



Europe in Discourse

Identity • Diversity • Borders

1st International Conference

Conference Proceedings



Proceedings of the 1st International Conference
Europe in Discourse: Identity, Diversity, Borders
Athens, September 23-25, 2016

Edited by Juliane House and Themis Kaniklidou

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword	
<i>Juliane House & Themis Kaniklidou</i>	5
 SECTION 1: POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSES ON THE EU	6
An Evil Empire? The EU as Dystopian Monster in the Discourses of Four European Populist Parties (The Front National, Podemos, Syriza and UKIP)	
<i>Catherine MacMillan</i>	7
Common Health Policy? Unify you must! Relative Performance of Cross-border Health Care Policy in Member States	
<i>Mevhibe B. Hocaoglu & Mustapha Ibrahim</i>	20
Europeanisation of Political Discourses on Discrimination	
<i>Berna Numan</i>	29
Towards a European Public Sphere: the Case of Talk Real	
<i>Tommaso Visone</i>	42
The construction of Europe in Romanian and Italian parliamentary discourse	
<i>Raluca-Mihaela Levonian</i>	47
How Far Is Romania off the European Union? Romanian Politicians' Discourse in the European Elections and the People's Interest in the European Agenda	
<i>Mihaela Ivănescu</i>	60
From Civilizing Mission to Soft Power? European Powers and the Politics of Attraction	
<i>Kyriakos Mikelis</i>	73
Europe – a geographical space or an economic area but never a political union. A kaleidoscope of positions nourishing the Brexit discourse.	
<i>Ronny Scholz</i>	87
“Suspicious Federal Chancellor” Versus “Weak Prime Minister”: Konrad Adenauer and Harold Macmillan in the British and West German Quality Press during the Berlin Crisis (1958 to 1962). A Critical Discourse Analysis.	
<i>Dorothea Merk & Rüdiger Ahrens</i>	101
European Values and Virtues in Discourse: Political Sphere or Public Space?	
<i>Vassiliki Delli</i>	117
 SECTION 2: CULTURAL ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY	130
Construction of Identities through the use of the first-person deixis in Alexis Tsipras' statements before and after the EU summits (June to October 2015)	
<i>Christos Sagredos & Evelin Nikolova</i>	131
Fictitiously oriental epistolary travel novels of the Enlightenment: a paradigmatic example for European discourse of identity	
<i>Hanna Nohe</i>	140
EU-topia or dystopia? The EU image at the crossroads	
<i>Sophia Kitsou</i>	151
Diversity in a European context: the Challenge of Creating a Shared Critical Vocabulary	
<i>Katerina Strani, Gabriella B. Klein & Emma Hill</i>	170
Hyperborean Variété of Identities in Neo-latin Texts of Riga Humanists	
<i>Mārtiņš Laizāns & Ojārs Lāms</i>	183
Entangled Refractions Global Perspectives on Europeanism and Asianism	
<i>Tobias Metzler</i>	193

Constructing a Ukrainian identity within the European context <i>Svitlana Pereplotchykova</i>	205
Reserving a Discourse of Euro-Identification: Euro-realism? <i>Sertan Akbaba</i>	217
Europe, European Union and the Council of Europe: Unidentified identities <i>Kyriaki Kondylopoulou</i>	230
The Russian Orthodox Church and European Values: Analyzing the Discourse in Russian Media <i>Galina Lukyanova</i>	237
What's Happening Elsewhere: Reasoning from a Middle Eastern Case to Europe <i>Martin Kurani</i>	250

SECTION 3: LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY 264

A Multimodal Comparative Approach to Linguistic Discourse Analysis: Sketch of a Project about Football Rivalry Discourses in the Southern European Discourse Communities of Portuguese, Spanish and Greek <i>Jannis Harjus</i>	265
Plurilingualism in Europe: promoting language and cultural diversity <i>Cinzia Colaiuda</i>	278
The Relationship between Language Learning and European Identity from a Global Perspective: Languages as Keys and Cultures as Treasures between the Continent and the World <i>Konrad Gunesch</i>	290
Our common terminology: the linguistic passport for a united Europe <i>Rodolfo Maslias</i>	303
European Identity: a Multimodal Perspective <i>Mariangela Picciuolo</i>	307
Recovering European identity in educational discourse or what do we mean when we discuss European identity as a language course subject? <i>Paraskevi Sachinidou</i>	340

SECTION 4: GREEK ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY..... 356

The dominant political narrative for Europe through Greek political speeches (1975-2015): the hope-despair vision of the European Union. <i>Iouliani Vroutsi</i>	357
That's not my democracy! <i>Antigone Kapasaki & Stamatia Psaroudaki</i>	366
Is the Greek Diaspora a historic diaspora from a small country at the Southeastern tip of Europe, super-diverse and globalized? <i>Marina Frangos</i>	378
The Chicken Game Strategy in the European Discourse The Case of the Euro-group negotiations for Greece <i>Neofytos A. Aspriadis & John A. Paravantis</i>	383
The representation of the refugees and the immigrants in the Greek press: A corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis approach. <i>Aggeliki Sakellariou</i>	397
Representations of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in the Greek press (2010-2016): a critical corpus-driven study <i>Ioannis E. Saridakis & Effie Mouka</i>	408
A Sample of Student Discourses of Civic Engagement and Global Citizenship in a Time of Crisis in Greece <i>Barbara Kondilis</i>	430

The “OXI” [ohee] (NO) of the Greek people in the English, German, and Greek Press <i>Yorgos Tahtsidis</i>	438
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SECTION 5: BORDERS AND SPATIALLY DETERMINED

IDENTITIES OF THE EU 457

Documentation of the Spatial Identity of Native European Populations Shaped through the Discourse of their Oral Histories and Traditions: a case study of the Arvanites. <i>Efrosini Kritikos</i>	458
Discursive and Visual Construction of Internal Borders. Analysis of advertisement samples from Italy, Greece and the UK in the framework of the EU Project RADAR <i>Gabriella B. Klein, Koffi M. Dossou, Maria Fountana & Stavroula Sokoli</i>	470
Relationality in practice: Doing spatial categorization at the German-Polish border <i>Dominik Gerst</i>	489

Editorial Foreword

This volume contains the proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Europe in Discourse: Identity, Diversity, Borders which took place in Athens, Greece, from September 23 to 25, 2016. The conference was hosted by Hellenic American College and was organized in conjunction with the PhD Program in Applied Linguistics at Hellenic American University in its Athens campus. It provided an opportunity for bringing together scholars from many different disciplines with their varied views and perspectives on the complexities and contradictions of contemporary European identity discourses. The conference proved to be a highly successful and indeed timely event because the European Union has been going through an existential crisis: Its humanitarian credentials are challenged as never before by a refugee crisis of unexpected proportions, by ever-present and ubiquitous threats of terrorism and by the alarming rise of right-wing populist movements in many European member states with their dangerous rhetoric of exclusion that culminates in demands to completely shut down Europe's borders. And the notions of solidarity and democracy are further thrown into question by a harsh politics of austerity and sometimes violent grass-root activism. The financial crisis in Europe is far from over resulting in crippling effects on the economies of Southern Europe and particularly Greece - the location of this conference. All these issues cry out for solutions and a return to the values which were once considered a hallmark of Europe, values of justice, freedom of speech, solidarity, diversity, multilingualism and, of course, democracy.

The conference dealt with the above pressing issues and it was aptly located at the very heart of the European crisis, in Athens, Greece. Scholars from 40 different countries met to discuss historical, geo-political, cultural, economic, social, and linguistic perspectives on the European Union, pointing to the important role of diversity and the pressing cultural problems of physical and symbolic borders. The papers presented at the conference considered taking stock of the most important issues and proposing new ways of including 'others'.

We have put together these proceedings based on the submissions of papers that were presented at the conference and that passed the subsequent reviewing process. In line with the major threads of the conference, we have divided the papers in this volume into the following five sections:

Section 1: Political and Institutional Discourses on the EU

Section 2: Cultural Aspects of European Identity

Section 3: Linguistic Aspects of European Identity

Section 4: Greek Aspects of European Identity

Section 5: Borders and Spatially Determined Identities of the EU

We hope that readers of this volume will gain an impression of the multitude, the richness and the complexity of voices on discourses of Europe which could be heard at the conference itself.

Juliane House and Themis Kaniklidou

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Section 1: Political and Institutional Discourses on the EU

An Evil Empire? The EU as Dystopian Monster in the Discourses of Four European Populist Parties (The Front National, Podemos, Syriza and UKIP)

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Yeditepe University

ABSTRACT

This paper uses a variant of the discourse-mythological approach to discourse analysis in order to examine depictions of the European Union in the discourse of four very different European populist, Eurosceptic parties: UKIP, the Front National, Syriza and Podemos. Despite important differences between the four parties, this paper identifies similarities between their depictions of the European integration project; in fact, all four can be said to describe the EU in terms of a dystopian ‘evil empire’. In this way, their discourse can be understood as a reversal of the EU’s founding myth as a haven of peace, democracy, freedom and human rights.

Keywords: populism, discourse, EU, dystopia, totalitarianism

1. Introduction

Euroscepticism has been on the rise across the European Union in recent years, at least partly triggered by the recent economic and financial crisis. Notably, in the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections, Eurosceptic and/or populist parties, both on the left and right, from many EU member states achieved an unprecedented success. This is at least in part due to disillusionment with both the EU and with mainstream politics at home (BBC 2014). More recently, in a referendum held on 3 June 2016, the British public voted to leave the EU, the first country to do so since the inauguration of the European integration project in the 1950s.

The following study focuses on four populist, Eurosceptic parties which obtained remarkable success in the 2014 EP elections. The parties are from four different EU Member States: the French *Front National*, the British United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), *Podemos* from Spain and *Syriza*, currently in government in Greece. While the four parties can be described as populist and Eurosceptic, UKIP and the *Front National* may be classified as right-wing while *Podemos* and *Syriza* are to the left of centre.

Populism is a notoriously difficult term to define, and has been applied to a wide variety of political parties. However, despite important differences in their policies and their position on the political spectrum, all four parties studied here can be classified as populist in that they claim to represent ‘the people’ against a corrupt political and economic elite, and argues that politics should be an expression of the ‘general will’ of the people (Mudde, 2015) (Tournier Sol, 2015) (Mudde, 2007, p. 41) (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014, pp. 119-142) (Kioupkiolis, 2016, pp. 99-120). Similarly, the term Euroscepticism can be used to describe a broad range of positions. According to Sczcerbiak and Taggart, for instance, Euroscepticism may be classified as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. ‘Hard’ eurosceptics favour withdrawal from the EU or, if their country is not yet a Member State, oppose its accession. ‘Soft’ Eurosceptics, on the other hand, are not against the European integration project as such, but indicates qualified opposition to one or more policy areas (2008, pp.7-8). On this basis, the FN and UKIP may be classified as hard Eurosceptic, while *Podemos* and *Syriza* are ‘soft’ Eurosceptic in that, while critical of the EU and its policies, they do not advocate withdrawal.

In this context, then, the discourse of the four parties is examined using a variant of the *Discourse Mythological Approach* (DMA), which combines the study of political mythology as a discursive practice with critical discourse analysis (CDA), in this case the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA). The paper aims, then, to examine how the four parties in question have challenged, and even reversed, the founding myth of European integration in their discourse

2. Theoretical Background: The Discourse-Mythological Approach

The theoretical basis of this paper is informed by the Discourse-Mythological Approach (DMA), as developed by Kelsey (2013, 2014, 2015). The DMA was originally developed to examine mythology as a discursive practice of journalistic storytelling; a clear difference between the use of DMA in the current paper and in Kelsey's original use is, therefore, that the present work focuses on political speeches and manifestoes rather than journalism. The DMA is underscored by a combination of Critical Discourse Analysis, specifically the Discourse Historical Approach developed by Wodak et al, and theoretical approaches to political myth.

2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis and the Discourse Historical Approach

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a method of discourse analysis that focuses on the study of the relations between discourse and social and cultural developments in different social domains; it sees discourse as a 'culturally and socially organised way of speaking' (Kelsey, 2014, p.314). In other words, it views discursive practices as contributing to the constitution of the social world, including social identities and social relations. In particular, due to its integration of the historical, social and political contexts in which the discourse occurs, CDA provides a vehicle for examining the latent power dynamics and potentials in agents (Wodak, 2011, p.38). While the theoretical premises of CDA can be traced back to Althusser's theory of ideology, Bakhtin's game theory and the philosophical traditions of Gramsci and the Frankfurt school (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016, p.48), the methodology used in CDA is potentially wide-ranging; indeed, according to Fairclough, any explicit method in discourse studies, the social sciences or the humanities may be used so long as it can produce relevant insights into the way that discourse reproduces, or resists, social and political inequality, power abuse or domination. Thus, CDA approaches are problem-oriented, and so are necessarily interdisciplinary and eclectic. (Meyer and Wodak, 2009, p.6). Within this broad context, as has already been noted, CDA may comprise a wide variety of methods.

This paper focuses on the discourse-historical approach (DHA) of the Vienna school, which is distinguishable by its specific focus on identity construction. According to the DHA, the discursive construction of 'us' and 'them', or 'in' and 'out' groups, is viewed as the basic fundament of discourses on identity and difference. Thus, given its focus on discursive constructions of 'us' and 'them', the DHA has been used in studies on topics such as racist discrimination or national stereotypes (Wodak and Boukala, 2014, p.178). In line with the importance of context in CDA, the DHA links discursive practices, social variables, institutional frames and socio-political and historical contexts (Wodak and Boukala, 2014, p.178). *Discourse*, in the context of the DHA, can be defined as possessing the following features;

- a. A discourse is related to a macrotopic
- b. It integrates various voices and perspectives
- c. It is argumentative in nature
- d. It is both socially constituted and socially constitutive (Wodak, 2011, p.39).

In this sense, a discourse can be distinguished from a *text*, which is a specific and unique realisation of a discourse. Texts also belong to a *genre*, which may include, for instance, political or expert speeches, party manifestoes or televised political debates (Wodak, 2011: p. 39). In this context, according to the DHA, specific discourses should be examined taking into account both interdiscursivity and intertextuality. Interdiscursivity, in this context, signifies that discourses are linked to each other in various ways. If we conceive of 'discourse' as primarily topic-related (as 'discourse on x'), a discourse on one topic frequently refers to topics or subtopics of other discourses; discourse on climate change, for instance, may refer to other discourses such as finances or health. Similarly, according to Wodak, intertextuality means that texts are linked to other texts, both in the past and in the present. Such connections may be established in different ways, for instance, through explicit reference to a topic or main actor; through references to the same events; by allusions or evocations or by the transfer of main arguments from one text to the next (Wodak, 2011, p.39).

Broadly speaking, the DHA is oriented towards five general questions, through examining the relevant discursive strategies used:

1. How are persons/events/phenomena/objects/processes and actions named and referred to linguistically? (*Referential/nomination* strategies)
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes? (*Predication* strategies).

3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question? (*Argumentation strategies*).
4. From which perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed? (*Perspectivisation/Framing*)

Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they intensified or mitigated? (*Intensification/Mitigation devices*) (Wodak, 2011, p.44). Such strategies may deploy various linguistic means. To give some examples, referential/ nomination strategies may use tropes, substitutions, certain metaphors and metonymies in order to create in-groups and out-groups in discourse, such as the use of 'we' and 'they' or of metaphors such as 'family' and 'home' (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012, p.23). This is closely related to predication, which, according to Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p.54) can be defined as 'the very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena'.

Similarly, argumentation strategies, for instance, used to justify attributions, can take a variety of forms. These frequently take the form of *topoi*, which can be described as 'parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory premises of an argument, whether explicit or tacit', and connect the argument with the conclusion or central claim. *Topoi* tend to provide 'common-places' instead of substantial evidence, and may be used to construct other groups or positions as scapegoats (e.g. by depicting them as a burden, a threat or too costly) (Wodak, 2011, pp. 42-43). They are thus central to the analysis of seemingly convincing fallacious arguments which are widely adopted in prejudiced and discriminatory discourses (Wodak and Boukala, 2014, p.180).

2.2 Discourse and Myth

As Kelsey notes, while it is important to distinguish between mythology, ideology and discourse, theoretical approaches to mythology and ideology hold overlapping concerns to disciplines of discourse analysis. Discourse is informed by ideological practices, which construct myths. The myths themselves then express the ideology, and express it through the dramatisation and theatrics of storytelling (Kelsey, 2015, pp. 4-5). In this context, understanding the role of myth can serve a similar purpose to that of CDA: through the analysis of language it addresses ideological concerns and challenges power relations that construct discourses in ways that serve particular ideological interests (Kelsey, 2014, pp. 314).

A myth can be defined as a story, but a story with a purpose, not merely to amuse (Tudor, 1972: p. 16, cited in Della Sala, 2010: p.5), or, simply, as 'an important story' (Boer, 2009: p. 9). They may also be defined as 'sacred narratives' (Della Sala, 2016, p.524). Myths, however, are not fixed but tend to come in many variants; thus the same narrative pattern may be re-appropriated in order to respond to differing needs for significance (Bottici and Kühner, 2012, pp.96-97).

A specifically political myth can be defined as the 'work on a common narrative which grants significance to the political conditions and experiences of a social group' (Bottici and Kühner, 2012: 98); it frames 'who can govern, why, how and over whom' (Della Sala, 2016, p.524). In this sense, a political myth 'tells a simple story that makes the evolution of a society and its polity intelligible' (Della Sala, 2010: p. 4). Political myth is also characterised by its 'inherent and sometimes unaware emotional commitment, which is a powerful generator of action' (Persson and Petersson, 2014, p.194). In particular, as Bottici and Challand point out, a political myth may be distinguished from other forms of historical narrative when the past is mobilised to uphold threatening views opposing 'us' and 'them' (2013, p.168).

As della Sala argues, successful myths 'become inscribed in political practices, rituals and institutions of different kinds and supported by prevailing beliefs and norms (2010); they may, thus, become 'normalised' and taken for granted, and may not be open to critical scrutiny (Persson and Petersson: 2014, p. 195). In this sense, political myths provide a narrative drawn from a fact to make sense of why political authority is being used; one of their main functions, then, is to generate legitimacy for political rule (Della Sala, 2010, p. 5).

There is an especially intimate relationship between political myth and national identity (Persson and Petersson, 2014, p.194); thus, the most compelling political myths are those connected with state and nation building, which can be foundational or primary myths that spawn derivative myths, which are especially important for sustaining legitimate political authority (Della Sala, 2010, p.6). As Della Sala argues, 'The stability of the nation and state depends partly on the ability of these stories to adapt to changing conditions, to be re-invented with each generation and for new stories to emerge that do not put into question the original myths' (della Sala, 2016, p.526).

However, according to Bell's concept of *mythscape*, which he describes as 'the temporally and spatially extended discursive realm wherein the struggle for control of people's memories and the formation of nationalist myths is debated, contested and subverted incessantly' (Bell, 2003, p. 66), there may be counter-uses of political myth, for instance between the 'officially' promoted myths and alternative versions from below (Persson and Petersson, 2014, p.195). Indeed, political myth itself is ridden with inherent contradictions and may be challenged and subverted from within by successful counterclaims, thereby potentially bringing down the powers that be; in this sense, the myth 'contains the seeds of its own destruction' (Persson and Petersson, 2014, p.195).

2.3 Political Myth and the European Union

While political myth is normally connected with the nation state, it has been argued that the European Union itself possesses its own political mythology. As della Sala points out, 'These have ranged from sacred narratives that trace how and why the EU was created to accounts of its exceptionalism, suffering and redemption, its missionary role, of its transformation and renewal and of a territory or political space' (2016, p. 531). In this context, perhaps the most important founding myth of the EU concerns how the original member states of the EU emerged from the ashes of World War II to renounce nationalism and, through integration, to build a Europe based on peace and prosperity. In this view, the prevention of war was the *raison d'être* of the European integration project. The Schuman declaration, for instance, stated, in what as Kølvråa argues was something of a utopian fantasy, that the primary ambition of the European integration project was 'to make war in Europe not only unthinkable, but materially impossible' (Kølvråa, 2016, p.172).

In this sense, pro-European leaders and elites have repeatedly sought to (re)legitimise European integration by warning that the failure of European integration, and of the Euro in the context of the recent economic crisis, would lead to the resurgence of nationalism and war (della Sala, 2016: p.532) (Wellings and Power, 2016: p.157). In this sense, as Wellings and Power argue, European integration and the European identity that legitimised it can be understood as 'very emotive indeed' (2016, p.157). Wellings and Power argue that, while such arguments about peace were becoming secondary to prosperity arguments by the early 1970s, they have become prominent again since the 1990s. This can be understood as an attempt to 're-legitimise' the EU in the face of increasing challenges, such as the demise of the 'permissive consensus' in the face of widening and deepening of integration, and of the Eurozone crisis, by regenerating a narrative based on the emotive memory of war and totalitarian terror (2016: p.169).

Moreover, in this context, the foundation myth of the EU has become institutionalised; the preamble to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, for instance, argues that the European integration project represents 'civilisation', in terms of political and human rights and prosperity, in contrast to repeating the 'bitter experiences' of the past;

Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. [...] Believing that Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity for the good of all its inhabitants [...] and that it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world. (European Union, 2005, p. 9)

In this sense, the EU arguably understands itself as a normative, or ideological, power¹ which seeks to 'civilise' its external environment (Manners, 2002: p.23) (Zielonka, 2013: p.36), an understanding which, according to Diez, is inextricably linked to the EU's construction of its own past as its principal Other (2005: p.634). However, importantly, Nicolaidis and Howse have noted that the EU's official self-image is somewhat utopian, or *EUtopian*, in that it is somewhat idealised rather than representing what Europe actually is (2002).

Of course, while the experience of the Second World War and the Holocaust is certainly a defining Other for the EU, it is certainly not the only one. As Neumann, for instance, argues, the East, particularly the Ottoman Empire and Russia, has traditionally been an important European Other, and continues to be relevant in that it 'is continuously being recycled in order to represent European

¹ Diez, for instance, has defined a normative power as a power which 'a power that is able to shape conceptions of the normal'

identities' (1999: p.207). For Bottici and Challand, for instance, the EU's Eastern Other takes two principal forms: the 'Hammer and Sickle' of Communism and the 'Crescent' of Islam, which 'among all the Others of Europe... stand out for their capacity to coagulate and reproduce significance within their respective contexts' (2013: pp.168-171). As Neumayer has argued, while the Nazi regime and the Holocaust have been the traditional discursive 'Others' of the European integration project, the arrival of Central and Eastern European 'memory entrepreneurs' in the European institutions following the accession of postcommunist Member States in 2004 and 2007 has facilitated a discourse based on the equivalence of Stalinism with Naziism, in which both are discursively constructed as 'totalitarianisms' (Neumayer, 2015, pp.1-2).

3. The 'Negative' Myth of the EU: The EU as a Dystopian Empire in Populist, Eurosceptic Discourse

3.1. Varieties of Dystopia: From Orwell to the Fourth Reich

In the discourse of all four parties studied, the EU is described as an entity controlled by a corrupt elite which, in tandem with the equally corrupt national Establishments, is attempting to impose a harsh, undemocratic neoliberal regime on the peoples of Europe. In this context, and in contrast to the founding myth of the EU, the EU is arguably depicted to varying degrees as a *dystopian* society in the discourse of the four parties concerned. In particular, dystopian narratives depict an oppressive society characterised by a lack of individual freedom due to excessive social control. This control may be exerted using a variety of measures, which may include propaganda, constant surveillance, terror, restriction of information, the discouragement of independent thought and the worship of a figurehead or concept. While control may be wielded by a totalitarian government it may also be exerted, for instance, by a mindless bureaucracy or by large corporations (Purkar, 2013: pp.1-4).

According to Frye's theory of myth, dystopias may be linked to archetypal demonic imagery, characterised by 'the presentation of the world that desire totally rejects: the world of the scapegoat, of bondage and pain and confusion': it represents 'a society held together by a kind of molecular tension of egos, a loyalty to the group or the leader which diminishes the individual, or, at best, contrasts his pleasure with his duty or honour' (Frye, 1990: p.147).

In both FN and UKIP discourse, for instance, the EU has been described as a stifling, totalitarian regime controlled by an all-encompassing, quasi-Kafkaesque or Orwellian bureaucracy. The Commission in particular has been singled out in the discourse of both parties; according to the FN website, for instance, the EU is run by unelected technocrats, in the form of the European Commission and the European Central Bank;

The Commission, an unelected organ, procures considerable powers to technocrats, as well as the monopoly on legislative initiative. At least 80% of our important national laws and rules are nothing more than the transposition of its laws and directives. The same *enlightened despotism* is applied to the European Central Bank, whose monetary decisions are imposed on the Euro countries, who have become, at best, one-legged when it comes to their economic policies (Front National, 2015).

Similarly, in UKIP discourse, the European Commission has also been described as the undemocratic, big-business dominated heart of the totalitarian EU government, as, for instance, in the following speech by Farage to Commission President and former Eurogroup chief Jean-Claude Juncker;

The means by which the European Commission makes law and holds law is actually the very enemy of the concept of democracy itself, because it means in any member state there is nothing the electorate can do to change a single piece of European law (Farage, 2014).

Similar discursive constructions can be identified in the discourse of *Podemos* and *Syriza*. According to *Podemos* leader Pablo Iglesias, for instance, the EU appears to be dominated by a corrupt ruling class of Eurocrats and politicians, themselves forming part of the worldwide financial elite, which in Iglesias' view are the real rulers of the world, and which he refers to as the 'Wall Street Party' (Iglesias 2014a, pp.115-141). Thus, for Iglesias, 'a Europe has been constructed which is not at the service of the citizens but at the service of the banks, including the German banks' (Berlunes 2014). For Iglesias, the domination of the financial elites

threatens the present and future of Europe, it threatens equality, liberty and fraternity, it threatens our life together ... Our peoples are not immature, nor are they colonies of any investment fund, they didn't conquer and defend their freedom just to give it up to a financial oligarchy (Iglesias 2014b).

In the following extract from a 2012 speech by *Syriza* leader Alexis Tsipras, the European and Greek policymakers and elites are accused of using a form of 'political and financial blackmail' in order to impose austerity measures, which, in turn, are part of a plot to introduce unbridled neoliberal policies across Europe 'based on cheap labour, deregulation of the labour market, low public spending and tax exemptions for capital' (Tsipras, 2012).

The European Union and its elites are seen as representing the opposite of values traditionally associated with the European integration project, including democracy, freedom, human rights, solidarity and prosperity. In this context, the EU elites have also been compared to Mafia bosses in *Podemos* discourse. Iglesias, for instance cites Juncker who, following Papandreou's declaration that he would hold a referendum on the Troika's memorandum, noted that 'We let him know that his behaviour was disloyal'. Commenting on Juncker's words, Iglesias retorts, referring to the *Godfather*, that 'Not even Vito Corleone would have done it better' (Iglesias, 2014a: p.136).

Both Farage and Le Pen, in particular, have *explicitly* compared the EU to literary dystopias. Notably, Farage has made several direct comparisons between the EU and Orwell's *1984*, describing it, for instance, as an 'EU Big Brother state' (Waterfield and Day, 2014). On another occasion, Farage compared EU plans to set up media councils to 'Orwell's *1984*' adding that 'This is a flagrant attack on press freedom. To hear that unelected bureaucrats in Brussels want the power to fine and suspend journalists is just outrageous' (Waterfield, 2013). Similarly, in the context of the EPP's plan to introduce EU education in schools, Farage, alluding to *1984*'s secret police, argued that 'the EU Thought Police now want to brainwash your children... Propaganda should have no place in the classroom' (UKIP MEPs, 2014).

Similarly, Le Pen has also directly compared the EU to a dystopia, both by depicting it as a mistaken utopia, and by describing it as Kafkaesque. In the following extract, for instance, Le Pen depicts the EU as an undemocratic 'utopia gone wrong', from which 'The French' want to escape; 'The French have understood that the EU does not live up to the utopia they were sold. It has distanced itself significantly from a democratic mode of operation' (Von Rohr, 2014). On this basis, then, in Le Pen's discourse the EU is a dystopian society in which the freedom and democracy of 'the people' are smothered by a totalitarian elite backed up by a mindless, Kafkaesque Eurocracy;

The idea of European cooperation has turned into a bureaucratic nightmare of a federalist and centralized character within globalization, which is the very opposite of liberalism ... EU citizens seemed to be living in Kafka's *Metamorphosis* (Prague Post, 2015).

In this sense, then, just as 'the mythical narration of the past can serve as a discursive and moral resource for the contemporary formulation of a utopian vision' (Kølvraa, 2016, p.170), it can also be used for emphasis in dystopian narratives. In addition, in a reversal of the founding myth of European integration, more or less indirect comparisons between the EU and Nazi Germany are common in the discourse of the four parties, particularly in the context of (perceived) German dominance in the context of the Eurozone crisis and, more recently, the refugee crisis. The comparison with Nazi Germany is a powerful one; as has been noted, the prevention of the recurrence of the traumas of Nazi domination and World War Two by developing a peaceful, prosperous, interconnected Europe has been a particularly important myth underlying European integration. In this sense, then, as Wæver points out, the European past has been 'securitized' in that 'Europe's Other... is Europe's own past which should not be allowed to become its future' (1998, p.90). In particular, as Devetak argues, Hitler represents both monster and ghost in international relations discourse;

the monster *par excellence* in international relations is Hitler. He epitomises evil in a way that compares with the Devil. It would be no exaggeration to say that since the Second World War Hitler has displaced the Devil as the personification of evil. All cruel murderous rulers are compared with him (2005: p.634).

Therefore, even a veiled reference to Hitler or the Third Reich is potentially powerful in creating an atmosphere of fear and threat. Rather than depicting EU integration as the 'antidote' to a potentially recurring past of fascism and war, then, the suggestion is that it is the EU itself which is leading to the return of Europe's bloody past.

All four parties allude, especially in the context of the Eurozone crisis, to a perceived German hegemony or dominance in the EU. While the link between contemporary German dominance of the EU and the Nazi Third Reich may not be stated directly, the connection is often nevertheless implied, albeit (relatively) subtly so. In the following extract, for instance, Farage argues that the EU has once again led to a German dominated, undemocratic Europe;

It's an irony isn't it, that the project that was designed to contain German power has now given us a totally German-dominated Europe. Just look at the euro, Germany has a currency that is undervalued by twenty percent, a growing and massive trade surplus and most growth in the German economy since the collapse of 2008 has indeed been in exports to other Eurozone countries... And when we have a General Election that says a country like Greece wants to change direction, well I'm sorry but that now must be brushed aside because the Germans don't want it (UKIP, 2015).

Le Pen has also referred to German dominance of the EU, for example, in her argument that 'the European Union has ruined us, has destroyed our security and is trying to impose its *diktat*' (Le Pen, 2015). Similarly, again alluding to Nazi Germany and its occupation of France during World War II, Le Pen accused President Hollande of being 'towed along' by Germany, and suggested that France was no more than a 'province' of Germany; 'Thank you Mrs Merkel for coming with your vice-Chancellor, the administrator of the province of France' (Paris Match, 2015)^{2,3}.

The Nazi past has also been alluded to in the discourse of the two 'left' populist parties discussed in this paper. Tsipras, for instance, argues that, in the absence of 'democracy, equality, freedom and solidarity, the most important values of the European political tradition... Europe will regress to a dark past we thought gone for ever' (Tsipras, 2012). This, of course, hints at the rise of Nazi Germany and the ensuing Second World War; thus, the proponents of austerity are, if not compared to Nazis themselves, are framed as potentially facilitating the rise of a new wave of fascism. Similarly, in an open letter to *Handelsblatt*, a German financial newspaper, Tsipras again refers to the risk of economic crisis provoking an extreme nationalist reaction; 'Prejudice was never a good guide, especially during periods when an economic crisis reinforces stereotypes and breeds bigotry, nationalism, even violence' (Tsipras, 2015a).

Moreover, while the *Syriza* government has generally refrained from direct comparisons between contemporary Germany and the Troika to the Nazi regime, *Syriza* have nonetheless aimed to keep the memory of Nazi war-crimes in Greece alive in popular consciousness. Shortly after becoming Prime Minister, for instance, Tsipras visited a war memorial in Kaisariani where 200 Greek resistance fighters were slaughtered by the Nazis in 1944 (Maltezou and Kirschbaum, 2015). Most famously, Tsipras brought up the question of German reparations for crimes carried out during the Nazi occupation of Greece, along with the return of antiquities plundered during World War 2. Arguing that Germany had a 'moral obligation to remember what the (German) forces did to the country', including executions, the massacre of entire villages and pillaging (Smith, 2015), he said that;

Germany has never properly paid reparations for the damage done to Greece by the Nazi occupation ... After the reunification of Germany in 1990, the legal and political conditions were created for this issue to be solved. But, since then, German governments chose silence, legal tricks and delay (cited in Smith, 2015).

Similar discursive strategies can be seen in *Podemos* discourse. Iglesias, for instance, views EU-imposed austerity as a quasi-colonisation of the Southern European periphery by the Northern Member States, particularly Germany, and the Troika. He argues that 'The crisis has led to a Europe split along a North/creditor South/debtor axis, which establishes a division of labour orchestrated by the richer countries' (Iglesias 2014a, p. 135). In this context, Spain has been 'relegated to a peripheral position, a

² France's reduction to the junior partner in the Franco German partnership has also been alluded to by Farage, who argued that its voice was now 'little more than a pipsqueak' in a 'totally German-dominated Europe' (Heffer, 2015).

³ For Le Pen, German dominance results not only in the imposition of austerity policies but also forces France to open its doors to immigration; in her view, 'Germany seeks not only to rule our economy, it wants to force us to accept hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers'. In addition, she argued that Germany's motivation in opening its doors to migrants and asylum seekers was to lower wages through importing 'slaves' (De La Hamaide and Rosnoble, 2015).

debtor country which provides cheap labour to the North of Europe' (Gimenez San Miguel, 2014), while its people are 'obliged to serve beers and tapas to the rich of the North' (Berlunes, 2014). In his book, Iglesias goes as far as to describe the Southern European Member States as 'colonies' of an undemocratic EU;

In the south of Europe, the situation is tragic: our countries have almost been converted into protectorates, into new colonies, where powers which nobody has elected are destroying the social rights and threatening the social and political cohesion of our societies (Iglesias 2014b).

Another discursive strategy which has been used notably in the discourse of the two 'right' populist parties, UKIP and the *Front National*, is to compare the EU to the Soviet Union, particularly under Stalinism. Instead of discursively constructing totalitarian communism as the antithesis of the values represented by the EU, however, both UKIP and the FN compare the EU to the USSR, again implying that the EU is a dystopian, totalitarian regime.

Farage, for instance, has argued that 'the EU resurrected the evil system that the people of Eastern Europe had lived under before' (Farage, 2010), and, in a later speech, that 'This European Union is the new communism. It is power without limits. It is creating a tide of human misery and the sooner it is swept away the better' (Farage, 2013). In the context of the Eurozone crisis, Farage argued that, 'Just as Stalin was happy for millions of Russians to die, the EU is content that millions of European people live in poverty and unemployment just to let the euro project survive' (UKIP, 2013). More recently, in the context of the 2015 Portuguese political crisis, Farage compared the EU to the 'Brezhnev Doctrine', and argued that 'a country only has democratic rights if it is in favour of the EU project' (Farage, 2015).

Marine Le Pen has also often referred to the EU as the 'Soviet European Union' (Le Figaro, 2015). In a 2014 interview, for instance, Le Pen argued that, 'I want to destroy the EU, not Europe! I believe in a Europe of nation-states. I believe in Airbus and Ariane, in a Europe based on cooperation. But I don't want this European Soviet Union' (Von Rohr, 2014). The FN website also compares the EU to the USSR in that it views both as 'unreformable, as they are built on the ideology of the pure state' (FN, 2015). For Le Pen, then, the 'unreformable' EU will meet a similar end to the USSR; 'I believe that the EU is like the Soviet Union now: it is not improvable. The EU will collapse like the Soviet Union collapsed.' In a further allusion to the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, Le Pen argued that, 'We must bring down the wall of Brussels, just as the Berlin wall came down' (Carnegy, 2014) and, more recently, in the context of the possibility of a British exit from the EU, argued that 'I compare Brussels to the Berlin Wall. If Great Britain knocks down part of the wall, it's finished, it's over' (Foster and Samuel, 2015).

3.2. The Populist Party as 'Dystopian Hero'

As has been noted above, in dystopian narratives, the citizens of the dystopia generally live in a dehumanized state in a society characterized by stifling totalitarian control. Feeling trapped by this regime, the dystopian hero, such as 1984's Winston Smith, often questions and rebels against the existing society and struggles to escape from its confines. In this sense, it can be argued that the leaders of the four parties concerned depict themselves and their parties as dystopian heroes, willing to rebel against the supposedly 'totalitarian' EU and thus to lead their peoples to an imagined future of freedom and prosperity. For UKIP and the *Front National*, in particular, this means supporting a full-blown exit from the EU. Speaking in 2013, Farage, for instance, argued that 'We know that only by leaving the union can we regain control of our borders, our parliament, democracy and our ability to trade freely with the fastest-growing economies in the world' (Farage, 2013). Similarly, Marine Le Pen, the self-styled 'Madame Frexit', promised that

I will be Madame Frexit if the European Union doesn't give us back our monetary, legislative, territorial and budget sovereignty. I believe that sovereignty is the twin sister of democracy. If there's no sovereignty, there's no democracy. I'm a democrat, I will fight until the end to defend democracy and the will of the people (Holehouse and Riley-Smith, 2015).

For *Syriza* and *Podemos*, the focus is on reform within the EU, rather than on giving up EU membership completely. *Syriza*, for instance, depicts itself at the head of a struggle against

neoliberalism in the EU, which would restore true 'European' values such as democracy, equality, freedom and solidarity;

Europe needs a new plan to deepen European integration. Such a plan must challenge neoliberalism and lead European economies back to recovery. It should prioritise the needs of workers, pensioners and the unemployed, not the interests of multinational companies and bankrupt bankers. Syriza-USF has committed itself to this road.... These struggles have started already and have led to the rise of left and resistance movements throughout Europe. They keep alive democracy, equality, freedom and solidarity, the most important values of the European political tradition (Tsipras, 2012)

For Iglesias, then, *Podemos* stands, in this respect, for renewed independence from this EU 'colonisation'. In a 2014 interview in Berlin, Iglesias argued that he was there 'to tell Merkel, the European Central Bank and the Troika that we don't want to be a colony, we don't want to be a colony of Germany or of the European Troika, and we want to recover our dignity as a people of Southern Europe' (Berlunes 2014).

Both parties, while not supporting the UK's decision to withdraw from the EU, argue that Brexit is a warning that the EU needs to be reformed. For Tsipras, the Brexit vote was a 'wake-up call' that the EU should 'replace austerity with growth, division with convergence, unemployment with decent jobs and endless negotiations behind closed doors with transparency and democracy' (Harris, 2016). Iglesias described the Brexit referendum as 'Europe's saddest day', and argued that 'nobody would want to leave a Europe based on justice and solidarity'. In his view, the solution was simultaneously 'to democratise the European institutions, but also to recover sovereignty' (Carvajal, 2016)

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can be argued that all four parties use 'Othering' strategies to refer to the EU. Typically, the 'Self', or the 'in-group' is framed as superior, while the 'Other', or 'Out-group', is depicted as inferior. Here, the 'in-group', typically for populist parties, is defined as 'We, the people', while the 'Out-group' is the (corrupt) Establishment. In this case, however, the EU is considered to be part of the corrupt Establishment, along with, for instance, mainstream national politicians and worldwide financial elites.

In this case, while the parties studied are Eurosceptic to varying degrees, it is the EU itself which is portrayed as the antithesis of 'European' values such as democracy, human rights or the rule of law. In this way, the founding myth of the European Union as a vehicle for peace and prosperity, as a 'normative power' or 'Eutopia' born from the ashes of the Second World War and the Holocaust is reversed. In the discourse of the parties concerned, it is the EU itself which is depicted in dystopian terms as a threat to Europe's peace and prosperity. This effect is heightened through allusions and comparisons to Nazi Germany and, in the case of the *Front National* and UKIP, to literary dystopias and to the USSR.

Finally, the parties concerned depict themselves as dystopian heroes, as those who are to lead their people to freedom and a better future away from an asphyxiating, exploitative EU. In this sense, the parties depict themselves, along with the 'man in the street', as the true bearers of European values. In the case of the two right-wing parties discussed, this 'freedom' is to come from leaving the EU completely; for *Podemos* and *Syriza* the focus is on reform within the EU.

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Common Health Policy? Unify you must! Relative Performance of Cross-border Health Care Policy in Member States

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ABSTRACT

Understanding how the common health policies in force are implemented across the EU is critical. This paper seeks to test the relative performance of Directive 2011/24/EU on Patient's Rights in Cross-border Healthcare using Data Envelopment Analysis. The findings of the study indicate that certain member states show 100% performance efficiency. Addressing the difficulties that patients encounter seeking reimbursement and reducing the number of adverse events patients face in a healthcare setting would contribute the most to maximizing performance of this Directive in the member states. The number of civil society umbrella organizations working on health issues, the number of specialist doctors, the number of specialized hospitals, the GDP or the population size have not been found to be associated with the relative performance of member states with regard to the implementation of this Directive. The study contributes to health policy research, public health and more widely to policy research by identifying variables that could be manipulated in order to maximize the performance of policies.

Keywords: Health policy, European Union, Relative performance, Efficiency, Cross-border Healthcare, Public Health, Data Envelopment Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The sources of health policies in the EU are legislations in the form of Directives and Regulations and decisions of the European Court of Justice. Article 35 in EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights declares that:

Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by the national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities.

The question of the possibility or impossibility of having a common health policy in the European Union has been widely discussed. Mackenbach et al (Mackenbach & McKee, 2013) in their study involving European countries, conclude that the European Health Systems show large variation in structure, integration, processes and outcomes in terms of health, quality, equity and costs. They have identified national income, survival/self-expression values, government effectiveness, democracy, left-party participation in government and Ethnic fractionalization as the factors/predictors that affect a country's policy performance. However, these factors are very abstract and difficult to measure or improve. Differences exist in the motivation and application of common regulations such as tobacco policy, food policy and alcohol control across the member states (Elmadfa et al., 2009; Gruning, Gilmore, & McKee, 2006; Österberg, 2011). However, a broad European welfare tradition, a common commitment to solidarity, liberalization, privatization, competition and consumer choice- driven healthcare systems could make common health policies across EU a possibility (Scott L. Greer, Hervey, Mackenbach, & McKee, 2013). Dixon and Polteikhoff (Dixon & Poteliakhoff, 2012) also note that the boundaries that have existed between two main categories of health systems in Europe

namely the Bismark systems of ‘social health insurance’ and the Beveridge systems of ‘tax funded universal coverage’ have ‘softened’ and ‘melted’ making implementation of common health policies a possibility. There is an urgency of policy research into modifiable factors, and as Washe et al (2013) conclude, so far factors/indicators such as social cohesion and ethnic fractionalization that have been suggested prove impossible or very difficult to modify. The main objectives of this study are therefore to identify variables that could be manipulated in order to maximize the performance of health policies, to explore the use of new approaches and tools that could provide us with insights into the workings of policies and in this way to encourage and motivate the formulation and improvement of common health policies to tackle common challenges using data that is readily available. This study realizes these objectives by testing the relative performance of implementation of the Directive 2011/24/EU on patient’s rights in cross-border healthcare across 28 member states using Data Envelopment Analysis.

Free movement in the EU is coupled with EU citizens claiming health care services in other EU countries and reimbursements by their home health system. Patients have the right to choose their healthcare provider including and also beyond their national borders, and they are entitled to reimbursement equivalent to a treatment at home. Eliminating the obstacles hindering patients from receiving treatment in another member state is the drive behind the cross-border healthcare directive. The EU creates several actors and factors to support that right. Dissatisfaction with healthcare provision and deficiencies of health system at home coupled with search for specialist treatment is often the motivation for patient mobility (M. Wismar & Busse, 2002; MP Wismar, Figueras, Ernst, & Van Ginneken, 2011). To ensure punctual treatment and provide options for complex procedures, some authorities and health insurers are contracted with healthcare providers in other countries that provide the required treatment for patients (MP Wismar et al., 2011).

The cross-border healthcare policy is designed to ensure a stable and quality healthcare treatment like the one a patient will receive in his home country. The preliminary version of the cross border health care directive was introduced in October 2007, following calls from both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers to address the cross border health care issues explicitly, due to the peculiar nature of the health sector (ref. Analysis paper by epr). Also, the decisions of the European Court of Justice on a number of cases concerning patient reimbursement for healthcare received in another member state launched the discussion of patient mobility in cross border health care. To that effect, a public consultation was carried out by the Commission to comprehensively identify the problems in the field of cross-border healthcare. The results motivated the Commission to forge a new draft directive. The new proposal of the commission introduced in July 2008 aims to provide legal certainties on cross-border healthcare issues. Exploring the potential of European cooperation to revamp the efficiency and effectiveness of all EU-wide health system is another outcome of the legal framework proposed. The European commission proposed a directive in 2011 on the application of patient’s rights in cross border healthcare which was adopted by the European parliament and European council (S L Greer, 2013). The reason for the proposal was to clarify the rules of cross border health care, provide information on patient’s rights and access to reimbursement in addition to improving collaboration between the EU countries on healthcare. The elements and goals of the proposed directives are: (1) Common principles in all EU health systems (2) A specific framework for all cross border healthcare (3) European cooperation on healthcare. The transposition of the Directive into legislation of all EU member states was enforced on 25th October 2013. The provisions of the Directive are as follows:

- Patient’s entitlement: Patients are entitled to reimbursement of equivalent cost of treatment at home. The treatment must be of quality and safety standards.
- Prior Authorization: Prior authorization is possible for highly specialized treatment or overnight stay. The process must be reasonable and can be refused.
- National Contact Points (NCPs): There must exist a NCP in each member state to give outgoing patients information on rights, appeal process, reimbursements and entitlements, and incoming patient’s information on quality, safety standards of the system and procedures for complaints.
- Prices, access, information and prescriptions: Treatment options and other related issues on process and quality must be provided by the healthcare provider. There should be no discrimination of patients.

The report on the operation of applications of patients’ rights in cross border healthcare for the European Parliament and the Council stated that, the next stage for the commission is assessing the member states transposition of the Directive.

Conflicting opinions exist regarding the performance of the cross border healthcare policy. S L Greer et al. (2013) conducted an analysis of the functioning of the cross border healthcare directive using evaluative questions that covers reimbursements, quality and safety, and undue delay. Their study shows that cross border healthcare is having a rapid growth with potential of more growth in the future. Nonetheless it shows that the number of patients under the directive is still very low. The study concluded that the cross border healthcare will be in high demand if patients are aware of the possibilities it offers.

One challenge of the policy is maintaining financial stability of national health systems while guaranteeing reimbursements for treatments. A study by Vasev & VrangbÅk (2014) showed that resource is an important factor for smooth transposition of the EU directive; they concluded that adjustment cost at the national health system of member state is imperative for the transposition. However, there is virtually no empirically robust evidence of performance (efficiency) evaluation of the policy on individual member states or the whole EU. With this work, we aim to make a first step towards assessing the transposition of the directive by evaluating the performance (efficiency) of each member state in implementing the policy relative to each other from operational, financial and quality point of views.

Efficiency analysis and measurement is a complex task, particularly when conceptual challenges, multiple objectives or great scope of error exist (Jacobs, Smith, & Street, 2006). A research discipline of organizational efficiency analysis was pioneered by Farrell (1957) who addressed this complex issue by developing sophisticated analytic tools that seek to measure the efficiency of organizations or system. An extension of this discipline is the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology. This methodology is utilized in this study and has been applied in evaluating multiple policies of other public sectors (Begg & Henry, 1998; Buleca & Mura, 2014).

Objectives of the Study:

This paper seeks to test the relative performance of Directive 2011/24/EU on Patient's Rights in Cross-border Healthcare across 28 member states using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to explore the relative performance of the implementation of the Cross-border Healthcare Directive, to identify factors that are associated with the relative performance scores and to explain differences in performance across member states based on data Special Eurobarometer 411 (2014) on Safety and Quality of Care for quality indicators and Special Eurobarometer 425 (2015) on Cross-border Healthcare operational success indicators.

METHODS

The method consists of two stages: first, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is employed to estimate the relative efficiency of the policy as practiced by each member state. This will allow us secondly to generate the average efficiency level of the policy as a whole, followed by regression analysis on the efficiency score.

The data used for the analysis was extracted from Special Eurobarometer 411 (2014) on Safety and Quality of Care for quality indicators and Special Eurobarometer 425 (2015) on Cross-border Healthcare operational success indicators. Relevant data was also extracted from the European Society of Cardiology, World Development Indicators, International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook and Eurostat. Due to incomplete data for some member states, efficiency evaluation of a total of twenty five member states is performed.

Data envelopment analysis (DEA)

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric data-oriented linear programming technique that calculates the maximum attainable output for every input. It is used in this study to analyze the relative efficiency of cross-border healthcare policy as practiced by the European member states. DEA has proven to be an effective technique in evaluating the relative efficiency of units known as Decision Making Units (DMUs), in this case the individual European member states with multiple inputs and outputs. It has numerous applications including Education, Finance, Agriculture, Energy and Health. The efficient DMUs are assigned an efficiency score of 1(100%), while the inefficient DMUs are assigned a score less than 1 (Jat, Deo, Goicolea, Hurtig, & San Sebastian, 2013). The DEA model was

first introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) to measure production efficiency. It was then extended by Banker et al. (1984), and since then numerous models and modifications have been developed for its advancement.

There are two model orientations in DEA, an input-oriented model (maintaining a constant output while input decreases) and an output-oriented model (increasing output while maintaining input) (Chuang, Chang, & Lin, 2011). It is argued that the input-oriented model should be applied in health (Chuang et al., 2011). Therefore, since the policy makers have inconsiderable control over their output, such as increasing the number of reimburse applicants, increasing the number of prior authorization application before treatment, but more control over inputs in this study, the input-oriented model is a better suggestion for the performance evaluation. Thus, the efficiency should be pursued by minimizing the input.

Efficiency definition and Inputs/Outputs

Effectiveness of public policies as the extent to which the policies are achieving the intended benefits plus any unanticipated side benefits, was further expanded on efficiency of public policies as the extent to which they are keeping the cost down (Nagel, 1986). Policy makers' broad definition of efficiency is the extent to which the objective achieved is compared to the resources consumed (Jacobs et al., 2006).

Recipients of the cross-border health care policy look at efficiency of the policy from different perspectives, but the three main legal frameworks provided by the directive are: rules concerning the reimbursement of cost of cross-border healthcare, responsibilities of the member states with regard to cross border healthcare and cooperation between health care systems. Our definition of efficiency for the cross-border healthcare policy encompasses the three legal frameworks by incorporating both quality and operational factors of the policy.

Inputs and Outputs in the DEA model

The efficiency model should be designed according to the intentions of the analysis as all modelling does (Jacobs et al., 2006). In the efficiency literature related to health the undesirable outputs are treated as inputs (Retzlaff-Roberts, Chang, & Rubin, 2004). In some studies they are transformed into desirable outputs. Selection of inputs and outputs of the cross-border healthcare policy for this analysis is based on the objectives of the policy.

Improving the quality of healthcare at the host country is an attraction for patients willing to travel abroad for healthcare, therefore minimizing the likelihood of harm occurring at any kind of health facility (hospital or non-hospital) healthcare is an important factor for improving the cross-border healthcare practice. To account for health expenditure at the host country, expenditure per capita for each member state is used as input (X1), extracted from World Development Indicators. To account for the quality of healthcare services in our efficiency evaluation, response of QC6a and QC6b are considered as inputs (X1 and X2), and QC7 as output (Y1) from Eurobarometer 411 (June 2014). To account for operational success of the cross-border healthcare, we consider the responses of QD7 (X3) as input and QD6 (Y2) as an output from Eurobarometer 425 (May 2015).

Inputs – undesirable variables that need to be minimized were:

- X1: How likely do you think it is that patients could be harmed by hospital care in (OUR COUNTRY)? By hospital care we mean being treated in a hospital as an outpatient or inpatient. (Answer: % Total 'Likely') (EB 411)
- X2: And how likely do you think it is that patients could be harmed by non-hospital healthcare in (OUR COUNTRY)? By non-hospital health care we mean receiving diagnosis, treatment or medicine in a clinic or surgery of your general practitioner or in a pharmacy. . (Answer: % Total 'Likely') (EB 411)
- X3: Thinking about the last time you had a treatment in another EU country, did you encounter any problems getting reimbursement from your national health service or health insurer? (Answer: YES) (EB 425)
- X4: Health Expenditure per Capita

Outputs – desirable outcomes that need to be maximized were:

- Y1: Have you or a member of your family ever experienced an adverse event when receiving healthcare? (Answer: NO) (EB 411)

- Y2: Have you received any medical treatment in another EU country in the last 12 months?
(Answer: Total 'YES') (EB 425)

The context of efficiency using these variables is to minimize the factors that hinder participation in cross-border healthcare and to improve or maintain the factors that promote participation in the cross-border healthcare policy, using Performance Improvement Management (PIM-DEA) software with the option of input oriented BCC model (model 1).

Data Analysis

Correlational analysis followed by regression analysis of any significant correlations were determined using IBM Statistics SPSS 20 were performed. Correlational analysis was performed using ,as independent variables the number of civil society umbrella organizations working in the field of cross-border healthcare (Data from European Patients Forum), number of specialist doctors (Eurostat), number of CVD Hospitals (European Society of Cardiology), GDP (World Development Indicators) and the population size (World Development Indicators) and performance efficiency as the dependent variable. The prediction was that there would be positive correlation between relative efficiency and number of civil society umbrella organizations working in the field of cross-border healthcare, number of specialist doctors, number of specialized hospitals (Cardiovascular Disease), GDP and the population size.

RESULTS

The efficiency evaluation presents an inefficient practice of the cross-border healthcare policy as shown by the average value in Table (1), out of the twenty five member states evaluated, 36% operate with perfect efficiency from the inputs and outputs used in this evaluation.

The weight distribution of efficiency evaluation using DEA shows the variables that contributes the most to the efficiency (Table 2). From the weight distribution, it shows that Y1 quality of service at individual (host country) which is the absence of adverse event, and input X4 which is reimbursement problem after receiving treatment contributes the most to efficiency. Therefore, to improve the efficiency of the member states such as Cyprus, Greece and France, reducing the number of patients having difficulties and problems with reimbursements would contribute positively to the efficiency and uptake of the cross-border policy. Similarly, improve the quality of health service by minimizing the number of adverse events experienced by the patients, would also contribute to the efficiency of the policy.

Table 1 Relative Performance Efficiency of EU member states

Country	Performance Efficiency (%)
AT Austria	100
BE Belgium	74,6
BG Bulgaria	100
CY Republic of Cyprus	60,68
CZ Czech Republic	92,5
DE Germany	100
DK Denmark	79,95
EE Estonia	100
EL Greece	60,06
ES Spain	88,61
FI Finland	100
FR France	66,81
HR Croatia	100
HU Hungary	100
IE Ireland	100
IT Italy	100
LV Latvia	98,32
NL The Netherlands	75,54
PL Poland	100
PT Portugal	74,55
RO Romania	100
SE Sweden	89,41
SI Slovenia	83,61
SK Slovakia	89,27
UK The United Kingdom	100

Table 2 also provides country specific guidance to improve performance efficiency. For example, if Denmark wanted to improve their performance efficiency in the implementation of the policy, they would need to reduce the number of patients experiencing problems during the reimbursement process

and decrease the number of patients being harmed by the hospital care they receive in Denmark.

Countries	Total health expenditure per capita (Input 1)	Harmed by hospital care (Input 2)	Harmed by non-hospital care (Input 3)	Experienced problems getting reimbursed (Input 4)	Not had any adverse event (Output 1)	Medical treatment in another EU country (Output 2)
AT Austria	0,21	0	0,94	0,78	1,08	0
BE Belgium	0,14	0	1,44	0	0	0
BG Bulgaria	0,21	0	0,92	0,77	1,07	0
CY Republic of Cyprus	0,33	0	0,71	0,37	0	0
CZ Czech Republic	0,37	0,7	0	1,13	0,95	0,33
DE Germany	0,11	0	1,54	0,69	0,57	0
DK Denmark	0	1,09	0	1,25	0	0,67
EE Estonia	0,58	1,59	0	0,22	0	0
EL Greece	0,21	0	0,59	0,51	0,58	0
ES Spain	0,21	0	0,95	0,79	1,09	0
FI Finland	0,36	0,67	0,65	0,66	0,34	0
FR France	0,13	0	1,28	0	0	0
HR Croatia	0,31	0,29	0,82	0,88	1,02	0
HU Hungary	0,24	0,79	0	1,03	0,95	0,26
IE Ireland	0,31	0,01	0,83	1,41	1,44	0,31
IT Italy	0,23	0,74	0	0,97	0,89	0,25
LV Latvia	1,18	0,4	0	2,1	0	0
NL The Netherlands	0,31	0,94	0	0,56	0	0
PL Poland	0,27	0,01	0,73	1,23	1,26	0,27
PT Portugal	0,64	0	0,85	0	12,93	0,85
RO Romania	4,54	0,65	0,12	0	0	0
SE Sweden	0	1,45	0	1,06	0	0
SI Slovenia	0,42	1,15	0	0,37	0	0
SK Slovakia	0,47	1,1	0	0,6	0,65	0
UK The United Kingdom	0,31	0	1,37	1,15	1,58	0
Average	0,4836	0,4632	0,5496	0,7412	1,056	0,1176

Table 2 Efficiency Weights

The findings of the study indicate that certain member states show 100% performance efficiency where France, Cyprus and Greece have lower relative performance efficiency compared to the rest of the EU countries. Addressing the difficulties that patients encounter seeking reimbursement and reducing the number of adverse events patients face in a healthcare setting would contribute most to maximizing performance of this Directive in the member states.

Independent variables such as the number of civil society umbrella organizations working on health issues, the number of specialist doctors, the number of specialized hospitals, GDP or population were not associated with the relative performance of member states with regards to the implementation of this Directive.

CONCLUSIONS

The study reveals that member states show harmony in the implementation of the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare. The study also identifies inputs/factors that could be manipulated thus motivating different member states to perform more efficiently. However, caution should be exercised by relative performances as these values are relative values and could be misleading where your performance efficiency could be low but compare to others you might come across as having perfect efficiency when you are only the best of the worst. Further studies are needed to better understand the role and effectiveness of the transnational NGOs working on universal care in the emergence and implementation of EU norm of a common health policy. Common health policies that are implemented efficiently across the member states are needed to deal with future common health challenges such as ageing populations, infectious diseases, antimicrobial resistance, shortage of blood products and conflicts. This study contributes to health policy research and more widely to policy research by identifying variables that could be manipulated in order to maximize the performance of policies, exploring the use of new approaches and tools that could provide insights into the workings of policies motivating the formulation of common policies to tackle common challenges across the EU.

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Europeanisation of Political Discourses on Discrimination

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ABSTRACT

Community law prohibiting discrimination has existed since the Treaty of Rome. In 1997, Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam bestowed upon the Council new competences to develop provisions combating discrimination. As the Council Directives on Employment Equality and Racial Equality have been transposed by member states, debates have been sparked on the application of these laws. Through a qualitative and quantitative content analysis, this paper identifies Europeanisation of Political Discourses on the issue of discrimination in the European Union and provides empirical evidence on ethical self-understanding of actors as Europeans by using indicators of the deliberative quality of debates held.

Keywords: Europeanisation, Anti-Discrimination Directives, Media Discourse, European Identity

INTRODUCTION

There were two major sources of inspiration for this research. The first source was the enactment of the European Union's Anti-Discrimination Directives in the year 2000, solidifying the EU's competency in the anti-discrimination field. This carried the potential for the emergence of the EU as an agenda setter, and many scholarly works were published following the enactment of these directives. Some have traced the source of these directives, while others have looked at the material content and legal innovations brought along by them.

The two Anti-Discrimination Directives, the Racial Equality Directive 2000/48/EC and the Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC, were enacted by the European Council on the basis of powers bestowed upon them by Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The directives were adopted at record speed by the European Council in 2000 due to a combination of reasons. EU member state governments wanted to show their stance against rising concerns about racism and xenophobia. This was mainly a reaction to the election of Jörg Haider's FPÖ in Austria. Links between the advocacy of a group of activists called the Starting Line Group (SLG) and the amendment of the Amsterdam Treaty to include Article 13, as well as this group's involvement in the drafting of the Racial Equality Directive were also revealed by several scholarly works (Case and Givens, 2010; Geddes and Guiraudon, 2004; Geddes and Guiraudon, 2007; Niessen and Chopin, 2001).

What followed the enactment of the Anti-Discrimination Directives was a period in which the member states had to transpose these directives into their laws. For states that had similar legislation already in place, this was a painless transaction. For the other member states with very different institutionalised practices or no such legislation in place, by contrast, the transposition of these directives posed questions and carried challenges. One of the challenges was the potential clash between the comprehensive content and scope of the directives affecting the life chances of many millions of EU citizens and the values and convictions of the diverse EU societies. How were these laws to fit in with the values and norms of the different societies that make up the EU? Were there any visible reactions towards these laws? Were these reactions politicised and if so could they be traced in the different mediated public debates? These questions are about conceptualisation of the 'good life' and how state and society are linked. The intriguing element about the EU Anti-Discrimination laws was that these laws were made at EU level and were mostly with the 'market making' perspective on the EU's purposes in mind. This so-called 'creeping competency'—the expansion of areas that fall under EU policy and law making—raised several empirical questions (Pollack, 1994). Could a European Public Sphere be a remedy for these concerns? This particular question on the merits of the emergence of a

communicative space in the European Union has been the second source of inspiration for this research (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Börzel and Risse, 2009; Haverland, 2006).

The notion of a modern public sphere being an integral part of the democratic decision-making mechanisms of today's societies was one of the possible ways of addressing several of the above-mentioned questions. The literature reviewed for the purposes of this research looked at the normative desirability and empirical possibility of a European Public Sphere (Sifft et al., 2007). Inconsistency of research findings has, however, been found to be the defining element of research in this field (Huber, 2008; Koopmans and Statham, 2010; Koopmans, 2015). To remedy the weaknesses of the field on the second, methodological front, two sets of empirical indicators were designed to test the important aspects of the questions surrounding the European Public Sphere. These were Europeanisation Indicators and Deliberation Indicators.

Testing Europeanisation of Political Discourses: Coverage Cycles, Topics, Actors and Belongingness

The first aim of this research is to identify the degree to which the national public spheres of EU member states have been Europeanised in respect of political discourses on the issue of discrimination. The second aim of the research is to identify the degree of communicative interaction present in the quality press of the member states and whether the EU Directives are politicised. The research relies on media content analysis to reveal empirical evidence on the Europeanisation of political discourses on the issue of discrimination. To achieve the above-mentioned goals, two sets of indicators have been developed. The first set of indicators are called Europeanisation Indicators (EIs), aiming to measure the extent to which mediated debates on discrimination have been Europeanised in the EU member states studied. This section of the paper presents the results on Europeanisation Indicators.


