the signing of treaties and backgrounding the involvement of states as collective actors. In the following example, no reference is explicitly made to the actors who signed the treaty.

(15) [...] on 9 May again, in Berlin, the German Instrument of Surrender was signed. The Second World War was ended" (Gudu, 2018).

Romania was mentioned in only three speeches in connection to the Second World War. The speakers gloss over her role at the beginning, as an ally of Germany. Instead, emphasis is placed on Romania's contribution in defeating Germany

(16) The great victory against fascism, in May 1945, found the Romanian army in the first line of battle, together with the other forces of the antifascist alliance. By employing its full material and human resources, through sacrifices on the battlegrounds, the Romanian people have inscribed their name in the war chronicle [...] (Teis, 2018).

In this manner, the speakers construct a relation of coherence with the previous narrative, maintaining the characterization of the Romanian people through values such as bravery and self-sacrifice. Although very concise, the narratives of Victory Day also address the thematic area of cultural references. The cultural values introduced here by the speakers are different from those introduced in regard to 9 May as National Independence Day. The narrative of 9 May 1877 is constructed around the delimitation of the state borders and the affirmation of the state unity and autonomy. The narrative of 9 May 1945 highlights Romania's adherence to certain "humanitarian" values and thus serves as a background for the introduction of the third topic, that of 9 May as Europe Day. The presentation of the common past is also based, in this case, on the construction of international solidarity against an external threat, represented by Nazi Germany.

Topic 3: Europe Day and the present collective identity

The 'Europeanness' of the Romanian people is brought into discussion by most of the speakers between 2016 and 2018. This seems to support Eriksen's claim (2005, p. 350) regarding the increased Europeanisation of national public debates in the last decades. However, real Europeanisation of the member-states cannot be revealed only by "mere talking about 'Europe'" (Krzyżanowski, 2009, p. 96). In Romania's case, its Europeanisation seems to have remained a contested issue, ten years after Romania's official access to the EU. Two key questions are raised in the analyzed statements. One of them is whether 'we', the Romanians, are truly Europeans. The other one regards Romania's place within the European construction and what measures or reforms are necessary in order to enforce or to correct Romania's current position on the European stage. As the speakers attempt to provide answers to these questions, they manifest their ideological options and their political affiliations, but, above all, they reveal a particular way of understanding Europe and the role of the European Union in regard to the nation-states and especially to Romania. Two main viewpoints on Romania's belonging to Europe emerge from the corpus: (a) the Romanian people have always been a European people and (b) the Romanians are undergoing a process of transformation in order to fully become 'Europeans'. Both ideas will be discussed below.

The politicians sustaining that Romania has always belonged to Europe advance a specific understanding of Europeanness, based on a common culture. Europe is seen as a community of opinions and attitudes, a symbolic space, which conflates values like democracy, tolerance, human rights and thus opposes not only the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, but also Ottoman domination:

(17) We, Romanians, who have always been a part of Europe, due to the history of our people, have fully proved that we are deeply committed to European values and principles. Even if, for a while, communism separated us from Europe, after 1989 we have fully proved that we are a part of the great European family (Balan, 2018).

Here, the communist past is strongly rejected and the Romanians are presented as victims, reduced to a passive role, through the accusative pronoun *ne*: *comunismul ne-a separat de Europa* (“communism separated us from Europe”). The speaker creates inclusiveness, asserting that the entire people have been a victim of the communist regime and, implicitly, that the entire people rejected the communist ideology. Moreover, it is suggested that Romania’s access to the EU has only certified a historical truth. In the political statement quoted above, the Romanians’ historical struggle for independence and sovereignty is interpreted as a proof of their commitment to the European sphere.

The second viewpoint presents Romania’s history as a constant progress. The current membership to international organizations is interpreted as a new stage in this evolution. In the following excerpt, Romania’s situation in the 19th century, at the end of the Ottoman rule, is opposed to its current status, as an independent and sovereign state:

(18) If, 150 years ago, the Great Powers had to guarantee for us, even in spite of a sacrifice of over 4,300 Romanian soldiers and officers and the wounding of more than 3,300 in the Independence War, Romania is today a country with a clear place on the world map: a member of the EU and of NATO, the most powerful military alliance in the world [...] the EU still represents the best way for Romania to flourish and consolidate democracy (Cosma, 2017).

The perspective advanced in such statements is a compromise between the past and present events. The speakers attempt to construct a Romanian collective identity which includes the glorious past and represents the present as being remarkable as well, although in a different manner. If heroism in the past was demonstrated in battles for the nation-state, contemporary demonstrations of heroism and sources of self-pride consist in Romania’s access to international alliances, or, as another speaker says: “to become a member of this exclusive club” (Macovei, 2017), referring to the European Union.

The progressive view of Romania’s trajectory implies, for the majority of the speakers, that the process of European integration has not yet come to an end. Differences emerge in regard to the changes advocated in order to help Romania on its journey towards Europe. Most often, these changes regard the economic level, as the politicians plead for an improvement of the state finances and an increase in the income level. According to this perspective, EU membership equals economic development, above all.

(19) Only to say that we belong to the European Union is not enough to make us truly Europeans! On this solemn occasion, I think we should aim to reach the income level of the citizens in other European developed states, especially because everybody else yearns for our geographical and human resources (Presura, 2018).

Future measures to be taken, in order to improve the citizens’ economic situation, are presented here only vaguely, as a general aim. In excerpt (19), the speaker attempts to mitigate the criticism brought against the state by praising the people and the resources of the country. The view advanced by this speaker, similarly to that sustained in example (17), suggests that the Romanian ‘people’ are perceived as a distinct entity by the state and from the government. In this manner, the speakers manage to convey harsh criticism against other political groups or against the current and/or former authority structures and, at the same time, create a bond with the ‘Romanian people’, maintaining its idealized depiction.

The idealization of the people is also visible in the speech made by deputy Holban. Although the politician recognizes that economic development is necessary for the state, this idea does not represent the main issue addressed in her speech. The focus is on the positive characterization of the Romanian people, a characterization grounded in an appeal to the Romanians’ common past. The heroic past becomes the foundation for our contemporary status as Europeans.

(20) I wish for us to remember more often that we are a sovereign and independent people and to have stronger national feelings, such as those feelings that fueled 9 May 1877. I wish for us to remember more often that we are a strong, determined and brave people, as we have proved in wars, not as conquerors, but as liberators, although history has often refused to give us what we deserved. I wish for us to remember more often that we are a Romanian people in a European context and that we should have the same duties and especially the same rights as the citizens of all the member states (Holban, 2018).

The idealization of the people is visible here in the three adjectives used as modifiers for the term *popor* ('people'): *puternic, hotărât și viteaz* ("strong, determined and brave"), all implying qualities demonstrated in battles. The speaker reiterates here a common topic which sustains feelings of national pride; that the Romanians have never attempted to conquer other territories. The topos of past injustice is used in order to argue for a shift in Romania's foreign affairs politics. The speaker suggests that Romania is still considered inferior to other EU states. Consequently, the injustice done in the past is continued by present forms of discrimination.

The most important claim expressed by politicians in connection to the current European construction regards the preservation of equal rights for the EU member states.

(21.a.) We still want a united Europe, just like Schuman, Spinelli, Monnet and Churchill wanted, but we must fight together for this goal. We do not need a multi-speed [Europe], but we need more solidarity and cooperation (Bulai, 2017).

(21.b) There are facts that show Romania's potential to be an active member of the European community. We have the duty to appreciate and defend our status as European citizens, because Romania belongs to Europe, no matter with how many speeds (Dinu, 2018).

The analyzed statements reveal a contradictory understanding of Romania's position within the EU. On the one hand, most speakers are aware of the developmental delays and sustain the necessity to improve Romania's economic situation. On the other hand, the politicians express disagreement with the idea of a multi-speed Europe, which would mean a symbolic change of Romania's status and a new form of marginalization. The emphasis on solidarity, which is reiterated in the narratives about the Independence War, is also present in the statements addressing Europe Day, but with a different meaning. In the latter case, the speakers ask for solidarity at the international level, as the only way to correct the past injustice to 'small' European states like Romania.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Analysis of the commemorative statements delivered between 2016 and 2018 reveals that Romanian politicians address more often the topic of Europe Day than the topics connected to the country's national history. In regard to historical events, the speakers prefer to focus on the achievement of state independence instead of Romania's participation to the Second World War.

The narratives about events in national history reveal a schematic characterization of the Romanian people. The main traits foregrounded are their patriotism and their solidarity in front of the various challenges represented by the foreign invaders or powers. In the narrative about the Independence War, Romanian national identity is constructed through a process of differentiation from all other foreign states, as the speakers highlight the sacrifice of the Romanian soldiers and the unfair loss of Romanian territory to Russia. In contrast, the narrative about the end of the Second World War creates a bridge between the past and the present, by emphasizing the importance of cultural and moral values, which represent the foundation for international alliances, beginning from the second half of the 20th century. The penalties imposed to Romania after the war are not mentioned and the few speakers addressing this topic point out the Romanians' heroism and their contribution to the defeat of a totalitarian regime. This message is carried on by the third narrative advanced by the speakers, about the constitution of the European Union and Romania's access to it.

The solemn marking of Europe Day in the Romanian Parliament appears to be an occasion for the politicians to express their commitment to the European values and thus construct a bond with the other EU states. However, this trait does not mean that the process of Romania's integration within the European

Union has been completed. The measures to take in order to increase integration regard both the economic as the political level. The forefathers' courage and patriotism are the values invoked by the speakers in order to motivate the current politicians to re-assert Romania's position as an independent state and as a partner of the other European states.

Romania's access to the EU is presented not as an option, but as a duty and the only possible way to preserve the values which have inspired previous generations. From this perspective, the discursive construction of Romania's identity implies its belonging to the civilized, democratic Europe, in other words, to the former 'Western' world. EU membership is still viewed as a warrant for economic development and the safeguarding of democracy, and also as a correction to the inequities suffered by the Romanian state in the past. The political statements analyzed reveal that Romania still strives to construct a new, coherent collective identity after the fall of the communist regime. The symbol of the cut national flag is mirrored, at the discursive level, by an attempt to "cut" certain periods and events from the past, to advance new interpretations of past moments and, above all, to weave the new interpretations into one single great narrative, which justifies the present and the future status of Romania as a part of Europe.

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When text mining meets discourse analysis: “Digging” in the Greek populism via automatic methods

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ABSTRACT

Does Europe live in a populist zeitgeist? Why would mainstream European parties become more populist in recent years? Some scholars argue that the expansion of right-wing populism in Europe points to the global economic crisis which has left undeniable consequences on a European scale. Others believe that the reducing ideological distinctiveness of parties would cause a change in the content of their communication shifting the competition from policy to image and emotion. This study proposes a different and innovative way of studying and understanding populism as a key constitutive dimension of modern political communication focuses on automatic textual data analysis. Most discursive approaches to populism follow manual content analysis based mainly on rubrics designed to assign grades to texts according to different indicators associated to populism. Having vast amounts of digital text in our disposal we can implement automatic methods and experiment with both dictionary and machine learning techniques in order to determine the benefits of each method to not only detect populism but also to outline its evolution. Furthermore, we are able by altering the focus of research to highlight the physiognomy of populist discursive formations, determine the ideological arena it comes from and examine not only the presence but also the lack of specific features and topics such as gender which has been a major emerging topic in recent literature.

Keywords: populism, discourse analysis, text mining, automated methods, lexicometrics, machine learning examples here, words and phrases, comma separated

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the first appearance of the term *populism* in 1891 to name a movement of farmers from the Midwestern and Southern United States who challenged the power of corporatism over their lives and work, the term populism -like most key terms e.g. ‘democracy’- has been invested with multiple meanings, approached in many ways and inspired various forms of political action. The way the term ‘populism’ and ‘populist’ are being used today, tends to describe an emotionally charged, polarization of society as opposite interests and social sections strive for areas of expression and vindication.

In order to investigate populism and its disruptive effect on society and politics it needs to be defined as well as its structural characteristics. Although scholars do not agree on a definition of populism there is consensus as for its main general features. No one can dismiss that the populist core consists of an antagonistic relationship between “the (good) people” and “the (corrupt) elite” (Canovan 1981; 2002; Mény and Surel 2002b; Mudde 2004; 2007; Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005; Jagers and Walgrave 2007). Populists mostly position “the people” at the center of politics while at the same time, they are hostile towards political, economic and cultural elites because they stand in the way of the expression and realization of the *volonte generale*.

Therefore, populism can be defined as a Manichaeian approach to the political world that equates the side of good with the supposed “will of the people” and the side of evil with a conspiring elite (Hawkins 2010; Mudde 2007). However, populism is not only about attacking ‘the elite’ and defending the interests of ‘the common people’; it is also about the very idea that all individuals of a given community are able to unify their wills with the aim of proclaiming popular sovereignty as the only legitimate source of political power (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Populist discourse aims at linking heterogeneous sections or members of society and their demands and needs making them equivalent and thus forming a collective identity around

which it is easier for the populist narrative to develop: the identification of the people with a charismatic leadership against a common enemy, the elite or the establishment.

Anti-establishment and Homogeneity

It is generally agreed that populist movements are, as Taggart (1995) puts it, “of the people but not of the system”. They involve some kind of reaction against the existing structure of power in the name of the people and within democratic systems that often means an attack on the establishment. However, one cannot consider this feature as defining populism alone for that description would also include social movements, whereas populism makes a systematic identification between people-centric and anti-elitist discourse.

Foucault (1977, 1981) defined individual and collective identity as a social construct that is created in language. In creating the homogeneity necessary for the identification of the people with their leader who will personify their interests, the construction of the opposite is also necessary as a means of defining the boundaries of the in-group. The first boundary is placed by the elites which in populist discourse are accused of being alienated from the people, arrogant, incompetent (Barr, 2009; Canovan, 2002; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2004; Weyland, 2001), ignorant of the ordinary people values and needs and focused on their own interests and agendas. Anti-elitism taps the vertical positioning of the political actor at stake: the enemy is *external* to the people, ‘up there’ and high above ordinary citizens. This all-encompassing vision of politics and the “people” corresponds to an equally broad definition of the elites. Elites can be political elites (parties, government, ministers, etc.), but also the media (media tycoons, journalists, etc.), the state (administration, civil service), intellectuals (universities, writers, professors) or economic agents (multinationals, employers, trade unions, capitalists). Populists worship the people (Ionescu and Gellner 1969, p. 4) and emphasize the people’s fundamental position in the center of politics (Mény and Surel 2002b, p. 12).

The second boundary to define “*our people*” is the separation from the “*obscene Other*” (Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras, 2006). New approaches in the Lacanian theory have demonstrated that establishing common forms of enjoyment, by tapping into shared visions of a glorious and innocent past and a special identity, supports the development of narratives that might define who we are against “them”. This symbolic, discursive and affective process of ‘othering’ is central to populism, not only in instances of right-wing nationalist anger directed at foreigners, but also through the core distinction between ‘us’ (the pure people) and ‘them’ (the corrupt elite or even groups and cliques that work against the people interest like syndicates even organized working unions). This can be conceptualized as an exclusion tactic a way of drawing a line and keeping ‘them’ out thus expanding the dichotomic aspect of the world that will help more effectively construct the narrative of ‘us’. As Pickering notes (2001, p. 72) “the symbolically constructed Other and the patterns of social exclusion and incorporation entailed by it are distributed in sign and language, discourse and representation”. Hence, exploring the mechanisms through which in-groups and out-groups are established in populist ideology is crucial.

That leads to the third constitutive feature of populism, the homogenous people (Taggart 2000, 2002; Mudde 2004). The people largely share the same interests and have the same features. Yet, some isolated groups clearly do not share the people’s ‘good’ characteristics. Within this framework, the enemy is not above, but *internal*, within the people. The true populist not only emphasizes the gap between the people and the elites, he or she also considers some groups’ values and behaviors to not be compatible with the people’s general interest. Hence, some specific population segments are targeted and excluded from ‘the people’ as being a threat to society and a burden on its citizens. Those groups are blamed for all misfortune affecting the general population. Consequently, these categories are scapegoated and must be fiercely dealt with, if not simply removed from the territory of the people.

In political terms, exclusion and inclusion refer essentially to two dimensions of democracy identified by Dahl (1971, 1989) and analyzed by Coppedge (et al. 2008): political participation and public contention. Political exclusion means that specific groups are prevented from participating (fully) in the democratic system and they are consciously not represented in the arena of public contention. In contrast, political inclusion specifically targets certain groups to increase their participation and representation. In most cases these groups were already part of the electorate, that is, they had the legal right to full political participation and representation but were ignored and marginalized by the political establishment. As Kioupkiolis (2016)

points out that has been the discursive approach within which SYRIZA framed the Greek youth and targeted their feeling of isolation and exclusion of the decision-making processes offering them a more dynamic and inclusive perspective. In that way, populist radical parties, left and right, can be seen as politically inclusive, since they are giving a voice to a 'silent majority' (Kazin, 1995, p. 252) that feels socially threatened. However, these parties are opting for the support of the electorate not so much by defending economic policies in favor of the working class as such (as social democratic and communist parties have done in the past), but rather by promoting the exclusion of all those who are not natives therefore not entitled to those policies: from criminal illegal aliens (opposed by all parties) to legal non-citizens (such as guest workers and refugees) to citizens of foreign decent (for example, Muslims) to ethnic minorities (such as Slovene speakers in Austria).

Ideology, communication style or political strategy?

So is populism an ideology? A set of ideas aiming to address profound matters of social and political life? Is it a communication strategy? A simple appeal to the *populous* in order to manipulate and flatter the general mood, thus neighboring to demagoguery?

There are three basic ways in which populism is systematically conceptualized in the literature: (1) populism as an organizational form; (2) populism as a style; and (3) populism as a thin ideology (Mudde 2004, Canovan 2002). According to Taggart (1995), populism refers to a particular type of party organization which is highly centralized, and which is led by a personalized and charismatic leader. Other scholars define populism as a political style in which politicians make use of a simplistic, direct language approaching demagoguery (Taguieff, 2007). While the populist style tends to be varied, there is generally an emphasis on "agitation, spectacular acts, exaggeration, calculated provocations, and the intended breach of political and socio-cultural taboos" (Heinisch 2003, p. 94). Often it denounces the compromises and complicated procedures of professional politicians (Canovan 1999, p.5). The populist style is "democratic" in the sense of being aimed at "the people", a general concept that can be used strategically by politicians from the left to the right, to appeal to a large electorate (Jagers & Walgrave 2007).

According to Mudde the disadvantage of defining populism as a political strategy makes difficult to grasp that the emergence and endurance of populism as linked to both supply-side and demand-side factors, since "the concept of political strategy puts too much emphasis on the leader, overlooking that under certain circumstances there might be constituencies which adhere to a populist ideology". A populist ideology is flexible enough to include the perceptions and needs of different electorates.

On the other hand, Canovan (2002) proposes the idea of conceptualizing populism as a "thin ideology" according to Freedman's (1996) concept. "Thin" meaning that populism, like other "thin" ideologies (feminism or ecologism) has not the same level of refinement as "full" ideologies such as liberalism or socialism and is only confined in a relatively small range of issues built upon a small number of core concepts. In the case of populism these concepts would be people-centrism, anti-elitism and exclusion. Therefore, thin-centered ideologies are unable to offer complex arguments and often adjust to the perceptions and needs of different societies (Freedman 1998, p. 751) or different uses of the discourse.

Rooduijn & Pauwels (2010) opt to define populism in the tradition of Canovan's 'politicians' populism' as a style adopted by political actors rather than an ideology (Canovan 1981, 1999; Di Tella 1997; Mudde 2000, 2004; Taguieff, 1997). These political actors can be politicians, party leaders, but also movement leaders, interest group representatives and journalists. In this general and rather thin conceptualization, populism is stripped from all negative and authoritarian connotations. Populism, thinly defined, has no political color; it can be implemented on the whole range of the political spectrum from the left to the right. Seen as a strategy to mobilize support, populism is a standard communication technique to reach out to the electing body.

In this paper we address populism as a communication discursive frame that appeals to and identifies with the people and pretends to speak in their name (Taggart 2000; Canovan 1981). More specifically, populism can be seen as a strategic and often stylistic display of closeness to (ordinary) people featuring several characteristics, from casual language to informal dress codes to emotional imagery, while it might also include performance and aesthetics (Moffitt, 2016). Language, however, is still the most important element of a political style as the content of the discourse.

By appealing implicitly to the people, a populist communication style emphasizes the sovereignty of the people and their will. In doing so, a politician frequently uses words such as ‘(the) *people*’, ‘(the) *public*’, ‘(the) *nation*’, ‘(the) *homeland*’, ‘(the) *citizen(s)*’, ‘(the) *voter(s)*’, ‘(the) *taxpayer(s)*’, ‘(the) *consumer(s)*’ and ‘(the) *population*’. As the Foucauldian school of thought has shown identity is understood to be about how language is used to create and position the self in relation to the world. By referring to the people, and by denouncing elites and out-groups, a political actor might position him or herself in the center of all that is ‘us’, our interests, our concept of ‘self’, not being alienated from the public and knowing what the people really want.

Approaching populism from a discursive point of view provides some advantages, a framework within which we can examine the way politicians frame issues like refugees and immigrants, the public interest, the nation, women, unions etc. Appealing to the people forms the essential core of populism, however, it is the combination of people-centrism, anti-elitism and exclusion that fundamentally distinguishes populism from other types of discourse. Moreover, this approach provides analytical advantages, as it can be employed as a tool to target select parts of a discourse to be further scrutinized in search of a deeper form of populism (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). And that is important since populism is a device used by the entire spectrum of public discourse thus allowing us to detect differences in the formulation and articulation of populism by both the left and right wings of politics and also by mainstream media, social media, opinion leaders and everyday discourse since very different problematic areas are detected depending of the context of populism discourse implementation.

Is it a populist *Zeitgeist*?

Mudde (2004) is wondering if we are living in a populist *Zeitgeist* given that mainstream parties across Europe have become more populist in recent years. Alvares & Dahlgren (2016) argue that the expansion of right-wing populism in Europe often point to the global economic crisis which, having started in 2008, has left undeniable consequences on a European scale. And, while the lower middle class has traditionally supported far-right politics, in modern Europe, the working class is gradually being detached from its left adherences tending to respond to populist “sirens”. As the future and wellbeing of social sections that would traditionally express themselves with in the Left is being threatened by austerity measures and other sources of economic pressure that compromised the welfare state and several working givens, they feel vulnerable and less protected. Moreover, the working class is shrinking due to outsourcing to countries with cheap labor and flexible working hours (Pelinka, 2013).

As Demertzis points out (2006, p. 3) the politics of late modernity is a politics of generalized ‘*ressentiment*’ (resentment) “as the uncertainties of capitalism and the surveillance of the state create in the individuals a diffuse sense of powerlessness, the public expression of which is not positive and self-grounded praxis but a hasty and dependent reaction which usually takes the form of ‘identity politics’ and ethicism” (see also Brown 1995, Connolly 1991). As societies lean towards a structure based on class division, inter and intra-class antagonism and social inequality, several feelings tend to appear and dominate the collective, so resentment according to Barbalet (1998, p. 68) is “a critically important feeling in a class society characterized by horizontal and vertical mobility”.

On the other hand, immigration, especially from regions where people do not share European cultural norms nor speak the language of the country in which they live, is confronting European societies with very real problems regarding how to deal with diversity within their own territory: that is, through the acceptance of multiculturalism or ‘forced’ assimilation. These social dilemmas are used to fuel a politics where the ‘us’ takes on “xenophobic” nationalistic, ethnic, racial overtones against a ‘them’ constructed and perceived as a threat”. (Alvarez & Dahlgren, 2016).

To sum it all up as a communication frame populism capitalizes on a sort of dichotomy of the social body by implementing.

People-centrism: a vertical concept of a homogenous people integrated by equivalence. a collective identity around ‘the people’ and the leadership representing them. This united heterogeneity is achieved through the opposition towards a common enemy (the elite or the establishment) the obscene ‘Other’ (Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras, 2006)

Anti-elitism: criticism and resentment towards inner groups - political elites (parties, government, ministers, etc.), but also the media (media tycoons, journalists, etc.), the state (administration, civil service), intellectuals (universities, writers, professors) or economic powers (multinationals, employers, trade unions, capitalists). The elites ignore the will of the ‘man in the street’ and only implement policies that benefit themselves. The symbolic, discursive and affective process of ‘othering’, represent a struggle between the “noble people and the oligarchy” (de la Torre, 2010)

Exclusion: the construction of the outside enemy (usually aliens or immigrants)

Ressentiment: “Populism is an ideology of resentment against the social establishment imposed by the long-term domination of a class, which is considered to have the monopoly of power, property and civilization” (Shils, 1956). Capitalizing of the alienation and of the disenfranchisement of the people in relation to the decision-making processes and centers of power, populism addresses hidden feeling of moral rage and indignation. So the affective dimensions of political identification (Stavrakakis, 2004) and, in particular, the role of emotions such as fear, rage and resentment (Demertzis, 2006) are crucial.

In this paper we opt to detect populism implementing a computer-based analysis, measure it, monitor its development in time, assess its linguistic transformations, create datasets for statistical and causal analysis. In this framework we attempted to develop an approach to literature that can be operationalized for quantitative content analysis, in a conceptual (how must populism be defined?), epistemological (how can we measure it) and empirical, manner using big textual data. The use of language is our compass. As Kazin (1995, p. 1) noted, language is ‘the most basic and telling’ characteristic of populism, a “language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as self-serving and undemocratic, and seek to mobilize the former against the latter”.

Methodology: approaching Populism with artificial intelligence

Most of the discursive approaches to populism follow manual content analysis methods: some are based on rubrics designed to assign grades to texts according to different indicators associated to populism (Hawkins 2009, 2010; Bruhn 2012), and others focus on the proportion of text devoted to topics and notions traditionally related to populism (Jagers & Walgrave 2007; Reungoat 2011). There have also been some incursions into computer-assisted methods (Armony & Armony 2005; Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn 2013, Aslanides 2016) proposing different approaches mainly in lexicometric methods, collocations and frequencies.

Jagers and Walgrave (2007) were among the first scholars to produce a systematic quantitative empirical analysis of populism. They define populism as a political communication style and measure it by means of an analysis of political party broadcasts of Belgian (Flemish) political parties. Another scholar who conducted a content analysis to measure populism is Hawkins (2009). He conceptualized populism as a political discourse and measured it by means of “holistic grading” of speeches by chief executives in an impressive number of mainly Latin-American countries. Pauwels (2011) and Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) measured populism in texts produced by West European parties based on ad hoc dictionaries with computer assisted methods. They operationalized Mudde (2004) and focused in two dimensions: people-centrism and anti-elitism. Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) employ their own dictionary to detect and measure populism in American presidential campaigns between 1952 and 1996. In a relative manner Oliver and Rahn (2016) follow Bonikowski and Gidron (2016) but they are trying to detect and measure three different kinds of populist discourse: political populism, economic populism and blame attribution.

Lexicometric analysis

Lexicometric approaches in discourse studies aim to identify major semantic structures inductively in digital text collections. Linguists apply lexicometric measures in the field of corpus linguistics to quantify linguistic data for further statistical analysis. Other social scientists who are interested in analyzing texts for their research adapted these methods to their needs and methodologies. Dzudzek (et al., 2009) mention four fundamental methods of lexicometrics:

- frequency analysis for every term of the vocabulary of the collection to identify important terms,
- concordance analysis to examine local contexts of terms of interest

- identification/measuring of characteristics of sub corpora which are selected by meaningful criteria (e.g. different authors, time frames etc.), and finally
- co-occurrence analysis to examine significant contexts of terms on a global (collection) level. Significance thereby is measured with a statistical test showing which terms occur together more frequently within the corpus, thus being able e.g. to identify clusters of co-occurring terms or measure their "keyness", the importance of specific terms for a given document.

Following that typology of research, we structured our approach around three axes:

- Is there any significant difference in terms of lexical frequencies and distributions between the politician's speeches?
- What are the collocation patterns of interesting lexemes of interest like "people" "establishment", "refugees", "immigrants", "nation" etc.?
- What is the emotional frame within which these lexemes are being presented?

Though there are some negative aspects of computer-based content analysis because of its unknown context integration our goal is to produce a systematic quantitative empirical analysis method of populism as a political communication frame. We began our analysis by assembling a corpus of 100 political speeches from 5 prominent Greek politicians: the current prime minister Alexis Tsipras, former prime minister Antonis Samaras and his partner in the 2012-2015 governmental coalition, Evangelos Venizelos, leader of the opposition Kyriakos Mitsotakis and current leader of the Socialist party Fofi Genimmata. We inserted the speeches in the Python environment and created a data frame where each line represented a whole speech and each column comprised from information like who the speaker is, the date of the speech and the city where the speech took place (fig. 1).

We constructed a 167-word populist lexicon with grades attribute to its three properties (people centrism, anti-elitism, exclusion). The analysis was conducted in the environment of Python. We implemented the dictionary as a means of further in-depth analysis as we opted to explore specific aspects of the texts:

Keyness: the significantly higher/ lower frequencies of particular words in our corpus

Topics: Group keywords relating to specific topics: people-centrism, anti-elitism, exclusion

Collocates: information about the most frequent or potent ideas associated with a word – form the semantic universe of a notion and contribute to the meaning of a word within a discourse, semantic extension of a word

Concordances: formulate a textual universe around a word thus illustrating its exact use – emerging semantic fields from within the general context

Figure 1: Snapshot from the Python environment

	filename	text	Name	Year	Day	Month	Place
0	Tsipras_2013-16-Jun-Athina.txt	συμπροσώπων του σώματος συμπροσώπων της μάλης...	Tsipras	2013	16	Jun	Athina
1	Samaras_2014-30-Jan-Koinovoulafiki-Omada.txt	φίλες και φίλοι πριν από δεκαετία μνηστής...	Samaras	2014	30	Jan	Koinovoulafiki-Omada
2	Venizelos_2015-08-Jan-Larisa.txt	φίλες και φίλοι χαίρομαι πραγματικά που...	Venizelos	2015	08	Jan	Larisa
3	Samaras_2014-15-Apr-Parousiasi-Europafodellio...	παρουσιάζουμε σήμερα φίλες και φίλοι το...	Samaras	2014	15	Apr	Parousiasi-Europafodellio
4	Tsipras_2018-27-Feb-Tripoli.txt	αγαπητοί περιεργαστήτε αγαπητοί δηλαδή...	Tsipras	2018	27	Feb	Tripoli
5	Tsipras_2014-22-Mar-Idryma-Louzenmourg-Poulatz...	φίλες και φίλοι συμπροσώπων και συμπροσώπων...	Tsipras	2014	22	Mar	Idryma-Louzenmourg-Poulatz
6	Samaras_2013-09-Mar-Politikki-Epitolpi.txt	νεοδημοκρατίας και νεοδημοκρατίας...	Samaras	2013	09	Mar	Politikki-Epitolpi


The populist lexicon was based on our annotation and the literature. Apart from words that are commonly accepted as being associated with populism such as “people”, “citizens”, “taxpayers” etc., we annotated less explicit words such as “us”, “we”, “them”, “they”, “invaders”, “palace”, “cliques”, “unpunished”, “Barons” and several casual phrasing and colloquialisms that our own study of speeches and political texts highlighted. Common collocates of the indicated words were also investigated and subjected to further concordance analyses. We performed stemming upon the words in the lexicon before inserting them in the computational environment, and we gave each row corresponding to a word a 0 or 1 value if the word belonged to the semantic “universe” of people-centrism, anti-elitism or exclusion/homogeneity (fig 3).

Figure 2: Snapshot from the populist lexicon from the Python environment with 0-1 values

	Word	Populism	Peoplecentrism	Anti-elitism/anti-establishment	Exclusion
0	αγωνες	1	1	0	0
1	αδυναμίω* κοινωνικίω* στρωμίω*	1	1	0	0
2	ακαταδιωκτίω*	1	0	1	0
3	αλλαζόνιω*	1	0	1	0
4	αλωνίζω*	1	0	1	0
5	αμεση δημοκρατια	1	1	0	0
6	αντιδημοκρατικίω*	1	0	1	0
7	ασπλίω* εισβολίω*	1	0	0	1
8	απλίω* πολίτιω*	1	1	0	0
9	αριβιστίω*	1	0	1	0
10	ατιμωρησια	1	0	1	0

We then removed all words from the texts except the populist words and created three separate dictionaries, a people-centric, an anti-elitist and an exclusion dictionary. We measured the frequency of populist words per politician to assess the density of populist speech usage. The results can be seen in the following graph (fig.4)

Figure 3: Frequency of populist words use per politician.