The informal inspection of the coverage cycles (Europeanisation Indicator (EI-1)) and the formal correlation analysis reveals some evidence for convergence of coverage cycles across the countries. But this convergence does not appear to be very strong. In addition, the evidence does not suggest that this convergence has much to do with EU membership or the EU's specific Anti-Discrimination Directives. The major peaks relate to national events or coincidences of several national events in different countries. They do not appear to relate to EU events. However, the overall level of salience of the issue of discrimination appears to be lower in the two non-member states than in the member states, but is not apparent that there are any differences in the correlation of the coverage cycles.

These tentative conclusions regarding the degree of convergence in coverage cycles are rather more negative than have been found in some other studies. An important difference between this study and most earlier studies is that it analyses convergence over an extended period, rather than just in response to particular episodes. For example, Van de Steeg (2006) finds evidence of convergence across European countries in response to the electoral success of Jörg Haider and the Austrian FPÖ. This finding is mirrored here most obviously in the coverage in May 2002. Major events such as these do clearly resonate across Europe. During more normal times, however, there seems to be much less evidence of convergence. Thus, the longitudinal rather than the episodic approach would seem to lead towards more cautious conclusions.

One important qualification of the evidence that has been presented on the correlations needs to be made. The data collected and analysed so far cannot capture time lags in the peaks across newspapers and across states. It has been reported in other Europeanisation studies that the in depth scrutinising of issues could take place after the first incidence of the topic being picked up in a particular state. This could take the form of a peak occurring in one country in one month but in another country with the delay of one month or even more.


The study finds that there is considerable variation in the absolute level of attention paid to discrimination issues across the EU. This was mostly associated with the number of years of membership of the European Union, though, of course, the presence of such an association is no guarantee of any causal connection. The highest level of attention was shown by the UK and Italy. This was followed by Germany. These three countries were later studied in depth.

Coverage Cycles: Pre and Post Enactment of EED and RED



The peaks and troughs of the news cycles show some evidence of correlations. Still, little reason was found to think that such correlations constitute evidence of substantial Europeanisation as such. The peaks in coverage cycles mostly occurred around major national events that captured the attention of EU member states and other nations. One very obvious such event was the presence of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the French Presidential runoff election of May 2002.

Coverage Cycles: EI-1



El-1: Correlation Analysis

	FAZ	SZ	Guardian	Times	Mail	Mirror	ComereOS	LaRepubblica	IrishTimes	Irish Independent	DerStandard	DiePresse	BernerZeitung	Tages Anzeiger	Hurriyet
FAZ	1	.552**	-.200*	-.078	-.350**	.012	.138	-.156	.493**	-.374**	.306*	.296*	-.024	-.337**	-.275*
Pearson Correlation		.000	.038	.852	.000	.902	.154	-.108	.000	.000	.001	.002	.832	.000	.003
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
SZ		1	-.151	-.060	.064	-.032	.344**	.400**	.160	.144	.006	.348**	-.208	.129	.235*
Pearson Correlation		.000	.118	.534	.385	.742	.000	.000	.098	.138	.325	.000	.066	.183	.014
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
Guardian			1	.509**	-.159	.374**	.213*	.007	.063	.298**	-.063	-.295**	.298**	.275**	.166
Pearson Correlation		.038	.118	.000	.100	.000	.027	.942	.518	.002	.381	.002	.008	.004	.086
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
Times				1	.228*	.508**	-.108	-.168	.214*	.201*	.148	.075	.401**	.030	-.024
Pearson Correlation		.852	.534	.000	.018	.000	.275	.083	.026	.037	.126	.438	.000	.885	.809
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
Mail					1	.274**	-.261**	-.268**	.087	-.512**	.248**	.330**	.068	-.293**	-.392**
Pearson Correlation		.350**	.064	-.158	.228*	.000	.365	.100	.018	.004	.006	.370	.000	.053	.002
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
Mirror						1	-.067	-.234*	.079	.046	.142	.039	.103	.072	-.051
Pearson Correlation		.902	.742	.000	.000	.004	.492	.015	.418	.634	.142	.686	.367	.460	.604
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
ComereOS							1	.575**	.071	.195*	-.009	-.033	-.283*	.284**	.369**
Pearson Correlation		.138	.344**	.213*	-.108	-.261**	-.067	.000	.466	.043	.310	.734	.011	.003	.000
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
LaRepubblica								1	-.059	.505**	-.135	.207*	-.384**	.412**	.721**
Pearson Correlation		-.156	.400**	.007	-.168	-.268**	-.234*	.015	.000	.165	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
IrishTimes									1	.028	.362**	.249**	.179	-.144	-.013
Pearson Correlation		.493**	.160	.063	.214*	.067	.079	.071	-.059	.772	.000	.009	.114	.136	.896
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
IrishIndependent										1	-.206*	-.049	.045	.384**	.717**
Pearson Correlation		-.374**	.144	.296**	.201*	-.512**	.046	.195*	.505**	.028	.032	.617	.695	.000	.000
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
DerStandard											1	.558**	.125	-.113	-.067
Pearson Correlation		.309**	.086	-.083	.148	.248**	.142	-.099	-.135	.362**	-.206*	.000	.273	.245	.491
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
DiePresse												1	-.162	-.024	.139
Pearson Correlation		.296**	.348**	-.295**	.075	.330**	.039	-.033	.207*	.249**	-.049	.558**	.000	.155	.806
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
BernerZeitung													1	.101	-.175
Pearson Correlation		-.024	-.208	.296**	.401**	.068	.103	-.283*	-.384**	.179	.045	.125	-.162	.374	.122
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79
TagesAnzeiger														1	.428**
Pearson Correlation		-.337**	.129	.275**	.039	-.293**	.072	.284**	.412**	-.144	.384**	-.113	-.024	.101	.000
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108
Hurriyet															1
Pearson Correlation		-.275**	.235*	.166	-.024	-.382**	-.051	.369**	.721**	-.013	.717**	-.067	.139	.122	.000
Sig. (2-tailed)															
N	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

There were no obvious direct relationships between these peaks and the EU Directives themselves. Furthermore, there is no conclusive evidence showing that correlations for member states are higher than non-member states. And the correlations between individual newspapers identified appeared to be almost random with respect to the newspapers' general outlooks on the world.

Given the findings of earlier studies as well as the results of the correlation analysis, the UK media was expected to be quite insular when it comes to debating European issues. The evidence here does not prove to be an exception. Europeanisation Indicator (EI-2) reveals that EU institutions and individuals speaking on behalf of EU institutions constituted only 6 per cent of all the actors in the coded statements. Furthermore, only 14 per cent of the UK articles mentioned any EU level actor at all. This implies a very low level of vertical Europeanisation (top down Europeanisation). These figures tell us that only a few EU level actors have trickled down to find a place in debates on discrimination held in the UK.

EI-2 Actors

Table 6.21 – Actor Origin: Italy

Origin of actors	Prevalence	
	No of quotations	% of total
Italy	109	49
Other member states	61	27
EU and other European Institutional actors	34	15
Extra-EU	18	8
Total	222	100

EI-2 Actors

Table 6.19 – Actor Origin: UK

Origin of Actors	Prevalence	
	No of quotations	% of total
UK	579	76
Other member states	96	13
EU and other European institutional actors	48	6
Extra-EU	38	5
Total	761	100

Table 6.20 – Actor Origin: Germany

Origin of actors	Prevalence	
	Number of quotations	% of total
Germany	185	51
Other member states	65	18
EU and other European institutional actors	79	22
Extra-EU	36	10
Total	365	100

The category of ‘International actors’ should also be noted here. This includes only extra-EU actors—that is, actors from international organisations such as the United Nations or actors from countries outside the European Union. These are mentioned even less often in the UK than are EU actors: they make up just 3 per cent of quotations. These figures contradict any idea that might be had—at least where discrimination issues are concerned—that the UK ignores the EU because it thinks of itself more as a global power.

The German sample as illustrated is the most Europeanised, when the actors types are concerned, among the three countries that are analysed here. European actors constituted 19 per cent of all the actors in the German sample. This evidence on the presence of European actors in the German print media is further strengthened by the evidence that 45 per cent of all the articles included at least some mention of European actors.

EI-2
Actors

Table 5.24 – Actor
Origin: Ireland

Origin of actors	Prevalence	
	No of quotations	% of total
Ireland	82	82
Other member states	9	9
EU and other European Institutional actors	3	3
Extra-EU	6	6
Total	100	100

Extra-EU international actors are also much more prevalent in Germany than was seen in the UK. Finally, the prevalence of experts among non-state actors in the German case also deserves mention here. Although it cannot be seen from the table, this at times included experts on European Anti-Discrimination policy, which was explicitly mentioned in the text of the articles. There was no such evidence in the case of the UK or Italy. The Italian sample, on the other hand, had presence of EU institutional actors higher than in that of the UK but lower than in that of Germany. European actors in the Italian sample constituted only 14 per cent of all the actors. This translated into the presence of European Actors in 28 per cent of all the articles coded. It could be claimed in light of this evidence that there is a considerable level of vertical Europeanisation. In contrast, the extra-EU institutional actors are as absent from the Italian debates as they are from the UK debates. Taking the evidence from all three countries, it would seem that the UK is characterised by a general insularity when it comes to discrimination issues, while Italy is open to European influences and Germany is open to a full range of international influences.

The UK again comes out to be a much more insular national public sphere compared to Italy and Germany when the debates on the discrimination issue are concerned. Though the identification of actors from EU institutions was conducted separately here from the identification in the actor types above, it is again found that such actors comprise only 6 per cent of the total. More interestingly, only 13 per cent of all the actors are from other EU member states, and these actors are mentioned at some point in only 17 per cent of articles. Thus, horizontal as well as vertical Europeanisation is observed to be low. The UK sample is unsurprisingly dominated by UK actors and thus includes only limited amount of references to other EU member states and EU institutions. This is more strikingly

demonstrated by the presence of UK actors in the proportion of articles. A noteworthy 92 per cent of all the articles include UK actors. This means that even when European actors are mentioned this is mostly in relation to a UK actor. As previously discussed, it is found that extra-EU actors are very largely absent. The rather ephemeral presence or in a way absence of the European actors is not compensated by international actors. Therefore, vertical and horizontal Europeanisation of public sphere of the UK is considerably low where the debates on the issue of discrimination are concerned.

El-3: Topics

UK	DEBATED TOPICS (TOP 30)	Prevalence	
		No of quotations	% of total
	Topics		
1	Racism/Racial Discrimination	131	16
2	Ageism/Age Discrimination	88	11
3	Discrimination In Employment	65	8
4	Equal Treatment of Gays and Lesbians	39	5
	Creation of a Single Equality		
5	Body/Merging of bodies	36	4
	Positive Discrimination/ Affirmative		
6	Action	31	4
	Equal Treatment of		
7	Travellers/Gypsies/Roma	27	3
8	Racial Equality	26	3
9	Transposing/Implementing EED	25	3
	Discrimination In Provision of Goods		
10	and Services	24	3
11	Institutional/Systematic Racism	24	3
	Sexual Discrimination/Sexual		
12	Orientation	23	3
	Change National Law (Modernize,		
13	Single Dis. Act etc)	22	3
14	Racial Diversity	22	3
15	Harassment	19	2
	Employment Equality Directive: Age		
16	Ground	18	2
17	Religious Discrimination	16	2
	EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY		
18	Directive	15	2
19	Indirect Discrimination	15	2
20	AGE diversity/equality	14	2
	Sexism/ Discrimination on the grounds		
21	of sex	14	2
22	UK Law	14	2
23	Racist Language	14	2
24	Mandatory Retirement Age	13	2
25	RACIAL EQUALITY Directive	13	2
26	Forced Retirement	12	1
27	Discrimination In Education	12	1
28	UK Policy	11	1
29	Equal Treatment of Immigrants	11	1
30	Race Relations Act 1976	11	1

The majority of actors in the German sample were of German origin. But this was only a bare majority, compared to the overwhelming majority that was seen in the UK. Three quarters of all the articles contained some reference to German actors—a high figure, but significantly lower than in the UK. In addition to the high level of vertical integration that has already been observed, actors from other EU member states constituted 18 per cent or all actors and were present in 32 per cent of all the articles. The equivalent figures for EU actors are 22 per cent of all the actors, present in 46 per cent of all the articles. This could be interpreted to mean that there is a higher level of vertical Europeanisation in Germany than the level of horizontal Europeanisation. In addition, the difference in the levels of Europeanisation between the UK and Germany is lower in the case of horizontal Europeanisation than it was for vertical Europeanisation. Vertical integration levels in Italy is between the British and German levels. But Italy is ahead by some margin in terms of horizontal integration: actors from other member state constitute 27 per cent of all the actors and are present in 43 per cent of all the articles. There is thus both horizontal as well as vertical Europeanisation when the Italian case is concerned, though, in contrast to Germany, this is not so focused on EU institutions themselves. Similarly to the

UK, Italian actors are present in the defining majority of all the articles at around 83 per cent. European actors clearly are mentioned in relation to Italian actors, not in isolation.

El-3: Topics

GERMANY	DEBATED TOPICS (TOP 30)	Prevalence	
		No of quotations	% of total
	Topics		
1	Racism/Racial Discrimination	67	15
2	General Equal Treatment Act/Allgm. Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (AGG)	55	12
3	EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY Directive	23	5
4	Transposing/Implementing Employment Directive	23	5
5	Discrimination In Employment	21	5
6	Ageism/Age Discrimination	21	5
7	Equal Treatment of Immigrants	18	4
8	Equal Treatment of Travellers/Gypsies/Roma	16	4
9	Racist Language/Imagery	16	4
10	Xenophobia	15	3
11	RACIAL EQUALITY Directive	15	3
	HORIZONTAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIRECTIVE	15	3
12	Transposing/Implementing the Directives	15	3
13	Racial Violence/Racist Attack	14	3
14	Integration of Minority Groups/Immigrants	13	3
15	Multiculturalism	11	2
16	Transposing/Implementing Racial Equality Directive	11	2
17	Equal Treatment of Gays and Lesbians	10	2
18	Sexual Discrimination/ on the grounds of Sexual Orientation	9	2
19	Employment Equality Directive-Burden of Proof	9	2
20	Discrimination In Education	8	2
21	Institutional/Systematic Racism	8	2
22	Discrimination In Social Protection	6	1
23	Racial Segregation	6	1
24	Employment Equality Directive: Sexual Orientation	6	1
25	Sexism/ Discrimination on the grounds of sex	6	1
26	Racial Diversity	5	1
27	Apprehension towards Asylum-seekers	5	1
28	Equal Treatment of MUSLIMS	5	1
29	German Labour Law	5	1
30			

Europeanisation Indicator (EI-3) shows that the transposition of the EU Anti-Discrimination Directives caused only a few references to the EU to appear in discussions of discrimination issues in the UK. There were extensive debates around the merging of the Equality bodies in 2007, but these were in no case linked back to the EU. This is an extremely important finding, because the merging of the bodies happened in fact after and as a result of the Anti-Discrimination Directives. The quality press in the UK, the actors raising issues in the quality press and governmental actors chose not to link these changes to the EU level. The existence of Euro-scepticism could have led to the hesitancy on this. The way the UK discusses the transposition of the directives, therefore, is indeed insular. Another possible reason behind this could be the similarity of the already existing UK laws to the content and scope of the Directives. This absence of the EU from the debates in the UK does not, however, mean that issues that are of common concern across European countries are not debated. One such issue that has found its place in the UK debate on discrimination has been the treatment of the Roma across Europe, as has been illustrated by the considerable commentary surrounding the expulsion of Roma from France.

EI-3: Topics

ITALY	DEBATED TOPICS (TOP 30)	Prevalence	
		No of quotations	% of total
1	Racism/Racial Discrimination	54	19
2	Fingerprinting of Individuals (Roma, immigrants)	23	8
3	Integration of Minority Groups/Immigrants	19	7
4	Equal Treatment of Travellers/Gypsies/Roma	18	6
5	Multiculturalism	17	6
6	Anti-Semitism	14	5
7	Muslims in Western Europe	14	5
8	Equal Treatment of Gays and Lesbians	11	4
9	Transposing/Implementing Racial Equality Directive	10	4
10	Other Religious Equality/ Identity Issue	9	3
11	Religious Discrimination	9	3
12	Separate classes for immigrant children	9	3
13	Ageism/Age Discrimination	8	3
14	Discrimination In Employment	7	2
15	Marginalisation of Ethnic / Racial Groups	6	2
16	Xenophobia	5	2
17	Harassment	5	2
18	Employment Equality Directive: Age Ground	5	2
19	RACIAL EQUALITY Directive	4	1
20	Racial Diversity	4	1
21	Religious Equality	4	1
22	Decriminalising Homosexual Conduct	4	1
23	Mandatory Retirement Age	4	1
24	Burden of Proof	3	1
25	All forms of discrimination	3	1
26	Equal Treatment of EU origin Immigrants	3	1
27	Marginalisation of Muslims	3	1
28	Homophobic acts/ harassment	3	1
29	Criminalising Homosexual	2	1

Europeanisation Indicator (EI-3) shows that the Italian public sphere does appear to engage with topics that are of wide concern across Europe. The issues relating to discrimination that are debated in Italy, such as the fingerprinting of the Roma and the question of whether there should be separate classes for immigrant children, turn out to be issues that catch the attention of the other EU member states and other European publics. In Italy, as in the UK, however, the bulk of the debate is carried on without direct reference to EU frames. It is only in the case of Germany that EU frames find prevalence.

Europeanisation Indicator (EI-4) on Reason giving provides shows that the total level of reason giving is low, which makes firm conclusions difficult but if the numbers are to be taken as they are, the Europeanness of the reason giving—the degree to which European interests, identity, values, or territory is invoked in justification of claims—is noticeably high in Italy and remarkably low in Germany. The Italian finding, if accurate, fits again with the idea that Europe is important in the Italian public sphere even if the EU itself is not. There were several references to the common Judeo-Christian roots of a common European identity. The findings regarding the German debate on discrimination, however, do not fit with the other evidence gathered and are difficult to explain. The UK fell in between Germany and Italy where references to Europeanness were concerned. Because reason giving is so low, a larger population of articles would need to be coded in order to capture a sufficiently large sample of reason giving to measure these trends properly. This is therefore an area where further research would be desirable.

Racial discrimination and Age discrimination have constituted the majority of the topics debated. Where these codes have been used, this means that racial or age discrimination are discussed without relating them in any way to the EU or to EU directives. This means that UK actors, whether media voices or state and non-state actors, do not refer to the EU as the sources of anti-discrimination laws. The different debates held in the UK on the issue of discrimination have been aloof of the European frame of references. The UK actors interpret the Anti-Discrimination Directives in a different way than the other two member states studied. The first reference in the UK sample ranking to the EU law on the ‘Transposition/Implementation of the Employment Equality Directive is ranked ninth on the list of topics debated. This corresponds to only 3 per cent of the total number of quotations. Further down the list at sixteenth place is the Employment Equality directive’s clauses on Age Discrimination. Further down still, at eighteenth and twenty-fifth, are more general discussions relating to the Employment Equality Directive and the Racial Equality Directive respectively. These four categories

are the only EU-related categories that appear in the table. Together, they account for 9 per cent of all the quotations.

This low level of connection to the EU could be interpreted by connecting what is already known about the circumstances in which the EU's Anti-Discrimination Directives were enacted. As discussed at the onset, the Starting Line advocacy network used the UK and Dutch legislation pretty much as a template to draft the EU Directives from. The Anti-Discrimination measures introduced by the EU are thus very similar to the laws that already existed in the UK. Their implementation has not caused the same degree of controversy as has been seen in some other EU member states.

Despite the lack of controversy surrounding the transposition of the Directives, one of the most hotly debated issues was the issue of Age Discrimination, especially in the Times newspaper. Both newspapers, but especially The Guardian, covered the merging of the three previously separate equality bodies (the Commission for Racial Equality, the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Disability Rights Commission) into the single Equality and Human Rights Commission. This merger raised concerns among several groups, who were concerned that their particular interests would not be adequately protected by an organisation with such a wide remit. The decision to merge Equality bodies was a by product of the EU legislation. Most of the new member states did not have any such institutions in place and had to do so as a requirement of the transposition of the Directives. The UK and other trendsetter states have taken this opportunity to merge their already existing institutions. This has been the most Europeanised aspect of the debate in the UK. Even here, however, the discourse did not make any linkages to the EU.

Germany's quality press is the most Europeanised in terms of the topics of discrimination debated. The debate as a whole was held with frequent references to the EU Anti-Discrimination Directives and how to transpose them. The Employment Equality Directive and issues relating to the transposition of the same directive occupy the third and fourth positions. More than 25 per cent of all the articles discussed the issue of discrimination within the context and with frames of reference to the Employment Equality Directive and the Racial Discrimination Directive. At the level of individual quotations, 26 per cent employed such frames.

Italians debated mostly issues surrounding the treatment of the Roma and illegal immigrants within the context of racial discrimination. It is evident from the hand coding of the sample that Italian press concentrated on its own issues. As we saw in the previous section, in discussing their own issues they do include many references to other European actors. These were mostly the statements of EU Commissioners urging Italy on the dangers of demolishing Roma camps and fingerprinting individuals. But they do not engage very much with the EU's actual directives.

One of the assumptions of the theories looking at communicative and normative aspects of European integration is that actors in the European Union after a period of time would start to use common frames of reference when discussing issues. These frames of reference could range from invoking a common European identity to mentioning a common European interest or referring to a common European territory. The methodology for this research handled this proposition by including these references as a part of the reason giving section. When actors are providing reasoning for their arguments they sometimes state common European interests and common European identities. They also reason with the necessity to consider the common European territory.

Testing Deliberation: Diversity of Actors and Deliberative Quality of the Debates on Discrimination

It could not be said that a high quality deliberative public sphere existed if that public sphere were entirely dominated by state actors. The inclusiveness of the public sphere is an important criterion for evaluating it. It should include a broad range of civil society actors and ordinary citizens. The public sphere can also be enriched if it includes actors who can draw on their expertise when they make their contributions.

State actors are strongly present in all cases studied, though somewhat less so in the UK. Non-state actors make up the rest of the sample. From the point of view of Habermasian theory communicative action, the category of actors comprising 'Media/authors' (that is, authors of the articles being coded) is not so important (Habermas, 1984). Furthermore, while Economic actors may make valuable contributions to discourse, it is important from the Habermasian perspective that the deliberative sphere should extend beyond the bounds of the economic market (Habermas, 1996). Thus, the most important

category for the quality of the deliberative sphere is the category labelled 'Citizens/civil society/other'. This makes up 20 per cent of all the statements in the UK, 14 per cent in Germany, 22 per cent in Italy, 34 per cent in Ireland and 32 per cent in Switzerland. This means that the differences between the countries are not enormous, but the deliberative sphere in Germany is, in terms of this indicator, of somewhat lower quality.

The second Deliberation Indicator aimed to capture one aspect of the deliberative quality of the debates. As explained communicative action in the Habermasian sense cannot exist unless actors go beyond the statement of facts and actually engage in debates by evaluating or advocating for or against different policy options and normative alternatives. This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of a deliberative public sphere.

In all countries studied, it can be seen that a large majority of statements—ranging from 77 per cent in Germany to 85 per cent in the UK went beyond statement of facts and actually related to evaluating and advocating for policy options. This minimal condition for the existence of quality communicative action is thus satisfied.

It is impossible to make any further inferences from the information in these tables about the quality of the discourse. Given common criticisms about negativity in contemporary media discourse, it would be tempting to suggest that statements that evaluate positively add greater value than those that evaluate negatively and that statements involving positive advocacy for a position are better than statements that advocate negatively against a position. But there is no justification for such general presumptions. As Risse (2015) argues, what matters is that contestation takes place. It is important within such contestation for actors to criticise the arguments of others as well as to put forward arguments of their own.

Similarly, there is no way of providing a general conclusion in terms of whether evaluative statements add more value than advocative statements or vice versa. In terms of the relative frequency of evaluative and advocative statements, there is a striking difference between, on the one hand, the UK and Germany, where evaluative statements outnumber advocative statements by a significant amount, and, on the other hand, Italy, where advocative statements outnumber evaluative statements in roughly the same proportion. But it would be unwise to seek inferences from this fact. The numbers are much smaller for Ireland and Switzerland to draw conclusions.

Taking the evidence from all of these indicators together, it can be seen that the public sphere that has been studied here is reasonably inclusive and that it does contain the sorts of evaluative and advocative arguments that are a precondition for the existence of a deliberative space. Nevertheless, the degree of reason giving is mixed – and remarkably low in the UK – while there is little evidence of engagement in explicit debate across key parts of the public sphere. In so far as there is an emerging European Public Sphere, the deliberative quality of that public sphere is not especially high. This appears to be especially true in the UK, while better quality deliberation may be present in Germany. Thus, the UK scores poorly in terms of both Europeanisation and deliberation, while Germany scores higher on both. Italy scores high on horizontal though not on vertical Europeanisation and occupies a more intermediate position on deliberation.

No indicator of either the Europeanisation of the public sphere or the deliberative quality of that public sphere can be perfect: all indicators are limited in one way or another. But the accumulation of all of these many indicators points towards rather clear conclusions. Overall, the European Public Sphere appears weak. In so far as it exists, it appears to be a public sphere of European countries rather than a public sphere defined by the EU. Only in Germany was evidence found pointing towards the significant presence of the EU itself in debates.

Conclusions and Future Directions

Risse (2015) provides a litmus test of what a Europeanised and politicised public debate should be like. He states that integration should be Europeanising domestic politics in the sense that European policies rather than European integration as such become subject to controversies in the public sphere. With the current communicative spaces and resistant national frames of reference and interpretation, this type of Europeanisation will certainly take time. This study set out to gauge the level of Europeanisation of debates on discrimination. Its conclusion must be that this Europeanisation has not proceeded very far.

The only significant level of Europeanisation is found with the German case and this finding is in line with the goodness of fit hypothesis.

The 'no democratic deficit' camp suggests that secondary legislation is highly unlikely to be politicised because it is mostly technical in nature. This research provides evidence to prove otherwise (Salience, Deliberation, Convergence). The findings of this study are in line with several new pieces of research that look at Salience, Expansion of Actors and Contestation as indicators of the politicisation of the European Integration project (Zürn, 2016).

This study purported to test whether the issue of discrimination has been Europeanised and politicised as an EU policy issue within the period of 1997-2008. The study tested for the salience of the issue in the UK, Germany, Italy and Ireland as member states and Switzerland and Turkey as control cases. The evidence shows salience and politicisation in cases of misfit such as the case of Germany. This suggests that even secondary law of the EU could be politicised given the right level of misfit.

To further the capability of the study to draw generalisations automated content analysis using Python language that enables 'scraping' and 'web crawling' using two libraries (urllib and BeautifulSoup) is currently undertaken. A corpus is being built using all available quality newspapers. Also considered is an expansion of the research to France, Spain/Portugal and a Central or East European member of the EU.

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Towards a European Public Sphere: The Case of Talk Real

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ABSTRACT

Europe as a “space of integration” (Zielonka, 2014) requires a true European public sphere. At the same time it is difficult to conceive of such a “Sphere” only through media such as television and national newspapers (Noelle-Neumann, 1993; Frank, Kaelble, Lévy, Passerini, 2010). From this point of view, it is interesting to ask how it is possible to create a true transnational debate about common European issues. The case of “Talk Real” highlights some features that can reveal crucial points of such a possible new European space.

Keywords: European Public Sphere; Talk Real; Talk Show; European Left; transnational debate; nomadic attitude; trans-linguistic horizon

According to Manuel Castells, “the public sphere is the space of communication of ideas and projects that emerge from society and is addressed to the decision makers in the institutions of society”¹. Following the ICT revolution, the public sphere² has not only become more complex and “rizomatic” in its infrastructure (Web and social media plus classic media) but has paved the way for the creation of new political movements and leaderships: such a change, modified not only the way in which people address decision makers but also how they are selected and elected. In this context, I am thinking of the new movements and parties such as Podemos in Spain, the Piraten Movement in Germany or the Five Star Movement in Italy. What seems to remain the same is the cultural space that is covered by such a deeply-modified public space: the national one. In a continent such as Europe, deeply intertwined and trans-nationally interested in huge political problems – such as mass migration, instability in border countries, terrorism, energy needs, etc. – the issue is indeed fundamental: thinking beyond the EU, can European standards of living survive without the birth of a European public sphere? Not only – as pointed out several times by Jürgen Habermas – would it be necessary in the implementation of a true transnational democracy³ and the progressive construction of a European people⁴, but it becomes more fundamental to avoid, in thinking and debating about the European common good, the distorted and increasingly lethal point of view of a closed national context (or, in the worst scenario, of the sum of closed national contexts). Thus, we can say that Europe as a “space of integration”⁵ requires a true European public sphere if it intends to avoid disintegration in several closed spaces. From this point of view, to avoid disintegration and create a new public sphere are not two sides of the same coin but simply the same action.

¹ Castells, 2008: 78-93.

² On the concept of public sphere, it is impossible to avoid a critical confrontation with the classic work of Habermas, 1989.

³ See Habermas, 2001; 2009; 2012; 2015. A similar perspective is that of Patrizia Nanz in Nanz, 2006.

⁴ On such an issue, it is interesting to consider the experience of a transnational review such as “Il Popolo europeo” (1958-1963). See Visone, 2016: 563-576. On the issue of the necessary construction of people, see Rosanvallon, 1998 and Ruocco e Scuccimarra, 2011; Bonaiuti, Ruocco e Scuccimarra, 2013 and Bonaiuti, Ruocco e Scuccimarra, 2015. For the recent debate concerning the European people see Scuccimarra, 2012: 161-186. For the relationship among the issue of European people and the processes of democratization see Balibar, 2016: 204-220.

⁵ See Zielonka, 2014.

1. From Public Spheres to Public Sphere

It must be noted that at the embryonic level there exist several tools/platforms that have created mini and fractionated European public spheres for a small polyglot of fragmented and “euro-interested” elites. These are, of course, the spaces created by the communication offices and sites of the EU institutions; the networks of European universities with their projects; the European cultural and political foundations; and transnational civil society movements with their campaigns, blogs and portals. But such a complex and fractionated world relates to just a few thousand people around Europe. For the rest of the population, political information – that which constitutes their political identity – is and remains the national one, received in their national language (or languages) by nationally structured media using a national lens (it does not matter that in countries such as Poland and Spain, the private television is the property of foreign firms). Thus, the interesting challenge of our time presents two intertwined steps: 1) PARTICIPATION AND ACCESS: to open a new common European space of information and discussion potentially accessible to every European citizen (involving a massive amount of translation), and 2) INTERCONNECTION AND VISIBILITY: to institute some hubs wherein the plural and different tools and platforms that will constitute (and in a small part already do) this space can communicate and transform a magma of several – though separated – spaces into a unique and plural space, avoiding the “atomic scission” of the present. These hubs also have the task of showing to ordinary citizens the existence of a new public sphere that does not destroy the national one while simultaneously integrating and exceeding the latter. These two steps – answering the question as to how it is possible to create an authentic transnational broad debate about common European issues” – have opened the way to an authentic and democratic European public sphere.

2. The Talk Real project

After this general consideration, I want now to introduce an interesting case study that – also considering its future probable development – can explain some aspects (and problems) of the kind of hubs that can contribute to the creation of a European public sphere as that I addressed above. I am referring to the Talk Real project created and managed by European Alternatives, a European association that promotes active citizenship at transnational level, and Piroetta Production, an Italian firm working in the audiovisual field. What is Talk Real? According to the funders:

“Talk Real is a new talk show for web-tv... It is a space for dynamic discussions that explore topics in depth, from a radical perspective: an informal but professional audiovisual platform for the dissemination of innovative ideas and the organisations and individuals behind them. Talk Real enjoys a heterogeneous participation of intellectuals, cultural workers and activists. Talk Real is a nomadic broadcast: the episodes are set in places deeply connected with ongoing new practices or struggles. The first ones were shot in Rome, in the Museum of the Other and the Elsewhere of Metropoliz; in Turin at the Festival of the Commons; in Lisbon in the context of a Create/React activist training promoted by European Alternatives, and in Athens during the Democracy Rising Conference and the day after the approval of the current memorandum. The show is directed by Berardo Carboni, cinema director and one of the early occupiers of the Teatro Valle Occupato. Among the models that inspired us are Fort Apache by Pablo Iglesias, Al Jazeera’s The Stream, The World of Tomorrow by Julian Assange and programs such as Recetas Municipales of the Spanish activist group, Zemos98. Talk Real seeks to create an opening to the world and to be transformed by the tensions and energies that run society. We are wanting to build a wide alternative media network to participate and disseminate the program. Current participants include OpenDemocracy, Italian daily *Il Manifesto*, activist online magazine *ROAR*, and spotlight on Eastern European activism *LeftEast*”⁶.

Fundamental features of the show are: 1) Its nomadic attitude: Talk Real visits the hosts of events or struggles, such as the Festival of Commons in Turin; the Democracy Rising Conferences in Athens; the Civil Society Forum in Paris; Social and Cultural Spaces in Italy, Germany or Portugal (Rome,

⁶ See Talk Real web page <https://talkreal.net/>

Bologna, Lisbon, Berlin, Sao Paolo, etc.). Thus, there is no fixed studio for the show. In fact, Talk Real can promote itself across a transnational space, reaching different people on the European/global scale by simply going to their events or attending political or social campaigns. 2) Its web-tv, open access, nature: the show, projected for the web, is freely available online, on YouTube and on partner sites (European Alternatives, Piroetta and – for 2015 – “La Repubblica” TV, Sky and La7). In some cases – such as the Talk Real at the Congress of Diem 25 in Berlin or at the Cosmopolitica Congress in Italy – the show was also available via live streaming free coverage on the European Alternatives website; 3) Its transnational structure and point of view: it aims to open up discussion about common European or transnational problems among people belonging to different nationalities, regions, cultures and professions. Among the Talk Real well-known guests there were Yannis Varufakis, Toni Negri, Saskia Sassen (USA), Marisa Matias, Celia Mayer, Juan Luis Sanchez, Srecko Horvat, Luciana Castellina, Costas Douzinas, Maurizio Landini, Montse Galceran, and Julian Assange. Furthermore, the show saw the participation of more than 85 philosophers, historians, journalists, artists, activists and politicians from more than 30 different nations (European and extra-European) with an almost perfect gender balance. Each episode discusses issues such as transnational democracy, the role of the left in Europe, the new transnational solidarity, the political context of the Balkans, the EU and Greek crisis, birth of new transnational movement, ecology in Europe, the new Municipalism in Europe, transnational corruption, EU transparency, etc. Also, when – as happened in Italy – the show can host only Italian guests, the transnational dimension and its implications (also of local problems) has been at the centre of the debate; 4) Its trans-linguistic horizon: despite its Italian birth – the director, Berardo Carboni, and moderator-host, Lorenzo Marsili, are both Italian – the show presents more episodes in English (9) than Italian (7) or Portuguese (1). Furthermore, Talk Real management is working on the introduction of subtitles, as can be seen with the Brazilian episode in Sao Paolo (Language: Portuguese with English subtitles). The idea is to introduce subtitles in almost three different languages (among English, Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Greek, Polish and German) for all past and future episodes; 5) Its engagement as a hub for left-wing viewers interested in the transnational dimension: Talk Real institutes a new space where left-wing activists and intellectuals from different countries who are interested and active on the same topics debate one with one another. From this point of view the show constitutes a transnational hub in which different European experiences and visions are debated, synthesised and spread out of their common channels (e.g. an episode about Spanish municipalism during which Spanish and Italian guests debated in Italian about the Spanish experience and its relevance for the entire EU).

3. Data concerning the Talk Real project

Once we have explained the project structure and logic, we can quickly consider some numbers. Costs: An average episode costs €2,000 to pay the troupe (three people) and reimburse flights to those who have travelled just to participate in Talk Real. The notion of a nomadic show helps to find people from different contexts who were already gathered for other events. Results: In one year, since November 2015, with 17 episodes shot in 11 countries using three languages - plus 20 short clip in 5 languages (English, Italian, French, Spanish and German) - Talk Real content received 153,000 views only on YouTube – 1/4 in Italy, with the rest in England, France, Germany, Spain, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Greece, Brazil, Slovenia, Hungary - plus many thousand more on the websites of its project partners (e.g., 5,000 on La Repubblica for the streaming of the ‘Democracy in Europe’ Talk Real). The material produced is around 660 minutes of video which stimulated 1,200 comments on YouTube alone. Considering the duration – less than one year – and the political collocation of the show (just part of the European left is interested in such a transnational approach) and the momentaneous use of only three languages (practically two) such a phase of the project presents some potentiality, especially if integrated – as it will be in the next phase - with a greater use of subtitles in other European languages. Talk Real managers wish to bring it to a vast audience, changing the format and in particular shortening it from 30 to 15 minutes (and consequently diminished the number of participants from an average number of 6 to 3).

4. Why Talk Real is interesting?

Why is this case interesting? If it operates in a particular political area (that of the transnational-oriented European left), it presents some features useful for opening up and building a democratic European public sphere. It originally began the path characterised by the two intertwined steps quoted above: 1) PARTICIPATION AND ACCESS: through YouTube and open source media and creating – following social media comments – the environment for a snowball effect that involves the same content of future episodes; 2) INTERCONNECTION AND VISIBILITY: with the partners’ websites

and participation of famous intellectuals, it aims to give visibility also to the normal activist and less well-known intellectual, creating a unique discussion among them and stimulating, through the action of the host, an attempt at creative synthesis. From this point of view, the show could represent a sort of first embryo of the transnational web-tv show of future Europe. But it also presents some problems : 1) in the ideal choice of its creators it could be a hub for just a particular political and intellectual area and thus be destined to have an impact on only a small part of European public opinion; 2) it presents growing costs if it also seeks to operate in countries where European Alternatives experiences more difficulties to find a local troupe, and the consequence of translating the content into several languages; 3) it still operates in an asymmetric way for a transnational show if we consider that 7 episodes out of 17 were shot in Italy; 4) it must involve the public more in the show (not only afterwards as an advisor or offering a critique through social media, but also during it in the case of streaming); 5) In order to be known and to involve people in its new space, it must be publicised and promoted in existing older ones: on the national web networks, through several national public spheres with an economic and ideal cost.

5. Final remarks

To conclude, it is important to underline the fundamental relevance that the issue of a “European public sphere” will have for the future of European integration. Today, conversely than in our past, a European discourse could only with difficulty survive with a “European public sphere” that is no more than the mere cacophonous sum of national public ones. Nationalism, xenophobia and isolationism found their new feeding ground inside such an exclusive and fragmented national representation of the European debate. We must discuss the possible tools and best practice that can allow to us to open up a new common – and of course, plural – European space. I hope that the case of Talk Real is an entry point to discuss from a different point of view such a new dimension of European integration. In talking about it, we must remember that, in Camus words, “*parler répare*”⁷. And Europe today absolutely needs such a restorative discussion.

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The construction of Europe in Romanian and Italian parliamentary discourse

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Abstract

This paper examines the discursive construction of the European Union and ‘Europe’ in the parliamentary discourse of Romania and Italy and the relationships between each state and the EU from a comparative perspective. The data analyzed comprise the stenograms of the plenary sessions held by the Romanian and the Italian Senates during 2012. Both corpora were investigated with quantitative means and also from a discourse-analytical perspective. The results show that Romanian political discourse advances a pragmatic and normative view of the European Union, constructing the relation between Romania and the EU as an asymmetrical one. In contrast, the symbolic dimension of Union is foregrounded in Italian political discourse and a relation of partnership between Italy and the EU is preferred.

Keywords: discourse analysis, European Union, Romania, Italy, political discourse, parliamentary discourse.

1. Introduction

The construction of a European identity has been studied in regard to the opinions and feelings expressed by the citizens of the European Union (EU) states. Besides official surveys like the Eurobarometer, one direction of research has focused on the effects of European integration and EU enlargement on the citizens’ rights and freedoms (e.g. Recchi and Favell, 2009) or on the citizens’ perceptions in regard to the national and the European identity (e.g. Robyn, 2005; Scheuer, 2005). At the same time, a growing corpus of research investigates the discourse of the EU structures and authorities (e.g. Wodak, 2011; Wodak, 2004; Caliendo and Magistro, 2009).

However, fewer studies have taken into account the role which political discourse in the EU states plays in the construction of a European identity. In this regard, parliamentary discourse can provide important evidence for understanding the process of European integration and the adoption of European citizenship and identity at a nation’s level. First, as Cheng (2003, p.55) observes, national parliaments are settings in which the representatives of political parties not only work together, but also struggle for power and this confrontation becomes manifest especially in and through discourse. Second, the parliaments of the EU states often have to mediate between the national interests and sovereignty on the one hand and the adoption of common EU laws and policies, on the other hand. Therefore, parliamentary debates can provide an insight into the construction of the European identity and its relation with the national identity in the public political discourse of a certain state.

The present study investigates this topic by analyzing the parliamentary discourse in two EU member states, Romania and Italy. It aims to assess how the European Union is represented as a social actor in the debates of the two parliaments and how politicians position their state in relation to the European Union. A further objective is to compare the political discourse of a new EU member state like Romania with the discourse of one of the EU founding states, like Italy, in order to discover similarities and/or differences. Such findings may shed light upon the meanings attributed to the European identity and its adoption or rejection in the member states.

2. The paradox of the European identity

In spite of its recent entry in political discourse, the concept of a European identity has generated a consistent debate, to the point that it seems to combine contrasting, if not paradoxical features. European identity is a widely discussed topic, at least in the EU countries, but that does not mean this identity has also been fully accepted or understood in a similar way by the citizens of all member states.

One possible reason for the slow adoption of a new supranational identity lies in the fact that the concept has not been triggered automatically by the foundation of the European Steel and Coal Community after the Second World War. Instead, it was constructed much later, only in 1973, at the Summit held in Copenhagen (Str  th, 2002, p.388). Str  th (2002) points out that in this case a common identity fulfilled a compensatory function, aiming to counteract “the eroding political legitimacy at the national level and the collapse of the political economy” (p.389). The common identity was thus shaped as a symbolic counterpart of an institutional reality already evolving.

Further, European citizenship is a creation of the European elites (e.g. Pagden, 2002, p.26), therefore lacking the contact with the masses to whom it is addressed. Since the abstract and distant character of the EU hinders the ‘imagination’ (Anderson, 1991) of the supranational community, attempts have been recently made towards the “humanisation” of the EU structures (Caliendo and Magistro, 2009) by shifting the focus from institutions to the people working within and for them.

Another aspect of European identity that needs deeper investigation regards the historical and political differences between the EU member states. Decades after the fall of the Iron Curtain, economic, political and cultural differences between the Western and the Eastern areas can still be perceived, maintaining the tendency to limit the understanding of ‘Europe’ to the Western areas of the continent (Pocock, 2002, p.60), while the status of Eastern and Central Europe is still viewed as problematic. Pagden (2002, p.47) explains the diffidence of the West European countries in regard to the East through “Eastern Europe’s uncomfortable proximity to Asia and its linguistic and religious separateness”. The Eastern area of Europe is thus excluded from the Western point of view. In order to have a better understanding of European identity, a shift of perspective is required, taking into account the significance of Europeaness for the peoples of Eastern Europe (Chebel d’Appollonia, 2002, p.189; Str  th, 2002, p.394). The analysis of the parliamentary discourse in a formerly communist state of the Eastern bloc may therefore reveal whether Europeaness is viewed and constructed here in a different manner than in a state that has belonged to the EU for a longer interval.

3. Data and methodology

The two corpora gathered for the present analysis represent the stenograms of the sessions held in the Romanian and the Italian Senate during the year 2012. All the data selected for analysis were public, and access to them was unrestricted. The stenogram of each meeting of each Senate was downloaded from the archives available on the official websites of the two Senates (www.senat.ro and www.senato.it, respectively). The stenograms were available in Romanian and Italian, respectively and the translation of the quoted fragments into English was made by the author of this article.

A separate corpus was then created for each language in order to be analyzable with quantitative methods. The Romanian corpus comprised the stenograms of all the plenary sessions of the Senate from January to December 2012, totalizing 851,084 words. The Italian corpus was formed by the stenograms of the Senate sessions from January to March 2012, with a total number of 976,563 words. This difference was due to the greater length of the sessions held by the Italian Senate in comparison to the Romanian counterpart. In contrast to the Italian senators, the Romanian ones had to abide more rigid rules regarding the time allocated for their interventions. Due to technical requirements, the quantitative analysis had to be conducted on corpora of maximum 1,000,000 words each, which led to the decision of downsizing the Italian corpus in order to match the dimensions of the Romanian one.

The quantitative analysis was carried out with the use of the Sketch Engine program, available at the web address: <http://www.sketchengine.co.uk/>. An advantage of the program consists in the possibility to use corpora in any language as an input, in order to generate word sketches for the words of the targeted language (Kilgariff et al., 2004). For the purpose of the present investigation, the Sketch Engine tool was employed in order to assess the frequency of certain keywords and then identify the most frequent collocation candidates for each keyword. The corpus analysis thus focused on two basic

aspects (word frequency and collocations), functioning as an introductory phase for the detailed qualitative analysis. As Koller (2012, p.26) points out, such quantitative findings obtained through computer-assisted corpus analysis can complement and refine the results obtained by an exclusively manual analysis. Here, it was assumed that differences in the discursive construction of the EU in the two corpora would be visible, first of all, in differences in the frequency of specific key terms regarding the European Union. In other words, the frequency of such terms would represent an indicator of the frequency with which European issues were discussed in the parliamentary sessions forming the corpora.

The use of the program facilitated the identification of texts in which the terms *Europe* and *European Union* appeared. These texts were further investigated from a discourse-analytical perspective in order to assess the representation of each state and the EU as social actors. The methodology applied was based on the theory of social actor representation proposed by van Leeuwen (2008). Following van Leeuwen's sociosemantic inventory, the realization of agency was investigated, by addressing the role allocation for the EU as a social actor in relation to each member state (van Leeuwen, 2008, pp.32-35). Other strategies such as assimilation, functionalization/ identification and personalization/ impersonalization were also taken into account, depending on their manifestation in the texts analyzed.

4. Results of the quantitative analysis

In the first stage of the analysis, the aim was to investigate the frequency of specific key terms: the nouns *Europe* and *Union* and the adjective *European*. The program calculated the total number of occurrences and the frequency for each term in each corpus were calculated. The results are presented in Table 1 of the Appendix. The analysis showed that the term *Unione* ("Union") had a higher frequency in the Romanian corpus than the noun *Europa* ("Europe") (534.45 per million compared to 197.31 per million). The adjective *europeano* ("European") was, however, the lemma with the highest frequency among the three chosen for analysis. In contrast, the term *Europa* ("Europe") was more frequent in the Italian corpus, while the terms *Unione* ("Union") and *europeo* ("European") were less frequent.

In the second stage, a list of collocation candidates for each keyword was prepared. The goal was to identify the terms occurring most frequently in the proximity of the selected lemmas. The results for the lemma "Europe" in the two corpora are presented in Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix.

The collocations for the lemma "Europe" identified in the Romanian corpus indicate a concern with the delimitation of specific areas of the European continent. Three out of the first ten terms listed refer to such geographic areas: *Sud-Est* ("South-East"), *Vestul* ("the West"), *Est* ("East"). The repetition of these terms suggests that the distinction between the Western and the Eastern part of the continent still remains powerful in Romanian political discourse. The preference for the term *Sud-Est* ("South-East") indicates a tendency to focus on the situation of the own state within the EU and on the issues concerning this specific region. Other collocations identified, like *2020* and *Strategia* ("the strategy") indicate the discussion of common objectives for the future development of the European states. In contrast to the Italian corpus, frequent collocations are represented by the abstract nouns *forță* ("the force") and *pace* ("peace"), followed by the verb *confruntă* ("faces", "confronts"). Still, the Romanian corpus does not include references to confrontations between the EU member states. Peace is viewed as a significant value for the European identity, while the verb *confruntă* ("faces", "confronts") is used in order to discuss the difficulties faced by the EU as a whole and by many of the European states.

The Italian corpus showed a preference for the term *Croatia* as a collocation for *Europa* ("Europe"). This can be explained by the fact that the Italian Senate ratified Croatia's accession to the EU in February 2012 and that this event triggered a more extensive debate in the Italian than in the Romanian Senate. The list of collocations reveals the frequency of the syntagma *Stati Uniti dell'Europa* ("United States of Europe"). A marked preoccupation for the relation between the EU member states is indicated by the adjective *Uniti* ("United") and the noun *unità* ("unity", "communion"). The only term referring to geographical areas within the European continent, *Nord* ("North") only appears on the twentieth place in the collocations list.

For both corpora, the lists of collocation candidates for the lemmas "Union" (Table 4 of the Appendix) and "European" (Table 5 of the Appendix) indicate a tendency for the institutional names to occur more frequently than other terms in the discourse of the Senate. In regard to the lemma "Union", besides references to the European Union and the Social-Liberal Union (a coalition of Romanian

political parties), the Romanian corpus includes frequent references to the Economic or Monetary Union. Terms such as *coordonarea* (“the coordination”) or *guvernarea* (“the governance”) reveal a tendency to maintain the discussion of EU issues at a formal level. The collocations identified in the Italian corpus indicate a high interest in Croatia’s accession to the EU, manifest in the use of terms with similar meanings: *adesione* (“adhesion”), *ingresso* (“entry”) and *integrazione* (“integration”).

In both corpora, the collocations listed for the adjective “European” indicate that institutional names such as the European Council, the European Parliament or the European Commission are mentioned very frequently in the parliamentary discussions of both states. In the Romanian corpus, the only common nouns included among the first fifteen collocation candidates are *fonduri* (“funding”) in nominative or in genitive and *Regulament* (“Regulations”), which suggests that the speakers showed concern for the institutional and the financial aspects associated with the EU membership.

5. To be or not to be European? The normative view of Europe in the Romanian corpus

The works of the Romanian Senate throughout the year 2012 reveal a growing interest manifested by politicians in regard to the EU. During the first part of the year, more attention is given to the domestic affairs, while European politics seem to be left in the background. A change takes place in June, when Prime Minister Victor Ponta begins his office. In his speeches, he insists on the need for the Romanian Parliament to be officially informed about the decisions taken at the European Council. The senators welcomed this initiative, highlighting the need for more frequent and detailed discussions about European issues:

1. [...] we consider, Mr Prime Minister and dear colleagues that it is very well that the Parliament of Romania debate as frequently as possible issues of European politics. This is a lack we have often felt, lately, and have even had the feeling that a certain lack of interest in regard to European problems is manifest, to say it quite openly, in the Romanian Parliament. (Ganț, 12 June 2012)

Senator Ganț mentions the lack of a parliamentary debate on European affairs. This lack has usually been due to the tendency to include EU issues in the domain of foreign affairs, a domain out of the Parliament’s control. However, the insufficient discussion of European issues needs to be linked to other traits of Romanian parliamentary discourse on the EU. Although Romania accessed the Union in 2007, the parliamentary debates of 2012 advance a perspective on Romania’s role within the EU that used to be characteristic of the access stage. The speakers thus highlight the similarities between the previous stage and the current status of EU membership:

2. This is basically, if you want, a very similar situation to that of the pre-access stage – in that period as well, the Government was the one who had the obligation and the responsibility, I insist, not only the obligation and the mechanisms, but also the responsibility of fulfilling the engagements taken by Romania in order to access the EU. We are in the situation to continue these measures that Romania had to take, that it has to take in the following period in order to fulfill its obligations as a member-state and to promote and defend its national interests among the European countries, as all other countries do. (Popescu-Tăriceanu, 12 June 2012)

From this perspective, shared by other politicians, the European Union plays an active role, controlling the progress of the members or their compliance to the general regulations. Romania’s role is limited mostly to a passive one. Such a view can be explained by Romania’s current need to fulfil certain conditions in order to become a Schengen state. Hence, the discussion tends to focus more on Romania, on its evolution, obligations and rights as an EU member. The European Union is constructed as a higher-ranked structure, whose role is to elaborate a series of norms and regulations that the member states should follow. It is important to note that this normative view of the EU is not applied to Romania exclusively. This is also visible in the case of Croatia which became an EU member in 2013. In 2012, the Romanian Parliament ratified its accession treaty, on the basis of the reports prepared by the Government and by a parliamentary commission, but no debate followed the presentation of these reports. Only one politician intervened on this issue, greeting Croatia’s access to the EU. Although the official reports were both favourable to Croatia’s integration, the representative of the Romanian Parliament insisted on the need for Croatia to fulfill its obligations in the future:

3. The members of the Board note that during the negotiations for adhesion Croatia has agreed to specific conditions that must be fulfilled till the date of access. Hence, during the period of ratification, Croatia's progress in putting the treaty in application must continue, while the European Commission has the task of closely monitoring this progress, based on Article 36 in the act of accession [...] (Zgonea, 26 June 2012).

As indicated by the quantitative results for Romanian political discourse, the MPs pay attention to the current state of affairs, to the adoption of certain measures and to their future effects for the Romanian state, while Romania's past as a communist state tends to be backgrounded. The EU is constructed as a supranational structure that is independent from the will of the member states. This view glosses over the symbolic value of Europeanization. A certain distance is thus maintained between the EU and Romania. Even in the cases when 'Europe' is seen by the Romanian politicians as a partner, it still remains an Other in relation to Romania, placed on a position of superiority and control. Often, the status assigned to the European representatives is that of the observer, which brings into question the issue of the 'public image' of the own state.

4. The inappropriateness of this motion is even more obvious, as there is in Bucharest these days a delegation from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Commission, to whom we send a message of political uncertainty, not at all beneficial for the citizens of Romania. As representatives of this country, we have to behave according to the visiting card we want to display. (Ungureanu, 27 April 2012)

The EU can be constructed not only as a normative structure, but also as an observer or a judge of the member states. Here, Prime Minister Ungureanu uses the argument of Romania's image at the international level, in order to delegitimize a no-confidence vote introduced by the opposition parties against his government. The 'opinion' of the European structures is often invoked in Romanian political discourse in order to legitimate or delegitimize political decisions about internal affairs. The appeal to the 'European partners' as observers and judges becomes a tool for putting pressure on the internal political opponents. Politicians seem to assume that Romania's access to the EU has triggered the need to comply not only with a set of regulations, but also with a set of unwritten rules of good behaviour for each state.

Europe's role as a judge is associated with a view of the European structures as a compact group or as an actor acting in a unitary manner. Besides the allocation of the role of a collective agent, few other strategies are employed in the construction of 'Europe' as a social actor. When talking about the decision-making processes in the EU, the speakers tend to background the roles played by specific individuals in these processes or even to exclude them, referring instead to the place where decisions are taken, *Bruxelles* ("Brussels"):

5. We must understand that the problems discussed and debated in Brussels have a direct influence upon all the member-states and, implicitly, upon all the citizens we represent; we have the obligation to become more interested in and more concerned about the European agenda [...] (Popescu-Tăriceanu, 12 July 2012).

The high number of occurrences of the terms "Union" and "European" in the Romanian corpus is also due to the inclination of many politicians to assess Romania's development through comparisons with other European states. At the beginning of 2012, such comparison has represented an important argument in the discourse of the Prime Minister Emil Boc, who had been criticized by the opposition parties, because of the unpopular austerity program of his government. In his speech, Boc rejected the accusations, by comparing Romania's situation with that of the other states during the international economic crisis. The negative description of the state of the European Union functions here as a background for the introduction of Romania's case:

6. Today, in the EU, there is the major risk of returning to economic recession. Recently, as you could notice, the state credit ratings of at least nine important states of the EU has been negatively affected. [...] Today, in Europe, important states of the EU are, unfortunately, about to collapse, economically and financially. And I say 'unfortunately' because this is the reality. Today, the EU searches for extreme and severe solutions in order to stop the economic crisis [...] (Boc, 23 January 2012)

In this text, the reference to the EU functions as a rhetorical strategy. The prime-minister insists on the negative description of the EU, in order to better foreground the alleged progress undertaken by Romania. The topos of disaster (e.g. Wodak et al., 2009, p.40) is constructed through lexical means, by the accumulation of terms with strong negative meanings (*recession, negatively, unfortunately, collapse*) and terms that convey the idea of imminent danger (*major risk, extreme and severe*).

solutions). Another interesting trait is the association of the term 'EU' with the time adverbial *today*. While the Prime Minister delivered this speech in front of the Parliament, street protests were taking place in Bucharest, because of the austerity measures previously adopted by the government. The Prime Minister chose to present Romania's situation in a broader context, that of a generalized crisis in the entire European Union. Through the emphasis on the difficulties faced by all EU member states at that moment, Emil Boc attempted to present Romania's situation in a positive light, suggesting that such hardships had already been surpassed, due to the sacrifice of the entire Romanian people.

The examples above suggest that the influence exerted by the EU on the member states is regarded as necessary and legitimate. The EU is not presented as an ongoing construction of its member states. On the contrary, the EU sphere fulfills the role of legitimating national political decisions, events, even the politicians' conduct, the existence of political parties or the arrangement of political alliances. The constant reference to the EU provides a source of legitimacy for Romanian political life, not the other way round. Consequently, a striking characteristic of Romanian political discourse is its uniformity in appraising EU's role in international relations. There is a general agreement among all the main political parties that Romania's access to the EU was necessary and useful for Romania:

7. [...] reminding to all those who watching us now that Romania's accession to the EU has been, for our country, one of the few political objectives for which political consense really functioned. Surely, our access to the European structures is due to all political forces and to all governments after 1995 and I believe it is our duty, today, to do everything that depends on the actual political class in order to make Romania's integration in the EU to become effective [...] (Ponta, 12 June 2012)

The politicians do not face the dilemma of pondering whether Romania should stay or exit the Union. Rather, the main question they face is "to be or not to be European?" Every political party claims the European identity for itself and accuses the opponents of not being European at all or not enough. Hence, EU membership provides a mechanism of control that can be set in motion by certain political actors in order to avoid or to correct measures that are perceived as undemocratic. Such idea is expressed, for example, by Victor Ponta as the leader of the main opposition party (the Social-Democrat Party), in response to the speech held by the Prime Minister Emil Boc:

8. It would be for the first time in 22 years when the Elections Law is created only by those in the government and this is a deviation from democracy that we will further communicate to our European partners, knowing that we do our duty and we are Europeans, talking about the deviations from the Elections Law. We need a correct elections system. (Ponta, 23 January 2012)

For politicians from all mainstream parties 'Europeanness' signifies the adherence to set of 'good', 'moral' or 'correct' values. Still, the use of Europeanness as a criterion for the categorization of political actors at national level triggers the danger of reifying the European identity, by considering it a stable, definite quality that never changes. Europeanness is seen as a property of certain politicians or political parties instead of others. In this manner, it becomes a key criterion for the discursive constitution of in- and out-groups and the inclusion or exclusion of political and social actors.

6. To be European, our way: the diverse views of Europe in the Italian corpus

Like the Romanian senators, the Italian Members of Parliament are aware of the relevance of the European issues and of their capacity to influence internal affairs. However, Italian senators express varied opinions about the European Union, which leads to extensive parliamentary debates, with many politicians declaring openly their pro-European feelings, whereas others choose to take more cautious stances. The different perspectives lead to differences in the roles allocated to the two main social actors, the EU and the Italian state, in political discourse.

A characteristic of the Italian political speeches analyzed consists in the distinction between various aspects of the European Union. The Union is not judged as a homogeneous entity, but as a complex construction that comprises diverse levels. It is important to note that the politicians' disapproval targets only specific aspects of the EU membership.

The negative evaluations expressed in the Italian corpus regard especially the institutional dimension of the EU, considered to be too distant from the citizens and from the governments of its member states. In the case of negative evaluation, the EU is often constructed through the strategy of impersonalization. Instead of referring to specific persons involved in certain actions, the speaker

chooses to refer to 'Europe' in general, thus creating the impression of a more impersonal and objective stance. According to Van Leeuwen's taxonomy, this lexical choice represents a particular form of the strategy of impersonalization, that of spatialization (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 46):

9. Alas, Europe has placed us in a *cul de sac*, because it has established an obligation, deciding that the public expenses should abide a series of parameters [...] (Divina, 29 February 2012; italics in original)

The negative judgments of the EU's activity in regard to the member states are associated with the allocation of the role of agent for the EU. From this perspective, Italy is assigned only a passive role. Not surprisingly, such relation still triggers feelings of dissatisfaction with the politicians who consider their duty to safeguard the national interests. Although most politicians acknowledge the need for Italy as a European state to comply with European regulations, this obligation is often perceived as the expression of subordination to the EU.

By blaming 'Europe' for the difficulties faced by the member states, speakers advance a simplified view of the current situation at national and international levels. The understanding of the term 'Europe' has thus shifted from the geographical meaning to a generic one, designating an autonomous entity that acts as a superior Other in relation to the member states. The use of the strategy of spatialization allows speakers to express harsh judgments, without advancing explicit accusations against specific individuals. In this manner, speakers present themselves as defending national interests and, at the same time, they maintain a certain degree of ambiguity in their discourse, avoiding an explicit attack against the European partners.

In some specific cases, the speakers abandon the construction of 'Europe' as a collective actor and isolate, instead, specific groups of actors. This strategy is visible in regard to the bureaucracy of the EU, frequently evaluated as one of the greatest weaknesses of the European project. In this case, members of the EU staff are presented through the strategy of assimilation (van Leeuwen, 2008, p.37), grouped under the label 'bureaucrats, a term that typically carries a negative connotation. Instead of being identified as individuals, they are represented by means of their functions held within the European structures:

10. [...] the access criteria that are chosen and applied by the community bureaucrats are completely sterile in relation to the history of the countries and of Europe [...] (Davico, 28 February 2012)

Many speakers present the current state of the relations between Italy and the EU as unsatisfying, but this asymmetrical relationship is not the only one constructed in Italian parliamentary discourse. Often, speakers attempt to place Italy and the EU on almost equal positions, presenting them as partners. Instead of a relation of subordination, one of interdependence is created:

11. The President [of the Council of Ministers, my note] has done well by saying in Europe that Italy has done its part until now, and it is legitimate to expect that now the European Union does its part [...] (Grillo, 25 January 2012)

Such stances allocate an active role to both parts involved in this relationship and, at the same time, they challenge the superior position of the EU. The politicians' struggle in order to assert Italy's status in relation to the Union is manifest in their refusal to assign the Union the role of an 'observer' or, as the fragment quoted below shows, the role of a 'teacher':

12. [...] at this moment, we do not believe that we could allow anybody to become a teacher in our home. I just want to remind you that at the end of 2011 the Italian public debt, its total amount, was basically equal to that at the end of 2010. [...] And I do not think that many persons in Europe can go to the teacher's desk in order to explain to us how to do austerity politics. (Mantica, 25 January 2012)

The 'top-down' approach regarding EU regulations that must be applied by all member states is thus accompanied and counterbalanced by a 'bottom-up' discursive approach, that insists on Italy's role as a constructor of the Union. The special status of Italy as a founding member is frequently stated and even extended to the present and to the future as well. Hence, Italy is often portrayed as making a significant contribution to the construction of the European community. This confirms a specific understanding of the role of the EU member states that are represented as creators – instead of objects or mere beneficiaries – in the process of the European construction. The EU is not seen as a reified, autonomous structure that exists independently of the European states and dominates them, but as an ongoing creation that can be – and must be – modified in order to correspond with the changing reality.

Consequently, the EU is often passivized, represented as a ‘creation in progress’ of the member states. The verbs frequently employed by speakers in order to convey this idea are ‘to build’ and ‘to make’:

13. (a.) It is necessary to change the mindset, it is necessary to go back to the reflection on the founding values of the Union in order to decide to make Europe, instead of the current sum of national interests, an effective political community. This should be our drive: the United States of Europe. (Sbarbati, 25 January 2012)
- 13(b.) The best way to safeguard our national sovereignty [...] is to build concretely the United States of Europe [...], having Italy as an acknowledged and serious protagonist in the financial area, but above all waking Europe up in regard to growth, projects and the future of the new European generations. (Baldassari, 14 March 2012).

The refusal to accept an EU that dominates the member states becomes manifest at the lexical level as well. Talking about the need to reform the Union, the Italian politicians advance diverse names for this updated European project. In this regard, they talk about a ‘political Union’ or reclaim the formula ‘the United States of Europe’. The representation of the European project as an ongoing construction is realized through the various modifications of the names ‘European Union’ and ‘Europe’ proposed by the speakers. By using pre-modifiers (such as “federal Europe”) or post-modifiers (such as “Europe of the nations”), the Italian politicians reveal their quest for a European Community that takes more into account the needs and interests of the member states and their citizens:

14. [...] the main effort must be that of aiming towards a really political unity of Europe; then, it may be a Europe of the peoples, as somebody wants, a federal Europe, as others want, or a Europe of the nations, as my political culture made me think (and it still makes me think), but, in any case, a Europe that should be fundamentally united [...] (Poli Bortone, 25 January 2012)

This fragment illustrates how the term “unity” is often used in Italian political discourse in order to express an overarching goal for the European project. The repeated calls for unity within the EU indicate that the Union is still perceived as a heterogenous group of states that find themselves in different stages of development and attempt to preserve their national interests to the expenses of the other members. The references to unity also indicate a characteristic view of Italy, as a state that belongs to a network of states and shares with the other states the responsibility for the entire European project.

Besides the technical or financial dimension of the EU, the Italian politicians frequently discuss the symbolic dimension of the EU, recalling its original purpose, that of ensuring peace, stability and prosperity for the member states. In this regard, the definition of ‘Europe’ as a common construction of the member states is constantly associated with positive evaluations.

For the Italian speakers, ‘to be European’ represents the perpetuation of an important tradition, an integration of the glorious past into present. Speakers feel that a dangerous gap exists between the original role played by Italy in the foundation of the EU and its current situation. Moreover, this gap does not stem from the internal difficulties of the Italian state exclusively. The politicians claim that a gap has emerged between the initial goals and the vision underlying the European project on the one hand, and the contemporary state of affairs on the other hand, with many member states experiencing economic difficulties. From this perspective, the evolution of the EU is not seen as linear, but as marked by a rupture with the past. Hence, the EU states need to recover the purity of the beginnings and to defend the original vision or to adapt it to the present, but preserving the noble ideals that animated the EU founders. The exact individualization of the actors representing the Union is rare in the Italian corpus and it usually occurs when the speakers refer to the origins of the EU. In this case, the senators choose to mention the political personalities who initiated and sustained the common European project:

15. [...] what would the founding fathers of the European unification say if we limited ourselves to judge only in commercial, financial, economic terms, forgetting the dreams that inspired Altiero Spinelli, Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman and the others? (Blazina, 28 February 2012)

As the texts quoted above show, a characteristic of the Italian political discourse is the attempt to overcome the mere economic and legal debates about the EU. It advances an extended, integrative understanding of the EU membership, as the politicians are interested not only in the situation of the own country but in all European countries. The extension of the Union represents a significant political event that is greeted and marked in the Italian Parliament. In February 2012, the Senate discussed and ratified Croatia’s accession to the EU and the debate comprised interventions of senators from various

parties. In contrast to the Romanian politicians, who pointed out the need for Croatia to comply to its obligations, the Italians welcomed Croatia's decision to adhere to the European values and focused on the common European identity and cultural heritage:

16. It should not be forgotten that Croatia, especially during the last decade, after the dissolution of the ex-Yugoslavia [...] has pursued, with determination, the accession to the EU, that takes place today on the basis of shared values like democracy, freedom, respect for human rights. [...] Upon closer examination, therefore, Europe proceeds fast, it continues on its way even in those countries severely marked by the history of our Europe, thus obtaining, day after day, results that seemed unbelievable a few years ago. (Pegorer, 28 February 2012)

The positive view of Europe in the Italian corpus is not linked to its role as an actor on the international political scene, but to its symbolic value. In this regard, Europe represents a shared set of values, like peace, freedom and democracy. The enlargement of the Union is depicted as a highly important event because of the symbolic importance attributed to 'Europe', understood as a unique political project of cooperation. The joining of Croatia is not viewed as the simple fulfillment of a set of criteria, but as a step forward in an ongoing process of normalization of international relations, that has begun after the Second World War.

7. Conclusions

The quantitative and qualitative analysis of the two corpora, in Romanian and Italian language, has revealed that the European Union is constructed differently in the parliamentary discourse of each state. These constructions are associated with different representations of the relations between each state and the Union.

Although Romania is a relatively recent member of the EU, the question of adopting the European identity was not particularly emphasized in parliamentary discourse. Instead, a pragmatic understanding of the EU membership is advanced in the Romanian corpus. This trait is visible in speakers' preference for the formal, institutional name "European Union" instead of "Europe". Further, a focus on the institutional dimension of Romania's accession to the EU is visible in the frequent use of the names of European structures and in the preference for the term "funding" as a collocation candidate for the adjective "European". For the Romanian speakers, the key benefits and concerns of the EU membership regard the financial aspects.

EU membership is thus viewed as a set of duties and rights for each state which are most often decided by actors outside the state. Most frequently, the EU is constructed as an agent, while the role assigned to Romania is a passive one, as a beneficiary or as a monitored actor. However, a high degree of uniformity is visible in the evaluations of the EU in the Romanian corpus. EU membership is represented as desirable and even necessary for Romania, in spite of the persistence of the normative view of the EU that can be traced back to the pre-accession stage.

The normative view of the EU is also acknowledged in the Italian political discourse, but the evaluations of the EU's role are more varied and complex in this corpus. The EU is criticized when it is constructed as an autonomous actor that has lost connection with the member states. Still, Italian politicians reject the exclusive focus on the economic aspects of the EU and plead instead for a recovery of its original values. The quantitative analysis shows the speakers' preference for the syntagma "United States of Europe". Terms like *uniti* ("united") and *unità* ("unity") are also more frequent in the Italian than in the Romanian corpus.

Italian parliamentary discourse is more emotionally laden, since the speakers choose to define 'Europe' as a set of dreams, hopes and aspirations, therefore highlighting the connection between Europe and the states that created it. The 'top-down' relation between Europe and Italy is outweighed by a 'bottom-up' relation, assigning the creator's role to Italy and the passive role to the EU. 'Europe' becomes thus a creation in progress that needs to be adapted and controlled, to the benefit of all member states.

The differences can be explained in various ways, especially in regard to the duration of each state's membership in the EU. Romania had accessed the EU only five years prior to 2012. Consequently, it lacks a consistent historical background as a member. Even after having joined the Union, Romania legitimates itself through its ability to fulfill the accession criteria. In contrast, Italy's status as a

founding member represents a source of legitimation for its politicians and sets a standard for their behaviour in relation to the Union.

Although the findings cannot be considered as generally defining the political discourse of the two member states in regard to the EU, they can give a clear impression about the discursive construction of the EU in the two states during 2012. These results can represent a starting point and enable further research on the political discourse of the two states in the following years, in order to find out whether such views of Europe have been maintained or modified by the parliaments elected more recently.

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APPENDIX

Table 1. Frequency of the key terms analyzed in the two corpora.

<i>Results for the Romanian corpus</i>			<i>Results for the Italian corpus</i>		
Lemma	Number of hits	Frequency in the corpus	Lemma	Number of hits	Frequency in the corpus
<i>Europa</i>	206	197.31 per million	<i>Europa</i>	508	444.49 per million
<i>Uniune</i>	558	534.45 per million	<i>Unione</i>	472	412.99 per million
<i>european</i>	1,557	1,491.29 per million	<i>europeo</i>	1,280	1,119.98 per million

Table 2. Collocation candidates for the lemma 'Europa' in the Romanian corpus

	<u>Cooccurrence count</u>	<u>Candidate count</u>	<u>T-score</u>	<u>MI</u>	<u>logDice</u>
P N Sud-Est	10	17	3.161	11.542	10.521
P N 2020	9	50	2.997	9.833	10.170
P N Multinațională	5	6	2.236	12.044	9.594
P N vestul	5	6	2.236	12.044	9.594
P N țări	10	220	3.149	7.848	9.587
P N Forța	5	8	2.235	11.629	9.580
P N Pace	5	8	2.235	11.629	9.580
P N Parlamentară	5	11	2.235	11.170	9.560
P N Adunarea	5	14	2.235	10.822	9.541
P N Est	4	8	1.999	11.307	9.259
P N lume	5	79	2.229	8.325	9.167
P N confruntă	4	33	1.997	9.263	9.099
P N Strategiei	3	10	1.731	10.570	8.830
P N Strategia	3	15	1.730	9.985	8.797
P N toată	5	204	2.218	6.957	8.642
P N Consiliului	10	640	3.122	6.307	8.597
P N economică	7	396	2.616	6.485	8.574
P N Tot	3	52	1.726	8.192	8.574
P N statele	3	112	1.719	7.085	8.272

Table 3. Collocation candidates for the lemma 'Europa' in the Italian corpus

	<u>Cooccurrence count</u>	<u>Candidate count</u>	<u>T-score</u>	<u>MI</u>	<u>logDice</u>
P N d'	62	846	7.826	7.365	10.551
P N un'	49	1,340	6.915	6.362	9.763
P N Consiglio	23	433	4.756	6.901	9.646
P N Europa	20	508	4.422	6.469	9.333
P N Stati	15	284	3.840	6.893	9.278
P N Croazia	12	139	3.446	7.602	9.247
P N Uniti	11	96	3.304	8.010	9.221
P N dell'	100	5,144	9.771	5.451	9.179
P N Italia	29	1,147	5.290	5.830	9.165
P N Paesi	17	501	4.069	6.254	9.109
P N alti	9	32	2.995	9.305	9.093
P N l'	138	8,526	11.425	5.186	8.967
P N unita	7	15	2.643	10.036	8.777
P N L'	18	877	4.151	5.529	8.734
P N tutta	10	278	3.123	6.339	8.704
P N all'	43	3,004	6.354	5.009	8.648
P N in	177	15,201	12.796	4.711	8.528
P N popoli	6	30	2.444	8.814	8.514
P N stessa	9	301	2.955	6.072	8.510
P N Nord	9	317	2.953	5.997	8.482

Table 4. Collocation candidates for the term 'Union' (rom.Uniune; it.Unione)

Lemma (Romanian corpus)	<i>Cooccurrence count</i>	<i>Candidate count</i>	<i>logDice</i>	Lemma (Italian corpus)	<i>Cooccurrence count</i>	<i>Candidate count</i>	<i>logDice</i>
Europene	305	392	13.361	europa	342	742	13.172
Europeană	94	383	11.677	Croazia	29	139	10.603
membre	40	144	10.867	dell'	252	5,144	10.522
Social-Liberală	30	33	10.700	adesione	25	88	10.515
Social-Liberale	25	25	10.457	Paesi	42	501	10.466
ale	92	1,782	10.331	Centro	19	51	10.217
Economice	22	24	10.275	membri	22	153	10.172
Monetare	19	19	10.076	Stati	26	284	10.138
cadrlul	31	447	9.981	ingresso	18	62	10.109
state	20	122	9.913	nell'	50	1,206	9.931
statele	18	112	9.782	all'	69	3,004	9.345
nivelul	20	213	9.731	integrazione	11	136	9.212
coordonarea	13	24	9.516	dall'	24	901	9.162
interparlamentare	12	12	9.430	interno	16	464	9.130
guvernanta	12	21	9.408	monetaria	7	12	8.888

Table 5. Collocation candidates for the term 'European' (Rom."European; It."Europeo")

Lemma (Romanian corpus)	<i>Cooccurrence count</i>	<i>Candidate count</i>	<i>logDice</i>	Lemma (Italian corpus)	<i>Cooccurrence count</i>	<i>Candidate count</i>	<i>logDice</i>
Uniunii	298	405	12.281	Unione	352	458	12.696
Consiliului	181	640	11.399	Paesi	89	501	10.677
Parlamentului	137	632	11.002	dell'	235	5,144	10.227
fondurilor	84	127	10.675	Consiglio	58	433	10.116
Consiliul	66	242	10.231	Banca	43	99	9.997
Regulament	58	116	10.150	Commissione	82	1,446	9.945
ale	115	1,782	10.140	livello	46	331	9.870
Uniunea	62	343	10.062	centrale	38	124	9.793
fonduri	54	131	10.034	sede	45	405	9.773
Comisiei	67	654	9.956	Parlamento	60	974	9.769
Parlamentul	61	467	9.948	politica	55	853	9.723
membre	45	144	9.760	Stati	40	284	9.711
nivel	46	210	9.736	nell'	56	1,206	9.528
României	95	2,093	9.736	Integrazione	27	136	9.287
al	159	5,393	9.550	all'	75	3,004	9.164

How Far Is Romania off the European Union? Romanian Politicians' Discourse in the European Elections and the People's Interest in the *European Agenda*

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ABSTRACT

As a relatively new Member State, Romania does not have a very long experience in the "electoral exercise" of the European Parliament, yet its citizens' trust in the European institutions and policies seems to be higher than in most of the other Member States. Meanwhile, the people's interest in the European elections has been quasi non-existent – lower than the European average – both in 2009 and in 2014. Why is interest in the European elections so low in a country that quite strongly trusts the European institutions? Why do not most of the politicians who run in the European elections address European issues, in order to better differentiate between the national parliamentary elections and the European ones? This paper will try to answer some of these questions, based on the experience of the three rounds of European elections that took place in Romania after its accession to the EU.

Keywords: European elections, Romania, candidates, political discourse, turnout, votes' distribution

INTRODUCTION

Similar to the national parliaments, the European Parliament (EP) is an institution with a very important mission: to represent European citizens and their interests, and not the ones of the national governments or some other groups in particular. Consequently, just like on the national level, the elections for the EP are of great significance for the democratic architecture of the European Union (EU). As such, for the European elections, the politicians' discourse should be different from the one used in the national parliamentary elections, emphasizing issues that bring European institutions and policies to people's attention. The citizens vote for their representatives in the EP, so the public debates during the electoral campaigns for the European elections should leave the national issues in the background and concentrate on the European ones. However, the political rivalries on a national level are often too strong, and sometimes the candidates seem to forget – if not outright ignore – the stakes of the European elections, choosing instead to raise awareness of issues that are not always in accordance with this type of election.

In general, EP electoral campaigns seem to avoid debates on European themes and instead highlight internal concerns and subjects of political parties from the national arena. This apparent unbalanced representation of national and European themes is due to the hybrid nature of EP elections, which means that this type of elections is simultaneously both European and national (Strömback, Maier, & Kaid, 2011, p. 5). Wouter van der Brug and Claes H. de Vreese (2016) note that, since the EU has developed around a structure of multilevel governance, EP elections are not comparable to their national counterparts. In the case of the voters, they are unable to sanction those Members of the EP (MEPs) who fail to meet their expectations, since the political parties rarely inform the electorate about the content of European policies (p. 2). As a result, the electorate is more likely to blankly validate electoral mandates, supporting wide-reaching policies about which the voters have no proper understanding. Moreover, since voters are ill-equipped to vote in EP elections because of European (second order) concerns related to their Member State (MS), they vote in favor or against a European agenda based on various national (first order) considerations.

In the last two EP electoral cycles, the economic crisis and the austerity policies adopted across the EU have had the unintended consequence of setting on a collision course an increasingly dissatisfied European electorate with Eurosceptic political parties of right wing inspiration, in mostly western MS,

which have successfully campaigned internally, on an (anti)European platform during EP elections, both in 2009 and more decisively in 2014 (see Ivănescu & Filimon, 2016, p. 251-258). This has been possible in part due to the Second Order nature of the European elections, which favors lower turnout, smaller parties and sanction votes of mainstream parties on the part of the European voters.

As one of the most recent MS that have adhered to the EU, Romania participated in three rounds of European elections starting from November 2007 – the year of the country's accession to the EU, when the elections took place for the half term. As further discussed in this article, the EP elections in Romania are consistent with the framework of Second Order Elections (SOE), which, as Tapio Raunio (2015) points out, is premised on the notion that “citizens behavior in second-order elections is more significantly affected by the national first-order context than by factors related to the European Parliament elections themselves” (p. 249). Even though the main political parties are all pro-European and the Romanian citizens constantly rank among the Europeans that express some of the highest degrees of trust in the European agenda, institutions and policies, in practice, this state of affairs does not translate into an actually informed transmission relay of European ideas on the part of the media, political figures and voters.

The methodology applied in this paper is a pluralist one: the comparative analysis of data regarding the electoral turnout, and the results will be combined with a discourse analysis in order to demonstrate that, in the cases of most of the candidates in the European elections, the discourse was less oriented towards European themes and policies and more connected to national problems, emphasizing – yet again – the national political rivalries.

REVISITING THE SECOND-ORDER ELECTION FRAMEWORK

According to Jean Blondel, Richard Sinnott & Palle Svenson (1998), a core problem of the EU surrounds the issues of democratic control, legitimacy and accountability (p. 1). Besides the various mechanisms of “democratic” control entailed by the European multilevel governance, EP elections are the ones that supposedly confer the EU legitimacy and transparency. Yet, as the EU continued to include more and more members, especially after EU15, the turnout of the EP elections registered a constant downward trend (from 61.99% in 1979 (EU9) to 42.54% in 2014 (EU28)) (see EU Parliament 2014; Filimon, 2015, p. 195). Low turnout has been justified by the “second order” nature of EP elections where, as stated before, citizens' voting decisions are not based on EU considerations, but influenced by the national context. However, if this is the operational explanation behind voting behavior in the European arena, Blondel et al. (1998) note that the legitimacy of the EU would not be influenced in the least by the EP elections; in other words: “the hope and indeed expectations placed on the idea of direct election to the European Parliament would be wholly unfounded” (p. 14).

Moreover, due to the structure of EP, the elections are not competitive and more importantly they prevent the participating electorate of the current MS, to vote in “free, equal and fair” elections that could significantly affect how and who appoints Euro-authorities (Schmitter, 2007, p. 20), especially since by and large the political competition at the EU level is defined by ideological fractures between the two leading Euro-enthusiastic groups: the European People's Party Group (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats Group (S&D). Meanwhile, the various protest votes and large Eurosceptic presence in the EP do not influence the decision-making process.

If the EP elections can hardly change the political composition, the debates on whether the electorate can influence the direction of the EU or trigger a significant change in the political direction become inconsequential. Political participation is necessary, but not expected to be binding within the multilevel structure of European governance. Consequently, EP elections appear to be anchored in a *laissez faire* logic on behalf of all the actors involved, from the largely abstaining electorate, to the national political parties focused on internal rivalries and up to the EU authorities whose decisions are binding and have a direct impact on the lives of European citizens.

Numerous electoral studies on EP elections and voting behavior have been devoted to the second order election (SOE) theory which entails that EP elections are considered less important than those on a national level (presidential or national parliamentary elections). But if the European policies play such an important role in the lives of Europeans and in the way MS rule themselves, then why are voters so disinterested in EP elections? Moreover, if they vote based on national arena preferences and not on adequate information regarding the EU, the question is why voting in the first place? After the first direct election of the EP (1979), Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt (1980) suggested that, instead

of treating EP elections as *sui generis*, they should be regarded as “national second-order elections” (p. 3). Though the first EP elections also registered the highest turnout out of eight election cycles, from the onset, the authors highlight the low turnout compared to national elections.

Besides the low political participation, another notable feature included “small and relatively new” political parties that registered higher vote shares and won seats in the EP (Reif & Schmitt, 1980, p. 6). In the authors’ opinion, EP elections are similar with second-order elections from the national arena (“by-elections, municipal elections, and various types of regional elections, those to a *second chamber*”) where voters’ decisions are influenced by conditions from the main national arena and where the results from national second order elections influence in turn the main arena (Reif & Schmitt, 1980, p. 9). Thus, two main considerations determine the results of EP elections:

- *Low stakes* – the outcome of EP elections does not necessarily affect a government, instead a number of representatives from the national political parties or independents are elected as MEPs;
- *Timing* – the results of EP elections are influenced by the period in the national electoral cycle in which they are organized (Marsh, 1998, p. 593).

Before the EP’s role in the EU increased its significance, the results of the EP elections had mostly national relevance: they acted as an electoral barometer for the national political parties in power or in opposition, signaling the voters’ preferences in regards to one party or another. For Reif and Schmitt (1980), though the stakes are low in second-order elections, they cannot be separated entirely from first-order elections, especially since they involve the same political actors and are organized in the same political system (p. 8, referred to in Marsh, 1998, p. 594).

The main characteristics of the SOE model identified by Reif and Schmitt (1980) are:

- Lower turnout of EP elections as compared to national elections;
- Parties in power will register electoral losses;
- New and smaller parties will register an increase in votes while mainstream and larger parties will have worse results than in the national elections (pp. 9-10).

Reif (1985) identifies four factors that influence this electoral outcome: “the nature of the parties competing at these elections, the low salience of European issues, the limited extent to which parties compete against each other at the elections, and above all, the fact that, ultimately, these elections do not allocate power” (p. 9 as cited in Blondel, Sinnott & Svensson, 1998, p. 15).

The fact that the EP elections have low stakes, together with the idea that they are used as a “sounding board” by the electorate and as a “mock exam” in the national electoral cycle by the political parties, diminishes the overall role and importance of EP elections. As Blondel et al. (1998) observe, since SOE are regarded as having less importance – despite the increased role of the EP in the EU process of decision-making – voters can choose to abstain or they can vote by default (p. 15). In other words, voters can vote for the same parties as in the national arena, not because they are particularly satisfied with their results, but because they customarily vote for those parties.

In this context, it should come as no surprise that during three rounds of EP electoral campaigns, Romania has registered a low turnout while the political parties have campaigned on a national affairs platform, with a diminished focus on the EU. In the next section, we analyze how MS from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) differ in their approach to the EP elections from their western counterparts.

EP Elections as Second-Order Elections in an Enlarged European Union: How Do Central and Eastern European Member States Vote?

With the exception of Cyprus and Malta, the countries that joined the EU in the fifth enlargement wave (2004, 2007), were former communist republics from Central and Eastern Europe. After three election cycles (2004/2007¹, 2009, 2014), the voting behavior of new MS is rather distinct from those in EU15. Simon Hix and Michael Marsh (2007) attribute the particularities of Central and Eastern European (CEE) voting behavior to fundamental differences regarding:

- Bases of party competition;

¹ In May and November 2007, EP elections were organized in the two new MS – Bulgaria and Romania, to cover half a mandate.

- High level of electoral volatility;
- Variations in anti-European sentiments and parties in CEE MS (p. 497).

Though trust in European institutions has remained high, averaging during five years (2004-2009) – for example, in the case of the Council, at 93.7% – in the new MS, support is even higher: Romania (98.6%), Bulgaria (99.3%), Slovakia (98.4%) etc. By comparison, in ten out of EU15 MS, support was below average: Denmark (85.1%), UK (87.9%), Sweden (83.7%) etc. (Rybář, 2010, p. 41-42) The pressing question when it comes to the voting behavior in CEE MS is why do the EU in general and European institutions in particular enjoy high degrees of trust² – as was the case at least until the onset of the economic crisis – if the turnout of EP elections is almost unrepresentative, and if the trust in national institutions continues to be low as multiple consecutive Eurobarometers show? One proposed explanation for the low trust in national institutions is attributed to issues pertaining to national corruption as well as lack of good governance and poor economic performances (Thomassen, 2009, p. 233). In terms of turnout, studies have shown that a low turnout does not indicate dissatisfaction with EU (Seeber & Steinbrecher, 2011, p. 224). Michael Marsh (2008) also highlights the fact that turnout does not reflect the European citizens' opinion on the EU or other European institutions (p. 227).

Furthermore, similar to their western counterparts, in CEE MS as well, the higher the distrust in national institutions, the higher the trust in the European ones and the higher the support in the European integration (Sanchez-Cuena, 2000, p. 148). Meanwhile, in terms of political participation, some authors justify low turnout by causes related to poor political socialization resulted from their earlier non-democratic experience which taught them that political institutions are untrustworthy and that expressing their dissatisfaction will have no impact at all (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014, p. 212-213).

The standard second-order election model applies rather distinctly to the new MS. For example, Simon Hix and Bjørn Høyland (2011) noted that in CEE MS, the anti-governmental voting trend was absent. Even when these parties would lose votes, the tendency to vote against parties in government remained muted, and the results were not comparable to those from other older MS (p. 149). At the same time, Hix and Marsh (2011) also observed how the enlargement process “dampened the swing against large opposition parties” (p. 8), confirming the fact that smaller or newer parties tended to fair rather poorly in CEE MS. In addition, it is also notable that, even though fringe parties of radical right inspiration are present in these countries, there are few isolated instances where parties appeared or developed anti-European / anti-integration platforms, as a counteraction to EU politics (the most notable example being Hungary).

In parallel, while the EP elections have not been afflicted by the Eurosceptic / radical right in CEE MS, compared to older MS, as witnessed more recently in the 2014 election cycle, the mainstream parties have continuously failed to address European issues of public interest during election cycles. In fact, as Nathaniel Copsey (2013) points out – citing Haughton (2009) – parties' politics from CEE MS is influenced by the EU in three directions:

- Constraint (see accession to the Euro area and Schengen space);
- Spillover (framing debates in European terms on issues pertaining to migration, energetic policy or structural funds);
- Point of reference (see political discourse framed in terms of “European standards” and used as a criticism by some parties against those perceived to not meet these standards, or as a “valence issue”: “an issue on which politicians and voters share the same opinion, be it positive or negative in domestic politics”) (p. 109-110).

When analyzing CEE MS voting behavior through the lenses of the second-order model, we find that the turnout to EP elections in CEE MS is lower than in western MS. In the 2004 EP elections, for

² From the Eurobarometer 62 (Autumn 2004) to the Eurobarometer 85 (Spring 2016), trust in national institutions (Parliament and Government) has remained at low but constant levels, fluctuating between 30% and 20% throughout the 12 years, with only a major raise in trust in Spring 2007 (43% trusted the national Parliament and 41% trusted the national government). In parallel, trust in the EU had been significantly higher, ranging between 40% and 50% from Autumn 2004 (50%) to Spring 2011 (41%). At its highest, trust in EU reached 57% (Spring 2007), while at its lowest, trust in EU averaged around 31% (Spring 2012, Spring 2013, Autumn 2013, Spring 2014). From Autumn 2011 to Spring 2016, trust in the EU continued to drop, averaging in the thirties percent, with only one semester out of ten reaching 40% (Spring 2015) (European Commission, 2016, p. 14).

example, turnout in older MS was 52.7% while in CEE MS, turnout was at 31.2%³. The Euro-gap – the difference in turnout between EP and national elections – is also higher than in older MS (Wessels & Franklin, 2010, p. 86). In terms of governing parties registering electoral losses, Jason R. Koepke and Nils Ringe (2006) found that in CEE MS, these parties do not lose in favor of opposition parties, denoting the absence of a protest vote (p. 341). In addition to that, while the voters in CEE are consistent with their western counterparts in their regard of EP elections as less important, they do not waste their votes on small or new parties, since they perhaps consider that casting a “no confidence” vote in EP elections would have no impact or would not attract compelling political feedback in the national arena (Koepke & Ringe, 2006, p. 341).

In the following section, we study the electoral behavior in Romania during EP elections, both from the side of the electorate as well as from the side of the main political parties.

Case study: Romania during EP Elections. High Trust, Low Turnout

Romania's participation to the EP elections has been time and time again characterized more by the political parties' national rivalry than by an accurate portrayal of what the EU stands for, and how the European policies affect the day to day life of Romanian citizens. Instead of the Europeanization of the Romanian society, a politicization of the process of Europeanization tended to happen in the internal political arena. In other words, whether the issues concerned the Romanian citizens living abroad in the EU or the existence or lack thereof of European projects and structural funds, these topics were used to score political points against a rather passive electorate. The EP elections do not succeed in engaging the peripheral Romanian electorate about the EU, instead the popular support for the EU and its institutions are taken for granted, also due to the fact that Romania and Bulgaria are the only CEE countries that did not hold referendums on the issue of accessing to the EU⁴. Irony will have that in 2007, in parallel with the EP elections, a referendum would be organized regarding the voting system. While an earlier referendum to impeach the president, from April 2007, registered a turnout of 44.45%, neither the campaign for the European Parliament, nor the one for the referendum could attract more than a quarter of the registered voters (26.52% turnout for the referendum, as compared to 29.47% for the EP election) (Autoritatea Electorală Permanentă, 2007a; Autoritatea Electorală Permanentă, 2007b).

The 2007 EP Election

The 1979 EP election was characterized not only by its high turnout but also by the fact that by virtue of being the first of its kind, it was popularized through a non-partisan mobilization campaign organized by the EP in all MS (van der Eijk & Schmitt, 2009, p. 209). Moreover, even though the main campaign topics dealt with issues about the national parties and national governments, there was a distinct effort in the development of a European institution elected by the European citizens. As viewed from this angle, the first EP elections constituted a novelty for the electorate and consequently, more than any other respects, they had potential first-order implications. Similarly, the election organized by the Romanian authorities, in November 2007 to cover the remaining half of the 2004-2009 EP mandate, was also the first of its kind and it could have been framed as a supranational election of first-order importance, instead of an ordinary second-order election.

Due to earlier internal political issues related to the impeachment of the President, Romania organized its first EP election in November 2007, so as to not coincide with the impeachment referendum and further confuse the voters. From the total 35 seats in the EP, 13 were awarded to the Democratic Party (PD), which would join the EPP Group, 10 seats were allotted to the Social Democratic Party (PSD) whose MEPs would join S&D, while 6 seats were secured by the National Liberal Party (PNL), which joined the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) Group. The remaining six seats were divided between the Liberal Democratic Party (PD-L) (three seats and part of EPP), the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) (two seats and part of EPP) and one independent candidate

³ Lowest values of political participation were registered in Slovakia (16.7%), Poland (20.5%) and Estonia (26.7%) (Albi, 2005, p. 160).

⁴ With the exception of Estonia (66.8%) and Latvia (67%), in all the other six CEE states, the results of the referendums registered over 70% of the votes in favor of the accession process: the Czech Republic (77.3%), Poland (77.5%), Hungary (83.7%), Slovenia (89.6%), Lithuania (89.9%) and Slovakia (92.5%) (European Parliament, 2016).

– László Tökés, who joined the European Free Alliance. A notable loss was registered by the far right, nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM), which had previously had five observers in the EP. The 35 MEPS were elected according to the Law regarding the organization and conduct for the European Parliament elections, which was promulgated in the beginning of 2007. In accordance with the law, the 35 MEPs were to be elected in one national constituency, based on a system of proportional representation with closed party lists. The electoral threshold was set at 5% (Albescu, Mateescu, Necula, Roescu, & Sultănescu, 2007, p. 6; see also: Law no.33/2007 regarding the organization and conduct for the European Parliament elections, art. 51).

The turnout for this election was 29.46%, representing a total of 5,370,171 votes, out of which 5,122,226 were valid. Keeping in line with the SOE model, not only was the turnout low, but the minority party of the Prime-Minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu – PNL – placed third (Maxfield, 2008, p. 1). Coming towards the end of an electoral cycle, the EP election acted as a simulation of the 2008 parliamentary elections. In this respect, the parties focused on mobilizing their electorate for future elections and had trouble organizing a campaign in which even finding potential candidates for the EP, was wrought with difficulties (Wolfe-Murray, 2007).

Romanians' trust in the European institutions was high (51%) as compared to their trust in the president (41%), government (18%) or Parliament (13%). In the first month after entering the EU, Romanians had a positive attitude towards the EU, associating it with "hope" (14%), "a better livelihood" (8%), "free movement" (7%), etc. (Albescu et al., 2007, p. 8). Opinion polls from earlier during that year – such as the European Integration Barometer, conducted by the Agency for Governmental Strategies – found that in March 2007, almost 30% of the Romanian citizens were not aware that the EP elections were forthcoming, almost half of them did not know how the MEPs were appointed, while 27% believed that the government was selecting them. An INSOMAR poll from October found that only 13% of the respondents knew the date for the EP elections (Moşneagu, Rădulescu, Alexandru, Chioveanu, Bucheru, & Mârza, 2007, p. 7). Opinion polls from September 2007 also showed that 65% of the respondents regarded the EP elections as important or very important, while 78% declared that they would participate in the elections (Albescu et al., 2007, p. 9).

A report from the Pro Democrația Association noted that the ones who integrated European themes in the media background, were mostly journalists and analysts, instead of the MEPs candidates, while on the whole, the EP elections received a considerably reduced focus from the media, when compared to the coverage of internal issues (Moşneagu et al., 2007, p. 7). Between October 26th, 2007 and November 23rd, 2007, the national public television channels, TVR 1 and TVR 2 had allotted to the EP and referendum campaigns a total of 2200 minutes of air time, out of which more than 1400 minutes focused on the EP electoral campaign. Out of this air time, 950 minutes were allotted to shows about EP political debates. Once a week, the TVR International channel broadcast 30-minute shows that debated issues about the EP election (TVR, 2007, p. 29).

William Crowther and Oana-Valentina Suci (2013) noticed that, despite the populist nature of the campaign, the results of the EP elections combined with those of the referendums, illustrated a shift towards "particular party leaders and catch-all parties competing at the centre" and "away from clear, comprehensive ideological divisions" (p. 381). Also, the EP electoral campaign did not address the serious issues faced by Romania related to the implementation of the *acquis communautaire*, emmigration or transborder crime (Crowther & Suci, 2013, p. 381).

The 2009 EP Election

Two years later, the 2009 EP elections were the first elections where both Romania and Bulgaria's political parties campaigned for a full term in the EP. Organized on June 7th, 2009, the election had a slightly decreased turnout from 29.46% in 2007 to 27.67% or the equivalent of 5,035,299 votes, out of which 4,840,033 (96.12%) were valid and 194,626 (3.86%) were null (Biroul Electoral Central, 2009, p. 1). If in 2007, 13 political entities and one independent candidate participated in the election, in 2009, there were eight political parties and two independent candidates (Elena Băsescu and Pavel Abraham) (Biroul Electoral Central, 2009, p. 1; Ivănescu, 2014, p. 125-127).

If in 2007 PD (the Romanian President's party) won the first place in the elections, in 2009, the Alliance between the Social Democratic Party and the Conservative Party (PSD+PC Alliance) came first, winning 11 seats, for a total of 31.07% of the votes. Meanwhile, PD-L (a fusion between the Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party) came in second (29.71% and 10 seats in the EP), while, the PNL maintained its third place from 2007 (14.52% and 5 seats in the EP). UDMR, with 8.92% and the far right party PRM, with 8.65%, won three seats each (European Parliament, 2009).

With 4.22% of the votes, the independent candidate, Elena Băsescu also qualified for a seat in the EP, joining the EPP Group. The results of the campaign confirmed the hierarchy of the groups in the EP: EPP (14 seats divided between PDL, UDMR and the independent candidate), S&D (11 seats, represented by the PSD+PC Alliance), and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group (ALDE, former ELDR, with 5 seats, represented by PNL). (European Parliament, 2009). For a short period of time (January 15, 2007 – November 14, 2007) the far right party PRM was part of the far-right Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty Group (ITS). PRM left the group, leading to the ITS' dissolution, after one of its members, Alessandra Mussolini made disparaging remarks about the Romanians expelled from Italy (Parau, 2014).

During the campaign, the PSD+PC Alliance candidates brought forward five main issues to be resolved in their political discourses between 2009 and 2014:

- “getting Romania out of the economic crisis;
- modernizing rural areas and agriculture;
- increasing access to quality health care and education;
- obtaining full rights for Romanians in Europe;
- achieving real equality between men and women” (Maxfield, 2010, p. 239).

Meanwhile, PD-L candidates focused in their speeches on issues related to:

- economic recovery from the financial crisis;
- switching to Euro by 2014, being admitted into the Schengen space by 2011;
- eliminating the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism that addressed judicial reform and fight against corruption (Plugaru, 2009, para. 18);
- extending Internet provision through structural funds;
- modernization of the energy infrastructure;
- consolidation of the single market for a better oversight of the financial sector;
- improving the economic cooperation and coordination between MS (Maxfield, 2010, p. 239).

In the case of PNL, the candidates addressed issues pertaining to:

- the free movement – be it of people, goods, or services;
- obtaining full rights of EU membership;
- structural funds;
- climate change (Maxfield, 2010, p. 239).

PNL candidates like Norica Nicolai, Renate Weber or Adina Vălean also supported plans to develop a project for a common European policy of border management in accordance with Romania's interests (Nicolai), projects regarding energy, the eastern border, climate change, EU enlargement and foreign policy, structural funds (Vălean) or proposed the development of a common area for justice⁵ (Weber) (Plugaru, 2009, para. 26, 27, 28).

In terms of the SOE model, while the turnout was low and the nationalist far right party, PRM, gained three seats in EP – unlike in 2007 when the Prime-Minister's party came in third –, the parties in power (PD-L and UDMR) did not lose votes in favor of the opposition. Moreover, the extra one seat as the difference between the PSD+PC Alliance and PD-L was quickly covered, after the independent candidate, Elena Băsescu – President Băsescu's younger daughter – re-joined PD-L. In addition, as Gabriela Borz (2016) notes, the mainstream parties did not actually lose a large share of votes in favor of smaller parties, even though PD-L registers a significant drop (p. 671). As compared to 2007, PD-L lost five MEPs and PNL lost one. Except for some sanction votes against the governing party, the losses can also be attributed to the fact that in the 2009 election, only 33 seats were available, as opposed to 35 seats in 2007. The results also brought to an end the fact that the parties' electoral outcome depends on the electoral timing. Though this variable applies with a higher accuracy in older

⁵ MEP Renate Weber talked about “reforming and professionalizing the Romanian judicial system from Brussels towards Romania” (Plugaru, 2009).

MS, this is not the case in Romania. The two EP elections took place either towards the end of the electoral cycle (2007), or in the beginning (2009), and in both case, the turnout was low while government parties did not register major losses when compared to national parliamentary elections (Borz, 2016, p. 671). As opposed to the low turnout from other MS – which is not directly attributed to some type of mistrust in the electoral process – opinion polls in Romania showed 56% of the voters who choose not to vote believe that the elections are rigged (Bujder, Condrea, Bucheru, Moşneagu, & Pârvu, 2009, p. 7).

Both the 2007 and 2009 EP elections have been overshadowed by internal politics. If 2007 was marked by two referendums and a presidential impeachment, the June 2009 electoral campaign was the antechamber for the upcoming presidential election. The Eurosceptic voices are entirely absent from the political background – not even in the case of PRM – reflecting the support of the European project, both on behalf of the political class, as well as on the electorate. Two years and a half later, the Romanian citizens' prospects in the EU remain high, as reflected in the Eurobarometers which show that two thirds of the respondents see the EU membership as a good thing that has benefited the country. This trend remains constant even later on after the onset of the economic crisis and the austerity measures. Even when trust levels decrease, the electorate remains pro-European and Euro-enthusiastic, albeit somewhat less naive in the EU as a panacea for all of society's ills (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore, 2013, p. 245).

The 2014 EP Elections

Nine political entities and one independent candidate participated in the EP elections held on May, 2014: the Social Democratic Union (USD) (including the Social Democratic Party, the Conservative Party and the National Union for the Progress of Romania), the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L), the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), People's Movement Party (PMP), People's Party – Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD), Greater Romania Party (PRM), Civic Force (FC), the Ecologist Party of Romania (PER), and the independent candidate, Mircea Diaconu. The winner of the 2014 EP election was USD, which won 37.60% of the votes and 16 seats in the EP (+5 as compared to 2009). PNL came in second, registering 15% of the votes and six seats in the EP (+1 as compared to 2009). Meanwhile, the former leading party of the previous two elections, PD-L came in third, with a market share of 12.23% of the votes and five seats in the EP (-5 compared to 2009). UDMR and PMP scored over 6% of the votes (UDMR – 6.29% and PMP – 6.21%) and each gained two MEPs. The independent candidate, Mircea Diaconu rounded up the list of future of MEPs, by scoring 6.81% of the votes (Biroul Electoral Central, 2014, p. 1; see also Ivănescu, 2014, p. 125-127).

In an election year marked by the resurgence of radical right populist parties which made inroads into mainstream politics by winning EP elections in older MS like France and the UK, the results of the Romanian EP election were notable for the absence of PRM no longer reaching the electoral threshold, registering only 2.70% of the votes. Similarly, Eurosceptic parties were also absent across the political spectrum. Consequently, the MEPs were yet again divided between S&D (USD – 16 seats), EPP (PD-L, PNL, PMP, UDMR – 13 seats) and ALDE (Mircea Diaconu, Renate Weber, Norica Nicolai – three seats) (European Parliament, 2014). The 2014 election had the MEPs seats split between the S&D and the EPP groups, since PNL decided to change its European affiliation and switched from ALDE to EPP. Of the previous ALDE MEPs, only Norica Nicolai and Renate Weber left EPP and went back to ALDE, as independent members.

Unlike the previous years, the 2014 elections showed an increased turnout, reaching for the first time the low thirties (32.44%) (Biroul Electoral Central, 2014, p. 1). Complementarily, it was also the first time when the differences in the SOE model between older and newer MS, were distinctly notable. The government party represented by USD did not lose the elections, winning instead by over half a margin. Small parties were not the receivers of sanction votes against mainstream parties, while nationalist and fringe parties like PRM and PP-DD failed to (re)gain access to the EP. The allegedly new party on the political scene, PMP, was centered around the figure of the President Traian Băsescu and was formed after the split of PD-L, after the latter became associated with the negative impact of the austerity measures imposed by international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as part of a series of loans and stand-by agreements.

Similar to the previous 2009 elections, the 2014 campaign was also a test for the main political parties in preparation for the presidential elections held at the end of the year. Consequently, the election coverage was dominated by the leader figures of the political parties (Victor Ponta from PSD, Elena

Udrea from PMP, Crin Antonescu from PNL) (Bird & Candea, 2014, para. 4), instead of the MEP candidates and their agenda for the EP. PSD's strategy focused on three directions:

- promoting the legacy of the Social-Liberal Union (USL), which until its dissolution, had proven to be a successful electoral engine for both the PSD-PC Alliances, as well as for PNL;
- promoting the image of the Prime-Minister and PSD leader, Victor Ponta – future presidential hope;
- promoting the issue of national pride (Mihalache, 2014, p. 7).

PD-L was the main opposition party in these elections, still sanctioned by the electorate for the former years of harsh and impoverishing austerity measures, even after the former President Traian Băsescu and former Prime-Minister Emil Boc distanced themselves to the point that a new political formation (PMP) appeared as a result of the split. The campaign focused on criticizing the ruling parties and on promoting MEPs such as Monica Macovei and Theodor Stolojan (Mihalache, 2014, p. 10).

After exiting the government alliance with PSD (USL – the Social Liberal Union), PNL distanced itself from its former political partner. The main message of the PNL campaign was centered around “Eurochampions” and marketed their candidates as being the most competent MEPs in the previous EP cycles, when compared to those from the other parties. While PNL launched a series of European projects: a candidates' agenda to the EP, entitled “Prosperity, Nation, Liberty”, a new liberal economic program, entitled “Liberal Economy. Through Our Own Means”, and also proposed to switch the official hour to that of Europe – all the initiatives failed to capture the media's attention and the public's interest (Mihalache, 2014, p. 9).

In many respects, the 2014 EP election was a period of change and transition for two of the main three political parties: PD-L and PNL. It is not a coincidence that soon after the EP election, in July 2014, both parties agreed to merge into one political formation, PNL, in order to counterbalance the socialist party's influence, just in time for the presidential elections.

While the internal agenda remained dominant, in terms of the EU, the 2014 EP electoral campaign continued to promote the interests of Romania in the EU, across the political spectrum, without referring to the way that the European issues influence Romania. As far as the electorate is concerned, Romanians continued to trust the European Parliament, even when the levels of trust reflected effects of the economic crisis: from 62% in 2009, to 49% in 2013 and to 55% in 2014 (European Commission, 2009, p. 110, European Commission, 2014, p. 89, p. 90). Similarly, 51% tended to trust the European Commission and overall 58% continued to trust the EU, marking a ten-point increase from Autumn 2013 (European Commission, 2014, p. 89, p. 93). In terms of a protest vote, the independent candidate Mircea Diaconu attracted the voters' support by benefiting from the exposure of a media trust and by campaigning on anti-system / anti-party platform.

Conclusions

The Romanian EP elections display a paradox of a mostly absent electorate that maintains high degrees of trust in European institutions which are responsible for a legislation applying internally to a rate of over 70% in general, and responsible *de facto* for the austerity policies employed by MS after the financial crisis. Another paradox is the one reflected in the correlation between trust and knowledge about the EU: before and even after the accession, “[a]lthough their knowledge about the Union was relatively poor, they tended to have a much better opinion about what they know about European institutions as compared to other nations” (Ivănescu & Filimon, 2014, p. 107).

European issues are promoted and gain interest only if directly influencing the citizens in mostly two directions: freedom of movement for the Romanian citizens living abroad and structural funds. As for the rest, the internal political rivalries continue to manifest themselves unabated even after seven years from the state's accession to the EU. The elections themselves remain and will continue to remain for the near future a period of preparation and creating strategies, in anticipation of the presidential elections. Topics of public interest are rarely promoted in a coherent manner – outside the general lines divided between center-left-leaning ideas of social interest and center-right ideas of neoliberal orientation. The problem of corruption pervades the public discourse and is used as an electoral gambit by various political actors. Neither the political discourses and debates, nor the candidates' or party programs emphasized the European issues, but focused more on the national ones.

In this article, we analyzed the way the standard SOE model applies to the more recent MS in general, and to Romania in particular, and we found that even though the turnout is constantly low and lower than the European average, Romania's voting behavior in the EP elections eschews the model partially, if not entirely. Mainstream parties are not subjected to a protest vote while government parties are not sanctioned by the electorate – at least not immediately (see PD-L in 2009 versus 2014) – and even then, it is not because of the timing in the electoral cycle. Nationalist parties have only once managed to win seats in the EP and even then it was not during the wave that characterized the 2014 elections. Small and Eurosceptic parties are missing altogether, while independent candidates won seats in each of the three elections.

In conclusion, political parties are all Euro-enthusiastic even though in many ways they remain far off the EU due to the way in which national politics are set, promoted and pursued. Meanwhile, Romanian citizens continue to maintain their faith in the EU project, not because of some misplaced conviction and misunderstanding of the EU's capabilities, but because internal actors disappointed them time and time again. In other words, the lack of trust in national institutions and political figures allowed for a "transfer of trust" to take place from the national arena to the European one (Ivănescu & Filimon, 2014, p. 113), even though the Romanian MEPs are the ones who supposedly promote their interest in the EP. Instead, what happens is that few MEPs promote an agenda in the interest of their Romanian voters, while the majority is swallowed by the EP groups' politics and interests. The fact that MEPs are "lost" into the internal logic of the EP and of the ideological blocks shows once more that, even though the EP increased its significance, the democratic deficit also continued to grow since the chasm between national EP elections and national MEPs working in the EP is continually widening, leaving the interests of the European citizens outside the democratic constraints and at the behest of technocratic mechanisms. This severe democratic blind spot, tacitly endorsed and constantly downplayed by European, national actors (parties and citizens), media and academics alike, can have severe, long-term consequences as those exposed by the 2016 Brexit referendum.

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From Civilizing Mission to Soft Power? European Powers and the Politics of Attraction

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ABSTRACT

The paper addresses Europe's central role in international affairs, focusing on the shift of that role's conceptualization from 'civilizing mission' (19th century) to 'soft power' (21st century). The rhetoric of civilizing mission as well as the stereotype of barbarians were noticeably used in imperialistic ideology, playing a crucial role in the expansion of the international society. With the demise of official colonial rule, this concept took subtler forms such as civilizing process and intervention. In turn, the notion of soft power specifically refers to serving national interests more through attraction rather than coercion. It has proven to be a useful tool for understanding European and other nations' strategic communication and foreign cultural policy (public and cultural diplomacy). Overall, an analysis of the relevance of those two concepts in the European context is offered, including a brief overview of key-elements of cultural and public diplomacy of major European powers.

Keywords: Europe, civilizing mission, soft power, cultural/public diplomacy

INTRODUCTION

The paper addresses Europe's central role in international affairs particularly in terms of civilization(s) and culture, focusing on the shift of that role's conceptualization from 'civilizing mission' (19th century) to 'soft power' (21st century). This shift reflects a broader one from cultural nationalism and propaganda to cultural diplomacy and nowadays cultural capitalism characterized by the sharp increase of the number of players who play the game of the politics of identity or culture and specifically attraction.

Within the study of the foreign dimension of cultural relations, the latter shift has been eloquently illustrated by Paschalidis (2009, pp. 277-285) in his account of cultural institutions and of their contribution to the export of national cultures, identifying four relevant phases:

- 'cultural nationalism' (1870s-1914)
- 'cultural propaganda' (1914-1945)
- 'cultural diplomacy' (1945-1989)
- 'cultural capitalism' (1989-nowadays).

In this view, the first out of the respective periods was predominantly marked by the development of institutions tied in with the process of national integration (e.g. Germany and Italy) as well as with the civilizing mission of the European colonial rule (e.g. France). The second period involved the conduct of foreign cultural policy under centralized guidance and support, also entailing the politicization of culture and the mobilization of intellectuals within official propaganda. The third phase impinged upon image management of both World War II victors (e.g. USA) and losers (e.g. Germany). Although serving outright cultural nationalism and losing some strength in favor of enhanced cultural cooperation, it is also true that national perspectives and ideological controversies retained momentum, reflected in current geocultural divisions (East-West, North-South etc). At the same time, the rise of English as a *lingua franca* and American popular culture posed challenges even for Europeans themselves. The last phase marks the use of cultural relations and the respective tools not by an oligopoly of great powers, as was the case in the past, but by a series of several states and actors with

varied powers, often implicated in the encounters of old, new and reemerging nationalisms as well as in schemes of international/regional cooperation.¹

At present, cultural institutes have covered and served different purposes, indicatively (Paschalidis, p. 285):

- Emphasizing and particularly striving for linguistic expansion (France, Great Britain, Germany)
- Remolding the international image (ex-socialist countries)
- Renewing ties with ex-dominions (Austria, Portugal)
- Putting forward soft power image as new world economic powers (Japan, China, India)
- Promoting economic and political agendas as regional powers (Turkey, Israel, Iran)
- Cultivating regional interests (the Visegrad Group)
- Retaining links with the diaspora (e.g. Mexico, Poland).

Having established a complex framework of interaction, the paper underscores cultural politics especially drawing on the discipline of International Relations. In international politics, actors have to choose from a range of general courses of action, especially dealing with challenges raised in the international system and notably within globalization. In this respect, they can coerce, reward, punish or attract other actors, simultaneously and respectively facing themselves multiple forms of coercion, rewards, punishment or attraction. The ‘civilizing mission’ and the ‘soft power’ logics and mechanisms fall into the ‘do as I do’ or ‘live as I live’ or ‘think/speak as I think/speak’ category, involving attraction, without necessarily excluding coercive elements; particularly in the first case but also in the second. After all, the theoretical understanding of attraction in the context of world politics is not monolithic, given its multifaceted conceptualization, i.e. as a natural objective experience or as a construct through persuasive argument or even as a relationship constructed through representational force (see Mattern, 2005).

As illustrated below, the rhetoric of civilizing mission, along with the stereotype of barbarians, was noticeably used in imperialistic ideology in a rather varied manner, playing a crucial role in the expansion of the international society. With the demise of official colonial rule, this concept was not rendered obsolete but took subtler forms such as civilizing process and intervention. In turn, the notion of soft power specifically refers to serving national interests less through coercion than attraction regarding culture, ideals and policies. Although it was coined for discussing the role of the US in the post-Cold War era, it has proven to be a useful analytic tool for understanding the European and other nations’ strategic communication (public diplomacy) and foreign cultural policy (cultural diplomacy).

With the above remarks in mind, the paper offers an analysis of the relevance of those two concepts in the European context and its key players involved in the multi-faceted game of the politics of attraction. The two next sections underscore each one of the notions, followed by a section briefly summing up key-elements of cultural and public diplomacy of major European powers. The final section offers concluding remarks, focusing on the challenges of both globalization and European integration.

CIVILIZING MISSION²

The evocation of civilization in international politics

The relevance of conflict and dialogue as major forms of the connection of international politics with civilizations is rather obvious. However, this connection also includes the use of ‘civilization’ as a criterion of distinction in multiple patterns of interaction with political motives and repercussions, involving exclusionary and hierarchical mechanisms and logics (Hall & Jackson, 2007; Mikelis, 2016). Bluntly put, the evocation of civilization in international politics is no less important than the encounters of civilizations as collectivities. ‘Civilizing mission’, along with the ‘standard(s) of civilization’, is a highly indicative example of such evocation.

¹ For example, EUNIC (European Union National Institutes for Culture: <http://www.eunic-online.eu>) and IFACCA (International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies: <http://www.ifacca.org>).

² The content of this section is an extensive reformulation of section 3 of Mikelis, 2016.

The 'standard(s) of civilization' (Gong, 1984. See Stroikos, 2014; Linklater, 2016) relates to the inclusion/entry of a state to a society of states (international society). It is the set of assumptions through which that society differentiates its members from its non-members, by accepting the latter in its ranks through the fulfillment of specific requirements, while retaining other forms of interaction such as unequal treaties or protectorates. Membership relates more to the behavior of all members as part of a single system rather than the formation of an alliance. This standard presupposes the existence of less mature or civilized entities and behavior. It stresses civilization as a condition, concerning hierarchical mechanisms and logics which may at times justify violence. Historically, a logic that civilizational superiority legitimizes the use of violence has often appeared, for example through proclaiming the civilizing actors' values subject to compliance on behalf of others (see Brown, 2000, pp. 202-204).

The formation of European imperialism was characteristically marked by the protection of civilization against the barbarian threat and by the use of the dichotomy 'civilization/barbarians' in colonial and imperialist discourse. In other words, imperialist ideology and the justification of wars entailed the stereotype of barbarian and the rhetoric of civilizing mission. The break-up of colonialism, along with the increasing incredibility of civilizing claims, marked the reconstitution of the content of this dichotomy, e.g. the reproduction of imperialist practices through the clash of civilizations concept (Salter, 2002). In particular, international thinking of the 19th century and the early 20th century included civilization as a crucial criterion for progress and belonging through the use of the standard of civilization and a rising discourse with imperialist, racial, class and gendered references (p. 156). In all the complexity of the respective intellectuals, support of conquest against non-Europeans and the exercise of despotic power over them took place even by liberal advocates of freedom and equality. Accounts of progress became more triumphalist and less nuanced or tolerant, while a sense of civilizational and specifically national self-confidence was a central feature of political discourse in France and Great Britain (Pitts, 2005, esp. p. 240. See Mehta, 1999, ch. 3; Bell, 2007).

Besides the 'bright' side of civilization in world history, consequently, the other side of the coin includes a darker dimension and in particular civilization's function as a "colonial ideology" or even as a "European ideology" (Mazlish, 2004, ch. 2 & 3), i.e. its "historic centrality in legitimating European imperialism and its continuing associations as a license for Western aggression" (Phillips, 2011, p. 9). This relates to the logic and mechanisms of a civilizing mission especially on behalf of Empires, with the notable example of France. The latter's cultural diplomacy in the 19th century explicitly included this element on the basis that advancing universal principles is desirable and necessary (Pitts, 2005, pp. 165-173). The expansion of an international society has been complemented by the role of a civilizing mission in the name of enabling and legitimating imperialist expansionism, related also to culture in terms of a "civilizing mission of culture" (Reeves, 2004, ch. 1).

On the other hand, it would be wrong to reduce the 'cultural nationalism' phase that cultural institutions underwent during the late 19th and early 20th centuries to a civilizing mission, in light of the institutions' involvement in national unification on several occasions. However, cases of integrating foreign cultural policy into imperialist competition were also at play especially on behalf of the aforementioned power, advancing mechanisms for spreading the respective language and culture notably using the civilizing mission rhetoric (Paschalidis, 2009, pp. 277-279). It would be equally misleading to assume a single relation between imperial violence and the rhetoric of civilization. After all, an inquiry into the debates over the British engagement in war, during the 19th century, succinctly shows claims in the name of civilization towards both defending and criticizing imperial expansion (Phillips, 2011). Generally, a systematic charting of international thought in historical depth illustrates "the Eurocentric conception of world politics", confirming orientalism but also its distinction in two versions (Hobson, 2012):

- Scientific racism (emphasizing the difference of superior and inferior races)
- Eurocentric institutionalism (focusing on the difference in terms of culture and rational western institutions vs irrational oriental institutions).

Both variants would be further divided into views in favor of or against imperialism. Obviously, this means not that the civilizing rhetoric was not put in the service of imperial strategies or interests but that it took place in a varied manner. Evidently, it remains crucial to keep an eye on the connection between civilizing rhetoric and strategy, with no prejudice. In this regard, it is challenging to take notice of the original expectations about the function of the UN as a mechanism of defense and adjustment of empires to emerging challenges (Mazower, 2009, esp. p. 27).

Civilizing processes and interventions in the Post-Cold War

These features do not merely belong to the past. Indicatively, attention has been brought to “civilizing process” or “global civilizing processes”, taken to mean the evolutionary tendency of European societies towards a cosmopolitan course with increasing refutation of violence. Attention is given here to the dominant attitudes towards cruelty or bodily and mental harm in world politics, along with the patterns which protect humans from irrational actions of others, as well as to developments in cosmopolitan moral emotions within the modern states-system (Linklater, 2004, 2005, 2010). However, a world society may increasingly emerge within a complex framework of “civilizing world politics”, without automatically ruling out the potential of violence (Albert et al., 2000).

While it seems reasonable to dismiss the return to civilization as a form of western dominance, hypocrisy or ideological anachronism, it is necessary to account for how civilization is implicated to broader processes of administration and governance involving international order. This process, while connected to the evolution of international law, presupposes some sort of violence and offense towards those who do not correspond to the relevant criteria, emerging as a “civilizing offensive” especially within “the war on terror” (Neocleous, 2011). This is also the case with “civilizing interventions”, i.e. the linkage of arguments for not only the war against terror but for humanitarian intervention as well with the dynamics of civilizing mission, in light of a discourse even with racial connotations, giving specific role to the global periphery as well as reflecting great power rivalries (Knox, 2013). Furthermore, the respective logic is also present at international peace building vis-à-vis the emergence of specific visions for the international organization of states and societies, specifically the principles of liberal democracy and of the free market economy, through peace keeping operations. Simply put, those missions and post-war reconstruction constitute a new version of civilizing mission, as far as they are connected with the transmission of criteria of proper conduct from the (western and liberal) core of the international system towards the periphery (Paris, 2002). Giving an indicative example, European efforts to facilitate poverty eradication in African states through budget support seem to have turned into a boomerang, in light of regressive liberalization essentially functioning as a form of neocolonial arrangement and resulting to the closing of genuine avenues for poverty alleviation (Langan, 2015).

Boldly put, history has been characterized by a process of formation of a uniform “empire of civilization” (Bowden, 2009). At present, globalization entails the emergence of the “global standards of market civilization”, the adoption of which has emerged as a requirement for economic development (Bowden & Seabrooke, 2007). An application of relevant standards took place also during the Eastern enlargement of the EU in the 2000s. The acceptance of such process related to a civilizing mission towards Eastern Europe (Triandafyllidou & Spohn, 2003, p. 11). The candidate member states were entitled to be considered worthy of the high standards set by states of the European core, in a process bluntly described in terms of ‘comply to EU rules and enter’. Evidently, the emergence of the EU has been marked by the reformulation of the standard of civilization rather than its obsolescence (Nicolaidis et al., 2014; Stivachtis, 2016). Overall, since the imperial era was characterized by a certain offensiveness in the name of specific civilizations or generally civilization, it is meaningful to search for the respective mechanisms or processes (the conscious and often violent imposition of civilization), to the degree that the present (post-cold war era) entails the remains of colonial logics and mechanisms from the back door (neocolonialism).

SOFT POWER

While a ‘civilizing mission’ is still relevant for the understanding of the ‘think/do as I think/do’ mechanisms of international politics, another concept has gained value, i.e. ‘soft power’. The latter refers to serving national interest less through coercion rather than attraction, regarding culture, ideals and policies. The concept was theoretically developed in a self-titled book by the prominent American scholar of IR J. Nye (2004. Cf. Parmar & Cox, 2010), oriented towards the US case. Two respective books had already preceded, whereby it was discussed regarding the new position and role the US and Post- Cold War foreign policy (Nye, 1990, 2002). Briefly summarizing those texts (Zahran & Ramos, 2010, p. 16), in the first out of the latter, soft power was approached as a special and yet neglected type of power of the superpower. In the second, a strategy was devised so that American foreign policy would exploit it, taking advantage of available power resources. The book, that followed, concentrated in the theoretical development of the concept and its repercussions. The projection of values and standards of actors and particularly states links soft power to specific dimensions of diplomacy, such as cultural diplomacy (Bound et al., 2007, ch.1; Mark, 2009; Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010) and public

diplomacy (Melissen, 2005a; Waller, 2008; Snow & Taylor, 2009). In all the polysemy of the respective concepts, cultural diplomacy is particularly related to “the deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy” (Mark, 2009, p. 7), while public diplomacy is oriented to targeting public audiences, involving the former as a long range instrument (Gilboa, 2008, p. 73) or as one dimension emphasizing the use of cultural goods in terms of tools of influence (Fisher, 2009, pp. 251-254).

In this respect, soft power has bluntly to do with:

- “The battle for hearts and minds” (Lennon, 2003; Bellou, 2010; Zaharna, 2010, ch. 2)
- “Winning the war of ideas” (Blinken, 2003) or similarly “conducting a war of ideas with public diplomacy” (Reilly, 2008) or an “information war” (Taylor, 2010)
- Telling a nation’s/society’s/entity’s “story to the world” (Wang, 2007) or concomitantly engaging into a “dialogue with the world” (Kiehl, 2006)
- “Managing national reputation” (Wang, 2006)
- The “diplomacy of ideas” (Ninkovich, 1981)
- How “competitive identity” in terms of “new brand management” (Anholt, 2007) works
- Emotions and dispositions management in international communication: e.g. ‘like me’, ‘why do you hate me?’, ‘don’t dislike me’, ‘imitate me’, ‘meet me’, ‘don’t misunderstand me’ etc (Graham, 2014).

In particular (Nye, 2004, ch. 1), the soft power of an actor is about the ability to achieve her purposes through an emphasis in the enhancement of attraction of her culture or ideas or policies. The main aim here is to co-form the preferences of other actors towards the direction of accepting and legitimizing the respective values. A characteristic example is the evocation of American ideals (way of life and values) juxtaposed to authoritarian regimes. Vice versa, repulsion for an (American or other) image or policy would reflect a restricted or failed soft power, especially in cases of perceiving the respective behavior as arrogant. According to this line of reasoning, cultural and public diplomacy would be important not only for spreading elements of culture or policy but also for making them appealing and popular, thus increasing the state’s soft power.