The graph shows that the speeches that were more prominently populated with words associated with populism were by Alexis Tsipras, followed quite closely by former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, whereas the least populist discourse belonged to Evangelos Venizelos. These results also showed us which populist words that were most frequently used by our politicians: *People* (λαός), *National* (εθνικό), *We*


(εμείς), Citizens (πολίτες), Our country (η χώρα μας), Our homeland (πατρίδα), They (αυτοί). In the following table we can see the top 10 words each politician used more frequently (see Table 1).

Table 1: Most frequently used words per politician

Fofi Genimata		Kyriakos Mitsotakis		Antonis Samaras		Alexis Tsipras		Evangelos Benizelos	
εθνικό	110	πολίτες	197	εμείς	129	λαος	202	εθνικό	249
εμείς	95	εμείς	123	λαος	67	πολίτες	127	εμείς	203
πολίτες	91	εθνικό	51	αυτοί	60	εμείς	81	λαος	135
συστημα	61	χώρα μας	50	καποιοι	43	εθνικό	79	πολίτες	82
λαός	57	πατρίδα	43	πατρίδα	42	αυτοί	60	καποιοι	69
				λαθρομετανάστες / παράνομοι μετανάστες/ λαθρομετανάστευση	40				
δήθεν	35	αυτοί	42	θυσιές	22	πατρίδα	49	συστημα	56
πρόσφυγας	34	ψέματα	39	εθνικό	18	λαϊκό	33	ψεμα, -τα	35
ψέματα	32	εθνος	34	λαϊκισμός	18	καθεστώς	26	θυσιες	34
λαϊκισμός, -τικο	30	καποιοι	34	χώρα μας	15	κατεστημένο	24	πατρίδα	32
πατριωτικό	21	λαος	28	μετανάστης, μετανάστευση, -τικο	12	τροικα	23	τροικα	30
χώρα μας	20	σκανδαλο	23	πρόσφυγες	10	συστημα	22	αυτοί	30
προσφυγικό	18	δικο μας	18	πολίτης	8	κάποιοι	16	εθνος	28
πατριωτικό	11	δηθεν	15	κυκλώματα	5	ολιγαρχία	15	δηθεν	14
μετανάστης, -ες	10	ελληνική κοινωνία	15	συνδικαλιστες, -αδες	5	ψέματα	12	προνομιουχοι	7
λαϊκό	9	ντροπη	10	συντεχνίες	4	πάρτι	11	μεταναστευτικό	7
ντροπη	7	τοσυνάμι	1	νοικοκύρης, -αίος - ηδες	4	αγώνες	11	κερδοσκόποι	7
						θυσιές	11		

These metrics initially revealed that all politicians make a similar use of people-centric vocabulary though anti-elitism is being more extensively and almost equally implemented by Alexis Tsipras and Antonios Samaras. Fofi Genimata is using a lot of exclusion words into her discourse and that can be explained from the fact that she has dedicated a large part of her discourse thematic to immigration and refugee issues (see fig. 5)

Figure 4: Use of the three populist lexicon categories per politician



It is obvious that only the frequencies of the words are not enough for a methodological approach but it offered as some starting point to start digging into the discourse of each politician and further examine their usage of populist words. For instance, while A. Tsipras was expected to implement anti-elitism in his discourse having been associated with the “underdog culture” (Stavarakakis, 2015, Markou, 2016) we were intrigued by the fact that former Prime Minister, A. Samaras was implementing anti-elitism in his discourse as well and further analysis was required. We extracted the collocations of high frequency words and

unique terms per politician¹. The collocations of a target word can provide valuable information about semantic preferences attached to it. With the hypothesis that frequent collocations of a word would contribute to the clarification of its meaning and highlight the most prominent and potent ideas associated with the word or the way a subject is framed, we created an interactive coding that would allow the researcher to look for the collocation of specific lexemes per specific politician. The coding asks the researcher which word they want to find collocates for, from which politician and how much context, (how many words before and after the target word) should the system generate. (see fig. 6)

Figure 5: Word collocations per politician

```
: word2find = input("What word do you want collocates for? ").lower() # Ask for the word to search for
name2find = input("Type the name of the politician? ") # Ask for the word to search for
context = input("How much context do you want? ")# This asks for the context of words on either side to gr
contextInt = int(context)

What word do you want collocates for? Λα[ουρε]
Type the name of the politician? Samaras
How much context do you want? 5
```

To begin our experimentation, we extracted the collocations for the lexeme “people” by all politicians. The results can be shown in the table 3.


Table 2: Frequent collocations for the lexeme 'people' by all politicians

Gennimata	Samaras	Tsipras	Mitsotakis	Venizelos
Greek (ελληνικός)	Greek (ελληνικός)	Greek (ελληνικός)	Greek (ελληνικός)	Greek (ελληνικός)
Country (χώρα)	Majority (πλειοψηφία)	SYRIZA (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ)	Tsipras (Τσίπρας)	Will judge (θα κρίνει)
Trust (εμπιστοσύνη)	Sacrifices (θυσίες)	Greece (Ελλάδα)	Judgment (κρίση)	Knows (ξέρει)
PASOK (ΠΑΣΟΚ)	Knows (ξέρει)	Opposite side (απέναντι)	Truth (αλήθεια)	Parliament (Βουλή)
Europe (Ευρώπη)	Country (χώρα)	Sunday (Κυριακή)	Trust (εμπιστοσύνη)	Friends (φίλοι)
Demands (απαιτήσεις)	Will judge (θα κρίνει)	Citizens (πολίτες)	To trust (να εμπιστευτεί)	Sacrifices (θυσίες)
Is entitled (δικαιούται)	Expects (περιμένει)	Athens (Αθήνα)	Country (χώρα)	PASOK (ΠΑΣΟΚ)
Sacrifices (θυσίες)	Europe (Ευρώπη)	History (ιστορία)	History (ιστορία)	Choices (επιλογές)
Responsibility (ευθύνη)	To pay (να πληρώσει)	Majority (πλειοψηφία)		Order (εντολή)
		Dignity (αξιοπρέπεια)		truth (αλήθεια)

¹ Collocation can be defined as “the phenomenon that certain words often co-occur with each other” (Baker, 2006, p. 96).


At this moment we opted for some emotional measurements and we introduced the NRC Emotional Lexicon, a list of words and their associations with eight basic emotions (anger, fear, anticipation, trust, surprise, sadness, joy, and disgust) and two sentiments (negative and positive). The lexicon comprises of 14.182 unigrams and 25.000 senses. The annotations were done manually by crowdsourcing methods using Amazon's Mechanical Turk service where 2216 people linked the words with the emotions they were associated with (Mohammad & Turney, 2013). Following how essential the word *'people'* (*λαός*) is for our politicians we performed a sentiment analysis of its usage. We measured the frequency of emotionally charged words within the collocational universe of given words used by each politician. According to our emotional lexicon and the correlation with the words associated with the lexeme *'people'* we discovered that Alexis Tsipras is referring to the *'people'* implementing most prominently positive words conveying feelings of trust, but also anger and fear. (fig. 8).

Figure 6: Sentiment analysis of Alexis Tsipras use of the word *'people'*




Antonis Samaras is also using positive but mostly negative words while he most frequently collocates *'people'* with words that convey sadness and occasionally disgust. (fig.9)

Figure 7: Sentiment analysis of Antonis Samaras use of the word 'people'.




Quite expressive in emotionality, Evangelos Venizelos speeches are the least negative of all politicians with a broad use of positive words and although he also displays feelings of fear and anger, he interestingly implements words that convey anticipation (fig. 10).

Figure 8: Sentiment analysis of Evangelos Venizelos use of the word 'people'.




Kyriakos Mitsotakis appears more reserved and as is showed in the following graph the usage of emotional words -apart from words that show trust- is relatively limited.

Figure 9:: Sentiment analysis of Kyriakos Mitsotakis use of the word 'people'.



Fofi Genimata speeches are less negative than the other politicians and less emotionally charged nevertheless she counteracts the usage of fearful and negative words with anticipation and joy.


Figure 10: Sentiment analysis of Fofi Gennimata use of the word 'people'.



We attempted to check on another prominent word used by all politician narrowing the comparison between the two main rivals of 2015 elections, current prime minister Alexis Tsipras and former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras. The lexeme “we”, an ingredient of both people-centrism and exclusion discourse attracted our attention as ‘we’ can be associated with the construction of the ‘people’ identity and the definition of in-group/out-group boundaries. (fig.12). Alexis Tsipras associates the word “we” most prominently with the words “want”, “Greece”, “propaganda”, “fear”, “hope”, “program”, “base”, “country”, “state” and “Greek women” and Antonis Samaras similarly enough also associates we with “Greece”, “want”, “country” but apart from those he uses the word in a more open manner further associating “we” with “democracy”, “Europe”, “the world”, and “investments”. Both politicians use

equally positive words but Alexis Tsipras is a little more negative in his speech though he uses more trusting and joyful words.

Figure 11: Sentiment analysis comparison for the usage of the word 'we' by A. Tsipras and A. Samaras.



Unique Features - Concordances

Collocations provide valuable though limited information as to what kind of associations of a word does a speaker or a writer is frequently making. Concordance lines² facilitate the examination of different patterns or semantic prosodies. These lines contain word clusters relating to a node (a word the researcher wants to focus upon) and expand the collocational analysis. That way we created a smaller corpus consisting of concordance lines for specific lexemes most frequently used by the politicians to measure their use and semantic associations. For example, the following figure is showing the concordance lines for the lexeme 'establishment' ('κατεστημένο') used by Alexis Tsipras. (fig. 13)

² A list of a given word or word cluster with its co-text on either side.


Figure 12: Concordance lines for the use of the word 'establishment' ('κατεστημένο') – A. Tsipras.

```
In [220]: theRowConc = []
for index, row in Corpus_Specific_Name_df.iterrows():
    makeConc(word2find, word_tokenise(row['text']), int(context), theRowConc)
    if len(theRowConc) > 0:
        print(index, theRowConc)
    theRowConc = []
```

0 ['1674: την αρχή αυτής της κρίσης την οποία προκαλεί το παλιό κατεστημένο πολιτικό οικονομικό και κοινωνικό η χώρα είχε δυο δύνα
τοτητες η', '1841: μας για να βγουμε απο το φουλο κυκλω του παλιου κατεστημενου για μας η μεγαλύτερη εθνική προτεραιότητα τώρα η με
γαλύτερη μεταρρυθμιστική', '2945: προεδρικό πολιτική που βλέπει και αντιλαμβάνεται τα αδιέξοδα του παλιού κατεστημένου σε μια νέα ε
λπίδοφορα και δημιουργική πορεία καλούμε όχι μόνο']
4 ['612: σε κάποια μεγάλα συμφέροντα που διαπλεκονται με τμήματα του πολιτικού κατεστημένου και μιας κατακοιτημένης ελίτ δίνεται χω
ρα για να απομυζούν τα']
5 ['156: στο βύθιο τα σχέδια επί χαρτον του πολιτικού και οικονομικού κατεστημένου την προπαγάνδα της διαβολής ότι δεν υπάρχει άλλο
ς δρόμος και', '1150: ολοκληρώνεται η νεοφιλελεύθερη μεταβολή της ευρωπαϊκής ένωσης γιατί το ευρωπαϊκό κατεστημένο υπο την ηγεσία
της κυρίας μεράκι αξιοποίησε την κρίση για', '2022: και των λαών της σε βάρος ενός νεοφιλελεύθερου και ιδιότελους κατεστημένου που
προσποιείται ότι δεν βλέπει και δεν ακούει γιατί η']
7 ['685: της δογματικής ερμηνείας του στη νεοφιλελεύθερη λιτότητα το ευρωπαϊκό πολιτικό κατεστημένο υποχρεώνεται σήμερα σε ορισμένες αλ
λα ερμηνείες αναπροσαρμογής επιβίωσης αναγκάζονται οι']
16 ['1066: θα σταθεί άλλο στον πανικόβλητο σαρμα και στο χρεωκοπημένο πολιτικό κατεστημένο που έχει ήδη καταρρεύσει αλλά θα σταθεί σ
την επομένη μέρα', '1484: τον ατμο των κρουγών και τις απειλές του ηττημένου πολιτικού κατεστημένου που συσπειρώνουν γύρω τους την
μεγάλη κοινωνική πλειοψηφία το του', '2109: είτε φανερά είτε μασκαρεμένα με κάποια έκφραση του σοπιού πολιτικού κατεστημένου είτε σε
παλίο είτε σε νέα συσκευασία παραλληλίσω όμως δεσμευόμαστε']
22 ['1197: υποψήφιους που υποστηρίζονται από το κο σαρμα και το μνημονιακό κατεστημένο και μας κατηγορήσε και για αυτό ακόμα η ηγε
σία του', '1288: μας κατηγορήσε αυτές τις μέρες ήταν αυτή του εντρούμου μνημονιακού κατεστημένου και ιδίως η νέα δημοκρατία γιατί οι
αδωνόητες οι μπάρμπα στα', '1787: ευρώπη μπορεί να διασωθεί η συνταγή το πολιτικό και οικονομικό κατεστημένο δεν δίνει δεκάρα για τ
ις συνταγές η συνταγή είναι το']
39 ['127: μεγάλης αλλαγής της μεγάλης αναστροφής του παλιού του χρεωκοπημένου πολιτικού κατεστημένου που θα δώσει τη θέση του σε μια
νέα γενιά']
51 ['263: καθαρά και ισχυρή εντολή στο συρτί οι δυνατόις του μνημονιακού κατεστημένου παλιότερες η νεότερες θα επιχειρήσουν να μας
εγκλωβίσουν μας θέλουν', '429: μας θέλουν σε διαρκή διαπραγματεύση με το χτέρι με ένα κατεστημένο που διεκδικεί το μονίμο δικαίωμα σ
την εξουσία σας καλούμε να']
54 ['969: και μετά υπο τη στήριξη ολοκληρώ του τρομακτικού και μιντιακού κατεστημένου οργάνω μια χώρα και έναν ολοκληρω λαό (εχρημα
ς στις αγριότητες', '1214: το παλάτι της διαβολής το παλάτι του πολιτικού και οικονομικού κατεστημένου που οδηγεί στη καταστροφή των
μνημονίων τη πατρίδα και το', '1232: και το λαό μας τη κυρίαρχη τελειώνουμε με το πολιτικό κατεστημένο της διαβολής τη κυρίαρχη μια
νέα κλίμακα γίνεται στη πατρίδα', '1256: χρόνια μετά θα ηττηθεί η πολιτική η νοοτροπία και τα κατεστημένα που καταδικάζουν την Ελλάδα
δα στο χειρότερο αδιέξοδο και στη μεγαλύτερη']
82 ['2006: λαό και θα συγκρούσουμε αν χρειαστεί με μεγάλα συμφέροντα με κατεστημένες νοοτροπίες με τζακια και κυκλώματα αλλά το πρ
ογράμμα μας οι']
98 ['271: αποτελεί αντισυστημική επιλογή η πρωτοφανής στήριξη της από το επικοινωνιακό κατεστημένο αυτής της χώρας δεν είναι τυχαία
η συμπτωτική είναι πολιτικά', '303: εναντί του μετωπου της αριστερας και έτσι το ίδιο το κατεστημένο αποδεικνύει και στους πιο δυ
σπιστους ποια πολιτική δύναμη είναι πραγματικά', '792: κυρίου σουλτζ οι υποψήφιοι που έχουν τη στήριξη του ευρωπαϊκού κατεστημένου
αν κάποιος από αυτούς εκλέγει τι ακριβώς θα κάνει για', '958: στην υπηρεσία των ανθρωπινών αναγκών φίλοι και συντρόφοι το ευρωπαϊκό
κατεστημένο έχει διαχειριστεί την κρίση όχι για να την επιλύσει αλλά']

Known for his implementation of an aggressive discourse concerning the old 'establishment', a prominent strategy in populism, we wanted to research how the word was framed and emotionally invested in his speeches. As shown in the following graph though the general emotionality around the word is relatively limited the negativity is quite high.


Figure 13: Sentiment analysis of the concordance lines for the lexeme 'establishment' by Alexis Tsipras



The words that Alexis Tsipras associated with the ‘establishment’ were quite explicit: *political* (‘πολιτικό’), *support* (‘στήριξη’), *old* (‘παλιό’), *European* (‘ευρωπαϊκό’), *people* (‘λαό’), *convolutedness* (‘διαπλοκή’), *palace* (‘παλάτι’), *we call* (‘καλούμε’), *leadership* (‘ηγεσία’).

In another example (fig. 15) we examined the way Kyriakos Mitsotakis used a unique feature of his speech, the word ‘scandal’ and how he invested it with negativity and fear³.

Figure 14: Sentiment analysis of Kyriakos Mitsotakis use of the word ‘scandal’.



Experimenting with Machine Learning methods

As seen before, the lexicometric methods are quite useful in analyzing discourse and monitor the way different people frame different concepts and in different timeframes. But in order to be able to maximize the use of automated methods for detecting and classifying discourse we attempted a supervised machine learning approach to our corpus.

Machine learning (ML) algorithms applied to textual data may, for example, infer rule sets or statistical probabilities of typical characteristics from hand coded input texts, thereby "learning" to retrieve or annotate information in unknown material. In contrast to unsupervised or lexicometric methods we can define a given set of categories and documents labeled with them (in our case ‘populist’ and ‘non-populist’). From this ‘training set’ the machine-learning algorithm may learn features to classify new unlabeled documents. In combination with pattern-based approaches, powerful visualizations and user-friendly browsers those algorithms are capable to extend traditional qualitative research designs and open them up to large document collections (Wiedemann 2015).

In implementing machine learning approaches, researchers are not obliged to restrict their analysis to single lexical units when using text mining. The representation of documents as vectors and document sets as matrices allows the preservation of linguistic contexts to a large extent. Context is not only co-text, defined as a rather small snippet of some terms surrounding a lexical unit. Instead, context may be a sentence, a complete document or even the entire corpus. Furthermore, various kinds of external data might be included into the analysis -like time indices of documents- allowing for the data-driven identification of evolvment patterns of linguistic data or text snippets manually annotated with information of interest like category labels, sentiment or valence scales.

³ The words K. Mitsotakis associated with ‘scandal’ were ‘Novartis’, ‘cover up’ (συγκάλυψη), ‘I know’ (ξέρω), ‘worse’ (χειρότερο), ‘is involed’ (εμπλέκεται), ‘government’ (κυβέρνηση), ‘stepping on’ (πατώντας) and ‘sale’ (πώληση)

For our purposes we extracted paragraphs of our speeches and coded them according to the three features of populism, people centrism, anti-elitism and exclusion attributing a value of 1 if the reference was there and 0 if there wasn't any (fig. 16). More specifically we measured:

- people-centrism with the question “Does the speaker refer to the people?⁴”
- anti-elitism with the question “Does the speaker criticize elites?”
- exclusion with the question “Does the speaker directly or indirectly attacks sections of the population or foreigners?”
- resentment with the question “Does the speaker convey feelings of resentment or aggression?”

Figure 15: Attributing values to paragraphs


Text	Speaker	Date	Place	Populism	Peoplecentrism	Antielitism	Exclusion	Resentment
Ενώ από την άλλη, απέναντί μας, βρίσκονται οι δυνάμεις που εκπροσωπούν το παλιό, που επιμένουν στα σφάλματα, που θέλουν να επαναφέρουν τα λάθη και τις στρεβλώσεις που έφεραν την Ελλάδα στο χείλος της καταστροφής.	Antonis Samaras	09/03/13	Athina-Politeiki Epitropi	1	1	1	0	1
Εμείς θέλουμε να σηκώσουμε, ξανά, την Ελλάδα στα πόδια της. Εμείς θέλουμε την Ελλάδα ανταγωνιστική, παραγωγική, υπερέχουσα. Εμείς θέλουμε να φέρουμε επενδύσεις, ώστε να βρουν οι άνεργοι δουλειά. Εμείς θέλουμε να δημιουργηθούν ξανά προοπτικές για τα νέα παιδιά, ώστε να μείνουν στην Ελλάδα, ή εκείνα που έφυγαν να επιστρέψουν. Εμείς πασχίζουμε να πιάσουμε τους στόχους της εξυγίανσης και να βγούμε από τις δεκαετίες και τα «μνημόνια». Και απέναντί μας είναι εκείνοι, οι οποίοι διώχνουν τους επενδυτές, που προσπαθούν να εμποδίσουν τις αποκρατικοποιήσεις. Ονειρεύονται, ξανά, να κρατικοποιήσουν τα πάντα. Έχουν κάνει σημαία τους την ανασμία. Καιδεύουν παρονόμους, στενοχωριούνται όταν εμποδίζονται βαρυνούντες να δραστηριοποιηθούν από τις φυλακές...	Antonis Samaras	09/03/13	Athina-Politeiki Epitropi	1	1	1	0	1
Δεν μονοπωλούμε κανένα πατριωτισμό. Αλλά τον θεωρούμε αρετή! Και θυμίζουμε σε όλους, ότι είναι αρετή να αγαπάς την πατρίδα σου, να μοιχείς γι' αυτήν, να θυσιάζεσαι γι' αυτήν, αν χρειαστεί. Κι η Πολιτική που πάνω απ' όλα προσβέβουμε είναι αυτό το χρέος προς το λαό, στην Πατρίδα! Γι' αυτό και η Πατρίδα είναι προϋπόθεση δημοκρατίας. Γιατί όποιος αντιλαμβάνεται την Πολιτική ως χρέος απέναντί της και απέναντι στο λαό είναι δημοκράτης. Όποιος αντιλαμβάνεται την Πολιτική ως χρέος απέναντι σε εμμέντες, αγκυλώσεις ξεπερασμένες του χθες, όποιος έτσι αντιλαμβάνεται τις υποχρεώσεις του, πολύ συχνά γλιστράει σε «κατευθύνσεις επικίνδυνες και σε ιδεολογικά ακόμα μονοπάτια επικινδύνων για την Πατρίδα. Πατρίδα και Δημοκρατία στις μέρες μας πάνε μαζί ή δεν πάνε πουθενά! Το λέμε αυτό και προς τα αριστερά μας και προς τα δεξιά μας! Και σε αυτούς που επικαλούνται τη δημοκρατία, αλλά περιφρονούν τον πατριωτισμό. Και σε εκείνους που επικαλούνται τον πατριωτισμό, αλλά περιφρονούν τη δημοκρατία. Και οι μεν και οι δε βλέπουν το ίδιο, Πατρίδα και Δημοκρατία!	Antonis Samaras	09/03/13	Athina-Politeiki Epitropi	1	1	1	0	1

We introduced into the Python environment a total of 800 texts, 400 marked with value 1 for populism and 400 with value 0 for non-populism in order to train the algorithm. We vectorized our texts representing each paragraph according to the frequency of its tokens implementing a Bag of Words model. We normalized the frequency according to the keyness of each token measuring also the inverse document frequency of the word by implementing the tf-idf measure. We also used bigrams, trigrams and quadrigrams that were counting the presence of phrases with two, three and four words in order to capture the context of the terms and we built a decision tree-based approach with a Random Forest classifier.

We then split our 800 texts into two sets, a training set consisting of 80% of the material and a test set consisting of the remaining 20% that would allow us to check our classifier. We asked which the classifier weighted as the most important words to help it decide how to classify the text at hand. In the following graph (fig. 15) we can see that our classifier ranked the words ‘people’, ‘establishment’, ‘lies’, ‘national’, ‘Greeks’, ‘system’, ‘land’, ‘Greece’, ‘Greek society’, ‘oligarchy’, ‘trade unionists’, ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘citizens’, and ‘homeland’ as the top most important tokens in the automated decision process as in to which category to classify the text.


⁴ The ‘people’ can be referred to in different ways, so we looked for every possible reference to people including terms like ‘citizens’, ‘our country’, ‘our homeland’, ‘taxpayers’, ‘we’, ‘society’ etc.

Figure 16: Importance of words in classifying the texts



We then tested the unknown 20% of the texts and the following confusion matrix (fig. 19) shows that we achieved an accuracy of a quite satisfying 0,725.


Figure 17: Random Forest confusion matrix accuracy: 0,725



This means that our classifier is able to identify if a text is populist or not and be successful by 70%.

We then attempted to implement a Naïve Bayes classifier, a probabilistic model that counts the independent value of each feature given the class variable. Our results with this classifier were poorer (fig. 20) probably because within the theoretic framework of Naïve Bayes the value of a particular feature (in our case tokens, bigrams, trigrams and quadrigrams) is independent of the value of any other feature, ignoring the correlation between them.

Figure 18: Naive Bayes confusion matrix accuracy: 0.65



CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK

Qualitative analysis has yielded the necessary theoretical results for comprehending the phenomenon of populism and analyze it within its contextual framework. Although the theoretical approaches offer a different set of useful tools for approaching populism, our choice to analyze it from a discursive frame view with an emphasis on language provided us with the necessary advantages that would facilitate the automated approach. We strongly believe that the quantitative approach presented here may sharpen the qualitative approach and equip the social researcher with tools that will support the exploitation of Big Data and the capitalization of the computational linguistic methods in the era of digitized texts. Measuring empirical data provide the opportunity of expanding the reliability of analysis and overcoming the so far subjective restraint of qualitative approach.

We experimented with two different methods to yield different results. By exploiting corpus linguistics and lexicometric approaches and by implementing an *ad hoc* dictionary we were able to penetrate the corpus and analyze the use of words, represent semantic fields and make comparisons between speakers, an attempt that has scarcely been done in the Greek language. The implementation of machine learning algorithms and the encouraging results in predicting whether a text is populist or not is very hopeful for achieving a greater reliability of our approach by further fine tune our features to improve our accuracy in the prediction.

We intend to implement this methodology to larger textual sets and parliamentary speeches in a longer time span to further study the discursive transformation of populism. Furthermore, in order to overcome the low validity introduced by “raw” automated methods, the need to properly code texts is crucial. And that will happen with a satisfactory number of trained coders that will reach high scores of inter annotator agreement to ensure the validity of our results. We opt to enrich the lexicometric approach with word embedding representations to help more accurately represent the semantic fields of specific words thus clarifying their usage and intentionality. Part of Speech tagging will also be helpful in analyzing linguistic style of texts and occasionally the intentionality and the speaker or writer. We are also working on ameliorating the accuracy of our Emotional Lexicon and its correlation to the meaning and emotionality of the words within specific context.

Big textual data is bombarding social science. Researchers need new tools and methods to respond to an unprecedented cascade of information that for the first time is digitally available and open for analysis and assessment. The quantitative inferences driven by automated methods, thematic coding of texts, inclusive

dictionaries, term frequencies, word keyness and semantic fields are evolving into the proper arsenal to deepen our comprehension into the human experience.

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Paris-Bonn axis in the triangle of Anglo-German-French relations? Discursive constructions of Franco-German relationship in the West German quality press from 1958 to 1962.

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ABSTRACT

The second Berlin Wall crisis (1958 to 1962) marks a highly important period for European relations. Within those years, Franco-German rapprochement was implemented and institutionalised with the Élysée Treaty on 22 January 1963. Simultaneously, Anglo-German relations suffered the worst set back since the end of World War II. Indicating direct interdependencies in a trilateral European relationship, this paper analyses the discursive construction of Franco-German alliance in the West German quality papers during the years 1958 to 1962. As the results of this paper show, the discursive representation of the new alliance between Paris and Bonn is to be interpreted within the triangular scope of British, French and West German relations. Applying the methodology of the Critical Discourse Analysis proposed by Ruth Wodak and Siegfried Jäger, this paper aims at uncovering power mechanisms in the West German media discourse to construct Franco-German harmony in opposition to reserved Anglo-German relations.

Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis, Franco-German rapprochement, discursive mechanisms, media discourse, national stereotypes, power-knowledge complex

INTRODUCTION

The British historian Sir Richard J. Evans commented in an interview with the author: “You find often there is a relationship between British images of Germany on the one side and of the French on the other, they alternate.” Examining the discursive representations of the British and the Germans in the national media during the Berlin Wall crisis, however, it becomes clear that they are constructed in a trilateral way with France. Yet this dynamic is indicated from a foreign political point of view: “[...] throughout the entire post-1945 era neither London nor Bonn regarded their bilateral relationship as of prime importance; relations with the USA and France appeared to be much more crucial.” (Larres, 2000, p.1.) Regarding the specific period from 1958 to 1962, the importance of France becomes even more crucial to the bilateral relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Great Britain. Deighton declares that “Anglo-German relations suffered a severe setback, one that is well marked by the fact that when Frank Roberts was sent to Bonn as British Ambassador in 1963, he did not at first establish personal contacts with Adenauer.” (Deighton, 2000, p.37). At the same time, the Franco-German “continental” alliance prospered, a process of rapprochement which led to the signing of the Élysée Treaty on 22 January 1963. Bassewitz confirms that this real approach between France and Germany is to be set around the year 1959, the very approach which produced the Franco-German treaty of friendship on 22 January 1963 (cf. Bassewitz, 1990, p.15). The strengthening of a Franco-German alliance with respect to a simultaneously growing distance between London and Bonn indicates a direct interdependence in a triangular power relationship which is to be assumed to function as the major influence on the West German national media discourse. However, the two crucial foreign political issues which also represent the major discourse strands in the West German media are Britain’s differing attitude towards the East-West conflict and the development of the European Economic Community (EEC) driven by France and the FRG. This paper aims at uncovering the discursive mechanisms in the construction of a Franco-German alliance in the leading West German newspapers. The three leading West German newspapers function as corpus, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ),

Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and *Die Welt*. Moreover, the “political level” is taken into consideration when analysing specific culminations of certain images and arguments with the aim of unmasking political influences the national media discourse.

1. Methodological overview: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Generally, the CDA is based on Michel Foucault’s concept of discourse which focuses on the underlying rules and power relations which lead to the formation of a certain text in a specific period. “Texts” can thus be regarded as “visible surface” of discourse which Foucault defines as “utterances” or “speech acts” (Foucault, 2010, p. 79). Those visible elements build the corpus of analysis from which the underlying rules, called “statements”, are to be uncovered by the discourse analyst. The graphic below illustrates the relation between “statement”, [“Aussage”], and “utterance” [“Äußerung”]. The “statement” is “transformed” by discursive practices [“Diskursive Praktik”] into the “utterance” where it becomes visible in the form of news, institutions, political and social debates or public commemoration ceremonies, among others. Foucault sees a statement as an “integral part of discourse” which forms certain utterances (Foucault, 2010, p.79f.). The (power) relation between the two concepts is compared to protons (“utterances”) which circulate around the statement as nucleus. Foucault describes it as the “atom of discourse” (*ibid.*). For example, a certain utterance which occurs often can be measured quantitatively and be interpreted qualitatively within its context; it indicates the dominance of a certain statement which exercises some sort of power. CDA [“Kritische Diskursanalyse”] has to draw conclusions from the analysis of texts to the underlying statement [“zugrundeliegende Aussagen”]. All discourses generate social reality, general knowledge and views and offer modes to interpret reality. This induces individual actions. As Wodak puts it, “discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p.258).




Figure 19: Illustration of the relation between “statement” [“Aussage”] und “utterance” [“Kern”]

Foucault himself did not provide any guideline or methodology to examine (media) discourses; CDA, however, had been developed some years after his death in 1984. The reference to a text’s “surface” is of high importance. CDA considers, in accordance with Foucault, “language as a social practice” whereas the “context of language use” is regarded to be crucial (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p.1). Moreover, particular interest is expressed in the relation of language and power (cf. *ibid.*, p.2). For Foucault, the complex between “power” and “knowledge” in discourse is crucial (Mills, 2007, p.67). The latter refers to the sum of views, beliefs and convictions that are valid at one period in a society. To define what becomes general and commonplace knowledge results from power struggles which take place in public debates, news

coverage etc. According to CDA, “power” refers to the mechanisms that define which “knowledge” is accepted as valid. Foucault thus argues that valid knowledge is constantly negotiated via exclusion mechanisms in discourse. Generally, there is no power that can be generated without knowledge; vice versa, it is impossible for accepted knowledge not to exert power (cf. *ibid*, p.69).

This paper analyses the West German quality press from 1958 to 1962 with respect to the discursive construction of Franco-German relations in a triangular context with Great Britain. Newspaper texts are regarded here as “visible surface”. Emphasis is laid on the underlying power influences which mark a positive construction of the bilateral rapprochement between Paris and Bonn and a negative relationship between the FRG and Great Britain. On a linguistic level, certain keywords are measured quantitatively and interpreted within the scope of the context. In order to detect power influences, references to archival political documents are made which refer to the common dominant course of foreign policy which is mirrored in the media discourse.