Regarding the resources of soft power (pp. 11-15), a major one relates to culture, and particularly facets like literature, art or education as well as mass entertainment or recreation. Another one refers to government policies, which usually work against soft power, to the degree that they are considered hypocritical, arrogant or narrow-minded. And yet another is related to values, such as democracy or freedom and the use of good or bad example. Although soft power practices have been around even since antiquity, the relative importance of the former has particularly increased in the information age. In this context, success depends upon (pp. 31-32):

- Possessing and using multiple channels of communication
- The closeness of a nation’s culture to universal norms or rules (e.g. liberalism, pluralism, autonomy)
- The credibility of internal and international values or policies.

However, “the hard truth about soft power” (Kounalakis & Simonyi, 2011) lies in the fact that it is not a panacea, especially taking into account its limitations (Liaropoulos, 2011). The ‘non-softness’ of soft power entails a conceptualization of the latter not in juxtaposition to hard power but as “a continuation of it by different means”, as far as attractiveness is a competitive form of verbal fighting, characterized by representational force (Mattern, 2005, p. 583 and see pp. 596-604). Indeed, it could also function controversially, to the degree that it is judged sufficient for handling reaction or that it renders geopolitical primacy or leadership tolerable or that it makes a benign hegemon (Layne, 2010, pp. 58-64. Cf. Voskopoulos, 2011). Simply put, soft power might often be considered as an adequate tool to handle suspicion against powers or in favor of a positive image. But this shouldn’t obscure other facets, such as that it may emerge as a dangerous illusion. Similarly, it is important to comprehend the precise mechanisms through which it contributes to the legitimation of war. This includes the strategic use of political discourse and it extends from propaganda to media and entertainment (Chouliaraki, 2007). As it is bluntly acknowledged by a famous scholar of public diplomacy, the latter –consequently also cultural diplomacy– is not an altruistic game not a ‘soft’ instrument, as far as a variety of purposes is served in multiple levels, including political dialogue, foreign investment and the creation or

solidification of ties with civil society but also features connected to hard power such as alliance formation and management, conflict prevention and military intervention (Melissen, 2005b, p. 14).

According to an indicative cartography of results, the spectrum of soft power involves (Chong, 2007, pp. 57-58):

- A weaker end, whereby academic and purely international elite debates result in stalemate with little policy impact
- Another end, whereby a national soft power becomes globalized to the extent that total hegemony results through the conversion of opinion to a particular cause. This becomes the cultural imperialism of a community
- The middle, whereby global non-state actor inclusive regimes and networks are negotiated to accommodate diverse agendas and particularistic interest aggregation.

Nye has equally acknowledged that soft power, especially in the US case, doesn't mean an one-sided connection between the appeal of American way of life and the tendency for following the respective foreign policy. So, American (or any national) cultural attractiveness or its positive political effect are not always a given. The use of cultural goods and tools might prove to be a double edged knife, as far as they are approached by others in a negative venire, i.e. as offensive or imperialist. Are there any criteria for diagnosing unpleasant consequences? Yes: a smart public diplomacy, in order not to fall into a mere form of propaganda and indeed an ineffective one, presupposes the recognition of the credibility dimension as well as self-reflection and civil society engagement (Nye, 2008). Nye eventually came to postulate that best results for a state come up not only through exclusively emphasizing soft power or its other –hard power– but their proper combination in the name of smart power (Nye, 2004, p. 32; Nye, 2009. Cf. Kounalakis & Simonyi, 2011). This transition to the latter concept would have to get down anyway to strategy (Liaropoulos, 2014, p. 100) and it means not necessarily a retreat from the orientation towards soft power, i.e. that it is a major stake for foreign policy, but at least a recognition of the inevitable implication of other factors or mechanisms, like alliances, sanctions etc.

Given the greater access of many people to many options in the information age, the crucial stake is not whether actors in international politics as well as groups or individuals provide or receive information or cultural/artistic goods. Yet, it counts if and how they inform/notify, acquiring attention, along with how they distinguish –as remarkable– part of the immense pieces of received information. What is missing or is at stake refers not to information *per se* but to getting or keeping attention (Nye, 2008, pp. 99-100). Simply put, familiarity is a relatively easy case, compared to how the relative interest and favorable treatment by others are attained and maintained.

Overall, international politics includes the dimension of culture/communication as a resource or means of power and indeed in terms of power. It is less a soft tool *per se* rather than a complex one pertaining varied sectors or levels, relating to how a state or society or group strives to be perceived in certain ways by others. On the one hand, the exact determination of the winners and losers of the respective games is not feasible in light of uncertainty and non-linearity in international politics (Gunaratne, 2005, p. 766). That is, today's winner in one battle over hearts and minds of others may be the loser in an equivalent one. On the other hand, success comes with increasing attraction or diminishing repulsion vis-à-vis actors' identity and behavior/actions. On top of that, the material dimension of world politics or its multiple and complex logics are still at play.

THE POLITICS OF ATTRACTION OF EUROPEAN POWERS

The heavy use of the concept of soft power and its mechanisms in the context of American foreign policy may justify the discussion of the relations between political and cultural hegemony or primacy, yet it shouldn't obscure European attention to the concept. To be sure, in light of the emphasis given nowadays to soft power by non-Western (e.g. Asian) powers, it would be misleading to misconceive the game of soft power purely as a Euro-Atlantic affair. Even so, this doesn't mean that individual European cases have lost value.

Starting with Great Britain, it is noted that the foundation of a major cultural institution (British Committee for Relations with Other Countries, eventually renamed British Council³) took place rather

³ In between, named British Council for Relations with Other Countries.

late (in 1934). Despite the function of intellectual and ideational mechanisms, reproducing imperial and colonial rule and politics, this nation was not the initiator out of the colonial powers, in regard to this dimension. The foundation of the respective institutions of other states had already occurred. The British concern lied less in converting the colonial subjects to English or an equivalent of the French version of civilizing mission. Compared to other cases, interest for the substantial support of this particular institute was rather limited (Parsons, 1984-1985, pp. 3-5; Corse, 2013, ch. 2). On the other hand, it was deemed important, during the conduct of cultural propaganda of World War II (Corse, 2013).

Nowadays, a highly indicative challenge lies in the handling the relevant issues in the Post-cold War era. Generally, the transition to the new century was followed by an increased role of public diplomacy, predominantly in terms of promoting the national image rather than of comprehensive interaction with transnational actors, as was the case with other states (Vickers, 2004. Also see Leonard, 2002, ch. 7 & 8; Bound et al., 2007). In the cultural dimension of foreign policy, attention was given to soft power, through a series of exhibitions and mainly the general option for communicative investment in the 2012 Olympic Games, specialized in a respective campaign. However, this did not mean a *carte blanche* for the already developed British Council, especially regarding oversight and funding, in light of the need for fiscal adjustment. So, the instrumental view of this institution, on behalf of the state, as a national tool of foreign policy, posed certain restrictions in relation to its previous action (Rivera, 2015). The general issue at stake here is an extensive set of actors of public diplomacy and communication, relating to the multiplicity of targeted audiences and messages, unveiling the need for coordination (Fisher, 2009).

As far as Continental Europe is particularly concerned, France and Germany stand out. While the connection between identity solidification and internal legitimation as well as the influence on neighboring and other countries relates more or less all shorts of states (from ex colonial powers to post-colonial states), especially the first case is considered to be a highly indicative example of an integrated respective process (Olins, 2005, 170-172). As already noted, the international cultural presence of both states was very intense, even since colonial rule and the breakup World War I, respectively in terms of civilizing mission and education or spiritual cultivation of the nation in its integration process. The concomitant interest continued during the Interwar. The end of World War II found the former power typically a winner but relatively weak and the latter looser and particularly stigmatized, in light of a previous non-civilized behavior.

However, they shared the fact that both were targets of Anglosaxon and particularly American penetration and influence in terms of language and culture, during the Cold War. In a certain extent, this was achieved, without automatically reflecting a unidirectional political influence towards the receivers. In particular (Kitsou, 2011), the institutional context of cultural diplomacy and promotion of English went under severe budget cuts and limitations, during the Post-Cold War. But in any case, familiarity with English and the American culture meant neither the internal cultural dynamics of those states and the respective societies (given after all a stricter legal framework from audio/visual goods/programs) nor the identification with the US perspective for foreign affairs.

Equally importantly, this did not mean the lack of interest of those two states to function as cultural transmitters, especially regarding the expansion of the respective language. In particular, France found itself characteristically antagonizing the US and Great Britain in French-Speaking Africa, regarding language teaching and the promotion of the respective culture (Maack, 2001). In fact, its presence has been found to be longer and apparently oriented towards dialogue and respect or mutual exchange rather than one-sided flow of information (p. 84), even though an African perspective would put this idealistic picture into question (Nwankwor, 2013).

The Post-Cold War polyphony meant new and re-emerging challenges for both states. The multidimensional institutional framework of German public diplomacy faced coordination issues, although there has been a common denominator; namely an active participation into intercultural dialogue, especially regarding the Muslim world (Zöllner, 2009. See Herzog, 1999). Similarly, the French case was marked by a reformed institutional framework. Among others, it included the 'usual suspects' of language learning and promotion of French culture, namely Alliance Française and the French Institute in upgraded role, as well as Campus France,⁴ emphasizing the promotion of higher education (Lane, 2013). France has always been interested in the promotion of French, putting forward to this end national tools and institutions along with international organization, such as the International

⁴ <http://www.campusfrance.org/fr/>.

Organization of la Francophonie. Nevertheless, such promotion, perhaps reflecting the controversies among cultures, was put under heavy pressure regarding the status of the specific language in light of antagonism among languages as well as its perception as a colonial mechanism and finally the varied economic and international environment (Ager, 2006).

Consequently, European attention to soft power is a fact, in the sense that major European powers are certainly engaged in the evolving politics of attraction, along with less powerful nations striving for an upgraded international role. An indicative example refers to the active participation in intercultural dialogue and particularly the Alliance of Civilizations (e.g. Barreñada, 2006; Balci & Miş, 2008). Equally importantly and along with the variety of practices in European cultural diplomacy (Topić & Rodin, 2012), soft power also refers to transnational entities, especially given the notions of “civilian power Europe” or “normative power Europe” (Bull, 1982; Manners, 2002. Cf. Nicolaïdis & Whitman, 2013), denoting the EU’s international presence and role as an international actor or power within a normative i.e. value or ideas-laden context. Having already noted soft power’s intricacies, focus is needed here on the interplay of soft and hard power. From this angle, attention needs to be given to the “soft power use of hard power”, that is how the emergence of a new strategic culture in the EU relates to the calibration of the use of military force to European publics and to the demands of their media (Matlary, 2006, esp. p.106). On the other hand, some margin is left that soft power may even be relevant to the management of radicalism within the EU as a means of internal balancing (Voskopoulos, 2016). Finally, EU identity politics involves soft power logic, though without being exhausted in it, especially taking into account complex processes of (de)securitization, i.e. the discursive construction of (non) security issues as such (Wæver, 1995; Huysmans, 2006). In this context, a highly intriguing challenge refers to the connection of the normative characteristics of the EU and the management of immigration and refugee or asylum issues, especially in light of recent developments (increased refugee waves towards the EU, reaction of European societies/states, religious terrorism within the latter etc).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The politics of attraction falls within the broader realm of the politics of culture. In the age of globalization, the latter particularly entails the inclusion of the cultural sector in the “politics of globalization” (Dasgupta & Nederveen Pieterse, 2009) or “civilizing globalization” (Sandbrook, 2003) and obviously the premise that “cultural flows are transforming the politics of national identity and the politics of identity more generally” (Held & McGrew, 2003, p. 18). The answer to the pertinent question about whether there is “a politics of cultural globalization?” may be negative, if this would mean a single and clear set of views and attitudes. Nevertheless, the multiple politics of globalization impinge upon globalized goods, ideas and institutions which are interpreted and integrated variably in daily life (Flanagan, 2004).

In this respect, various features are interesting, e.g. the potential emergence or the limits of a global culture (Guillen, 2001, pp. 252-254), the appraisal of cultural difference within politics and the possibility for advancing alternative views (Appadurai, 1996: ch. 7; Sen, 2004) and of daily practices in varied dimensions (indicatively language, identity, boundaries) taking place within globalization (Leung et al., 2009; Singh, 2010). This is also the case with processes in both ‘micro-’ and ‘macro-’ levels, through which dominant cultures represent, manage or marginalize different groups (Petersson & Tyler, 2008), along with the use of media technology and aesthetic forms by multiple (e.g. minority) groups within political games (Imre, 2009) as well as with the relation of policies and developmental frameworks to cultural values (Radcliffe, 2006).

As far as Europe is concerned, while the cultural and historical context of the respective geography is rich (Leontidou, 2004; Murphy et al., 2014), the EU developments stand out in relation to mingling national and other (sub-national, supranational, transnational) identities and cultures and to how regional integration relates to the possibility of replacing the nation-state as the central framework of reference and the provision of meaning. The endeavor depends upon –among others– the content and mechanisms of an emerging European identity (e.g. Marcussen et al, 1999; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Fuchs & Klingemann, 2011). Key-elements relate to the multicultural challenge towards the European nation-state and to the possibility for the Europeanization of identities or their transformation, including migratory dynamics (Spohn & Triandafyllidou, 2003), as well as the challenges of the Eastern Enlargement (Gerhards, 2007; Ilonszki, 2010). Characteristic issues include the solidification of a political dimension of European identity, juxtaposed to a lesser cultural dimension (Bruter, 2005;

Demossier, 2007), the contribution of the monetary union (use of the Euro) in the emergence of a supranational identity and moreover the dependence on national identities (Risse, 2003), symbolic initiatives for a supranational cultural identity (Sassatelli, 2002; 2009) and finally the survival of national cultures along with the parallel existence of a pan-European cosmopolitan culture consisting of (Laitin, 2002. Cf. Beers & Raflik, 2010; Schlenker, 2013):

- The knowledge of English
- A liberal view in secularization issues
- Familiarity with basic currents and trends in popular art.

The adoption of English as the contemporary *lingua franca* may have initially reflected the hard power of the US, however its contemporary use confers soft power less on the respective government than on European governments, as long as they “understand the bargaining resources and weaknesses of monoglot speakers of English with whom they deal in a world of interdependence” (Rose, 2008, p. 471. See pp. 469-471). As illustrated in this paper, European identity politics also includes the shift of Europe’s central role in international affairs in terms of civilization and culture from ‘civilizing mission’ to ‘soft power’. The former hasn’t vanished, rather taking on subtler forms, while the latter was formulated at a broader Euro-centric context, albeit not a restrictively European one. European attention to soft power entails the engagement of European nations as well as of the EU into the evolving and challenging politics of attraction. Overall, the Post-Cold War game of public or cultural diplomacy and soft power is both asymmetrical and relatively open to multiple players, entailing the need of identifying a variety of actors and of respective processes.

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***Europe* – a geographical space or an economic area but never a political union. A kaleidoscope of positions nourishing the Brexit discourse.¹**

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ABSTRACT

In this paper I will present some results of a study on British political culture with regard to historic discourse positions revived in the Brexit campaign around the much feared “ever closer union”. Looking at European Parliament (EP) election manifestos from the United Kingdom, France and Germany for the period of 1979 to 2014, the paper focusses at text sequences in which the relation between United Kingdom and the European Union is negotiated in some way. By contrasting these discursive constructions with results from a French and a German corpus, we will be able to determine a characteristic attitude towards the European Union in each of the analyzed political discourses. The question will here be how the notion *Europe* is constructed in the public discourse of each country.

Keywords: Brexit; comparing French, British, German political discourse on Europe; Modern Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies; legitimization in discourse;

1. Introduction

On 23 May 2016, a majority of voters² have opted for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. Disregarding the political and economic consequences this decision may have in the future, this paper tries to understand this decision from a discourse analytical perspective. As such, the study traces the conceptualization of Europe and the European Union in comparison to the political discourse in France and Germany. The interest for these conceptualizations stems from Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) discourse theory, in which the discursive construction of meaning is understood as a struggle for hegemony in discourse pre-empting political influence. In this sense, *Europe* is considered as a floating signifier changing its meaning depending on the context wherein it is used. Similarities and differences in the meaning of *Europe* can be revealed by comparing different co-texts of the signifier *Europe*. Developing such a kaleidoscope of Europe’s meanings will reveal the discursive conditions under which the Brexit campaign emerged and succeeded. Brexit can be understood as a particular moment of the discursive struggle in which a particular hegemonic formation of politically charged signifiers, such as Europe, has gained momentum in politics. The paper, therefore, analyses the structure of the meaning formation by comparing the conceptualization of *Europe* in a historical corpus of German, French and British manifestos for the European Parliament elections.

A comparative analysis of different political discourses shows in how far the discursive construction of the notion ‘Europe’ in different national discourses overlaps and what discursive particularities exist in each country. A German, French and British corpus was compiled containing election manifestos of all political parties that have been elected to the European Parliaments at least once since 1979. Each corpus has a volume of approximately 400.000 tokens and contains around 60 texts originating from national political parties ranging from right wing to left wing orientation. The study uses corpus

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² British, Irish and Commonwealth citizens who live in the UK, along with Britons who have lived abroad for less than 15 years, were eligible to vote.

linguistic methods which were developed in French discourse analysis since the 1970s under the label of lexicometrics (Lebart, Salem, & Berry, 1998, Tournier, 1975, 1993).

The paper presents results of a larger project entitled “The discursive legitimization of the European Union” (Scholz, 2010). The project aims at a detailed investigation of the linguistic construction and discursive negotiations of the notion of ‘Europe’. These negotiations are understood as having an impact on the belief in the legitimacy (Weber, 1922) of the European political influence on each of the three investigated countries. Legitimation is here considered to be a communicative act in the public sphere in which the meaning of institutions and actors is critically assessed and thereby affirmed (Eder, 2006; Eder & Trenz, 2003). As this process is influenced by the power relations within a discourse we need to account for the whole discursive field with its different positions, actors and regularities (Münch, 2010).

The first section of this paper outlines a theoretical approach to analyzing legitimization processes in political discourse. The second section presents the corpus and describes some national particularities of the institutional context in which these manifestos were compiled. The third part of the paper examines the textual context of the notion ‘Europe’ across the three corpora: First, I will look into the effects that different combinations of core meanings of Europe have. Second, I investigate to what extent Europe is represented as an autonomous political agent in each of the national discourses. Third, I will look at the effects in the representation of Europe when used in the co-text of the nation state in the French and British corpus. The paper concludes with a particular focus on explaining the Brexit in terms of discursive phenomena. An annex contains numerous text examples on which my analysis is based on.

1. The European Union and its political legitimization

European integration has been a prominent political and economic endeavor of Western nations ever since the devastating experience of World War II. For the last 60 years the “European project” was considered the guarantor for peace in capitalist Europe. And, indeed the project guaranteed constant access to new markets for companies developing within and outside the European Economic Community. At least since the 1970s there have been increased efforts to build a political community which was first evidenced by the creation of political bodies like the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. All of these political institutions have experienced a continuous increase in political power since the process of enhanced political integration gained momentum with the Maastricht treaty and the foundation of the European Union (1993). The financial crisis which started in 2008 and eventually turned into the “Euro-Crisis”, and culminating in the so called “Greek debt crisis”, has triggered another major shift in political competencies from national political bodies to supranational bodies. Thus, the European Central Bank has changed its role from targeting the control of inflation to a direct political involvement with crisis management across states (Maesse, 2015).

With the shift of political power, a discussion has started on the political legitimization of the “new” powerful political entities. Referring to Habermas’ (1989) analysis of the transformation of the public sphere, questions were raised whether there actually is a public sphere in the European Union in which political issues can be debated and scrutinized. Numerous studies taking a normative stance have claimed a democratic deficit in the institutional structure of the European Union (Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002; Rhinard, 2002; Weiler, 1995). While this discussion of the possibilities and limits of supranational democracy is very important, the discursive practices involved in the process of legitimizing political action have been widely ignored in this debate.

If we want to study the legitimization of political power with discourse analytical methods, we have to first explain the relationship between the representation of politics and its justification in the political discourse. This relationship is determined by the discursive construction of knowledge about a certain issue which entails a number of possible actors, actions and arguments which can be presented as justified, in order to take a certain position within the narration of the debate on this issue. According to Weber (1922), each form of domination seeks to make the dominated people believe in its legitimacy, and to foster this belief (p. 122). In modern states we speak of legal domination because their legitimacy is based on the belief in the legality of the set order and the right to instruct those who are appointed to exercise domination (ibid., p. 124). As the order follows democratic organizational principles, the legitimization is based not only on the belief in the legality but also on the value-rational

judgement (*'wertrationales Urteil'*) of the dominated people. Therefore, the state has omnipotence in all areas on its territory (i.e. state-sovereignty).

The legitimization processes triggered by the empowerment of the supranational political entity 'European Union' can be described as a double-structure of shifting power between the national and the supranational level (Münch, 2009, p. 24). Thus, we have on the one side the process of the legitimization of an emerging European economic and social order; and on the other side there is a process of de-legitimization of national orders in which national political fields dominated by political parties and associations are superimposed by European political fields (Münch, 2010, p. 41). This de-legitimization is not only a result of the Europeanisation but also of the globalization, even though both processes have a very different impact on the development of societies (ibid., p. 16). Münch argues that the tendency to delegitimize particular political orders is based on the general principles in the world-culture: The sacralization of scientific knowledge and the sacralization of individual autonomy. Therefore in the transnational field the sciences take the role of a ruler by dominating the legitimized democratic order through unlegitimized, scientific governance (Münch, 2009, pp. 11-28).

Eder, Hellmann and Trenz consider legitimization in terms of a communicative act. For them the public space is the sphere between state and society in which the meaning and legitimation of institutions is communicated affirmatively or critically (Eder, 2006). With regards to transnational politics they argue that the existence of arenas dedicated to symbolic mobilization through mass media is essential for the legitimization of transnational political actions (Eder, Hellmann, & Trenz, 1998, p. 338). According to them the emergence of a public space in a transnational political field in which political institutions are legitimized or delegitimized, is based on the existence of a structure that is inclined for public resonance representing interests of political actors in the broadest sense to which the institutions do or do not react (Eder & Trenz, 2003).

As proof of the existence of a public sphere, for Eder and Trenz (ibid.), it is sufficient if one can assume the existence of a counter mobilization which legitimizes political institutions and actors of the transnational political field (p. 125). Yet, Münch argues that the opinion building process in the discursive field is much less diverse and open than Eder and Trenz assume. He contends that the public discourse and its participants have to obey the rules which are set by the hegemonic project of liberalization. The predominance of this project in contrast to delegitimized positions which do not follow the paradigm of competition can only be unveiled by examining the discursive field as such, with its contours, positions, actors and rules (Münch, 2010, p. 44). That means in order to study the legitimization of political power it is necessary to analyze the 'discursive fields' involved. A discursive field is constituted by the conditions under which politics emerge on a symbolic level. In order to assess these conditions Soeffner and Tänzer developed the "figurative politics approach". This approach understands mass media as a precondition for the representation and mediation of politics. Soeffner and Tänzer argue that a politician has to apply his or her knowledge of the mediatized symbolic orders if he or she wants to realize a certain policy. The decision process, the representation of power, political practice and political aesthetics constitute a unit and a certain type of figurative politics specific to a particular era (Soeffner & Tänzer, 2002, pp. 26-30).

If we assume a power shift has taken place between the supranational and the national political field (Münch, 2009, p. 11; 2010, p. 44) and this power shift is legitimized in public discourse (Eder & Trenz, 2003, pp. 125-128; Habermas, 1991, p. 11) then its legitimization or delegitimization should take effect in one or another form of power representation in this discourse (Soeffner & Tänzer, 2002). From this perspective the analysis of manifestos of national political parties for the election of the European Parliament can testify how national political actors represent their political power as legitimate and how they relate it to the supranational political influence of the European Union. By using corpus-linguistic tools we can account for the lexical and semantic structure of the discourse relating to the different political parties in the three countries analyzed. In order to investigate this, I follow a descriptive rather than a prescriptive notion of legitimization in order to understand why citizens do or do not accept and support a government (Steffek, 2003). With regards to the successful Brexit campaign the question then is, how British politics was legitimized vis-à-vis European politics. And, to what extent European politics were delegitimized. This question is tackled by analyzing the discursive construction of Europe's meanings in different European political discourses.

2. A corpus of election manifestos – national particularities

This study takes into account all the political parties that were relevant for the political discourse in France, Germany and the United Kingdom since 1979 – the year when the first direct elections to the European Parliament took place. Table 1 gives an overview of the political parties of which an election manifesto was integrated for each of the 8 European elections held so far (every five years between 1979 and 2014). Each language corpus contains election manifestos from national political parties that were represented at least once with one seat in the European Parliament. Because I am interested in the question how the political influence of European Union is legitimized or delegitimized within the national political discourse the aim was to collect the election manifestos of the national political parties.

With respect to the German corpus, it has to be mentioned that the German Federal Constitutional Court decided in 2014 that the obligatory limit of 5% of votes in order to obtain a seat in the parliament had to be abolished. As a consequence small, single issue parties could enter the European Parliament for the first time: for example the ecological parties *Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei* and *Mensch Umwelt Tier*, the right wing parties *Alternative für Deutschland* and the NPD (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*), the Family Party (*Familienpartei*), the Free Voters (*Freie Wähler*), and the Pirates. The corpus has been completed with manifestos of these parties for previous unsuccessful elections if they were available (2009: FW, MUT, ÖDP).

Caused by a somewhat more dynamic landscape in France in terms of the foundation and the renaming of political parties, the French corpus is less consistent than the German and British corpus in terms of the names. However, we can distinguish between (neo-)Gaullist parties and movements: RPR, RPF, MPF, UMP; socialist parties: PS, PRG; communist parties: PCF, LO, NPA, FG; center parties: UDF, UDI/MoDem, NC; and right-wing parties: FN, CPNT.

The particularity of the British corpus stems especially from the political division into four countries (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland), each of which have a particular vote quota to ensure that the political interests of each nation is represented in the European Parliament. Since the first direct elections in 1979 there have been representatives from Northern Irish parties DUP, SDLP, and UUP in the European Parliament. Since the 2000s *Sinn Féin* gained political importance and obtained its first EP-seat in 2004. Furthermore, the Welsh national party *Plaid Cymru* (PC) and the *Scottish National Party* (SNP) have been represented ever since 1979 with at least one EP-seat.

Table 1: Manifestos of political parties contained in the 3 corpora for each EP-election³

(For the full names of acronyms see annex 1)

Year	British Corpus	French Corpus	German Corpus
1979	CONS, Greens, Lab, LDP, SDLP	FN, LO, PCF, PS, UDF, RPR	CDU, CSU, FDP, Grünen, SPD
1984	CONS, DUP, Greens, Lab, LDP, PC, SDLP, SF, SNP, UUP	FN, PCF, PS, UDF, RPR	CDU, CSU, FDP, Grünen, SPD
1989	CONS, DUP, Greens, Lab, LDP, PC, SDLP, SF, SNP, UUP	CPNT, FN, PCF, PRG, PS, UDF, RPR, Verts	CDU, CSU, FDP, Grünen, REP, SPD
1994	CONS, DUP, Greens, Lab, LDP, PC, SDLP, SF, SNP, UKIP, UUP	CPNT, FN, LO, PCF, PS, RPF, UDF, RPR, Verts	CDU, CSU, FDP, Grünen, PDS, REP, SPD
1999	CONS, DUP, Greens, Lab, LDP, PC, SDLP, SF, SNP, UKIP, UUP	CPNT, FN, LO, PCF, PRG, PS, RPF, UDF, RPR, Verts	CDU, CSU, FDP, Grünen, PDS, REP, SPD

³ I am very grateful to Hermann Schmitt and his team of the Euro-Manifestos-project for making available numerous election manifestos from their database.

2004	CONS, DUP, Greens, Lab, LDP, PC, SDLP, SF, SNP, UKIP, UUP	CPNT, FN, LO, MPF, PCF, PRG, PS, RPF, UDF, UMP, Verts	CDU, CSU, FDP, Grünen, PDS, REP, SPD
2009	BNP, CONS, DUP, Greens, Lab, LDP, PC, SDLP, SF, SNP, UKIP, UUP	CPNT, FN, LO, MoDem, NC, PCF, PS, UMP, Verts	CDU, CSU, FDP, FW, Grüne, Linke, MUT, ÖDP, REP, SPD
2014	BNP, CONS, DUP, Greens, Lab, LDP, PC, SDLP, SF, SNP, UKIP, UUP	DR, FN, FG, MPF, NPA, PS, UDI/MoDem, UMP, Verts	AfD, CDU, CSU, FAMP, FDP, FW, Grüne, Linke, MUT, NPD, ÖDP, Piraten, REP, SPD
Total number of token	537,732	485,977	558,450

3. *Europe is ...?* Referential core meanings

Emphasizing the qualitative analysis of text sequences in this paper, I will omit the quantitative exploration of the corpus. Previous studies in this series have shown that there is a substantial overlap with regards to the vocabulary that is predominantly used in the French, German and British EP-election manifestos (e.g. Scholz, 2010). However, some tendencies evidenced on the quantitative level need deeper analysis on the qualitative level. As *Europe* and *Europa*, respectively, is one of the most frequent content words, which, as a proper name, has a non-fixed meaning – often influenced by the co-text the term is used in – I decided to have a closer look at all sentences, in which we might find some sort of definition of *Europe*. The most obvious word combination with this regard is *Europe is/Europe (c'est)/Europa ist*. This combination occurs 114 times in the British, 151 times in French corpus and 117 times in the German corpus. The quantitative results on the core meaning of *Europe* could be confirmed when analyzing these text sequences: In the political discourses, depending on the co-text, the meaning of the term *Europe* seems to float between three core meanings: 1. Europe as continent; 2. Europe as community of social values (democracy, humanism, solidarity, peace etc.); 3. Europe as political entity: European Communities, European Union. In some rare cases it refers to only one of these three cores. But, it is rather the ambiguity of this proper name that makes it interesting to exploit in political communication for the persuasion of potential voters in political discourse.




Figure 1: *Europe is* (blue square) and *UK/Britain* (red squares) in the British corpus (each square represents a sentence of the corpus)(Software: *Lexico3*)

3.1 Effects of combining the core meanings in different ways

Figure 1 shows the interface of the software (Lexico3) that has been used in order to locate the relevant text sequences. The advantage of this is that one can also look for two terms that collocate in the same sentence. The visual shows list of n-grams and their frequency on left side and a map of the corpus, on which each square represents one sentence. The word combination *Europe is* is represented by blue boxes (here only one of 114 visible). The red squares represent sentences, in which terms referring to the United Kingdom (*UK*, *United Kingdom*, *(Great) Britain*) have been used.

French and German sentences containing the equivalent of *Europe is* refer to Europe predominantly as ‘community of social values’ and ‘political entity’. The semantic area, in which the meaning of Europe is floating combine the core meaning 2 and 3. (see 6.1 and 6.2 in Annexes). This use fosters the argumentation that the political integration of Europe is necessary due to its cultural identity. Hence, cultural identity functions as the argument for political integration. The argumentation goes as follows: “Because Europe has certain common characteristics, for instance it is the ‘motherland’ of human rights and humanist values, and because it shares a common history (e.g. common suffering from world wars) there has to be a political integration of the continent.”

In the British corpus, the meaning of a community of social values occurs only on rare occasions (see 6.4 in Annexes). In contrast to the French and German use, the British parties refer predominantly to the meaning ‘Europe the continent’ and to a much lesser extent to ‘Europe the political entity. For example, the Scottish National Party states in the 1989 manifesto: “Europe is now affecting more and more of our lives! The Channel Tunnel, 1992 and the Single European Act make it essential that Scotland has a voice, at the top table of Europe, defending our interests and taking full advantage of the opportunities for Scotland within the European Community.” By relating Europe to the Channel Tunnel, it refers to the meaning of the Continent – by relating it to the Single European Act, it refers to the political entity at the same time. That means there seems to be no distinction between these two core meaning. The following statement from the 2014 Labour Party manifesto combines both meanings similarly, but in a less explicit reference: “But if Britain’s future in Europe is to be secured, we know that Europe needs to work better for Britain.” The first mention of *Europe* is ambiguous: it could refer to the continent or the political entity, to which it refers unambiguously in the second mention. The effect is the following: If Europe refers to the continent, it can realize no or only a weak meaning as a political agent. Interestingly, this is the case in the part of the sentence that is allocating a strong political agency to Britain. If the first part of the sentence read “if Britain’s future in the European Union is to be secured”, the reference to the political entity would be unambiguous, but the sentence would refer to a possible conflictual political situation. In such a sentence, Britain’s strong political agency, which is obvious in the actual version of the sentence, might be interpreted as competing with or depending on the European Union. In contrast, the second part of the sentence refers deliberately to the political entity. But here the action and political dependency point to the opposite direction: the European Union needs to serve Britain, which again appears as a strong political agent.

In comparison to the French and German corpus, in the British manifestos we find a combination of different core meanings with a correspondingly different effect on the conceptualization of Europe: Cultural identity, the main argument in the French and German corpus, is missing in the British corpus. Therefore, by conceptualizing Europe with the meaning referring to ‘the continent Europe’ the exceptional position of the UK as an island state vis-à-vis the rest of the European Continent is emphasized. When Europe refers to the continent (which is understood as geographical distant from the UK) and the political entity (European Union) at the same time, then the exceptional geographical position of the UK is transferred to the political level. From a semiotic perspective, the UK is part of the European Union, but only as a geographical island, which symbolically becomes a political island. This island is therefore realized within the national public sphere as having an exceptional political status and a strong political agency within the EU.

3.2 Europe an autonomous political agent?

In the 114 sentences in the British corpus containing *Europe is*, only 22 resemble the formal structure of a definition. These ‘definitions’ are dominated by negative representations of Europe. For example, in 1979 the LDP⁴ criticizes Europe for still being ‘far from a genuine common market’; in 1994 UKIP states disapprovingly that Europe is a ‘democratic and economic disaster’⁵ and a ‘black hole’⁶; in 1999

⁴ Unfortunately Europe is still far from being a genuine common market. (LDP 1979)

⁵ The UK Independence Party says ‘Europe is a democratic and economic disaster’. (UKIP 1994)

⁶ But Europe is bleeding us dry! Europe is a black-hole into which we throw money. (UKIP 1994)

the Conservatives decry the lacking prosperity and the high unemployment⁷. Only 8 of these 22 sentences represent Europe with positive features. For example, Labour describes Europe as the future of young people (1999)⁸ and as precursor for climate protection policy⁹ and a source for Britain's prosperity (2004)¹⁰. The Liberal Democrats discuss in their 2004 manifesto "Why Europe is good for British jobs". Plaid Cymru considers Europe as important¹¹ and the Scottish National Party as a dynamic place in the world¹². Five of the eight sentences are contained in the manifestos of the 2004 elections campaign. This might be an indicator that the debate culminating in the Brexit debate in 2016 had already developed to a substantial extent by 2004.

In contrast to the French and German corpus, the frequent reference to 'Europe the continent' has the effect that , the meaning of Europe in the political discourse stays rather vague and cannot develop a very strong political agency in the British manifestos. Europe's vague conceptualization in the British discourse is also evidenced on the grammatical level. We find a predominant use of *Europe is* in:

1. Conditional clauses (*If Europe is to succeed...*)¹³
2. Negations (*Europe is not...*)¹⁴
3. Descriptions of target states conceptualizing Europe as an ongoing project, which can only gain meaning in the future (*Our vision of Europe is...; The future of Europe is...*) (see 6.5 in Annexes)
4. Adverbial use (Europe as location not subject of the sentence) – as such there is no need to acquire a referential meaning.

This vague conceptualization of Europe in the British manifestos illustrates the predominantly distanced attitude with regard to the political integration of the European Union. In the French and German manifestos the meaning of Europe is much stronger developed. The term often functions as sentence subject (see 6.1 and 6.2) and therefore refers to an autonomous agent. Especially the examples in Annex 6.1 illustrate a strong political agency of 'Europe' in the German discourse that is never to be found in the British corpus. Whenever the British parties refer to Europe as a political entity, they do this not without emphasizing their own autonomy and the sovereignty of the UK. Europe is not conceptualized very much as a political agent so that the UK and its political parties can appear as the dominating, autonomous, creative agents on the political field of action.

3.3 Europe versus nation state

Furthermore, in the British and French sequences, there is a juxtaposition of the nation state and Europe which does not occur in the German corpus. Juxtaposing the nation state to Europe has the effect that Europe's meaning shifts to the political entity, which, at the same time, is conceptualized as politically meaningful and therefore potentially powerful. In other words, when political parties explicitly relate their politics to the European Union they imply that it has political power. However, in the British corpus, in most of these cases *Europe* is used in an adverbial position. And even if it refers to the European Union, it does not develop the impression of a very strong political agency. At the same time in almost all examples listed under 6.7 *Britain* appears as an autonomous sovereign political actor. The following statement of the Conservative Party taken from the 1994 manifesto illustrates prototypically the political attitude prevailing the British corpus: "With our growing economy, Britain

⁷ At the moment, Europe is becoming less prosperous compared with the rest of the world and unemployment across Europe is far too high. (CONS 1999)

⁸ Young people are the future of Europe and Europe is their future. (LAB 1999)

⁹ Europe is at the forefront of efforts to combat global climate change, the most pressing environmental challenge facing the world. (LAB 2004)

¹⁰ And over three million British jobs depend on our trade with Europe. Europe is crucial to Britain's prosperity. (LAB 2004)

¹¹ This is why Europe is important and this is why Plaid Cymru - your only welsh voice in Europe - is vital. (PC 2004)

¹² The world is changing fast; Europe is moving on. (PC 2004)

¹³ Innovation is essential if Europe is to compete successfully. (CONS 1994) And if Europe is to deliver them, it must change. (CONS 2004, see 6.4:5 for complete section)

¹⁴ A social Europe is not just about working conditions. [...] Our vision of a new Europe is not the single market with its barriers removed, but a wider Europe with the Berlin wall dismantled. (LAB 1989) Remember, what is paid into Europe is not received back in full to Northern Ireland! (DUP 1999) Creating a greener Scotland and a greener Europe is not just about developing renewable energies. (SNP 2009)

can face the future with confidence. But Europe is a vital part of that future, and for Europe to succeed, it needs the right strategy – the conservative strategy.” Britain is represented as the driving force, and Europe appears as the (potential) follower of Conservative party politics. Europe does not seem to have any autonomous political agency. Only the Liberal Democrats (6.7 example 3) and Labour (6.7 example 5) acknowledge Europe’s political agency when they relate it to consumer interests protection or three million jobs.

In the French corpus, political sovereignty is especially emphasized up to the early 1980s. But in contrast to the British corpus where this effect occurs through a weak conceptualization of Europe, in the French corpus the impression of autonomy and responsibility for political actions emerges through the conceptualization of Europe as a political agent for French interests in the world. The following examples illustrate this attitude explicitly (see also 6.3): “Because they think that Europe is the indispensable dimension in order to become an actor of change on the global scene; because they estimate that a community of destiny unites more and more its people facing serious threats; because they want that France and the French are actors and not playthings of history, the Socialists consequently are Europeans.” (PS 1979) “Europe is necessary for defending the common interests of our nations threatened by the superpowers. But the organization of a Europe that we wait for and that we desire, in which a dignified and strong France could effloresce, this Europe does not progress. (RPR 1979) Whereas Britain’s relationship with the EU appears rather competitive, no conflicts seem to exist between French and European interests.

In the German corpus the juxtaposition of the nation state with Europe is missing. Together with a relatively strong conceptualization of Europe as a political union striving for social and humanist values, the European Union seems to possess political agency that does not interfere with German national politics. At least up to the 1990s in the German case, Europe’s political power did not seem to interfere with other German political interests, which were pursued by the national political parties.

4. Conclusion with regard to the Brexit outcome

The aim of this paper was to better understand the discursive context that provided the foundations for the Brexit campaign in 2016 by analyzing a corpus comprising European Parliament election manifestos for the period of 1979 to 2014. The analysis has shown that the three core meanings ‘Europe as a continent’, ‘Europe as a community of social values’ and ‘Europe as a political entity’ are reproduced in all three corpora. However, each political discourse emphasizes different aspects and combines the core meanings in different ways.

The comparison of British textual sequences containing the defining word combination *Europe is* with its French and German equivalents has revealed the particularities of the conceptualization of *Europe* prevailing in the British political discourse: Europe has a rather weak political agency because it is used in adverbial positions. The term *Europe* refers predominantly to the continent and the political entity at the same time. This has the effect that Britain’s geographical status as an island reinforces implicitly a justification for a distanced political relation to the European Union. This representation is combined with a conceptualization of Britain as a strong political agent vis-à-vis a politically weak or to be weakened Europe. In the French and German texts we find a much stronger political agency allocated to Europe, each emphasizing different aspects. Whereas the German texts refer above all to Europe as a community of social values, the French manifestos underline Europe’s capacity to foster French interests in the world.

With regard to a historical perspective, the analysis has shown that most of the semantic elements that have dominated the Brexit campaign in its reference to Europe have existed in the British political discourse already since the 1990s with UKIP stating that ‘Europe is a democratic and economic disaster’, a ‘black-hole into which we throw money (UKIP, 1994) and with the Conservatives arguing for reforms of EU political powers (examples 6.4:5 and 6.5:3).

The analysis has shown a multitude of semantic shifts of the term *Europe*, depending on the contexts in which the term is used. The semantic material that has been used in order to argue for Brexit has existed in the British political discourse for a long time. The reasons why these elements became especially important in 2016 cumulating in the Brexit decision are manifold and contingent. However, I would argue that the Brexit campaign and the Brexit decision are the result of a broader crisis of politics in late capitalism, for which Crouch (2004) coined the term post-democracy. On the discursive level this crisis takes a different shape in each country depending on the prevailing discursive elements

and their structure. In the United Kingdom with its current economic, political and historical climate, this structure was favorable for a development into the Brexit campaign. However, despite finding a rise of populist movements such as PEGIDA or the *Front National* which nourish the same kind of fear that fed the Brexit campaign, in Germany or France the discursive structure is different and is unfavorably disposed towards such a campaign.

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6. Annexes

6.1 Examples from the German examples: Referring to 'Europe as a community of social values'

1. Die Einigung Europas zu einem freien, demokratischen und sozial gerechten Gemeinwesen ist eine Herausforderung für die Bürger Europas, besonders für die europäische Jugend. Ihre aktive Teilnahme am Aufbau Europas ist notwendig, denn Europa ist ihre Zukunft. [...] Nur ein geeintes Europa ist stark genug, seine Zukunft zu meistern, seinen legitimen Interessen in aller Welt Achtung zu verschaffen, sich gegen die militärische Bedrohung zu behaupten und seine Existenz in Unabhängigkeit und Freiheit zu sichern. (CDU/EVP 1979)

[The unification of Europe to a free democratic and socially just community is a challenge for the citizens of Europe – especially for the European youth. Their active participation in the construction of Europe is necessary because Europe is their future. [...] Only a united Europe is strong enough to master its future, to improve its respect, to repress the military threat and to secure its existence in independence and freedom.]
2. Die neue Europapolitik muss eine Gesamtpolitik sein, die von langfristigen Zukunftsaspekten geleitet wird und vier Dimensionen umfasst: sie muss ökologisch, sozial, basisdemokratisch und gewaltfrei orientiert sein; denn Europa ist heute bedroht durch die ökologische und ökonomische Krise, durch eine militärische Katastrophe und durch einen ständigen Abbau der Demokratie und der Grundrechte. (GRÜNEN 1979)

[The new European policy has to be an overall policy that is driven by long term future aspects and that comprises four dimensions: It must have an ecological, social, grass-root democratic and non-violent orientation; because today Europe is threatened through the ecological and economic crisis, through a military catastrophe and through a constant dismantling of the democracy and the basic rights.]
3. Europa ist auf der Suche nach Zukunftsperspektiven. [...] Hunderte von Millionen Menschen hungern und leben in tiefer Armut. Europa ist aber auch ein Kontinent menschlicher Hoffnung. (SPD 1979)

[Europe is in search for future perspectives. [...] Hundreds of Millions of people are starving and live in profound poverty. But, Europe is also a continent human hope.]
4. Europa ist das in zwei Jahrtausenden gewachsene Stammland der Menschenrechte. (CSU 1984)

[Europe is the in two thousand years grown homeland of the human rights.]
5. Europa ist zwar der alte Kontinent, aber die Hoffnungen vieler in der Welt, die nach einem humanen Weg in die Zukunft suchen, richten sich eher auf das, was wir in Europa tun, als auf die Modelle – der Supermächte. (SPD 1984)

[Indeed Europe is the old continent, but the hopes of many in the world that are looking for a human way into the future, are founded on what we do in Europe and not on models of the super-powers.]
6. Europa ist mehr als die Europäische Gemeinschaft. Die ihrer Freiheit beraubten Völker und Volksgruppen in Mittel- und Osteuropa gehören ebenso dazu, wie die freien Völker in den anderen Teilen unseres Kontinents. (CSU 1989)

- [Europe is more than the European Community. Peoples that are deprived of freedom and ethnic groups in Middle and Eastern Europe are part of it as well as the free peoples in the other parts of our continent.]
7. Nur ein demokratisches Europa ist ein starkes Europa. (SPD 1994)
[Only a democratic Europe is a strong Europe.]
 8. Europa ist nicht nur eine Wirtschafts-, sondern vor allem auch eine Wertegemeinschaft. (CDU 1999)
[Europe is not only an Economic but above all also a value community.]
 9. Junge Menschen sind die Zukunft Europas und Europa ist ihre Zukunft. (SPD 1999)
[Young people are the future of Europe and Europe is their future.]
 10. Europa ist vor allem eine Chance für Kinder und Jugendliche in der Europäischen Union. Sie sind die Zukunft unseres zusammenwachsenden Europas. (FDP 2004)
[Europe is above all a chance for children and young people in the European Union. They are the future of our coalescent Europe.]
 11. Unser Europa ist hohen sozialen und ökologischen Standards auf der regionalen, europäischen und internationalen Ebene verpflichtet. (GRÜNEN 2004)
[Our Europe is committed to the high social and ecological standards on the regional, European and international level.]
 12. Ein soziales, demokratisches und friedliches Europa ist möglich. (LINKE/PDS 2004)
[A social, democratic and peaceful Europe is possible.]
 13. Die europäische Verfassung muss die Grundlage für ein demokratisches wie auch starkes Europa legen. Europa ist eine Wertegemeinschaft. [...] Europa ist eine Friedensmacht. Wir stehen dafür, dass die Stärke Europas stets der Sicherung des Friedens und der Verteidigung elementarer Rechte dient. [...] Europa ist die Chance für mehr Sicherheit für seine Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Der wirkungsvollste Weg, die innere Sicherheit in Deutschland zu festigen, ist der Export von Sicherheit in unsere Nachbarstaaten. [...] Europa ist eine Einheit in Vielfalt. Gerade das macht die Stärke und Einzigartigkeit unseres europäischen Projektes aus. (SPD 2004)
[The European constitution has to build the foundations for a democratic as well as strong Europe. Europe is a value community. [...] Europe is a peace power. We guarantee that Europe's force will always serve to secure the peace and defend elementary rights. [...] Europe is a chance for more security for its citizens. The most effective way to consolidate the internal security in Germany is the export of security into the neighboring states. [...] Europe is a unit in diversity. This is it what singularizes the strength and uniqueness of our European project.]

6.2 Examples from the French examples: Referring to 'Europe as a community of social values'

1. Comme l'a dit Jacques Chirac, 'L'Europe, c'est avant tout une civilisation commune et la conscience que tous nos peuples ont d'y appartenir'. (RPR 1979)
2. A ceux qui se battent d'abord pour des valeurs, les socialistes disent aujourd'hui : l'Europe est le cadre naturel de votre combat. (PS 1989)
3. L'Europe est en lutte pour sa liberté, que dis-je, pour sa libération, et je le dis ce soir, de manière solennelle, jamais nous n'accepterons l'amputation et l'esclavage des nations sœurs captives du communisme, ni le texte accompli de Yalta, ni la capitulation diplomatique d'Helsinki. (FN 1994)
4. L'Europe, c'est un projet que nous défendons, qui vise à construire une société prospère, mais qui se libère de tous les matérialismes réducteurs, qui protège les faibles, qui défend la personne humaine contre toutes les menaces d'asservissement : le chômage, la drogue, l'exclusion, le racisme, l'insécurité, l'oubli des repères moraux qui sont notre bien commun. (UDF 1999)
5. L'Europe, c'est la construction unique de peuples et de citoyens qui se sont unis, et pas seulement d'états qui se sont alliés. (UDF 2004)

6. L'Europe est attachée à la préservation et à la défense des valeurs communes de l'Union qui reposent sur deux piliers : l'état de droit et la démocratie. (UMP 2004)
7. L'Europe est le premier foyer mondial de création culturelle. (UDF 1989)
8. L'Europe, c'est une identité historique : le cœur de l'Europe, c'est l'empire romain dans ses deux visages, l'empire d'occident et l'empire d'orient, l'héritage historique de Rome et Constantinople. [...] L'Europe, c'est une identité anthropologique. C'est une façon propre de concevoir le statut de la femme, la famille, la liberté, la responsabilité individuelle dans la définition du bien et du mal. [...] L'Europe, c'est une identité sociale : le droit, la loi, le contrat, la protection sociale. (UDF 2004)

6.3 Examples from the French examples: Europe versus nation state

1. Parce qu'ils pensent que l'Europe est la dimension indispensable pour devenir un acteur du changement sur la scène mondiale, parce qu'ils estiment qu'une communauté de destins rassemble de plus en plus ses peuples face à de graves menaces, parce qu'ils veulent que la France et le français soient des acteurs et non des jouets de l'histoire, les Socialistes sont donc européens. (PS 1979)
[Because they think that Europe is the indispensable dimension in order to become an actor of change on the global scene; because they estimate that a community of destiny unites more and more its people facing serious threats; because they want that France and the French are actors and not playthings of history, the Socialists consequently are Europeans.]
2. L'Europe est nécessaire pour défendre les intérêts communs de nos nations menacés par les superpuissances. Mais l'organisation de l'Europe que nous attendions et désirions, dans laquelle pourrait s'épanouir une France digne et forte, cette Europe ne progresse pas. (RPR 1979)
[Europe is necessary for defending the common interests of our nations threatened by the superpowers. But the organization of a Europe that we wait for and that we desire, in which a dignified and strong France could effloresce, this Europe does not progress.]
3. C'est bien de cela qu'il s'agit : construire l'avenir, le façonner avec nos propositions et nos votes pour que l'idéal de justice, de progrès social et de paix que nous portons dans notre conviction reçoive enfin le droit de vie ! « La France est notre patrie, l'Europe est notre avenir ». (PS 1989)
4. Pour l'UDF, le maintien du siège du Parlement Européen à Strasbourg, symbole de la réconciliation entre les peuples d'Europe est une priorité car il incarne l'engagement européen de la France. (UDF 1989)
5. L'Europe est d'ores et déjà une grande puissance commerciale et un ensemble économique largement ouvert aux échanges. Cette orientation a permis à la communauté et, en son sein, à la France de développer son économie et d'accroître sa prospérité. (RPR/UDF 1989)
6. Elle est le reflet à la fois de la volonté de défendre les intérêts de la France en Europe et d'une forte ambition européenne pour la France. L'Europe est aujourd'hui l'espace naturel où se dessine notre avenir. (RPR 1999)
7. L'échec, en 1954, de la communauté européenne de défense (dû au refus de la France), a encore renforcé la priorité accordée à une union économique – de plus en plus réduite au marché – et à un processus de décisions intergouvernemental. Cette conception de l'Europe est aujourd'hui dépassée. (Verts 1999)
8. C'est d'autant plus urgent que la commission de Bruxelles a signé des accords de libre-échange avec le monde entier et que l'Europe est devenue un immense marché où les droits de douane ne sont plus en moyenne que de 2,6%. L'intérêt de la France et sa survie sont en jeu. (FN 2004)
9. Enfin, le coût de l'entrée de la Turquie dans l'Europe est considérable : selon une étude réalisée par l'Osteuropa Institute de Munich, le coût de l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Europe s'élèverait à 14 milliards d'Euros par an, soit un coût plus élevé que celui de l'Élargissement aux pays de l'est. Ce que nous voulons : une Europe européenne, dans laquelle la France préserve son identité et son rayonnement. (MPF 2004)
10. Si l'Europe est devenue le cadre naturel de la vie économique de la France, celle-ci doit d'abord rechercher la performance et la compétitivité. (UMP 2004)

6.4 Examples from the British corpus: ‘Europe of social values’ referring rather to ‘the continent’ than to ‘the political entity’

1. We share the objectives of maintaining peace and protecting our freedoms. We believe that a stronger and more united Europe is in the interests of the Western alliance as a whole. (CONS 1984)
2. The green party believes that the only sure way to lasting peace and unity in Europe is; to foster and build upon people’s sense of regional identity. (GREEN PARTY 1989)
3. Increased assistance, credits, trade agreements and security cooperation must all be used to ensure that this difficult process is achieved and that peace and stability is maintained. We must ensure, however, that increased assistance to Eastern Europe is not at the expense of help for the third world. (SNP 1994)
4. Europe is simply too diverse and the historical obligations of member states differ too widely. Our solution: peace and cooperation. (GREEN PARTY 1999)
5. Their enemies are no longer Soviet Russia but terrorists, whose war against democracy is now being waged in their streets. This world may be new. But the people of Europe still want the same things: freedom, peace and prosperity. And if Europe is to deliver them, it must change. (CONS 2004)
6. Some of the most striking sights of this year have been the pictures of young Ukrainians waving the EU flag. For them Europe is an ideal: a symbol of a better future, of peace and prosperity. This was the original case for the European Union: Securing peace among the countries of Western Europe as they emerged from the horrors of the Second World War. (LAB 2014)

6.5 Examples from the British corpus: ‘Europe as an ongoing project’

1. The green vision for Europe is based on economic security rather than blind economic growth; on environmental protection rather than environmental destruction; and on cooperation rather than insularity and separation. (GREEN PARTY 1994)
2. Our vision of Europe is an area of freedom, stability, prosperity and justice. [...] Young people are the future of Europe and Europe is their future. (LAB 1999)
3. Some people believe that the best way to protect our jobs, raise our living standards and defend ourselves is to give more control to the European Union. Their vision of Europe is to continue down the same path we have followed for decades. This vision is flawed, and the evidence is plain to see. (CONS 2004)

6.6 Examples from the British corpus: Adverbial use of *Europe*

1. For young people who need it to generate more jobs, for communities facing pressures on public services and housing, and for businesses struggling with red tape, the need for real change in Europe is urgent. (CONS 2014)
2. A strong green presence in Europe is now more important than ever. (GREEN PARTY 2004)
3. We cannot achieve this alone, which is why remaining a strong voice at the heart of Europe is more important than ever. [...] At this time of global economic uncertainty, our full engagement in Europe is more important than ever so we can push forward the reforms that are essential for Europe’s and Britain’s economic future. [...] Labour in Europe is working hard to deliver for the people of Britain and we have led the way in ensuring transparency. (LAB 2009)
4. It’s certainly true that the EU’s institutions are not perfect - just as Westminster isn’t - and across these pages you’ll find details of the ways in which we want to reform them. But don’t be fooled: being in Europe is good for Britain. (LDP 2014)

6.7 Examples from the British corpus: Europe versus the nation state

1. Today, Britain’s voice in Europe is strong and clear, and its message is respected by our partners. (CONS 1984)

2. A protectionist Europe is no more likely to secure our interests than a protectionist Britain. A non-aligned Europe is no more likely to safeguard our liberties than unilateral disarmament in Britain. (CONS 1984)
3. Europe is often in a much better position than national governments to protect the interests of the consumer. (LDP 1984)
4. With our growing economy, Britain can face the future with confidence. But Europe is a vital part of that future, and for Europe to succeed, it needs the right strategy - the conservative strategy. (CONS 1994)
5. Britain is working, and Labour in Europe is delivering for the British people – don't let the Tories wreck it again. [...] And over three million British jobs depend on our trade with Europe. Europe is crucial to Britain's prosperity. (LAB 2004)
6. Labour's position on Europe is clear and principled: we strongly believe Britain's future lies at the heart of a reformed EU. (LAB 2014)

“Suspicious Federal Chancellor” Versus “Weak Prime Minister”: Konrad Adenauer and Harold Macmillan in the British and West German Quality Press during the Berlin Crisis (1958 to 1962). A Critical Discourse Analysis.

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ABSTRACT

This paper deals with the in-depth analysis of the discourse strand “Adenauer-Macmillan” in the West German and British press coverage during the second Berlin Wall Crisis (1958 to 1962). Providing the highest number of national stereotypes in the West German and British quality papers, this personal relationship between the Federal Chancellor Adenauer and Prime Minister Macmillan dominated the respective national press quantitatively and qualitatively throughout the year 1959. On the one hand, the Critical Discourse analysis of this period reveals the negative course of argumentation and national stereotypes of Anglo-German press coverage regarding the discursive context; on the other, it provides a detailed analysis of the stereotypes used to report on Adenauer and Macmillan both national media discourses. This gives not only information about the discursive construction of Anglo-German relations in the quality press coverage but also about the discursive mechanisms of how national stereotypes occur in national discourse.

Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis, Media Discourse, Anglo-German Relations, National Stereotypes, Cold War History, Discursive Mechanisms

1. Introduction: The Second Berlin Crisis in the West German and British Quality Press

Der Trend zu einer positiveren Haltung gegenüber der BRD hat etwa Mitte 1960 eingesetzt. Seit diesem Zeitpunkt hat es [in der britischen Presse] keine massiven antideutschen Pressekampagnen mehr gegeben. [“The trend towards a more positive attitude towards Germany was set up by mid-1960. From this time on there have not been any massive anti-German press campaigns in the British press”] (Schütz, 1961, p. 3).¹

Die Verbesserung des politischen Klimas zwischen Bonn und London nach der Englandreise des Bundeskanzlers im November 1959 lässt auch die Berichterstattung der deutschen Presse über die deutsch-britischen Beziehungen zurückgehen, die sich seither auf die früher üblichen Themen [...] beschränken. [“The improvement of the political climate between Bonn and London after Chancellor Adenauer’s visit to London in November 1959 also reduces the coverage of the German press about German-British relations, which is from that time on restricted to the previously common topics.”] (Schütz, 1961, p. 4).

¹ All German quotes and newspaper articles in the following are translated by the author.

Thirteen years after the end of the Second World War when the Second Berlin Crisis began in 1958, the British and West German press coverage was dominated by the complex political events of this period. The conflict, which is defined as the “tensest in the Cold War history”, reaches its climax with the construction of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 (Gearson, 1998, p.1). Being one of the longest Cold War disputes, it was initiated by Soviet Premier Khrushchev, who gave a first ultimatum on 27 November 1958 to the Western allied forces, Great Britain, France and the United States. In this ultimatum, the Soviet Premier demanded from the Western forces to withdraw their troops out of West Berlin within six months and to make the former capital a ‘free city’. The Western allies did not respond to this ultimatum. In the following months, however, the Soviet demand fostered intense diplomatic discussions among the Western allies and with the USSR. In May 1959, a conference of the four foreign ministers of the respective occupation zones in Germany was set up in Geneva to discuss the prevailing situation of Berlin as well as the future of Germany.

Amid this highly tense period of the East-West conflict, the British Prime Minister Macmillan initiated a single-handed state visit to Moscow in February 1959 to conduct diplomatic talks with the Soviet Premier. Without having consulted his Western partners, US President Eisenhower, French Premier de Gaulle or West German Chancellor Adenauer, Macmillan left Moscow, having made no diplomatic progress in the East-West conflict. On a personal level, this visit led indeed to discord between the German Federal Chancellor and the British Prime Minister. In a personal letter to President Heuss from 20 June 1960, Adenauer expressed his deep mistrust of Macmillan: “Allerdings ist mein Vertrauen gegenüber Macmillan gering, weil er die Vorbereitungen seines Besuchs in Moskau vor allen anderen Partnern, vor den Amerikanern, den Franzosen und vor uns geheim gehalten hat.” [“Indeed, I have little confidence in Macmillan as he kept the preparations for his visit to Moscow secret from the other partners, from the Americans, the French and from us.”] (Adenauer, 1960, p. 2). As Adenauer pursued a strict foreign policy of “Western Integration” which demanded a “firm Western position”, it was feared in Bonn that Macmillan could weaken this political position with his visit to Moscow.

Consequently, Anglo-German relations made up a dominant part in the West German and British news coverage in 1959. This period, which represents the focus of this discourse analysis, began at the end of January 1959 and ended with the subsequent state visit of Adenauer in London on 17 November 1959. The political events in the analysed period represent the following “discursive events” in the respective national press: Macmillan’s Moscow visit from 22 February until 3 March, the encounter between Macmillan and Adenauer in Bonn on 13 March, a series of critical public utterances of Adenauer against British foreign policy on 9 April as well as in June and September 1959 and finally, Adenauer’s visit to London from 17 to 19 November 1959. After this period, the topic of direct confrontation between the two nations regarding the tense political events began to shift to more general topics on Anglo-German affairs in the West German press, such as the negotiations about the entrance of Great Britain into the Common Market from 1960 onwards, as the *Bundespresseamt* (Federal Press Office) suggested in 1961 (Schütz, 1961, p.4).²

Between January and November 1959, the British and West German quality press focused on the bilateral relationship between the German and British statesmen. The West German government report of 18 October 1961 considered the “overt public criticism of the federal government, especially of the personality of Chancellor Adenauer” the most important points that strained Anglo-German relations in the British press in 1959 (Schütz, 1961, p. 3). From the German side, doubts about “British loyalty to the Western alliance after Macmillan’s Moscow visit” represented the focus of British-related topics in the German daily newspapers (Schütz, 1961, p. 3). Considering the general press coverage throughout the Berlin Crisis, it is said that the British press had only changed its negative attitude towards Germany by mid-1960; German national daily newspapers instead reduced their press coverage of Anglo-German conflict right after Adenauer’s visit to London in 1959 to the “previous usual topics, such as ‘German-British talks in Königswinter’ or the ‘role of England between EEC and EFTA’” (Schütz, 1961, p. 3).

Due to the high amount of press releases discussing the acute tension in German-British foreign policy in 1959, this article focuses on the discursive construction of German-British relations with special emphasis on the personalities of Adenauer and Macmillan. The analysed newspapers represent the British and West German quality press which are the British *Times*, *Daily Telegraph* and the *Guardian* / *Observer* as well as the West German *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*

² For a detailed overview of the Berlin Wall Crisis see Gearson, 1998.

(FAZ) and *Die Welt*. In this paper, these three British and German national newspapers were regarded as *one* respective national discourse. The primary aim of this paper is to show how this controversial relationship between Adenauer and Macmillan is presented in the British and West German media throughout 1959 as well as highlighting the discursive mechanisms, images and arguments which are used to describe the two statesmen in the respective national press.

2. Theoretical and Methodological Approach: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Many current approaches to discourse analysis are based on the principles of the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926 - 1984). Foucault, however, did not provide any concrete guidelines or methodology to examine especially media discourses. Until now, various approaches to discourse analysis based on his theory have been developed, such as the *Discourse Analysis*, *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA) or the *Historical Discourse Analysis*.³ Within the methodology of the CDA Sara Mills, Norman Fairclough or Ruth Wodak are important representatives.⁴ Generally, CDA aims at examining the discursive mechanisms of power and ideology that shape the societal discourse at a particular time beyond the mere linguistic analysis of speech action. Thus, texts are analysed and interpreted within their discursive context. According to Mills, CDA represents “a political analysis of text” (Mills, 2004, p. 131). This approach which integrates the analysis of texts within their discursive environment is also in accordance with Fairclough, who sees the discursive analysis of “texts (...) from an avowed politically committed perspective” (Mills, 2004, p. 145).

Among the theories of CDA, the German linguist Siegfried Jäger has proposed an extensive approach to examine discourses critically. Jäger puts a high emphasis on the structure of discourse on the one hand and on the linguistic analysis of a single discourse level on the other. He provides a concrete guideline to define the various discourse levels within society and to show their interdependence and influence on each other. Hereby, the role of the media discourse as a “highly socially influential” instance on public perception is highlighted (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p.259). Secondly, the linguist proposes a framework of how to examine the press coverage by splitting it into the various news topics, the “discourse strands”. He analyses them linguistically to uncover the iconic elements, their past and present development, their arguments, images, stereotypes and discursive mechanisms, embedding the text of a newspaper article into its discursive context as the CDA suggests. Due to his concrete methodology of analysing media discourses, this paper follows his approach.


Jäger argues that many different topics on certain subjects arise within the societal discourse. Subjects that refer to the same topic form a “discursive strand”, which has a past, present, and a future dimension (Jäger & Meier, 2015, p. 121). A discourse strand evolves in time, adds new arguments or drops others. Jäger compares a news topic metaphorically to a “river of social knowledge”, which carries national images, stereotypes, argumentations and the notion of national identity. Discourse strands are constantly adjusted to the present and “react” to the present socio-political reality (Jäger, 2012, p. 158). The various discourse strands appear and act on different discourse levels; these are the levels of politics, the mass media, everyday life, education or the sciences. The discourse planes take each other’s elements, refer to one another and thus, generally influence each other. Within them, the media discourse holds a special role: being located between the political and the everyday life level, the mass media take up elements from *all* other discursive planes and present them to everyday life. Therefore, the media have considerable power to shape public opinion. As Jäger puts it, “mass media regulate everyday thinking and exert a considerable influence on what is and what can be done in politics and [in] everyday life” (Jäger & Meier, 2015, 123). Figure 1 illustrates this process:

³ For an overview see: Mills, 2004., Schiffirin, D., Tannen, D., & Hamilton, H.E. (2001). *The handbook of discourse analysis*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

⁴ For further reading see: Schiffirin, D., Tannen, D., & Hamilton, H.E. (2001). *The handbook of discourse analysis*. Malden, MA: Blackwell., Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical Discourse Analysis. The Critical Study of Language*. London: Longman. Fairclough, N. & Fairclough, I. (2012). *Political Discourse Analysis. A Method for Advanced Students*. Oxon: Routledge.; Mills, 2004.; Wodak & Meyer, 2015.

*Discursive Levels**Academic Plane**Political Plane**Media Plane**Everyday Life Plane**Educational Plane**Influences on**Elements are taken from*

Figure 1: Schematic description of various discourse levels as well as their interactions and interdependencies (Jäger, 2012, p. 164)



As mentioned above, national images and stereotypes play a key role within the media discourse. A stereotype is defined here as a fixed *textual* image about one's own and another nation, "the other" (Beller & Leerssen, 2007). This national image is considerably resistant to change and transmitted via public discourses. With reference to this, Beller and Leerssen argue that national stereotypes "take shape in a discursive [...] environment" (Beller & Leerssen, 2007, p. xiv). This suggests the close interconnection between stereotypes and the media discourse. Thus, a national stereotype functions as a "guideline" from which the members of a society may construct their picture of social reality. Equally, the media construct this notion of society for its members. Due to their characteristics, stereotypes have a long history and therefore possess a high degree of plausibility. In public opinion, predominant national stereotypes which are commonly shared might be taken by the media and used again and again, thus reinforcing them. This is a reciprocal process, as figure 1 illustrates.

For the purpose of this paper, Jäger's twofold approach was applied. First, the British and West German newspapers were analysed according to their dominant discursive strands, that is to say, the leading press topics. It was found that the discourse strand "Adenauer-Macmillan" represented both the quantitative and qualitative leading strand in both national media discourses in 1959; this changed in the subsequent years when the discourse strand "European Economic Community" (EEC) had its turn in the beginning of 1961. The figures 2 to 5 illustrate this development. As a second step, the respective discourse strands were examined linguistically with regard to their iconographic means. It was seen that the discourse strand "Adenauer-Macmillan" contained most of the national stereotypes discussing Anglo-German affairs, whereas the topic of Britain's entry into the EEC represents a more generalised "European" topic. Thus, the time reference for this discourse analysis is 1959.




Figure 2: Quantitative distribution of the discourse strands “Adenauer-Macmillan” and “European Economic Community” in the *Times* in 1959

Figure 3: Quantitative distribution of the discourse strands “Adenauer-Macmillan” and “European Economic Community” in the *FAZ* in 1959




Figure 4: Quantitative distribution of the discourse strands “Adenauer-Macmillan” and “European Economic Community” in the *Times* in 1962.




Figure 5: Quantitative distribution of the discourse strands “Adenauer-Macmillan” and “European Economic Community” in the *FAZ* in 1962.

The following section gives firstly a chronological overview of the negative development of the discourse strand “Adenauer-Macmillan” in the British and West German quality press in 1959 with the aim of illustrating the dynamic occurrence of negative images in the respective national press. Secondly, on a linguistic level, the results of the discourse analysis of the strand “Adenauer-Macmillan” will be presented with regard to its iconographic means. The results represent the images and arguments which were used to create discursively Anglo-German relations in the respective British and West German quality papers in 1959.

3. Discourse Analysis of the British and West German Quality Press in 1959

1. Course of the Discourse Strand “Adenauer-Macmillan” in the West German and British Press Coverage from January to November 1959

a. Timid approaches and improved relations after President Heuss’s Visit to London in October 1958

On the 7 January 1959, before the press controversy between Adenauer and Macmillan began, the *Times* had released an article with the subtitle “Marked Improvement” suggesting Anglo-German harmony. In this report, Adenauer is appreciated as “friend to Great Britain”. This report quotes Winston Churchill as follows: “In General de Gaulle and Dr. Adenauer in Germany we are fortunate to have two wise and forceful leaders of their countries who are also proven friends to Great Britain” (“Swift Election”, 1959, p. 5).⁵ This positive attitude is reflected in an article of the *SZ* on 11 January.

⁵ All in-text citations will be quoted with a half-title.

Titled “England und die Zukunft Europas”, the article concludes: “Europa kann ohne England nicht existieren, England ist ein Stück von uns” [“‘England and the future of Europe’, Europe cannot exist without England, England is a part of us [the European community]”] (Schröder, 1959, p. 2). The two reports fall into the period before Macmillan’s official announcement of his Moscow journey on 5 February 1959. In fact, the preceding state visit of the West German President Heuss to London in late October 1958 had signalled a general improvement of Anglo-German relations in the national press coverage.

b. Hostile Discourse and Confrontations on Macmillan’s Visit to Moscow

The rather respectful press coverage of British and German political relations changed abruptly when Macmillan declared his visit to the Kremlin in early February 1959. On 5 February, the *Times* published the article: “Mr. Macmillan to go to Moscow in a few weeks”, describing even British politicians’ reactions as “sincere astonishment” (“To Moscow”, 1959, p. 10). Now, the former positive tone of both national media discourses changes. The *Guardian* criticises Adenauer on 5 February in: “A ‘hard’ foreign policy” where the paper writes about Adenauer’s “illusion”, that “West German interests identify completely with those of the Western World as a whole” (Prittie, 1959, p. 8). This article discusses the gap and distance between the Federal Republic and Great Britain.

On 17 February, a statement by Adenauer expressing his concern about the worsening of the British attitude towards Germany is published in the *Guardian*. The article: “German plans” reported on Adenauer’s worries. “Dr. Adenauer expressed concern to-day about the attitude of some sections of British public opinion to the German question and the views of some British newspapers on disengagement” (“Plans”, 1959, p. 6). Furthermore, the article denounces “a certain resentment in Britain against West Germany” (“Plans”, 1959, p. 6). On 18 February 1959, the *SZ* pleads for an improvement of German-British relations. The report “Für deutsch-britische Freundschaft” [“Towards a German-British friendship”] concludes that Great Britain wants a friendlier relationship with the Federal Republic: “Großbritannien wünscht sich freundschaftlichere Beziehungen zur Bundesrepublik. Lord Home räumte ein, daß es “in einigen Kreisen [...] Reserviertheit und Mißtrauen gegenüber Deutschland gibt” [“Great Britain wants a friendlier relationship with the Federal Republic. Lord Home admitted that in some circles there exists a reserve towards Germany. The British government will talk with Chancellor Adenauer about the possibilities of avoiding any economic division of Europe”] (“Deutsch-britische Freundschaft”, 1959, p. 2). The following day, the *Times* criticises Adenauer for his “apprehension” about Macmillan’s political plans: “In the past few days the Chancellor and others have not bothered to hide their displeasure or perturbation at this latest example of the waywardness of their weakest ally, as Britain is known here [in Bonn]” (“Bonn Suspicious”, 1959, p. 8).

Throughout the end of February and March 1959, the press coverage on Macmillan’s Moscow visit was quite different in the two countries. Whereas the German press reported on the results from Moscow, an equally high emphasis is put on Adenauer’s short-term diplomatic visit to Paris. The British quality papers instead focused entirely on the process of Macmillan’s encounter with Khrushchev. As far as the Anglo-Soviet talks are concerned, even the British press is critical of the success of the Prime Minister’s visit. On 27 February, the *Daily Telegraph* denounces the Moscow visit as “failed”. In the article “Moscow visit negative”, the paper concludes that “Mr. Macmillan’s talks with Mr. Khrushchev have for all practical purposes [...] been completely negative” (Hilton & Floyd, 1959, p. 1). On 5 March *Die Welt* discusses the results of Macmillan’s visit with the same result. This article asserts that “der Besuch Macmillans in Moskau keine Besserung der Lage herbeigeführt [habe]” [“Macmillan’s Moscow visit has not led to any improvement of the situation”] (“Eisenhower und Macmillan”, 1959, p. 1).

c. “Defrosting the atmosphere”: Macmillan’s Visit to Bonn in Spring 1959

The press coverage of Macmillan’s visit to Bonn on 13 March focused in both nations on the political differences between Macmillan and Adenauer. On 12 March *Die Welt* writes about the efforts from both governments to improve the existing political differences: “Am Vortage des Bonner Besuches des britischen Ministerpräsidenten Macmillan bemühte man sich auf deutscher wie auf englischer Seite, die Atmosphäre aufzutauen” [“The day before the visit to Bonn of British Prime Minister Macmillan, there were attempts on both German and British sides to defrost the atmosphere”] (“Macmillan”, 1959, p. 1). This climatic metaphor of ‘defrosting the atmosphere’ is taken up later in the article. It is assumed there that Macmillan will come up “against an icy wind” when discussing his plans on disengagement in Europe with Adenauer (“Macmillan”, 1959, p. 1). The *Times* reports in “Bonn Visit To-day” that “Some of the difficulties which were expected to beset the talks have already been resolved. The initial hostility towards Mr. Macmillan’s journey to Moscow has been much reduced” (“Bonn Visit”, 1959, p. 12). On 16 March 1959, the *FAZ* quotes that Adenauer and Macmillan have found common ground

again. (Rapp, 1959, p. 2). This rather positive trend of reported improved relations is not echoed by the *Guardian*. The paper remarks that after the encounter of Macmillan and Adenauer there exists still “distrust of Britain, which Mr. Macmillan’s visit could not entirely eliminate” (“On Germany”, 1959, p. 6).

d. Low-ebbed intermezzo in British-German relations

Despite the rather positive tendencies in the course of this discourse strand, the reported relation between the Federal Chancellor and the British Prime Minister deteriorated in April 1959. On 2 April, the *Times* denotes “Anglo-German relations at low ebb” and speaks of the “Unpopularity in Bonn of Mr. Macmillan” (“Unpopularity”, 1959, p. 8). The *FAZ* cites this article in its report “Adenauer und die Briten” [“Adenauer and the British”] one day later and confirms this “most regrettable situation” (“Die Briten”, 1959, p. 2). The British are then denoted as the “weakest allied partner”: “Die Geduld des Kanzlers ‘mit seinen schwächsten Alliierten’ scheint erschöpft zu sein” [“The Federal Chancellor’s patience with his ‘weakest ally’ seems exhausted”] (“Die Briten”, 1959, p. 2). On 6 April, the *Guardian* writes that “in spite of the smiles which Mr. Macmillan and Dr. Adenauer managed to muster when parting in Bonn last month, it is now obvious that the views of the two statesmen are to-day farther away from each other than ever” (“Deathlock”, 1959, p. 6). On 9 April 1959, the *Times* asserts that Adenauer denied any “troubled relations with Mr. Macmillan” (“Wire-Pullers”, 1959, p. 12). One day later, Adenauer’s public statement is widely reported in the British press:

Dr. Adenauer (...) expressed concern to Mr. Macmillan, and Mr. Macmillan’s visit preceded the most recent crop of articles on Anglo-German relations. Moreover, it should be emphasised that the latter were sparked by Dr. Adenauer’s own criticism of Mr. Macmillan’s ideas and his hostile remarks about the British (“Wire-Pullers”, 1959, p. 12).

The news coverage on Adenauer’s speech on “wire-pullers” forms an extensive part of the British quality press. In the West German news coverage, however, focus is mainly on the British reaction. The *FAZ* dedicates an extensive article on Adenauer’s speech on 10 April 1959 reporting on an irritated British reaction (“Verwunderung”, 1959, p. 3). One day later, the *FAZ* even indicates that the “Erregung über Adenauer verebbt” [“Annoyance at Adenauer decreases”] (“Erregung”, 1959, p. 4). On 10 April, the *Guardian* makes the criticism that the “West German press (...) has observed a discreet silence over Dr. Adenauer’s accusations” (“Persecution Complex”, 1959, p. 10). The *Daily Telegraph* released an article on “Anglo-German Harmony on ‘Essentials’”, in which Foreign Secretary Lloyd described the West German Chancellor as a “remarkable statesman” (“Anglo-German harmony”, 1959, p. 14). The same edition includes comments on Adenauer’s utterances. In the article “Are we beastly to the Germans?” it is commented that “Dr. Adenauer’s bitter remarks to this effect were no doubt tactless, and in suggesting the existence of an anti-German conspiracy he was very wide of the mark. No conspiracy is needed, since anti-German feeling exists without being artificially inspired” (“Beastly”, 1959, p. 6).

Until November, when the national press focuses on Adenauer’s subsequent meeting with the British Prime Minister in London, the respective arguments in British and German press coverage remain largely unchanged. This applies also to the period throughout June and September, when the national press focuses on Adenauer’s further critical utterances on British policy. On 23 June 1959, the *Times* titles an article: “Dr. Adenauer criticises Britain again” in which he “urged [Mr. Macmillan] to ‘give up some of his views’” (“Criticism”, 1959, p. 10). Furthermore, the article speaks of “a private war” in which Adenauer “has now turned once more against Britain” (“Criticism”, 1959, p. 10). The *FAZ* quotes that the Foreign Office remains literally “speechless” considering the Federal Chancellor’s criticism (“Sprachlos”, 1959, p. 4). Two days later, the *FAZ* reports: “Der Bundeskanzler hat mit seiner wiederholten Kritik an der britischen Politik seit dem Besuch Macmillans in Moskau das persönliche Verhältnis zwischen London und Bonn derart abgekühlt, dass eine Periode des Vergessens angebracht als ein ‘spontaner’ Verständigungsversuch (...) erscheint” [“Due to his repeated criticism of British politics since Macmillan’s visit to Moscow the Federal Chancellor has rendered the personal relationship between London and Bonn so cold that a time to forget the past seems more appropriate than a spontaneous attempt to reach understanding”] (“Bretano berichtet”, 1959, p. 7). The *Times* takes this argument on 29 June noting that “The Chancellor is now well aware of the harmful effects of his open criticism of the British approach. His apprehension of Mr. Macmillan’s intentions almost certainly remains undiminished” (“Independent Line”, 1959, p. 8).

e. Change in the bilateral relations of Germany and Great Britain

The press controversy between the two statesmen persists through Adenauer’s further open criticism in front of the German parliament in September 1959 until mid-October, when both national media

discourses begin their reports on the upcoming visit of Adenauer to London on 17 November 1959. In the period before, a profound positive change in the reporting about Anglo-German relations is indicated. On 13 November 1959, the *Guardian* reports on “Resolving the Anglo-German disputes” as well as “Bonn hopeful about Adenauer visit to London” (“Resolving Disputes”, 1959, p. 11). This article mirrors a general change in the British press towards a more substantial and positive attitude towards the Federal Republic: “The Federal Government believes that the prospects for the Macmillan-Adenauer talks in London next week are *excellent*” (“Resolving Disputes”, 1959, p. 11). The *FAZ* report on “England hofft auf klärende Gespräche” [“England hopes for clarifying discussions”] from 14 November discusses the British government’s expression of goodwill and optimism about Adenauer’s visit. (“Klärende Gespräche”, 1959, p. 3). On 17 November 1959, the *Daily Telegraph* titles “Dr. Adenauer in London To-Day. Germany confident of stronger ties” (“In London”, 1959, p. 1). Later in this report, the paper expresses a positive attitude towards Germany among the British public (“In London”, 1959, p. 1). The subsequent day, the *Daily Telegraph* cites “Mr. Macmillan speaks of partnership for peace” and remarks positively that “Dr. Adenauer confident talks will succeed” (“Adenauer Confident”, 1959, p. 24). This positive trend of the British press coverage is echoed in the West German press, which reports in great detail about the process of this state visit in London, but also puts a high emphasis on the British press coverage of the West German Chancellor’s talks. The *FAZ* titles on 19 November “Rasche Fortschritte im Gespräch zwischen Adenauer und Macmillan” [“Rapid progresses in Macmillan-Adenauer talks”] (“Fortschritte“, 1959, p. 1). Two days later, the outcome of the political talks is regarded as “best possible result” („Bestmöglichstes Ergebnis“, 1959, p. 2). The *FAZ*, however, remarks that the British press, in its coverage about the state visit, is free of animosity: “Die britische Presse, die sich vor und während des Besuchs Adenauers fast ausnahmslos jeder Feindseligkeit enthalten hat, ist auch am Freitag davon frei” [“The British press has refrained almost completely from any hostility before and during Adenauer’s visit, it is also free of it on Friday”] (“Macmillan berichtet“, 1959, p. 3).

The development of arguments and images used in this discourse strand illustrate the change and adaption of the images according to the respective political relationship between the two nations throughout 1959. It shows how these images follow a positive trend as soon as the foreign political differences decrease. This might prove the close interconnection between the political and the media discourse level.

2. National Stereotypes of Adenauer in the British Press

The linguistic analysis of the discourse strand “Adenauer-Macmillan” exposes three major stereotypes which were used for Adenauer in the British Press throughout 1959: “Authoritarian”, “Suspicious” and “Firm”. These images occurred and changed within the course of the coverage in the analysed period in correspondence to the discursive context. Negative stereotypes, however, occurred predominantly in the period of actual crisis between Adenauer and Macmillan from March to November 1959.

a. *Authoritarian*”

Adenauer is frequently denoted an “authoritarian” in the British press. In comparison to “power” or “strength”, which is positively connoted, the meaning of “authoritarian” is negatively linked with the NS-Regime in British argumentation. On 15 February 1959, immediately before the Prime Minister’s Moscow visit, the *Observer* releases the article “Little European”, which discusses the negotiations about the British entrance into the Common Market. The article portrays the president of the economic executive committee, the German Walter Hallstein, as an “alpha mind” like the West German Chancellor: “There was then an urgent need for a man (...) with an alpha mind, limitless capacity for work and with social and political convictions (...) identical to those of Chancellor Adenauer” (“Little European”, 1959, p. 9). On 20 February, the *Times* denotes Adenauer directly as “authoritarian”: “Dr. Adenauer is an authoritarian and nearly 10 years of undisputed power have convinced him that he knows best” (“Suspicious”, 1959, p. 8). On 7 April, the *Times* writes about the upcoming Geneva conference in May 1959 considering West Germany’s relation with the Western allies. “If the Chancellor recognises any authority greater than his own it rests in Washington, but it will be progress if the Prime Minister in London can persuade him (...) that the West can enter into negotiations without the British selling him down the river” (“London Visit”, 1959, p. 10). On 29 April the *Daily Telegraph* reports on “Adenauer’s influence on Western policy talks”: “Dr. Adenauer, although he is supposed to be on holiday (...), is in fact dominating the discussions [...]” (“Influence”, 1959, p. 1). On 9 June, the *Times* reports on Adenauer’s position of Chairman of the CDU: “Dr. Gerstenmaier has long represented what little opposition there is in the party to Dr. Adenauer’s authoritarian methods; (...) *Der Spiegel* said to-day that Dr. Schröder had observed the old Nazi motto

that the Führer is always right” (“Resign”, 1959, p. 9). This image of Adenauer as sole authoritarian within his party and foreign politics was previously indirectly presented in the *Guardian* on 5 February 1959: “He [Adenauer] has experienced dictatorship and has seen how little qualified his own German people are to stand up against it successfully” (“Unmelted”, 1959, p. 8). Here, direct references to the Nazi regime are made.

b. “Suspicious”

Especially in the first half of 1959, the West German Chancellor is commonly described as “suspicious”. This attribution is mainly used in the context of Macmillan’s foreign policy. In this regard, Adenauer is also characterised as “anxious” or “nervous”. However, the terms “fear” and “suspicion” are seen as a “natural” characteristic of him as well as of the German people. On 14 January 1959, the *Daily Telegraph* titles: “A *Flutter* in Bonn” referring to a possible acknowledgement of East Germany by the American ambassador Dulles commenting that “Dr. Adenauer is naturally anxious not to be sabotaging American efforts” (“Flutter”, 1959, p. 10). Closely related to the stereotype “suspicious” is “mistrustful”. On 9 March, the *Times* speaks of a “genuine mistrust” when reporting about French reactions to Macmillan’s Moscow visit. Along with this, a direct reference to the West German Chancellor is made (“Macmillan”, 1959, p. 10). In the article “Bonn Visit To-day” the *Times* reports on 12 March 1959: “What the Germans fear most is a military compromise or settlement without a political one.” In relation to this, it is frequently reported about “British assurances” in the same argumentation: “In spite of the British assurances (...)” (“Assurances”, 1959, p. 12). Two days later, the *Times* titles: “Macmillan reassures Bonn.” The section “Final talk with Dr. Adenauer”, which treats general political discussions after Macmillan’s Moscow visit, is headlined with “Still Suspicious” (“Macmillan Reassures”, 1959, p. 6). It is stated here that “by to-day, a sizable load of suspicion had been removed from German minds” (“Macmillan Reassures”, 1959, p. 6). On 18 March 1959, the paper asserts that “his [Adenauer’s] suspensions remain, and he is likely to go on expressing them, but they do not preclude agreement with some of Mr. Macmillan’s ideas” (“Arms Limitation”, 1959, p. 8).

On 24 March, the *Guardian* writes about “Dr. Adenauer’s concern” when reporting on “British plans for military disengagement in Europe” (“Disengagement”, 1959, p. 7). One day later, the *Guardian* article “Adenauer put in picture” treats the results of negotiations between the British Prime Minister and US President Eisenhower. Adenauer’s reaction is summarised as follows: “But German suspicions of Britain are likely to persist whatever *assurances* were given to-day to Dr. Adenauer” (“Picture”, 1959, p. 11). On 4 April, the *Times* writes the article “Reassuring Dr. Adenauer” in which also “the Federal Government was suffering from extreme suspiciousness. Dr. Adenauer has again been prey to deep suspicions of a British intention to sell Germany down the river” (“Reassuring”, 1959, p. 6). On the same day, the *Guardian* releases the report “West German Fears”, which treats Macmillan’s diplomatic talks with US President Eisenhower about the situation of Berlin (“Fears”, 1959, p. 5).

c. “Firm”

Unlike “authoritarian”, the British press used the stereotypes “firm” and “strength” for Adenauer also in a positive context. Hereby, the terms are connoted with “steadfastness” and refer to Adenauer’s uncompromising foreign policy. On 10 April 1959, the *Guardian* portrays Adenauer as “sentinel on Europe’s outpost” (Prittie, 1959, p. 10). Titled with “Dr. Adenauer’s achievements”, the article emphasizes the West German Chancellor’s “coherent policy”; “Dr. Adenauer has given the Federal Republic a sovereignty” (Prittie, 1959, p. 10). Moreover, it is stated that he gave “Western Germany a clear and coherent line of foreign policy” (Prittie, 1959, p. 10). Two days later, the *Observer* titles Adenauer as “Steadfast friend of the West”. The West German Chancellor is called here “the most loyal and steadfast friend of the West, including Britain, who has ever held power in Germany” (Haffner, 1959, p. 16). It should be noted that these positive descriptions of Adenauer refer to his previous announcement of a possible resignation from his position as West German Chancellor.

The descriptions “firm” or “strong” might also be critically used to describe Adenauer’s foreign policy as “rigid”. In the portrait “The Unmelted Dr. Adenauer (sic!)” from 5 February 1959, the *Guardian* gives an overview of West German foreign policy (Prittie, 1959, p. 8). Subtitled with “A hard foreign policy”, Adenauer’s West German policy is described as “not (...) very inventive. Dr. Adenauer can legitimately be accused of (...) inflexibility.” On 11 May, the *Guardian* reports on West Germany’s firm position. This article asserts that no “slight modification of Dr. Adenauer’s ‘hard’ foreign policy in face of the Soviet (...) threats” will be made. The image of Adenauer’s firm foreign policy is the only image that had been constantly prevalent in the British press throughout the analysed period from January to November 1959. the *Daily Telegraph* writes after Adenauer’s visit to London on 20

November 1959: “It is clear that Dr. Adenauer has not departed from his (...) rigid view of how world affairs should develop” (“Talk”, 1959, p. 1).

The following figure 6 illustrates the quantitative distribution of the stereotypes on Adenauer in the *Times* in 1959. The graphic shows that the stereotype “authoritarian” was mainly used in the British reports on Adenauer’s public criticism of British foreign policy in June and September. “Suspicious” and “Firm” instead represent the main argumentations in the reports on foreign policy.




Figure 6: Quantitative distribution of the stereotypes of Adenauer in the *Times* 1959

3. National Stereotypes of Macmillan in the West German Press

Unlike in the British press, German stereotypes on the British Premier are used differently in the West German media discourse. Here, Macmillan is addressed less *directly*; criticism of Macmillan is seen in the word “impersonalised” which is used to describe British foreign policy in general. The context however confirms that the subsequent stereotypes: “weak”, “pragmatic” and “unemotional” allude to Macmillan. The following examples are thus interpreted as stereotypes of him. Generally, it was observed that the West German press did not use harsh direct accusations of or hostile remarks on Macmillan, unlike the British press on Adenauer. Rather, the press of the Federal Republic reported on the accusations by the British newspapers.

a. “Weak”

The stereotype “weak” for Macmillan occurs in the West German press in the period from February to May 1959. It refers to the period around the Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow and treats his possible negotiations with the Soviet Premier about the question of Berlin. In this context, “weak” is used in terms of a British “soft attitude” of foreign policy strategies towards Khrushchev regarding the latter’s ultimatum. This stereotype disappears around May 1959 from the West German news coverage.

On 2 February 1959, the *FAZ* writes in the article: “London fühlt sich weniger betroffen” [“London feels less concerned”] about the consequences of Macmillan’s planned visit to Moscow and treats German concerns about a “British softness”: “Man tut gut daran, bei allen Überlegungen und Ängsten über ein ‘Weichwerden’ der britischen Regierung nicht zu vergessen, daß Macmillan keine Illusionen über den Kreml hat” [“In all the deliberations and fears about a softening of the British government, one would do well to remember that Macmillan has no illusions about the Kremlin”] (“Weniger Betroffen”, 1959, p. 3). Two days later, the *FAZ* reports on the likelihood of British concessions to the USSR: “Britische diplomatische Kreise verhehlen nicht ihre Verwunderung über Unterstellungen, daß die britische Regierung nicht sonderlich wählerisch sei in ihrer Bereitschaft zu Konzessionen” [“British diplomatic circles do not deny their astonishment about allegations that the British government is not very selective in their willingness to grant concessions, which would be at the expense of Germany”]; Macmillan’s assertion is then reported that “the West must be open to concessions” (“Druck”, 1959, p. 3). On 8 April 1959, the *FAZ* writes about Adenauer’s strict rejection of any negotiation with the Soviet Union. In the report “Anhaltend schwere Verstimmung in London über Adenauer” [“Lasting

disgruntlement about Adenauer in London”] the *FAZ* writes: “Es wird in Großbritannien verstanden, daß der Bundeskanzler mit stärkstem Misstrauen allem begegnet, was nach Konzessionen an die Russen aussieht” [It is understood in Great Britain that the Federal Chancellor responds with the greatest mistrust to anything that looks like a concession to the Soviet Union] (“Verstimmung”, 1959, p. 3). Later, the British press is cited as having said that “the Federal Government believes that, because the British government is too weak, it is suspected that Germany will be sold out to the Russians” (“Verstimmung”, 1959, p. 3). On 18 April 1959, the *FAZ* reports on “Die deutsch-englische Verstimmung” [“German-English disgruntlement”], in which British foreign policy is characterised as “willing to compromise”: “Die englische Staatsräson pflegt internationalen Verwicklungen mit größerer Kompromißbereitschaft zu begegnen” [“The English reason of state tends to treat international involvements with a higher willingness to compromise”] (Birrenbach, 1959, p. 2). Later in May, the *FAZ* reports also on French concerns about “British softness” in the upcoming Geneva Conference. In this context, a weak British diplomacy is discussed: “Aber die Deutschen fühlen sich noch nicht sicher. Die britische Diplomatie bereitet ihnen weiterhin einige Sorgen. Es ist möglich, daß Großbritannien zum Einschwenken bereit ist” [“But the Germans do not feel safe yet. British diplomacy still causes them some worries. It is possible that Great Britain is ready to make concessions”] (“Frankreich”, 1959, 2).

b. “Pragmatic”

The term “pragmatic” refers exclusively to the characterisation of British policies. This coincides with the following statement of the government report on British-German press from October 1961 which says that Great Britain’s relationship with the Federal Republic was founded on pragmatic, not on emotional reasons after World War II (Schütz, 1961).

“Pragmatic” is linked throughout the entire period of analysis with the description of British foreign policy. On 28 February 1959, the *FAZ* writes about the progress of Macmillan’s talks with Khrushchev. In this detailed report, questions about the Western political situation implied by Macmillan’s Moscow visit are raised. The article argues that questions regarding Berlin should be faced with “British pragmatism”: “In diesen Tagen müßte man es mit dem britischen Pragmatismus halten: wait and see; in die deutsche Umgangssprache übersetzt: abwarten und Tee trinken” [“In these days one should stick with the British attitude of pragmatism: wait and see; translated into German colloquial speech: wait and have a cup of tea”] (Tern, 1959, p. 1). On 18 April 1959, the paper reports on the German-English discord. This article reflects on the motives of the British foreign policy in the respective situation of the Berlin Crisis which is defined as “pragmatic”: “Die Engländer sehen die Aufgabe von heute, die von morgen bekümmert sie weniger. Darum ist von jeher die englische Außenpolitik pragmatisch gewesen” [“The English see today’s task; tomorrow’s task does not bother them too much. That’s why English foreign policy has always been pragmatic”] (Birrenbach, 1959, p. 2). Later, in November 1959, shortly before Adenauer’s visit to London, the *FAZ* defines the British as “pragmatic”: “Man hat es bei den Briten mit Pragmatikern, nicht mit Prinzipienreitern zu tun” [“When one deals with the British, one is dealing with pragmatics, not with sticklers for principles”] (Tern, 1959, p. 1).

c. “Unemotional”

Like “pragmatic”, the stereotype “unemotional” is used indirectly to discuss Macmillan’s foreign policy by the West German press. Apart from that, the stereotype characterises a general British attitude towards Germany. In its meaning, “unemotional” can be equated with “indifferent” or “sober”. The stereotype “unemotional” occurs in the whole period from February to November 1959 in the West German press, with its peaks in May and November.

On 16 March 1959, the *FAZ* describes the English as “unemotional”: “Engländer lieben keinen Pathos,” [“The English do not love emotionalism”] (Rapp, 1959, p. 2). This report presents a speech by Macmillan in which he emphasises a “British steadfastness” with reference to the two World Wars (Rapp, 1959, p. 2). On 18 April 1959, Birrenbach characterises the British as “sober” as well as “cynical realists” with regard to British foreign policy strategies: “Die Engländer, nüchterne, manchmal sogar zynische Realisten” [“The English are sober, sometimes even cynical realists”] (Birrenbach, 1959, p. 2). On 26 November 1959, the *FAZ* takes the argument of “sensitivity” and characterises the English as “too proud to be sensitive”: “Keine Nation erträgt Kritik, selbst strenge Kritik, so gut wie die Engländer. Sie sind zu stolz, um empfindlich zu sein” [“No nation accepts criticism, even harsh criticism, so well as the English. They are too proud to be sensitive”] (Höpfel, 1959, p. 2). In the article “Der trennende Ärmelkanal” [“The separating English Channel”], Höpfel cites a French philosopher

who characterizes the English as “indifferent”: “André Maurois hat in seinen ‘Drei Briefen über die Engländer’ geäußert, ihr einzigstes Gefühl gegenüber fremden Nationen sei das einer ungeheuren Gleichgültigkeit” [“André Maurois commented in his ‘three letters about the English’ that their only attitude towards foreign nations is that of immense indifference”] (Höpfl, 1959, p. 2). Finally, one day before Adenauer’s London visit in November, the *FAZ* describes the British government as “sober”: “Man [die Bundesregierung] sollte sich eher glücklich preisen, es mit einer britischen Regierung zu tun zu haben, die sich nüchtern zu den zwischen den beiden Ländern aufgeworfenen Fragen stellt” [“The Federal government should consider itself lucky to do business with the British government which deals unemotionally with issues raised between the two countries”] (Tern, 1959, p. 1).

Figure 7 illustrates the quantitative distribution of the stereotypes of Macmillan in the West German press. Quantitatively, the stereotypes on the British Premier are less in number than those of the Federal Chancellor in the British press. Apart from March, where the stereotype “weak” is dominant, “pragmatic” and “unemotional” occur evenly throughout 1959. “Weak” is disappearing after the period of Macmillan’s Moscow visit. Thus, it can be considered as a temporary stereotype; “pragmatic” and “unemotional” remain steady throughout the entire analysed period.




Figure 7: Quantitative distribution of the stereotypes of Macmillan in the *FAZ* 1959

IV) Discussion of the National Stereotypes in Anglo-German Media Discourse

The analysis of the discourse strand “Adenauer-Macmillan” has illustrated the use of national stereotypes as well as their dynamic character in the British and West German media discourse throughout 1959 with respect to the discursive context.

Firstly, this analysis showed that the British and West German media discourse do not operate independently of each other. Rather, they dynamically relate each other, both in number and content. The figures 2 to 5 illustrate the quantitative relation of the articles released on Adenauer and Macmillan in the *Times* and the *FAZ*; thus, the discourse strand operates mainly parallel to each other in both national newspapers. Regarding content, the analysis of the topic “Adenauer-Macmillan” exemplifies a direct reference of German and British articles. It could be seen that the German press reported largely on British reactions to Adenauer’s critical utterances on Macmillan, for example, while the British press addressed the Federal Chancellor directly as in the period from April to September 1959. Direct citations and references to the other nation are mutually found in the German and British newspapers. It was also seen that the interaction between the German and the British media discourse was both quantitatively and qualitatively higher in the period of crisis. This process decreases when the political situation between the Federal Republic and Great Britain improves and shifts to more general topics after Adenauer’s London visit in November 1959.

Furthermore, it was observed that stereotypes occur in certain “surroundings”, that is to say, in certain argumentations. The British stereotype “authoritarian” for Adenauer has its peaks in June and September 1959. Thus, it is used to report on Adenauer’s overt criticism on British foreign policy and

British public opinion in general. The stereotypes “firm” and “suspicious” instead occur in the British reports about Adenauer’s foreign policy. Apart from that, it is interesting to see that some national stereotypes of the Germans and the British are opposed to each other. The West German press writes about a “weak Prime Minister” whereas the British newspapers denote Adenauer as “authoritarian”; British foreign policy is “unemotional” while the Federal Chancellor is described as “sensitive”. The contradictoriness of the stereotypes in the media discourse is observed in the period of acute discord. As soon as political relations relax, the direct references between the two national media discourses decrease. This process is considered as another discursive mechanism. The stereotypes transmitted by the British and West German discourse were also classified according to the frequency of their use. A quantitatively high transmitted stereotype is indicative of a dominant position in media discourse which implies a strong influence on public opinion. Therefore, focus is directed to the respective frequency of each stereotype with regard to the discursive context as the CDA suggests. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate this process.

The analysis of this discourse of British-German news coverage during the Berlin Crisis is limited, in one way by the duration of the period. It would be worth analysing how the stereotypes of Adenauer and Macmillan developed in the subsequent years of the Berlin Crisis, 1960, 61 and 62. As the discourse strand “E.E.C.” takes over in 1960 and the political events of the Berlin Crisis shifted more to American as well as “allied” affairs, it is expected that no such repetition of negative stereotypes will appear in the British and West German press as it was presented here in 1959. Another relevant aspect would be to investigate today’s national press coverage on Anglo-German relations with respect to the Brexit debates to see if (and how) the national stereotypes discussed in this paper are still valid in today’s British and German quality press. This would give most interesting results on the long-term duration as well as the diachronic change of national stereotypes in Anglo-German media discourse.

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European Values and Virtues in Discourse: *Political Sphere or Public Space?*

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ABSTRACT

This paper brings to the foreground the European Union's long-discussed politicization process, focusing primarily on the foggy landscape of its moral identity, its social and political values and the concept of 'institutional ethos.' The skepticism that the recent crisis has brought about seems to make the EU appear as distinctly awkward towards its political, social and ethical constitution both at an institutional and discursive level. Nevertheless, the alleged absence of a coherent political sphere or a firm public space, manifested in the apparent lack of a political and ethical 'soul' for the EU, has ignited the urge to readdress issues related to the salient values that have directed the EU's development. Hence, this paper embarks upon distinguishing and elaborating on the distinct meanings 'values' have acquired within the historical European context and analyze their teleological and deontological nature. By tracing the corresponding official EU documents and discussing the polysemous concept of values and the institutional ethos, my goal is to show that the European discourse on values has been the "domain of all statements" (Foucault, 1985) that can be constantly contested and modified, thus justifying the 'fluidity' and 'invisibility' that accompany the debate on the EU's moral identity.

Keywords: values, virtues, institutional ethos, invisibility, discourse theory

1. Introduction

Half a century after the EU was formed and despite its success measured in terms of uniqueness, longevity and economic importance, a unanimous conclusion about what the European Union really is and what it stands for remains a contested issue of the EU's perplexed political agenda. Indeed, the EU's very nature and constitution pose the most repeatedly asked questions whilst most strikingly, the more time has gone by, the more complex the debate related to EU identity and objectives has become. As testimony to this unresolved political problem, the current crisis seems to have reinforced the idea that the EU constitutes "a political conundrum both as to what it is about and what it should do," especially in times of hurdles (Williams, 2010, p. 2). Hence, the EU's controversial nature appears to be "an entity that can choose to act one day as a market regulator and the next as a fledging polity, constituting the double nature of a beast" (Cerutti, 2010, p. 11) often interpreted as "a conceptual chameleon, shifting its purpose depending on the changing political, social, economic and legal environment as well as perspective" (Williams, 2010, p. 3). Moreover, the recent economic and political crisis is now accompanied by the fear that Europe is once more running the danger of becoming "an incoherent collection of sub-unions lacking any historical, ethnic, psychic – or even geographical – reason to exist" (Allott, 1997, p. 487) with no coherent idea of its actuality or an ideal of its potentiality. For a number of scholars, this fear is attributed to the lack of an 'arch' denoted by the philosophical and ethical void that has always permeated the Union's existence, relating largely to issues of institutional ethos and the very nature of the values that have directed its development. Undoubtedly, the 'flesh has been put on the bones,' but "the search for a soul," according to Jacques Delors (1992/2010) that would attract the great loyalty and commitment of the people of Europe is still missing.

In an effort to define the EU's political identity and values or ethos, it becomes evident that one cannot be complacent by merely looking into the borders of the EU to potentially define the 'borderland' of

Europe (Balibar, 2004). In Balibar's perspective, the EU's borders are neither defining nor defined as a project (2004). Is it then that "values make the borders of Europe?" (Rehn, 2006) or "does potentially Europe end where its values are not shared?" (Špidla, 2006). The correlation between the set of values and Europe as a geographical rather than a political construct seems to increase the geographical uncertainty and does not provide the relevant questions with adequate or safe answers. Moreover, the response to the philosophical and political anxiety of Europe's political identity and values has often taken a metaphysical turn, demanding "a metaphysics of Europe's self-constituting and not a rationalization of the 'European integration'" (Allott, 2003, p. 202) wherein we "should not act as apologists of the current incoherent state of the public realms of Europe or of a state of affairs which is an unwilling and irrational outcome of countless coordinated and uncoordinated acts and events" (Allott, 2003, p. 202). Nevertheless, if the EU can be welcomed on a cultural level as a "leviathan of shreds and patches" (Allott, 2003, p. 202), the rhetoric of 'Unity through Diversity' as an essential counterweight to the complex political nature of the EU has rather failed to address issues of identity, values and inclusion. In fact, the recent crisis has shown more or less directly that diversity has been acceptable only in so far as it does not jeopardize unity. Therefore, cultural aspects along with political ones remain indeterminate and subject to a constant process of negotiation, exchange and syncretism (Shore, 2003). If "unification of Europe means the unification of hatreds" (Lyotard, 1993, p. 159) the process of political integration and the attempted unification will involve feelings of hate and fear instead of fraternity, solidarity and hospitality.

Moreover, the deep existential concerns related to Europe's values and political identity have been aggravated by the multifaceted crisis triggered by the major social problem of the recent refugees' movement along with the political turbulences caused by the so-called 'Brexit' vote in the UK. In defense of "a community of responsibility" (Esposito, 2009) with a firmer political model and corresponding political institutions that can rectify integration altogether, the quest for the political identity and 'telos' of the EU has called into question the issue of democratic legitimacy and the legitimization of European governance. Hence, the effort towards a new 'politicization' and 'socialization' of the European project emerges as a primary impulse in the current crisis period. However, at this point in time, Europe needs to turn to the 'metaphysics' of its missing component, namely its salient 'values' and its 'ethos.' All the ambiguity on how values have been defined and integrated in the European community has always been a fundamental issue but it is now entering a new phase. Moreover, questions as to the nature of those values – political, social, constitutional or even philosophical ones – that have directed its institutional form, its development, the extent to which they have had an impact on all aspects of life in the EU and the relationship that exists between them in the resolution of various current conflicts have attracted significant attention among politicians, civilians, stakeholders and academics and have generated new discourse. There is one common belief that seems to unite the aforementioned people; although 'values' were embraced early in the EU's history, their specification, scope and depth have always been unclear. Admittedly, we can see in some instances how value aspects might be fulfilled, still there is often no sense of when, where and how this should occur or how these value aspects should interact. Advocates of the European edifice and its ideal are urged anew to assist forging European concepts related to its moral identity or at least help clear the way from the relics of rather obsolete notions.

Hence, the first aim of this paper is to distinguish between social and political values and elaborate on the distinct meanings 'values' have acquired within the European context. I attempt to show that the rather impenetrable and at times contested concept that the term 'value' acquires by definition becomes more obscure and 'invisible' within the European political and rhetorical framework that attributes 'teleological' or 'deontological' characteristics to values depending on perspective. As part of this exploration, my second aim will be to discriminate between 'values,' 'principles' and 'virtues,' as exemplified by the European texts. My findings will help demonstrate whether 'values' in diverse contexts politically describe qualities and states of condition suitable for shaping action along with political programs or whether they lack the ethical framework desired to provide the EU with its 'missing soul.' Furthermore, I will pinpoint the interrelation between political values and the concept of institutional ethos in an attempt to prove that the EU has endeavored to connect its values to an emerging 'institutionalized ethos,' even if the latter remains ill defined.

By employing Foucault's notion of 'discourse,' which is central to the poststructuralist discourse theory, I will try to show that for several years the EU's discourse on values and the European ethos has been the "domain of all statements" (Foucault, 1985, p. 80) while all attempts made by the EU to define its institutional ethos have generated discourse that constitutes a discursive formation, i.e. series of rules of formation which provide the conditions of existence, co-existence, regularities and transformations towards the EU's established political discourse (Foucault, 1985; Torfing, 2005).

Furthermore, the value framework of Europe on a legal, political and discourse level is the result of a *social practice* (Foucault, 1985) where the rules of formation are modified following *social antagonisms* (Mouffe, 1993/2005). Employing also the analytical tools of discourse theory, my final goal will be to discuss the EU's institutional ethos as a series of attempts to fill in the 'empty signifier' that the EU's suggested ethos puts forward, readdressing the EU's assumed 'invisibility' as far as its moral identity is concerned.

2. Exploring the Concept of 'Value': A Philosophical Review

'Values' have always been a portmanteau term and the concept of value has always proven a foggy one across disciplines and time. In philosophical studies, the concept of 'value' remains a fundamental term in the field of ethics, yet other disciplines within the humanities and the social sciences have contributed alternative approaches to defining values. The problem of reaching a complete definition for them and built an 'axiology' (classification of values) is the item of an interdisciplinary agenda since legal and cultural studies have also included the term in their fields of study. Admittedly, every attempt to define values entails a range of limitations and reservations resulting in a broad but also constructive polyphony; thus for many theorists values will never be adequately or comprehensively defined while for others values constitute self-evident principles and specific rules that govern people's lives.

For many scholars, values put forward a logical and historical starting point, i.e. the notion of philosophical 'good.' Both material and moral (non-material) goods are thought to be properties or states either personal (e.g. freedom, health, etc) or social (e.g. equality, social justice etc), described as highly essential and worth having or pursuing (Brugger, 1976; Polin, 1944). Hence, they need to be applied generally or at least be satisfied. A good stands for the ontological form of the means of satisfying a need, while value constitutes the deontological version of that same good. Thus, 'freedom' as a property or state is a good while 'freedom' as a value is the deontological principle whose content is the good of freedom. Hence, freedom as a good is a concept of practical reason while freedom as a value is the corresponding concept of pure reason (Brugger, 1976; Polin, 1944).

Furthermore, values bear two conceptual features that may originally seem contradictory but ultimately are not. A value per se has a rigid and absolute content on the level of pure reason, in other words in its original conception. This is valid for the content of a value before the latter enters a historically and geographically specific value system wherein its content becomes more relational. Their second feature is the historical meaning they acquire. This is also demonstrated by their relation to the notion of human good. As mentioned earlier, goods embody the needs of an individual or the society that demand satisfaction; still they are molded and emerge within the historical time and context of a given society. This society can be local, national, European or even global. Therefore, goods are presented with a historical evolution trend while the same applies for the corresponding values. Thus, the absolute content and the historicity of value are not contradictory conceptual aspects but they are interrelated since the first dimension of the value is the prerequisite for the other. More specifically, being able to realize the differentiation in the content of a value as a result of its historical evolution due to time and place, i.e. its *reducibility* to its absolute content, ensures that this is indeed the same value. In a different case, the various stages of this evolution can be considered different values (Tsatsos, 2005). Besides, the absolute content of a value can only be understood within a philosophical frame that can clearly define the differences between pure and practical reason (Tsatsos, 2005).

From this brief review, values are seen as substantial constituents of the history of civilization. The latter cannot be viewed as a close-ended venture. Indeed, the history of civilization and therefore the history of values can never reach completion. The meaning of values and the content of those meanings is a process of an eternal redefinition. This might suggest, as a conclusion, that the meaning of values is determined only *hic et nunc*, i.e. it is dependent on the historical time and place within which a value is invoked. One might infer that their inter-temporal relevance and their 'sustainability' render the theorization of values a subject matter susceptible to revision and thus historically an indefinite project.

3. Social and Political Values in the Early European Context

In light of the EU's valiant efforts to enshrine the notion of 'good' on a constitutional level it is essential to consider carefully the scope of any research and evaluative effort made in the European

context towards defining and building up the EU's social and political value system. Undoubtedly, values-related issues in Europe have been the object of several empirical studies conducted during the 80's and 90's. The first attempt to approach a study of social values in a European context is registered at the end of 1970's under the aegis of the European Values Systems Study Group, an independent foundation of academics, which was established in 1977. This research initiative emerged from an interest in the extent to which the countries of Western Europe could be thought to share a common value system and later on between 1981 and 1990 from the desire to assess the nature of any change in those values. Focusing on essential human values, behaviors and attitudes, the study was a large-scale, longitudinal and interdisciplinary research aiming at establishing fundamental 'schemata' of values in Western Europe. There are several reasons why at the time such systematic studies of people's values would take on particular significance. According to Inglehart (1990), the basis of contemporary political activity and interest was changing; class-based interests were becoming less influential in the formation of political attitudes than the pursuit of the values of individual development in a wholesome environment. Secondly, values were assuming significance towards the creation of modern pluralistic societies. Values, by nature, can justify the existence and development of social segments but they can also prevent those segments from disintegrating into groupings of individuals or causing a new split up of the society. Thirdly, the effort to classify values and study them would seemingly provide an answer to a general unease despite the acknowledged achievement in political freedom and relative economic satisfaction, especially in Western Europe. This was rather a high priority at the time attesting to what Sennett would argue already in 1978: "Western societies were moving from something like an other-directed condition to an inner-directed condition – except that in the midst of self-absorption no one can say what is inside. As a result, confusion has arisen between public and intimate life; people are working out in terms of personal feelings public matters which properly can be dealt with only through codes of impersonal meaning" (p. 5). For other scholars, satisfaction was more likely to be found in the cultivation of the personal values of what was soon enough termed 'civil society' or families, communities, friendship networks, solidaristic workplace ties, voluntarism, spontaneous groups and movements (Wolfe, 1989). Thus, values were seen as clearly covering and motivating a very wide range of human activity. Discussing values in the light of the contemporary milieu anew would ensure two new orientations; on one hand, the significant realization that a personal value such as 'salvation' or 'freedom' does not exist in isolation but is clearly related to prevailing social or political values in contemporaneous cultural changes and on the other hand, the emergence of a 'bottom-up' values system expressed in the formation of an early yet molded 'civil society' which consolidated the need of people to create networks sharing common beliefs. Even the more 'person-centered' views of values could now fail to ignore their influence as reflected in the wider culture of a society, reaffirming the belief that values can never be seen as solely self-determined.

On a political level, the same need to create some sense of belonging for citizens within the EU is manifested by the need for an identity *of* and *for* the Union and the search for its spirit and soul. It is the time of some of the most sweeping changes within living memory that entail a period of immense upheaval for Europe. The demise of the Communist system in the USSR, the fall of the Berlin Wall followed by the re-unification of the East and West German states and the rise in nationalistic fervor across countries such as the Baltic States affected the lives of Europeans immensely. Nations seemed to combine and re-fragment with disconcerting rapidity and the future coherence of any multi-cultural nation could not be assured. On the other hand, Europe in the 1990s was witnessing the completion of the internal market and the significant movement towards economic and administrative unification.

The political changes across the European continent were followed by the need to foster anew cultural and social values which, nevertheless, remain specifically linked to the framework of the nation-state and are unlikely to vanish overnight (Ester and Halman, 1990). However, Europe was left with a sense of ideological and political vacuum that fed the need to fix some kind of ethical framework for the institutional EU and provide an identity through espoused values. While citizens were turning inwards to search for a network of personal and social values as a safety net, perhaps ironically, EU initiatives were "self-consciously devoted to promulgating but also entrenching often repeated Western liberal values in post-communist states" (Williams, 2010, p. 6). The aim was to give new impetus to the advance of these same values within a Europe supposedly already constructed upon them. Therefore, in a rather paradoxical manner, the Union required putative member states to show their commitment and observance to a whole range of political criteria and this was the reason its existing members and institutions were called to maintain that they were already abiding by them (Williams, 2010). At that time, the emerging incitement was to forge shared political values and address the first critiques pointing out the EU's democratic deficit and its ambivalent attitude towards human rights. Moreover, what was being prioritized was the gradual fashioning of a full working single market and the

promotion of an important counterweight to the EU's rather strong economic orientation. Furthermore, the future possibility and the political discussions over an eastern enlargement to avoid a new political and geographical schism would intensify the self-interrogation as to what Europe can stand for and what might be its place in history.

4. Tracing Values in the European Texts

In retrospect, the quest for a moral identity apparently began in an attempt to make sense of the evolving EU in the midst of a fluctuating political milieu without the latter losing sight of its origins and history. As mentioned already, the meaning of values is understood on the basis of the temporal and spatial context in which they emerge, evolve historically and acquire meaning. Therefore, values are not only historically significant but also socially relevant. Even at a given historical moment, values enshrined in political and legal texts can be comprehended and used to different ends by bodies or institutions that may even represent contrasting interests. Indeed, the historical and social background of the EU can cast more light on the way of prioritizing its values and their embodiment in the official European documents and treaties. With this claim in mind, the resolution to "preserve peace and liberty" in the preamble to the 1957 EEC Treaty can be justified by the firm political commitment to peace and the aversion of a new disastrous war. The immense calamity of the Second World War assigns high priority to the goods of security and well-being, by safeguarding above all peace with rights and liberty as a sense of justice and the basis for living together (Walzer, 2000). At the 1973 EC Summit in Copenhagen, the Declaration of a European Identity drawn by the nine Member Countries of the European Communities expressed the wish to ensure that "the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected" (EC Summit, 1973, article 1). By underpinning the idea that those nine member states share the "same attitudes to life" [...], they are determined to defend "the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress – and of respect for human rights" (EC Summit, 1973, article 1). The motive to attempt a definition of the European identity "with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind" is provided by the signed document itself towards establishing "a system of political cooperation with a view to determining common attitudes and, where possible and desirable, common action" [...] (article 2) and "the determination to take part in the constitution of a United Europe" (article 3). Still, there seemed to be no suggestion as to what extent those "cherished values" and shared "attitudes to life" could be implemented into the actual political life or no clear hint on how the "principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, and of social justice" would be measured against each other to be developed institutionally or be implemented to have positive impact on European citizens themselves.

The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) negotiated in Maastricht in 1992 made a specific claim in its preamble that the Union was attached to the "principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law" (Art. 27a–27e, 40–40b, 43–45). The effort was to deal with issues of institutional values and reaffirm the Union's belief in its structural political values. Moreover, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated these into the text of TEU and ensured the constitutional quality of restraining measures when the validity of shared values as defined in the TEU was clearly breached. According to Article 6(1), the Union is now 'founded on' the list of principles that were simply mentioned in the TEU, affirming its founding basis. Although this assertion is not necessarily self-evident, the dialectics between rhetorical discourse on the founding values of the EU and the validation of protective legal measures is now apparently much more balanced. The Union seems to realize that ideas and values cannot be enthroned only through rhetorical statements or discourse and their reception by people but also by means of proper institutions and legal measures. The Treaty of Nice that came into force in 2003 provided the Union with the ability to act in a precautionary initiative in case of imminent danger of violation of the EU's common values. Therefore, the Treaty of Nice turned the Union's means of intervening much more functional, compared to the Treaty of Amsterdam that would only treat and not prevent any breaching. Article 7 of the Treaty ascribes a similar responsibility to the Commission to conduct monitoring and take precautions in order to protect the fundamental rights within the EU.

The most concrete identification of principles and values that govern the Union was agreed in the context of the Constitutional Treaty (2004). Despite the fact that this treaty was never ratified, an indeed specified list of values and their provisions were eventually replicated in the replacement Lisbon Treaty. Both the draft for the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty expressed in the most

comprehensive manner to date the political will to represent constitutionally the EU's 'moral identity.' Hence, the new article 2 of the TEU is thoroughly devoted to values, confirming that the EU is

“founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (TEU, Art.2).

Complemented by the new Article 3 of the TEU which describes the EU's aims, the Union is decided “to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.” It will also promote “social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child” and “economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.” Both values and aims of the contemporary EU intertwine in the context of the Union's attitude towards the world where “it shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter” (Lisbon Treaty, 2007, Art. 3).

It is evident that such a plethora of values compounded with policy statements serves one additional goal apart from providing a values system with legal force, i.e. the transparent efforts on the part of the EU to legalize its institutions along with its ordinance in the eyes of the European people who would feel very estranged or disaffected before those processes. Furthermore, with the Lisbon Treaty provisions, the EU attempts the clearest and most concerted effort to enshrine a notion of the 'good' for Europe with far more crystallized objectives and specific priorities. The EU is empowered to promote these values that can become part of its normative framework and transform into constitutional principles. The newly identified values in the Lisbon Treaty obtain significant gravity representing “the legal order as it currently stands” (Tridimas, 2006, p. 15) moving towards “the emergence of a European demos by laying down the attributes of moral identity and a political community” (Tridimas, 2006, p. 16).

5. From Political Values to Institutional Ethos

Notwithstanding those daring attempts to construct a moral identity and a values system for the EU, political analysts will still maintain that a meaningful philosophical and political framework for the EU is far from being present, suggesting that the European Union does not put forward an ethical identity or 'ethos.' This particular realization of 'lack' has never been adequately defined but remains rather pronounced as “a lack of imagination or a lack of genuine identification with the meaning and purpose of integration” (Havel as quoted by Ward, 2003). Some scholars suggest that the discourse of 'Unity through Diversity' and subsidiarity has never succeeded in generating an ethical stature for the EU despite the fact that it is repeatedly reproduced within European rhetoric. In contrast, the concepts of ethical identity and ethos remain rather problematic and pinpoint to the concern that what is indeed missing is a public philosophy which can provide inspiration (Ward, 2003). Jan Zielonka (2006) stresses that the 'public space' is still weak and fragmented in an environment where there can “hardly be a single dominant identity, ethos and demos” (p. 138). The lack of public space entails absence of political attachment to the political values of the EU, which are not “capable of becoming part of both objective institutions and individuals” (Balibar, 2004, p. 9).

Although the ethos outlined and discussed so far can only emerge through democratic processes and corresponding legal or practical action and despite the extensive effort to forge socially shared values in the EU, this ethos is not identified with 'moral change' or 'moral convergence' that relates to individuals or the forming of a homogeneous society through societal shifts. In spite of the fact that we are considering a public ethos, the absence of a uniform European society or demos can give reasons for the lack of moral convergence that fails to transform into any form of societal or civic ethos. It is rather an 'institutional ethos' that is under discussion followed by diverse interpretations from various scholars. Hence, 'institutional ethos' stands for “the collective disposition, character and fundamental values that capture the existent sense of the EU as an institution in terms of both its particular formally constructed arrangement and its general pattern of activity” (Williams, 2010, p. 10; Keohane, 1989, p. 162). One can associate this tentative definition with the actual content of the Greek word 'ethos,' denoting both 'character and custom' in line with Aristotle's thought. Considering ethos in these terms,

it can reflect the desirable ethical nature of the EU as both promoted in the official documents and developed institutionally in accordance with how this ethical nature has helped shape and guide law, policy and practices. This attempted definition clearly relates to the 'experiential nature' of values, dependent upon time, place and historical evolution. Moreover, since ethos as a notion incorporates time and custom in the Aristotelian thought, it is evident that an institutional ethos emerges over time and as such it can be altered to some extent given that its constituents, namely, principles of thought, decisions and practices of legal, political, social or economic nature evolve along. In the wake of the EU's institutional existence and historical evolution, values redefine their content over time thus affecting the EU's overall institutional ethos and its practices. This can justify a loose or not that stable status for the EU's institutional ethos, yet the latter can still function as an 'ethical guide map' that determines what is acceptable or less acceptable, sets rules -formal and less formal- and norms to be adopted by the institution attempting to safeguard the political identity and its democratic legitimacy.

The lack of a European demos has triggered the thought that European citizens cannot directly contribute to the formation of this institutional ethos. The EU's discussed operation related to the cultivation of diverse values is at least one piece of evidence that validates the claim that on an individual level citizens are used to bring along their ethical views and perspectives when in contact with the EU's institutional environment and its practices. Europe has encouraged this significant awareness of the gravity of a values system. Nevertheless, the very conceptualization of an institutional ethos is synonymous with those structures and norms that when adequately developed can rise beyond personal perspectives and help shape individual choices anew or help citizens to both comprehend and attach to new framing practices emerging from this very ethos. A consistent institutional ethos with practices and decisions affirmed across time consolidates its center of gravity in people's consciousness. There seems to be a two-way communication between the institutional ethos and the citizens who accommodate it. The older the institution, the more established and strengthened its ethos is expected to be. This premise can result in favorable reception and acknowledgement on the part of individuals. On the other hand, people's 'acceptance' of this ethos remains a consolidating force for its longevity and enduring quality.

The aforementioned analysis is necessary to clarify that although the nature of the institutional ethos still sounds indeterminable, the critique that the EU completely lacks an ethical orientation is incorrect at least on an official political level following top-down approaches. The EU's political construction as a polity implies that its entitlement to confirm order by means of its embraced values entails an institutional ethos, which is created gradually and redefines itself continuously. Besides, law, clearly incorporated in the context of treaties has played an important role in depicting and developing the EU's effort to legally safeguard its ventures under discussion. Either in 'soft' or 'hard' regulations or via its instruments such as the European Court of Justice together with its judicial interpretations, the scope and character of the institutional ethos is in the process of development. This continuous development establishes a sense of certainty or at least surveillance as regards the ethical framework the Union is seeking, assuring to a considerable extent the coherence the European edifice has always looked for. Therefore, it seems that the glue to keep the European project together is there either by its ordinance as a polity or through the reinforcing order of law but the matters concerning the ethical identity of the EU strangely enough remain an uncharted territory. The majority of European citizens seem bewildered concerning the sources of European values either in conjunction with its political nature or struggle to discover their attachment to EU law. Blaming it on the absence of public mobilization to give force to the Union or the lack of "consciousness of collective belonging" (Habermas, 2001, p. 18), we are not closer to the understanding or the perception that the EU has gone so far as to cultivate this ethos and transplant it to European life. What might be other reasons that the EU's ethos carefully crafted and reworked remains 'invisible' in the eyes of European citizens? Is it really 'invisible' and how can one approach this overall awkward interpretation and reception despite the EU's sustainable efforts towards this direction?