2. Historical background as discursive context

A brief focus on the foreign political constellations of that time is relevant for this paper due to two aspects: first, the West German newspapers refer to specific aspects of the respective foreign political relationship, with regard to content. Second, the actual degree of mutual understanding or differing attitude in foreign political relations is regarded as main power influence on how bilateral relations are constructed in the national press. Generally, it can be said that the quality newspapers represent the dominant media discourse of that time as the press was considered the main medium for political information, even among the leading politicians (Gillesen, 1965, p.131). The influence of the press texts on public opinion can be considered as very high.

There are two main strands which construct Franco-German and Anglo-German relations during the years 1958 to 1962. The first regards the Soviet Ultimatum from November 1958 which was directed at the Western Allies to withdraw their troops out of West Berlin; otherwise, Soviet Russia would have acknowledged the German Democratic Republic (GDR) officially as a sovereign state. This, however, would have prevented a German reunification in the long run. The interests of the West German government, however, were strongly based on reuniting East and West Germany. Furthermore, this Soviet demand was regarded as a violation of international law. It was in the aftermath of November 1958 that fundamental differences among the Western Powers revealed: France agreed with Federal Chancellor Adenauer not to consider any negotiations on the GDR and remain “firm” against the Soviet demands whereas British Prime Minister Macmillan favoured private talks with Khrushchev on the future of Germany during a unilateral trip to Moscow in February 1959.¹ Macmillan’s initiative as well as his demands for demilitarisation in central Europe, known as “disengagement”, were regarded as opposition to West German interests; a deep bilateral crisis between London and Bonn began in spring 1959 which was stirred by several public critics of Adenauer on British policy throughout the year 1959. When US President Eisenhower met with Khrushchev in September 1959 for bilateral talks on Berlin, this particular Cold War crisis had turned out to be a Soviet-American conflict. From this time on, the trilateral relations between Paris, Bonn and London moved more to economic matters. It can be said that the Soviet Ultimatum had functioned as a catalyst for the Franco-German alliance. Simultaneously they led equally to a crisis between London and Bonn.

The second issue is ‘continental’ and refers to the growing power of the EEC between France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries from which Britain initially stood apart. London reacted by founding the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which was initiated in January 1960 to counterbalance the rapid economic growth and success of the Common Market. Adenauer and de Gaulle wanted to build a political union upon this economic institution. The British initiated the EFTA of seven members as a loose trading association without any political intentions. In July 1961 the British government made the request to join the EEC. This was due to American pressure on the one hand; on the other, the British hoped to maintain their powerful influence on the world stage and their special relations to the US by joining the economic association of the “inner Six”. But in 1962 Adenauer and de Gaulle pushed forward the political union which London did not want to accept; furthermore, the first months of

¹ For further reading see: Gossel, 1991, p.172f. and Gearson, 1998.

negotiations in Brussels showed that British entrance would be much more difficult as the Commonwealth countries represented a key factor: Adenauer and de Gaulle wanted to have Great Britain without the Commonwealth, the British did not want to give up the special ties to their (former) colonies. Adenauer played a decisive role in this triangular relationship: whereas de Gaulle was firm on his position, Adenauer was considered temporarily as a “mediator” between Paris and Bonn. The degree to which the Federal Chancellor tried to stand up for British interests in his talks with de Gaulle defined the positive or negative representation in the national British newspapers on German policy.

The respective national foreign political interests in these two issues have a lasting influence on the discursive construction of the trilateral relationship between France, the FRG and Great Britain. In the following, the two main developments will be presented: firstly, the bilateral crisis between Bonn and London in 1959 and the close Franco-German agreement in the East-West conflict. Secondly, the Franco-German common approach in pushing forward the political union of the EEC in 1962. The following analysis illustrates the discursive construction of these trilateral relations between the continental nations and Great Britain viewed in the context of the political relations. The first part is based on the Franco-German alliance in 1959 in the immediate threat of the Soviet Ultimatum, the second part is dedicated to the economic and political aspect of the EEC and Great Britain’s role in EFTA and later wish for access to the Common Market from 1960 on.

Discursive construction of a Franco-German relationship in the West German quality newspapers

1. Anglo-German crisis as catalyst for Franco-German harmony in 1959

1. Reported polarisation between France and Germany on the one side and London on the other

The discursive construction of the triangular relations of a polarisation between Franco-German relations and Great Britain becomes obvious in the bilateral meeting between the British Prime Minister and Adenauer in Bonn on 8 October 1958. The West German press coverage from Macmillan’s meeting with Adenauer is always related to the previous private talks between de Gaulle and Adenauer in Colombey-les-deux-Eglises in September 1958. The SZ states clearly the agreement between Paris and Bonn: “Macmillan wird die Umgebung des Bundeskanzlers in einer großartig gehobenen Stimmung antreffen, [...] die das Treffen zwischen de Gaulle und Adenauer [...] hinterließ” [“Macmillan will find the surroundings of the Federal Chancellor in a cheerful mood (...) which the meeting between Adenauer and de Gaulle had left”] (“Erkundung”, 08.10.1958, p.3)². Die Welt highlights the priority of the FRG: “Vor kurzem noch hat der Besuch des Kanzlers in Colombey-les-deux-Eglises bewiesen, daß die Bundesregierung [...] Wert darauf legt, mit dem westlichen Nachbarn ein Verhältnis der Freundschaft zu gewinnen und zu erhalten.” [“Only recently the Federal Chancellor’s visit to Colombey-les-deux-Eglises had proved that it is the Federal government’s priority to win and to maintain a relation of friendship with her Western neighbour.”] (Sethe, 08.10.1958, p.1). It is interesting to see from a qualitative perspective how much weight is put on clarifying the relationship with France in a context of the visit of the British head of state. The SZ comments on this meeting as follows: “Wie aus diplomatischen Kreisen verlautet, besteht an dem Gespräch vorwiegend ein britisches Interesse. Macmillan will sich [...] über die Unterredung informieren, die Adenauer am 14. September mit [...] de Gaulle hatte.” [“As reported from diplomatic circles, it was the interest from the British side in this meeting. Macmillan wants to get information on the Adenauer-de Gaulle talks from 14 September 1958.”] (“Macmillan bei Adenauer”, 08.10.1958, p.1). The trilateral interdependence is shown precisely in the following FAZ-article: “Wenn Bonn und Paris miteinander sprechen, hört London ebenso aufmerksam zu wie Bonn beim Gespräch zwischen Paris und London.” [“When Bonn and Paris talk to each other, London is as careful a listener as when there are talks between Paris and London”] (Rapp, 08.10.1958, p.2). Moreover, this article further cements a Franco-German agreement against Great Britain; this is achieved indirectly by quoting English public opinion and de Gaulle: “Doch vermuten manche Leute in England, wenn de Gaulle Europa sage, meine er einen Block ohne England, wolle er ein Europa als ‘dritte Kraft’ zwischen der angelsächsischen und der östlichen Welt.” [“Some people in England suppose,

² All in-text citations will be quoted with a half-title.

though, when de Gaulle says Europe, he refers to a bloc without England, was it his objective for Europe to be a 'third force' between the Anglo-Saxon countries and the Eastern world." (Ibid.). The dominating issue of discussion during this Anglo-German meeting was the British interest in establishing a Free Trade Area as a counterbalance to the growing EEC. The British wanted to act rapidly as the first reduction of internal tariffs among the six EEC countries was to be implemented in January 1959. Adenauer emphasised that he would do anything to prevent any trade war in Europe as well as British isolation.³ A positive résumé from the bilateral meeting is drawn from the FAZ: "Volle Übereinstimmung herrschte zwischen dem englischen und dem deutschen Regierungschef darüber, daß die Verhandlungen über eine Freihandelszone bald und befriedigend abgeschlossen werden müßten." ["There had been complete agreement between the English and the West German head of state on the issue that the negotiations about the Free Trade Area should be finished soon and be satisfactory"] ("Freie Hand", 10.10.1958, p.1). As it was said before, the West German foreign political approach to welcome any alliance of Great Britain with continental Europe was reported in the British press with a positive tenor which was mirrored in the West German press. This is expressed in the FAZ article from 12 January 1959: "Es wäre fatal, wenn über dem Thema Gemeinsamer Markt Europa scheitern würde. Europa kann ohne England nicht existieren. England ist ein Stück von uns." ["It would be fatal if Europe failed due to the topic of the Common Market. Europe cannot exist without England. England is a part of us."] ("Zukunft Europas", 12.01.1959, p.2). However, due to the French veto the FTA failed at the same time as the Soviet Premier forced the Western Powers to react to his demands in the second Berlin crisis which lead to a growing polarisation among France and the FRG on the one hand and the Anglo-American countries on the other.

2. *The Berlin crisis*

In the West German press, this polarisation becomes decisive in the beginning of February 1959 when the American foreign minister John Foster Dulles went to Paris, London and Bonn to discuss a common approach in the East West conflict. Simultaneously, rumours about a British initiative to travel unilaterally to Moscow are being released, thus deepening a juxtaposition between Paris and Bonn on the one side and the Anglo-American countries on the other. On 5 February the FAZ titles "mistrust in English politics" highlighting the Franco-German agreement against Great Britain: "Während man an Dulles' Gesinnung nicht zu zweifeln braucht, [...] erscheint uns das deutsch-französische Mißtrauen gegenüber England mehr begründet. England hatte nie Bedenken, Politik auf Kosten der Länder Europas zu machen. [...] Wenn Chruschtschow nur versucht hat, Zwietracht unter den Westmächten zu säen, dann hat ihm dieser Versuch dank der Mitarbeit Englands bereits den ersten Erfolg verschafft." ["While there is no need to have doubts on Dulles's attitude, the Franco-German distrust of England seems more reasonable to us. The British never had any concerns about doing politics at the expense of other countries in Europe. If Khrushchev only had tried to sow the seeds of discord among the Western Powers, then he was successful thanks to the British collaboration"] ("Mißtrauen", 05.02.1959, p.2). Two argumentation lines can be observed in the following discursive construction of the Anglo-Franco-German relations: first, the term "Paris-Bonn axis" occurs. The existence of this axis between Paris and Bonn is initially denied, however: "Aber der Bundespressechef bezeichnete Spekulationen über eine 'Achse Bonn-Paris' [...] für völlig aus der Luft gegriffen" ["But the head of the Federal Press called the speculations about a Paris-Bonn axis completely baseless."] ("Konferenztermin", 03.02.1959, p.1). Secondly, the mistrust in Macmillan's possible intention, to negotiate on the future of Germany, is also denied: "Beide Staatsmänner (Adenauer und Dulles, Anm. d. Verf.) [...] sind nicht aus weichem Holz geschnitzt; [...] Dulles eignet sich für einen 'appeaser' ebenso wenig wie [...] Macmillan, dem man wegen seiner Moskauer Extratour nicht zu mißtrauen braucht." [Both head of states (Dulles and Adenauer, remark of author) are not made of soft wood; Dulles is an unlikely appeaser as Macmillan, whom one does not need to mistrust due to his Moscow escapade"] (Tern, 07.02.1959, p.1). Generally, the number of articles increase which express a disapproval of the British initiative from a French perspective: "Die Moskaureise wird in Paris mit ausgesprochenem Unbehagen verfolgt. Nach Meinung Pariser Kommentatoren ist nicht zuletzt ein Motiv dieser Reise darin zu suchen, daß englischerseits auf die Bundesregierung Druck ausgeübt werden solle, nicht mehr so eng mit Frankreich zusammen zu gehen [...]" ["Paris follows the Moscow visit with much apprehension.

³ Cf. Adenauer, 1978, p.13.

According to the French commentators, one reason for this journey might be to exert pressure on the Federal Republic not to align so closely with France.”] (Geyer, “Moskaureise”, 08.02.1959, p.1).

3. ‘Paris-Bonn Axis’

Although the different approaches between Great Britain on the one side and France and the FRG on the other are mentioned clearly in the aftermath of Macmillan’s rather disappointing visit to Moscow, the West German press denies any differences before the Prime Minister’s talks with Khrushchev: “Die Bundesregierung hat mit vorsichtigen Ausdrücken die Meinungsverschiedenheiten, die sich zwischen London und Washington einerseits, Paris und Bonn andererseits abzeichnen, als unwesentliche Nuancen bezeichnet.” [“The Federal government has referred to the differences of opinion which have become apparent between Washington and London on the one hand and Paris and Bonn on the other as insignificant nuances”] (“Moskaureise?” 04.02.1959, p.1). This argumentation line is followed until the end of Macmillan’s visit at the beginning of March. When the newspapers report on Adenauer’s sudden visit to de Gaulle shortly after Macmillan’s return from Moscow, the media discourse counteracts any interpretations to “further strengthen a Paris-Bonn axis”: “Die Bundesregierung betont, daß die kommenden Gespräche in Paris zwischen dem Bundeskanzler und dem französischen Staatspräsident de Gaulle hauptsächlich die Deutsche Frage und die Berlin-Krise behandeln werden. Es sei nicht daran gedacht, eine Achse Paris-Bonn heiß zu schmieden. Vielmehr sollte ohne Schaffung eines weiteren Gegensatzes zu Großbritannien [...] dem Westen ein neuer Impuls für das Formulieren einer politisch-strategischen Linie im Verhalten gegenüber der Sowjetunion gegeben werden.” [“The Federal government underlines that the upcoming Paris talks between the Federal Chancellor and French President de Gaulle would mainly deal with the German question and the Berlin crisis. It is not thought to further strengthen a Paris-Bonn axis; rather, it is about finding a new impulse for a political strategy in how to deal with the Soviet Union without artificially creating a contrast to London (...)”] (“Neue Impulse”, 27.02.1959, p.3).

It is interesting to observe that before and during Macmillan’s Moscow visit the West German media discourse uses the strategy of denying any distrust towards British intentions although it can be said that British politics were opposed to the West German foreign policy of rejecting any negotiations with Soviet Russia on the German question at this stage. The discursive construction of a ‘Paris-Bonn axis’ takes over in the aftermath of the British Prime Minister’s rather unsuccessful attempt to find an agreement with Khrushchev on the German problem of Berlin in Moscow. The West German newspapers now emphasise this polarisation by approving the Paris-Bonn axis: “Jedenfalls ist die sogenannte Achse Bonn-Paris für die Ost-West-Auseinandersetzung heute eine Realität [...]” [“In any case, the so-called Paris-Bonn axis has become reality in the East-West conflict”] (“Macmillan in Bonn”, 12.03.1959, p.1). A highly interesting aspect is that one day later, the British quality paper “Daily Telegraph” writes: “There is no Paris-Bonn axis against London as the result of Dr. Adenauer’s visit to President de Gaulle; indeed, how can one speak of an axis among allies?” (McLachlan, 13.03.1959, p.12). This indicates a high dependency of national media discourses on the one hand; on the other, it shows how the British discourse differently constructs this triangular relationship. Again, the term “Paris-Bonn axis” was used in the West German press coverage after Adenauer’s return from de Gaulle when the British Prime Minister went to Bonn on 11 March 1959. The FAZ summarises the bilateral meeting between the French President and the Federal Chancellor with a clear statement of Franco-German agreement: “General de Gaulle und Bundeskanzler Adenauer haben gerade ihre drittes Treffen innerhalb von sechs Monaten gehabt. Europäische Politiker sprechen mit gutem Grund von einer neuen ‘Achse’ zwischen Paris und Bonn [...]. Während der letzten Monate hat sich die Verständigung zwischen den beiden Staatsmännern als eine der bedeutendsten politischen Tatsachen in Westeuropa erwiesen.” [“Gen. De Gaulle and the Federal Chancellor have had their third meeting within six months. With a good reason some European politicians speak of a new axis between Paris and Bonn. Within the past months, the rapprochement between the two statesmen has proved to be one of the most important bases in Western Europe.”] (“Akkord”, 09.03.1959, p.2).

Apart from April 1959, a change in the use of the term “Paris-Bonn axis” can be measured. This refers both to the quantity and the quality of the term used as figure 3 illustrates. Looking at the political level, West German politicians became increasingly worried about Adenauer’s obvious agreement with de Gaulle at the expense of the British. On 6 March 1959, a CDU politician expressed his doubts in a private letter to the CDU-politician Dr. Pferdemenges: “Wir können es uns in der augenblicklichen Situation nicht leisten, uns bei allen wichtigen Anliegen, die Großbritannien an uns hat, reserviert oder ablehnend zu verhalten, und andererseits die deutsch-französische Freundschaft überzubetonen.” [“In today’s political climate we

cannot afford to behave in a reserved of negative way towards Great Britain regarding the important requests which the British government makes of us and at the same time, to overemphasise the Franco-German friendship”] (“Brief an Dr. Pferdemenges”, 06.03.1959, p.2). This tenor is shared among the leading politicians which archival documents prove. From April 1959 on, also influenced by Adenauer’s open criticism in the British press and foreign policy, the West German media discourse begins to distance itself from highlighting a close Paris-Bonn alignment in the form of an axis. Furthermore, the cooling of Anglo-German relations in April 1959 due to Adenauer’s criticism of Macmillan leads to a complete reconsideration of the trilateral relationship as the FAZ article from 14 April shows: “Das britische Gerede von einer ‘Achse’ Paris-Bonn sei ziemlich unfreundlich [...]. Die öffentliche Meinung und die Regierung Großbritanniens haben die Neigung, Frankreich immer weniger als den alten und traditionellen Freund aus der Entente Cordiale zu betrachten. Frankreich erscheint ihnen eher als der neue Verbündete der Bundesrepublik. Da die Beziehungen zwischen London und Bonn ihren Tiefpunkt erreicht haben – seit zehn Jahren waren sie niemals so schlecht – laden die Engländer auf Frankreich einen Teil der Abneigung ab.” [“The British gossip about a Paris-Bonn axis is quite unfriendly. (...) British public opinion and the British government tend to consider France less and less as their traditional old friend from the Entente Cordiale. Rather, to the English, France seems more and more the ally of the Federal Republic. As the relations between Bonn and London have reached their low point – they have never been that cool for ten years – the English dump their dislike partly on France, too”] (“Abneigung”, 14.04.1959, p.2). Regarding the parallel worsening of Anglo-German relations, the CDU-politician Kurt Birrenbach releases an article in the FAZ at the same time. The title: “Die deutsch-englische Verstimmung. Zur Diagnose und Therapie” [“The Anglo-German Upset. Tips for diagnosis and therapy”] with the subtitle: “Gerüchte über eine ‘Paris-Bonn Achse’” [“rumours about a Paris-Bonn axis”] (Birrenbach, 18.04.1959, p.2). Birrenbach pleads for an improvement of Anglo-German relations as the threat by the Soviet Union forces the FRG to cooperate with all Western Allies, not only with France: “Zunächst beurteilt London Chancen und Wege für eine Lösung des Berliner Konflikts anders als Bonn und Paris [...]. In der außenpolitischen Situation von heute kann es sich die Bundesrepublik nicht einfach leisten, die Verschlechterung der deutsch-englischen Beziehungen reaktionslos hinzunehmen. Wir sind in der Auseinandersetzung mit der Sowjetunion auf die Unterstützung der angelsächsischen Mächte entscheidend angewiesen.” [“London judges the opportunities for a possible solution to the Berlin crisis differently from Bonn and Paris (...). In today’s foreign political situation the FRG cannot afford to accept the worsening of Anglo-German relations. We depend crucially on the support of the Anglo-Saxon countries in this quarrel with Soviet Russia”] (Ibid.). Within the course of 1959 the discursive construction of the triangular relationship changes towards more balanced relations. One reason for this might be the Geneva conference of the four Foreign secretaries which started in May 1959 and lasted until August. The conference was held among the French, British, American and Soviet foreign ministers; the FRG and GDR had only observer positions. The conference discussed the German problem and the future of Germany. Although it ended without any great results, apart from the announcement of bilateral talks between US President Eisenhower and Khrushchev in September 1959, Bonn understood that the future of Germany depended also on a British attitude in these negotiations. This might function as a powerful influence on the West German media discourse to balance this triangular relationship more towards a British participation.

4. Rebalancing the triangular relationship

From June 1959 on, a move away from a strict Paris-Bonn axis towards an opening can be observed. The FAZ uses a survey to highlight this development: “Mir wäre etwas weniger Achse Bonn-Paris und etwas mehr Brücke Bonn-London sehr lieb [...]. Viele Leute in der Bundesrepublik empfinden so. Nicht, daß sie eine enge Zusammenarbeit mit Frankreich etwa missen möchten; sie halten nur eine einseitige starre [...] Achsenverbindung für fragwürdig, jedenfalls dann, wenn sie den Brückenschlag nach Großbritannien unmöglich macht. Diese Dreieckssituation in Europa, die die Vorstellung erweckt, als sei die Freundschaft von zwei Partnern notwendigerweise immer gegen den dritten gerichtet, ist höchst unselig.” [“I would prefer a closer bridge between Bonn and London to less axis between Bonn and Paris (...) Many people in the Federal Republic share this opinion. Not that they did not want a close Franco-German cooperation; they cast doubt on a unilateral, rigid axis if this prevents a closer approach to Britain. This triangular situation in Europe, which gives the impression that the friendship between two partners was only possible at the expense of the third, is highly ill-fated”] (“Gerümpel”, 26.06.1959, p.2). When Adenauer and Macmillan met on 17 November 1959 for the first time after Macmillan’s visit to Bonn in March eight months before, the West German press coverage highlights the positive course of the Anglo-German

bilateral talks. Although the close Franco-German friendship is present in the argumentation, the FAZ writes: “Unser Londoner Korrespondent kann von den ersten Tagen des Besuchs in London, von dem sich die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland einiges verspricht, Gutes berichten” [“Our London correspondent can report good results from the first days in London from which public opinion in Germany expects a lot”] (Tern, 19.11.1959, p.1). Apart from that, the SZ reflects upon the rather bad quality of Anglo-German relations. France is opposed as positive counterweight but also questioned: “Von Zeit zu Zeit vernimmt man die Klage, unser Verhältnis zu Großbritannien lasse zu wünschen übrig, ja es sei schlechter denn je. [...] Manche sagen, der Bundeskanzler hege gegen die Engländer ein Vorurteil, das ebenso schwer zu erschüttern ist wie sein vorbehaltloses Vertrauen zu Frankreich.” [“From time to time one hears the complaint that our relationship with Great Britain leaves a lot to be desired, nay, it is worse than ever. Some say the Federal Chancellor has prejudices against the English which are just as hard to shake as his unconditional trust in France.”] (Junius, 18.11.1959, p.1). After the end of the meeting, the FAZ distances itself clearly from the term “Paris-Bonn axis”: “Man kann und soll vieles auf der deutsch-französischen Freundschaft aufbauen. Aber gewiß wird auch de Gaulle die Bedeutung der Achse Bonn-Paris, von der manchmal mit einem nicht sehr glücklichen [...] Bild gesprochen wird, nicht überschätzen.” [“One can and must build a lot on the Franco-German friendship. But de Gaulle will certainly not overestimate the importance of the Paris-Bonn axis, which has sometimes not been a very happy object of discussion.”] (“Ruhm”, 23.11.1959, p.1).

The West German media discourse follows the consensus of the FRG’s foreign policy line to counterbalance the bilateral relationship with Great Britain. Adenauer and Macmillan had discussed important issues at this meeting: from the British side, a “tougher” line towards the Soviet Union was asked for the German side. Vice versa, Adenauer assured the British of any support to prevent trade problems between the newly founded EFTA and the EEC.

5. Interpretation

As can be seen above, Anglo-French-German relations were reported in a close interdependence on each other in the West German press whereas a positive Franco-German agreement was opposed to an Anglo-German discord. This direct interdependence in the discursive construction of the trilateral relations can be measured quantitatively as the figures 2 and 3 illustrate. Although the year 1959 is marked by the bilateral crisis between Bonn and London, almost a parallel quantity of articles refers to the relationship between Adenauer and de Gaulle. The orange line marks the quantitative distribution of the press articles which negotiate the Anglo-German relations; the course of the line is also applicable to the press coverage on the Franco-German rapprochement. This is especially distinctive in the first half of the year 1959 with Macmillan’s Moscow visit and the worsening of Anglo-German relations in March 1959.




Figure 20: Quantitative distribution of press releases on Adenauer and Macmillan in 1959




Figure 3: Quantitative distribution of press releases on Adenauer and de Gaulle in 1959

Another keyword is the “Paris-Bonn axis”. Its distribution, as it will be discussed below, was frequently used in the year 1959; it decreased in 1960 and fell to its low point in 1961 when Macmillan decided on British membership in Brussels. In 1962, when Adenauer and de Gaulle pushed forward the political union of the EEC and celebrated the Franco-German reconciliation in July 1962, the quantity of the term ‘Paris-Bonn axis’ rises again to a higher amount than in 1959. In the following section, the term will be shortly interpreted within the scope of the developments of the British relationship to the EEC.

2. Britain and the EEC 1960 to 1962

At the end of 1959, the Berlin crisis had turned more and more to a US-Soviet conflict. In May 1960 the planned East-West summit in Paris failed beforehand because of a US spy plane which had invaded Soviet airspace. Furthermore, Khrushchev waited for new initiatives on Berlin as the presidency of Eisenhower ended later this year. With the year 1961 and the newly inaugurated President Kennedy the Berlin crisis had become acute again. In August 1960, Macmillan and Adenauer met in Bonn. Anglo-German relations had begun to improve as the British Prime Minister refrained from his ‘flexible’ Soviet policy.⁴ This positive

tendency is mirrored in the discursive construction of the triangular relationship: the SZ writes on the occasion of this meeting: “Während der Draht zwischen Bonn und Paris in den letzten Jahren stets intakt war, erscheint für ein Einvernehmen zwischen Bonn und London, wie es ist jetzt abzeichnet, [...]. Es hat gefühlsmäßig England näher an den Kontinent, damit auch Macmillan an Adenauer näher herangeführt [...]” [“While Bonn has been on good terms with Paris within the past years, an agreement between London and Bonn, as it is becoming apparent now, (...) has instinctively brought England closer to the continent and thus Macmillan to Adenauer.”] (Thilenius, 12.08.1960, p.1). Also, the author pleads for a ‘synchronisation’ between the French and the British requests (Ibid.). This is an example for balancing the triangular relationship in the West German media discourse as the foreign political interests between Great

⁴ After the personal meeting between Macmillan and Adenauer in Bonn on 10 August 1960, Adenauer wrote: “Die Gespräche verliefen völlig anders als alle anderen Gespräche zuvor.” [“The talks were completely different from all other talks before.”] (“Vertrauliches Gespräch”, 11.08.1960, p.1). Adenauer emphasised that Macmillan admitted that “seine Politik gegenüber Sowjetrußland, die er bisher betrieben habe, [sei] ein Mißerfolg gewesen.” [“his policy towards Soviet Russia had been a failure.”] (ibid.). The Federal Chancellor concluded: “So verlief alles in größter Harmonie” [“Thus there was great harmony”] (ibid.).

Britain and the FRG come closer; Macmillan tends to agree with Adenauer on a common attitude towards the Soviet Union and Adenauer welcomes any possibility to associate Britain more closely with the continent. Simultaneously, Adenauer had growing differences of opinion with de Gaulle over the French nuclear politics and French politics in NATO towards the end of 1960. Lappenküper argues that Adenauer chose deliberately to 'connect' with Macmillan (cf. Lappenküper, 2001, p. 1661). The media discourse mirrors this power influence as presenting the Anglo-German relations in a rather positive and improved tenor. In November 1960, the FAZ denies any presence of a Paris-Bonn axis: "Die Achse Bonn-Paris gehört der Vergangenheit an. Europa ist also in Gefahr, weil es kein Europa ohne ein weitgehendes Einvernehmen zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland gibt." ["The Paris-Bonn axis belongs to the past. Europe is thus in danger, because there is no Europe without a far-reaching agreement between France and Germany."] ("Atommacht", 02.11.1960, p.11). As figure 4 illustrates below, the term 'Paris-Bonn axis' decreases after the turbulent year 1959 in Anglo-French-German relations and reaches its low point in 1961. This can be explained by the fact that Macmillan changed the British course towards joining the EEC after the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in April 1961. As this was in the interest of the FRG, the bilateral relations between Bonn and London improved; consequently, the use of the Paris-Bonn axis dropped. A more balanced trilateral relationship is expressed in the FAZ on 25 May 1961: "Die Bundesregierung hat sich wiederholt als Vermittler zwischen Frankreich und England versucht. Wir sollten auch weiterhin alles tun, um England seinen neuen Weg zu erleichtern. Bei gutem Willen auf beiden Seiten sollte ein Beitritt Englands zur Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft möglich sein." ["The Federal government has tried repeatedly to function as mediator between France and England. We should continue to do all in order to ease England's new path. With goodwill from both sides the British entry into the EEC should be possible."] (Roeper, 25.05.1961, p.1).

From December 1961 on, Franco-German relations improved steadily as several steps in the development of the EEC are made. At a bilateral meeting between the French President and Adenauer in Paris in December 1961, the two statesmen discussed the upcoming developments of the EEC. In this, de Gaulle speaks about British entry: "Es sei aber [...] eine politische Frage, denn die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft sei eine politische Operation. Wäre sie eine reine wirtschaftliche Angelegenheit, dann könnte man den Gemeinsamen Markt mit allen, mit England, dem Commonwealth, den Vereinigten Staaten schaffen. Das wäre dann aber nicht mehr Europa. Der Herr Bundeskanzler habe als Erster und auch der (de Gaulle) zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt gewollt, dass dieser gemeinsame Markt die wirtschaftliche und praktische Grundlage für Europa sein solle." ["It was a political question, however, because the EEC is a political operation. If it were a purely economic matter, then one could create the Common Market with all, with England, the Commonwealth and the United States. This would not be Europe anymore. The Federal Chancellor was the first, and then also de Gaulle later, to want this Common Market to be the economic and practical basis of Europe."] ("Geheime Aufzeichnung", 09.12.1961, p.7). From 1962 on, the tenor in the West German newspapers changed with respect to a more critical attitude towards the British entry as the SZ article from January 1962 illustrates: "Die außerordentlich komplizierten Vereinbarungen in Brüssel versetzten selbst Befürworter eines britischen EWG-Beitritts in ernste Stimmung. Erhebliche Schwierigkeiten werden prophezeit." ["The exceptionally complicated agreements in Brussels cause a serious mood even among supporters for the British entry to the EEC. Considerable difficulties are to be expected."] ("Bedenken", 17.01.1962, p.2). Die Welt reports on the British public's reaction to the negotiations with the EEC: "In den Zeitungsredaktionen hagelt es Leserbriefe. [...] Sie warnen vor den schweren Souveränitätsverlusten, die die außen- und innenpolitische Handlungsfreiheit Englands gleichermaßen beschneiden würden." ["Editorial offices are swamped with readers' letters. They warn about the heavy loss of sovereignty which would limit England's freedom of action both in matters of foreign and domestic policy."] (Globig, 22.01.1962, p.1). Adenauer meets later with de Gaulle in Paris in February 1962. The two statesmen agree that Great Britain should join but without the Commonwealth countries. They concluded that "die EWG nicht zu gross werden dürfe, sonst platze sie." ["The EEC should not become too big, otherwise it will burst"] ("Adenauer und de Gaulle", 17.02.1962, p.18). Adenauer made public utterances from March 1962 on in which he proposed an association of Britain to the Common Market instead of an entry. Simultaneously, Adenauer follows de Gaulle's attitude. This is criticised in the article: "Der Kurs de Gaulles" ["De Gaulle's course"] from May 1962: "Konrad Adenauer und die Bundesregierung insgesamt haben der britischen Regierung ihr Wort gegeben, den Beitritt Englands mit gleichen Rechten in die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft zu unterstützen. Wer das deutsch-britische Verhältnis für alle Zeit vergiften will, hat es leicht: Er braucht nur ein unehrliches Spiel genau in dem

Augenblick zu spielen, wo die Verhandlungen über den Beitritt Englands ernsthaft beginnen.” [“Adenauer and the federal government have given their word to the British government to support England’s entry to the EEC with equal rights. Whoever wants to poison the Anglo-German relations forever, has it easy: he only has to play a dishonest game in that moment when the negotiations about an English entry have really begun.”] (Benckiser, 12.05.1962, p.1). In July when Adenauer went to Paris to celebrate the Franco-German reconciliation, the FAZ writes “Keine Achse” [“No axis”]: “Weder die kleinen noch die großen Mächte dürfen durch eine Verständigung zwischen Paris und Bonn Schaden erleiden, die an gewisse Achsen erinnern würde.” [“Neither the small nor the bigger powers should suffer from an agreement between Paris and Bonn, which would remind anyone of any axis.”] (“Keine Achse”, 03.07.1962, p.2). The article: “Einverstanden – aber keine Achse” [“Agreed but no axis”] comments on another résumé of Adenauer’s state visit to Paris. In August 1962, the Federal Chancellor repeats his criticism of British entry. This time, the West German media discourse criticises his extreme attitude of alignment with France. In the article: “Europa will England” [“Europe wants England”] this becomes obvious: “Dieses Spiel zwischen EWG und politischer Union darf es nicht geben. Es ist die Linie der deutschen Politik, England als vollen Partner dabeihaben zu wollen.” [This game between the EEC and the political union must cease. It is the line of West German politics to have England as full member in the Common Market.”] (“Europa will England”, 31.08.1962, p.1). The SZ denotes Adenauer’s course as “new own goal” and thus, distances itself completely from the Federal Chancellor’s attitude: “Außenminister Schröder [...] such[t] nachzuweisen, daß die Stimmungsäußerungen [seines] alten Herrn keineswegs die Richtlinien der deutschen Politik darstellen.” [The Foreign Minister tried to prove that the moody utterances of his old master do not represent the guidelines of German politics.”] (“Eigentor”, 31.08.1962). This functions as a mechanism which the media discourse uses to correct any extremes that deviate from the line of common foreign policy, even if it’s the head of state. The term ‘Paris-Bonn axis’ becomes frequently used in the further course of the West German press coverage of 1962. It is then directly linked to the establishment of the political union of the EEC. Thus, it “wins” over the bilateral relationship between Bonn and London, which is cemented with the signing of the treaty of friendship in January 1963.




Figure 4: Quantitative distribution of the term “Paris-Bonn axis” in the FAZ from 1959 to 1962

1. Discussion of the results

This paper showed both qualitatively and quantitatively the interdependencies in the discursive construction of the triangular relationship between France, West Germany and Great Britain in the leading national newspapers of the FRG. It was seen that any press coverage of a bilateral meeting between Adenauer and Macmillan was linked to France; quantitatively, the figures 2 and 3 illustrate the similar distribution of press releases which reported on Anglo-West German and on Franco-West German relations in spite of the immense bilateral crisis between Bonn and London in 1959. As imbalances in this troubled

phase of Anglo-German relations produce a lot of knowledge which was measured in the number of articles released in this paper, an almost equal proportion of published articles dealing with France indicates a high discursive weight in the West German discourse. The documents which proved this close agreement between Adenauer and de Gaulle are also mirrored in friendly tone in the German newspapers in 1959. When British foreign policy moves closer to the FRG's interests, the triangular relationship becomes more balanced in 1960 and 1961; Bonn takes the role of the mediator *between* Paris and London and not *against* London. In the later progress of the EEC in 1962, this changes as the French and West German interests push forward the political developments of the Common Market. The close alliance between de Gaulle and Adenauer is marked as "Paris-Bonn axis" in 1959 and 1962. The term indicates an imbalance in the triangular relationship. When in July 1962 Adenauer seeks reconciliation with France and distances himself from the role of the mediator for the British requests, even the media discourse distances itself from the Federal Chancellor and criticises his extreme line. Thus, the media discourse follows the consensus of the foreign policy; if anyone, even a head of state, deviates from it, he will become excluded. The West German media thus follows the power influence and the common interests of the foreign policy.

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Refugee and migrant crisis in Europe: The EU-Turkey agreement

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INTRODUCTION

The European Union is currently facing a vast number of challenges, such as the protracted economic crisis, the UK's withdrawal from the European Union and terrorism. However, it seems that one of the greatest problems is the unprecedented migration flow, created by a series of geopolitical and economic factors, which threaten the unity of the EU. It is no coincidence that the refugee crisis was among the major factors that led to Brexit, i.e. Britain's decision to withdraw from EU one year ago. In 2015, more than one million refugees entered Europe triggering according to the United Nations, "the greatest refugee crisis after World War II", raising questions about the ability of the EU and its member states to manage the mass arrival of refugees seeking asylum in Europe.

The refugee crisis is gradually becoming a humanitarian issue, while the dilemmas that arise for the EU are significant. On the one hand, if the EU had left its external borders open, it would have put at risk the Schengen acquis and the fundamental principle of free movement of people. On the other hand, by closing its doors to so many refugees, it was likely to destabilize countries such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, which to date are home to millions of refugees. Moreover, such a stance on the part of Europe does not comply with the humanitarian principles that they have been defending for decades, such as the fundamental human right to international protection. The massive and uncontrolled arrival of migrants and refugees has put pressure on the first countries of entry such as Greece and Italy, on the asylum systems of many Member States and the common European asylum system as well. Given the fact that the majority of immigrants and refugees arrive in Greece via Turkey so as to continue their journey to the rest of Europe, it became clear that the EU had to work with Turkey in order to address this major problem. Thus, with the intent of deepening their relations and dealing with the crisis, they reached a nine-point agreement with the aim of controlling migratory flows and halting the influx of illegal migrants.

Today, two years after the implementation of the agreement, the main objective of reducing illegal entries has been achieved, although a number of controversial issues have arisen concerning its legitimacy and human rights violations. Even if the agreement proves to be successful, migration flows are difficult to predict and none of the push-factors forcing refugees and immigrants to Europe seem likely to be resolved soon. Therefore, apart from the agreement's implementation in the context of international legality, cooperation between member states and international community as a whole is required so as to make the current refugee crisis manageable. The refugee crisis is a global problem and the EU should contribute to global efforts to address this phenomenon.

Understanding the refugee crisis

The Arab Spring events, the socio-political instability prevailing in the Middle East as well as the ongoing warfare in Syria have led to the massive arrival of displaced populations, wishing to be granted protection. Europe has always been a destination for asylum seekers, but in summer 2015 there was a marked increase in migratory and refugee flows from the war zones of Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (Gizis, 2016). Both Greece and Turkey, due to their geographical position, are the main entry points and transit countries for displaced populations entering the European territory, either by the land borders through Evros or by sea. In the latter case, the main entry points are the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos. In particular, the number of migrants and refugees arriving in Europe by sea since the beginning of 2016 was more than

200.000, according to UNHCR official data. The majority of those populations (three quarters) had entered Turkey and Greece before the end of March 2016, while the number of immigrants arriving from neighboring Italy was not negligible. Today, Turkey hosts more than 2.5 million Syrian refugees, more than any other country in the world, followed by Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. As far as concerns Greece, numbers are equally impressive, as the refugees exceeded the number of 140.000 in the first two months of 2016, and more than 1 million are estimated to have crossed Greece and Turkey in order to reach other European countries. Both Greece and Turkey are transit countries, as most migrants and refugees have as a desired destination other European countries, such as Germany and Hungary. In 2017, the number of refugees entering Europe illegally via open waters decreased to approximately 29.600, while the total number of arrivals dropped from 988.703 in 2015 to 57.450 in 2017, mainly due to the implementation of the agreement. Moreover, the year before the EU-Turkey statement, only 569 relocations had taken place, a number that increased to 21.847 in 2017, showing the significant effects of the aforementioned agreement.

Due to the extent of the refugee crisis, a number of states, such as Austria, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Croatia imposed internal border controls related to migration so as to sufficiently address the risk of secondary movements of irregular migrants coming from Greece. At the same time, due to the deficiencies in the management of the EU's external borders, and according to the Schengen Border Code, the temporary reintroduction of border controls was decided through the Schengen suspension. Thus, both the closure of the borders of several European countries and the suspension of the Schengen area have resulted in the containment of thousands of refugees in Greece, creating new problems related to the inability to manage the massive migratory flows.

In 2016, about 55,000 refugees were "trapped" in Greece, while most of them were domiciled in the improvised refugee camp located at Idomeni. The living conditions were appalling, the medical assistance inadequate, while the refugees had to struggle with numerous difficulties, such as terrible weather conditions, lack of clothing and food etc. Because there were no legal options, people in Idomeni had no choice but to try and leave on irregular routes; for the same reasons, they refused to stay in an official camp. However, many of those who attempted to walk across the Balkan route were systematically pushed back to Greece a fact that caused episodes and social tensions. Apart from the camp in Idomeni, in May 2016, about 8,000 refugees were temporarily hosted in Lesvos, Samos, and Chios and secondarily in Leros and Kos, deteriorating ever more the existing conditions. In addition, a large number of refugees were housed at Hellenic airport, while several of them were residing at Piraeus port for a few months, until their transfer to a hosting center in Skaramangas area. In order to improve the unacceptable living conditions, new facilities were established in Thessaloniki and Athens, while the existing ones in Larissa and Grevena (Georgiopolou, 2016) were modernized so as to increase the accommodation capacity. Moreover, the UNHCR accommodation scheme, in place since November 2015, helped manage the unprecedented burden for the Greek reception system by establishing 20.000 places in open accommodation funded by the Commission and primarily dedicated to applicants seeking international protection eligible for relocation. In July 2017, the aforementioned scheme was included in the Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation Program (ESTIA) intended to provide urban accommodation and further assistance to 30.000 people by the end of the year. In 2017, the program had created more than 21 thousands places in total in 3.577 facilities spread across different cities in Greece, significantly contributing to tackling the crisis.

The refugee issue developed into an international humanitarian crisis, which made it necessary to directly manage the refugee flows on the basis of three priorities, namely: the establishment and functioning of Reception and Identification Centers (RIC) - the so called "hotspots", an increase in the number of first reception facilities and the development of long-term accommodation and integration facilities for those in need of international protection (Alivizatos et al., 2016). Since December 2015, the European Union's Civil Protection Mechanism has been activated for coordinated crisis response, along with a series of additional actions in an effort to resolve the problem. Such actions include strengthening the presence of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (Frontex), the deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (Rabit) following a Greek request to address emergency situations, such as the migrant smuggling (Regulation 2007/836/EC), as well as the provision of technical and operational assistance from the European Asylum Support Office, as will be explicitly discussed in the following chapters. As part of the operational measures for the management of the refugee crisis, it was particularly important for the hotspots to function, as already mentioned above, as

centers for the registration and identification of refugees in order to identify more clearly those who are genuinely entitled to international protection. The "hotspots" that have been set up are located in Lesbos, Kos, Chios and Samos, where First Reception Centers and temporary accommodation centers for asylum seekers and vulnerable groups coming from third countries have been established. The extent of the refugee crisis overpowers the narrow boundaries of national governments and highlights the need for collective action and cooperation. Following this logic, an agreement was reached between the EU and Turkey on ending illegal immigration from Turkey to the EU and replacing it with legal rules and procedures for the resettlement of refugees in Europe.

However, despite the progress made in implementing the agreed measures, at present, about 13.000 asylum seekers are trapped on the Aegean islands without access to adequate protection and basic services while the "containment policy" still applies. What we mean by this is that people residing in the RIC are subject to a "geographical restriction", as they are obligated not to leave the island, according to the restrictions on the freedom of movement imposed by the Schengen's Borders Code. Despite the fact that it was supposed to be a temporary and extraordinary measure, both in scope and duration to what is strictly necessary to end the human suffering and address the deficiencies of the external borders, it has become a practice that raises questions concerning the defense of fundamental human rights. Moreover, the nominal capacity of reception facilities including RIC and other facilities as of 31 January 2018 was 7.876 locations, while the number of refugees residing there reached about 10.000. Finally, while the RIC were meant to be temporary accommodation centers, they have been transformed into closed detention facilities of all newly arrived persons. Therefore, although the implementation of the agreement significantly contributed to the reduction of illegal migrants, the humanitarian issues that arise for both the migratory population itself and the host countries are of major importance, as will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

1.2. Definition of refugee concept and basic principles of international protection

Modern migration flows are divided into three main categories, the first of which comprises people who are likely to be recognized as refugees, such as Syrians and Afghans. The second includes those living under conditions of instability and violence in their countries of origin and are likely not to be selected as persons in need, despite the risks they face, as in the case of Somalia. In the third category, we include those who migrate mainly for economic reasons, as is the case of the Western Balkans peoples.

Asylum is a form of international protection granted to people who leave their country of origin because of well-founded fear of persecution. In addition, protection is being offered to individuals that are at risk of serious harm, when returning to their country of origin (European Commission, 2014). In accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, "a refugee is considered to be a person who, due to justified fear of persecution on grounds of race or ethnic origin, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political conviction, remains outside his/her home country and cannot or does not wish due to this fear, to enjoy the protection of his/her country of origin" (Pouloupoulou, 2007, p. 52). At this point, it should be pointed out that asylum seekers are individuals who have lodged an asylum application in the host country and can only be considered as refugees after the application has been approved. We also need to clarify the blurring difference between economic migrants and political refugees where, in the first case, people migrate to improve their income and general economic situation, while in the latter, fears of persecution lead them to come to such a decision. Therefore, there is a different legal and institutional framework for economic migrants and refugees, the diversification of which is provided by the principle of non-refoulement, with certain exceptions. In particular, the aforementioned principle constitutes a rule of international law based on Article 33 of the Geneva Convention and other multilateral international conventions, and prohibits the surrender, deportation, refoulement and expulsion of any refugee to a country that is likely to face the risk of persecution or serious harm. However, according to the second paragraph of Article 33, persons deemed to be dangerous to the host country and persons convicted of serious crimes are excluded from the aforementioned principle. In addition to the principle of non-refoulement, which is an important right of beneficiaries of international protection, other rights are related to the issue of residence and movement authorization inside and outside the country, access to employment, education, health care, social security, as well as access to inclusion and integration programs in the country of residence. Finally, a person may not meet the criteria required to be regarded as a refugee, but he/she might still be unable to return to the country of origin because there is a danger of being seriously harmed (death penalty or execution, torture or

inhuman or degrading treatment or serious and individual threat to his or her life or physical integrity due to indiscriminate violence) (European Commission, 2014). In this case, he is granted subsidiary protection (supplementary protection) under the criterion of physical or any other harm, which is also a form of international protection similar to that of asylum.

The content of international protection consists of respecting the fundamental human rights and providing the assistance that the refugees need as people leaving their country to escape violence, conflict, oppression and other situations putting their lives in danger. Therefore, international protection is based on two principles, which are the burden-sharing principle (or joint responsibility principle) and the principle of international solidarity. Both principles rely on the obligation to provide assistance for the promotion of a common goal through the sharing of responsibilities and the reciprocal nature of the abovementioned obligation, as the present crisis goes beyond the control of individual states and requires joint action. Given the fact that European Union receives more than 40% of the total number of asylum applications worldwide, it has incorporated these principles into its legal framework by acting in solidarity and contributing to the burden-sharing for the refugees' protection.

Causes and incentives of migration

The refugee flows are extremely complex and are determined by a correspondingly complex combination of factors, while a main cause is considered to be the escalation of the civil war in Syria. The war in Syria, which began as an effort to bring down Assad's dictatorship, took the form of a religious conflict, and despite the involvement of regional powers and states, does not seem to be nearing an end. Estimates indicate that more than 250 thousand Syrians have died, while UNHCR official figures show that more than 4.2 million Syrians have been registered as refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. In 2015, 70% of the Syrian population lived in poverty and 30% in extreme poverty, while education, health and social care systems are now in collapse. In addition to the ongoing violence and instability in Syria, emerging terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (ISIS) together with the inability to find a political solution, are forcing Syrians to move elsewhere in order to survive. Moreover, another factor that encourages them to seek better living conditions is that, even after the end of the war, reconstruction and rehabilitation take years, making their future even more uncertain and dangerous. An additional cause of refugee outflow is the general degraded situation prevailing in the Middle East combined with the action of extremist groups in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Iraq, etc. Moreover, geopolitical changes have restricted any other alternative routes and countries of destination such as Libya, making Europe the most "attractive" destination. Also, countries that have received a large number of refugees, such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, despite leaving their borders open, do not encourage the long-term integration of refugees and the guarantee of their rights, further reducing the alternatives of displaced persons. At this point, we should highlight that although Syrians have the status of temporary protection, Turkey does not grant them full refugee status or even allow their full integration into Turkish society. That is why most people prefer to stay within the EU borders, as they assume that their national rights will be better protected within these borders than in Turkey. Therefore, the deterioration of the conditions in the first host country or first country of asylum request is an important driving force for new migratory movements.

The secondary causes of refugee movement includes poverty and lack of job opportunities due to the fact that it is impossible to obtain a work permit. In addition, refugees often do not have access to key health and education-related services forcing them to move again. Turkey is such an example, as despite the fact that Syrians can enjoy health services free of charge, they have to pay 20% of the medical expenses combined with additional obstacles such as the language and the lack of qualified personnel. The aforementioned example, along with a series of deficiencies in Turkey's protection system, justifies the reluctance of the majority of refugees to remain there and their choice to move to other European states. Finally, other underlying roots of displacement may be related to the limited recognition of their legal and social status, discrimination and victimization.

Consequently, we can distinguish both existential reasons and strategic ones that encourage refugees to migrate, where in the first case immigration is related to security issues such as political upheaval, conflict and human rights violations, while in the latter is associated with the general improvement of their living

conditions. Some of the causes, such as warfare, are not new but have been deteriorating over time, leading to a lack of prospects for refugees returning to their home country and for a more overall solution to the issue, exacerbating migratory pressures on Europe. In conclusion, the reasons for migration to Europe are complex and multidimensional, and there is an overlap of the factors that lead to this phenomenon, which are primarily political and secondarily economic.

Key features of modern refugee flows

In this sub-chapter, we will attempt to analyze the main features of modern refugee flows as they have been developed in the past three years, based on countries of origin and destination, the principal routes followed by refugees, the risk of travel, certain traits concerning the age composition of refugees and the increased impact that the refugee issue has on certain states.

As concerns the countries of origin, the ongoing conflicts make Syria the country with the largest number of immigrants and refugees, with 49% in 2015. Syria is followed by Afghanistan and Iran with 21% and 9% respectively, while a smaller number comes from Kosovo, Albania, Pakistan and Eritrea. As has already been mentioned, both Greece and Turkey are refugees' transit countries, as their real destination is other European countries, from which Germany comes first. In 2015, Germany received more than 476,000 asylum applications, and more than 1 million people have arrived in the country, following "easy" measurements system for counting and distributing individuals before applying for asylum (BBC 2016). Thereafter, according to the number of asylum requests, Germany is followed by Hungary, Sweden, France and Austria. In the same year, Germany and Sweden received about 50% of all asylum applications. The highest number of applications in some countries compared to others is based on a number of factors according to which the refugees make their choice and are related to the country's geographical location, wealth and social benefit system, but above all to the liberal asylum policies and corresponding access to protection status.

Both immigrants and refugees arrive in Europe through four main routes, the importance of which changed significantly during 2015.

The first is the Western Mediterranean route, which is being used by migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa through Spain and Morocco. However, the refugee flows coming from this route over the past few years are very low, mainly due to cooperation between Morocco and Spain.

The second route is the central Mediterranean- from Libya, Tunisia and Egypt to Malta and Italy. This risky route was widely used until 2014 (60% of the flows in 2014), while in October 2013 and April 2015 large-scale tragedies took place in the sea trying to cross the Mediterranean. On this route, the flows are limited as well, on the one hand due to the increased instability in Libya and the high level of risk as it's considered to be the most dangerous one, and on the other hand, because of the tough security measures on the part of Italy.

The third and most popular route is the eastern Mediterranean- from Turkey to Greece through the islands of Kos, Lesbos, Chios and Samos. The flows from this route have increased rapidly over the last three years (2015-2017), transforming it into the main maritime route, as the International Migration Organization notes, which estimates that more than one million people have arrived by sea for 2015 compared to just 35 thousand that have arrived by land (BBC, 2016). The shift of flows to the Eastern Mediterranean is primarily due to a change in the immigration patterns of Syrian refugees and their choice to travel to Europe via Turkey and Greece, as this route is considered to be shorter and easier. The Greek islands are just a few miles from the Turkish coast, making this route safer, especially compared to the Central Mediterranean. Moreover, on several occasions refugees themselves attempt to travel on their own through this route, without the help of trafficking networks, considering that there are enough chances to reach their destination. However, there continues to be an increased level of risk if we consider that refugees cross the sea in plastic boats far exceeding the estimated number of passengers on board.

The last route is that of the Western Balkans, which is crossed by refugees through the Balkan countries (Albania, Kosovo, Bulgaria) to Serbia and Hungary, having as their final destination other European countries. The two main groups traveling through this route consist of people coming from different Balkan countries as well as immigrants and refugees arriving from Greece, intending to stay in other European

countries. As arrivals in Greece increased considerably, so did the flows on this route, a fact that justifies the restriction and the closure of the Balkan countries' borders in an attempt to curb the mass arrival of refugees. It is also worth mentioning that due to increased border and sea controls, trafficking networks seem to adapt to these measures by changing the routes that they follow, as immigrants and refugees from Constantinople have been increasing lately crossing to Romania or Bulgaria. Continued increased security measures in the Aegean are likely to lead to new and more dangerous routes, such as the Black Sea. It should also be noted that in the summer months a greater number of deaths is recorded, as efforts to enter Europe are intensified at this time. Finally, despite the fact that it is impossible to trace precisely the number of victims and missing persons, it is estimated that in 2015 almost 3.800 immigrants lost their lives in their attempt to cross the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas to reach Europe. For the first four months of 2016, deaths have been substantially reduced to about 400, mainly due to the more organized effort to tackle the refugee crisis. As we will see later on, the number of deaths in the Aegean decreased from 1.775 in the 20 months before the statement to 130, showing the immediate effect of the EU-Turkey Statement.

In 2015, from all migrants crossing Europe, 58% were men, 17% were women and 25% were children (Garmikli & Kader, 2016, p. 18). In the same year, more than 80,000 unaccompanied minors sought asylum in EU countries, 13% of them children under 14, with Sweden being the first destination country. At this point, we should underline that an unaccompanied minor is a person under the age of 18 who arrives in the territory of an EU Member State and who is not accompanied by an adult responsible for him/her, or, who is left unaccompanied after his/her entry into the Member State. Furthermore, according to Europol estimates, some 10.000 unaccompanied children have disappeared since the beginning of 2016, while fears are expressed about the possibility that they might have ended up in the hands of organized crime. With regard to the age composition of first-time refugees, about 4/5 of them (83%) are less than 35 years old, while those aged between 18-34 represent more than half (53%) of the total number of asylum seekers. Finally, 3 out of 10 (29%) are under 18, and, as already mentioned, a significant proportion of them are even younger.

Due to a multitude of factors, such as the geographical location and the asylum system, some European states suffer a disproportionate burden because of the huge number of refugees, which can be distinguished in two main categories. On the one hand, we have the frontline states, such as Greece and Italy, which receive a huge number of arrivals, the majority of which are rapidly moving to other European countries. On the other hand, there are countries that receive a huge number of asylum applications, such as Germany, Hungary and Sweden. Therefore, both categories of states are heavily influenced and often negatively affected, which is linked to the fact that asylum seekers in the EU are not homogeneously distributed among Member States. Indeed, in 2013, over 90% of all asylum applications were processed in only ten countries, with Germany and France occupying the top positions in all the countries. In addition, both Sweden and Hungary received the highest number of asylum seekers per inhabitant, which justifies the decision of the latter to impose border restrictions on the entry of refugees into its territory. Therefore, both the asylum procedure and the general management of the problem are impossible without fair burden-sharing on behalf of the European countries.

In conclusion, as can be seen, migratory and refugee flows are complex and constantly changing, unequally distributed and shifted to new directions, causing serious difficulties in dealing with the existing refugee crisis.

In the next chapter, we will attempt to analyze the key points of the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement and a set of individual issues related to the agreement, such as the Dublin II Regulation, the Schengen acquis etc.

The EU-Turkey Agreement on the Refugee Crisis

In November 2015, during the EU-Turkey Summit, the common action plan was introduced, with the aim to intensify their relations and deal with the migration crisis. Despite the progress that was made, mainly with the Turkish labor market opening to Syrians, under temporary protection, with the improvement of the Turkish coastguard's and police's efforts regarding safety issues, and with the information exchange reinforcement (Council of the European Union, 2016), illegal migration flows to Europe continued to exist. Therefore, on March 18 2016, EU Heads of States and Governments and Turkey agreed on the termination of illegal migration from Turkey to the EU and its replacement by safe and legal routes to Europe for those

in need of international protection, under the Union and International Law. The agreement was put into effect on March 20 and April 4th, 2016 was set as the date-goal for the commencement of the return of people arriving in Greece after March 20th and the first resettlements (European Commission, 2016). Therefore, since the agreement was put into effect, a concurrent process begins, regarding the return of people entering Turkey via Greek islands illegally on the one hand, and the resettlement of Syrian refugees from Turkey to Europe on the other hand. This makes clear that Europe takes action, as a continent bound by the Geneva Convention and fundamental asylum rights. Greek and Turkish governments are responsible for implementing the agreement, while the legal and operational processes fall under the jurisdiction of their nation states. The agreement is based on mutual commitments and recessions and includes the following nine principal points:

- 1) All new illegal immigrants arriving at Greek islands via Turkey as of March 2016 will be sent back, under Union and International Law precepts, with respect to the principle of non-refoulement and prevention of collective expulsions. This practice is an emergency and temporary measure, which is believed to be necessary for the reduction of human losses and the restoration of public order. Immigrants arriving at Greek islands will be registered by the registration centers responsible (hotspots) and asylum requests will be processed individually by Greek authorities, in agreement with the Asylum Procedures Directive and in cooperation with the UN Refugee Agency. Immigrants that do not request asylum, or those whose request has been rejected as unfounded or unacceptable, will return to Turkey, under the above mentioned directive. The EU and its institutions will aid Greece and Turkey, so that the necessary measures will be taken and bilateral settlements will be made, which will ensure the prompt agreement implementation. The EU will undertake the expense coverage, regarding the illegal immigrants' return operation.
- 2) The second point provides that for every Syrian sent back from the Greek islands to Turkey, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey in the EU. The European Commission, the EU and other member-states Agencies and the UN Refugee Agency will cooperate on establishing a mechanism, which shall ensure that this principle will be put into effect as of the very day of the return commencement. Immigrants that have not entered or tried to enter the EU illegally in the past will be given priority. In terms of the EU, under the above mentioned mechanism, the resettlement will be implemented, under commitments made by the Member-States, according to the conclusions drawn by the Member-States' government representatives, during the Council of July 20, 2015. Resettlement placements amount to 18.000, while in case of additional needs, additional resettlements of up to 54.000 people will be made, via a similar voluntary mechanism. If settlements fail to terminate illegal immigration and the number of returns approaches the estimated limits, the mechanism will be reexamined (European Commission, 2016). If the number of returns outreaches 72.000 according to the above mentioned estimation, the mechanism implementation shall be terminated and repealed.
- 3) According to the third point, Turkey will take the necessary measures, in order to prevent the opening of new sea or land illegal immigration routes from Turkey to the EU, cooperating with the neighboring countries.
- 4) If illegal traversals between Turkey and the EU are terminated or at least reduced significantly and in a manageable way, the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be introduced. At this point, it should be highlighted that both the member-states and the Schengen associated countries are called to participate in this program voluntarily, depending on their capabilities. The distribution of the states participating should be based on some criteria, regarding among others corporation, reception and inclusion abilities, population, GDP, national unemployment rates, previous asylum provision efforts and candidates' vulnerability. The final decision on admission falls into the judicial jurisdiction of the Member- States, which should cooperate via common processing centers and working groups operating in Turkey (European Commission, 2015). With regard to the admission process, it should be completed in a short period of time, which cannot exceed 6 months. It is, therefore, an alternative approach regarding resettlement, an important supplementary measure in the mutual commitments included in the common action plan with Turkey.
- 5) The implementation of the roadmap aiming at the withdrawal of validation responsibilities for Turkish citizens will be expedited until the end of July 2016 the latest, in all participating countries. Turkey will proceed to the necessary actions, in order to fulfill the remaining requirements, so that the Commission will

submit an appropriate proposition for final approval by the European Parliament and Council by the end of April.

6) The third point provides that the financial support by the EU will be expedited with the disbursement of the originally distributed 3 billion Euros, in terms of refugee accommodation in Turkey and the collateralization of additional actions for people under temporary protection. When resources have been depleted and providing that the above mentioned commitments are completed, the EU will introduce a supplementary funding of 3 billion Euros by the end of 2018 (European Commission, 2016).

7) The seventh point mentions that the EU and Turkey applaud the examination of the ongoing projects on the improvement of the Customs Union.

8) As far as the issue of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU is concerned, both parties confirmed their commitment to putting into effect the accession process, as is determined in their mutual statement on November 29, 2015. In December 2015, the opening of section 17 regarding the financial and monetary policy was accomplished, while the opening of section 33 during the Dutch presidency in the Council of the EU, is set as the next step. This section covers the rules about the funding resources required for the EU budget funding, following the accession. The preparatory work for the opening of new sections will continue at a fast pace, with the Member-States' qualifications.

9) Lastly, the EU and its Member-States will cooperate with Turkey in a collaborative effort, to improve the humanitarian conditions of Syria, especially in some areas close to Turkish borders. This effort will allow the local population and the refugees to live in safer areas.

Therefore, the agreement is based on the Turkish approval of the quick return of all immigrants that are not in need of protection and move from Turkey to Greece, as well as those being arrested in Turkish waters. The EU has proceeded to some concessions regarding the opening of some pre-accession process sections, the financial reinforcement and the abolishment of entry visas for Turkish citizens. Moreover, under the present agreement, the enhancement of the measures against illegal immigrant trafficking networks has been decided. Furthermore, high level dialog between the two parties will be reinforced by more frequent and structured meetings, including the organizing of two summits per year. Concluding, the fact that all points of the agreement will be forwarded together and will be the subject of constant observation must be underlined.

Today, two years later, the implementation of the aforementioned measures has delivered tangible results, while sustained efforts continue to be made by all sides and all EU Member States. In the next chapter, we will discuss in detail the positive and negative aspects of all points of the agreement, the exact way they were implemented and the deficiencies that still exist.

The Dublin II Regulation & the Schengen acquis

One of the key legislative acts governing the European asylum system is the Dublin II Regulation (Regulation 343/2003), which lays down the criteria and mechanisms for identifying the EU Member State responsible for examining an asylum application submitted by a third-country national. All EU Member States are required to apply the Regulation, including Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, which are involved in Schengen cooperation. The Regulation therefore establishes the principle that only one Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application, while its main objectives are to avoid sending asylum seekers from one country to another, preventing misuse of the system by submitting multiple asylum applications, and to ensure rapid access of asylum procedures (Regulation 2003/343 / EC). In order to prevent submitting more than one asylum application by one person and to facilitate the implementation of the Regulation, Eurodac has been established as a Pan European fingerprint comparison system for asylum seekers and certain categories of illegal immigrants. The responsibility for examining an asylum application lies first of all with the Member State which played the greatest part when the applicant entered the EU, which in most cases is the country of entry. Also responsible may be a State which has issued a visa or residence permit to a third-country national who subsequently decides to remain in that state by applying after the expiry of the permit. The Regulation defines objective and hierarchical criteria for determining which Member State is responsible for examining the application, while giving priority to the principle of family reunification and unaccompanied minors protection.

However, the current Dublin system was not designed for large-scale uncontrolled arrivals, which fail to ensure a sustainable and equitable distribution of responsibility for asylum seekers across Europe. This has led to situations where a limited number of states deal with an overwhelming majority of asylum seekers, not allowing national asylum systems to function properly. Greece is precisely such a case, since according to the mechanism, immigrants who enter the country and then move to another EU country should be returned back to Greece, as it is the first country of entry. The system may also be subject to abuse, as it lacks clear provisions concerning the obligations and possible sanctions in case of non-compliance, in particular with regard to the refusal of applicants to provide their fingerprints for the Eurodac system. Finally, the current set of liability rules can also lead to complex and time-consuming procedures, which in turn create disincentives for compliance with these rules for both applicants and national competent authorities. That is why the massive inflows that exceed the reception capacity of Greece and the inadequate implementation of asylum procedures resulted in the suspension of the regulation in 2011, as the European Court of Justice held that the return of refugees to Greece through the aforementioned regulation, jeopardizes their human rights. Other countries, such as Germany and Sweden (2010), have suspended the application of the regulation due to the malfunctioning of asylum systems, which demonstrates the serious deficits in this area. Therefore, there is an urgent need to amend the regulation, which should be based on the principles of efficiency and solidarity.