6. EU's Deontological and Teleological Ethics

The unexplored nature of the EU's institutional ethos, the absence of a direct relationship between law and values within a firmly defined ethical framework and the latter's 'social practice' procedural history attest to the indeterminacy of values in the European context. As a vicious circle, the value-components of the EU's ethos never fully succeed in building a solid ethical framework, i.e. a firm institutional ethos, which in turn seems to fail to assure a determinacy for the values themselves. Despite the rhetoric concerning the establishment of political values and their presence in the

constitutional form, the practicalities of the actual application remain uncertain. Neither the Parliament nor the Commission can adequately offer the policy or the actions towards a clear interaction between the EU's values and their espousal by the European people. The so called 'fluidity' and 'invisibility' of the EU concerning its values has been often held responsible for turning the ethos of the EU into a 'patchwork' of contingent values whose scope and content are forever 'in motion' (Williams, 2010). It has also been described as 'chaotic' where both means and ends remain uncertain whilst the lack of an alternative political sphere or public space that would help solidify those values is more than obvious.

An explanation for this realization can rest on a different approach to the 'ailing' ethical identity of the EU. The Union and in particular the European Court of Justice need to operate in a context that does not promote values, as defined in this paper, but centre on the notion of principles and especially the 'principle of effectiveness.' Principles are defined as "the legal norms laying down essential elements of a legal order" (von Bogdandy, 2003, p. 10) referring to general propositions from which rules might derive and thus contribute to forming a framework for decision and action (von Bogdandy, 2003; Tridimas, 2006). According to Jürgen Habermas (1997), principles seem to possess a deontological character whereas values are rather teleological. Principles relate to obligation while values emit a sense of purpose, understood as "intersubjectively shared preferences" (Habermas, 1997, p. 255). Therefore, while principles command action and enable judgment within specific interpretative parameters, values mostly recommend. Their character is more aspirational, helping to provide a sense of 'ultimate ends' or fill in the gaps which appear when principles cannot directly provide guidance or conflict with each other (Quinton, 1988). Therefore, one can claim that it is rather principles that the EU mostly operates on despite its proclaimed discourse on values.

Another path to judge the EU's employment of principles is through reference to wider discussions of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, a division of normative ethics that emphasizes the 'virtues or moral character,' in contrast to the second approach of normative ethics that emphasizes 'duties or rules' (deontology) or the consequentialist ethics that places emphasis on the consequences of actions (Hursthouse, 2003). Alasdair MacIntyre (1985) defines virtues as a "disposition or sentiment which will produce in us obedience to certain rules" (p. 244). Thus, virtues do not adhere to the Aristotelian concept of teleology but rather evoke a certain sense of mediation between principle and value. Hence, virtues describe the way in which values can be enacted through the application of principles. Their main feature is that they can often take on the appearance of value, by suggesting a shared preference, *and* of principle, by informing the construction of standards (Williams, 2010). One can infer that the principles developed through European law can be better understood as virtues. Moreover, they are not based on a fundamental values system that puts forward great coherence despite the fact that the consistent use of rhetoric regarding institutional values suggests otherwise. Although values can still be defined as a *hic et nunc* project, the political inability or the absence of political and public sphere that would help adopt a coherent understanding of values, either prudential or moral, emerging mainly from a more convincing collective consciousness is not evident. Rather the principles and virtues adopted in the EU context have been arranged around the central goal of giving effect to the treaties with a tendency to the technical rather than the ethical core, particularly aiming at the principle of effectiveness or the 'virtues of governance' (Williams, 2010). Less concerned with fulfilling actual ethical needs, they are entitled to support the EU's existence and development aiming at ensuring order and functions of ordering.

7. The 'Ethos' of Europe: 'Empty Signifier' and/or 'Social Practice'?

A different effort to comprehend the 'ethos' of the EU – from its very early efforts to discuss values to the orchestrated attempt of an 'institutional ethos' – and help dissolve its seeming instability or 'invisibility' can be obtained by means of discourse analytical tools. In its principles, social and political life acquires its meaning via discourse while all social phenomena are never complete or total. Meaning can never be ultimately fixed and this admittance opens up the way for constant social struggles about definitions of society and identity, with resulting social constructions and social effects. The process of establishing meaning is thus a political process, entangled by pluralism and struggles for power (Mouffe 1993/2005).

In this perspective, the EU's ethical framework is being discussed in the existent literature in a way that its actual content resembles the notion of an 'empty signifier.' Laclau and Mouffe (1985) suggest that 'empty signifiers' are signifiers without a particular signified. For instance, the concepts of 'nationalism' or 'democracy' may serve as examples of 'empty signifiers' (Montessori, 2011). Due to

their empty character, that is their lack of a direct observable relation to a particular signified, these notions represent an absent and transcendent totality, one that can never be fully captured or obtained. According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), different discourses offer different content to fill in an 'empty signifier.' As a result, different groups can identify in their own particular ways with a universal demand. This takes place through the "linking together of signifiers in chains of equivalence that establish the identity relationally" (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 43).

From the viewpoint of discourse theory, the suggested 'ethos' for the EU is the political, legal and social field that can never be 'congested' or 'closed' wherein several political or non-political practices attempt to fill this 'lack of closure' (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000). In the logic of 'discursive structuration,' diverse political forces may compete in their efforts to present themselves as particularly well positioned to fill in the 'lack of closure.' According to discourse theory analysis, their effort is to *hegemonize* a notion by carrying out this function (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000; Montessori, 2011).

The discourse on the EU's ethical framework seems to take place around an 'empty signifier' the EU's ethos constitutes in the course of time. Indeed, the treaties themselves and various actors of the political or legal arena of the EU itself, not least social actors such as international organizations and NGOs' reports or independent qualified experts, venture to indicate the qualities they strive to realize in the demand of an 'ethical EU.' These actors emphasize or reemphasize human rights, social equality, democracy, peace and liberty in a new context and the importance of solidarity along with other traditional values as part of their vision for Europe. Their aims range from opposing the neo-liberalist trajectory that the EU has acquired, offering a substantial counterweight to the strict economic and competitive character the EU has encapsulated from its early years of formation till now (Rasmussen et al., 2004) to making provisions for the external image of the EU as an entity with an ethical core and creating a captivating philosophy for the Union by generating appropriate discourse. Hence, they try to gain acceptance for their particular meaning and succeed in fixing it. In line with discourse theory, charging the empty signifier of 'ethos' with their own meaning will gain hegemony for them. Similarly, the effort to hegemonize this discourse comes in the form of various publications written as "a continent's answer to market fundamentalism" (Rasmussen et al., 2004). Additionally, several online blogs, fora and academic voices are trying to charge the empty signifier of 'ethos' for Europe – not just the EU – with their own meaning in cases where new or differing 'politicization' for Europe becomes an issue (e.g. OpenDemocracy.net and blogs.lse.ac.uk).

A similar interpretation can be provided following Foucault's poststructuralist discourse theory where a discourse is "the domain of all statements" (1985, p. 80). By focusing on the rules that govern the production of such statements, his theory supports that everything that is said and considered within a particular discourse constitutes a 'discursive formation.' However, a 'discursive formation' is not a random collection of statements but rather the result of a series of rules of formation, which provide the conditions of existence, co-existence, regularities and transformations for a particular discourse (Foucault, 1985; Torfing, 2005). This implies that efforts towards discussing the ethos of Europe in earlier decades have generated rules of formation that regulated "what can be said, how it can be said, who can speak and in which name" (Torfing, 2005, p. 7). On this level, discourse is seen as a 'social practice' and the rules of formation are the result of decisions made by authorities, i.e. the Commission, the treaties or various institutions as an overall outcome of research and evaluation. Considering the discourse that revolves around the EU's ethos as a 'social practice' allows us to obtain the view on the 'ethical dimension' of Europe as being socially constituted, historical and contingent, rather than essentialist or imperative (Montessori, 2011). This implies that discourse can be contested or modified which is the case within the European context concerning the ethical identity of the EU.

The contested meaning of 'ethos' or 'institutional ethos' of the EU can thus be explained when one tries to classify the content it acquires and interpret its 'fluid' and rather 'invisible' nature, under the suggested lenses of discourse theory. In that context, both value system and ethos remain to a large extent political projects that re-emerge and call for adaptation of their content depending on geographical, economic and political circumstances. Consequently, the EU's framework of values and its institutional ethos are able to trigger discourse that often causes ambiguity. However, their assumed 'floating character' is vivid evidence that both concepts have not been depoliticized and as such, they are evolving within the political arena. Besides, this perspective is in accordance with the philosophical and political definition of values described above; the meaning and content of values is contingent upon history, time and place and their complete definition constitutes an open-ended matter, i.e. an eternal quest.

8. Conclusion

The EU's assumed 'invisibility' concerning its ethical identity in the early years of its existence emerges from the peculiar position of the European institutions, compelled to seek forms of political and social regulation applicable between diverse economic priorities and undoubtedly, varying ideological registers in the context of the deep ideological, political and social diversity that has always characterized the EU. This has contributed, at times, to an indiscernible political agenda and to diverse efforts to define what values of Europe actually stand for. Nevertheless, the 'patchwork' of contingent values and the institutional ethos which in turn fails to assure determinacy for the values that the EU promotes turns more intelligible considering the *hic et nunc* meaning of values per se and the social constructionist struggle to attribute meaning to the EU's ethical identity provided by the analytical tools of discourse theory. Moreover, the normative ethics applied by the EU favors the functional interpretation of values as principles or 'virtues of governance' aiming at primarily ensuring the EU's continuation and development. Moreover, it might be suggested that the EU attempts to establish its values retrospectively reinforcing identity and legitimacy towards its political longevity. In this context, values can also be considered an emerging part of the European heritage rather than a reflection of heritage already in existence.

The political sphere towards establishing an ethos for Europe exists. Nonetheless, it remains closely related to the EU's politicization project, which should by no means move away from a multilateral and dynamic process and the need for a robust form of allegiance building and democratic legitimacy. In some theorists' opinion, the advent of the crisis shook the EU's 'ethical imaginary,' making it again 'invisible' to its citizens. Following a more careful reading though, this 'invisibility' appears solely related to the complex status of the EU's institutional ethos, which requires further political validation. In a contrasting viewpoint, this 'invisibility' can prove a new incentive, a rather crucial post-crisis imperative for turning Europe into a more coherent whole by readdressing the need for political legitimacy in a 'bottom-up' approach and the rebuilding of the EU's democratic foundations. Undoubtedly, a European public space has come to light despite its accompanying drawbacks and disillusion. According to Debora Spini (2008), "it may be partially sustained by more transnational associations, but its primary nourishment will be provided by the compenetration of national and European political issues in the debates in individual states" (p. 152). Therefore, the challenge before the European polity is "to involve but also transform the national polities" (Spini, 2008, p. 152). In this perspective, the European civil society, which remains contiguous but not altogether coincident with politics, may play an important role. The development of a lively civil society cannot provide the Union with the fullest political legitimization the latter needs. Still, a civil society at the European level can interact creatively with political and social actors present at the level of individual polities as an essential step in the process of the EU's politicization or re-politicization. Hence, its aim will be to shape "a space where Europeans can engage in debates about matters of common concern, political projects and shared values" (Spini, 2008, p. 152), not 'lobbying' for existing values but discussing and shaping values anew. Using the concept of institutional ethos as a common denominator, the EU's political and ethical discourse can subsequently move from the existing 'top-down' approach to an effort that will enhance a 'bottom-up' parallel discourse that can strengthen the political sphere without substituting it. Debating, deliberating and identifying the European public good in the framework of Europe's reinforced 'ethical imaginary' can result in a new politics with more visibility, more solidarity and, in the context of a new Europe, with a reinforced value-based identity and a more democratically established ethos.

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Section 2: Cultural Aspects of European Identity

Construction of Identities through the use of the first-person deixis in Alexis Tsipras' statements before and after the EU summits (June to October 2015)

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ABSTRACT

The aims of this paper are two-fold. It aims to shed light on the way identities are constructed in political discourse through the use of pronouns on the one hand and to demonstrate how politicians present these identities as Good/Evil and Right/Wrong on the other. By analysing a number of statements made by Alexis Tsipras before and after the European Council meetings and the Euro summits over the period of June to October 2015, it was found that the Greek Prime Minister tends to use first plural pronoun "we" to a much greater extent than he uses the first singular pronoun "I". Moreover, the pronoun "we" was found to serve the construction of three distinct identities. In particular, "we" can be interpreted as i) the Greek Prime Minister/ Government, as ii) the Greek Prime Minister/Government and the Greek citizens and finally as iii) the Greek Prime Minister/ Government and the other European Union political leaders. What also seems to be interesting is the fact that whether a statement is made before or after a negotiation may largely affect the extent to which and the underlying reasons why pronouns are employed. It was found that the politician seems to favour different identities in his pre-summit statements from his post-summit ones. More specifically, the first identity constructed through the use of "we", namely the one representing the Greek Prime minister and the Greek Government, is employed almost twice as much in his statements after the summits than in his pre-summit ones. In his pre-summit statements, however, Alexis Tsipras seems to identify more with the identity representing the European Union political leaders. Both the occurrence of the pronouns and the frequency of each "identity" constructed per Tsipras' statement are illustrated by statistical data as well as qualitative analyses explaining the findings. Projections of Good/Evil, Right/Wrong and Truthfulness/Falsehood upon the identities are also part of the discussion of the findings.

Keywords: political discourse, first person pronoun, construction of identity, projections of Good/Evil upon identities

INTRODUCTION

In this research paper, we hope to shed light on the use of the pronouns "I/my/me" (henceforth "I") and "we/us/our" (henceforth "we") in several statements given by the Prime Minister of Greece, Alexis Tsipras before and after the meetings of the European Council and the Eurozone summits from June to October 2015. We consider Tsipras to be an interesting case on the Greek political stage for two main reasons. First, never before has Greece had a Prime Minister coming from a left-wing party. Secondly, Tsipras' popularity grew very rapidly especially since the financial crisis in Europe and the Eurozone of 2008.

Chilton (2004) supports the view that language is not only about sharing information but also about signaling group identities (p. 18). Charteris-Black (2005) argues that successful speakers, especially in political contexts "need to appeal to the attitudes and emotions that are already within the listeners, which is mainly achieved through the linguistic performance" (p. 10). Additionally, Allen (2007)

maintains that “fundamental to the political sphere” is the construction of identity, group membership and “ways of talking about the Self, the Other and the polarizing categories of us and them” (p. 3). Thus, Tsipras’ use of “we” will be classified into three main categories, each constructing a different identity. More specifically, the first plural pronoun “we” will be analyzed in terms of its use for the construction of three identities (“we” as Greek government; “we” as Greek government along with Greek citizens, “we” as European political leaders). Moreover, critical discourse analysis (CDA) is used to analyze Tsipras’ projections of Good/Evil upon the three identities.

SETTING THE SCENE

Historical Background

It is in late 2009 that the Greek financial crisis started. In the 2012 national elections in Greece, the left-wing party “Syriza” got the highest share of votes in its history by then therefore coming second. It may be the financial crisis as well as Tsipras’ declarations that among his priorities were the fight against the humanitarian crisis, better negotiation with the EU and the international Monetary Fund that may have contributed to his increasing popularity and finally his victory in the general elections in 2015.

As a Prime Minister of Greece, Tsipras participated in the meetings of the European Council, namely an institution of the European Union consisting of the political leaders of the EU member states. Moreover, he participated in the Euro Summit meetings that started in 2008 in reference to the debt crisis. The discussion at the European Council meetings and the Euro summits from June to October 2015 focused among others on Greece, its financial needs and the issue of migration and the refugees.

Deixis and Construction of Identities in Political Discourse

What we analyzed is how the first-person deixis is employed to construct identities in several statements that Tsipras gave upon arriving in Brussels for the summit meetings and those following them. Levinson (1983) explains that the importance of deixis lies in its definition, namely in that it belongs to the domain of pragmatics “because it directly concerns the connection between the structure of language and the contexts in which it is used” (p.55). According to Chilton (2004), the Self (“I” or “we”), can be better understood when correlated to space (where the interlocutors are located), time (when communication is performed) and modality (p. 58). For Mansarate Quinto (2014) establishing the deictic center “facilitates the interlocutors to identify time, location and agents in the deictic field” (p.5). Of all categories of deixis in political discourse, Hasan (2011) highlights the importance of personal deixis -which he defines as pronouns (such as I, you, etc.) and their variants (e.g. my, mine, your) - in that they are “very much related to the relationship of power and solidarity” (p.9). Fairclough (1989) defines pronouns as “certain values encoded in different formal aspects of language” (p. 81) while Beard (2000) advocates that the pronouns politicians use are worth examining “because they make a significant contribution to our overall understanding of their language” (p. 44).

The majority of more recent research studies suggests that it is the first person, both singular and plural, that is of utmost interest basically because it facilitates the construction of identities. The first singular person (I) serves as “a term of self-reference and not a substitute for a noun or name as is the case with the third person pronouns” (Bramley, 2001, p. 27). Moreover, Malone (1997) maintains that “I” “provides subjectivity and states the speakers’ position” (as cited in Bramley, 2001, p. 27). As regards the first plural pronoun, “different treatments will occur for any use of “we” (Sacks, 1992, p.335). For Pennycook (1994), “we” “implies an authority to speak for others” and clearly presupposes the existence of a “they” or “you”, thus assuming that a parallel “other” exists elsewhere (p. 176).

According to Wodak (2012), language is used to define similarities and differences; to draw clear boundaries between “us” and “others” (p. 216). Wodak and Boukala (2015) contend that the financial crisis of 2008 has brought about debates about European identities leading to a distinction between “Us”, “the real Europeans” and “Them”, “the Others” (p. 87). Bongelli, Riccioni and Zuzczkowski (2013) argue that politicians tend to describe their own political party, their actions, ideas, programs, their “Self” in a positive way (True/Good) and the opposition party, the “Other” as negative and untruthful (False/Evil) (p.178). In this study, the identities arising from the analysis of the first-person

deixis will be also examined in terms of Truth/Goodness and Falsehood/Evilness that Tsipras may project upon them.

CORPUS AND METHODOLOGY

The sample is composed of five pairs of statements given by Tsipras in Brussels upon arriving at and following the EU Council meetings and the Eurozone summits from June to October 2015. Each pair includes the Prime Ministers' statements referring to the summit that is to follow as well as his statements on the conclusion of the summit preceding. In fact, over the short period of Tsipras' governance other statements were also detected, which however could not be analyzed since they constituted only a pre-summit or only post-summit statements therefore rendering a comparison before and after a particular summit untenable. The study is based on a corpus of 2313 words. More specifically, the pre-summit statements consist of 417 words and the post-summit ones of 1896 words. The data was retrieved from the official web page of the Prime Minister of Greece and his channel on YouTube. For the purpose of this paper, all the audiovisual material was transcribed into written text with the aid of a web application called "Online Dictation".

The qualitative analysis of the corpus, i.e. the detection of the pronouns "I" and "we" as well as expressions which serve as indicators of the concepts of Good/Evil, was conducted by the two authors (both native Greek speakers) who periodically met in order to compare and discuss the results of their individual and independent analysis and to find an agreement. The analysis here is predominantly qualitative, supported by some statistical data on the assumption that a purely quantitative analysis would not necessarily provide reliable outcomes. The occurrence of linguistic features related to this analysis is presented as a percentage of the word total of the statements.


PRESENTATION OF DATA

Frequency of "I" and "We"

Table 1: Percentages of "I" and "we" per summit-statement

BEFORE			AFTER		
DATE			DATE		
	WE	I		WE	I
25-6-2015	2,5 %	5 %	26-6-2015	1,26 %	0 %
12-7-2015	8,33 %	2,77 %	13-7-2015	5,14 %	0,91 %
23-9-2015	4,76 %	0 %	24-9-2015	1,57 %	0,39 %
15-10-2015	5,08 %	2,54 %	15-10-2015	2,61 %	1,6 %
25-10-2015	6,43 %	3,46 %	26-10-2015	1,91 %	0,19 %
TOTAL	5,75%	3,11%	TOTAL	2,96%	0,79%

Bar graph 1: Frequency of “I” and “we” in the corpus



The table and the bar charts compare the frequency of the first singular pronoun “I” with the frequency of the first plural pronoun “we” in Tsipras’ statements before and after the summits. The table, in particular, lists the occurrence of the first-person pronouns in each pair of statements, given in a chronological order. The frequencies concerning the whole corpus are further illustrated in the bar charts.

As can be seen, both before and after the summits “we” is employed to a greater extent than “I”. Moreover, both “I” and “we” present a decline in the post-summit statements. More specifically, “I” plummets from 3,11% of the word total of the statements before the summits to 0,7% after them. Similarly, the occurrence of “we” in the post-summit statements was nearly half in relation to the pre-summit statements.

Identities constructed through “We”

Presenting the identities

The first plural pronoun “we” in Tsipras’ pre/post-summit statements represents three distinct identities:

- IDENTITY 1 stands for the Prime Minister of Greece and the Greek government
- IDENTITY 2 stands for the Prime Minister of Greece, the Greek government and the Greek people
- IDENTITY 3 stands for the Prime Minister of Greece and the rest of the European Union political leaders

The following extract serves to illustrate IDENTITY 1 and IDENTITY 2.

Extract 1 from post-summit statement, on 13.07.2015

Δώσαμε μια σκληρή μάχη έξι μήνες τώρα και μέχρι τέλους παλέψαμε προκειμένου να διεκδικήσουμε ό,τι καλύτερο. Μια συμφωνία που θα δώσει τη δυνατότητα να σταθεί η χώρα στα πόδια της και ο ελληνικός λαός να μπορέσει να συνεχίσει να αγωνίζεται. Βρεθήκαμε μπροστά σε δύσκολες αποφάσεις, σε σκληρά διλήμματα. Πήραμε την ευθύνη της απόφασης, προκειμένου να αποτρέψουμε την υλοποίηση των πιο ακραίων επιδιώξεων των πιο ακραίων συντηρητικών κύκλων στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση.

We have been giving a tough fight for six months, and till the very end we fought in order that we assert the best agreement, an agreement which will enable the Greek people to continue their fight and the country to stand on its own two feet. We have been found facing hard decisions and hard dilemmas. We took the responsibility of deciding so that we deter the implementation of the most extreme pursuits of the most extreme conservative groups in the EU.

The importance of this extract lies in the historical context in which it was produced since it is related to the agreement Tsipras reached at the summit following the referendum, which took place on 05.07.2015 and concerned whether Greece was to accept the bailout conditions in the country's government-debt crisis ("Greece debt crisis," 2015a). Hence, the first three "we" in the text may represent IDENTITY 1, probably suggesting that it is Tsipras and his government who actually made this "best agreement" that he is talking about possible while the two "we" in the row may denote the IDENTITY 2, as it is the Greek people who "were found facing hard decision and hard dilemmas" when they decided to reject the bailout conditions by responding to the yes or no question of the referendum.

Extract 2 from pre-summit statement on 25.10.2015 illustrates IDENTITY 3:


*Ωστόσο, ένας κρίσιμος κρίκος, η Τουρκία, δεν έχει προσκληθεί, άρα, σήμερα, η συζήτηση θα διεξαχθεί μεταξύ των χωρών που βρίσκονται στο δρόμο των μεταναστευτικών ροών. Ωστόσο, όλοι γνωρίζουν ότι στο τέλος του διαδρόμου υπάρχει μία είσοδος. Άρα, αν εμείς δε **μπορέσουμε** να **συμφωνήσουμε** με τη χώρα που βρίσκεται στην είσοδο αυτού του δρόμου, πιστεύω, ότι θα είναι πολύ δύσκολο να **βρούμε** μία κάποια λύση.*

*An important connecting link, Turkey, has not been invited. So, today the discussion will be held among the countries located on the road of the migration flows. Yet, everybody knows that at the end of the road there is an entrance. So, if **we** first do not agree with the country from which the migration flows pass, I believe that it will be difficult for **us** to find a solution.*


The text here is mainly about migration and refugee movements. In this extract, "we" represents IDENTITY 3 implying that it is all of the EU political members participating in the summits that may have a difficulty finding a solution. Yet, although Tsipras is also included in this identity (IDENTITY 3), since he is a EU political leader too, it is worth noticing that he uses "we" but gives the impression of referring to "they/them" (all other political leaders except him). In other words, Tsipras explicitly includes himself in the group of the EU political leaders but at the same time he seems to implicitly do the opposite, namely exclude himself.

Frequency of Identities

Pie Chart 1: Frequency of ID1, ID2 and ID3 before the summits



Pie Chart 2: Frequency of ID1, ID2 and ID3 after the summits



The pie charts represent the frequency in which the three categories of the pronoun “we” occur before and after the summits. As can be seen from the graphs, the first category, namely “we” as the Greek government, constitutes only 4,16% of the word total in Tsipras’ statements, while there is a dramatic rise to 58,92% in his post-summit ones. In other words, although the IDENTITY 1 constituted only a minority with respect to the IDENTITY 2 and IDENTITY 3 before the summits, over half of the “we” employed after them fall into IDENTITY 1. On the other hand, IDENTITY 3 was a significant majority in the pre-summit statements (87,5%) but was the least used category in his post-summit statements (14,28%). Finally, IDENTITY 2 was neither a majority nor a minority in his statements both before and after the summits. However, it can be observed that there was a great increase from 8,33% before the summits to 26,78% in its use after them.

Projections upon Identities

It can be claimed that Tsipras in his pre/post-summit statements makes projections of Good/Evil mainly upon IDENTITY 1 and IDENTITY 3. In the extract below Tsipras makes a comparison between the EU political leaders and the Greek government. In other words, he compares IDENTITY 1 and IDENTITY 3.

Extract 3 from post-summit statement, on 26.06.2015

*Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση με τις καταστατικές τις αρχές **υπερασπιζόταν** τη δημοκρατία, την αλληλεγγύη, τον αμοιβαίο σεβασμό. Αυτές οι αρχές **δεν βασίστηκαν** σε εκβιασμό και σε τελεσίγραφα. Ειδικά σ' αυτούς τους δύσκολους και χαλεπούς καιρούς, κανένας δεν έχει το δικαίωμα να θέτει σε κίνδυνο αυτές τις αρχές. Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση **θα συνεχίσει** με αποφασιστικό τρόπο να δίνει τον αγώνα υπέρ αυτών των αξιών.*

*The European Union and its principles **used to defend** democracy, solidarity and mutual respect. These principles **were not based on** blackmail and ultimatums. Nobody has the right to jeopardize these principles, especially in such hard and turbulent times. The Greek government **is determined to keep on fighting** for these values.*

In this extract Tsipras uses the past tense to describe a past state which seems to have stopped, whereas when referring to the Greek government he uses the present tense. In this way, he implies that today's EU (IDENTITY 3) does not defend democracy, solidarity and mutual respect, which the Greek government (IDENTITY 1) does.

Extract 4 from pre-summit statement, on 25.10.2015

*Δυστυχώς, έως σήμερα, ήταν πολύ δύσκολο να βρούμε μία λύση, **διότι αρκετές χώρες υιοθέτησαν μία στάση, η οποία μεταφραζόταν να μην βρεθεί το πρόβλημα.***

Unfortunately, till today, it was very difficult for us to find a solution because several countries adopted an attitude which was interpreted as if they did not want the problem to be seen.

Extract 5 from post-summit statement, on 15.10.2015

Δυστυχώς, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση κινείται με ρυθμούς χελώνας, όταν οι εξελίξεις γύρω μας τρέχουν με ραγδαίες ταχύτητες. Αντιμετωπίζουμε, ίσως, ένα υπαρξιακό πρόβλημα, ως ευρωπαϊκή ένωση. Πρέπει να το αντιμετωπίσουμε μέσα από την αρχή της αλληλεγγύης και της συνεργασίας και του διαμερισμού της ευθύνης. Οι αποφάσεις που πάρθηκαν σήμερα, είναι προς τη σωστή κατεύθυνση. Υπενθυμίζω, ότι η ελληνική πλευρά από τον περασμένο Μάρτιο είχε θέσει την αναγκαιότητα συνεργασίας με την Τουρκία, ώστε να μειωθούν οι τεράστιες προσφυγικές ροές.

Unfortunately, the European Union moves at a snail's pace while things are moving rapidly. We probably face an existential problem as EU. We have to fix it with the principles of solidarity and cooperation and the allocation of responsibility. The decisions taken today are on the right direction. I remind that the Greek part had –since last March – set the need for cooperation with Turkey so that the huge refugee flows can be reduced.

In extracts 4 and 5 Tsipras claims that the EU political leaders (IDENTITY 3) neglected the proposal of the Greek government (IDENTITY 1) that immediate action regarding the migration flows be taken, therefore presenting the IDENTITY 3 as Evil and IDENTITY 1 as Good. As Wodak and Boukala (2014) point out “huge tensions within Europe and the European Union lead to fragile balance” between “us” and “them”, which automatically raises the question who are the gatekeepers that take decisions on who is allowed to cross which boundaries, when and how, through the pretext of national security” (p. 176). Tsipras here implies that it is IDENTITY 3 who plays the role of the gatekeepers and fails to exhibit “solidarity, cooperation and share in responsibility” which IDENTITY 2 on the contrary does “since last March”.

The following extract serves to illustrate Tsipras’ projection of Good and Evil upon IDENTITY 2 and IDENTITY 3.

Extract 6 from post-summit statement, on 13.07.2015

Πήραμε την ευθύνη της απόφασης, προκειμένου να αποτρέψουμε την υλοποίηση των πιο ακραίων επιδιώξεων των πιο ακραίων συντηρητικών κύκλων στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση.

We took the responsibility of deciding so that we deter the implementation of the most extreme pursuits of the most extreme conservative groups in the EU.

As can be seen, Tsipras claims that it was IDENTITY 2 that prevented IDENTITY 3 from “implementing the most extreme pursuits”, through the referendum, thus projecting Evilness on IDENTITY 3 and presenting IDENTITY 2 as Good. The superlative degree as well as the very choice of the words “conservative” and “extreme” in the phrases “the most extreme pursuits” and “the most conservative” intensifies this projection.

Discussion

According to Beard (2000) the use of the first singular pronoun “I” shows personal involvement while the plural form “we” gives a sense of collectivity, helps to share responsibility and is mostly employed by politicians when they want to present uncertain news and tricky decisions (p.44). In his pre-summit statements Tsipras does not deliver any news but he declares his optimistic views concerning the summits. Thus, “I” is highly preferred in Tsipras’ pre-summit statements with a view to expressing his true or fake optimism regarding the negotiations and highlight his engagement in the very process of negotiating. On the other hand, “we” is mostly used in the post-summit statements probably because he wants to announce the outcome of the summits in a way that implies shared responsibility among the EU leaders and/or because he may want to avoid presenting himself as self-important. The same reasons may also explain Tsipras’ general preference of “we” to “I” in both the pre/post-summit statements. Moreover, one could also notice a decline to the extent that both “I” and “we” are employed in the post-summit statements. Avoiding the use of these pronouns in his post-summit statements, Tsipras may want to emphasize the result of the negotiations, namely the consensus reached rather than the agents involved in the process of negotiating.

As Fairclough (2004) points out, social relations and identities are manifest through pronouns in discourse (p.137). Hence, it is observed that IDENTITY 3 has a leading role in Tsipras' pre-summit statements while IDENTITY 1 is dominant in the post-summit ones. Conversely, IDENTITY 2 has a stable position in both pre/post-summit statements, which was partly expected, especially if one considers the fact that the Greek people being represented by Tsipras have a passive role in the summits. Nonetheless, it was initially assumed that IDENTITY 3 would be a significant majority in Tsipras' both pre/post-summit statements. This was our hypothesis because the negotiations towards a positive agreement, a consensus favoring Greece are totally dependent on all the EU political leaders. However, our assumption was not confirmed. It was IDENTITY 1 that was mostly employed in the post-summit statements while IDENTITY 3 was the least used. A possible explanation could be Tsipras' intention to highlight the role of his government in the negotiations and present the consensus reached as a personal achievement. The fact that IDENTITY 1 was favored after the summits can also be associated with Tsipras' intention to confirm the historic voters and secure the expectations of the citizens. According to Bongelli, Riccioni and Zuczkowski (2013), politicians favoring themselves in their speeches strengthen the audiences' trust and at the same time convince them of the goodness, truthfulness and appropriateness of their own reasons and proposals (p.77).

Our research demonstrates that IDENTITY 1 and IDENTITY 2 are depicted as Good in Tsipras' statements, while IDENTITY 3 is portrayed as Evil. Nevertheless, although Tsipras is also included in IDENTITY 3 since he is a EU political leader too, he uses "we" but seems to be referring to "they/them" (all other political leaders except him). Tsipras is just a small part of a whole as far as the IDENTITY 3 is concerned. So, the negative connotations of Evil are mostly related to the other EU political leaders, which sets a basis of a comparison between the three identities and enhances the Goodness of IDENTITY 1 and IDENTITY 2. This may be due to the fact that left-wing political ideology in Greece generally tends to adopt a negative attitude towards the institution of the EU.

Conclusion

In conclusion, pronouns play a significant role in political discourse in that they serve to construct group identities on the one hand and make the projections of Good/Evil upon those identities on the other. More specifically, the first-person pronouns influence the overall effect of Tsipras' speeches. "We" is mostly employed with a view to exhibiting collaboration in politics while "I" is less used to highlight his personal involvement in the EU political stage. Moreover, "we" has been interpreted as including many agents in a way that three different identities are constructed, the role of which is associated with the projections of Good/Evil upon them.

Further research could examine a broader corpus of pre/post-summit statements. In addition, one could also examine the effect that projections of Good/Evil upon the identities may have on lay audience.

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Fictitiously oriental epistolary travel novels of the Enlightenment: a paradigmatic example for European discourse of identity

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a literary genre that can be considered paradigmatic for the functioning of European discourse. The genre experienced its peak during the long eighteenth century while the modern understanding of Europe was developing. Thus, European authors created Oriental characters that travel to the authors' countries and in letters share their observations with their compatriots. However, the Oriental travellers are fictitious; the real observers and creators of the letters are the European authors themselves. Applying Michel Foucault's concept of discourse, presented in *Orders of Discourse* (1970), and complementing it with Jürgen Link's (1988) comments for literary purposes, the paper aims at analysing how the differences concerning the Other create unity despite the differences between the neighbouring countries. Thus, the analysis is to exemplify how diversity within becomes unity by opposing itself to an external Other, and how the creation of European identity works on a discursive level.

Keywords: Europe, eighteenth century, fiction, Other, Orient, Foucault

INTRODUCTION

The characteristic features of modern Europe such as we know it today – with its plurality, but also with its dichotomies – essentially developed, as research of the last decades has confirmed (cf. Schmale, 2012, p. 291 or Chaunu, 1982, p. 464f.), in the eighteenth century through enlightened debates. Thus we can read descriptions that seem surprisingly current:

The Christian Europe is so agitated, and there are so many different interests which make her move, that it is not surprising, if one often receives false information, much of which is made circulate on purpose [...]. There is agitation in England & in Scotland, as in the rest of Europe, & the matters are in such confusion, that there is much reason to fear some fatal event to this big Empire, which is governed by different people, & of which the authority equals that of the King, if it is not bigger.¹

L'Europe chrétienne est si agitée, & il y a tant de differens interest qui la mettent en mouvement [...]. Il y a des troubles en Angleterre & en Ecosse, comme dans le reste de l'Europe, & les affaires y sont si brouillées, qu'on y appréhende avec beaucoup de raison quelque événement fatal à ce grand Royaume, qui est gouverné par des personnes différentes, & dont il y en a de qui l'autorité est égale à celle du Roy, si elle n'es pas plus grande. (Marana, 1684, letter 99², p. 396f.)

Does not this quote seem to have been written today? It has, however, been taken from the first known text of a genre which can be considered paradigmatic for the functioning of European discourse. It developed and experienced its peak during the 'long eighteenth century'³, simultaneously to the already

¹ The translation is mine, which also holds for further translations of citations in the present paper.

² Concerning the texts cited, I always include, for better orientation, the number of the letter, which, from now on, will be abbreviated with "l.".

³ The eighteenth century, used as a synonym of the Enlightenment, is „long“ in the sense that it can be considered to already start before the ‚mathematical‘ century, as Paul Hazard (1994) has shown, for instance. Thus, he places its beginning around 1680 (p. 9).

mentioned modern understanding of Europe. Therefore, I wish to present this genre that I name the *fictitiously Oriental epistolary travel novel*⁴. It can be described as follows: European authors, from France, Great Britain, Spain and the German speaking area imagine Oriental characters that travel to their countries in order to observe the peculiarities of these places. The authors make these fictitious Orientals spend several years there and write letters to their compatriots, in which they share their observations of the visited countries. However, the real observers and creators of these letters are the European authors themselves.

Thus, in the following paragraphs I will analyse how this literary genre creates a specific discourse structure, focusing on Foucault's *Orders of Discourse* and Link's reintegrating discourse theory for literary texts, based itself on Foucault. By doing this, we are going to look at several texts of the mentioned genre, such as the first known example of the genre, Gian Paolo Marana's *L'esploratore turco* (1684), Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes* (1721) and other texts that I will mention along the lines. In a first step, I will present Foucault's and Link's theories, focusing on the aspects which will be relevant for the analysis and at the same time evaluating the theories critically. In a second step, I will analyse the genre according to these theories on three levels: first, its narrative constellation, second, the function of the Oriental, and third, the discursive dimensions concerning Europe. The results are finally going to be resumed in the conclusions. We will see how diversity within becomes unity by opposing itself to an external Other, and how the creation of European identity works on a discursive level.

1 THEORETICAL INSTRUMENTS: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS IN LITERARY TEXTS

1.1 Michel Foucault's *Orders of discourse* (1971)

Let us start, then, with certain theoretical aspects of Foucault's opening lecture that he delivered in 1970 when entering the *Collège de France*, entitled *L'ordre du discours*, or, in English, *Orders of discourse*⁵. *Discourse* is defined by Foucault basically as “the fact people speak” (Foucault, 1971, p. 8), that is, the act of speaking itself (Bilba, 2014, p. 527 and p. 531). However, in the course of his explanation, Foucault (1971) points out differences within different kinds of speech acts, or, things actually said by people. On the one hand, he mentions “discourse 'uttered' in the course of the day and in casual meetings, and which disappears with the very act which gave rise to it” (p. 12), and on the other hand “those forms of discourse that lie at the origins of a certain number of new verbal acts, which are reiterated, transformed or discussed” (p. 12). This differentiation is carried out, according to Foucault (1971), by certain more or less officially established “procedures” (p. 8) within society.

Foucault (1971) distinguishes three types of such procedures: first, those placed at the exterior of discourse, which he calls “rules of exclusion” (p. 8) in society; they are discursive behaviours that are socially and institutionally despised. Next, he examines procedures at the interior of discourse, “where discourse exercises its own control” (p. 12), to which he counts, second, procedures of “events and chance” (p. 12) as internal influences to order discourse, and, third, those of a “rarefaction among speaking subjects” (p. 17). Within each one of these categories of procedures, Foucault (1971) points out three principles⁶. However, as for our analysis one principle of each procedure will be particularly revealing, I will keep to these three, that is: the opposition of “reason and folly” (p. 14), “commentary” (p. 12), and “fellowship of discourse” (p. 18)⁷. For analytical reasons I am going to present the first two

⁴ Up to now, the genre has been named in different ways. Thus, in order to give only few examples, Klaus-Jürgen Bremer speaks of a “pseudo-orientalische Briefsatire“, a “pseudo-Oriental epistolary satire“ (Bremer, 1971, p. 84); Wolf Hermann Steinsieck names it the “pseudo-orientalische Reisekorrespondenz“, the „pseudo-Oriental travel correspondence“ (Steinsieck, 1975, p. 64). Comparing it to Bremer's denomination, this term has the advantage of including the aspect of travelling. However, “pseudo“ seems to imply an absence, whereas it possesses, as we will see, creative capacities.

⁵ Unless noted explicitly, I am using and citing the translation carried out by Rupert Swyer (1971), which appeared in *Social science information*, 10 (2), 7-30.

<http://ssi.sagepub.com/content/10/2/7.short?rss=1&ssource=mfr>

⁶ That is: first, concerning rules of exclusion: tabus, folly opposed to reason, and false versus true ; second, concerning events and chance: commentary, author and disciplines, and, third, concerning the rarefaction among speaking subjects: ritual, fellowships of discourse and education (cf. Foucault, 1971, p. 8ff.).

⁷ In French, “société de discours” (Foucault, 1971, p. 41, French version).

in inverted order.

Thus, we will begin by looking into procedures of events and chance, and, in particular, into commentary. Commentary is based on the premise mentioned above, that discourse is organised as a hierarchy: many things said, such as daily utterances, disappear immediately after having been spoken, others become foundational texts that continue being 'said' and being talked about.⁸ Commentary can be designed as an in-between of both: it does not disappear immediately after being uttered, but is not a primary text, either. Mainly, however, it has an enhancing effect on the quality of an original text as such (Foucault, 1971, p. 13): by talking about it, even though in opposition to it, commentary places the foundational text in the centre of discourse (Foucault, 1971, p. 12). Commentary has, therefore, a repetitive function or is, as Foucault puts it, a "masked repetition" (p. 13). In fact, the lines of the present paper are a commentary on Foucault's text, so that we are, actually, enhancing it. Yet, for the purpose of the analysis of discourse in the above mentioned genre, it is necessary to refer to the semantic amplexness of the principle of commentary: it can also take the form of an imitation or continuation, that is, refer to the original text by way of intertextual allusions. We will shortly see the importance of this aspect.

The second principle I would like to present concerning the ordering of discourse according to Foucault is placed at the exterior of discourse, that is, in social conventions: I am referring to *folly* as a *rule of exclusion*. Opposed to reason, it serves to mark that which is 'outside' the norm. Thus, as the non-accepted, it highlights normative discursive behaviour, or, discourses that are evaluated as 'rational'. Interestingly, Foucault (1971) indicates the ambivalent connotation of folly in occidental society: always placed at the margins of society, it can, nevertheless, be designated, and it has been so, both as imbecility and as geniality. Thus, although a 'mad man's' words were considered, in the Middle Ages, as "nul [sic] and void" (p. 9), at the same time they were "credited with strange powers, of revealing some hidden truth, of predicting the future, [...] what the wise were unable to perceive" (p. 9). This aspect will prove central in our upcoming analysis concerning the function of the fictitious Orientals we are going to look into.

The third and final principle that is to be described in this context forms part of procedures of *rarefaction among the speaking subjects*: these procedures serve to establish certain conditions of discourse, so that the access to it is limited to those individuals who fulfil those conditions (Foucault, 1971, p. 17). The principle itself is denominated by Foucault (1971) the "fellowship of discourse" (p. 18). Such a fellowship is established by demanding a certain discursive knowledge from its members. Foucault (1971) furnishes the example of Rhapsodists who possess the knowledge of certain poems to recite (p. 18). The *disciplines*, described by Foucault (1971, p. 15) as principle of the second procedure (that of events and chance), become thus a *fellowship of discourse*, for they presuppose that individuals exercising them would have a knowledge of specific methods and terms (Foucault, p. 31f.). In the analysis which we are going to carry out, we will show that the examined genre indirectly also establishes such a fellowship of discourse.

Now, Foucault (1971) underlines that all of these procedures and principles rely on "institutional support" (p. 11) and are, thus, "neither stable, nor constant, nor absolute" (p. 12), which adverts the social and historical relativity of such procedures and values concerning discourse. Therefore it can be illuminating to examine how discourse was connoted in certain societies at certain historical moments. The fictitiously oriental travel novels of the Enlightenment as a historical genre are such kinds of documents. However, whereas Foucault focusses mainly on scientific discourse⁹, the mentioned genre, due to its fictitious and narrative form and characters, is to be counted rather to the *belles lettres*. As a consequence, we are to ask up to which point Foucault's theory can be applied in this case. In fact, Jürgen Link in 1988 published an essay on the subject, entitled "Literary analysis as inter-discourse

⁸ It has to be stressed that discourse in Foucault's (1971) sense is to be understood both as oral and as written 'utterance', for he considers both "discourse 'uttered' in the course of the day and in casual meetings" (p. 12) and authors' writings (p. 14).

⁹ Foucault's (1971) understanding of discourse as scientific becomes explicit, when he speaks of the disciplines (cf. p. 15f.), as well as when he mentions it in the following way: "Whether it is the philosophy of a founding subject, a philosophy of originating experience or a philosophy of universal mediation, discourse is really only an activity, of writing in the first case, of reading in the second and exchange in the third." (p. 21).

analysis”¹⁰, where he argues why and how Foucault's discourse analysis can nevertheless be applied to literary texts. His proposal shall briefly be presented in the following paragraphs.

1.2 Jürgen Link's “Literary analysis as interdiscourse analysis” (1988)

Recognising that Foucault with his “analysis of historically specific 'discursive formations'” (Link, 1988, p. 284) aims in particular at the production of scientific knowledge or, as Foucault would say, of the disciplines as such, Link (1988) pronounces the difficulty of linking this approach to literary analysis (p. 284f.). However, he discovers a connection between the specialised discursive formations and literary analysis: that of “interdiscursive elements” (Link, 1988, p. 286), which he defines as linguistic elements that are used and understood in different disciplines – that is analogies, metaphors, symbols (p. 286). As a particularly representative example he uses the balloon to point out what he calls a “collective symbol” (Link, 1988, p. 286): a symbol that, due to its socio-historical importance, is generally understood and can be used as metaphor for different disciplines. Thus, the balloon can represent scientific discourse, being a machine, religious discourse as a kind of miracle (Link, 1988, p. 289), as well as poetic discourse in the sense of the fascinating power of classical poetry (Link, 1988, p. 287). According to Link (1988), literature elaborates on such interdiscursive elements (p. 286). The task of literary discourse analysis would be, then, to isolate those elements and detect the different disciplines they may refer to.

For our following examination, the presented aspects of Foucault's (1971) and Link's (1988) reflections will serve as theoretical and structural support to highlight the functioning of discourse in the presented genre. Thus, as a first step, I will present the narrative constellation of the genre. The narratological terms used, based mostly on Genette (1972 and 2002), will be explained in the context. We will see that the individual texts can be understood as commentary in Foucault's (1971) sense of the two intertextually most influential works of the genre: Marana's *L'esploratore turco* and Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes* respectively. In a second step, I will point out how the concept of reason and folly can be applied to the narrative technique of criticising society in the texts. Finally, I will show how opposition of Europe and Orient is created by means of a *fellowship of discourse*, employing certain collective symbols.

2 ANALYSIS: DISCOURSE ON EUROPE IN FICTITIOUSLY ORIENTAL EPISTOLARY TRAVEL NOVELS

2.1 Narrative constellation of the genre

In order to define the genre according to its narrative characteristics, I will present those texts that have substantially influenced the whole genre: the first known work of this kind, Gian Paolo Marana's *L'esploratore turco* (1684) and Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes* (2003, original text published 1721). As my above mentioned denomination of the genre, *fictitiously oriental epistolary travel novels*, suggests, the genre is composed of three characteristic elements that are to be presented in the following.

Starting with the adjective “epistolary”, it denotes a particular technique of composing novels, that is, in the form of letters. Famous epistolary novels such as *Pamela* (1740) by Samuel Richardson, *The sorrows of young Werther* (1774) by Goethe or *Dangerous liaisons* (1782) by Choderlos de Laclos share the fact that the whole 'plot' is transmitted and narrated exclusively in letters. This epistolary character implies the absence of a narrator: there is no *voice*, in Genette's (1972) terms (p. 224ff.), which introduces characters, organises the telling of events etc. Nevertheless, let us be precise, the content, that is, the letters themselves, are an invention of their authors. However, the letter form implies not only the absence of a narrative voice, but also determines focalisation: all letters are internally focalised; in each, voice and focalisation coincide, that is, the letter writer is, at the same time, the one who perceives. As to 'our' case, the (fictitious) letter writers, and therefore those who perceive, are (invented) characters from the Near and Far East.

Let us consider these aspects with two concrete examples. First, Marana's *L'esploratore turco*. What we find here is, in the terms of Herman (1989), a *monody* (p. 85ff.): there is only one letter writer, the so-called 'Turkish spy' named Mahmut Arabo. He writes, nonetheless, letters to 34 different addressees,

¹⁰ I have translated the title of the German original (Link, 1988): “Literaturanalyse als Interdiskursanalyse”. All the following quotes of this text are my translations.

such as Bekhir Bassà, the eunuch page Mehemet, the Grand Visir, the Caimakam, the Dervis Mehmet Bassà, a Mufti, the Captain Aga of the Janissaries, but also his mother Ocoumiche, to give only some examples. These titles already allude to their Ottoman and Muslim background. They can be attributed to different thematic fields, be it politics, religion, military or the family. Thus, the fictitious letter writer has the occasion of writing about various topics in the observed society. Concerning Montesquieu's text, it presents a prototypical example of a polyphony (Herman, 1989, p. 85ff.): altogether, 19 different characters write letters, mainly Persians, some of them from Europe, most of them from the Orient.¹¹ Due to the above mentioned blending of voice and focalisation typical for epistolary novels, the effect is multiperspectivism in which different opinions and attitudes can be expressed and opposed one to another; and yet, here too, all of them are (fictitiously) from the Orient.

The second characteristic element of the genre is the journey from the East to the countries of the authors. Thus, in *L'esploratore turco*, the above mentioned spy Mahmut travels, commissioned by the Sublime Porte, from Constantinople to Paris, in order to report on the events at the court of the French king Louis XIV. As in most of the texts, the voyage is resumed in the first letter:

After 144 days of route I have concluded my journey. I have arrived in this town called Paris in the fourth [month], counting in the Christian way. In Hungary I did not stop, and in Vienna of Austria I spent 41 days. At that court, I observed all that I was told by the Sublime Porte, and I referred everything to the invincible Visir Azem [...].

In 144. giorni di camino ò terminato il mio viaggio. Sono giunto in questa città di Parigi alli 4 [mesi], contando al modo dei Christiani. In Ongaria non mi sono fermato, & in Vienna d'Austria hò consumato 41. giorni di stanza. Hò osservato in quella Corte quanto mi è stato prescritto dall'Eccelsa Porta, e tutto hò riferito all'invincibile Visir Azem [...]. (Marana, 1684, p. 1f.)

In this extract, we receive, on the one hand, a summary of the time passed and the places stopped at during the journey. On the other hand, we equally get to know the function of the traveller: he is to inform the Sublime Porte according to its wishes. In Montesquieu's text, four people are travelling: Usbek, Rica, Rhédi and Nargum, all originally from Persia, thus amplifying the observations made and making it possible to compare them.

The third characteristic element of the genre, the fictitiously oriental aspect, has by now probably already become clear by itself: by creating texts in which the letter writers and travellers come from the Near and Far East (e.g. the Ottoman Empire, Persia or China), the point of view is that of these invented Oriental characters. Thus, the description of the countries of the authors (and readers) undergoes an alienation effect. It is created by employing orientalisising terms. That is, terms from the Oriental context are used to describe typical phenomena of the observed culture. Thus, in Goldsmith's *The Citizen of the world*, the Chinese letter writer Lien Chi Altangi describes the ritual of an Anglican mass, often including references to Confucian or Taoist customs:

Some time since I sent thee, oh holy disciple of Confucius, an account of the grand abbey or mausoleum of the kings and heroes of this nation. I have since been introduced to a temple not so ancient, but far superior in beauty and magnificence. [...] In this temple I was permitted to remain during the whole service; and were you not already acquainted with the religion of the English, you might, from my description, be inclined to believe them as grossly idolatrous as the disciples of Lao. The idol which they seem to address, strides like a colossus over the door of the inner temple, which here [...] is esteem'd the most sacred part of the building. It's [sic!] oracles are delivered in an hundred various tones; which seem to inspire the worshippers with enthusiasm and awe [...]. When it began to speak, all the people remained fix'd in silent attention, nodding assent, looking approbation, appearing highly edified by those sounds, which to a stranger might seem inarticulate and unmeaning. (Goldsmith, 1966, l. 41, p. 173f.)

In this example, we find both the presence of orientalisising terms, such as "temple" instead of „church“, references to Confucian or Taoist customs, such as "the disciples of Lao", and the absence of Christian technical terms, such as "church", "priest" or "mass". Letters written from the original places of the travellers, as is the case in Montesquieu's text, reinforce this orientalisising effect, as well as the

¹¹ In the order of their appearance they are the following: Usbek, Zachi, Zéphiss, Rustan, Fatmé, the First Eunuch, Mirza, Méhémet-Ali, Jaron, Rica, Rhédi, Hagi Ibbsi, Pharan, Nargum envoy from Persia in Moscovie, Zélis, Ibben, Narsit, Solim and Roxane.

comparison of phenomena in the original and the observed culture. Thus, we can observe a double inversion of familiar and foreign worlds: on the one hand, for the oriental character the world familiar to the author and the reader is foreign; on the other hand, the world familiar to the readers becomes foreign to themselves by experiencing it through the (fictitious) observer's point of view. We will come back to this aspect in an instance.

Before, however, I would like to draw our first link to the principle of Foucault's (1971) mentioned at the beginning: commentary. In fact, I have used out of all Marana's (1684) and Montesquieu's (2003) texts to illustrate the characteristics of the genre, because it was them who influenced all the others – or the others who continued, imitated and positioned themselves to them. Thus, Daniel Defoe (1718) wrote his *Continuation of letters written by a Turkish spy in Paris* and continued explicitly Marana's work. George Lyttelton (1735) wrote the *Letters written by a Persian in London to his Friend at Ispahan*, and many others mention a relationship to one of these two texts more or less explicitly.¹² After all, by creating a text in the narrative form presented above, they already position themselves clearly in the line of these two works. Thus, by creating such kinds of continuations, imitations and intertextual references, we find commentary to at least one of the two presented *original texts* in Foucault's terms, in the sense that the 'foundational' text is kept in mind and reinforced. This does not mean, of course, that the other texts do not possess any aspects in which they differ from the original. In fact, Cadalso's *Cartas marruecas*, for instance, can in many ways be read as an opposition to Montesquieu, not only concerning the image of Spain (Tschiltschke, 2005). But the original text is, nevertheless, re-evoked, and, thus, commented on.

2.2 The Oriental observers as Foucault's folly – or reason?

Let us move on to the second presented principle of Foucault: that of *exclusion of folly* in opposition to *reason*. As we have recently seen, the fictitious Oriental observer is an essential element in the narrative 'architecture' of the genre. In fact, as we could see concerning the alienation effect, these characters receive the function of a subject that is external to the society described. Thus, it would seem plausible that they are the folly as opposed to reason. In the following lines, however, we are going to show up to which point, this function is indeed fulfilled and in what measure the signs are inverted, the Oriental observers becoming the element of reason and the observed society that of folly.

The very first appearances underline, in fact, the strangeness that the observer himself feels due to his being foreign to the place. Therefore the Oriental might appear, at first glance, as external folly to the described society. Thus, in Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes*, Usbek states in a letter to Rhédi his curiosity regarding the new place: "I spend my life examining: in the evenings I write what I have observed, what I have seen, what I have heard during the day: I am interested in everything, surprised at everything: I am like a child, whose still tender organs are impressed vividly by the least objects." („Je passe ma vie à examiner : j'écris le soir ce que j'ai remarqué, ce que j'ai vu, ce que j'ai entendu dans la journée: tout m'intéresse, tout m'étonne: je suis comme un enfant, dont les organes encore tendres sont vivement frappés par les moindres objets.") (Montesquieu, 2003, l. 48, p. 128) The Persian Usbek is made describe himself as a child that is naive, and therefore often placed, like the lunatic, at the margins of the 'reasonable' society. A similar case appears in Goudar's (1774) *L'espion chinois*, when Cham-pi-pi is made describe to Kié-tou-na his arrival to France: "We left the Orient the day before yesterday in a public carriage, in order to head towards the capital of the European world. The further we advanced on the continent, we were looking for France everywhere, & could nowhere find it." („Nous sortîmes avant hier de l'Orient dans une voiture publique, pour nous rendre dans la Capitale du monde Européen. A mesure que nous avançons dans le Continent, nous cherchions par-tout la France, & ne la trouvions nulle part.") (l. 6, p. 9) Up to this point, it seems to hear someone speak who is looking for a small object, not knowing that a country cannot be 'found' in this manner. It seems, in short, that we have to do with a lunatic. However, reading on, it turns out to be different, I quote: "Instead of a fertile and abundant land, such as we had imagined it, only dry earth and deserts presented themselves to our view." („Au lieu d'un Pays fertile & abondant, tel que nous nous l'étions

¹² Thus, Friedrich Wilhelm von Meyern in 1787 creates a character that is the grandson of Montesquieu's traveller Usbek (Meyern, 1787, p. 8ff.); Cadalso, as for him, tries to defend the Spanish nation against the images created in the *Lettres persanes*. Thus, Cadalso (2006) has Gazel write that "Uno de los defectos de la nación española, según el sentir de los demás europeos, es el orgullo." (l. 38, p. 241). He certainly refers to the passage where Montesquieu (1721) makes Rica quote the letter that a French traveller in the fiction wrote about Spain: "On conçoit aisément que des peuples graves et flegmatiques, comme ceux-là [les Espagnols et les Portugais], peuvent avoir de l'orgueil: aussi en ont-ils." (Montesquieu, 1721, l. 78, p. 189f.).

représenté, il ne s'offroit à nos regards que des terres arides & des desserts.”) (Goudar, 1774, l. 6, p. 9) In fact, the Chinese observer did not find what he was looking for, because he had expected a place similar in standard to China:

We nowhere discovered any trace of that beautiful Chinese agriculture, which turns our empire into one of the most fertile of universe. France is such today as it came out of the hands of nature: some old oaks, nearly toppling, badly furrowed fields, meadows little irrigated, and orchards that carry some early fruit form the entire national agriculture.

Nous ne découvrîmes nulle part aucune trace de cette belle agriculture Chinoise, qui rend notre Empire un des plus fertiles de l'Univers. Le [sic!] France est telle aujourd'hui qu'elle sortit autrefois des mains de la nature: quelques vieux chênes prêts à crouler, des champs mal sillonnés, des prairies peu arrosées, des vergers qui portent quelques fruits précoces, forment toute l'agriculture nationale. (Goudar, 1774, l. 6, p. 9)

The Oriental observer thus serves to state reality as such. Often, he discovers absurdities, as does Defoe's Turkish spy Mahmut, when he describes the religious quarrels among Christians:

[...] the *Nazareens*, the Worshipers of the Messiah, have run such Divisions among themselves, and rais'd so many Quarrels about Religion [...]. In a Word, they have philosophiz'd so long about their God, and how to call him, that they have quite lost him [...]. [...] among all sorts of Infidels that ever infested the World, these Christians, as they would be called, are arriv'd to the highest Pitch of Infidelity [...]. (Defoe, 2003, l. 24, p. 117)

The Christian religion that should serve, as any religion, to get nearer to God, is so deeply concerned with internal quarrels about the name of God, that instead of approaching it, they 'lose' it. This absurdity is revealed by the Turkish observer. In d'Argens' *Lettres chinoises*, the Chinese traveller Sioeu-Tcheou opposes explicitly the reason of the Chinese to the French and thus implies their folly: “Apart from this, the Chinese, dear Yn-Che-Chan, seem much more reasonable to me in their way of thinking about the public censors than the French in theirs about the parlements.” (d'Argens, 2009, l. 48, p. 489) The Moroccan traveller Gazel in Cadalso's *Cartas marruecas*, for example, rationally states the contemporary misery of Spain:

The decadence of your fatherland in this century can be demonstrated with all geometrical rigor. [...] In the before last century your nation was the most learned of Europe, [...]; but today, the scholars that are thus called here are hardly known on the other side of the Pyrenees.

La decadencia de tu patria en este siglo es capaz de demostración con todo el rigor geométrico. [...] En el siglo antepasado tu nación era la más docta de Europa [...]; pero hoy, del otro lado de los Pirineos, apenas se conocen los socios que así se llaman por acá. (Cadalso, 2006, l. 4, p. 165)

His native interlocutor, on the contrary, does not realize the situation. He defends what he calls the 'culture' of his nation by enumerating examples of superfluous and superficial, even immoral facts, such as the importance of food, the acceptance of lovers by the husbands themselves, or the perfumed powders. By designing these as “honourable” and useful, the folly of the Spanish is exposed to perfection.

Now, according to these aspects it might seem as if the genre inverted the order of discourse that Foucault presented. This is true as far as criticism is concerned: the Oriental observer has the role of exposing the deficiencies of the author's society. Therefore, the external individual has to appear as the element of reason, in opposition to the native society that as a collective personifies folly. However, the alienation effect uncovers a second dimension of difference which shall be the focus of the following lines.¹³

2.3 Europe as *fellowship of discourse* or collective symbols thanks to the Oriental Other

In fact, the alienation effect implies another consequence: the linguistic separation between the Oriental observer and the observed society. It is created, as we have already seen, by using 'orientalising' terms in order to describe phenomena that are considered typical for the described culture. We are now going

¹³ This satirical function has repeatedly been observed in literary criticism on this genre. See, for instance, Rogge, 1966 and Steinsieck, 1975, p. 66ff.

to show that the effect is that of a *rarefaction among the speaking subjects* in the sense of the principle of a *fellowship of discourse*, as we got to know it above, even though on a broad level: the Oriental observer would thus belong to the individuals that are not initiated; concerning the fellowship itself, we will recognise that in the text, Europe corresponds to a cultural collective that can be considered a 'fellowship of discourse' in the sense of Foucault. In order to show this, I am going to point out certain elements which can be named collective symbols in Link's sense, found in the presented genre.

Thus, concerning religion, Defoe's correspondent Mahmut writes in letter 2: „I say, notwithstanding all this, these designing Dervices, and their Pontifical Muffti at Rome, have introduc'd these incoherent Innovations [...].“ (Defoe, 2003, l. 2, p. 64). While describing – and criticising – the reforms carried out by the bishops and the pope, Defoe makes his character use terms of his Muslim religion. Thus, Mahmut appears as an individual that is not instructed in the terms of Christianity and thus placed outside that community.¹⁴ However, besides referring to Muslim religion, he as Muslim functions also as a collective symbol, indicating the whole Oriental culture as such.¹⁵ The Oriental observer symbolizes a religious opposite, as can be seen in the description of the behaviour of the same letter writer:

I have received thy welcome Letter [...]. The Words were no sooner sounded by my Voice, but, without being able to read any farther, I turned my Face towards the happy Shades of Mecca, and blessed the Memory of our great Prophet Mahomet, washing my self with Water, and making my Prayers in Form [...]. (Defoe, 2003, l. 23, p. 114)

Mecca as the holy town, the washing ritual as well as the numerous prayers are symbols that characterise the Muslim faith and, thus, distinguish it from Christianity.

Regarding politics, despotism is, basically, used as a symbol for the Orient, in contrast to republics in Europe, as Montesquieu makes Rhédi state: “One of the things that has provoked my curiosity the most on arriving in Europe is the history of the republics. [...] All this happened in Europe: for, concerning Asia and Africa, they were always tormented by despotism.” (Montesquieu, 2003, l. 131, p. 284ff.) As Oriental, Rhédi, in the fiction, is not used to republics and wants to learn about them; he had been excluded, up to that point, from this of knowledge. Note equally how the two symbols are linked explicitly to the continents as such, and not to single countries or nations. The principle of a *fellowship of discourse* from which the Oriental traveller is excluded can be found in the following narration of a conversation which Lyttelton's traveller attended:

I was this Morning with some Gentlemen of my Acquaintance, who were talking of the Attempt that had been made not long ago of setting up a Press at *Constantinople*, and the Opposition it had met with from the *Mufti*. They applied to me to know what I thought of it, and whether in *Persia* also, it was our Religion that depriv'd us of so useful an Art. I told them, that Policy had more part than Religion in that Affair: That the Press was a very dangerous Engine, and the Abuses of it made us justly apprehend ill Consequences from it. You are in the Right, said one of the Company, for this single Reason, *because your Government is a despotick One*. But, in a free Country the Press may be very useful [...]. (Lyttelton, 1735, l. 50, p. 109)

The manner in which the situation is related illustrates the exclusion of the observer from the collective as if it were a fellowship: not used to what is described as a “free Country”, but only to Despotism, the foreign individual is not initiated and can therefore not evaluate the advantages of the press. Thus, we see the phenomenon of an individual being excluded from a collective. At the same time, in this example the excluding mechanism is not language as it is in Foucault, but opinion.