Apart from the fact that the Regulation is an important part of the legal framework governing asylum procedures, it is directly linked both to the implementation of the agreement and to the suspension of the normal functioning of the Schengen area. The Schengen acquis is based on the Schengen Agreement (1985), which states that the signatory countries have abolished all internal borders, which have been replaced by a single external border, ensuring the free movement of persons within these borders. Today, the Schengen area consists of 26 European countries, 22 of which belong to the EU, while the remaining 4 (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein) are associated members. The current immigration challenge has led to a failure to manage the external borders, which could jeopardize the functioning of the internal area of free movement. In cases where the EU's external borders are at risk due to serious and persisting deficiencies, Article 29 of the Schengen Borders Code provides for the reintroduction of border controls at all or specific parts of the borders of one or more Member States. These are emergency measures subject to a special procedure, while the suspension of the Schengen area cannot exceed six months. It is possible to extend border controls for an additional six-month period up to 2 years, while it should be emphasized that this procedure is not intended to impose sanctions, or to cause the isolation or exclusion of any member state from the Schengen area (European Commission, 2016). Instead, the process aims to mitigate the serious threats to public policy or internal security of the Schengen area, which would otherwise undermine its overall functioning. Therefore, according to the Schengen evaluation mechanism and after serious deficiencies in the management of external borders are identified, the Commission proposes to the evaluated Member State, to take certain specific measures to ensure compliance with the Council's recommendations. In November 2015, the evaluation report concerning Greece revealed serious shortcomings in the carrying out of external border controls, and following a Commission proposal, the Council issued recommendations for remedial action. The main objective of the recommendations was to ensure that Greece implements appropriately and effectively the rules governing the management of external borders as suggested in the Schengen's Code. Despite the significant progress made by Greece, all deficiencies identified until now have not been satisfactorily addressed, mainly because the national border management system did not have the operational and administrative capacities needed to effectively control external borders, according to the standards of the Code (European Commission, 2016). Today, Germany, Austria, Sweden, France, Denmark and Norway continue to carry out these controls in order to address the continuing risk of secondary movements by illegal immigrants from Greece.

Concluding, a key factor for restoring the functioning of the Schengen area is the viable implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement of 18 March in conjunction with the observance of the Dublin rules and with the full involvement of Greece. However, to date, not all deficiencies have been rehabilitated, and despite the existence of the roadmap for the "restoration of the Schengen area", more than two years later, the normal functioning of the Schengen area has not been restored (European Parliament, 2018). Their exceptional and temporary measures, eventually lasted more than two years, are the most important negative aspects of the agreement.

Evaluation of the agreement

The EU-Turkey agreement has introduced new ways of rescuing people and law enforcement in migratory flows, with a direct impact on both the number of arrivals and the number of people lost. In the period prior to the implementation of the agreement, the daily average of arrivals was 3.222, which has now been reduced to 80 arrivals per day, a decrease of 97% (European Commission, 2018). Moreover, the number of deaths in the Aegean decreased from 1,175 in the 20 months before the statement, to 130, reducing the loss of lives by 89% (European Commission, 2018). Another positive aspect of the agreement is the tripartite co-operation between Greece, Turkey and Germany on NATO's action in the Aegean, in the context of improving the guarding and control of internal and maritime borders. The significant efforts made by the Greek and Turkish authorities in cooperation with the European institutions have made a decisive contribution to reducing flows and especially deaths in the Aegean, as noted above. Also, this cooperation has helped to limit new alternative entry routes of illegal immigrants, as the situation is closely monitored by the abovementioned entities, the Commission and Frontex. With regard to financial support and in order to meet the needs of refugees and host communities, by the end of 2017, the EU had fully committed and contracted 3 billion Euros under the Facility for refugees in Turkey, while 1.85 billion has already been paid. Furthermore, according to the conclusions of the European Council, Turkey has been undertaking legislative and institutional reforms concerning Syrians and other nationalities, which allow immigrants to return to the country in full respect of their fundamental rights in the framework of the Asylum Procedures Directive (European Council, 2016). Significant steps have also been taken to dismantle the business model of smuggling, since enhanced cooperation following the agreement has led to a significant increase in activity by the Turkish authorities with the arrest of a large number of smugglers. Finally, despite the fact that each country is different and the EU-Turkey agreement reflects the particular circumstances prevailing, such initiatives can be a source of further cooperation with both the EU and other third countries.

In conclusion, significant progress has been made by both sides for the implementation of the agreed measures, particularly as regards the reduction of irregular refugee flows and the intensification of border controls. These actions demonstrate the collective will of the EU and its Member States to address the aforementioned migration challenges, although further action is necessary, especially as concerns accelerating the implementation of resettlement mechanisms.

From the very start of the planning stage of the agreement, a series of problems- both legal and technical- emerged, which over time became noticeable, making its implementation particularly difficult and its legality questionable.

Starting with the technical problems, despite the commitment of the member states for a certain number of employees, the positions required to facilitate the implementation of the agreement have not been filled. In particular, Frontex received a proposal from 21 Member States for 44 experts and 702 escort officers, while the effective implementation of the agreement requires 50 and 1500 respectively. In addition, hotspots have been turned from registration centers into detention centers, with significant delays in registering and assessing asylum applications. The lack of a sufficient number of accommodation centers and poor welfare conditions, raise questions about the respect of fundamental rights such as the right to medical care or the right to decent working conditions. Further practical difficulties are related to the need for logistics equipment such as offices and computers, while changes are also considered necessary concerning the existing legal framework, particularly concerning the interview process of asylum seekers (Syrigos, 2016). Also, the creation of new hosting facilities and the placement of officials in the relevant departments for the processing of asylum applications, require certain bureaucratic procedures that cannot be implemented within a short time period.

UNHCR and other international organizations are deeply concerned about human rights violations related to the accommodation of migrants in overcrowded and unhealthy detention centers and to the inadequate legal protection for asylum seekers, as both the Turkish and the Greek asylum systems are highly problematic. The most talked about aspect of the refugee crisis concerns the legal status of Syrian refugees arriving in Turkey. Turkey is a contracting party to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, which is the basic legal document defining the concept of refugees, their rights and the obligations of States. However, Turkey has included a geographical restriction when signing the agreement, according to which only persons coming from Europe are recognized as refugees, while those arriving from elsewhere can only be temporarily placed under the asylum-seeker status. The temporary

protection regime in Turkey discourages the long-term integration of migrants and refugees into society, while their rights and opportunities remain limited. In addition to the absence of long-term prospects for refugees, because of the aforementioned geographical restriction, the characterization of Turkey as a safe country does not meet the EU's requirements. Today in Turkey, there are 25 accommodation centers in ten different southern and southeastern suburbs, which accommodate about 260 thousand Syrians or 14% of their total number, while the remaining 86% lives outside these centers in various parts of Southeast Turkey (Aydin, 2016). However, these Southeastern areas where refugees are located are vulnerable to terrorism and separatist tendencies, which constitute a violation of certain provisions of Article 38 of the Safe Third Countries Directive. In conclusion, refugees from third countries cannot obtain refugee status in Turkey; there is neither security nor appropriate living conditions, except for temporary fulfillment of their basic needs, while the concept of "voluntary" return appears to be problematic.

As far as the Greek asylum system is concerned, both UNHCR and other entities have pointed out the existence of serious deficiencies, which have become even more apparent given the current situation. These deficiencies concern key issues such as the absence of interpreters, legal assistance or other forms of assistance and legal advice. Moreover, the registration of asylum applications is a time-consuming process, while few applications are examined daily, as there is no standardized priority system. In addition, despite the fact that the Greek law does not impose the compulsory detention of asylum seekers irregularly entering the country, there are several cases where asylum seekers are detained together with other illegal immigrants even under appalling conditions. The threat of possible detention in conjunction with the terrible living conditions, act as a deterrent to the application for asylum, which further complicates the already critical situation. Other problems identified are associated with the inadequacy of the number of accommodation centers, their underfunding, the lack of resources, as well as the absence of any financial assistance for registered asylum applicants. A particularly serious disadvantage of the Greek system is also the inadequate protection of unaccompanied minors, as they are often treated in the same way as adult asylum seekers. Despite the legal and administrative deficiencies, a series of stricter regulations have been adopted in recent years, such as the new asylum service (2011) and the amendment of the provisions of the Immigration Code in the context of harmonization of the Greek legislation with the Directives of the Parliament and the Council. Such regulations are distinguished by increased quality compared to the previous regime, although they are considered insufficient for the effective management of the huge number of refugees present in Greece. This fact becomes more prevalent with the unequal distribution of asylum claims under the Dublin Regulation, creating an over-accumulation of refugees in the Greek territory. Other issues related to the Dublin Regulation are associated with the fact that individuals who seek or have been granted protection do not have the right to choose in which Member State they will settle.

In conclusion, both the Turkish and the Greek asylum systems do not have the means to properly fulfill their obligations due to their significant shortcomings, which makes impossible the full implementation of the agreement. We also have to point out that all these deficiencies violate fundamental human rights such as those of dignity and health, a finding that raises serious concerns about the legality of the agreement and the continuation of its implementation.

Other negative aspects of the agreement include the limited number of relocations and the ineffectiveness of the voluntary human readmission system. European states have formally pledged to re-install 72,000 Syrians from the 2.7 million in Turkey; however, more than 13,000 are still being trapped in overcrowded hotspots on Greek islands. Therefore, the swapping mechanism does not function properly and together with the closure of the Balkan route, the negative impact is even bigger. Furthermore, despite the improvement in border control resulting from the cooperation between Frontex, NATO, the Greek and the Turkish authorities, concerns are raised about the effectiveness of combating smuggling networks. These networks are considered to be a very profitable and well-organized activity that has been established in recent years in Turkey, so combating them in such a short time is practically impossible. We also have to point out that the EU accession talks, visa liberalization, the customs union reform and the large-scale Voluntary Admission Scheme are on hold. Last but not least, the EU has received criticism for being too slow to deliver the additional funds in order to tackle the refugee crisis.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The refugee crisis is a complex issue of political, social, economic, cultural and humanitarian nature that has become one of the most significant problems of the EU. While the transit and host countries are struggling to cope with the ever-growing number of immigrants in their territory, the rest of Europe is trying to resolve the crisis with a deal. Understanding the extent of the crisis for Member States, and the danger for the Union's external borders, the EU has reached an agreement with Turkey in an effort to stem the massive migratory and refugee flows. However, since the early stages of the agreement, a number of issues have been raised, which call into question its sustainability.

The prolonged, lengthy and time-consuming asylum policy procedures undermine the credibility of the EU and create a climate of uncertainty for all. Also, the Dublin Regulation has proven to be unsustainable, and the Member States' commitments concerning the relocation mechanism have not yet been met. Moreover, the absence of strong external borders directly affects the functioning of the Schengen area and the free movement of persons. A large number of humanitarian organizations are talking about the violation of fundamental human rights, while the unequal distribution of burden in some states over others perpetuates the current crisis. Particularly important is the fact that for many years Turkey was considered to be a buffer state between the unstable Middle East and Europe. Taking into account that Turkey does not have the capacity and the means to manage the Syrian refugee crisis alone, serious security problems may develop in the future, which might entail political and social risks for the EU and its member states.

In conclusion, addressing the immigration and refugee crisis is a joint obligation that requires correct strategy and organized efforts over time based on the concept of solidarity and responsibility. The EU should ensure, inter alia, provision of humanitarian aid, proportionate allocation of responsibilities, and integration efforts for displaced populations. The conflicts and oppression, to which the refugees are subjected in their countries of origin, seem unlikely to retreat soon, due to the degraded situation in some countries, such as the growing instability in Egypt and the escalation of conflicts in Libya and Yemen. Given the absence of positive perspectives, the EU should, through development, funding and intermediation, work with the countries of origin so as to address and prevent the causes of these flows. Further financial and diplomatic efforts will therefore make a decisive contribution to resolving the problem, particularly with regard to the dramatic dimensions of the civil war in Syria. Finally, more effective partnerships in the management of the refugee crisis with the United Nations, regional organizations, civil society and local communities will be of great help in finding a solution and stabilizing the situation.

The EU is currently dealing with a multifaceted crisis, not only political and humanitarian, but also a crisis of legitimacy, which must be addressed in the context of its universal values and democratic principles. The agreement has been criticized for being a continuation of the EU's external policy, meaning large amount of cash in exchange for border control. However, such a crisis requires an innovative template for new comprehensive migration deals. Both the EU and all other countries need to realize that refugees are above all human beings who decide to take the dangerous journey to Europe because they have no choice. If the humanitarian dimension of the issue takes precedence over the national policies intending to halt refugee flows, this refugee crisis would take on a much different meaning.

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“Europe” on National Greek television: Forging the agenda of reform for Europe through media discourse

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the discourse that is articulated for Europe on National Greek Television in the era of the Greek crisis mainly through two unique programs under the title “Europe” and “28 Europe”. In these programs, representations of Europe of the past and the present emerges, and in parallel, an agenda of reform for the Greek-European crisis. Using semiotics and critical discourse analysis, we approach the whole concept, the content, the selected guests, and the prioritization of the subjects. In the framework of National Greek Television and its programmatic principles in favor of the public good, a central question exists: Could the media be the peaceful mediator in Europe’s fateful conflicts, fulfilling the primary mission of real journalism according to the famous reporter Ryszard Kapuściński, and contributing to the restoration of the myth of United Europe?

Keywords: reform, media discourse, national television, journalism, Europe

THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN EUROPEAN CRISIS

In this paper, we intend to examine mainly through critical discourse analysis the potential role of Mass Media as a peacekeeping mediator between the participants of Greek- European crisis, to cancel the martial evolution and probably the collapse of the European edifice. Sun Zu (1995, 30) claims “The best strategy is to cancel the enemy’s plans” and as the great reporter Richard Kapuscinski (2010, 164-165) stated, “I think that the role of mass media in the new map of social collisions is incredibly important. Thanks to media, that has been a kind of mediator between the opposite sides, by the meaning that gives information about the ones’ objectives and the goals to the other”. Moreover, the emphasis in this short study is placed on the Greek state media, that by nature are obliged to afford objective, reliable information for the public good, something very crucial in this explosive phase that the Old Continent experiences. As Richard Kapuscinski believes, journalism cannot change anything immediately, but it can impact on politicians, “we can help them” (2010, 164), as he states, by forming the public opinion and by affecting on decisions. Thus, through media discourse, an agenda of solutions emerges sometimes implicitly, as in the case of Europe, simultaneously creating an image for future Europe. Moreover, Kapuscinski underlines that real journalism sets goals for a change in society. All the great journalists, as he states, giving the example of Mark Twain, Hemingway, and Gabriel García Márquez, all representatives of New Journalism we could add, “struggled for something” (Kapuściński, 2010, p. 163) and through their narrative wanted to promote a vision of the world.

“EUROPE” AND “28 EUROPE”

So, in the cadre mentioned above, two current programs broadcast on National Greek Television, born in the period of crisis, are examined comparatively.¹ Both of them refer to Europe; the first one is under the title “Europe” (“Ευρώπη”) and the second one is entitled “28 Europe” (28 φορές Ευρώπη).² The aim is not only to reveal the solutions that emerged for the Greek European crisis through critical media discourse but also what kind of Europe these promote implicitly. The two programs coexist in parallel in the National Greek Television universe and concretely:

“Europe”

1) Europe is a political program about European subjects and, as the programmatic article of ERT National Greek RadioTelevision underlines, intends to deal with the problems of daily European reality that the citizens of Europe are concerned with, and aims to approach these problems that, according to the article, “has never been headlines.”³

Using semiotics, we can analyze the signal of the program⁴ that remains the same from the beginning (2014). The program starts with the word of Europe (in capital letters) on an azure blue canvas at oblique angles with white letters that gradually become 3d. In parallel, the letters seem to stand out of the azure flatbed, emphasizing the process of creating and stabilizing a multifaceted Europe with a variety of viewpoints. Concretely, it starts focusing on the first part of the word, E UR and after the R and the rest

¹ As for the private domain of Greek television, a little research in the area of Private Greek Television gives restricted elements. The programs for Europe do not exist in private channels with some exceptions. These are a few programs on regional channels, for example, “24 hours Europe” by Ioanna Dementi. It is a program broadcasted directly from the European Parliament through different local channels (for instance Patrida Tv, Best Tv, Syros TV, Shteia TV). Also, as the related programmatic article refers, is the only program for Europe with significant influence on social media and on young people that also corporates with Europol TV. (“Η μοναδική εκπομπή Ευρωπαϊκής ενημέρωσης με μεγάλη απήχηση στα social media και σε νεανικό κοινό η οποία διαθέτει μνημόνιο συνεργασίας με το Europol TV” (Europol TV is the official television state of European Parliament) (<https://now24.gr/24-ores-europii-ekpompi-pou-edraiose-tin-europaiki-enimerosi/>). The first apparition of the program was on 30 September of 2017 on Extra TV and then was broadcasted every Sunday at 23:30 and during the weekend through many local channels referred above (<https://www.sport24.gr/media/premiera-gia-thn-ekpomph-24-wres-eyrwph.4869988.html>). In November of 2017 was in the prime zone of the channel on 21: 00.

(<https://www.paraskhnio.gr/%CF%80%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%B1%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AC-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BD-prime-time-%CE%B7-%CE%B5%CE%BA%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%BC%CF%80%CE%AE-24-%CF%8E%CF%81%CE%B5/>)

Moreover, there is another similar program on Ionian Tv entitled “European Steps” by Dimitra Demeti that focuses every Thursday on 22:00 on the subjects of the daily reality through the European view. Interviews Greek and foreign Europeans deputies and news from all over the Old Continent.

(<http://ioniantv.gr/show/vimata-stin-efropi-european-steps/>), according to the programmatic article of the program. As for the area of national radio, there are a notable number of programs for Europe. For example, one of the older programs is since 1997, the program entitled “I exercise my rights in future Europe” (Ασκώ τα δικαιώματά μου στην Ευρώπη του αύριο). Except the discriminated guest the emission much earlier emphasized on subjects concerning the rights of European people. This emission with Broadcaster Periklis Vasilopoulos on NetFm got a citation from the European Commission.

(<https://tvxs.gr/news/kala-nea/eyfimos-mnea-tis-komision-se-radiofoniki-ekpompi-tis-ert>)

² This emission for Europe is constituted during this period by Kostas Argyros with a new emission with a bit different new title “Citizens of Europe” that underlines expressively the emphasis on the European people as members of the European society.

³ See “Europe” (14-11-2015) <https://webtv.ert.gr/ert1/europe/14noe2015-europe/>

⁴ See “Europe” (9-2-2019): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yLIAMkM7apQ> and “Europe” (22-3-2014) <https://webtv.ert.gr/ert1/europe/22apr2014-europe/>,

OPE from a different angle, upside down, and little by little the shot becomes wider concluding all the 3d letters of the word Europe. The white color, the symbol of purity and integrity, is dominant as the azure that gives a sense of peace and mentality is the ground of all the European edifice. Also, when we see the 3d word “Europe”, the stars of the European flag emerge out. Concretely the first five stars depict on the one side images/pictures of the European Union and especially on the first one, the flag of European Union.⁵ Then on the second one the edifice of European Parliament, on the third one the family photograph of the European Prime-Ministers, on the fourth one the Acropolis, on the fifth one a priestess of Ancient Greece firing the light in the holy land of Olympia, on the sixth one the landscape of Santorini. The rest of the stars have symbols of the values of the European Union on them, for example, books connoting the culture, people talking to each other, implying the real human contact. The stars, that are golden on the other side, spin around, giving the impression that they are dancing in a circle creating the image of a shining community in a blue dreamy colored background. The signal finishes with the word “Europe” and the twelve stars of the European Union in a circle that embraces the word. Simultaneously, the soundtrack is dynamic and rhythmic, harmonious, and vivid, enforcing the feeling of the cooperation and the amity of the participants in this dancing circle.

The hostess is Eva Boura, who interviews her guests from all the political parties on the crucial subjects of Europe. The program is enriched with reports and interviews of prominent persons of the European Union and often researches public opinion of European people or polls. The whole concept is substantially an academic approach, and the discourse of the experts’ wisdom is dominant. Usually, professors of Universities, journalists, political researchers and analysts and from time to time is being heard the voice of European people through the dynamic genre of reportage. Typically, the guests are selected because they are the experts in their field. So, the program intends to present the more profound element of the reality by academic means, mostly in combination with the popular informative journalistic style of a typical political program, aiming to be objective and reliable as a source of information about Europe.

In each episode, the background image has a connotative meaning, for example, the edifice of the European Parliament with the flags of the European states. Sometimes the program is broadcasted from the studio in the European Parliament in Strasbourg.

The theme selected from the European reality mainly refers to as the multi-crisis of the European zone, including the Greek crisis. As Eva Boura denotes in the episode aired 9-2-2014, the program aims to attend the decisions of the European institutions with an emphasis on decisions that concern Greece. Every Saturday, this program, according to its programmatic article, tries to inform⁷ the Greek citizens mainly so as to redefine their relationship with Europe. On the imagination of the Greeks, the cruel reality of their daily life has connected with the European crisis. The program wants to point out the more significant European problems such as the refugee crisis, unemployment, progress overall, development with respect

⁵ According to the official site of European Union the European flag “symbolizes both the European Union and, more broadly, the identity and unity of Europe. **It features a circle of 12 gold stars on a blue background. They stand for the ideals of unity, solidarity, and harmony among the peoples of Europe.** The number of stars has nothing to do with the number of member countries, though the circle is a symbol of unity”. (The European flag | European Union. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/flag_en). Probably the signal has similarities with the design on the commemorative coin for the 30 years of Europe. As the European Union’s official website refers, “to mark the 30th anniversary of the decision by EU leaders to adopt the flag as an EU emblem, the 19 euro area countries are issuing a special commemorative coin. Following an online competition held in 2015 by the European Commission, citizens and residents of the euro area selected the design created by Georgios Stamatopoulos, an engraver at the Bank of Greece. It comprises 12 stars that morph into human figures embracing the birth of a new Europe. [Take a look at the winning design](#)”.

(The European flag | European Union. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/flag_en)

Though it is impossible the inventor of the signal of the program “Europe” to be influenced by the commemorative coin, as the program is born prior, in 2014, the mobility we could say is a common characteristic.

to the environment and in concern with the climate change⁶, energy, Europe's international relationships, the growth of the Radical Right, simultaneously giving an alarming picture of contemporary Europe. So, though the program focuses on the Greek problem, it simultaneously has a panoramic view of the European situation, something evident through its logo. This program aims to change this traumatic feeling because of the European Union and attempts to do it by rational means. Nevertheless, it is notable that in the episodes over the course of 5 years, the institution of European Union is not disputed. Additionally, the title, the scenery, the direction, and the selected music depict the image of a strong European Union, and all suggested solutions are within such a concept. The most repeated phrase through the mural of the episodes is "united Europe with solidarity and peace." The phrase of the hostess Eva Boura is also characteristic for the fundamental view of Europe through this program, who in a recent episode, said, "The European Union is an indisputable organization that has been validated by the history. We have repeated it many times in this program. However, some people want to doubt it and make others skeptical about it."

Additionally, the popularity of this political program is notable, as the directive of National Greek Television decided to keep it because its ratings were higher than the average ratings of the National Greek Television programs.⁷ That also indicates that the Greek people tend, little by little to implicate Europe in their daily lives because of the current crisis realizing that Europe defines the cadre of their lives. It is a typical political program, namely constructed of the journalistic interview as the main genre, of a dominant host/ess and the reportage as an interval genre.

However, in the case of such a program the "discourse of image," according to the expression of George Pleios (2001), semiotically gives additional information than the journalistic discourse itself, as well as the analytical scientific discourse enunciated by the invited experts. So, the whole aesthetic profile and the general style of this program create an image of Europe reformed on the same paradigm: a sane Europe that is not finally far away from contemporary Europe on the condition that we apply the realistic and possible suggestions that emerge from this program.

"28 Europe"

2) In parallel, "28 Europe" is an awarded documentary program broadcast on the National Greek Television produced by journalist Konstantinos Argyros in the era of crisis. It has the dynamic of the reportage on the road, and not the dry atmosphere of an interior round table in the studio. It could be said that it is an open-air program. The title depicts the multidimensional image of the constantly- despite facing increased difficulties- Europe of 28 countries and the antinomies there are inside the European community, as each group of people has their view of this unification through its historical and cultural eyes and the particularities of their character. The guests are interviewed outside and rarely in their offices. Diversity is something that is pointed out in this program. The journalistic discourse uses literary practices to awaken spectators emotionally.

The program's signal firstly starts with the explosion of red color that tends to take the shape of heart finally turned into a parachute that implicitly represents the journalist as a new Jules Verne who makes the round of the European world obtaining a panoramic view. The color red, symbolic of a revolution, of a collision, of violent events that change human history, is the dominant color that gives life to the black and white pictures of emblematic European monuments. Initially, the reporter appears with the upper part of his body full of flashes. After that, he appears again with the upper part of his body full of red moving clouds this time. In both pictures he appears with his hand-tied in front of him connoting that the journalist is initially an observer. Then, the journalist is shown to be walking on a landscape of war and ruins connoting that the journalist become a man of action, a fighter with his own special weapons. The picture talks about a Europe that needs to fight for its restoration with the rules of ethics and real democracy. These images imply characteristics of dynamic, revealing, investigative journalism. Finally, the journalist,

⁶ See "Europe"(16-2-2019): <https://webtv.ert.gr/ert1/europe/16fev2019-europe/>

⁷ In 2017 the program "Europe" had ratings 4,3% under the average of ranks in the National Greek Television. It would be interesting to have data research for the qualitative characteristics of the viewers to examine if, for example, there are intellectuals, young citizens, something that could inform us for the perception of the emission, that is an axon characteristic of her identity. <https://www.euro2day.gr/news/highlights/article/1538678/poies-ekpompes-ths-ert-ehoy-n-th-megalyterh-thlethe.html>. Of course, the same suggestion is for "28 Europe".

Konstantinos Argyros, shows us his face, half-lit, enigmatic, being in the light of truth and the dark of the difficulties and the problems, on the red background, while the title of the program appears next to the number 28 and the word Europe. The first two letters are white and the rest red. Also, the number 2 is in red, and the number 8 is half white and half grey. The connotation of white is purity and hope while the grey implies the grey zone of uncertainty caused by the accession of a new member. According to the programmatic description of National Greek Television, the program focuses on issues, not at an angle of formal, informative journalism but having a different kaleidoscopic view emphasizing that Greeks and other European people talk about Europe as if they do not belong to it, as if “Europe makes decision for us without us”. As this article denotes, “Europe has started a conversation about its future, from the institutions until the practice of concrete politics that has not been fruitful till now.”

Attending the episodes of three years (2016-2019), it is evident that “28 Europe” focuses on the “European” issues, “many and open” as the related programmatic article denotes. However, in this case, the approach is “from the bottom,” we could say, namely through the eyes of the European citizens’ daily reality with a sceptical, a subversive character and in a dynamic, non-conformist style. Analytically, the soundtrack, the style of direction, the camera’s tricks during the journey through Europe is an innovative concept, a bit “rock,” that makes this program famous according to the ratings.

The selected subjects illuminate the dark sides of the European Union. The issues reveal the view of investigative journalism. Characteristically, the “scandal” of Barroso, former President of the European Commission, concerning his recruitment by Goldman Sachs, the American multinational finance company is the central subject in an episode posing many questions about the ethical rules that the European Union adopts, given that only a woman European commissioner reacted against this. It is notable that this crucial issue is absolutely neglected by the program “Europe”. Another thematic choice is the murder of a journalist in Malta, or the tragedy of Baclatand, the poverty in England, the results of Brexit, and the attitude of Ireland. The program attempts to investigate the reasons for Euroscepticism, deconstructing the superstition of the European Union’s enemies and forging the image of an ideal Europe, a Europe that keeps the particularities of each country obtaining a vibrant identity and having ethics. The journalist follows the rule that the doctor should examine first the environment of the sick member (Greece in this case) so as to find its therapy. So, here the eye of New Journalism is present.

This eye of New Journalism is apparent also in many episodes focused on the cultural particularities of every European country supplying cultural information of the highest interest for the past of European civilization making Europe more familial to Greek people. A characteristic example is an episode entitled “The other final. Calcio Storico” on 12-7-2018⁸. When all the people were interested in the Fifa World Cup in Russia, the journalist went to Florence to watch another final, the Calcio Storico, a unique match between different neighbourhoods of the town. It is a game of the 16th century that is considered the ancestor of the football game connecting through this event the past with the present, namely the city's tourism and the legendary socket of Fiorentina.

⁸ <https://webtv.ert.gr/ert1/28europe/12iol2018-28-fores-eyropi/>

Another attractive characteristic of this program is the intertextuality as almost all the episodes open with a selected maxim of a great writer or intellectual promoting the spirituality as a fundamental element of the European Union. It also favors the dialogue of discourse with the semiotic world of cinema, as in the episode for Baclatand that starts with an extract of a relevant film. Also, its titles are intriguing taking for example "The quiz of Jeremy," "Europe made in France," "In the country of Mauthausen," indicating the usage of literary practices and reminding the modes of New Journalism.

These two programs that were broadcast before the "black" (namely the termination of the Station from 11 June 2013 to 7 November 2013) in the National Greek Television had the approval to be continued after the reopening of National Greek Television.

COMPARING ON THE SAME SUBJECT

After having presented the general characteristics of the two programs through a widely comparative view mainly for the period 2015-2018, it is suggested to verify them through comparing two selected episodes that refer to the same subject, to reveal the difference of the two programs expressively.

The commune subject of the two episodes is the 50th anniversary of May 1968 that will be the foundation of this concrete comparative approach.

In "Europe" (on 12 May 2018) (<https://webtv.ert.gr/ert1/europe/12mai2018-europe/>) this subject is presented in an academic style. The guests are representatives of the generation who lived the revolt of May 68 and the new generation, as in this episode the invited persons are three people who participated in the revolt in Greece, in the USA and France. Specifically, the journalist and ex-Minister of Education Petros Eythymioy, Euro Deputy Miltiadis Kyrkos and Spyros Kavounidis, the president at that time of international students at Stanford University, are on the panel as representatives, we could say, of the old generation. Also, Kostis Giannidis, the president of the students of the Erasmus network, is invited as representative of the new generation. Moreover, Helene Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, the Greek academic Byzantinologist and the first woman Chancellor in Sorbonne, is interviewed as well as Makis Kavouriaris, the first president of the Greek students in Paris in that period.

In "28 Europe" (aired on 14 May 2018) (<https://webtv.ert.gr/ert1/28europe/14mai2018-28-fores-eyropi/>) Kostas Argyros remembers May 68 in Berlin. He has chosen the capital of Germany to inform his audience for something that is not well known: how that antiauthority revolt of May 1968 in Germany was the beginning of a real conversation- privately and publicly- about Germany's Nazi past. Moreover, he makes his audience realize that the authoritative construction of the German society, as was for all the institutions, consisted of a cultural revolt that also made a lot of Germans question what kind of democracy their country had. This view still exists in Berlin and Germany.

A widened view, as it does not make the expected references to France and "Danny the red" (the nickname of Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the student leader in May 68), but projecting the relationship of the hegemonic power of the contemporary European Union with this symbolic event for the values of the West World. This choice connects May 1968 with the current European crisis and the German hegemonical policies that have appeared again this time in a civilized context as the European Union is.

Moreover, the persons who are interviewed are not widely known to the Greek audience, as "Rudi" Dutschke, his American (as for the origin) wife, a young man that was shot in the head by a fanatic of the extreme right in April 1968 in Berlin and died some years later from the consequences of this injury. Also, there was the murder by the police of a student in the demonstration against the visit of the Persian emperor and his "beautiful woman." The vice president of the German Parliament, Claudia Roth, who was a protagonist of that period underlines that most of the leaders of this revolt considered it "the spring against the autarchy of the political power."

Choosing the paradigm of Germany, Argyros reveals all the consequences of May 68 in a different kind of program, a program of New Journalism we could say, that with the mode of an essayist analyzes logically but simultaneously heats the emotion of his spectators. The extract of a film ("Der Baader Meinhof Complex," 2008 of Uli Edel) about the attack "Rudi" Dutschke, the travel in the daily Berlin and its monuments with excellent photographs and a dynamic direction are elements of a different aesthetic

comparatively with the first program. All the above mentioned and also the out of studio interviews (as is the bookstore where the professor of political science gave his interview), reveal a radically different ideologically and political attitude, vividly underlying the wire that connects May 68 with the actual problems of the contemporary society. Finally, the intertextuality, which is one of the steady elements of 28 Europe, is verified here. The aphorism of Tomas Man for the young means that young is not only by nature. We can always be all young, as according to Tomas Man, young is whoever wants to fight against the system.

Moreover, H. Funke, the German professor of political sciences, contests that there are individuals inspired from the values of May 1968. Nevertheless, according to him, there is not nowadays any massive movement that could practically change the world, as it happened in May 1968 with the movement of students, from which other contemporary movements derived.

Thus, we could say that the first program appears to be historical and without concrete suggestions about the future. Though there was a representative of the new generation present in the studio, the view on the subject was regional, aiming at pointing out the Greek protagonists of this period more than the global dimensions of the revolt. The most stimulating point was the statement of the European Depute that refers concisely to the coral aspects of the movement of May 68.