A third symbolic field I would like to mention is that of gender. We can often find, in these texts, symbols such as the veil and the harem indicating the women's exclusion from public sociability in

¹⁴ In fact, Christianity appears, in many of these texts, as a general marker of Europe, as opposed to Islam in the Ottoman Empire and Persia or Confucianism in China. Thus, Montesquieu's Persian Usbek writes: “We have arrived in Livorno [...]. It is a big spectacle for a Mohammedan to see, for the first time, a Christian town. [...] Rica's and my intention is to get immediately to Paris, which is the seat of the empire of Europe.” (Montesquieu, 2003, l. 24, p. 88f.) This correlation might be due to the historical period of the creation of the genre: in the Middle Ages, “Europe” was often used as synonym of Christianity (see, for instance, Michaud, 1993, p. 5), a phenomenon that in the eighteenth century was changing, but still somehow present. Note also, in this quotation, the expression „empire of Europe“. It seems, thus, to be indeed perceived as a unity.

¹⁵ At the same time, by using these alienating terms, implicitly we can note the parallel organization of the different religions.

Oriental countries, China included, as opposed to the visibility of women in public life in Europe. A concise example is located in d'Argens' *Lettres chinoises*:

I am beginning, dear Yn-Che-Chan, to take some notion of the customs and habits of the French; but what regards their women, I have not been able, up to now, to get some true idea of their size and physiognomy. It is not that they were veiled such as all the Asian [women]; or that they were extremely restricted to their apartments as the Chinese, they are running, on the contrary, in all the streets of town, and the public avenues are full of them.

Je commence, cher Yn-Che Chan, à prendre quelque notion des mœurs et des coutumes des Français; mais quant à ce qui regarde leurs femmes, je n'ai pu même jusqu'ici avoir quelque idée juste de leur taille et de leur physionomie. Ce n'est pas qu'elles soient voilées ainsi que toutes les Asiatiques, ou qu'elles soient extrêmement resserrées dans leurs appartements ainsi que les Chinoises, elles courent au contraire dans toutes les rues de la ville, et les promenades publiques en sont remplies. (d'Argens, 2009, l. 2, 194)

The women in France are defined, first, by negating the symbols that characterise the 'Asian' women, as d'Argens' letter writer Sioeu-Tcheou calls them, that is the veil and the staying in their houses. This definition is then amplified by attributing to the women in France the symbol of their presence everywhere in town and in public. Thus, the veil as a collective symbol can – apart from the gender issue – be linked to other realms of society, be it their attitude towards individual freedom, be it the dealing with knowledge. Opposed to the veil is, on the other hand, the visibility in the street. This openness can equally be applied to several domains: openness towards mankind, knowledge or other cultures.

That the dimension of the gender issue is, in fact, European is explicitly expressed by Montesquieu's character Rica:

It is a big issue among men, of knowing if it is advantageous to remove liberty from women instead of leaving it to them. [...] If the Europeans say that there is no generosity in making unhappy the persons that you love; the Asians answer that there is baseness in men to give up the power that nature has given them upon women.

C'est une grande question, parmi les hommes, de savoir s'il est plus avantageux d'ôter aux femmes la liberté, que de la leur laisser. [...] Si les Européens disent qu'il n'y a pas de générosité à rendre malheureuses les personnes que l'on aime; les Asiatiques répondent qu'il y a de la bassesse aux hommes de renoncer à l'empire que la nature leur a donné sur les femmes. (Montesquieu, 2003, l. 38, p. 114)

The observing letter writer here asks a question rather than stating a fact: the question of women's liberty. However, in order to answer it, he contrasts two opinions: those of the Europeans on the one hand to the "Asians" as he calls them here, on the other hand.

In the examples of the analysed genre, the collective symbols often belong, as we have seen, to the culture of the fictitious Oriental traveller. The collective symbols thus contribute to create what Jürgen Link names the "impression of a cultural unity" (Link, 1982, p. 11). They create a collective which is opposite to the one described, both of which are often named explicitly: Orient/Asia and Europe. It is thus by means of the Oriental observer that, in spite of the often national character of the texts, the notion of Europe obtains an essential importance and significance. However, in all of the cases given, the Other, that is, the opposing entity, is imagined (although based on information). Thus, the binary constellation of Self and Other is but a construction.

CONCLUSIONS

Let us summarize. We have analysed the genre of the fictitiously oriental epistolary travel novel, typical for European Enlightenment, applying three principles of Foucault's work *Orders of discourse*, namely commentary, folly and fellowship of discourse, the third of which was complemented by Link's rereading of Foucault for the aims of literary analysis. By thus looking into the presented genre, we could see paradigmatically how European discourse often functions: although the genre in the Eighteenth century was used particularly in order to criticise structures and habits of the society and thus, contrarily to Foucault, aimed at changing rather than maintaining discursive order, one

fundamental principle can be recognised concerning European discourse: by creating an extra-European observer, the authors of the genre are able, on the one hand, to alienate the point of view and thus critically analyse their society; on the other hand, the distant perspective creates new unities: whereas within, as we could see in the opening citation, the neighbouring countries would be rather involved in quarrels and interested in surpassing the others in strength and development, seen from the (fictitious) outside, they constitute nevertheless not only a geographical, but also a cultural unity. The differences concerning the Other create unity despite the differing and at times fighting neighbouring countries. Although the concept of the modern Europe as we know it today was, in the Eighteenth century, only beginning to develop, the narrative structure of the genre and the manner of guiding discourse shows very clearly that the creation and maintenance of collective identity works by creating and opposing oneself, that is the own collective entity, to an external Other (be it real or imagined) that creates internal unity.

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EU-topia or dystopia? The EU image at the crossroads

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ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) seems to have a relatively “good image” in the wider world; however, its “self- image” within its member states has been badly hurt since the Eurozone crisis started. According to public opinion surveys, in some member states less than half the public does not believe that the EU promotes prosperity. Undoubtedly, communicating Europe is a difficult task done in fierce competition between European institutions, but also with member states, who are much easier to identify, are closer to their nationals, and who are often tempted to “nationalize” the successes of the EU project and to blame Brussels for news that is less positive. This paper discusses the controversial issue of the EU image while exploring to what extent, in which ways and by what mechanisms can the EU influence and remedy its negative perceptions among the EU public.

Keywords: EU, Eurozone crisis, soft power, public diplomacy, communication gap, the EU Citizens’ Club

Introduction

The development of the European Union has greatly enhanced Europe's soft power in the world and on the international scene; the EU is the most important competitor of the United States in terms of soft power (Nye, 2004, p. 75). According to Nye (2004), who coined the term, “soft power” is the ability to “get others to want the outcomes you want” or “to shape what others want, not by means of coercion, but by attraction”(p.5). This kind of power relies primarily on three resources: culture, political values and foreign policies (Nye, 2004, p. 11). As far as culture is concerned, there is no doubt that European art, literature, music, fashion and cuisine have a strong attractiveness all over the world (Nye, 2004, p. 11). Not only has each individual member state its own soft power through which it can exert influence but the European Union as a whole, being a symbol of a united Europe, possesses a lot of soft power. According to the Transatlantic Trends Survey carried out by the Pew Research Center in 2014, the majority of the Americans feel positively about strong European leadership in global affairs, and as far as the BRIC states are concerned, they do not feel that either Russian or Chinese leadership is desirable (Transatlantic Trends 2014, p. 14). Seventy percent of U.S. respondents, up 13 percentage points since 2013, described strong European leadership as desirable, while only 21%, down 8 percentage points since 2013, said the opposite. Even more significantly, the increase was among those who described strong EU leadership as “very desirable” — 32% in 2014, up 11 percentage points since 2013 (Transatlantic Trends 2014, p. 14).

The EU has been, and remains, a force for peace and stability on the European continent. The fact that war is now unthinkable for European nations which fought each other for centuries contributes to its positive image worldwide. The EU is considered a power that is not only constructed on normative basis but acts in a normative way in world politics (Manners, 2002, p. 252). The principles of human rights, peace, and democracy have been deeply embedded in the European integration project since its inception and reflect the very core values of the EU’s ontology and teleology (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010, p. 290). The EU is an ‘ideational’ actor characterized by common principles (peace, democracy, respect for human rights etc.) who acts to diffuse norms within international relations (Whitman, 2011). The European Union represents an original model of regional economic integration that has been a source of inspiration for developing countries i.e. the Union of States of East Africa, the Central American Common Market etc. (Yvars, 2010, p. 274). In the late 1980s, when Eastern Europeans were asked which countries could be regarded as model countries in terms of economic growth, equality, democracy and individual freedoms, Western Europe outran the United States (Meyenberg et al. as quoted in Nye, 2004, p. 77). As the process of integration consolidated, the respect for human rights

along with the promotion of democracy and peace were actively used by the European Union as foreign policy tools. With the return of the central and eastern European states to the ideational liberal democracy,

this trend was consolidated with the European Union's move from a continental to a global foreign policy agenda and its endeavors to assert itself as a global peace-builder and norm-setter. The quest for peace and the pursuit of democracy and respect for human rights, among other coveted values, have justified the depiction of the EU as a "force for good" in line with the perspective of a "normative power Europe"(NPE) (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010, p. 290).

According to the historian Timothy Garton Ash (2003), the European Union's soft power is demonstrated by the fact that not only millions of individuals but also whole states i.e. Turkey want to enter it. Nowadays, unprecedented numbers of people are taking dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean to reach the EU countries (Human Rights Watch, 2015). More than a million migrants and refugees have made their way to Europe, fleeing armed conflict in the Middle East because they see Europe as a place of peace and wealth compared to the violence and despair that characterize their home countries (Lilli, 2015). Pushed by civil war and terror, poverty, human rights abuses and deteriorating security people not only from the Middle East but also from the African continent risk their lives to reach the EU borders in order to start a new, better life.

Besides its attractive culture and political values, Europe also derives its soft power from its foreign policies. Europe gains credibility from its positions on global climate change, international law, and human rights treaties, its development aid to poor countries and its involvement in peacekeeping operations under multilateral organizations i.e. the UN and NATO (Nye, 2004, p. 80). In the case of Iraq, the US unilateral decision to go to war against the global public opinion meant the decline of US soft power and the rise of the EU's influence. According to Shirley Williams (2003), Europe's soft power is "formidable" (p. 22). Even though Europe's soft power in the world is formidable, the EU seems to lack the soft power required to get the member state publics to want the outcomes its political leaders want or to shape what they want, not by means of coercion, but by attraction. How is this possible?

Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and the EU domestic communication

Another term which is generally associated with the concept of soft power is public diplomacy. Some scholars see public diplomacy as a "key instrument of soft power" (see Melissen, 2005, p. 4). However, this association is not without problems. Hocking (2005) underlines the paradox of associating soft power with public diplomacy (p. 35). He claims that if attraction really worked, there would be no need for public diplomacy. Undoubtedly, values and ideas cannot transfer themselves; thus, there must be some contact between soft power and public diplomacy (Rasmussen, 2009, p. 4).

As there is no single definition of public diplomacy, and seems to be more easily described than defined (definitions vary and change over time), for the purposes of this paper, we adopt Sharp's (2005) definition of public diplomacy as "the process by which direct relations with a country's people are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented" (p. 106). Since we agree that the EU is a *sui generis* entity, that is, an intergovernmental and supranational organization of European countries, which currently has 28 member states (after Brexit to become 27), then we understand that "the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural and educational programming ... to create a public opinion environment in a target country or countries that will enable target country political leaders to make decisions that are supportive of...[its] policy objectives" becomes a difficult or almost impossible task (McClellan, 2004, pp. 23-24).

For Leonard (2002), former director of the Foreign Policy Center, an independent British think-tank, public diplomacy is "about building relationships: understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting misperceptions; looking for areas where we can find common cause" (p. 8). By making reference to British public diplomacy, he underlines three important dimensions of public diplomacy activities: *news management*, *strategic communications* and *relationship building*.

Domestic EU communication is like coordinating external communication, since it has to convince 27 member states' audiences of its messages. Taking into account Mark Leonard's definition and dimensions of public diplomacy activities, one can argue that the EU, being in need of legitimizing its existence and policies first and foremost internally, could employ public diplomacy practices for its

communication with the publics of its member states. Through such practices, there is a series of impacts that the EU can exert. It can (cf. public diplomacy impacts, Leonard, 2002, pp. 9-10):

- Increase people's familiarity with the EU (update image, turn around unfavorable opinions)
- Increase people's appreciation of the EU (create positive perceptions, get them to see issues from the same perspective)
- Engage people with the EU (strengthen ties – from education exchanges to scientific co-operation; get them to understand and subscribe to European values)
- Influence people

So far, whenever Europe has developed a communications strategy, "it has tended to be elitist, self-congratulatory, and without an understanding of how the news media actually work. The aim has been to make people love Europe, not to give people the information they need in order to be able to understand and tolerate it" (de Vreese, 2003, p. 6). According to de Vreese (2003), "this is not the fault of the communications teams – the structures of the EU have left them very little to play with" (p.6). If we perceive public diplomacy as "a modality of diplomacy that seeks indirect and structural influence by affecting the political discourses within other states" (Rasmussen 2009, p. 1), it seems that the EU has failed to do so within its member states. Only a few studies have been carried out to examine how the EU communicates with its citizens and seek to influence public opinion or how it promotes its internal image, what communication strategies it uses and what it can do to improve its communication with the public. It is "true that the EU does not speak with one voice and this does not necessarily mean that there is not, on an abstract level, a common self-image and common messages transmitted by the cacophony of EU voices. [...] 'Diversity is the EU brand' and it is not only communicated through official communications and initiatives but lived on a daily basis through the actual functioning of the EU" (Rasmussen, 2009, p. 9). As a matter of fact, the European Union's basic communication problem derives from its *suis generis* character, that is, "an internally diverse political entity of different states that work effectively together for the common good" (Rasmussen, 2009, p. 9). As regards the self-image of the EU as a model for peace, the narrative of the EU as a peace project has pervaded European integration since its inception in the 1950s but, although the EU has realized that this narrative can no longer convince the young generations of Europeans, it is not willing to relinquish it. The "'EU as a peace project' is still very much the identity that the EU seeks to communicate to the world" (Rasmussen, 2009, p. 9). In fact, there are "two underlying motives for strengthening European integration: maintaining and securing peace in Europe and increasing economic prosperity as well as employment" (Rasmussen, 2009, p. 1). As far as economic prosperity is concerned, the tremendous benefits the Single Market (officially existing since 1993 and guaranteeing the four basic freedoms: free movement of goods, persons, services and capitals) has brought to European citizens and businesses have not been properly communicated. Undoubtedly, this is evident in the aftermath of Brexit, when the "Financial Times", an elitist newspaper, attempts through its article titled "The EU single market: How it works and the benefits it offers" to explain to their public what they should have already known.

There is financial data that confirm that European integration has brought economic growth to the participating national economies. In terms of the cumulative gains in the real gross domestic product per capita resulting from the integration of Europe between 1992 and 2012, every national economy realized income gains from the European integration (see Table 1). Denmark and Germany benefitted the most by seeing the greatest gains per resident (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p.1). "If the values from only 1992 and 2012 are compared, every country except for Greece has been able to achieve a higher per capita income due to the European integration" (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p.1).

Table 1: Comparison of Gross Domestic Product per capita in 2012 with and without increased European integration

Rank	Country	Difference in %	Difference in euros
1.	Germany	2.3	680
2.	Denmark	2.0	720

3.	Belgium	1.6	470
4.	Austria	1.4	450
5.	Finland	1.2	360
6.	United Kingdom	1.0	310
7.	Ireland	0.9	330
8.	Italy	0.9	200
9.	France	0.8	230
10.	Spain	0.7	150
11.	Netherlands	0.6	190
12.	Portugal	0.4	60
13.	Sweden	0.4	140
14.	Greece	-1.3	-190






























Perceptions of the EU in the member states

The EU image at the crossroads



Despite the economic benefits of EU membership, according to the results of the most recent Standard Eurobarometer 84 survey (European Commission, 2015) (see Figure 1) carried out in November 2015, the European Union tends to project a positive image in only 11 Member States (down from 15 in spring 2015) among the 28 Member States. The countries where respondents had a positive image of the EU were Romania (57%), Poland (55%), Ireland (54%), Lithuania (53%) and Croatia (51%). Again, just about half of the respondents in these member states held a positive image. The EU's image was neutral for a majority of the population in 15 countries (up from ten), and negative in Cyprus and Austria. The positive image of the EU lost ground in 24 Member States, most strikingly in Estonia (36%, -13 percentage points), Germany (34%, -11) and the Czech Republic (27%, -10).

Figure 1 Attitudes toward the EU, by image of the EU

QA9 In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? (%)

		Total 'Positive'	Aut.2015 - Sp.2015	Neutral	Aut.2015 - Sp.2015	Total 'Negative'	Aut.2015 - Sp.2015	Don't know
EU28		37	▼ 4	38	=	23	▲ 4	2
HR		51	▲ 4	37	▼ 3	12	=	0
PL		55	▲ 2	35	▼ 3	7	=	3
PT		42	=	41	▲ 2	15	▼ 2	2
IT		38	=	37	▲ 3	23	▼ 2	2
ES		33	▼ 1	46	▼ 1	18	▲ 2	3
LT		53	▼ 2	40	=	6	▲ 1	1
FR		35	▼ 2	38	▼ 2	25	▲ 4	2
UK		30	▼ 2	36	▼ 1	31	▲ 3	3
CY		22	▼ 2	36	▲ 2	41	▼ 1	1
IE		54	▼ 3	30	▲ 1	14	▲ 2	2
SE		39	▼ 3	36	=	25	▲ 3	0
DK		36	▼ 3	45	▲ 1	18	▲ 2	1
SK		35	▼ 3	40	▼ 3	24	▲ 6	1
EL		22	▼ 3	40	▲ 2	38	▲ 1	0
BE		39	▼ 4	38	▲ 3	23	▲ 2	0
HU		39	▼ 4	40	▼ 3	20	▲ 7	1
SI		33	▼ 4	45	▼ 1	21	▲ 5	1
RO		57	▼ 5	32	▲ 5	9	▼ 1	2
FI		32	▼ 5	48	▲ 1	20	▲ 4	0
AT		23	▼ 6	35	=	41	▲ 5	1
BG		48	▼ 7	34	▲ 5	17	▲ 3	1
LU		45	▼ 7	35	▲ 5	20	▲ 3	0
LV		32	▼ 7	49	=	17	▲ 6	2
MT		43	▼ 8	46	▲ 7	10	▲ 2	1
NL		34	▼ 8	41	▲ 4	25	▲ 4	0
CZ		27	▼ 10	42	=	31	▲ 11	0
DE		34	▼ 11	38	▲ 1	27	▲ 10	1
EE		36	▼ 13	50	▲ 9	12	▲ 4	2


According to the results of another, non- EU commissioned, public opinion survey carried by the Pew Research Center in 2016 (see Figure 2), the EU's strongest supporters were the Poles (72%) and the Hungarians (61%). In many other member states, support was not enthusiastic. Only 27% of the Greeks, 38% of the French and 47% of the Spanish shared a favorable opinion of the EU. In this survey, EU favorability was down in five of the six nations surveyed in both 2015 and 2016 (see Figure 3). Notably, there has been a double-digit decrease in France (down 17 percentage points) and single-digit declines in Germany (8 points), both of which are considered the core countries of the EU, the United Kingdom (7 points) and Italy (6 points). Thus, one cannot help but wonder: Quo vadit the European Union?

Figure 2 Views of the EU vary widely in Europe*Figure 3 Favorable views of the EU in decline in key European countries*

Interestingly, according to the results of the same survey, young people – those aged between 18 and 34 – are more favorable toward the European Union than people 50 and older in six out of the 10 nations surveyed (see Figure 4). The generation gap is most evident in France – 25 percentage points – with 56% of young people but only 31% of older people having a positive opinion of the EU. There are

similar generation gaps of 19 points in the UK, 16 points in the Netherlands, 14 points in Poland and Germany, and 13 points in Greece.

Figure 4 Young Europeans more in favor of the EU





The EU citizens feel that their voice does not count

According to the results of the most recent Standard Eurobarometer 84 survey (EB84) (European Commission, 2015), we referred to earlier, the proportion of Europeans who believe that their voice counts in the European Union is 39% (-3 percentage points since spring 2015) (see Figure 5). On the other hand, more than half of Europeans believe that their voice does not count in the EU (54%, +4). This is, however, the third highest score for this view since 2004. Only in 11 Member States, majorities of respondents believe that their voice counts in the European Union (down from 13 in spring 2015), with the highest proportions in Denmark (72%), Sweden (69%) and Croatia (68%). What is more, less than a fifth of the population believe that their voice counts in the EU in Latvia (15%), Cyprus (15%), Greece (16%) and Estonia (17%). The belief that "my voice counts in the EU" has diminished in 19 Member States.

Figure 5 My voice counts in the EU

D72.1 Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.






The future of the European Union: optimism loses ground


A majority of respondents feel optimistic about the future of the EU in 22 member states (down from 26 in spring 2015), led by Ireland (76%), Romania (73%) and Poland (70%) (EB84, European Commission, 2015) (see Figure 6). At the other end of the scale, pessimism is the highest in Greece (34% vs. 63% “pessimistic”), Cyprus (37% vs. 58%) and Austria (40% vs. 56%). Majorities are not only pessimistic in these three countries but interestingly, in France (44% vs. 52%), Germany (46% vs. 48%) and Czech Republic (47% vs. 51%). Optimism has lost ground in 25 member states since spring 2015, remarkably in Germany (46%, -14 percentage points) and in the Netherlands (58%, -13 percentage points).

Figure 6 Attitudes toward the future of the EU





Perceptions of national economies: the North-South divide

Europeans' perceptions of their national economies seem to improve; however, they are still generally negative: 40% believe that the national economic situation is 'good' (+2 percentage points since spring 2015), whereas 57% think it is 'bad' (-2) (EB84, European Commission, 2015) (see Figure 7). Though these perceptions seem to enhance in the EU as a whole, the gap between the countries remains extremely large: as in spring 2015, 83 points separate Germany, where 86% of the population estimates that the situation of their national economy is good, from Greece (3%). More than three-quarters of the population perceive their national economy in a positive light in Germany (86%), Malta (85%), Luxembourg (85%), Denmark (83%), the Netherlands (79%) and Sweden (76%). In a second group of countries, this opinion is not predominant, but is still held by a majority of respondents: Ireland (57%), the United Kingdom (53%), the Czech Republic (51%), Austria (51%), Poland (47% vs. 46% 'bad') and Estonia (47% vs. 46%). On the whole, positive views prevail in 12 member states (up from eight in spring 2015). Nevertheless, a majority of respondents are still pessimistic in 16 member states, with the fewest depicting the national economy as 'good' in Greece (3%), Portugal (8%), Spain (9%) and Bulgaria (9%). Thus, an important question arises: Where is the land of prosperity promised in the founding treaties? Where is EU-topia or has become a U-topia?

Figure 7 Perceptions of national economies*The sense of EU citizenship varies*

About two-thirds of Europeans feel that they are citizens of the EU (64%, -3 percentage points since spring 2015), while around a third do not feel like that (34%, +3) (EB84, European Commission 2015) (see Figure 8). The sense of European citizenship gained ground slightly since the Standard Eurobarometer of spring 2010 (EB73), when this question was introduced for the first time (62% vs. 37% in spring 2010). Majorities of respondents feel that they are citizens of the EU in 24 Member States (down from 27 in spring 2015). More than three-quarters of the population do so in Luxembourg (85%), Malta (82%), Lithuania (77%), Denmark (76%) and Ireland (76%). In Bulgaria (47% 'yes' vs. 52% 'no'), Cyprus (49% vs. 51%) and Italy (49% vs. 50%), a slight majority of the population do not feel they are citizens of the EU. In Greece, as in spring 2015, the population is divided (50% vs. 50%). Since spring 2015 the sense of EU citizenship has decreased in 19 countries, most strikingly in Austria (63%, -9 percentage points) and Germany (74%, -7) although it had gained ground in 17 countries between autumn 2014 and spring 2015. The proportion of the population who feel that they are citizens of the EU has not changed in three member states: Portugal (72%), France (61%) and Greece (50%). It has risen in six countries: Slovenia (75%, +10), Spain (75%, +6), Croatia (66%, +3), Denmark (76%, +2), Belgium (72%, +2) and Hungary (69%, +2).


Figure 8 Sense of EU citizenship



Positive aspects of the EU

For Europeans, the most positive results of the EU are still “peace among the Member States of the EU” (56%) and “the free movement of people, goods and services within the EU” (55%) (EB84, European Commission, 2015). “The euro” (25%) and “student exchange programs such as Erasmus” (22%) are in third and fourth position. Other items are mentioned by less than a fifth of Europeans: “the economic power of the EU” (19%), “the political and diplomatic influence of the EU in the rest of the world” (19%) and “the level of social welfare (healthcare, education, pensions) in the EU” (18%). “The Common agricultural policy” is mentioned by 10%. In the euro area, “peace among the member states of the EU” comes first (56%), followed by “the free movement of people, goods and services within the EU” (54%) and “the euro” (33%). “The level of social welfare (healthcare, education, pensions) in the EU” is in sixth position, mentioned by 16% of respondents. Outside the euro area, “the free movement of people, goods and services within the EU” is first (57%), before “peace among the member states of the EU” (54%) and “the level of social welfare (healthcare, education, pensions) in the EU” (22%). “The euro” is in eighth and last position, mentioned by 10% of the respondents.

Figure 9 Positive aspects of the EU



Taking all the statistical data into consideration, one cannot help but wonder: how is the EU perceived by its citizens as an EU-topia, that is, a good place to live in or has become a dystopia, an undesirable place to live in, after all?

The statistics seem to converge that the EU publics are divided as far as the EU is concerned and that the EU, despite being considered a land of peace, is not believed to promote prosperity at least in the crisis-struck countries. In Greece, for example, a country traditionally seen as pro-European, where for the majority of the people the EU was always positively associated with democracy, economic prosperity and a move away from the inherent weaknesses of national politics, the Greek public opinion seems to have fallen out of love with the EU but does not, however, want to leave the Eurozone or renounce membership altogether (Clements et al., 2014, p. 247, p. 262). Greeks feel discontent with the lack of effective solutions from Europe in terms of outputs (Clements et al., 2014, p. 263). The crisis and the respective response to it have made a strong impact on how the citizens perceive the EU and its legitimacy. The notion of Europe as a normative power (values or ideas-laden) has now been strongly criticized internally, within the member states, due to the hierarchical and power relations that have been exposed through the financial and economic crisis (Mikelis, 2016, p. 2). On top of that, even in the publics of the founding member states there seems to be a decline in the European sentiment. Thus, is there a way for the EU to influence and remedy the public's negative perceptions?

Communicating the EU to the people and closing the ‘gap’: a difficult task or mission impossible?

There has always been a ‘communication gap’ between the European Union and its citizens. Communication has been too much of a ‘Brussels affair’. It has focused largely on telling people what the EU does: less attention has been paid to listening to people’s views. The communication gap has been a subject of discussion in EU circles at least since the referenda held before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (European Commission, 2006, p. 4). In Eurobarometer surveys, people complain they know little about the EU and although many of the policy decisions that affect their daily lives are taken at European level, they feel they have little say in its decision-making process. The EU has also been accused of a ‘democratic deficit’ on the grounds that the EU institutions and their decision-making procedures suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible to the ordinary citizen due to their complexity. EU voters do not feel that they have an effective way to reject or to change, in some ways, the course of EU politics and policies. The democratic deficit is blamed for the indifference of the citizens of the Union and their estrangement from European institutions (Moussis, 2011a).

There is no doubt that democracy requires well-informed, critical thinking and active citizens. “Information is a key instrument of any policy making, let alone multinational policy-making” (Moussis, 2011b). Citizens show distrust in the EU policies as they do not understand them for lack of proper information. “The role of information has been underestimated and largely neglected in the EU, with the result of a growing estrangement of the European public from European policies, which become ever more complicated as they advance and, hence, increasingly difficult to understand” (Moussis, 2011b). This information deficit puts the integration process in danger. “The more ignorant the citizens are about the institutions, the goals and the mechanisms of the integration process, the more easily the public opinion may be misled about particular issues or the general thrust of the process” (Moussis, 2011b).

The European Commission in its *White Paper on a European Communication Policy* in 2006 discusses the EU communication problem and acknowledges that people feel remote from the decision-making process and EU institutions. It admits that there is a sense of alienation which partly mirrors the disenchantment with politics in general and that one reason for this is the inadequate development of a ‘European public sphere’ where the European debate can take place. “Citizens feel that they themselves have little opportunity to make their voices heard on European issues, and there is no obvious forum within which they can talk about these issues together. A pan-European political culture – with pan-European political groups and foundations – is still developing” (European Commission, 2006, pp. 4-5).

The urgent need for the emergence of a European Public Sphere (EPS) has been acknowledged by the European Commission along with the need to re-communicate the EU to the public so as to close the gap. The aforementioned *White Paper* stresses that people get to know about EU politics and political issues largely through their national education systems and their national, regional and local media (European Commission, 2006, p. 4). They also find out about the EU through the manifestos of political parties dealing with national, regional and local issues, and they talk about these issues mostly in their own communities. In other words, the ‘public sphere’ within which political life takes place in Europe is largely a national sphere (European Commission, 2006, p. 4). Moreover, as far as the media are concerned, to the extent that European issues appear on the agenda at all, they are presented to citizens from a national perspective (European Commission, 2006, p. 4). “Any story is told within the conceptual framework of the nation and any claims about ‘us’ and ‘them’ assume that the nation is the central imagined community” (Anderson as quoted in Bärenreuter et al., 2009, p. 12). The formation of a supranational identity is limited by the fact that the media are largely national, with the exception of *Euronews*. However, *Euronews*, a multilingual television news channel launched in 1993 and subsidized to unite linguistic and cultural differences amongst European citizens with the aim of shaping a more inclusive European identity by covering news and current affairs from a ‘European perspective’, has failed to appeal to the general public and remains, to most Europeans, in all likelihood, a largely unknown channel (de Vreese, 2007, p. 8). Gerhards (as quoted in Bärenreuter et al., 2009, p. 12), who considers a pan-European media system as indispensable for an EPS, seems to doubt on its practicability due to language differences, differing habits of media reception and the costs for translation and distribution. However, as suggested in the *White Paper*:

Europe needs to find its place in the existing national, regional and local ‘public spheres’ and the public discussion across member states must be deepened. This is first and foremost the responsibility of the public authorities in the member states. It is the responsibility of government, at national, regional and local level, to consult and inform

citizens about public policy – including European policies and their impact on people's daily lives – and to put in place the forums to give this debate life. [...] Citizens sense that there is something missing from a national debate which ignores aspects of public policy that are of direct relevance to them. Far from being in competition, a stronger recognition of the European dimension in national political exchange can only add to its credibility. That is why national public authorities, civil society, and the European Union institutions need to work together to develop Europe's place in the public sphere. (European Commission, 2006, p. 5)

Ferran Tarradellas Espuny (2015, p. 27), head of the Representation of the European Commission in Barcelona, points out that communicating the EU “is a difficult task done in fierce competition between European institutions, but also with member states, who are much easier to identify, are closer to their nationals, and who are often tempted to ‘nationalize’ the successes of the EU project and to blame Brussels for news that is less positive.”

The lack of objective information (by European institutions, governments and political parties) combined with a sharp disinformation on the part of Eurosceptic media is an explosive mixture placed under the foundations of European unification because, according to Moussis (2011b), it divides citizens in two categories: the apathetics and the dogmatics. This means that there is a vast majority of Europeans who are indifferent, because they find living and working conditions in Europe acceptable, compared with other parts of the world, but do not ascribe these conditions to the EU. On the other hand, there is a minority, which is constantly annoyed by “the deeds or supposed misdeeds of the European institutions (notably that of usurping national sovereignty), underestimates or even denies all the achievements of the Union in terms of peace, relative prosperity and unobstructed movement of goods, services, labor and capital” (Moussis, 2011b).

In 2014, the President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker, realized the need to reinforce the EU communication efforts so he decided to place communicators close to the Commission's decision-making circles (Tarradellas Espuny, 2015, p. 27). The cabinet of each commissioner is now assisted by a communication adviser. Communication advisers are in charge of preparing and coordinating the political communication of the Commissioners. They are coordinated by the Spokesperson service which is under the direct authority of the President (European Commission, 2014, pp. 9-10). In addition, to be closer to citizens, the European Commission has 36 representations in all EU member states (mainly in the capitals) charged with the task of explaining what the EU does on their behalf (Tarradellas Espuny, 2015, p. 27). The representations are the Commission's eyes, ears and speak for the Commission on the ground in all EU member states. They interact with national authorities and stakeholders and inform the media and the public about EU policies (European Commission, 2016). Also, the Commission, having recruited a team of social media officers so as to make the voice of Europe heard through new means of communication, is present on several social media platforms.

Can these communicative efforts on part of the EU be successful? The multi-national survey carried out by the Pew Research Center in 2016 just two weeks before the Brexit referendum confirms growing Euroscepticism across Europe as about two-thirds of both the British and the Greeks, along with significant minorities in other key nations, want some powers returned from Brussels to national governments. “The EU's image and stature have been on a roller coaster ride in recent years throughout Europe”, even in the countries that wield the most influence, according to the authors. Euroscepticism is on the rise and the EU is confronted with the challenging task of restoring public trust after the financial crisis and its handling of the influx of refugees from Syria and North Africa.

Public diplomacy, strategic communication and the EU communication gap: the case of the EU Citizens' Club

As mentioned earlier in this paper, there is no single definition but many regarding the concept of public diplomacy. They share, however, certain common elements: (a) the aim to exert influence on foreign public audiences; (b) the interaction with non-governmental actors; (c) the distinction between old/traditional and new/public diplomacy (Skouroliakou, 2012, pp. 2-3). However, one could reasonably argue: how is public diplomacy linked to the communication problems that the EU faces with its citizens?

It is important to note that although public diplomacy is primarily a foreign policy activity managed by foreign ministries, it differs from traditional diplomacy in that it deals not only with governments but it

addresses non-governmental individuals and organizations (i.e. NGOs, think tanks etc.), that is, it implies collaboration and dialogue that extends beyond governments and political elites to broader civil society (Riordan, 2004, p. 2). For Leonard (2002), it is the public face of traditional diplomacy (p. 12). “Its objective is to create, for a given country, as positive a climate as possible among foreign publics in order to facilitate the explanation and hopefully acceptance of its foreign policy” (Roberts, 2007, p. 45). Thus, it implies that a problem-solving process is involved. As it has already been mentioned, Mark Leonard identifies three dimensions of public diplomacy activities: *news management*, *strategic communications* and *relationship building*. Time is vital in this categorization. Leonard describes the first dimension as reactive, that is, when faced with negative press coverage, a country should be ready to react to news events as they occur. This response to the communication crisis may be given through interventions in the media or even launching campaigns. Strategic communication is described as “proactively creating a news agenda through activities and events which are designed to reinforce core messages and influence perceptions” (Leonard, 2002, p. 11). Thus, “proactive public diplomacy deals with perception management. In other words, it is concerned with the image and perception of a country. Successful management of this perception is important if messages are to be communicated effectively. The image that foreign publics hold of a country can influence their reception of messages” (Skouroliakou, 2012, pp. 4-5). Relationship-building is the third dimension of public diplomacy (Leonard, 2002, pp.18-21). It develops over years and aims at building contacts and creating networks of communication among peers: media, non-governmental actors, academics, students etc. “The purpose of relationship-building is to exchange ideas and experiences and ultimately develop a deep understanding of the country and its culture. By enhancing knowledge of a country and its people, one gets a profound insight on the mentality and behavior of people, on their beliefs and values, one can better understand their views and positions in matter of politics, economy and culture” (Skouroliakou, 2012, p. 6). Leonard argues that relationship building is the most long-term of the three dimensions of public diplomacy whereas news management is short-term and strategic communication is medium-term.

From the discussion of EU perceptions it becomes evident that although the EU seems to have a relatively ‘good image’ in the wider world, its ‘self- image’ within its member states is badly hurt, especially in the crisis-struck countries. Thus, it could be argued that practices that public diplomacy employs so as to create as positive a climate as possible among foreign publics in order to facilitate the explanation and acceptance of policies could be adopted by the EU. As public diplomacy addresses non-governmental individuals and organizations, this means collaboration, communication and dialogue that extend beyond governments and political elites to broader civil society.

In this context in Greece, an attempt has been made in Zanneio Experimental Junior High School through the formation of a students’ club to help the citizens (students aged between 13 and 15 years old) understand and become familiar with the EU, its organization, function and development. Another goal of the club was to help students develop civic competences, that is, skills and attitudes in order to actively participate in civic life at European level. This club named the EU Citizens’ Club was instigated by the writer during the school year 2015-2016 in the aftermath of the Greek bailout referendum when the Greek people were called to vote a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to an unclear question as to its actual meaning and potential consequences for the country and its membership in the EU. In order to be able to evaluate the impact of such an initiative, during the first meeting of the club that took place in October 2015, 18 students out of the 22 who joined were asked to answer some of the core questions posed by the Standard Eurobarometer and the Parlemeter so as to investigate their knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of the European Union. Questions on identity, EU membership and citizenship were also included in this first questionnaire.

At the beginning of the school year, the majority of the students (61.1%) perceived Greece’s membership in the EU as neither good nor bad whereas 33.3% considered it as good. The majority (66.7%), however, believed that Greece has benefitted from its membership in the EU. The EU’s image was neutral for the majority of the students (55.6%) whereas 33.4% of the students were divided: half of them had a fairly negative image of the EU and the other half had a fairly positive image whereas the rest (11%) was evenly divided (5.5% had a very positive whereas another 5.5% a very negative image) (see Figure 10). When students were asked the same question at the end of school year and despite the fact that the majority still held a neutral view of the EU, 35% had a fairly positive image (almost +20 percentage points up since the beginning of the school year) whereas no one had a negative image at the end (see Figure 10b). In the second survey, 20 students took part out of the 22 members of the club.

Figure 10 The EU image at the beginning of the school year






Figure 11 The EU image at the end of the school year




As far as their self-assessment of EU knowledge is concerned, on the scale from 1 to 10, their average knowledge raised from 4 to 6 (+2 points) (see Figure 12). While, at the beginning of the school year, the majority felt they knew little or nothing about the EU (scale score 1-5: 89%) and only 2 out of the 18 students indicated that they had some or much knowledge about the EU (scale score 6-10: 11%), at the end of the school year the majority felt that they had some or much knowledge about the EU (scale score 6-10: 75%) whereas only 5 out of the 22 students stated that they knew little or nothing about the EU (scale score 1-5:25%).

Figure 12 Self-perceived knowledge of the EU, its policies and its institutions



The vast majority of the students (85%) acknowledged that their knowledge of the EU before joining the club was not sufficient (see Figure 13).

Figure 13 Sufficient/Insufficient knowledge of the EU before joining the EU Citizens' club



In the first survey, 83.3% believed that they were not very well informed, whereas in the last survey that took place at the end of the school year, 95% of the students believed that were fairly well informed (Figure 15) in comparison to 16.7% in the first survey (almost 80 percentage points up from the first survey, see Figure 14).

Figure 14 Informed/Not Informed about the EU at the beginning of the school year






Figure 15 Informed/Not Informed about the EU at the end of the school year



In addition, the vast majority of students seem to be willing to participate in public life (see Figure 16).

Figure 16 Participation in public life

It seems that after the 20 two-hour club meetings during which the students had the opportunity to get to know the EU through various methodological tools (games, quizzes, debates, dialogue, group discussions, role play and simulation activities, projects etc.) the majority of the students still held a neutral view of the EU. However, 35% had a fairly positive image (almost +20 percentage points up since the beginning of the school year) whereas no one had a negative image which is also a major gain. The goal of the club was not to make students love the EU but to make them understand the EU and how it functions. Fifteen out of the twenty-two students had the chance to take part in the simulation of a meeting of the parliamentary Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament while visiting the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU). During their visit at the HAEU, the students participated in educational activities, which ended with a parliamentary debate. They were divided into four groups, and each of the groups stood for one of the European Parliament's political groups: the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), the European People's Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). The groups discussed the issue of the temporary suspension of the Schengen Treaty after which they took a stand and voted. Since the vote was divided, the students went on debating until the decision was unanimous. The simulation which incorporated role-play and debating intrigued students as they had to put themselves in a position where they even had to argue the opposite of what they believed; in this way they were taught about tolerance, respect for different points of view, understanding, and they gained valuable insights into how the EU institutions work, where delegates from different backgrounds have to discuss, negotiate, cooperate and reach an agreement.

Conclusions

In this paper, an attempt has been made to discuss the controversial issue of the EU image and the growing Euroscepticism within the member states, especially the crisis-struck ones. In this context, the idea of a school club was put forward at a time when public support for the EU was low in Greece mostly due to the financial and economic crisis. It is true that in the absence of a long term communication policy on part of the EU -except for the Erasmus that has been a successful paradigm of a European Public Sphere- and in a negatively shaped context, it is not easy to create a favorable climate for the EU. However, the goal of this European citizens' club was not to make students love the EU or make them accept EU policies uncritically. This is not what citizenship education is about. It is about preparing well informed, critically thinking, and active citizens. When citizens are informed, they reinforce democracy.

Public diplomacy, although primarily a foreign policy activity, sets as an objective to create as positive a climate as possible among the general public in order to facilitate the explanation and hopefully acceptance of policies. Those in favor of public diplomacy advocate that it is not only about image but increasingly about ideas, values and involving non-governmental actors. Thus, drawing on public diplomacy practices, a successful communication strategy for the EU could be based not only on the

assertions of European values (equality, democracy etc.) but also on reaching civil society in the member states, engaging in a real dialogue with it and giving place for its voice to be heard. By building relationships and engaging with ordinary citizens at a young age through schools, universities, NGOs, clubs that may be affiliated with counterparts in EU member states, etc., the European public sphere can be created.

The results of the questions posed to the members of this European citizens' club are encouraging as they reflect a positive attitude on the part of young people towards participation in public life. Young EU citizens are keen to participate and despite the fact that the vast majority of them hold a neutral view of the EU, the findings show that perceptions and attitudes towards the EU are shapeable as by the end of the school year none of them had a negative view of the EU and the percentage of those holding a fairly positive image increased significantly. The effort to win over the "hearts and minds" of the Europeans, however, is not an easy task as it is set in communication as a two-way process and particularly, in listening to them by giving them space where they can make their voices heard and more specifically, it is set in reaching and listening to the messages sent out by the younger generations if there is to be a sustainable future for the European integration.

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Diversity in a European context: the Challenge of Creating a Shared Critical Vocabulary

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ABSTRACT

This paper draws on research conducted as part of the EU-funded RADAR project (Regulating AntiDiscrimination and AntiRacism). It focuses on the need to create a common vocabulary on diversity and 'race' that could be shared by the nine project partners in six EU countries (Italy, Greece, UK, Poland, Finland and the Netherlands), to fulfil the project's aims. The RADAR project deals with the complex and topical phenomena of racism and xenophobia, which involve controversial terms and expressions. These are not static, but evolve with social change and increased awareness of diversity, which makes our task even more challenging. Starting with the concept of 'race', which we reject as a biological category, but not as a research subject, we critically examine other 'race'-related terms of everyday use with seemingly benign, but essentially excluding and discriminatory character. Finally, we make suggestions on possible steps towards a common multilingual, multicultural approach.

Keywords: racism, critical language use, hate communication, hate speech, migrants, 'race', xenophobia, Europe, intercultural, multilingual

INTRODUCTION: The RADAR project and the need for a shared 'race'-related vocabulary

This paper draws on research conducted as part of the EU-funded RADAR project - Regulating AntiDiscrimination and AntiRacism (JUST/2013/FRAC/AG/6271). The project, which ran from November 2014 until October 2016, was funded in the framework of the EU Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Programme, under the heading *Combating different forms and manifestations of racism and xenophobia*. Led by the University of Perugia, RADAR included nine partners in six EU countries (Italy, Greece, UK, Poland, Finland and the Netherlands) and it investigated the mechanisms of hate-motivated and hate-producing communication. The aim of the project was to develop a training methodology and tangible tools for identifying 'racially'-marked offences, based on verbal, paraverbal, non-verbal and visual communication practices.

The development of these tools was crucial, for two main reasons. Firstly, they were meant to respond to key EU initiatives such as the EU Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia¹, the purpose of which was to fight racist and xenophobic crimes across the EU. Member States were obliged to transpose this into their national laws by 2010, however this made little difference. The EU Fundamental Rights Agency published two reports on victims of hate crimes in November 2012², which showed that hate crimes were still a daily problem across the EU and that "many of these crimes remain unreported, unprosecuted and unpunished".³ Secondly, these tools would enable us to determine

¹ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32008F0913>

² <http://fra.europa.eu/en/press-release/2012/hate-crime-reality-eu-two-new-fra-reports-show>

³ [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-13-11_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-11_en.htm)

how racism is constructed communicatively through hate speech, and more broadly hate communication, and how it then becomes ingrained in society. This meant that an investigation into both hate-producing (not necessarily intentional) and hate-motivated (intentional) communication was necessary.

Against this backdrop, the objectives of the project were: a) to compare existing legislation and relevant studies in the six partner countries; b) to identify specific hate communication practices in the media, legal documents, political discourse, everyday discourse and social media; c) to identify the formulaic mechanisms of hate-oriented communication practices with regard to techniques, procedures and strategies; d) to develop a training concept with concrete tools for recognising such communication practices and ultimately preventing hate crimes; e) to elaborate good practices, recommendations and tools for the legal and police sectors in particular.⁴

To fulfil these aims and objectives, the project was divided into four work streams. The first work stream focused on the state-of-the-art and user needs analysis. This involved collecting and comparing laws and judgments in every partner country, relating to racist hate speech 'race'-based discrimination, conducting interviews with people who have experienced racism and collecting debates about discrimination, racism xenophobia and hate communication in general. One of the deliverables of this work stream was to establish a shared critical vocabulary on racism, xenophobia and discrimination that could be used by the nine project partners in six different languages to fulfil the project aims. This critical vocabulary was of paramount importance, not only for the practical aspects of the project, but also (and perhaps more importantly) to illustrate the fundamental differences in concepts of 'race', racism, xenophobia and diversity in European societies. Indeed, such terminology is far from static. It is historically and socio-politically contingent, which made our task even more demanding. This paper focuses precisely on this challenge.

Starting from a critical view of 'race', the paper also explores the concept of whiteness before examining the language of racism in Europe. It then analyses a selection of sensitive terms in the six project languages and concludes with proposals on how to meet the challenge of establishing a shared, transnational, transcultural 'race'-related vocabulary (if at all possible). The overall aim is to provide a scientific reflection on how ethnic sensitivity changes with time, also as a consequence of the influence of mass media, of political rhetoric and the judicial system.

1. 'Race' and whiteness

1.1 A critical view of the term 'race'

The use of the term 'race' has been widely debated in public and academic contexts. Warmington (2009) identifies two main problems associated with the term. First, an unquestioned use of the word has the potential to solidify a term whose origins are discriminatory and have no scientific basis (see below). Second, alternative uses of the word that seek to recognise this first problem, such as 'race' in inverted commas, run the risk of opening real, everyday and institutional experiences of racism and racist abuse to scepticism. We identify a third issue with the use of the term 'race': language. Within its English use alone, 'race' remains open to discussion. In translation, and across the many contexts of Europe and European languages, its use becomes even more complex. Below we discuss the manifold issues of trying to translate the vocabulary of the experiences of racism, and of anti-racist terms across these monolingual and multilingual contexts.

We consider 'race' purely a social construct. For clarity across contended cultural and linguistic contexts of the RADAR Project, we place the term in inverted commas throughout the paper.

As Black, anti-racist and anti-colonial scholars and activists have long argued (Fanon 2001; 2008), there is neither a biological nor scientific basis for racial division between humans. The identification of 'race' as a category of biological division has colonial (Said 1977; Spivak 2010) and research-based roots (Tuhiwai Smith 1999), and was used from the sixteenth century to support white, European

Also consider: "Despite the best efforts and commitments of Member States of the European Union to counter discrimination and intolerance, including manifestations of hate crime, there are indications that the situation in the EU is not improving. On the contrary, in the last few years, we have witnessed continued and renewed violations of the fundamental rights of people living in the EU – not least of all their right to human dignity – through verbal abuse, physical attacks or murders motivated by prejudice" (FRA report, 2012, p. 3).

⁴ More information can be found on the project website:
<http://win.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/project-2/>

conquests, enslavements and rule around the world. In the contemporary West, it is now widely accepted that 'race' has no biological basis. However, this does not mean that the experience and effects of racial identification and racism are not real or that racial discrimination does not exist. In 1998 the American Anthropological Association released a statement on 'race', arguing, among other things, that "[t]he idea of 'race' has always carried more meanings than mere physical differences; indeed physical variations in the human species have no meaning except the social ones that humans put on them" (1998 AAA Statement on Race). What is crucial is not only that a term which "imposes social meanings on physical variations" (Smedley, 1998, p. 693) has become normalised, but, more importantly, that it defines people to a point that it supersedes any other aspects of their identity. As Smedley (1998, p. 695) explains:

"'Race' identity took priority over religion, ethnic origin, education and training, socioeconomic class, occupation, language, values, beliefs, morals, lifestyles, geographical location, and all other human attributes that hitherto provided all groups and individuals with a sense of who they were."

Because of the salience of 'race' in a person's identity, any attributes that are ascribed to a particular 'race' (either negative or positive) end up characterising the individual as a whole. This mechanism forms the basis of bias and prejudice (see Hugenberg and Bodenhausen, 2004; Augoustinos and Every, 2007). Dividing humanity into different 'races' constitutes a "tool to oppress and exploit specific social groups and to deny them access to material, cultural and political resources, to work, welfare services, housing and political rights" (Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R, 2001, p. 2; see also Bethencourt, 2015, p. 3; and others). 5

It is important to stress that we are critical of the term and concept of 'race', but not its study and its manifestations in contemporary society, which is heuristically useful and necessary. We neither criticise nor condemn the choice of some people to self-identify in any way they wish. Adopting a critical view of 'race' because of its historically oppressive and divisive origins does not mean that we are favouring a 'colourblind' approach, which denies that one's 'race' may have significant impact on their experiences, based on a racialised social hierarchy. It is this social hierarchy that we reject and we are critical of the link between physical and cultural traits (see Garner, 2010, p. 6), but we neither ignore nor reject difference, nor, most importantly, the struggles of ethnic minorities in white-dominated societies.

Despite our position with regard to the term and concept of 'race', we are also mindful of the cross-European context in which the RADAR project takes place. Though 'race' and racist abuse occur across all partner countries, the language, terminology and culture in which these take place are not the same, nor are they understood in the same way. For instance, in Italy there is a movement of university professors and scholars who are actively engaged in advocating the removal of the term 'race' from the Italian Constitution on the grounds that it is "unscientific and overdue with regard to the current situation" (*Addio alla razza*, 2016). As we discuss in more detail below, 'race' as understood in English and in a UK context cannot be transferred into other languages or countries, as neither the linguistic terms nor the sociohistorical contexts are directly translatable. We bear in mind also that experiences and self-definitions of 'race' are situational and emic. This stands both for definitions and understandings of whiteness in Europe, and for definitions and understandings of people of colour. Bethencourt asks: "How is it that the same person can be considered black in the United States, colored in the Caribbean or South Africa, and white in Brazil?" (Bethencourt, 2015, p. 1). We further ask, when working multilingually and interculturally, is a common critical anti-racist vocabulary achievable or even desirable?

Bethencourt's question recognises that both social and linguistic elements should be taken into account when talking about racial definitions. It also highlights the slipperiness of the vocabulary used to do so, alongside the importance of the perspective of the creators/users from which the vocabulary is spoken. As all of the contexts of the partners present majority-white⁶ populations, it is also necessary to explore the concept of whiteness.

⁵ For a more thorough exploration of 'race', see Smedley, 1999; Garner, 2010; Gunaratnam, 2003; Aspinall, 2009; Machery and Faucher, 2005.

⁶ 'White' and 'whiteness' across European contexts are contested terms and are also open to discussion.

1.2 Whiteness

The term 'whiteness' is neither easily translated nor communicated. First used by W.E.B. DuBois in 1935 to describe the 'wages of whiteness' in the US upon the African American population, it has been used by Black and Black Feminist activists and scholars throughout the 20th century to describe everyday and institutional conditions of inequality imposed upon people of colour⁷ by systems and people who benefit from white privilege (discussed below). The term gained wider currency in the last 20 years, especially alongside postmodern turns in the social sciences, which have become interested in the effects and implications of whiteness on everyday lives (Ahmed, 2007).

Like other racially-descriptive terms, therefore, whiteness is not a simple, one-dimensional concept that relates only to skin colour. Like 'race', it also constitutes an aggregate concept of economic and socio-cultural traits and experiences that are pre-defined and pre-supposed, and that give those perceived as white systemic and institutional advantage. Whiteness confers advantage by constructing itself as the norm, so that whiteness in Western societies is by default "normative and natural [...] the standard against which all other cultures, groups, and individuals are measured and usually found to be inferior" (Henry and Tator, 2006, p. 46). Whiteness gains further power by concealing its own normativity. Gunaratnam (2013) argues that it can be understood as an "invisible norm that produces outliers" and argues that for people of minority ethnic heritage "as outliers we are marked". Peggy McIntosh's (1990) famous 'Invisible Knapsack' of white privilege begins to unpack the multiple ways in which the norm of whiteness gives advantage. Of course, 'whiteness' "does not mean that all White people accrue advantage equally", nor does 'whiteness' mean "[all] White People" (Abdi, 2016, p. 58). However, the term begins to describe a broad set of social, institutional and discursive conditions that seek to racialise people in a hierarchical manner.

Language use is implicated in the creation of these conditions, and the conceptualisation of terms for racialised experiences raises questions about power and categorisation. In the context of whiteness, it is important to ask: who creates the vocabulary to talk about racial experiences? Who uses the vocabulary? How? To what extent is race-based vocabulary an imposition of top-down terms and categorisations? To what extent does race-based vocabulary assist in the concretisation of racial division and hierarchy?

In the context of the RADAR Project, we recognise that whiteness and white privilege are experienced differently across European contexts. Whilst taking this into account, we also note that due to white privilege, the imposition of dominant, white-led vocabulary on the experiences of minority groups and people of colour is inappropriate. We maintain that 'race'-related vocabulary must be established by those to whom the vocabulary is addressed, those directly affected by it, those minority groups historically oppressed and marginalised.

2. The language of 'race' and racism in legal texts

Investigating the diverse and multiple experiences of racism in a European context requires considering experiences, backgrounds, contexts, languages and frames of reference. Generally speaking, we need to take into account: the sociolinguistic dynamic, where a specific term has a socially and historically achieved meaning; the pragmalinguistic dynamic, where the meaning of a specific term is given by its use in a specific cultural context and concrete social situation; the conversational contextualisation of a term (Dossou et al, 2016, p. 11). When looking at the sociolinguistic dynamic, it is clear that we must consider the socio-historical differences in the project countries. For instance, the UK demographic and social context of a former colonial Empire that has been ethnically and culturally diverse as a result, is very different from that of Poland or Greece. And even if we take into account historical similarities (e.g. colonialism in the UK and Italy), social norms and practices diverge. The question that arises then, is who establishes these social norms and, more importantly, the language of society.

As a general rule, language and social norms are established by the dominant public. In this case, it is somewhat ironic that 'race'-related terminology, including recommendations on terms to use and to avoid, is more often than not established by white people (cf. Gunaratnam, 2013). When it comes to social norms, the significance of the media in shaping attitudes to 'race' and otherness is paramount (Van Dijk, 1999; Frost, 2008; Oliver et al, 2009), however this is not the focus of this paper.⁸ The

⁷ The term 'people of colour' is examined in 3.2.2.

⁸ Strani et al (2016) have looked at how the media in Greece and the UK present and communicate the concept of 'race' and of 'race'-relations to their respective publics, based on material collected for the RADAR project. The choice of Greece and the UK as the countries/societies of study is useful because of the wide differences

language of ‘race’ and racism, the related terminology and norms are enshrined in legal texts, which are written by the dominant white majority and produce (as well as perpetuate) crystallised categories of otherness. This section looks at some of these categories, using material from the comparative reports on terminology of legal texts in the RADAR project countries⁹.

The comparison of legal texts in the six project countries showed that each country has anti-racism and anti-discrimination laws, defining and punishing discriminatory acts against people or groups by reference to ‘race’, skin colour, religion, national origin, ethnic origin, and sometimes descent. In this respect, the distinction between ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ groups is not clarified. Furthermore, the laws of Greece, Italy and Poland condemn activities and hate against other ‘races’, however the term is not explained. In the respective languages ‘race’ is translated as tribe (Greek) or breed (Italian, Polish). In the Netherlands, the Board of the Institution for Human Rights explains the concept of ‘race’ in the Equal Treatment Act in accordance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination broadly. According to this explanation, the concept of ‘race’ includes “colour, descent and national or ethnic origin” (Papers II 1990-91, 22 014, no. 3, p. 13).

The terms ‘race’ and ‘racial’ are also present in the EU anti-discrimination Directives that have been in place since 2000. The “Race Equality Directive” mentions discrimination on the ground of “racial or ethnic origin” and, related to the workplace, also on the ground of “religion or belief”.¹⁰ Nevertheless, it is explicitly stated that:

“The European Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate human races. The use of the term ‘racial origin’ in this Directive does not imply an acceptance of such theories.”¹¹

This seems to be contradictory. If the EU does not accept theories on the existence of separate human races, then it is not clear why the term ‘race’ is being used. In particular, it is not clear whether it refers to something that actually exists or as a mere heuristic classification. If indeed the reason is for lack of a better term, this should be clarified in the Directive, along with the fact that ‘race’ represents a constructed classification that does not describe any natural or objective reality. The considered Member State laws (Finland, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, UK) do not explicitly refer to this point in their national legal texts, leaving the concept ambiguous.

On the contrary, UK Law refers to presumed (by the offender) “membership to race or other groups” (see Strani and Hill, 2015). This means that there can be a ‘racially’ defined group (a group of black people, a group of Asian people etc.), who would experience racism on the basis of their (presumed) ‘race’. ‘Membership’ also implies belonging and so echoes identity, something which is not clear in other definitions (ibid.). The Dutch Law talks about “race, religion or personal beliefs”, where the term “race” includes the reference to colour and ethnicity (Rouah, 2015). In Italy, legal texts also use terms such as: colour, descent, national or ethnic origin (or simply “origin”), religious beliefs and practices.¹² In 2013, a judge (Judgment 1615/2013) described a black person as a *persona di razza diversa* (“person of different race”), which both accepts the false perception that different races actually exist and it assumes that white people are the norm and everyone else is “different”. This term is a clear expression of white privilege and domination in a multicultural society.

In Finnish non-discrimination legislation (e.g. Non-Discrimination Act, Act on Non-Discrimination and Equality Board) the term ‘race’ is rarely used, and rather ‘ethnic/national origin’ or ‘nationality’ are used as basis for discrimination: “Nobody may be discriminated against on the basis of [...], ethnic or national origin, nationality, language, religion, belief, [...] or other personal characteristics.” (Non-

in (modern) history, society and demographics. This exploration is also crucial for the wider discussion of racist discrimination in a European context.

⁹ This and other project reports are available on the RADAR online platform: http://lnx.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/htdocs/radar.communicationproject.eu/home/dokeos/main/document/document.php?cidReq=RAD01&curdirpath=%2FLAWS_and_JUDGMENTS (registration required)

¹⁰ European Commission 2014, “Equality: EU rules to tackle discrimination now in place in all 28 EU Member States”, Press Release, Brussels, 17 January 2014; see also “Press pack: Report on application of the directives and annexes” http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/discrimination/news/140117_en.htm; “European Commission – Tackling discrimination”: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/index_en.htm

¹¹ Footnote 6 in the Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal L 180, 19/07/2000 P. 0022 – 0026.

¹² *Discriminazione per motivi razziali, etnici, nazionali o religiosi* (Discrimination for racial, ethnic, national or religious reasons); Legislative Decree of July 25, 1998, n. 286.

Discrimination Act 1325/2014). However, in the Criminal Code Section 11 – Discrimination (885/2009), the term ‘race’ is used in relation to the fact that it “places someone on a clearly unequal or otherwise essentially inferior position”. Other categories are placed together with ‘race’, such as “national or ethnic origin, skin colour, language, [...], inheritance, or religion, [...]”. There are few court cases regarding ethnic/‘racial’ discrimination, as there are only few instances where the discrimination has been considered severe enough to merit a criminal sentence. However, there are several judgments by the National Discrimination Tribunal of Finland concerning ethnic discrimination. In most judgments, the term “ethnic/national origin” is used, and the term “race” is rarely seen (Helenius, 2015).

It has not been possible to collect court judgments referring to communication practices in relation to ‘racial’ discrimination in Greece, because access to official court data is not allowed. Especially in the past, before Law no. 4285/2014 was published, Greek legislation stipulated that racist motivation would only be addressed in the sentencing phase, rather than during the trial, making police and prosecutors less likely to investigate potential bias elements of a crime from the outset. Consequently, very few court convictions have ever been made on the basis of racist motivation (Fountana & Sokoli, 2015).¹³

In Poland (Szczepaniak-Kozak & Adamczak-Krzysztofowicz, 2015), there were references to “national and race affiliation” (*przynależności narodowej i rasowej*, Judgment IV K 372 /13), or “in the context of the colour of his skin” (*w kontekście koloru jego skóry*, Judgment III K 409/13). In the same case, the judge introduces the following definition of racial affiliation (*przynależność rasową*) as “referring to the human race, so the difference among others in terms of appearance and colour of the skin, so the set of morphological hereditary traits such as colour of skin, eyes and hair, the shape of the face and the physiological and biological characteristics, regardless of cultural differences, language, religion, common origin, or social ties that make up the ethnicity” (ibid.). In this definition, ‘race’ refers exclusively to physical traits and is not connected to identity and heritage or belonging. The use of the term “affiliation” is therefore confusing in this case.

To sum up, the only descriptions of the word ‘race’ we have in a legal context are: a) in the aforementioned EU directive (Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal L 180 , 19/07/2000 p. 0022 – 0026), where the concept ‘race’ is actually defined by what it is not; it is not a biological concept; b) the ad hoc definition by a Polish judge, which relates ‘race’ purely to physical characteristics. This does justice neither to people of colour (the term will be clarified below), whose ‘race’ may be an important source of identity and pride, nor to judicial systems which need clear and useful definitions of salient concepts relating to racism, xenophobia and hate crime. For this reason, we must emphasise the historic and communicative processes of discrimination as opposed to crystallised categories, perpetuated by legal texts written by the dominant (white) majority. A critical analysis of relevant terminology is a good start.