REBIRTH OR REFORM

To sum up, we could denote that in the first program, entitled “Europe,” the political analysis and a technocratic approach dominate. Also, an agenda of reform emerges that leans upon on the admission (expressively or semiotically) that the European Union and its institutions need not change radically, affording practical and realistic solutions. The suggested solution in the program entitled “Europe” has a functional and technical character; for example, the reorganization of the Greek Public Administration, and the exploitation of European funds. There are plenty of useful solutions for various problems, but it does not seem to suggest the change of the European paradigm. The program points out the formal political discourse of political parties in the protected environment of the studio. Moreover, a negative characteristic is that the same guests are invited repeatedly something that does not show a robust polyphonic character.

The second program, entitled “28 Europe”, attempts to change the European paradigm through selected issues while being radically innovative. Moreover, through critical discourse analysis, we have contested that the discourse of the image supplies more information than the discourse itself. Exciting quotes, paradigms of the distinct literary genre of maxims (aphorisms), enrich this program in a stimulating way. Using this genre, according to Bakhtinian textual dialogue (1980), a Europe without borders, based on a spiritual communication emerges in contrast with the Europe of technical characteristics and numbers, the Europe of the humanism and simultaneously the European people with their cultural particularities are featured, as they make Europe multicolor, multilingual, and polyphonic. The power of the interviewer does not exist here, and the voices of people not necessarily Eurosceptic, are mixed alternatively with the places and monuments of Europe. The Greek crisis in the mural of these episodes becomes a little piece of the European crisis. Representatives of alternatives parties talk to the camera concisely and precisely. This program focuses on the problems of the European daily life, as they are expressed “from the bottom” and forge an agenda of rebirth, not just reform, especially as for the ethical values.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Finally, both programs favor Europe, but in the program “Europe” very often the discourse of concrete political representatives is heard at a classic journalistic roundtable of a dominant journalist. The other program “28 Europe” points out that we want another Europe, the Europe of the people. The style of “Europe” gives an agenda of reform, not a rebirth of Europe. Thus, it looks a bit superficial, suggesting necessary structural changes and providing reliable information. Despite this, an agenda of reform/rebirth of Europe has emerged from the two programs. Could we combine them for the sake of the European people? However, from the two programs, an idealistic macro agenda of rebirth can emerge, having the main principles based on diversity, on dialogue, on ethics and a realistic micro agenda of practical and

technical restoration of Europe. Nevertheless, the two programs studied verify that the aesthetic is politics and that the discourse of image is many times more informative about the ideology and view on the world than the journalistic discourse itself.

National Greek Television correctly gives tribute to both of them affording the chance to the journalists to be peacemaking mediators. However, primarily, according to the above mentioned, Konstantinos Argyros' program that "struggles for something," as Kapuscinski states, something more than the information. It attempts to deconstruct the stereotypes by placing emphasis on civilization, to touch the inner emotion and the human conscience and in such a way to eliminate the communicational obstacles, fulfilling the mission of journalism in our complicated world.

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The actorness of the EU and the Western Balkans: towards permanent liminality?

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ABSTRACT

In this article, the author examines the EU's identity in relation to the concept of external Other. It is argued that the EU identity formation represents a relational process shaped not only by its interaction with national identity but also with significant others, necessary for the defining/redefining and manifesting of the EU's identity. The paper focuses on the Western Balkans as an external Other in the process of constructing and shaping the EU actorness. It goes beyond the clear-cut dichotomy in the self/other relation, introducing the concept of liminality as a useful analytical tool in explaining the identity of these two actors. The article suggests that both the EU and the Western Balkans are "stuck" in a liminal position, i.e. trapped in-between different sets of role expectations which could lead to the permanent liminality.

Keywords: EU, Western Balkans, liminality, enlargement, identity.

INTRODUCTION

What represents the international identity of the European Union? How do we define the EU as an international actor? When speaking of EU actorness in international relations, many scholars use different concepts to describe the specific nature of the EU in international relations, in order to highlight the difference between the EU and other actors, to define the EU as something that is not what the other actors are (cf. Ojanen, 2018). However, the purpose of this article is not to debate different concepts used to define the *uniqueness* of the EU as an international actor. Rather, the article looks at EU actorness through the self-other identity nexus. It starts from the premise that the EU identity-creation is a relational process, shaped not only through its interaction with national identity, but also with significant others. The EU cannot be the sole author of its identity and the different others are necessary to define/redefine and manifest its identity (cf. Triandafyllidou 2008; Neumann, 1998). Accordingly, EU actorness is regarded in this article as a particular identity of the EU vis-à-vis external others, reflected in its ability to change others through the spreading of particular norms. It is argued that the EU enlargement policy is the main tool of the EU's capacity to project its norms and values. Among a variety of others that are significant in the constitution of the EU identity through the process of enlargement, the article focuses on the Western Balkans as the EU's external Other. In this article, the EU- Western Balkans identity construction is perceived not as a clear-cut dichotomy in the self/other relation, but as a possibility of different juxtapositions that can be theorized as constituting processes of linking and differentiation. Hence, the article focuses on the concept of liminality as a "middle position" in the self/other relation. The concept of liminality refers to "in-between situations and conditions characterized by the dislocation of established structures, the reversal of hierarchies and uncertainty about the continuity of tradition and future outcomes" (Horvath, Thomassen, Wydra, 2015, p. 2). Thus, the concept of liminality makes a useful analytical tool which could demonstrate the oscillation between binary oppositions and questioning of stable identities and hierarchies.

The article will be structured as follows. We will first discuss the impact of the external Other and its significance for the EU identity-creation. In addition to analysing the neatly set dichotomy of the self/other relation in international relations theory, the concept of liminality is introduced as a useful analytical tool in order to explain the changing nature of identity. The second part of the article focuses on the Western Balkans as the EU's external Other. The article argues that the relation between the EU and the Western Balkans in the enlargement process is characterised by the liminal position of both actors. Although by definition temporary, the liminal position of the EU and the Western Balkans could lead to a permanent state, given that both actors are trapped in-between differing sets of expectations.

The EU identity and impact of external Other

Gerard Delanty points out that the term "identity" is widely used but also often abused (Delanty, 2005, p. 51), while Bo Strath argues that identity is "a problematic and fluid concept" (Strath, 2002, p. 387). Notwithstanding the numerous definitions of identity in a variety of disciplines, certain features of identity can be distinguished as such (Stojadinović, 2011). Identity arises as a product of social interaction and thus is socially constructed. Identity is not given, fully formed, but is created in social action as an expression of a social actor's self-understanding and self-recognition. Therefore, identity is not a fixed, unchangeable category but a dynamic, contextual, flexible one. Identity is a mode of self-understanding, a wider conceptual framework that enables understanding and explaining the world around us (Stojadinović, 2012, pp. 27-8). Also, identity is two-faced, simultaneously implying similarity and difference. Every search for identity implies differentiating oneself from what one is not. The self/other relation is dialectical: there is no self without the other.

The concept of other is widely explored in academic research studies. This is evidenced by myriad important studies in social sciences that provide us with the useful insights into the conceptual analysis of self and other. Some scholars introduced the self/other identity differentiation into EU integration studies (Delanty, 1995; Neumann, 1998, 1999; Rumelili, 2004; Diez, 2005; Hansen, 2006; Neumann and Welsh, 1991). They underlined the dichotomy between self and other as pivotal in the making of the European identity. Accordingly, EU identity is regarded by these authors as a relational process, shaped not only by the interaction with national identity, but also with significant external others (Triandafyllidou, 2008, p. 280).

Yet, despite the fact that the notion of identity and the process of identity-formation in relation to other has gained considerable attention, the impact of the external Other on the process of identity-formation remains underexplored in international relations studies (Lucarelli, 2011, p. 149). This lack of interest is related to the fact that identity as a constitutive element of international politics was for a long time neglected in international relations theory due to the domination of state-centric approaches to international relations. However, with the development of the constructivist approach in international relations theory and its conceptualisation of global politics in terms of the social interaction processes in which actors engage, identity has become a key variable in the domain of European integration studies. Mainstream constructivism (conventional constructivism) concentrates on the role of norms and ideas in shaping international political outcomes (Checkel, 2006). The focus of this approach is on social ontology, i.e. question how ideational or normative structures constitute agents, their interests and their identity. However, by attempting to answer the question how collective identities relate to other identities, conventional constructivism neglects the relationship between identity and difference. Specifically with regard to the EU, it considers that the EU identity is constituted by characteristics that are internal to the EU, ignoring the effect of Others in the constitution of this identity. Hence, the EU is perceived as a new type of international actor with a value-based or normative identity ("normative power"), based on its singularity in terms of its evolution and character (Manners, 2002; Whitman, 2011). Positive/inclusive forms of differentiation contribute to the process of EU identity construction, while the impact of Other is downplayed in the process of EU identity construction.

Contrary to conventional constructivism, the poststructuralist approach of identity in international relations (Campbell, 1992; Delanty, 1995; Doty, 1996; Diez, 2005; Hansen, 2006; Neumann, 1999; Neumann and Walsch, 1991) underlines the importance of the nexus between collective self and its others in the process of identity construction. It views identity on the basis of the clear-cut self/other dichotomy, i.e. mutually exclusive oppositions. The constitution of identity does not thus mean the dynamics of homogenisation and association, but a continuous delineation of the self from the other. In the poststructuralist view, identity formation through differentiation implies a hierarchy and subordination. Central to the construction of identity is asymmetry of power in the self-other relation. According to the poststructuralist approach, discourse represents the key mechanism in the social construction of reality and the definition of power relationship in society. Discourses have performative power, i.e. rhetorical strategies inherent in discourses contribute to the way we perceive social facts (Carta, Morin, 2013, p. 22). Through discourse, identity is produced and reproduced in contrast to Other. The poststructuralist standpoint argues that the EU identity is not constituted only by characteristics that are internal to the EU, but also by its external others.

Therefore, the EU as an international actor represents a construct which not only designates the EU as a distinctive kind of actor in international politics, but also determines the nature of the relationship the EU has with Others (Diez, 2005; Hansen, 2006; Rumelili, 2004).

However, "the stability of social order relies not only on neat oppositions but also on the acceptance of the unclassifiable, of surprises and coincidences, and of ambiguity and fuzziness" (Giesen, 2012, p.789). Although the poststructuralist standpoint argues for the relational understanding of identity and is interested in deconstructing social and discursive structures (Rumelili, 2012), it fails to explain "what falls between neat clean-cut categories" (Malksö, 2012, p. 483 and p. 486). The concept of liminality, as a space "in between the opposites, as the third possibility, the transition between inside and outside, the "neither...nor" or the "as well as" (Giesen, 2012, p. 788), has been generally neglected in international relations theory as well as in European integration studies (cf. Rumelili, 2012, Malksö, 2012).

Introduced and developed in the field of anthropology by Arnold van Gennep (Gennep, 1960), the concept of liminality, in Gennep's view, relies on the universal constant of transition of human beings from one social status to another. There is a pattern (French: schema) that always occurs in this process of transition i.e. rites de passages, which involves three distinct stages: rites of separation, liminal or threshold rites and post-liminal rites. Through this three-stage structural change, each individual rejects the old identity and acquires a new one. The liminal or threshold stage is characterized by a temporary period of timelessness and social structurelessness. Thus, the concept of liminality can be defined as a condition "neither here nor there, betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention and ceremonial" (Turner, 1969, p. 95). Liminality is a temporary condition, a moment, when the past is suspended and the future has not yet begun. As a process of transition, it involves ritual processes or practices of imitation, led by a master of ceremonies (absolute ruler), as a leader who shows the way how to acquire the new identity through imitation.

Although a liminal situation is by definition temporary, transitory, it might happen that a temporary situation becomes extended, lasting, even a permanent state. Permanent liminality happens "when a temporary suspension of the normal, everyday, taken for granted state of affairs becomes permanent, generating a loss of reality, even a sense of unreality in daily existence" (Szakolczai, 2017, p. 233). It comprises a constant state of social limbo, involving a deep-rooted sense of ambivalence (Szakolczai, 2017). Also, apart from celebrating the creativity of the concept of liminality, the term also allows us to understand "the manner in which a painful situation of uncertainty can emerge and, in particular, how and why such situation can be explicitly used and even artificially provoked" (Szakolczai, 2014, p. 34). In a broad manner, liminality can be applicable to both space and time. Therefore, single moments, longer periods or even whole epochs can be liminal (Thomassen, 2009, p. 16). According to some authors, liminal places can be more extended areas, like "borderlands" or even whole countries, placed in-between positions between larger civilizations (Thomassen, 2009, p. 16). Also, liminal experiences can be "artificially produced" as in rituals, or they can simply happen (Thomassen, 2009, p.18).

In recent years, some authors have focused on the concept of liminality in the international relations (IR) theory (Rumelili, 2012, Malksö, 2012, Neumann, 2012). By highlighting that IR theory is mostly concentrated on the construction of rigid formal dichotomies, they underline the importance of the concept of liminality because "most of international politics happens in between different political subjects that are themselves "happening" as a result of multiple relational links to others" (Malksö, 2012, p. 483). They put an accent on the importance of the permanent liminality as emerging from the painful experience of a prolonged state of political ambiguity (Malksö, 2012). According to some authors, liminality should be examined in IR theory as both a temporal and spatial category, as well as a characteristic experience accompanying the transformative situations and transitions in international politics. These transitions can be sudden, as in the case of revolutions, or prolonged, as in the case of wars or states of enduring political instability (Malksö, 2012, p. 486). On the other hand, some scholars focus on how discourses of international politics construct liminal spaces, position certain actors within those spaces, and how the actors constituted as liminal, in turn, practice their liminality (Rumelili 2012, p. 497).

The EU actorness and the liminality of the Western Balkans in the enlargement process

One of the most powerful features of the EU international actorness is its tendency to "reproduce itself outside its own borders, i.e. to domesticate relations with non-member states and to project internal solutions onto its external relations" (Renner, Trauner, 2009, p. 451). The process of EU enlargement became the important focal point for the EU identity formation. Through the process of enlargement, the EU strengthens and legitimises its identity. When an EU candidate country successfully adapts the EU norms, the EU identity is legitimized, while the unsuccessful candidates are perceived as "the other". Thus, EU enlargement is a process that continuously produces sites of liminality around it (cf. Rumelili, 2004). At the same time, however, through the enlargement process, the EU has been undergoing a transitional process of becoming (Pace, Pallister-Wilkins, 2016). As David Campbell points out, "collectivities are always in need of reproduction, which implies that they "are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming" (Campbell, 1992, p. 12).

Thus, the end of the Cold War and the creation of the EU as a new political actor required the search for a new identity of the EU that went together with the (re)definition of the EU's external Others. The EU identity-building after the end of the Cold War and the underlying discourse on its political responsibility for the eastern and southern parts of the European continent, i.e. in terms of spatio-temporal narrative of "Europe whole and free". This representation of the EU was followed by the construction of the EU identity towards others. In parallel with the process of enlargement of the EU to the Central and Eastern part of the continent, the Balkans occupied a specific place as the European Other in the process of the EU identity construction. The newly created Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP) was put into the practice during the war in Yugoslavia. After a failed attempt of the EU to "Europeanise the Balkans" during the war, the identity of the Balkans in this new post-Cold war context has been constructed on the dichotomies of integration/fragmentation, unity/disunity, peace/war, Europeanisation/Balkanisation, civilisation/barbarism, i.e. in terms of clear-cut binary opposition. By the inclusion/exclusion binary, the ghettoisation of the Balkans occurred (cf. Todorova, 2009). The symbolic spatial bordering enabled the constitution of the EU's normative order as a place of governance and upholding of the EU values, in opposition to the "threatening stranger" that violated these values (Vukasović, 2018, p. 8). Therefore, the EU represented the Balkans as the "frontier region", a symbolic feature that transcended its immediately visible feature and represented an instrument of EU power which created a space of exclusion and inclusion (cf. Cocco, 2017, p. 294).

At the same time, the EU enlargement policy became an important focal point for the EU identity formation. The success of the EU enlargement policy in the Central and Eastern Europe led to the construction of a stable EU identity which enabled the EU to categorise the Balkans in a more "benign" manner, by portraying itself as "exceptional" and as example to be followed by others (Vukasović, 2018). In the post-conflict settlement of the region, the introduction of the term "Western Balkans", including the countries of ex-Yugoslavia except Slovenia but including Albania, marks a change in the EU's approach to the region. The label "Western Balkans" is no longer a synonym for conflict, but, on the contrary, is a new term coined in a new context to denote a region with a "European perspective". Therefore, the liminality of the Western Balkans as partly-self/partly-other replaces the binary opposition in the EU identity discourse. The Western Balkans were placed in a situation "in-between", neither here (EU) nor there (Balkans), neither excluded nor included, as a region with a "European perspective". The region represented the Other not as anti-EU Self or non-EU Self, but a less-EU Self. At the same time, the legacy of the disintegration of Yugoslavia posed the greatest challenge for the EU in the process of the region's "Europeanisation".

In 2000, the Western Balkans were included in EU enlargement process. The European Council in Santa Maria de Feira in June 2000 affirmed that the countries of the Western Balkans have become "potential candidates for EU membership" (European Council, Santa Maria de Feira, 2000). The inclusion of the Western Balkans in the process of European integration was reaffirmed during the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003 which stated that "the EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries" and that "the future of the Balkans is within the European Union" (European Council, Thessaloniki, 2003). Due to the double challenge of the post-war consolidation and Europeanisation, the accession process of the Western

Balkans was based on double conditionality: in addition to the obligation to fulfill the general criteria, known as "Copenhagen criteria", laid down for the Central and Eastern European countries, specific criteria foreseen for the Western Balkans resulted from the legacy of wars ("political conditionality") and related to the full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, respect of human rights, the return of refugees and regional cooperation (Lopandić, 2001, p. 172). As a region in transition from one state to another, the Western Balkans found themselves in the liminal position. At the same time, the EU was supposed to play the "master of ceremonies" role, determining the transitional process that the region must undergo through accession frameworks and democracy promotion efforts. The EU was seeking to repeat the success of its Eastern enlargement in the Western Balkans (O'Brennan, 2014).

Today, twenty years on from the introduction of the Stabilization and Association Process for the countries of the Western Balkans, certain progress has been made in "relocating" these countries from the "extreme European periphery" to the European mainstream (Đukanović, Dašić, 2018, p. 6). In 2013, Croatia joined the Union. Serbia and Montenegro are negotiating the membership status and are considered as leading countries in the region. The European Council from June 2018 discussed the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and Republic of North Macedonia (ex-FYROM), after the latter reached the agreement with Greece on 12 June on their name dispute. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo and Metohija hold the status of "potential candidates". Speaking about the Western Balkans at the London Summit on the Western Balkans in July 2018, the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini said: "In these years we have been all working together to draw the region closer and closer to the European Union, politically, economically and security-wise. And we have seen remarkable results, solutions to the most difficult bilateral issues. The Western Balkans are steadily moving forward. And today we reconfirm that we are together with the region on that path, sharing the commitment towards our common future" (European Commission, 2018).

However, despite the optimistic rhetoric, the success of the EU enlargement policy has been far from evident in the case of the Western Balkans. In spite of some progress in political and economic reforms, two decades after, the Western Balkans region still looks like an "unfinished project" (Milovanović, 2017, p. 43). The region remains in a liminal position, "neither here, nor there", "European" but still not fully "European". Despite the political conditionality through which the EU has sought to bolster democratic reforms in the Western Balkans, the EU has not been able to replicate its success from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) enlargement. Although the region has formally progressed towards EU membership through partial compliance with the membership requirements, the profound political reform remains elusive (Richter, Wunsch, 2019, p. 2), creating decoupling between formal compliance and the progress in democratisation. This discrepancy leads to the "pathological effects" of Europeanisation and casts doubt on the transformative power of the EU in the process of enlargement. Or, as some authors contend, "conditionality works well if membership criteria are clear, if the same criteria are applied to all applicants, if they are strictly but fairly monitored, if the findings are transparently communicated, and if there is no doubt that the reward will come once conditions are met" (BIEPAG, p. 5). Therefore, the identity of the EU, successfully constructed through the enlargement process, was faced with instability. Thus, apart from the Western Balkans, the EU also found itself in a liminal position.

It is possible to identify several reasons that account for the slow pace of the enlargement process of the Western Balkans and their persisting marginality on the EU's agenda. First, due to the Union's post-Lisbon economic stabilisation and internal consolidation topping the political agenda, the enlargement policy progressively lost importance for the EU (Wunsch, 2011, p. 27). Since 2008, the EU's internal problems, caused by the global financial and economic crisis, have made the enlargement policy "a second-rate issue" both for the EU and its member states" (Stojić, 2016, p. 2). This was followed by the rise of Eurosceptic voices among the member-state elites, marked by negative attitudes towards the European integration process which is seen as technocratic, undemocratic and damaging to European citizens. Second, critical evaluation of the last two EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 has strengthened opposition inside the EU to the admission of new members (Szpala, 2018). This was followed by the "evaluation fatigue" and "implementation fatigue" of the EU in the Western Balkans after 2008 (O'Brennan, 2018, p. 2). This situation had a

negative impact of the enlargement process of the Western Balkans. According to some authors, the EU developed a "wait-and see" approach towards the region, placing it at the "periphery of the periphery" (Bechev, 2012, p. 1). Thus, the lack of drive from the EU for the intense involvement in the region was accompanied by the slow pace of the necessary reforms in the region. Meanwhile, however, the EU sent optimistic messages, such as promises of membership, declarative support for the fulfilment of the required criteria etc. This inconsistency in the EU's rhetoric lowered the confidence of the Western Balkans elites to continue with reforms (Mišćević, 2016, pp. 143-4). Third, the so-called "migration crisis" highlighted the ambiguity of the relationship between the region and the EU. Faced with a large number of refugees transiting through the region, the Western Balkans countries became the key factor for the effective management of migratory flows towards the EU. Due to the absence of common solutions at the EU level - with the member states divided between those calling for solidarity and those advocating for a complete closure of borders - the EU's internal problems spilled over to the Western Balkans, causing bilateral tensions between states in the region. In this situation, the enlargement policy was "used" by the EU to keep candidate countries along the Western Balkans migration route highly motivated to cooperate. The Western Balkans countries, especially Serbia and Macedonia, were used as the EU "gatekeepers" against the refugee flows from the Middle East (cf. Milovanović, 2017, p. 44). However, the EU's pressure on some countries to be more "European" in this situation, called into question the credibility of the EU enlargement policy, especially in terms of conflict resolution and regional cooperation. This was particularly evident in the case of Serbian-Croatian dispute, leading to mutual accusations marked by inflammatory rhetoric. Thus, despite the EU rhetoric that its enlargement policy is about "exporting stability", i.e. about "reinforcing peace and stability in Europe" (European Commission, 2009), the "migration crisis" was an example of "exporting instability" from the EU to the Western Balkans (BIPAG, p.15). The EU primarily views the Western Balkans through the security lens while the question of democratic practices is left aside. Fourth, from a technocratic process involving the European Commission and candidate countries, enlargement has become highly politicised. This has been accompanied by anti-accession discourses and Eurosceptic messages which have a negative effect on the accession process as such. Furthermore, far-reaching political and economic consequences of the June 2016 UK vote in favour of leaving the EU also had an impact on the enlargement policy, making the future of EU reforms unclear.

The impact of all these factors was evident in the 2015 EU Enlargement Strategy, which fails to provide precise mid- and long-term priorities for the Western Balkans region (Stojić, 2016, p. 2). The Strategy stated that "while there has been important progress by many countries in many areas over the past year, the challenges faced by these countries are such that none will be ready to join the EU during the mandate of the current Commission, which will expire towards the end of 2019" (European Commission, 2015, p. 2). The overall tone of the Strategy is sober and reflects the state of affairs in the EU enlargement process to the Western Balkans. The Strategy reaffirms the "strong focus on the principle 'fundamentals first' in the accession process i.e. rule of law, fundamental rights, strengthening democratic institutions, including public administration reform, as well as economic development and competitiveness and stresses that the progress is being made, particularly with the introduction of legislation and establishment of necessary administrative structures, but that the countries have a low level of preparation for membership. Although the Strategy outlined that "the clear perspective of EU membership is a key stabilising factor for the countries of the Western Balkans" (European Commission, 2015, p. 4), the overall approach of the Commission is cautious and lacks enthusiasm for future members.

Thus, with the EU's economic and financial crisis, accompanied by the migrant crisis, Brexit and politicisation of the enlargement process, the EU's identity has become ambiguous, i.e. unstable and insecure. On the one hand, the EU wants to repeat the success of its Eastern enlargement in the Western Balkans, but on the other, its enlargement approach suggests that the EU's transitional process has come to an impasse on the issue of its transition outcome. Is the EU capable of re-examining its future enlargement, as well as fully integrating the Western Balkans region? Faced with new challenges, enlargement policy has changed and so has the EU identity as an "exporter of stability". The liminality of the EU renders the transition process in the Western Balkans difficult, especially because the governments adopt unpopular reforms and politically costly measures for the sake of implementing the values and principles imposed by the European Union.

The EU dynamism towards the Western Balkans re-surfaced in 2017. In his State of the Union address in September 2017, the European Commission President announced: "If we want more stability in our neighbourhood, then we must also maintain a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans. It is clear that there will be no further enlargement during the mandate of this Commission and this Parliament (...) but thereafter, the European Union will be greater than 27 in number" (Juncker, 2017). The new signals that the Western Balkans are back on the EU agenda were visible in February 2018, when the European Commission presented the new Enlargement Strategy, offering a "credible enlargement perspective" to the Western Balkans. The Strategy outlines that the WB "are part of Europe, geographically surrounded by EU Member States", stresses their "common heritage and history" as well as "a future defined by shared opportunities and challenges", to conclude that a European future is the only option for the Western Balkans (European Commission, 2018, pp. 1-2). However, the document highlights that "much remains to be done across the board to align with the EU's *acquis*", that the Western Balkans show "clear elements of state capture" and that "none of the Western Balkans countries can currently be considered to have a functioning market economy nor capacity to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces in the Union" (European Commission, 2018, p. 3). Therefore, it is emphasized that the 2025 membership perspective "is extremely ambitious" and that the "Union must be stronger and more solid before it can be bigger". The latter statement points to the direct link between future enlargement and a possible EU reform process until 2025. At the same time, the Commission reaffirms the merit-based approach to enlargement, having in mind significant differences among countries in the region in the accession process. Thus, the possible accession of all countries as a group is officially dismissed, although that approach was *de facto* abandoned already with the accession of Croatia in 2013. It is also stressed that the EU has long been "strongly" engaged in the region in order to support the future of the region as an integral part of the EU and that the Western Balkans membership would be in the EU's "own interest".

On the face of it, the new EU Enlargement policy puts the enlargement process back on the EU timetable, as part of its agenda for a new EU in 2025. However, by avoiding to clearly specify when the Western Balkans will become members of the EU and without offering new instruments to facilitate the process, including financial ones, the EU policy overall remains unchanged, insisting that the Western Balkans should "redouble their efforts" in order to complete "their political, economic and social transformation" (European Commission, 2018, p. 2). Therefore, the message of the Enlargement Strategy is clear: it renews the EU's political will and commitment, but without new supportive and more credible initiatives. However, the role of the Western Balkans as external Other was significant for this "revival" of the EU's enlargement policy and exit from passivity towards future steps in the process of enlargement. The Western Balkans revived the "uniqueness" of the EU as a transformative power and made the EU a relevant actor mainly due to the rise of influence of other international powers in the region at the expense of the passivity of the EU¹. As the European Commission President declared, "we must find unity when it comes to the Western Balkans and their future membership. Should we not, our immediate neighbourhood will be shaped by others" (Juncker, 2018). This was confirmed by Commissioner Johannes Hahn, who stated that "it would be unwise and almost *negligent* to leave behind a vacuum that other international actors, *whose values do not agree with ours*, make use of" (Vytiska, 2018).

The EU's ambiguity in the enlargement process leads to the ambiguity in the perception of the EU by the Western Balkan countries. At the beginning of the enlargement process, the prospect of EU membership was taken for granted by the Western Balkans countries as the only option to move forward. Therefore, joining of the "European club" was presented to the region by the EU as the only valid option, especially in the light of the legacy of war and the possibility of sliding back to the "violent past". Any other alternative but the "European" one would be connected with the "retrograde politics of the past", with the "non-European", "non-civilised", i.e. with the "Balkans" (Brkić, 2011, p. 71). In the process of enlargement, the discursive power of the EU to portray itself as a community of "progressive", "role model" values creates the standard of "normal" which is accepted as such by Western Balkans as external Other. However, gradually, with the changing identity of the EU in the enlargement process, the change of the attitude of the countries towards EU membership occurred. This ambiguity is reflected in the perception of the EU as both positive and negative, as a process both of approval and disapproval, acceptance and denial, as a mixture of

"resigned and fatalistic Euro-realism and growing Euro-scepticism" (Belloni, Brunazzo, 2017, p. 29). This is accompanied by a drop of EU's popularity as well as its transformative power among the Western Balkans citizens, i.e. its ability to influence, in an efficient way, the legal, political and economic changes within the countries aspiring to become future EU members. This is notably due to the EU's requirements that candidate countries comply with the values and principles which are challenged within the EU itself, with the rise of far-right Eurosceptic parties (Belloni, Brunazzo, 2017, p. 31). Also, by insisting on regional cooperation, the EU and its member states have often used enlargement policy to put pressures on the countries in the region to act in a certain way regardless of the process of implementing the EU Acquis, especially in the field of rule of law². This was followed by the practice of some EU Member States of blocking the enlargement process in order to force the states of the region to make concessions in bilateral disputes (cf. Szpala, 2018, p. 3).³ Overall, the EU enlargement policy, represented as its most successful policy and enabling the construction of an EU as an example to be followed by others is losing its credibility among Western Balkan countries. As some authors underline, it could take 200 years for the Western Balkans to catch up with the EU average level of GDP per capita (Bonomi, 2018, p. 7). Although the EU has been an indispensable actor of stability in the region so far, the Western Balkans region requires much more engagement from the EU. The 2018 EU Enlargement Strategy represents a positive step in that direction, notably by foreseeing a progressive increase of EU funds that provides for a gradual transition from IPA to structural funds. However, without any concrete promises regarding accession or the next steps in the accession process to Western Balkans, the credibility of the EU enlargement strategy will be called into question and consequently, detrimental to its political leverage.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Twenty years after the introduction of the Stabilisation and Association Process, as a specific framework which will enable the Western Balkans to progressively advance towards EU membership, the Western Balkans are still in the "European waiting room" (cf. Belloni, Brunazzo, 2017). Although the region has made some progress on its path to European integration, it is still betwixt and between, neither here nor there, European but not yet European. The region tends to be captured in the permanent liminality. The EU, on the other hand, as a master of ceremony in the process of guiding the region towards new, "European" identity, is also challenged by liminality. The Western Balkans as external Other played a significant role for the stability of the EU identity as a "norms exporter", values community, "an example to be followed by others". However, in the new context, the EU identity is facing new challenges challenge the stability of its identity as a norm exporter, leading to an ambiguous, i.e. instable and insecure identity. On the one hand, the EU wants to repeat the success of its Eastern enlargement in the Western Balkans, but on the other, the EU enlargement approach suggests that the EU's transitional process has come to an impasse on the issue of its transitional outcome. Therefore, the EU could be also captured in a "constant state of social limbo", especially due to the reawakening of the old debate of "deepening vs. widening".

Endnotes

¹In recent years, China and Turkey are developing deeper economic relations with the countries of the region, making the EU financial support less attractive, due to the absence of conditionality in their financial loan offers to the countries of the Western Balkans. Also, after the deterioration of relations between EU and Russia, the latter is gaining more influence, notably in Serbia and Republika Srpska. The EU responded by actively engaging in the resolution of internal political crises in some countries of the region. This is notably the case with Macedonia during the political crisis toward the end of 2014, when the EU acted as a mediator during 2015, and with Bosnia and Herzegovina, during 2014 and 2015, in order to prevent a further long-term stalemate of reforms.

²For example, the compromise between Serbia and Kosovo in the process of normalisation of their relations was a priority over the implementations the necessary reforms, especially in the field of rule of law.

³This mainly concerns Republic of North Macedonia (ex-FYROM), which was granted candidate status in 2005, but whose negotiations did not start due to the veto used by Greece in the bilateral dispute over the name-issue.

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EU and Islam, Climate Change, Energy Security

The European Union and Islam: An intercultural reform agenda inspired by Romantic literary and linguistic passion, Goethe's educational efforts, current cultural cosmopolitanism, and mindful multilingual mastery

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ABSTRACT

In challenging times for the relationship between the European Union and Islam, this paper offers common ground for agendas of intercultural reform and understanding. It investigates the cultural and linguistic efforts of the exemplary European literary Romantic Johann Wolfgang von Goethe as one of the few Western Romantic writers focusing his cultural and linguistic attention on the Arabic area. Goethe's work, life and worldview are analyzed from the conceptual stance of cosmopolitanism as the contemporary cultural identity form of world citizenship, based on a literature matrix of what constitutes a cosmopolitan person, for instance engagement with specific cultural diversity. Empirically, the paper links up with a previous study of the author establishing three new types of cosmopolitans, before it evaluates whether and how Goethe's linguistic and literary engagement with Arabic language and literature can inspire or reform citizens or institutions in current cultural relationships between the European Union and Islam.

Keywords: European Union, Islam, Goethe, Romanticism, cosmopolitanism, multilingualism

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the European Union and Islam is often described at a crossroads, for instance in social and political aspects, such as regarding immigration policies or the question of integrating religion and the state in national affairs. Respecting these serious concerns, this paper attempts to find common ground, historical and present, not only reconciliatory but also progressive, by showing how undisputed literary masters might still offer inspiration to contemporary students, teachers and European citizens, when it comes to fortifying or reforming Europe's cultural and literary dimensions across national, cultural and linguistic divides, in the interest of cross-continental understanding and collaboration.

To this end, this research brings into high relief the educational, cultural and linguistic efforts of an exemplary European literary Romantic, namely Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Contrasting Goethe to Byron, who is often seen as the epitome of the Romantic author, Goethe was one of the few Western Romantic writers focusing his cultural and linguistic attention on the Arabic area. This paper analyzes and compares selected elements of Byron's and Goethe's work, life and world-view from the conceptual viewpoint of cosmopolitanism as the contemporary cultural identity form of world citizenship.

Cosmopolitanism as cultural world citizenship is based on a literature matrix of what constitutes a cosmopolitan person, for instance external engagement with specific cultural diversity, or internal attitudes of connoisseurship and appreciation. Empirically, the paper links up with a previous study of the author establishing three new types of cosmopolitan individuals, labeled "Advanced Tourists", "Transitional Cosmopolitans" and "Interactive Cosmopolitans", before it analyzes and compares whether, to what extent and degree, and with which limitations Goethe's linguistic and literary engagement, specifically with Arabic language and literature, fulfill the requirements of, and can inspire contemporary cosmopolitanism.

The result should be relevant for a wide range of European citizens and European Union reform agendas: from student and teachers of language and cultural studies, over theoreticians and practitioners of European integration models as well as social and political decision-makers, up to culturally, linguistically and esthetically interested persons who wish to enrich their individual outlook on international affairs and

contribute to the growth and change of the European project through the eyes and life experiences of authors who belong to the common cultural heritage of the European Union, and arguably of mankind.

Comparing and Revealing Byron and Goethe

Popularized by iconic images sporting a multi-colored bandana, the Englishman Lord George Gordon Byron (1788-1824) is often seen as the epitome of the Romantic author, and also discussed as an example of cosmopolitanism in the scientific literature. However, it was the German Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), commonly recognized as Germany's greatest writer and poet of all times, who was one of the few writers of Western Romanticism who focused their cultural and linguistic attention on the Arabic area, specifically considering it as an example for the meeting of East and West (Miller, 2016, p. 908).

This seems especially relevant since Goethe is considered to have coined the term "world literature" in the sense of modern comparative literature studies (Mommsen, 2014, p. ix). This research first compares Byron and Goethe from the conceptual viewpoints of multilingualism as mastering languages in a certain number and degree, and of cosmopolitanism as the contemporary cultural identity of world citizenship.

Empirically, this research then links up with a previous study of the author, which had established three new types of cosmopolitans beyond the existing literature, called "Advanced Tourists", "Transitional Cosmopolitans", and "Interactive Cosmopolitans". We conclude by evaluating both Byron's and Goethe's linguistic and literary engagements with Arabic language and literature against current multilingualism and cosmopolitanism. These timeless learning ideals are arguably ever more relevant in our globalizing world, as can be the insights and heritage of Byron and Goethe as poets, writers and scholars.

Hence literary, linguistic, cultural and educational studies, scholars and practitioners could benefit from, and aspiring writers, students and teachers of language or literature, politics or European Studies could be inspired by their achievements just as by their limitations. Therefore, we will compare these two poets first to each other in terms of Romantic passion for language and cultural learning, then to those students in terms of multilingualism and cosmopolitanism, and finally for inspirational value in terms of potential European cultural policy and reform agendas.

Cosmopolitan and Romantic Passion for Cultural and Language Learning

Some authors stress that a "mix of passion and rigor, of enthusiasm and analysis...is necessary in language learning, and indeed in any type of considered literary expression (which is any expression that puts language to fine use)" (Halliday, 2003, p. 82). Other writers highlight that "a 'Romantic' disposition places the individual at the heart of the language-learning project, accentuating the personal value of the cultural encounter" (Ros i Solé and Fenoulhet, 2013, p. 257).

The latter group of writers further this argument in the direction that "Romanticism...can play out in language learning" to the extent that "studying and entering a new languaculture [sic] can also be a way of living more intensely...Language learning then can act as an affective force that mediates between reason and passion...Language learners therefore...engage with difference and work out new meanings in the here and now" (Ros i Solé, 2016, p. 40-41).

One could consider Romantic cosmopolitanism to be related to such passion for language and cultural learning: for instance, in her 2009 book titled *Romantic Cosmopolitanism*, Wohlgemut maintains that "the early nineteenth-century figure of the cosmopolitan derives in large part from philosophical tales of the Enlightenment such as Montesquieu's *Lettres Persanes* (1721), Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), Voltaire's *Candide* (1759), and Goldsmith's *Citizen of the World* (1762)" (Wohlgemut, 2009, p. 95). She then broadly defines a citizen of the world, or cosmopolitan, as a person who fluidly moves between cultural spheres, exchanging them at will for home countries and cultures (2009, p. 97).

Byron as Romantic Cosmopolitan?

Several authors specifically link Lord Byron to cosmopolitanism in a version which they label "Romantic cosmopolitanism". For example, Wohlgemut specifically describes the English poet Lord Byron as a self-declared citizen of the world, and analyzes Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* as an example of a traveler who left the home country without much regret or looking back (2009, pp. 100ff.).

In more depth, in her 2009 article titled *Byron and Cosmopolitanism*, Esterhammer points out that “Byron is of particular interest in this context because he abandoned his potential political career in England in favor of more covert political involvement in resistance movements in Italy and Greece, then wrote his Mediterranean experience into best-selling and epoch-making literature, especially the long poem *Don Juan*” (2009, p. 114).

Esterhammer particularly stresses some of Byron’s literary and lived experiences: “For Byron...encounters with otherness in life and in literature habitually take verbal form, including conversation and foreign-language acquisition. Byron wrote *Don Juan* as an expatriate, while living mainly in Venice, coming to terms with life in Italian, and intentionally engaging with linguistic foreignness. Before beginning the poem, he spent several months studying modern and ancient Armenian at the Armenian monastery in Venice, having been attracted to this challenge precisely because of the difficulty and strangeness of the Armenian language” (2009, p. 114, referring to his *Letters*, 5: 137).

Esterhammer concedes that, purely on a story level, *Don Juan* “stages encounters with strangers and their cultures, performing these encounters in terms of tourism and imperialism, piracy and rescue, love and language-learning...speaking Spanish, dressed up by the islanders to look ‘like a Turk, Or Greek’ (2.160), and craving an English beefsteak breakfast” (2009, p. 119). However, Esterhammer summarizes Byron’s cosmopolitanism as a foremost literary and theoretical dimension: “Byron’s literary language thus performs experiences of border-crossing...Byron’s poetry can open up an alternative genealogy for cosmopolitanism – a way of recovering, alongside Romantic nationalism, a Romantically [sic] ironic theorization of cultures in contact” (2009, p. 120).

Also, from what Wohlgemut reports from Byron’s travel writing, he seems to have had a rather self-centered and Eurocentric position, combined with an explicit superiority complex, for instance when he writes in his *Letters*: “Here I see and have conversed with French, Italians, Germans, Danes, Greeks, Turks, Armenians...and without losing sight of my own, I can judge of the countries and manners of others. Where I see the superiority of England (which by the bye we are a good deal mistaken about in many things) I am pleased, and where I find her inferior I am at least enlightened” (*Letters*, 2: 3, 35).

However, Byron’s readers receive no clues as to whether he was personally successful, or merely attempted interactive and in-depth engagements with a target language and a target culture, as would correspond to our model of interactive cosmopolitanism outlined below, after Goethe’s Arabic cultural engagement.

Goethe’s Arabic Cultural Engagement

Goethe first started to read the Holy Qur’an in the years 1770-71, in his early twenties, together with practicing Arabic handwriting (Mommsen, 1967, p. 15 and 2014, pp. 4, 12-14). Yet only in 1814, his mid-sixties, he went beyond the script and seriously considered learning the language fully (Einboden, 2014, pp. 60-61; Mommsen 2014, p. 13). As a result, in 1815 he spent around a decade learning Arabic, in hours of daily practice, for example copying verses from the Holy Qur’an (Einboden 2014, pp. 61-62). Already in 1814, upon receipt of the Persian poet Hafiz’s *Divan*, he had decided to write what became the 1819 *West-Eastern Poetry Collection* (*West-Östlicher Divan* in German) (Einboden, 2014, pp. 63-64), a work of world literature in form of a collection of 250 poems in oriental style (Mommsen 1967, pp. 12, 122).

Goethe reportedly and famously expressed: “Hafiz has no peer” (Bell, 2003, back cover). Hafiz was the poetical surname of Shemsuddin Mahommad, who lived in Shiraz in the early fourteenth century, the dates of his life put between 1315 and 1390 (Avery, 2010, p. ix; Bell, 1928, p. 1 and 2003, p. 1; Bicknell, 2012, p. 8). According to Lewisohn (2010, p. xix), Hafiz’s timeless appeal lies in his popular accessibility, which allegedly is even greater for today’s Persian-speakers than Shakespeare is for English speakers. Witteveen (1999, p. 9) holds Hafiz’s poetry to be even more beautiful than that of his more famous countryman Rumi. All this might account for Goethe’s fascination with Hafiz, across the four centuries that separated them.

Goethe’s Arabic Language Learning

Goethe mastered seven languages already as an adolescent: publishing in his native German, he freely corresponded privately in English and French, had a comfortable reading knowledge of classical Latin and Greek, and admittedly struggled with Hebrew in high school (Ullendorff, 2001, pp. 470-473), besides deepening Italian during his later published *Italianische Reise* (Italian Journey). Regarding Arabic, we

know from contemporary sources that rely on accounts of Goethe's peers as well as of his remaining handwriting manuscripts and practice sheets that Goethe combined the study of Arabic with a deep reading of the Qur'an, by practicing the Arabic script at every opportunity given his undoubtedly busy work and writing schedule.

As for the extent and depth, but also the limitations of Goethe uniting literary inspiration with linguistic aspiration, Müller (2014, pp. 19-20) accounts: "While Goethe poetically reflected himself in the figure of Hafiz in the *Divan*, he used the manuscripts themselves for an act of profane writing magic: he tried to familiarize himself with writing Arabic characters. His immersion in the spirit of oriental calligraphy was disconnected from actually understanding the verses he copied. But the copyist wanted to absorb the combination of the spirit, word, and script: 'I'm so close to learning Arabic. I want to at least practice the lettering enough to be able to copy the amulets, talismans, Abraxas [sic] and seals in the original script. In no other language are spirit, word and letter embodied in such a primal way.'" Thus Mommsen (2014, p. 122) concludes that "Goethe would not have achieved the penetrating insight of that final sentence without studying those manuscripts that had come to him by chance".

Cosmopolitan Conceptual Framework

Cosmopolitanism across history and disciplines

Historically, cosmopolitanism has been especially intensely debated during the time of the Greek Stoics of the 1st and 2nd century BC, in the seventeenth/eighteenth century, and since the 1990s (see Appiah, 2006, pp. xiii-xv; Carter, 2005, pp. 15-28; Grovogui, 2005, p. 103; Mazlish, 2005, p. 101). Multiple possible definitions across various academic disciplines have changed over the course of those historical periods (see Trepanier and Habib, 2011, p. 5; Brennan, 2001, p. 76; Pollock et al., 2002, p. 1; Dharwadker, 2001, p. 1). Our cosmopolitan model is a literature synthesis in form of a topics matrix, enriched by considerable critical thinking, and describing a cultural individual identity as relevant for European Union citizens across professions and backgrounds, sharing literary and linguistic interests related to Islam.

Cosmopolitan people being at home in the world

Cosmopolitans "feel at home in the world" (see for instance Brennan's 1997 book, *At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now*), or display an interest in or engagement with cultural diversity by straddling the global and the local spheres in terms of personal identity, with one foot in each sphere, finding a balance in which the global is decisive without having to dominate all the time. This element is expressed for instance in the diversity of European and Islamic cultural roots, such as per their various national, linguistic or cultural attachments, such as against family or immigration backgrounds.

Cosmopolitan global-local continuum

While persons that we typically see as "locals" may not be interested in cultural diversity, "cosmopolitans" consciously value, seek out and try to access local cultural diversity (Hannerz, 1990, pp. 237, 249-250; Pollock, 2002, p. 17). This could be visualized as a continuum along which the cosmopolitan can advance, and which also serves to distinguish between different cosmopolitans with respect to their local competences, as well as between different degrees of competence (and local cultures) within the same cosmopolitan person. This is relevant for instance for the ever-growing number and connections between multicultural societies or individuals in our ever more globalizing world.

Cosmopolitan cultural openness and engagement

A key characteristic of cosmopolitanism is "a willingness to engage with the Other, an...openness toward divergent cultural experiences" (Hannerz, 1992, p. 252; similarly Papastephanou, 2002, pp. 69-70). Yet the individual cosmopolitan is free but not obliged to endorse that culture positively, either in its entirety or with respect to components of it.

Regarding the preceding three matrix issues (at home in the world, global-local continuum, and open engagement), Byron and Goethe seem to differ in several interesting ways: Byron was more actively involved in different geographical locations while Goethe engaged with the Arabic language and culture mainly at home. Yet Goethe, in his literary pursuits was more interested in the Arabic world and literature, and consequently actively and personally sought out and arguably much more appreciated the encountered linguistic and religious diversity.

Cosmopolitan elements of effort and elitism

Cosmopolitanism might require personal effort. Bruckner calls it “finding joy and strength in overcoming habitual limits” (1996, p. 247), giving examples of poets and writers struggling to acquire or express themselves in their foreign language. One could see cosmopolitan effort as requiring all the personal resources aspiring to elements of the cosmopolitan matrix.

As for elitism, Brennan puts forward “the unalloyed goodness of the ‘cosmopolitan’” and argues that “in the English language, its connotations have been relentlessly positive: ‘free from provincial prejudices’, ‘not limited to one part of the world’, ‘sophisticated, urbane, worldly’” (1997, p. 19). Some characterize cosmopolitans as “people with credentials, decontextualised cultural capital” (Hannerz, 1990, p. 246 and 1996, p. 108), while some see “intellectuals” as typical examples of cosmopolitans and in turn naming intellectuals at the same time as the typical example of transnational professionals (Robbins, 1998, p. 254).

In this respect, Goethe’s explicit and literary documented efforts at learning the Arabic language are relevant. Regardless of the degree of success of the outcome, namely Goethe’s personally achieved degree of fluency or mastery of the language, he would have at least credibly and culturally sublimated any linguistic shortcomings by means of his literary engagement with the Muslim world, in his work of the *West-Eastern Divan*.

Cosmopolitanism’s relation to travel and tourism

Cosmopolitan traveling is indispensable for first-hand experiences of cultural diversity (Beck, 2000, p. 96; Clifford 1992, p. 103), yet only if combined with “connaissance” (connoisseurship) and a cultural engagement that differentiates it from mere tourism (Hannerz, 1996, p. 105; Robbins, 1998, p. 254). “Typical tourism” is often limited to holiday stereotypes and cultural clichés with respect to the target culture (Bruckner, 1996, pp. 247-249; Carter, 2001, p. 77).

This could likewise be considered a continuum, showing individuals between stages of tourism towards stages of cosmopolitanism. While both Byron and Goethe traveled extensively in connection with their writing, Goethe’s comparably more extensive real-life travel related to his writing resulted in his 1816 account *Italian Journey* (which was itself undertaken between 1786 and 1788). Here, we focus on his expressions of deep linguistic engagement, which are foremost found in relation to his Arabic learning.

Cosmopolitanism and the location of home

For the cosmopolitan, “home” might not necessarily be the “home culture” any more, but take on an entirely new meaning (Hannerz, 1990, pp. 240, 248 and 1992, pp. 253-254 and 1996, p. 110), or combine several locations or perceptions of home, while it logistically probably cannot be just about “everywhere”. Our empirical part sheds new light on the array of cosmopolitan homes, specially mediated by the linguistic abilities of our interviewees.

Earlier, Wohlgenut (2009, pp. 100ff.) saw Byron as a traveler who had left the home country without much regret, while his Letters (*Letters*, 2: 3, 35) reflected less favorably on encountered cultural diversity. Yet even his English superiority complex does not conclusively reveal his preferred home location. Conversely, Goethe’s *Italian Journey* could be a strong (yet not stringent) indication of Italy as a temporarily adopted home country for the journey’s two years’ duration.

Cosmopolitanism’s relation to the nation-state and to internationalism

Due to the etymological classical Greek origin of *kosmou politês*, “citizen of the world” (Appiah, 2006, p. xiv; Carter, 2005, p. 21; Kemp, 2011, p. 23; Werbner, 2008, p. 2), some reject any cosmopolitan attachments or loyalties beneath an all-encompassing global humanity. By contrast, a more moderate “rooted cosmopolitanism, or...cosmopolitan patriotism” (Appiah, 1998, p. 91) stresses loyalties and ties to smaller geographical or cultural entities, such as nation-states, local communities, or families.

Here, then, it is helpful to differentiate cosmopolitanism from “internationalism”. While they are often seen as synonyms, already etymologically the concept of internationalism (as “between and among nations”) cannot easily explain (as can the cosmopolitan’s “feeling at home in the world”) why a person’s home might actually be *outside* his or her own nation-state, or in several parts of the world. For the same reason, cultural issues that are below or above the nation-state remit (for instance interest in small-scale local cultural diversity, like regions or cities, or an overarching identity dimension covering the whole world) are easier to capture with cosmopolitanism. Here again, cosmopolitanism can complement European identity

given its inclusive nature, so that for instance a EU citizen now has additional choices to his or her national, European, or trans-European affiliation and identity.

Cosmopolitanism and globalization

While globalization is associated with cultural uniformity (Sifakis and Sougari, 2003, p. 60) just as much as with diversity (Scholte, 2000, p. 23), cosmopolitanism actively seeks out diversity. Also, the globalization debate started only in the 20th century (Scholte, 2000, p. 16), while cosmopolitanism's historical roots are much longer.

Regarding the preceding two matrix issues (cosmopolitanism's relation to the nation-state, internationalism and globalization), we have seen Byron openly adhere to his English roots; by contrast, Goethe had reportedly and occasionally in his literary and everyday life expressed a discomfort at the limitations of a purely German educational context. While for neither of them vehement or explicit real-life expressions or proclamations of internationalist attitudes are transmitted, their well-renowned real-life actions speak for themselves: Byron's self-sacrificing participation in Greek independence, and Goethe's coining of the term "world literature" more than fulfil the previous two categories, in both lived and literary terms.

Finally, globalization being a contemporary concept and research category which neither Byron nor Goethe could have foreseen or fulfilled, it is therefore of exclusive and unique importance and responsibility for modern-day citizens in any part of the world, including European Union citizens, or linguistic and literary students and scholars. Thus after summarizing the cosmopolitan conceptual matrix, we will investigate a group of students, before comparing their identity revelations with Goethe's literary and life manifestations regarding the learning of, and engagement with, Arabic and Islam.

Summary of the Cosmopolitan Conceptual Matrix

According to the synthesized literature, the following are the ten main areas of personal concern or engagement for a cosmopolitan person. They can serve as a catalog summary and reference for the empirical investigation below, but also as a dynamic and personally adaptable guideline for a student or teacher who wishes to combine his or her their foreign language learning or teaching activities in transnational higher education with a possible cosmopolitan cultural identity as citizens of the world.

Correspondingly, the last item enables and includes European identity affiliations, in a non-competitive but inclusive, compatible and encompassing manner, characterizing the relationship between European and cosmopolitan cultural identity. It is also the conceptual answer to the literature of how to combine continental and wider-ranging affiliations and identities. It will be empirically substantiated below by our interviewees who link their identity dimensions to their linguistic ability and development:

- 1) A straddling of the "global" and the "local" spheres as a world citizen;
- 2) A "connaissance" (connoisseurship) with respect to local cultural diversity;
- 3) A general willingness and openness towards that cultural diversity;
- 4) A possible sense of personal effort or elitism as achieving a cosmopolitan cultural identity;
- 5) The mobility to travel, as long as not just with a "typical tourist" attitude;
- 6) A notion of "home" that can be extremely varied, even if not everywhere;
- 7) A nation-state attitude between "rooted" and "unrooted" identity;
- 8) An internationalism beyond its nation-state limitations;
- 9) A globalization attitude embracing cultural diversity rather than uniformity; and finally,
- 10) A general compatibility and complementarity with cultural, political and individual notions of European affinity and cultural identity.

METHOD

Investigative Method: Linking Multilingualism and Cosmopolitanism

Out of an overall sample of forty-eight international, post-graduate students at the University of Bath in England, pre-chosen for their multi-linguistic competence, I chose the eleven most multilingual ones via a self-assessment questionnaire of each one's language learning history and ability, with quantitative and qualitative criteria requiring advanced working knowledge in at least three foreign languages beyond the mother tongue. This was based on literature definitions requiring the mastery of "at least three foreign languages" (Apeltauer, 1993, p. 275), while conceding that in such scenarios "it is inappropriate to expect near-native speaker competence" (Morgan, 2001, p. 46).

All our interviewees, between 22 and 27 years of age, had advanced working knowledge of between three and five foreign languages, in all four skills of reading, writing, listening and speaking. Goethe easily fulfils these requirements with his applied working knowledge of four, and reading knowledge of two further languages. However, we miss detailed accounts as to Byron's actual language mastery, outside of for instance a multitude of multilingual character voices in some of his works such as *Don Juan*.

The sample choice reflected that the literature on the identity of multilingual persons is mostly unrelated to cosmopolitan identity. Authors merely find that they are "acquiring a different cultural identity in every language" (Kotchimidova, 2000, p. 130), or that they "have a richer repertoire of linguistic and cultural choices and could fine-tune their behavior to a greater variety of cultural contexts" (Stroińska, 2003, p. 97). Only two writers describe their linguistic identities in plastic but still basic terms, such as "strata" or "layers of a cake" or of "an onion" (Bassnett, 2000, pp. 66-71; Steiner, 1998, pp. 12-127).

Overall, more research is needed on the identity of multilingual persons (Aronin and Ó Laoire, 2004, p. 12; Gunesch, 2008, pp. 74-81 and 2013, p. 178). Only one author links cosmopolitanism to linguistic development, giving examples of writers and poets who learned and prominently used foreign languages in their works, such as Vladimir Nabokov (Bruckner, 1996), but taking for granted that his sketchy cosmopolitan model has a lot to do with language learning.

Hence our interviews were exploratory, in-depth, semi-structured and covert, as the topic of "cosmopolitanism" was explored in a non-guiding manner to ensure full validity for any established links between the multilingualism of the interviewees and their revealed cosmopolitan personal cultural identity.

Empirical Research: Analysis and Synthesis

With the student interviewees expressing themselves freely about their language attitudes, against the background of the cosmopolitan literature matrix categories, which were treated as interpretive and flexible tools rather than fixed categories, it was possible for a pattern of three broad ideal types of (multilingual) interviewee profiles to emerge, which I called "Advanced Tourist", "Transitional Cosmopolitan", and "Interactive Cosmopolitan":

- 1) Even if the advanced tourist is not the "simple tourist" of the literature any more, some interviewees revealed functional mastery concerns, consumerist attitudes, or national identities in ways that limited their willingness to engage with the diversity of target cultures.
- 2) The transitional cosmopolitan is located somewhere between the tourist and the cosmopolitan on the continuum, but developing over the matrix categories towards the third type, the interactive cosmopolitan.
- 3) The interactive cosmopolitan reveals advanced forms of interactive and integrative behavior and mindset, fitting the ideal-typical cosmopolitan literature requirements, especially by displaying an open-minded, flexible, self-critical, as well as giving or sharing attitude.

Empirical Synthesis

These three ideal profile types were then compared to each other by means of an empirical *synthesis*. To show both the elements of the empirical analysis and of the empirical synthesis, each of the below quotes, separated from each other as paragraphs, corresponds to a statement made by one individual interviewee;

where several of them are assembled under an ideal type and under a specific aspect, it is done to highlight the nature and process of the empirical synthesis. Quotation marks have been maintained to stress the “spoken and spontaneous” character of these statements, and to set off more clearly one interviewee from another in statements that follow each other within one ideal type.

DISCUSSION

First New Ideal Type: Advanced Tourist

The advanced tourist’s identity dimensions center on local, regional, or national dimensions, and despite declarations of openness and worldliness, the emotional inner world reveals parochial or local limits with respect to the matrix issues of “identity dimensions” or “home”:

“First of all I’m Basque, and afterwards a European. I don’t know; my European feelings haven’t been very developed yet.”

The advanced tourist stresses the professional usefulness of language learning, which suggest the advanced tourist being a prototype of “transnational occupational cultures” (Hannerz, 1990, pp. 243, 246 and 1996, p. 108; similarly Robbins, 1998, p. 254):

“I think why I chose Spanish is especially because...Latin America is for Political Scientists a very interesting field of study...This was more utilitarian, to have more possibilities afterwards with the language...to find a job, in the now uniting Europe or in a job market that is getting more international every time.”

Second New Ideal Type: Transitional Cosmopolitan

Transitional cosmopolitans, on the continuum between the advanced tourist and the interactive cosmopolitan, might for instance profile as still advanced tourists regarding certain matrix issues, such as the question of home, where national and even local attachments prevail, with wider attachments only established exceptionally:

“I tend to live wherever I go...It’s where you are brought up, where you had your first friends, and where you live, where your parents’ house is...But then, you have other parts of the world where you feel very comfortable as well...Madrid...became my second home...It usually doesn’t happen...but when it happens, it’s something exceptional.”

On the other hand, transitional cosmopolitans can have a very cosmopolitan attitude towards their (native) nation-state, with foreign sympathy triggering compatriot criticism:

“The nation-state makes you homogeneous, and makes you patriotic, and gives you myths, gives you symbols, and gives you a whole set of ideas which are not very helpful if you want to live as a global person, and not as an ethnocentric person.”

“I have been treated as a xenomaniac [sic] by my friends sometimes... The fact that I can criticize Greece, it means that for them [the Greeks] I am a little bit of a foreigner.”

Although he does not refer to the use of his linguistic or cultural knowledge or achievements in professional terms, and much less so in contemporary terms, his above-mentioned evaluations of other cultures might reveal Lord Byron to be positioned between the Advanced Tourist and the Transitional Cosmopolitan. His worldliness, travels, and passionate, self-involving abroad exploits hint at a real-life Transitional Cosmopolitan stage. However, he does not, at least not convincingly strong, seem to embody the interactively engaging and openly appreciating stage of the Interactive Cosmopolitan.

Goethe, on the other hand, is manifestly much more comfortably able to embody this type. His world literature opus *Italian Journey* chronicles an extended encounter with the country and its culture, and already by itself testifies to the willingness to submit to another cultural and linguistic framework’s precepts. Goethe’s extension of the trip beyond its originally planned duration also suggests a personal readiness to overcome national (German) backgrounds and settings of expectations regarding engagement with, and enrichment by local cultural diversity and people.

Third New Ideal Type: Interactive Cosmopolitan

The interactive cosmopolitan is the most open-minded, flexible, holistic and giving of the three ideal types, substantiating and contributing to core literature on cosmopolitanism. This type also has the widest and linguistically intensive mediation of vital matrix categories; languages are much more pervasive and important. For instance, interactive cosmopolitans personalize the link between multilingualism and cosmopolitanism by rephrasing the key aspect of “effort” in one of the most advanced literary concepts of cosmopolitanism, namely Bruckner’s “finding joy and strength in overcoming habitual limits” (1996, p. 247) in linguistic terms, when overcoming linguistic insecurities and learning stages:

“[Learning and keeping up Dutch] was always kind of like a struggle, it was always hard to maintain, somehow. But...I could find out something that was beyond my limits...Through improving your language...you always go a step further.”

“I would really look forward to that [being in a culturally completely unfamiliar environment], if I could. When I went to Morocco...I was just so amazed...that...it was just totally different...a bit uncomfortable, but because I couldn’t speak the language.”

“I would be curious [in that culturally unfamiliar environment], nosy, would like to get to know...and would look for the keys...Keys being...language as a main source...Of course it’s also again feeling insecure, feeling incapable...but I think the feeling, or the eagerness of wanting to cope would be higher, or weigh more.”

The interactive cosmopolitan’s linguistic mastery enables a highly open, interactive and two-way cultural engagement, culminating in critical reflection about the own country and culture:

“[Languages] mean the opportunity of learning...Not only learning about people...It also would inspire your personal view of things. It makes you more open...It makes me feel more that I know where I’m going, and getting to know people better.”

“If I travel, I like to talk with people, and to learn something about their country and to learn then something about mine...Language learning...it’s a way of education, it’s a way of learning not only more about other cultures but also about yourself...You can anticipate to give something.”

The more interactive a person is, the more he or she sees the professional and the private aspects of learning and using foreign languages are indissolubly intertwined. The reasons for such persons’ learning and use are also in development, from function or profession to mind-set, worldview, and up to aesthetics. Experiences and references beyond Europe are clearly contrasted but at the same time integrated with continental ones:

“In contrast with European languages, you see that there are other systems, other ways of indicating things. For instance...my first inclination [of interest in the Arabic language] was because of the artistic way of writing. It’s really like a piece of art...It’s a beautiful language...In Turkey...in a store...the lady...gave me a...very beautiful bilingual Qur’an”.

Interactive cosmopolitans concede a “foreign identity” without substantiating it linguistically, yet they allow to be taken into “another sphere” when using certain languages. This is almost on a par with the “strata”, “layers” or “onions” dimensions described by two authors on the identity of multilingual persons (Bassnett, 2000, pp. 66-67 and Steiner, 1998, pp. 120-125):

“I act differently when I speak Spanish. I’m more in the Spanish way of life. A bit more open, I’m more eager to say personal things...Maybe because values, education, family, and so on, brought with them, aren’t established in my Spanish identity. ‘Spanish identity’, of course, is an exaggeration, but when I speak Spanish...I have several identities, but you can’t stick to the languages.”

“Speaking with a Dutch person carries me into another sphere. So kind of this cake [of my identity dimensions] changes and shifts, like from context to context...But a piece of it is definitely always Dutch...It’s another way of seeing, of perceiving, I think...of being aware of yourself and of other people.”

For an interactive cosmopolitan, language knowledge is an essential and indispensable factor for feeling at home, indeed a matter of global identity, where languages serve as a passport or qualifier to access and cope in foreign environments:

“Knowing the language well doesn’t make you feel at home. But you cannot feel at home unless you know the language.”

“The language that is necessary to cope in the [everyday] situations is a basic factor of feeling [at] home.”

Finally, the interactive cosmopolitan’s picture of “home” is highly differentiated, multi-dimensional and complex, strikingly reflecting Hannerz’s alternatives of “a privileged site of nostalgia”, or “a comfortable place of familiar faces, where...there is some risk of boredom” (1990, p. 248 and 1996, p. 110). “Home” can also be different according to geographical context, in complex diversity of dynamic interactions, embraced with an open attitude, or involving multi-sensory perceptions (the second voice refers to Egypt’s and Cairo’s souks and bazaars):

“[Home:] How boring, at first. But of course, it’s more than that...The word ‘home’ is ‘stick to the same place’, and I would like to move a lot...I would like to say that it is an uninteresting concept, but I still have some nostalgia towards home.”

“It [home] means people I relate to...But it’s not something where you’re born. It is also where you’re born, but other home places accumulate... It captures all of your senses, it’s what you see, it’s also what you smell...Then again it depends on the context...I would say that “a home” is a place where I can live any mood, a range of different situations.”

With the advantage of Goethe’s detailed chronicle of the *Italian Journey*, it seems safe to say that he, at least in European geographical and cultural terms, over-fulfils even the student’s example of personal cultural and linguistic engagement. Even by today’s standards of Marshal McLuhan’s “global village” with its worldwide integrated communication as well as travel and tourism networks, devoting a substantial period of one’s personal life, and involving a hiatus from one’s professional life, can still be seen as remarkable, if not outstanding. Specifically with respect to Islamic culture and the Arabic language, his efforts, however judged in terms of linguistic success, surpass or at least equal the revelation of the student who familiarized himself with the Arabic script, or appreciated being presented with a beautiful edition of the Qur’an. Altogether, it is the analysis of Goethe and the synthesis of our students’ newfound three ideal cosmopolitan types that will inform our conclusions and recommendations regarding European Union intercultural reform agendas, aspirations and inspirations.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Concluding Comparisons between Literary and Real-Life Cosmopolitans

Comparing Goethe’s and Byron’s Romantic and contemporary cosmopolitanism

Goethe’s 18th-century multilingualism was exemplary even by today’s standards, as is his literary cosmopolitanism in his *West-Eastern Divan*, and his personal cosmopolitanism as described in his *Italian Journey*. However, these occasions are rare and limited to specific countries, cultures and locales. Other than some of our students, Goethe did not have direct local contact with the Arabic language or culture.

Our most multilingual and cosmopolitan students’ personal engagement and sharing in Arab culture included open appreciation of the beauty of the Arabic language. They share these expressions with Goethe, over eras, ages and disciplines. Remarkably, they already had first-hand local experience of Arab culture, writing and literature; for instance when mentioning a shopkeeper’s gift of “a beautiful Qur’an”. Even so, Goethe’s linguistic and literary-cultural achievements, despite his limited success in mastering the Arabic language, would arguably place him among our Interactive Cosmopolitans as well.

Alas, the same cannot be said about Byron, as we lack any detailed and reliable accounts of his real-life language mastery beyond English. His literary or real-life identity revelations in terms of our research would at best let us locate him in places between the Advanced Tourist and the Transitional Cosmopolitan.

However and altogether, literary Romanticism seems to be a repository of representatives, ideas, ideals and therefore inspirations that are suited and recommendable for contemporary cosmopolitans or European Union citizens in their individual and international cultural engagement, specifically in relation to cultural, linguistic and literary aspects and influences of Islam.

Recommendations for Contemporary Cosmopolitans and European Reform Agendas

Recommending modern students' romanticism, multilingualism, and cosmopolitanism

With their lived, personal cultural engagement, our investigated students arguably more than “hold their ground” next to one of Romanticism’s and world literature’s exemplary figures. This is probably good news for all those of us whom Goethe’s literary and worldly achievements might intimidate, having been brought up on Dr. Faust’s famous exclamation of having studied most existing subjects and faculties yet still ending up just as clever as before.

Thus the revelations of our students, combined with the freshly gained perspective on Goethe might inspire language learners, travelers, cultural aficionados, and culturally sensitive readers and writers for their own linguistic and cultural projects. Since historic and comparative awe are often obstacles in students’ engagement with literature and their most famous representatives, it is recommended to use the insights of this research to provide them with motivation and inspiration in their studies of Romantic works and authors. In the context of the European project, it also fills us with a sense of achievement over the last one and a half centuries, since personal educational developments until Romanticism reserved to literary and cultural elites now seem to have been successfully opened up to young European students.

Relation of Romanticism, literary and linguistic passion, and European reform agendas

As for the European continent and the Union’s relationship with Islam, both cultural and literary giants as well as contemporary language-conscious students have been found to share motivations and inspirations that can improve educational and esthetical life choices, on individual and international levels. The personal dedication, whether of Goethe or of our students, could be seen as challenging to match for a broad spectrum of European citizens. Then again, any agendas of reform or improvement on the dream of European Union and ever-closer integration on cultural levels, are bound to be linked to, or rather necessarily based on personal or political investments. It might not take cosmopolitan elitism to get there, but effort to fill in the gaps in the European project is arguably exactly what would make the task fulfilling.

Integrating international, multilingual, educational and literary efforts in a research on some of Europe’s most notable Romantic figures might appear ambitious, given the European Union’s current sociopolitical challenges. It might also be much more cultural than spiritual, more romantic than revolutionary, and more personal than political. Yet that orientation might be appropriate for intercultural reform agendas if we are to take seriously the often-quoted quest of Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, of a “soul for Europe”, and the vision that “if we were to start again, we would begin with culture”.

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From Energy Security to ‘Green’ Energy Security: Tools the EU could use to assure uninterrupted supply of energy resources

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ABSTRACT

Energy security is a topic included in many discussions concerning the EU. Raw materials are vital to the EU's production and growth, so energy is of utmost importance. However, the EU depends highly on Russia concerning energy supplies. ‘Green’ technology could offer some independence to the EU, however, it is significantly based on ‘rare earths’ (REEs), almost 90% of which are produced in China. This implies that the Russia-dependent EU in terms of energy, is also China-dependent in terms of ‘green’ energy; thus, security of its supply is at risk. Can the EU become independent in terms of energy supplies be it ‘green’ or not ‘green’? Which political and non-political means could the EU use to become independent concerning the REEs supply to its ‘green’ energy production? Could high-tech - product recycling be among them?’ are questions this research answers, while highlighting the importance of REEs to the ‘green’ energy sector.

Keywords: energy security, rare earths, European Union, China, security of supply, ‘green’ energy security, recycling, energy resources, natural resources security, raw material security

INTRODUCTION

Energy, a noun originating from the Greek word ‘*energeia*’ which in English means ‘*action*’, is what makes the world go round. In other words, energy is what makes everything move, and facilitates the production of new products. Energy or energy sources are “all solid, liquid and gaseous fuels; electricity; uranium; steam and hot water; and the traditional fuels such as fuelwood, charcoal, vegetal and animal wastes” (OECD, n.d.). There are also new and renewable energy sources which according to the OECD again, “are energy sources including solar energy, geothermal energy, wind power, hydropower, ocean energy (thermal gradient, wave power and tidal power), biomass, draught animal power, fuelwood, peat, oil shale and tar sands” (n.d.). What we notice here is that many forms of energy, such as uranium, water in all its forms, sun and wind, are natural resources.

Natural resources are natural assets (raw materials) in nature that can be used for economic production or consumption (OECD, n.d.). The problem is that natural resources and more specifically, energy, may not always be available or accessible. For example, this might happen due to geomorphological reasons or very high prices. The point here is that, there are both internal as well as external threats that could temporarily or permanently stop the energy related activities such as production, transport and use (Blazev, 2015, p. 49). It is the need to maintain an uninterrupted flow of energy that leads us to “anticipating, planning and preventing any interruptions in the energy sector” (Blazev, 2015, p. 49). When such circumstances occur, we can start talking about energy security.

Theoretical Framework – Cases

The theoretical framework to be applied in this paper is energy security. There are several definitions in the bibliography concerning energy security. Building upon Baldwin's argument that security is “a low probability of damage to acquired values” (1997, p. 13), and the definition of energy security as “low vulnerability of vital energy systems” (Jewell, Cherp, & Riahi, 2014, p. 744), Cherp and Jewell (2014) argue that there are several questions around that subject that have not been answered yet. A larger definition with regards to energy security, provided by the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC),

also proposes “the 4 A’s of Energy Security”, namely availability, accessibility, acceptability and affordability. According to the center’s report, energy security is defined as:

“...the ability of an economy to guarantee the availability of energy resource supply in a sustainable and timely manner with the energy price being at a level that will not adversely affect the economic performance of the economy. Thus, there are several factors that can influence the ‘security’ of energy supply, such as: (1) the availability of fuel reserves, both domestically and by external suppliers; (2) the ability of an economy to acquire supply to meet projected energy demand; (3) the level of an economy’s energy resource diversification and energy supplier diversification; (4) accessibility to fuel resources, in terms of the availability of related energy infrastructure and energy transportation infrastructure; and (5) geopolitical concerns surrounding resource acquisition. In terms of energy demand elasticity, an economy that is able to decouple economic growth with energy use –through energy efficiency and conservation– will have an advantage in terms of its energy security” (Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APEREC), 2007, p. 6).

The International Energy Agency (IEA) puts it more simply though, stating that energy security is the “uninterrupted availability of energy resources at an affordable price” (IEA, n.d.). This also the definition that will be used for the purpose of this paper. Taking a closer look, the stress falls on two phrases of this definition. First, uninterrupted availability, which implies that availability on its own is not the key to energy security. Energy resources must be available, but this availability has to be constant, with no sudden, unscheduled, unexpected, surprising interruption. The second phrase that carries great importance is affordable price. This illustrates the fact that even if energy resources are uninterruptedly available, a very high price could make them inaccessible to certain consumers. Therefore, for energy security to exist, both conditions (uninterrupted availability and an affordable price) have to be valid.

Energy security can be examined both from the supplier’s as well from the consumer’s point of view. The former, is called security of supply, which is what consumers are concerned about, whereas the latter is called security of demand, which is what suppliers are concerned about (Bahgat, 2009). In both cases it is the attempt to “ensure a healthy and undamaged energy sector as a precursor of energy independence, which in turn contributes to a healthy national security” (Blazev, 2015, p. 49). This paper, focuses on the security of supply since the EU is rather a consumer (net importer of energy) than a producer (net exporter of energy). This indicates that it is dependent on energy imports which in turn implies it is energy dependent as shown in Figure 1 (European Commission, 2017a, p. 66).

The European Union’s energy security challenge

In 2015 – 2016, the EU-28 was import dependent by 54% for the fuels in its energy mix (European Commission, 2017a, p. 66; Eurostat, 2018). In the EU’s energy mix (Figure 2), petroleum and its products and gas are the top fuels used by the EU (34% and 22% respectively), adding up to a total of 56% for both fuels (European Commission, 2017a, p. 22). Given that the EU is clearly dependent on these two energy fuels it is worth examining their origin (Figure 3). With regards to oil, Russia scores high (29.1%) with Norway (12%) and other non-EU suppliers (19%) following. As far as natural gas is concerned, Russia is again the EU’s top supplier (37%), followed by Norway (32.5%) and Algeria (11.1%) (European Commission, 2017a, p. 26). Such data lead to the conclusion that the EU is Russia-dependent for more than half of its energy mix (followed by Norway) (Eurostat, 2018 a) and therefore, it is highly vulnerable in terms of security of supply. This was proven in 2007 – 2008 and in 2006 and 2009 when the Russia – Belarus and the Russian – Ukrainian dispute respectively over the prices of the natural gas caused the Russian Federation to halt its exports towards Ukraine, through which the EU also gets its supplies (Blazev, 2015, pp. 70, 239, 593, 729). Combined with severe winter weather conditions, the result for the EU was that many countries such as Germany, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary went through ‘frozen’ periods that also had a death toll (Blazev, 2015, pp. 239, 593, 729, Harding & McLaughlin, 2009).

Methodology

By analogy, the framework of energy security can also be applied to other raw materials. According to Waltz (1979, p. 89), “Reasoning by analogy is helpful where one can move from a domain of which theory is well developed to one where it is not. Reasoning by analogy is permissible where different domains are structurally similar.” Energy security as a subgroup of raw materials, has a lot in common with all the raw materials. First of all, all raw materials can be examined under the same two aspects, namely security of

supply and security of demand. Secondly, the ways to tackle any possible disruption in their supply are similar. Most often they are: a) diversification of suppliers so that the consumer is not solely dependent on one provider; b) reduced use, to decrease demand; c) in-house production, so that the consumers can cover their needs in a particular raw material simply by producing it themselves and, d) recycling so that there is not a great need to find new sources/reserves of a particular raw material and a greater level of environmental sustainability is achieved. Therefore, the theoretical framework of energy security will also be used on the critical raw materials called *rare earths* (REEs).

Critical Materials

Among raw materials, there is a smaller group of materials which are considered *critical*. According to the Critical Materials Institute (CMI), “critical materials (a) provide essential and specialized properties to advanced products or systems, (b) have no easy substitutes, and (c) are subject to supply risk” (Critical Materials Institute, n.d.) . For the EU specifically, critical are “those raw materials of high importance to the economy in the Union as a whole and whose supply is associated with a high risk” (Pavel & Tzimas, 2016, p. 9, Box 1.2) and are measured by calculating the EU’s import dependence (Pavel & Tzimas, 2016, p. 50). Since this paper is directly related to the European Union (EU), the definition of critical materials to be used is the second one.

Rare earths

Within the list of various materials that the EU considers critical, one can find the rare earths too (European Commission, n.d. a). The rare earths (REEs) as Table 1 shows, are 15 chemical elements of the lanthanides group. However, Yttrium (Y) and Scandium (Sc) are also considered rare earths because their chemical and physical properties are similar to those of the REEs (Van Gosen, Verplanck, Long, Gambogi, & Seal, 2014); so in total, there are 17 REEs. The rare earths can be grouped into *light* and *heavy* (Long, Van Gosen, Foley, & Cordier, 2010, p. 3) and are used in a large number of modern-day devices such as smartphones, computers, TVs, ‘green’ vehicles, in defense as well as space applications (Voncken, 2016, pp. 89-106). According to Kamenopoulos and Agioutantis, REEs fall within the group of critical and/or strategic minerals (2014, p. 140).

REEs producers

As regards producers of rare earths globally, China is at the top of the list with 95% of the global production of the metals. The United States follows way behind with a single-digit production of only 2%. Finally, Russia and Australia represent 1% of the global rare earths production each and a 0.7% of these metals is produced by other countries such as Brazil and India (Table 2) (European Commission, 2017b, p. 336).

REEs and the EU

For the EU, at least 5 of the rare earths are included in the raw materials for which the EU is almost 100% import dependent (Pavel & Tzimas, 2016, pp. 3-4). These are dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, samarium, yttrium and other REEs all of which are used for the production of defense application systems (Pavel & Tzimas, 2016, pp. 3-4).

As far as the suppliers of the REEs are concerned, as depicted in Figure 5, China hits the top accounting for 40% of the EU’s REEs supplies. This is no surprise, since China is the top REEs producer with 95% (86% of the global refined production in 2017 (Roskill, 2018)) of the global production taking place there. Therefore, it is expected to be the top trade partner with regard to the imports of these metals. The U.S. is a little bit behind China, with 34% of the EU’s REEs supplies imported from there. Then, Russia follows with 25% and finally, 1% of the REEs imported in the EU comes from countries other than these three.

In light of this evidence, the EU is import-dependent when it comes to rare earths (mixed Rare Earth Oxides – mixed REOs) on a 100% level, and it is upon these imports that the entire EU consumption of REEs is based (European Commission, 2017b, pp. 337, 338). This signifies the EU’s great vulnerability towards a possible disruption of supply and it raises high concerns over its security of supply. Adding to that, the most vulnerable sectors are aeronautics and electronics. Among other industrial applications, “green” technology applications are also heavily dependent on the REEs imports from China. For example, permanent magnets made of rare earths are used in wind turbines and ‘green’ catalysts” (Voncken, 2016, pp. 89 - 106).

TOOLS TO TACKLE THIS CHALLENGE

Tools to secure energy efficiency: Tools already used

The Energy Union

In February 2015, the European Commission decided to start implementing a new strategy towards an Energy Union with the goal of providing the “EU consumers – households and businesses – secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy” (Eurostat, 2018) b). This strategy is based on five pillars: a) energy security, solidarity and trust, b) a fully-integrated internal energy market, c) energy efficiency contributing to moderation of demand, d) decarbonizing the economy and e) research, innovation and competitiveness (Eurostat, 2018 b). As concerns monitoring, each year the State of the Energy Union is released illustrating the level of progress reached and pointing out the fields that need to be developed further (Eurostat, 2018 b).

‘Green’ energy goals

The European Union has set some targets regarding the percentage of the renewable energy into its energy mix. For 2020, the EU is committed to reach 20% (Figure 4), a target it will not have difficulty reaching (European Commission, 2015, p. 15). However, as far as the target of 27% for 2030 is concerned, it seems a bit more difficult to achieve, and that is the reason why bolder action has to be taken towards that goal (European Commission, 2015, p. 15).

Tools that could be used

Diversification of suppliers

There are at least four solutions the EU could use to overcome this challenge. First and foremost, it should diversify its oil and gas suppliers. The support of new oil and gas routes and pipelines that will avoid supplier and transit countries prone to conflict will also help towards this end.

In-house production

Second, the EU’s self-production would significantly reduce its risk rate. This indicates the high importance of the recently discovered energy reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean region, specifically in Cyprus. If the EU is able to benefit from energy reserves of its own member-states, then it will take a great step towards energy independence and energy self-sufficiency (Tziampiris, 2012, p. 138).

Reduced use

Thirdly, the European Union could attempt to use less energy and control the demand. In that way, it would raise the level of sustainability even more and safeguard its energy supplies.

Substitution: ‘Green’ energy

If the previous solutions both seem time-consuming and not providing short-term results, there is a fourth possible solution: ‘green’ energy. The term ‘green’ is used in this paper as synonym to environmentally friendly energy coming from renewable sources or from environmentally friendly technology. In fact, should the EU increase its energy production from renewables, it will also help it towards the 2020 target it has set for renewable energy (Figure 4). This time there is some other danger lurking though, which has to do with the materials used to manufacture ‘green’ technology such as wind turbines, solar panels and ‘green’ vehicle catalysts. What all these have in common is that they demand rare earths to be produced. Therefore, we could argue that ‘green’ energy security issues are raised here, which can be addressed only if the rare earths supply chain is secure.

Tools to secure ‘green’ energy efficiency: Tools already used

The EURARE Project

The EURARE Project’s purpose was to develop a European Rare Earths industry. In this way, Europe would be able to protect its REE supplies which are of vital importance for many of the European economic sectors, such as electronics and machinery. This would happen through economically viable

methods that respect the principle of sustainability as well as the environment. This project, which started on January 1st, 2013 and ran for five years, was co-funded by the European Commission (About EURARE, n.d.).

The project's objectives were:

1. Definition and assessment of exploitable REE mineral resources and REE demand in Europe.
2. Development of sustainable and efficient REE Ore Beneficiation Technologies, that will lead to the production of high grade REE concentrates and minimization of produced tailings.
3. Development of sustainable REE Extraction and Refining Technologies, to produce pure REE oxides, REE metals and REE alloys suitable for use in downstream industries.
4. The development of a **strategy for safe REE mining and processing**.
5. **Field Demonstration** of the novel EURARE REE exploitation technologies.
6. Identification of novel sustainable exploitation schema for Europe's REE deposits. (About EURARE, n.d.)

More specifically, there were four steps that would facilitate meeting the project's objectives and reaching success. Firstly, the REE resources across Europe would be located, classified according to their characteristics and evaluated in terms of technological as well as economic importance (see Map 1 for REE resources, deposits and occurrences across Europe); secondly, the project aimed at building such technologies that would allow for the efficient and sustainable exploitation of the rare earths' resources; third, a "critical mass of scientists and engineers" would be established, upon which all three parts of the REEs industry (exploitation, processing and manufacturing) would be based and finally, the fourth goal of the project was to develop a system that would inform on the REEs and gather all the knowledge the project would provide (About EURARE, n.d.).

The Raw Materials Initiative (RMI)

In 2008, the European Commission launched the Raw Materials Initiative in an attempt to secure the EU's access to raw materials. Fuels and agricultural production materials are exempted from the term raw materials for the purpose of the Initiative (European Commission, n.d. b). This strategy consists of three pillars:

1. Fair and sustainable supply of raw materials from global markets
2. Sustainable supply of raw materials within the EU
3. Resource efficiency and supply of "secondary raw materials" through recycling (European Commission, n.d. b)

The Raw Materials Initiative stakeholders are all brought together by the European Innovation Partnership (EIP) on Raw Materials (European Commission, n.d. b).

List of Critical Raw Materials (CRM)

The CRM List is regularly published by the Commission (European Commission, n.d. b) and is a "priority action of the EU Raw Materials Initiative" (European Commission, n.d. a). It is a list reporting all non-energy raw materials that are highly important to the EU's economy, industry, technological applications and 'green' applications while at the same time they carry a high risk of supply (European Commission, n.d. a). The first CRMs list was released in 2011, followed by the second list in 2014 and the third in 2017. The factors that are taken into consideration in order to classify an element as critical and include it in the list, are economic importance and supply risk. Economic importance refers to the level of significance a certain raw material carries for the European Union's economy, while supply risk indicates the level of risk of a possible disruption in the supply chain (European Commission, n.d. a).

Tools that could be used

Diversification of suppliers

Most of the times, the first solution that comes to mind concerning security of supply of any material is to diversify the suppliers. This means that the EU should not rely exclusively on China to be its provider of REEs, but it should look for alternative providers. This would make it less vulnerable to a possible disruption of the Chinese supply.

It would also lower the EU's risk of becoming a 'trade hostage' in case China decides to use the REEs trade as a tool to put pressure on the European Union concerning political affairs. The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute in 2010 has also set a precedent to that kind of behavior. In 2010, after the Sino-Japanese dispute over the islands, Beijing lowered its production quotas and as a consequence, it also lowered its export quotas (Mazza, Blumenthal, & Schmitt, 2013, p. 4). As expected, these moves affected the rare earths market causing a spike in the REEs prices (Dadwal, 2011, p. 182). However, the Japanese economy is highly based on the production of high-tech products (Cheng, 2009, p. 57) and is therefore very much dependent on rare earths whose primary producer is China (Dadwal, 2011, p. 181). As a result, Tokyo underwent an economic choking that led to its surrendering to the Chinese demands (Hagstrom, 2012, pp. 282, 284). Therefore, the precedent that has been set, dictates to the EU the diversification of its rare earths' providers.

However, while it can be quite easy to get energy supplies from various producers, this is not the case when it comes to rare earths. The reason is that there are very few alternative producers to China and these producers have only a single-digit share of the global production (see Table 2). Therefore, one should turn to different alternatives in order to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of rare earths to the market.

In-house production

Diversification of suppliers still keeps the EU dependent on third parties. Instead of relying on third countries with regards to receiving supplies of rare earths, the EU could take advantage of its domestic reserves and the capabilities forming around their extraction. To illustrate that point, Greenland (Paulick, Rosa, & Kalvig, 2015) and the Nordic countries are home to significant reserves of rare earths that the European Union could use in order to acquire some level of independence (see Map 1). There are also large rare earth resources (deposits and occurrences) in Europe that, if exploited in a sustainable way, could secure the EU's rare earth supply chain (Goodenough, et al., 2016, pp. 852-853). Furthermore, rare earths can also be found as by-products of bauxite's process of extraction. For example, Greece has got a significant bauxite production and the rare earths that come as by-product, according to Dr. Balomenos, amount to "10% of the European demand for rare earths" (Euronews, 2017). In light of this evidence, even if the EU's in-house production cannot make it 100% self-sufficient, it certainly can assure a considerable amount of self-reliance and make it at least partly independent of the Chinese domination of the market.

Reduced use

One more solution addressing the challenge, could be the reduction of the amounts of rare earths that are used in the relevant applications. Nevertheless, the best way for this to be done is without lowering the final product performance (Binnemans, 2014, p. 43). One way to reduce the use of REEs is by substituting them.

Substitution

A possible solution to this problem could also be the development of materials that could substitute for the rare earths (European Commission, n.d. a). The challenge here is that REEs are not easily substitutable – meaning it is not cost-effective for businesses to use some other materials in their place - and in some cases cannot be substituted at all. For example, there are certain defense applications where rare earths are indispensable (Binnemans, 2014, p. 42). Apart from that, when it is possible for rare earths to be substituted, the overall performance of the products is affected resulting in lower product performance than the expected (Binnemans, 2014, pp. 42-43). This leads to the conclusion that the EU should allocate more funding to Research and Development with the purpose of finding alternatives and substitutes to rare earths. What it should bear in mind, however, is that these alternatives have to be equal to the REEs, concerning the level of performance of the final products.

Recycling

One more possible solution could be to extract and recycle rare earth parts from products that have reached their end-of-life point and have been recycled (European Commission, n.d. a). In that way, the demand for new production or, in the case of the European Union, for new imports of rare earths would not be that high. Adding to that, the EU could claim that it has its own recycled production of rare earths and this, to some extent, would give it independence as far as the supply is concerned, lowering the risk of a possible supply disruption.

However, these parts are very small components (Voncken, 2016, p. 124). Therefore, the extraction process requires a complex and energy intensive process which is not economically viable for companies (Voncken, 2016, p. 124). In addition, building the necessary infrastructure for such a process can be too cost-ineffective. As a result, there is a lack of such infrastructure as well as collecting systems that would allow for rare earths to be extracted, collected and reused in new products (Binnemans, et al., 2013, p. 4). In addition, the level of recycling is really low. For example, in 2011, the amount of rare earths being recycled was less than 1% (Binnemans, et al., 2013, pp. 3-4).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, the EU is rather dependent in terms of energy as well as 'green' energy which is based on the 17 metals of the periodic table called 'rare earths', making it highly vulnerable to a possible supply disruption.

With regard to energy, the EU relies heavily on imports coming from the Russian Federation. This makes it dependent on Russia and on Russia's possible conflicts with any transit countries, like in the case of the Ukraine back in 2009. In other words, Russia is likely to manipulate its position as a producer on the energy chessboard, by using energy as an economic tool to exercise political pressure on third parties. The EU can easily become the 'victim' of such resource diplomacy moves and face serious energy security risks in terms of supply.

The answer addressing this challenge can be the Energy Union. This is the EU's energy strategy that aims to make it more independent by diversifying its suppliers even more; by attempting to make better use of domestic energy production; by trying to reduce the level of energy consumption within the EU, which will also lead to fewer energy imports; by trying to create a fully integrated energy market; by investing in research and innovation in the energy field, and by setting renewable energy targets in order to substitute 'energy' with 'green' energy. As far as this is concerned, the European Union has set certain goals concerning the energy produced by renewable sources of energy for 2020 as well as for 2030.

In addition to these tools that are already used, the European Union could also try to diversify its energy suppliers even more in order to reduce its level of dependence from Russia and the level of vulnerability of its energy supplies. Secondly, it could also intensify the exploitation of energy reserves found within its member-states' territory, like the ones in Cyprus. Additionally, it could take measures to reduce energy consumption and therefore diminish energy demand. What is more, the European Union should also try to use 'green' energy even more than it already does. In that way, it will be able to substitute even larger amounts of conventional forms of energy with renewable ones. Of course, renewable sources of energy need 'green' technology in order to be produced.

With respect to 'green' technology, although it is an alternative to the energy risks the EU faces, this solution brings its own risks to the table. The technology on which 'green' energy is based relies on rare earths. Rare earths are almost exclusively produced by China and the EU is 100% reliant on rare earths imports. Although rare earths are not only imported from China, it is an undeniable fact that it is the 'key' partner to the EU since it dominates the REEs global production. The EU's 100% reliance on rare earths imports signifies a very high level of vulnerability of its supply chain which means a very high risk in supply.

Nevertheless, as the European Union is aware of the existing threats concerning its REEs supply chain, it has developed certain tools to take control of the situation. A striking example of that is the EURARE project which ran from 2013 – 2017. The aim of the project was to create a European rare earths' industry

in order to assure the uninterrupted supply of them within the EU market (About EURARE, n.d.). What is more, the EU launched the Raw Materials Initiative in 2008. This was a program with the goal of making access to raw materials secure and uninterrupted, thus supporting the EU's growth and competitiveness (Commission of the European Communities, 2008). Another tool towards the same direction has been the List of Critical Raw Materials that the Commission publishes every two years, which began in 2011. This is a list presenting the raw materials that are vital to the EU economy together with the level of their supply risk, with the goal being to ensure continuous access to the raw materials that are of crucial importance to the EU market (European Commission, n.d. a).

Among the tools the EU could use are: diversification of suppliers, domestic production, the reduced use, substitution, and, the recycling of the REEs. As far as the diversification of suppliers is concerned, this is not very easy to achieve because not many countries are rare earths producers. In fact, China is next to monopolizing the global REEs production, making it hard for other countries that are willing to have a share in the market, compete with it. With regards to the domestic production, although the EU has got significant reserves of rare earths, it has not taken full advantage of them yet. Towards that goal is the EURARE project that ran from 2013 – 2017. As far as reduced use is concerned, the European Union could take certain measures to reduce the use of rare earths and control the demand. One way to achieve this is through substitution. Concerning this, whereas there are materials that could replace them, they do not achieve the same level of product performance as rare earths do. This implies that although substitution would be a good solution towards a REEs – independent market, it seems that consumers will not enjoy the same benefits from using the products whose manufacturing process is based on rare earths. Finally, recycling the rare earths parts contained in high tech products that have reached their end of life, is a solution that not only addresses the issue, but also does so in a sustainable and environmentally friendly way. However, lack of the necessary infrastructure along with the high construction cost and the tiny size of the parts to be recycled, do not create a very bright picture for this kind of treatment towards solving the problem.

All in all, it turns out that the EU is vulnerable both in terms of energy as well as 'green' energy because in the first case it is highly dependent on Russia and in the second case it is 100% reliant on rare earths' imports and is almost 100% dependent on the supplies coming from China. For example, if Russia decides to reduce or halt energy flows towards Europe for any reason, the EU will be short of energy and this will have an impact on all the parts of the European economic (and not only) life. If China decides to reduce or halt its rare earths' exports for any reason, then the EU will not be able to import the rare earths that are essential to the 'green' technology sector as well as to many other industrial sectors. Since it does not have any alternatives that would sufficiently cover for such a lack, it will face production line disruption of 'green' technology – based products, as well as many others. This means that products such as wind turbines and solar panels will stop being manufactured causing problems for 'green' energy production. Simply put, the EU faces not only energy security challenges, but also 'green' energy security challenges. If energy security is the uninterrupted availability of energy resources at an affordable price (IEA, n.d.), by analogy (Waltz, 1979), we could then define 'green' energy security as the uninterrupted availability of environmentally friendly produced energy at an affordable price.

The good news is that the EU is aware of the energy and 'green' energy security challenges it faces, and it is for that reason that it has made steps and developed tools towards tackling them. We can also claim that energy and rare earths have already been politicized¹, and on certain occasions they have even been securitized¹, since they are topics of the public sphere and sometimes, they are also considered to be threatened. However, this is not the case with 'green' energy. 'Green' energy is certainly a topic of the public agenda; thus, it has been politicized, but it we cannot argue that it has been securitized yet. Certainly, we can advocate that its connection to rare earths cannot leave it unaffected. To conclude, it is important that the EU continues working towards securing sustainability and constant, uninterrupted flows of energy supplies to its domestic market. The tools it has already developed together with the recycling of rare earths can provide a drastic solution towards reducing the EU's level of insecurity and vulnerability against such threats.

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Endnotes

¹ According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, pp. 23-24), any public subject can move through the following levels: from being nonpoliticized, when it is not part of the public debate and the state does not even deal with, to becoming politicized, when it becomes part of the state's policy and the public debate, to being securitized, when it is perceived as a threat which has to be addressed. For more on the theoretical framework of securitization, its process, its key concepts, its units and levels of analysis, see Buzan, B., Waever, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*. Colorado-London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., pp. 5 – 47.

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
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
APPENDIX

Figure 1: EU Energy Statistics; EU 28 – Import Dependence (All fuels, %)




Source: (European Commission, 2017a, p. 66)

Figure 2: EU Energy Statistics; Gross Inland Consumption – Energy mix (%) – Primary Products only, 2015



Source: (European Commission, 2017a, p. 22)

Figure 3: EU Energy Statistics; EU 28 – Natural Gas, Crude Oil and Solid fuels suppliers (%), 2015



Source: (European Commission, 2017a, p. 26)

Table 1: Rare Earths

Light REEs		Heavy REEs	
Lanthanum (La)	Promethium (Pm)	Terbium (Tb)	Thulium (Tm)
Cerium (Ce)	Samarium (Sm)	Dysprosium (Dy)	Ytterbium (Yb)
Praseodymium (Pr)	Europium (Eu)	Holmium (Ho)	Lutetium (Lu)
Neodymium (Nd)	Gadolinium (Gd)	Erbium (Er)	Scandium (Sc)
			Yttrium (Y)


Source: (Van Gosen, Verplanck, Long, Gambogi, & Seal, 2014; Long, Van Gosen, Foley, & Cordier, 2010)

Table 2: Mine Production of Rare Earth Oxides (REOs) globally, 2010 – 2014

Country	Share in the global production
China	95%
USA	2%
Russia	1%
Australia	1%
Others	0.7%


Source: (European Commission, 2017b, p. 337)

Figure 4: EU Renewable Energy Targets in % of the Gross Final Energy Consumption




Source: (European Commission, 2017a, p. 27)

Figure 5: EU's main REEs suppliers



Source: (European Commission, 2017b, pp. 337-338)

Map 1: European REE resources, deposits and occurrences, 2017



Source: (Welcome to EURARE, 2019)

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