3. A selection of sensitive, problematic and standardised terms

Starting from an exploration of UK ‘race’-related terminology, this section will examine a selection of sensitive and challenging terms in the project languages. This list includes selected examples for the purposes of this paper and does not constitute an exhaustive account of the project’s findings. It is evident from our analysis above that the term ‘race’ has been the most ambiguous and problematic. There seems to be an emphasis on physical / phenotypic traits rather than identities, heritage, belonging and experiences. More importantly, despite extensive literature by scholars of colour (the term is clarified below), ‘race’-related terminology is largely established by the white majority.

¹³ The authors also note that the ECRI Report on Greece (fifth monitoring cycle), published on 24 February 2015 (<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Greece/GRC-CbC-V-2015-001-ENG.pdf>), comments on the unavailability of data in relation to incidents of hate speech (p. 17 -18).

“34. [...] The exact number of these incidents is difficult to ascertain in the absence of systematic data collection. Furthermore, there are no detailed statistics on the few cases that reach the courts, since there is no central hate crime database. Each court is supposed to compile its own data, without standardised criteria.

35. ECRI recommends that the Greek authorities set up a national monitoring mechanism for incidents of hate speech. This should also include, but not be limited to, a centralised database for court cases”.

3.1 'Black' / 'White'

The term 'black' has a particular sociolinguistic dynamic in UK usage. 'Black' is more than a skin colour; it can be seen as an integral part of someone's identity and politics, and as a term that recognises a long struggle against oppression by colonialism, institutional and everyday racism (Gilroy 2002; Olusoga 2016). So 'black' can describe both *ethnicity* and *identity*. For this reason, 'Black' can be understood as both an inclusive and divisive term¹⁴. It is inclusive in the sense that it seeks to unify the experiences of minority ethnic groups and provide a shared identity. But it can also be regarded as divisive because it irons out any differences within Black, African and Caribbean groups for the sake of taxonomy and categorisation. It can also be seen to ignore intersectionality or difference in discrimination faced by people of different socio-economic backgrounds or heritage. Despite these considerations, the term 'black' is the most commonly used in self-identification and it is also the established term in UK official documents. It is important to note that, unlike the US, in the UK the term 'African' in conjunction with the nationality 'American' is not used instead of 'black'. The reason is not merely accuracy - indeed, a significant proportion of black British people are from the West Indies and others simply do not self-identify as African - but also a recognition that identity can be detached from skin colour, e.g. you can be black and European.¹⁵

Similarly, in Italy the term black ('nero') used to have a derogatory connotation, however it is now being re-claimed by black Italians themselves. A video has been produced in this sense by young black Italians, rejecting the term 'di colore' and favouring the term 'nero'.¹⁶ The video also shows a new sensitivity emerging which rejects meaningless classifications. Italian's former minister of integration Cécile Kyenge stated during a talk show: "mi definisco come congolese italiana" (I define myself as Italian Congolese), rejecting any reference to blackness or black as an epithet. In other cases, especially when the term has a positive connotation, the English term 'black' is often used.

Interestingly, amongst the 60 people interviewed as part of the RADAR project who experienced racism, two UK respondents self-identified as 'black', whereas in the other project countries they self-identified as their nationality (Nigerian, Somali, etc.) (Strani and Monteoliva, 2015). This leads to the assumption that perhaps the positive connotations of the term 'black' as a source of pride and a primordial part of someone's identity only exist in UK society. Similarly, the term 'white' is used widely in the UK to describe ethnicity. The term is potentially problematic as it might imply a binary with 'black' and reinforce racial division. UK Census and population data differentiates some white ethnicities - for instance, 'white Irish'. In the UK press, legal texts, cases and judgments, the term 'white' is infrequently used to describe a (white) person's ethnicity as 'whiteness' remains a presumed norm (we examined this in section 1.2). This normative hegemony of whiteness is also the case in other EU countries.

3.2 'Non-white'

There are more complex categories than black or white. The term 'non-white' is frequently used to describe 'other' categories; frequent use does not necessarily mean accurate use, however. 'Non-white' implies a hegemony of whiteness to such a degree that all other ethnicities revolve around it. For this reason, it is highly contentious and problematic. Despite this, it is still used in a UK context to contrast the experiences of people of colour with white people. The term 'racialised person' or 'racialised group' is used in the US¹⁷ and, even though it may sound stilted and artificial in UK English, it is gaining popularity amongst UK scholars. The term is also used in French (*personne racialisée*) but not in any of the RADAR project languages.

¹⁴ Universities Scotland Race Equality Toolkit, 2010: <http://www.universities-scotland.ac.uk/raceequalitytoolkit/terminology.htm>

¹⁵ The distinction between the use of the terms Black and African-American is well illustrated here: <http://www.blackstudies.org.uk/conference-and-events/blackness-in-britain-2015/>

¹⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Lyq1ep5T4Y>

¹⁷ <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/racial-discrimination-race-and-racism-fact-sheet>

3.2.1 BME (Black and Minority Ethnic), BAME (Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic)

The terms BME (Black and Minority Ethnic) and BAME (Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic) are used in a UK context to describe a broader range of population groups. Though the terms are increasingly used in government and NGO literature, they remain contested and unpopular as terms of identification. Evidence from the literature (Demby, 2014; Okolosie et al, 2015) and from interviews conducted as part of the RADAR project (Strani & Monteoliva, 2015) show that such terminology can never be universally accepted. Issues with the terms include: a bureaucratic emphasis on ethnicity with which it is difficult to identify; an unwelcome emphasis on Black, Asian and other ethnicities as 'minority'; the implication that Black, Asian and other ethnicities all have the same racial experiences; and the continued exclusion of other ethnicities and groups in the titles. This term does not exist in any other EU language.

3.2.2 People/person of colour (POC)

The term "person of colour" is worth examining. Used to describe any group that is not white and is 'othered' on the basis of skin colour, religion, ethnicity or other cultural basis, it is increasingly used in the UK (see "Writers of Colour" in <http://mediadiversified.org/>), but not without opposition¹⁸. The main objection to the term is that it resembles the highly offensive and obsolete term 'coloured'. The term 'coloured' is only used in South Africa and surrounding countries to refer to a specific group of mixed race people (see RADAR interviews, 2015). 'Person of colour' is gaining prominence in the UK, despite the aforementioned opposition, and it is considered an all-encompassing term for people who are largely regarded as 'other', irrespective of skin colour. For instance, a white Muslim or an East Asian person can be considered a person of colour because of the experience of oppression and discrimination by the white majority. This is important because the emphasis shifts from skin colour or visible difference to cultural and in some cases invisible differences that result in shared experiences of oppression, discrimination and othering.

The term 'people of colour' is not easily translated and it is not used in any of the project languages in this way. As already mentioned above, a similar term does exist in Italy - *persona di colore* (literally "person of colour") (Caniglia and Klein, 2015), but has the opposite intent and effect. The term is euphemistic in the Italian context and constitutes a stilted attempt to create a politically correct term for black people, since the term *nero* (black) is considered offensive. It is important to note that the term *persona di colore* has not been introduced or at least appropriated by the target group, as it is shown in interviews conducted with people who have experienced racism in Italy.¹⁹

3.3 Other terms

'Mixed race' refers to people of mixed heritage and is not accepted by everyone in the target group. The problem lies in the term 'race', not in the term 'mixed'. 'Mixed heritage' or 'mixed parentage' seems to be the most preferred term used by the people belonging to these groups (Aspinall, 2009).²⁰ In other project languages, similar terms may be derogatory, e.g. *mulatto* in Italian, or neutral, e.g. *μυγάς* in Greek, which comes from the Ancient Greek word for 'mix'.

'Visible minorities' is a term that originated in Canada and is sometimes used in the UK for people of different colour. It is seen critically, however, because of the unnecessary emphasis on the visible difference, which ignores any cultural or heritage traits of a person. The term is largely backward, as it focuses on skin colour and not on the person or any intersectional experience (e.g. gender, disability, religion, class, socio-economic status, etc.). No similar term was noted in any of the project languages. It is clear that, because of specific historical, political and demographic characteristics as well as its

¹⁸ (see <http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2014/11/07/362273449/why-we-have-so-many-terms-for-people-of-color> and <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/racial-discrimination-race-and-racism-fact-sheet>, although the latter refers to the US).

¹⁹ Interviews were conducted with victims of hate crime and people who have experienced racism in the six partner countries. See country-specific interview reports on the RADAR online platform: <http://lnx.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/htdocs/radar.communicationproject.eu/home/dokeos/main/document/document.php?cidReq=RAD01&curdirpath=%2FINTERVIEWS> (registration is required). Also, see explanatory video of young black Italians: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Lyq1ep5T4Y>

²⁰ Also see http://www.mix-d.org/files/resources/Terminology_Chart_09.pdf

colonial past, 'race'-related terminology in the UK is constantly evolving to the point where "our race terminology is struggling to keep up" (Okolosie et al, 2015; Demby, 2014).

4. Recommendations

Clearly, non-discriminatory language that can be applied in multicultural contexts should be used at all times. Our investigation has shown that this is not an easy task. Terms related to 'race' and racism cannot be translated uncritically from one language to another. Self-identification is of paramount importance, but it is not always straightforward or unanimous. And even if 'race' is viewed critically, or even if the term 'race' were banned completely, racism would still persist. *All* races are racialised, including whiteness, but whiteness obscures its racialisation. To understand how racism works, it is crucial that we begin to recognise and develop tools for unpacking how whiteness is racialised, and what this means for people of colour. This is worth asking in a European context, especially as whiteness is not a constant.

The first step towards achieving a multicultural understanding of non-discrimination and use of non-offensive, non-discriminatory language, is to overcome the 'us-them' divisive discourse. Only then we can start to acknowledge societal diversity, but without being 'colourblind', i.e. without denying that still the colour of one's skin may have significant impact on their experiences, based on a racialised social hierarchy. Indeed, to say we have to get rid of *all* 'racial' terms does not eliminate racism, and ultimately demonstrates white privilege in the extreme. In practice this just further occludes the boundaries, discrimination and abuse experienced by people of colour. As we state in our paper, it is the term 'race' as such that we find problematic, but we do not deny diversity, difference or the struggles of ethnic and religious minorities in white-dominated / hegemonic societies. Our intent is to overcome an 'us-them' division but acknowledge difference in the spirit of mutual respect and inclusion.

We need to take into account that the choice of words matters insofar as they represent and shape our mind-sets and therefore our perception of reality. These terms need to be interpreted in a multidimensional perspective with respect to social, cultural, biological and political-ideological variables, historically determined as linguistic actions and discriminatory practices. In this respect, it is crucial to learn the history behind the usage of certain words so that we can understand why it is offensive to use them (e.g. in the British context these are often relics of colonialism and violent oppression).

Furthermore, it is of equal importance to reclaim some of the vocabulary that has become negative, e.g. 'immigrant' or 'foreigner'. The 'I am an immigrant' campaign in the UK has tried to do precisely that.²¹ By reclaiming certain words, we are trying to reinstate their positive connotation against the tendency to turn them into negative categories. Above all, the target groups should be leading discussions on terminology, language use and self-identification. It is unacceptable that the majority of 'race'-related terminology is established by the white majority. A person of colour cannot identify with a term imposed by the white majority, especially if that term is established for purely bureaucratic or categorisation purposes (e.g. BAME, BME). An intercultural dialogue in this respect is important, but one led by people of colour (the target groups) themselves.

Still, reclaiming or changing the way we talk about people of colour and other racialized minorities is not enough. To instigate real social change which will in turn be reflected in society's discourse, we need to ensure their fair and accurate representation in the media, in advertising and in public space in general. With regard to media representation, it is important that minorities, migrants and all groups who may constitute targets of hate communication express themselves and tell their own stories in talk shows, news bulletins etc. It is too often that these groups are not given a voice and instead others (members of dominant groups) tell their stories or speak out for them. Depriving a person or a group of their voice constitutes a dangerous process of depersonalisation, which also deprives the public of a crucial point of view - that of minorities, migrants, people who experience racism and/or hate communication. When the public misses this crucial narrative, this has a considerable impact on people's perceptions, attitudes, behaviour – and language use. Furthermore, one can rarely see people of colour pictured in various leadership positions. Instead, they are usually used portraying certain (unskilled) jobs and roles (victim, worker, helper etc.). It would be interesting, for instance, to see images of black businesswomen, or Muslim doctors. Individuals who are part of certain groups are

²¹ www.iamanimmigrant.net

absent from powerful positions such as politicians, news anchors or artists. Seeing minorities in such roles will have a positive impact on public perceptions and can eventually transform public discourse.

Some of these recommendations are not new.²² The need for intercultural dialogue and the promotion of positive images, for example, are suggestions that have been made before. However the fact that this is still recognised as a need means that there is still important work that needs to be done. In this respect we would like to propose the following:

Firstly, the promotion of positive images should not take on the form of 'heroisation' of minorities. It should not be a case of demonisation vs. heroisation, but instead portrayals of minorities as everyday people like everyone else. The use of minority ethnic people to portray businessmen, scientists, etc. in advertisements is advisable, but beyond that, the portrayal of minority ethnic people in everyday roles (everyday people doing everyday things) is also crucial.

Secondly, the initiatives for intercultural dialogue, awareness raising etc. should be led or at least co-led by minorities themselves. Most existing initiatives have failed because they are led by the dominant groups and minorities are therefore reluctant to get involved. The only way for a common multilingual, multicultural approach is for the social processes that lead to the establishment of standardised terminology to be initiated and ideally led by the minorities themselves. Overall, differences between countries and languages will always exist because of historical, social, political and demographic differences. As long as these differences are communicated, then awareness of differences in terminology will eventually lead to awareness of the diverse experiences of people of colour and attitudes to diversity in different European countries.

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²² For the RADAR project recommendations in all project languages, please visit http://lnx.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/htdocs/radar.communicationproject.eu/home/dokeos/main/document/document.php?cidReq=EXPL810d&curdirpath=%2FRADAR_GUIDELINES (registration is required).

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Hyperborean Variété of Identities in Neo-latin Texts of Riga Humanists

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ABSTRACT

The image of Hyperboreans describes the Northeast border of Europe that has historically been in a pendular state between the cultural values of the West, East, and local pagan ones. Early modern times were a crucial period in the shaping of regional identity features as at that particular time Livonian Order collapsed and Livonia was devastated by the Russian Tsardom. In contrast, the Riga Humanists brought Renaissance echoes to this furthestmost corner of Europe. This paper will give a concise outline on the formation of Livonian identity and its portrayal in the works of poetry by Riga Humanists (Frenzel, Eucaedius, Plinius).

Keywords: humanists, Neo-Latin poetry, Livonia, Hyperboreans, Riga, Augustinus Eucaedius, Basilius Plinius, Salomon Frenzel, borders, identity

INTRODUCTION

As contemporary border studies focus sharply on the issues of identity, the diversity to be found in the construction of identities in the border areas where ethnicities, nations, religions, and in a historical perspective even different ages meet, it is important to apply the methods of border studies to the study of identity discourse in literary texts, even if these texts do not discuss identity explicitly. In particular, this approach should be applied to literary texts that engage directly with the issues of identity portrayal in border areas. The Neo-Latin Riga Humanist texts allow an analysis of identities on the geographical, cultural, and religious borders. These texts contain material that can be analyzed through the prism of mixed populations, the presence of both hegemonic and minority identities (Wilson, 2012, p. 2) among other identity-shaping features.

Identities and borders

Identity formation is closely connected to the notions of border and nation/ethnicity among other factors. For example, state borders are commonly understood as multifaceted social institutions and they help condition how societies and individuals shape their identities (Scott, 2012, p. 83). Borders can also be conceived as social structures that are constantly and communicatively reproduced (Scott, 2012, p. 83). Borders are reproduced, for example, in situations of conflict where historical memories are mobilized to support territorial claims, to address past injustices, or to strengthen group identity, often by perpetuating negative stereotypes of the “other” (Scott, 2012, p. 83). The definition of borders whether political or cultural is a process that cannot be finalized (Scott, 2012, p. 84). In the case of Riga Humanist texts as they stem from a defined period in the cultural history of Latvia, the social, ethnic, and religious identities portrayed are strictly defined and can be a matter of re-evaluation from contemporary perspective. In the case of Europe and the EU the constant (re-)definition of borders reflect the search for a sense of political community based on (geo)political, social and cultural identity and together with various other factors, they give sustenance to notions of a shared European history but also serve as powerful markers of national and local identity (Scott, 2012, p. 85). This is another vivid characteristic to be found in the texts of Riga Humanists as will be seen in later analysis due to the fact that the identities of Christians and pagans, educated nobles and unenlightened beings are separated in strict terms throughout their texts – on the one hand Christianity and humanist education is

asserted as a Pan-European ideal, but the social division between Teutonic ruling order and local ruled ethnicities adds local color in the description of these subjects.

Hyperborean borders and texts

The notion of Hyperboreans in the poetry of Neo-Latin poets of Riga is an allusion to the Northeast border of Europe, that in contemporary geographical terms we refer to as the Baltic countries. This region throughout history has constantly been in a pendular state between cultural values of the West, East, and in more ancient times between local pagan customs and crusading Christianity. Contemporary Latvia and Estonia in the course of history have been on the border and a border themselves between Western Europe and the East, between Christianity and paganism, between Catholicism/Protestantism and Orthodoxy, between Western democracy and totalitarianism of the Soviet Union. Christianization in the 12th century was of a peaceful character at first that transformed into a military campaign in the 13th century and thus Christianity was introduced *igni et ferro*. With the advent of the first crusaders Christianity was brought to *limes Christianae orbis* (the border of Christian world, as Augustinus Eucaedius puts it) and the city of Riga was founded (in 1201 by bishop Albert), a city that in later centuries became a prosperous trade center. A complex feudal formation that in history is known by the name of Livonia, consisting of bishoprics and the order, in a contradictory colonial manner granted the region's integration into the Western world. At the same time this border was fragile. With minor historical shifts, this former Eastern border of Livonia is the contemporary border of Estonia and Latvia, and thus the border of the European Union in the East, and by this retaining its historical function up to nowadays.

The particular texts from 16th century Riga Humanists analyzed in this paper give an insight into the attitudes toward social and political issues reaching back to the arrival of first Christian missionaries from the West as part of the Crusades. In these texts the evaluation of local tribes and their customs are presented in opposition to the Teutonic forces that lay claim on this land. A further feature that comes into play in the descriptions of local identities – be it the one of colonizers or the colonized – is the permanent presence of Russian forces even further to the East that are a constant threat. Another topic evident in these texts is the role of education, what would be a decent and appropriate one and where should one seek for it, if one happens to be living in Livonia during the 16th century.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Historical background on the geopolitical frame of Livonia (Latvia)

As the times are quite far away from where we are today, it would be of great help to give an outline about events of relevance in their historical sequence. From the 12th century onwards the contemporary territory of Latvia experienced a constant inflow of Christian missionaries along the mercantile interest of traders to find new trading paths and markets, and consequently new resources. In the 13th century this territory was already under control of the Holy Roman Empire and later the *Sancta Sedes* in Rome, and was given the name *Terra Mariana* (The Land of Mary).

But only the early modern times were a crucial period in shaping the identity of this particular region as the ideas of European humanism flourished in this region during the times of harsh geopolitical turbulence in the 16th century and reinforced the identity of this region as belonging to Western European cultural values (the establishing period of Westernization being the Christianization in the 12th and 13th centuries). At the end of 16th century Livonian Order collapsed and Livonia although not conquered was devastated by the Russian Tsardom during the Livonian War from 1558 to 1583. In the aftermath the medieval, feudal and conservative Livonian Order state disintegrated and the Northeast coast of Baltic Sea became a place where over several centuries pendular disputes went on about political and cultural boundaries. In contrast to these dire events, some educated humanists from the West of Europe arrived and brought Renaissance echoes to this furthestmost part of Europe. This paper is a fraction from an ongoing research about the late proliferation of humanist ideas in the Northeast part of Europe, i.e., contemporary Latvia and its capital Riga, and their influences on the local education and the emergence of vernacular texts creating the first examples of Latvian, Estonian and Baltic German literature.

But before the Livonian War, an event of an ongoing significance occurred – the Reformation which was appealing to the mercantile citizens of Riga as it promised more freedom in trade affairs. Riga

became a citadel of Protestantism already in 1522 – just 5 years after the beginning of Luther's Reformation. Livonia thus became internally divided and its weakness was immediately exploited by Moscovia, and the Livonian War devastated the land and put an end to the territory of the Order State in 1583. In the aftermath the territory became an apple of discord between Russia, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Sweden still for many centuries to come. From the name of a work by one of the Riga Humanists – Georg Ciegler's *Discursus de rerum humanarum incertitudine* (*Discourse on the incertitude of human affairs*) from 1598 (also known as *Weltspiegel* (*Mirror of the World*) in German translation) we can gather what was the atmosphere like in Livonia, precisely describing the times and conditions of Livonia at this particular time.

It must be mentioned that the Livonian State hadn't put much effort into education thus rendering it unprepared for changes that European cultural streams had brought all over the Western world. Thus only the processes of Reformation and Counter-Reformation made Riga a fertile place for cultural advancement that resulted in the activities of Riga Humanists who in turn created the local Neo-Latin tradition in literature. It is constituted by men of education of presumably both local (Basilus Plinius) and foreign origin (Salomon Frenzel) that made Riga their place of activity for longer or shorter periods of time. They mostly were attracted to Riga by the opportunities to work in Riga Dome School and the prospects of a generous compensation.

Riga Humanists

So how did exactly humanist Neo-Latinity reach Northeast Baltic shores, referred to as the *extrema ora Boreae* or *Aquilonis* by some of the Riga Humanists in their works? One major factor is the close trade relationships with Germany that paved the way for quite a rapid spread of the ideas of Reformation early on in Riga.

The designation *Riga Humanists* is a rather recent academic notion that was introduced in the 1920s by scholars of the newly established University of Latvia (see, e.g., the title of (Spekke, 1925) where he calls Salomon Frenzel a Riga Humanist). This notion referred to a group of intellectuals that attempted to introduce and continue European traditions of Humanism and Neo-Latin poetry here, in the Hyperborean latitudes of Europe (Lāms, 2015, p. 9). Humanism arrived relatively late in Riga when compared to the flourishing and blossom of Neo-Latin humanism in Italy and as the prominent scholar of Neo-Latinity Jozef IJsewijn (IJsewijn, 1990) claims, "[...] the culminating point as reached in the decades immediately before and after 1500" (p. 44) and on the summit of humanist activity in this region he remarks (IJsewijn, 1990) that, "in Sweden that point lies around 1640" (p. 44). So we can conclude that humanism in Livonia and Riga however late is quite vivid nonetheless – after some swallows in the first half of the 16th century at the time of the Reformation, main activities such as educational reforms, production of poetry, book publishing happened in the second half of the century and at the end of it when the movement was already dimming out elsewhere in Europe, it succeeded to lay important foundations in former Livonia (Lāms, 2015, p. 11). The notion *Humanists of Riga* or *Riga Humanists* is mostly known in the Latvian and German scholarly circles as *Rīgas humānisti* or *Rigaer Humanisten* respectively. It is known and used in contemporary studies written in German, but can not be found in articles composed in English except very recently (e.g., see: Lāms, 2005). Issues regarding humanism in the Baltic region are very poorly integrated in the Anglophone research tradition in general, due to the fact that Livonian Neo-Latinity is mostly affiliated with German cultural space. One can also come across such expressions as *the so called Livonian Humanists* and *Humanists of Livonia* (see: Švābe, 1931, p. 12239). But the notion *Livonian Humanism* might be misleading as it is used anachronically and that, as will be seen in this paper, the term *Livonians* can be referred to completely different cultural entities that are in opposition to each other. It must be noted that only a few of the humanists who were active in Riga had a long-lasting connection with this city (Lāms, 2015, p. 12). In the case of Riga Humanists it is not possible to define one specific idea or refer to a manifesto which could be attributed to them in general. One could assert that the notion of Riga Humanists mark a particular place of activity for several people, where a specific narrative was created about the place and time, in which the tension between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation was depicted, as well as the multicultural environment, representing the complex past and unclear future.

Cultural background of Riga in the times of Riga Humanists

To further sketch out the milieu where Riga Humanists were operating it is of major importance to indicate several events occurring in Riga over the 16th century that made Riga a fertile ground for the ideas of humanism to grow roots and that attracted men of humanist views to the city. The first significant factor is the foundation of the first public library in 1524 when the councilman Paul

Dreiling in order to serve the public good donated a small collection of books from monasteries to the priest of a Latvian parish Nicholaus Ramm (died in 1532) and thus the foundations of *Bibliotheca Rigensis* were set.

Another factor in favor to the humanist movement are the reforms at Riga Dome School. In 1528 with advice from Philip Melanchthon it becomes a Protestant school that brings Western humanist education to the local bourgeois and trader circles, in 1594 developing into a five-year Latin school that prepares students for university, but as it fails to grow into a university itself and along the foundation of Tartu University in 1632 in Estonia, the local humanist endeavors are put in jeopardy, and the cultural focus moves more towards vernacularity in literature and thus fertile conditions are provided for the first secular and vernacular works of Latvian literature to appear (Bērziņa, Cīrule, 2015, p. 21; Lāms, 2015, p. 17).

And the third factor was the foundation of a local typography in 1588 by Nicolaus Mollinus as a reaction to the Catholic typography in Vilnius, Lithuania. Mollinus mostly published the works of Western and local humanists, study books for the purposes of Dome School, and gradually books in Latvian were published as well. Latvian historian Jānis Straubergs (Straubergs, 1940) writes on the importance of the establishment of a printing house in Riga, “*The establishment of this printing house would have been delayed even more, if the fight against Jesuits did not force the Rigans to pay utmost attention to their own cultural institutions, thus creating a counterforce to Catholic aggression, which was fostered by the printing house founded earlier in Vilnius*” (p. 17).

One of the most prominent scholars of the 20th century on the heritage of Riga Humanists the Latvian philologist, historian, and diplomat Arnolds Spekke (1887–1972) evaluates the nature of *immigrant humanists* as being thoroughly of colonial character. In his memoirs *Atmiņu brīži (Moments of Remembrance)* (Spekke, 1967) he states, “*Once we used the term pseudo-classicism, let’s not hesitate to join this pseudo- to Livonian Humanism due to its colonial character. It is a factitious bridge [...] and the distances between foreign castles and native shacks are vast and impassable. [...] All these colonial humanists lack, simply lack a thoroughly humane foundation. But what then humanism endeavours to be?*” (p. 544). Although harsh in his views on the phenomenon it nevertheless is important to accentuate the significant role of Riga Humanists in the education of Livonians that later set in motion the first sparks of Latvian self-awareness and the first specimens of Latvian scripture.

TEXTS BY RIGA HUMANISTS

Methods and materials

In the 16th century with the emergence of Lutheranism the Christian faith became available to the local pagans not by compulsion but choice. Reformation created fertile conditions for the ideas and texts of humanism to spread among citizens of Riga, thus promoting the ideals of an all-round education. With the activity of Riga Humanists in 16th century the identity of Livonian region was affirmed as Christian, oriented towards Western values of humanist education and was the starting point for vernacular and national movements that bloomed in later centuries.

In the following section we will analyze three texts by Riga Humanists with special attention and close reading of fragments that portray the different identities and their features in Livonian society. After identifying the significant fragments we will put them into the cultural, historical and social context of Livonia and provide interpretation for these fragments accordingly.

The texts to be analyzed

The texts analyzed in this paper all have their origin in the 16th century. The works are: 1) *Aulaeum Dunaidum (The Tapestry of Daugava Nymphs, 1564, Wittenberg)* by Augustinus Eucadius, a poem in hexameter verse that is devoted to Sigismund August von Mecklenburg (1560–1600). The encomiastic poem is a historical and chronological review of the deeds of ecclesiastical leaders operating in Livonia and Riga from 12th to 16th centuries. There is scarcely any information about Eucadius’ life available; 2) *Encomium inclitae civitatis Rigae metropolis Livoniae (Encomium to the renowned Riga the metropolis of Livonia, 1595, Leipzig)* by Basilius Plinius (1540–1605) is a poem in elegiac verse whose central focus is on Riga, its marvellous buildings, the excellence of the city’s councilmen, institutions and magnificent geographical conditions that make Riga an ideal place for trade and dwelling. Basilius Plinius was born in Riga, studied medicine at the University of Wittenberg (*Universität Wittenberg*) and was the doctor of Riga and a prolific poet who composed more than 10 poems mostly concerning

the subjects of natural sciences; 3) *De vera nobilitate et literarum dignitate* (*On true nobility and dignity of arts and sciences*, 1599, Riga) by Salomon Frenzel (1561–1605), a propemptikon (a well-wishing poem to a dear person before departing for a journey) in hexameter verse. Frenzel was born in Breslau (contemporary Wrocław in Poland) and before arriving in Riga he was occupied as the professor of ethics at the University of Helmstedt (*Universität Helmstedt*) and in Riga he took the post of rector at the Riga Dome School. In the case of these texts, the topic of identity is not so much about shaping as of portraying it and thus consequently about the relationship between the various social and other types of groups, viewed only from the well-educated circles of humanists that form the part of the ruling order at the particular period under analysis.

Results

Tapestry by Eucaedius and the liberators of barbarians

Turning to these particular texts, the first thing to mention how the Hyperborean identity is being constructed, is the geographical position the authors attribute to the people encountered in the region that we today know by the name of Latvia. The term Hyperboreans is the name attributed to the people living in Livonia, the Northeast part of Europe. Hyperboreans is a designation for the people that supposedly live beyond the realms of the North wind and this name stems from the historical writings of Herodotus (Hdt. 4.36; Herodotus, 1868, p. 200–202). Augustinus Eucaedius (Eicēdijs, 2014) is one of the authors who identifies the Livonians as being Hyperboreans describing the Eastern coasts of the Baltic Sea as “*extremas Boreae oras*” (the farthestmost coasts of Boreas (p. 51)) or, to use a Latin equivalent of Boreas, “*extremis [...] Aquilonis in oris*” (in the farthestmost coasts of Aquilo (p. 48)), and viewing their land as the “*limes Christianae orbis*” (the threshold of the Christian world (p. 36)), thus to describe the setting of his poem, he borrows a designation from Ancient Greek mythology and history, a conception that is unfamiliar in this region as a self-designation. In this perspective the term Hyperborean land should be understood as a space where various ethnicities, cultures and languages meet and several identities are indicated and discerned in the narratives of the poems. It can also be regarded as a designation that is known to the educated upper classes of the Renaissance period of Europe as it is a poetical denomination borrowed from the tradition of Neo-Latin poetry. The name Hyperboreans in this context is attached to specific connotations as it is a name for a Barbarian tribe – the locals of Livonia are called *barbara pubes* (barbarian throng), they are compared to the beasts in the wilderness – *ferae* (wild animals), called *gens ferox* (wild tribe), *gens aspera* (rough tribe), a folk that is not civilized – *populus agrestis* (rustical people) people who cannot be educated or voluntarily turned away from the pagan rituals to the reverence of the Christian god – *gens indocile* (uneducatable tribe). In addition Eucaedius mentions (Eicēdijs, 2014) that these tribes do not have any laws or noteworthy traditions from the viewpoint of a Christian, “*gentes sine lege feroces*” (lawless wild tribes (p. 115)) and “*neque lex, neque cultus erat*” ([who] didn’t have neither laws, nor religion (p. 51)) and the expression is a slightly transformed borrowing from Virgil (Vergilius, 2009, p. 241, line 316). By representing them as people who do not have a true religion (i.e., Christian faith), he emphasizes (Eicēdijs, 2014) that superstition is characteristic to them, as the locals adore inane deities, an illusion (*numina vana colere*) that is infectious (*vana superstitio infecit*) to minds who are unenlightened and pressed by dark mist (*atra caligo mentem pressit*). Thus these tribes are not acquainted with the truth and the true religion (*veri ignarae mentes*) and have blind hearts (*pectora caeca*) (p. 59). These expressions pertaining to the illustration of the religious customs of locals show a strong one-sided view on religious practices that derogate the local paganism from the viewpoint of Christians. These phrases strongly support the *either or* situation where there is no space for alternative religious views than Christian or compromises, thus it is fully acceptable to *debellare superbos* (Vergilius, 2009, p. 194, line 853) as Virgil puts it and *Aeneis* being a source for set expressions and allusions for Eucaedius of paramount significance.

Eucaedius also verbally weaves the invading tribes in stark contrast to the local ones. He is talking about the crusaders and baptizers who are coming to the Hyperborean realms of *Balthica littora* (shores of the Baltic sea), to *populi ad Septentrionem* (the Northern people) where Christianity is still not a common phenomenon. These crusaders arrive in the name of the Catholic church at the end of the 12th century. The church has allotted this part of the world for the mission of Christianization (Eicēdijs, 2014), “*attribuit partem regni*” (allotted part of the realm) and “*gentes concedit habendas*” (to subdue the local tribes) (p. 63). Eucaedius focuses a lot on Riga as the capital and metropolis of Livonia and they are viewed as urbanizers as well, “*turrigerae Rigae fundamenta locat*” ([bishop Bartholdus] lays the foundation to Riga – the city of towers) (p. 55). The crusaders that come to the Hyperborean shores are *Saxones* (Saxonians) from Germany. It is of importance to note that Eucaedius throughout his poem

uses the term *Livones* (Livonians) not to describe the local pagans as it is the case in Basilii Plinius' poem, but the Teutonic forces who have settled here and founded Riga. Thus he appropriates this designation to the Baltic Germans in similar fashion that the term *Americans* are attributed to the descendants of European origin who have settled in North America, to the general description of locals leaving the epithets mentioned above in this paragraph.

Another force at play in Eucaedius' poem is the neighbouring nations from the East that are a constant threat to Livonia and the Saxonian conquests. Eucaedius is talking about the *Mosci*, *Tartari*, *Scythi* (Moscovians, Tatars, Scythians) who have *mens indomita* (unrestrained minds), *pectora cruda* (cruel hearts), *caedibus gaudens* (enjoy killing) and are *Turco feritate par* (equal to Turks in fierceness). Thus the Saxonians have a twofold force to deal with – the local pagans that are comparatively peaceful and the Eastern Moscovians that are a military threat. Referring to (Scott, 2012, p. 83) it is clearly visible from these remarks that the negative attitude towards the *other* – be it the locals or the Moscovians – is a strong poetical vehicle to oppose one's good deeds and excellent virtues to the *other's* vices and faults to keep the image of one's own identity morally intact and justified.

Encomium by Plinius and the opposition of colonizers and colonized

In Basilii Plinius' description the position of Livonia and the character of the local pagan tribes is similar to the view expressed by Eucaedius. He states (Spekke, 1927) in an exaggerating manner that Livonia is at the same time a benevolent and fertile land, but wild nonetheless, "*terra benigna, ferax*" (p. 43), where there is plenitude of bees, cattle, fish, birds and fruit to be found, "*locus non commodior*" (a place without equals in favorability (p. 71)) and "*fons et thesaurus totius orbis opum*" (the spring and treasury of the whole world's wealth (p. 71)). No wonder he calls it the *orbis novus* (the new world (p. 50)) where the climate is enjoyably suitable for a human being – the climate of Livonian metropolis Riga is described thus, "*clementia coeli [...] aether quam placido mitis amore fovet*" (mild weather [...] the gentle air caresses with such peaceful love (p. 52)). The weather and land is of such a great quality that the arriving forces or whoever else may arrive would be stunned (*stupet advena*, (p. 53)) from such excellent conditions. Due to these geographical characteristics Plinius describes the local farmers from the perspective of Saxonians as fortunate peasants (*agricolae felices* (p. 53)) for whom there is almost no need for toil in comparison to German lands.

Before the arrival of crusaders, the Livonian territories in Plinius' poem are depicted as thoroughly peaceful where freedom reigned without disturbances, for example, "*libertas fuit tranquilla; pax ubi laeta viget*" (p. 44; p. 47). The locals are characterized in similar manner to Eucaedius as being *barbara turba* (barbarian herd (p. 45)), *gens rustica stulta* (stupid rustical people (p. 46)) who are ready to give up their land for cheap gifts and conform to the demands and rules of the oppressors (p. 47). An episode Plinius describes allows us to infer that the locals are viewed as an unpractical nation – the episode regards beeswax which the locals do not know how to use thus paying no particular attention to it, but the Saxonian traders see an opportunity for a material gain in collecting the beeswax that is unattended from the locals, and the Saxonians fill up their ships and bring the wax back to Bremen (pp. 47–48). For this reason Plinius gives the designation *miseri indigenae* (miserable indigenous people (p. 49)) somewhat compassionately to the locals as their minds are not sane from the perspective of the Saxonians – *mentis inops* (lack common sense (p. 50)). Thus it is no wonder that the locals are not fit to defend themselves and their freedom both with military and diplomatic means as they are *Martis et artis inops* (lacking martial skill and arts (p. 49)). It is no intention for Plinius to conceal what the *Bremenses* are doing in Livonia, as he names all the natural resources desired by them as *praeda* (spoil (p. 45; p. 46; p. 48; p. 49)) thus with the colonization the locals lose not only their liberty but are stripped from their most valuable resources. The discovery of a land that is so generous and fertile is good news to most of the Western Europe and these news spread quite rapidly, bringing in hordes of opportunists, and Plinius employs the simile of flies who are flying to the honey pot that has been left open and in the open, "*ceu muscae aduolitant ad lancem melle repletam*" (they hasten [to Livonia] as flies to a plate full of honey (p. 49)).

The forces arriving in Livonia, Riga and Daugava respectively, in Plinius' *Encomium* are met by the local river god, who describes them in a rather neutral manner, "*gens peregrina ab externis*" (a foreign nation from outside (p. 44)) or, to put these incomers as coming from a different geographical background, Plinius names them the *Hesperii viri* (the Western men (p. 45)) thus making explicit the opposition of West and East/North in his poem. This distinction serves to place them in opposition to the Northern Livonians that we today consider as forming a part of the Northeast Europe. Their advent is described as a fulfilling of a prophecy as we can gather from the narrative given by the river god, and the prophecy tells that the locals will be subjugated by the incoming people (*advena imponit iugum*), thus this crusade is given force of a fateful and unalterable nature, as the act of god's will. In addition

the Saxonians are far more technologically advanced than Livonians and the river god has never seen ships of such magnitude before and other devices that the *Teutones* bring along as well. However this subjugation will be a *liberating* one as the locals will get to know the one true religion, that of Catholic faith, and will abandon their pagan beliefs or at least will be forced to do so. Although Plinius understands that the peace of Livonians will be destroyed by foreign powers, “*servitium, tristitiam ferunt*” (will bring servitude and sorrow (p. 44)) and later in the poem Plinius gives a more elaborate account of the contents of the prophecy, “*gentibus et miseris impositura iugum*” ([that] will put a yoke on the nations and miseries (p. 48)), it still is regarded as a good event that is fully justifiable. This invasion is portrayed as a righteous one that brings with itself education and law – both Themis (the Ancient Greek goddess of justice) and the Muses find Livonia as their new home (p. 44) and they begin to erect their buildings (churches and schools) on their new ground. By accepting the Christian faith the locals are not viewed anymore as an opposing force, but one that is available for employing in lots of tasks of everyday life for the benefit of the ruling order. Looking from a Teutonic viewpoint this campaign is a success as in formal terms the Livonian and Baltic tribes are integrated into the Christian society and thus the cultural values of the West, although the Teutons establish their role as the governing class, but the indigenous locals become peasants and artisans in most cases. But in the 16th century the identity issues are reshaped by the arrival of Reformation as will be shown further on.

Also novelties to material culture are brought with the crusaders as one passage in Plinius’ poem suggests, “*barbara tum didicit rerum nova nomina lingua*” (the barbarian language learned a lot of new words for the things (p. 50)) – thus exerting influence both on local language and material culture. This line from his poem is of major significance as it reveals the situation on the linguistic plane. The contemporary Latvian lexis has been influenced by words of Germanic origin since the 12th century and a lot of them are still to be found in everyday speech, e.g., *kēķis* (die Küche – kitchen), *kleita* (das Kleid – dress) and others. It is an interesting turnaround from the contemporary perspective as most of these Germanic origin loanwords are considered barbarisms or vulgarisms in Modern Latvian, thus the relationship between the language of culture and the *barbara lingua* have been flipped upside down. In addition it must be noted that today the influence of German loanwords has been replaced with the ubiquity of English, and the contemporary Latvian speakers pick up easily such words as *stendaps* (stand-up [comedy]), *šērot* (to share something, especially on social networks) among lots of others, thus even when the *lingua* is not *barbara* anymore (maybe it has never been?), the influence on *rerum nova nomina* is quite extensive. Thus it is shown that the language of the crusaders is exemplary and one to be followed. This example shows how the identity is not only formed by means of physical borders but by linguistic contacts as well, and in front of a new culture not only new customs and artefacts are intermixed within the local heritage but also new conceptions borrowed or injected from the arriving foreign forces.

Taking this into account and the episode with beeswax as well, one can assume that the oppressing forces are portrayed as having a positive effect on the subjugated – they bring to them culture and the most progressive mechanical devices available at the time.

Propemptikon by Frenzel and the value of education

In addition to the Plinius’ praise of the Riga Dome School and the highly educated men working there, a significant addition to the views on education is proposed by another Riga Humanist Solomon Frenzel from whose *propemptikon De vera nobilitate et literarum dignitate* (1593, 1599) is possible to draw some conclusions on the role of education in Livonia as well as the scope of education to be acquired in the local environment. In his 1599 edition of the *propemptikon* that is a dedication to Johannes Gotthard von Tiesenhausen, he speaks of the role of the higher education, its advantages for a man and the importance of the love for arts and sciences and generically can be regarded both as a panegyric and a mirror for princes (Viiding, 2014, p. 217.). Frenzel is no more concerned with the opposition between the West and East, the invaders and locals. In his focus is only the local aristocracy and their ambitions – he separates the local nobility into two segments: nobles by birth (*nobilitas generis*, which applies to everyone he is talking about) and nobles by education (*nobilitas literaria*, that should be the goal of every nobleman but unfortunately it is not the case). It must be mentioned that Frenzel does not contemplate on the possibility of an appearance of a *homo novus*, he keeps the boundaries of this educational discourse strictly in the ranks of nobility without any mention of a possible vertical mobility between the social classes due to one’s talents. As his hexameter poem is a *propemptikon* one can already suspect from the genre that someone is on their way and that it is a separation. In this case it is Frenzel’s friend who is going to study at a university in Germany, thus he is getting a lot of praise from Frenzel. And in Frenzel’s view only those nobles who are educated can be truly called nobles as will be seen from the further analysis of his poem.

As Tiesenhausen has acquired a good basic education in Livonia in *artes bonae* (the fine arts, i.e., a humanist education (Spekke, 1925, p. 13)) and is willing to further develop his mental capacities, the only reasonable choice is to part for the Western Europe in order to gain an education at the university level. Although at the time (at the end of 16th century) there were no universities in Livonia, Frenzel illustrates a situation that resembles the contemporary conditions in the former Livonian territory of Latvia and Estonia. Although here are universities (University of Latvia and Tartu University respectively) the emigration to Western Europe due to educational reasons is fairly common. Also Frenzel praises the education one can acquire either in Germany or in Italy at the end of 16th century (p. 12; p. 16).

Frenzel separates (Spekke, 1925) the nobles into two groups with regard to their attitude to *artes bonae* – they are either *Centaurosum genus* or *Cyclopes* (the Centaur kind or Cyclopes (pp. 13–14)) or the welcomed guests in the garden of Muses and Apollo (p. 12). The Centaur-like creatures from the nobility circles are the ones who, “*contemnit artes bonae*” (hold arts and sciences in low esteem (p. 13)) in contrast to those who never stop in the search for new knowledge and mental self-improvement. Frenzel uses another image – Castalian spring – to discern between these two groups of noblemen. The ones have tasted the water of Castalia on their lips, the others dislike even to approach it (p. 14). Thus the portrayal of identities in these poems can be seen as constructed in a ladder-like manner in several steps of opposition: in the first place one must be a Christian to be regarded of any value; secondly it is of importance to be of Teutonic (or equal) descent, preferably a noble family; then it is important to be not only noble by birth but also have the ambition to become noble by virtue. So there will always be new aspects to be added to one’s identity no matter how many traits it is possible to ascribe to a person.

One aspect in Frenzel’s work that shows how Western education can be truly valuable is its application for welfare of the local society. After Tiesenhausen’s educational *grand tour* in Europe, Frenzel exhorts him to return in order to figuratively harvest whole crops of fruit rather than just delight in a few of them that a humanist education brings, “*privata [...] frugem aliquam studia advectant; sed publica messem*” (private pursuits will bring some fruit, but public ones a whole harvest (p. 15)). For this reason Frenzel advises Tiesenhausen *in patriam redire* and to take care of *patrii agri* (to return to fatherland and take care of the fields of fatherland (p. 16)). Of course it is not an invitation to work on the fields himself but to manage the workforce. These expressions about Livonia as *patria* is an evidence that the Teutons that arrived in the 12th century by the middle of the 16th century felt in the Hyperborean realm at home and considered these fields as the land that righteously belongs to them and Frenzel’s views are coinciding with the ones of Eucaedius who by the designation *Livones* refers to the Teutons and not local pagans as Plinius does. In these expressions one can also observe that in contrast to the descriptions in Eucaedius and Plinius where the settlement of colonizers is described retrospectively, Livonia is no more called *orbis novus* or a land that belongs to the farthestmost coasts of Boreas, but *patria*, and for this reason it is important to take care of it for the benefit of all rather than plunder it. It is a description that allows us to conceive Livonia or its remains to be more exact as belonging to the Western culture and values, the incoming forces do not have to introduce their institutions and culture anymore, and it is no more a land on the border of Western civilization in the Northeast geographically and ideologically but has itself become this border of Europe.

Livonia as a border

An important role in the poem of Eucaedius and to a greater extent in the encomium of Plinius is assigned to the capital of Livonia – Riga which is called (Spekke, 1927) the, “*Clypeus adversus Moschum .. altera clavis Europae*” (a shield against the Moscovian [...] the second key of Europe (p. 60)). The first key and shield is Vienna that guards the European inlands against the Turkic invaders. This particular shield serves to keep the Eastern enemies away. The epithets and other poetical devices used to define them positions them as the ultimate enemies. In Plinius’ poem they are portrayed most severely – *Hiaena Sarmatica [...] Schythica Charybdis [...] Schythicus lupus [...] Scythica hydra* (Sarmatian hyen [...] Scythian Charybdis [...] Scythian wolf [...] Schythian hydra (p. 60–61)) – mostly using the images of Ancient Greek mythology. The image of Scylla and Charybdis is used by Eucaedius (Eicēdijs, 2014) in the comparison between Catholics and Lutherans (p. 119). As already mentioned, Riga adopted protestant views very early during the Reformation and the role of Catholicism was reduced, and Eucaedius views the Roman Church as dreadful as the fatal sea monsters.

The evaluation of the practices of Catholics and Lutherans are a theme to be found in Eucaedius’ and Plinius’ poems. For example, Eucaedius writes that the arrival of the first Christians who were Catholics from the West was a glorious moment, though their original virtue had diminished and had been lost since the time of Wolter von Plettenberg who was a *Landmeister* of the Livonian Order to his

death in 1535 (Eicēdijs, 2014, p. 28). Only with the consecutive implementation of Lutheran practices Livonia has a chance of reviving the once reigning splendid virtue, as Luther is the one who has shown the way back to the true religion, “*nam doctrina sacro postquam renovata LVTHERO, / atque suo nostris verbo Deus appulit oris*” (when the doctrine was renovated by the sacred Luther, / and god moved up to our coasts with his word (p. 104)). Also Plinius expresses his views what regards the struggle between Catholics and Lutherans. He praises (Spekke, 1927) Andreas Knöpken (1468–1539) whose activities introduced Lutheranism to Riga as he, “*primus patriae studio purgata Lutheri / sparsisti in templis dogmata Praeco Dei*” ([you] first the herold of god disseminated in the churches of fatherland the doctrine purified by the eagerness of Luther (p. 82)) and that Knöpken was able to get rid of the impious papal monsters in the churches, “*Pellitis e templis impia monstra Papae*” (p. 82)).

Discussion and conclusions

When discussing identities and borders it is always a question of mutual and constant re-definition of both of them – the identities of both the ones that have power and the ones that are overpowered – as both of them gain new features, although ones do so willingly and others are forced to take up new traits. The examples shown in the texts of Riga Humanists are no exception. All the poems analyzed in this article portray the different aspects of identities in strict binary oppositions – praise of protestant faith and blame of Catholicism and local paganism, praise of Western colonizers and blame of indigenous tribes, the opposition of Western European values against Eastern and Russian cultures, the importance of education, and other factors as well. These poems are great historical and literary sources that provide material for re-evaluation of the portrayed features of identities from contemporary perspective as these texts in most passages offer one-sided portrayals of both the colonizers and the colonized, thus making it easily discernible for the researcher to understand what force the poet sides with. The adherence to Paneuropean and universal cultural heritage of Western Antiquity in these particular texts create the illusion of a culturally homogeneous society in Livonia whose only concern is the defence against Eastern threats, although the internal discordances between the oppressors and the oppressed are silenced altogether. Only the constant struggle in the centuries following 16th century that led to the emancipation and independence of Latvia in the 20th century also led to the re-evaluation of Riga Humanist movement and their ideology as Spekke indicated in his memoirs. If from the perspective of the poets from early modern times the pagans were associated with barbarianism, from contemporary viewpoints in post-colonial discourse the ones regarded as barbarians would definitely be the bringers of freedom, truth and other gifts to the Hyperborean realms, thus again changing the identity features of ourselves as we would view our forerunners differently.

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Entangled Refractions Global Perspectives on Europeanism and Asianism

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ABSTRACT

Europe and Asia are imagined continents constructed through discourse. The emerging claims that both represent distinct homogeneous spaces were complementary historical processes that paved the way towards enshrining an essentialist East-West binary opposition. The dichotomous monologues revolving around the issue of continental distinctiveness resulting from this trajectory found their conceptual expression in the discursive frameworks of Orientalism and Occidentalism constituting the other as 'Other'. Juxtaposing the meta-geographical reflections of the Japanese intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901) and the founder of the Pan-European movement, Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972), this article challenges this narrative by showing that the formations of imagined continents are in large part reciprocal processes. A close analysis of the writings of these thinkers reveals that Europeanism and Asianism represent two distinct yet interrelated discourses. Both serve simultaneously as archetype and antithesis of the other, underscoring the ambivalent simultaneities of binary oppositions and exchanges at work in the discursive construction of meta-geographical concepts. Europeanism and Asianism, so the central claim of this paper, are entangled refractions, opposing yet overlapping discourses.

Keywords: Orientalism, Occidentalism, Asian history, Pan-Europe, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi

East is East and West is West

The terse statement that the East is “a dramatic direction” seen from Europe (Miklószy & Korhonen, 2010, p. ix) and the analogous observation that the West occupies a similar position from an Asian vantage point encompass the central theme of this paper. East and West, Europe and Asia are not mere toponyms but discursive constructions undergoing constant re-narration and re-configuration. The perceived antagonism between the neighbouring continents paved the way for the emergence of binary oppositions in which each provides the necessary projection screen for the emergence and consolidation of the other. This is particularly evident in connection with the emergence of the notion ‘Europe’. For Europeans the perceptions of the lands and people to the East have long represented an essential strategic device to stabilise and fix the fluctuating boundaries of their own imagined continent. In the absence of clear geographic demarcation lines, the construction of a firm cultural divide served as a major foundation for the claim of a continent centring on a shared identity. The presence of the imagined continent ‘Asia,’ essentialised as non-Europe, enabled this European identity to emerge and expand. The process of European othering of Asia has a long historic tradition stretching back to Ancient Greek accounts of Persian invasion scares. Yet, it was not until the modern period that the perception of Europe and, by extension ‘the West’ as antithesis to Asia gained true momentum and received its essentialist, antagonistic connotation. The rapidly widening global power asymmetry in the wake of European expansionism is the key to understand this trajectory. The initially commercial endeavours followed by the establishment of Western political domination over vast parts of Asia during the eighteenth and nineteenth century paved the way for the emergence of the intellectual hegemonic regime of Orientalism, which in turn served as central component in legitimising and accelerating the Europeanisation of the globe.

In his seminal 1978 study, Edward Said provides a powerful analysis of this phenomenon, exposing Western discursive productions of knowledge about ‘the Orient’ as instrument of cultural and political

hegemony. As “a system of knowledge about the Orient,” Orientalism provided a “grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness” reiterating the idea of European identity as superior in comparison to non-European peoples and cultures (Said, 1978, pp. 6–7). Studies on Occidentalism have adopted the basic assumptions of Said’s analysis and conceptualised the term symmetrical to Orientalism to refer to polarised Eastern conceptions of the Occident. Analogous to Orientalism, Occidentalism represents a highly ambivalent discourse in which fear and fascination, rejection and reception converge and coexist. The tendency of equating Occidentalism to “a cluster of images and ideas of the West in the minds of its haters” (Buruma & Margalit, 2002) reduces it to a mere expression of Eastern anti-Westernism. Conceptualising Occidentalism merely in terms of bigotry, its tendency of diminishing Western civilisation to soullessness, decadence and unrestrained materialism (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 10), however, fails to encapsulate the complex contradictions inherent in the term. Such reductionist views of Occidentalism as a style of representation, producing polarised and hierarchical conceptions of the West and its ‘Others,’ have consequently become subject of growing scholarly criticism (see Bonnett, 2010; Carrier, 1995; Chen, 2002; Coronil, 1996).

This paper seeks to contribute to this ongoing and diversifying debate. It challenges the perspective of ‘dichotomous monologues.’ Rather than disputing the existence of the two opposing discursive formations Orientalism and Occidentalism, I endeavour shifting the angle of perspective onto the relationship and the mutual formation of Europe and Asia to show that their discursive boundaries are far more permeable than hitherto acknowledged. The demarcation lines separating the two are simultaneously tiers of conversion and intellectual entanglement. Put differently, the Western gaze onto the East and the Eastern perspective on the West gave rise to what I call ‘entangled refractions,’ opposing yet overlapping discursive formations.

In an attempt to circumvent some of the heavy ideological baggage embedded in Orientalism and Occidentalism, I suggest an alternative terminology of ‘Europeanism’ and ‘Asianism’ to frame the following reflections. This semantic alteration facilitates identifying points of conversion between discursive formations and aids to avoid essentialising dichotomies. More importantly, it allows focusing on the fluctuating boundaries and characteristics of these two imagined continents rather than the ideological spheres of ‘the East’ and ‘the West.’ The suggested pair of -isms I put forth refers to a broad range of ideas and practices aiming at and contributing to the construction of meta-geographical concepts. Encompassing self-referential as well as externally imposed tendencies of spatial-temporal identity formation, the juxtaposition of Europeanism and Asianism, undertaken here, divulges the highly ambiguous discursive currents at work in the construction of geographic entities, oscillating between entanglements and binary oppositions.

The following article analyses these intertwined discursive formations by juxtaposing two case studies. Comparing the writings of the nineteenth century-Japanese intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi (福澤 諭吉, 1835–1901) with those of Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972), the founder of the Pan-European movement, the following paper reconstructs the omnipresent tension between particularistic local and meta-regionalist tendencies that lie at the heart of Europeanism and Asianism alike.

In a first step, the article delineates the genesis of the term ‘Asia’ and its semantic transformation in nineteenth and twentieth-century Asia, thus establishing central components at work in the discursive constructions and counter-discursive deconstructions of meta-geographical labels. Against this backdrop, the appropriation of the European construction ‘Asia’ and its transfigurations are explored further in the context of Meiji-period controversies concerning Japan’s geopolitical position and its relationship to Asia and the West respectively. Focussing on Fukuzawa’s controversial call to ‘leave Asia,’ I then scrutinise the dialectics of extrinsic meta-geographical constructions and particularistic identities. Dialectics in reverse stands at the centre of the second part of this paper, reconstructing the place Asia occupied in the emergence and development of inter-war pan-Europeanist thought. Hence, the conceptualisations of ‘Asia’ – as contrapuntal aspect to the construction of non-Asian Asianist and European identities – form the *tertium comparationis* of the entangled refractions emerging from the intertwining of Asianism and Europeanism.

The power of naming

‘Asia’ was born in Europe. In the wake of the profound changes in European world views following the accidental ‘discovery’ of the Americas, the huge landmass to the East was reinvented as periphery, as inferior to the self-declared centre of civilisation and progress. With Jesuit missionaries coming to China in the late sixteenth century the term ‘Asia’ travelled eastwards. Its first recorded appearance in

Chinese can be traced back to the world map¹ produced by Matteo Ricci and his court assistants, Li Zhizao, and Zhang Wentao in 1602 upon request of the Wanli Emperor. From China the semantic/cartographical innovation and the term 亜細亞 (Asia, C: yàxiyà, J: àtēji) travelled to Japan (Masuda, 2000, p. 17).² For almost a century, the term *Ajia*³ did not gain any specific connotation in Japan and remained a pure toponym. Throughout the eighteenth century, the dominant East-Asian geographic terminology deriving from classic Chinese cosmology revolved around the distinction between *Tōyō* (東洋, Eastern Ocean) and *Seiyō* (西洋, Western Ocean).⁴ In contrast to the early usage of *Ajia*, *Tōyō* and *Seiyō* represent substantive analytical concepts that served as toponyms as well as ethnonyms (Korhonen, 2013, p. 7). In the wake of Tokugawa-period discussions of global cultural, economic and political developments the terms *Tōyō* and *Seiyō* gained further conceptual prominence. These developments found their equivalent on the mainland. In *Haiguo Tuzhi* (海國圖志, *The Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms*) written and revised by the eminent Chinese scholars Wèi Yuán (魏源, 1794–1857) between 1843 and 1852, the term *Yàzhōu* (亞洲, *Asia*) merely occurred in lists of European geographic names. It was not until the nineteenth century that ‘Asia’ ceased to be a purely technical term employed by East Asian cartographers. In the wake of European colonialist expansion in East Asia, it developed into a concept representing a specific geopolitical space bound together by a long record of cultural, commercial and diplomatic links as well as a common destiny (Saaler & Szpilman, 2011, p. 2).

The trajectories of the term ‘Asia’ in Asia underscore that continents do not exist *sui generis*. Rather than signifying fixed geographic entities, they are “a large cluster of related ideas, social and cultural as well as politico-geographical, and mystical” conceptualisations (Whitaker, 1954, p. 2). They are ideas simultaneously shaped by intrinsic as well as extrinsic discourses. Although ‘Asia’ refers to an actual landmass, it is not a descriptive term of some inert reality but a representation of a conception of reality. The ‘reality’ of Asia is an ‘invention’ of the concept ‘Asia’ (see O’Gorman, 1961, p. 73). It is essential for the present context to delineate the opposing ends, intrinsic and extrinsic inventions of Asia, served. Whereas the latter process seeks to homogenise differences in order to establish a reductionist typology of an antithetical ‘Other’ for the sake of self-consolidation and leverage over others, intrinsic tendencies represent an attempt to enhance and promote meta-national linkages as a source of strength in order to oppose the subjugation under external dominance.

The extensive controversy concerning the term ‘Asia’ unfolding among Japanese intellectuals during the late Edo period exemplifies this dualism. Two complementary, yet conflicting strains came to dominate the debate. Some regarded the term with growing concern interpreting it as a tool of Western attempts to dominate the East. Others sought to appropriate it in an attempt to overturn Sinocentrism that had long dominated Japanese culture and to re-invent Japan’s past as distinct from that of the neighbouring countries. In the eyes of the former group, the Western ability to freely coin terms and name distant countries revealed Japan’s incapability of self-determination. As early as 1820, Yamagata Bantō (山片 蟠桃, 1748–1821) lamented the fact that the naming of continents and countries was exclusively a Western achievement that distorted the proper place names, replacing *tenjiku* with India, *morokoshi* with China and most shamefully of all, forcing the name ‘Japan’ onto the Island Empire (Matsuda Kōichirō, 2011, p. 49). Some years later, Aizawa Yasushi (会沢 安, 1781–1863), a leading thinker of the nationalist Mito school, expressed his outrage in face of the “barbarians” practice of naming places across the globe (Wakabayashi, 1986, p. 193).

By mid-century, the politicisation of the term ‘Asia’ in Japan was in full swing. Both the representatives of *Mintogaku* (水戸学, school of thought propagating the centrality of the emperor for Japanese identity) and their rivals associated with *Kokugaku* (國學, National Studies) sought to emancipate Japanese tradition from the dominance of Sinocentric Confucianism as well as to reject the

¹ Referred to in Chinese as *Kunyu Wanguo Quantu*, 坤輿萬國全圖, *Map of the ten thousand countries of the earth*.

² Similar to the developments on the mainland, the term ‘Asia’ first appeared on a map published in Japan in 1695 as part of *Ka’i tsūshō kō* (華夷通商考, *Thoughts on trade and communication with the civilised and the barbaric*) written by the Nagasaki astronomer and geographer Nishikawa Joken (西川 如見, 1648–1724).

³ In the early eighteenth century, the geographer Arai Hakuseki introduced the Italian pronunciation of the word that is still used in Japan today.

⁴ The geographic writing of the scholar-bureaucrat Arai Hakuseki (新井 白石, 1657–1725) was instrumental in popularising this distinction in eighteenth-century Japan (Arai, 1905).

subsuming of Japan under the label ‘Asia’ vehemently. The repudiation of ‘Asia’ further intensified in the wake of the Chinese defeat in the First Opium War (1839–42). In Japan, the menace of Western domination intensified by the emergence of the slogan ‘yellow peril’ during the closing decades of the nineteenth century, found expression in the *kiki ishiki* (危機意識, crisis-consciousness) zeitgeist (Weber, 2009, p. 39). By the end of the nineteenth century, the waning adoration of Chinese culture and the consolidation of Japan’s isolationist international order had reinforced the profoundly negative connotation of the term ‘Asia’ among leading Japanese advocates of the country’s modernisation. This trend culminated in a series of editorials published in the mid-1880s. The most influential ones among these texts appeared anonymous on 16 March 1885 in the Tokyo paper *Jiji shimpō* (時事新報, *Current Events*). Soon after it appeared, the text was ascribed to one of Japan’s leading intellectual supporters of Westernisation, Fukuzawa Yukichi (福澤 諭吉, 1835–1901) who had founded the paper in 1882.⁵

The editorial bore the programmatic title “Datsu-A ron” (脱亞論), translated alternatively as “leaving Asia”, “De-Asianisation” or simply “Good-bye Asia.” Fukuzawa’s text encapsulates the above-described transformation of the term ‘Asia’ in Meiji-period thought and politics in a very pointed manner. Its central passage reads:

“... everyone in our country accepts the modern Western civilization. Not only were we able to cast aside Japan’s old conventions, but we also succeeded in creating a new axle towards progress in Asia. Our basic assumption could be summarized in two words: ‘Good-bye Asia (Datsu-a)’” (Fukuzawa, 1997, p. 352).

Looking westwards: Fukuzawa and the Europeanisation of Asianism

Born into an impoverished lower samurai family of the Nakatsu clan in 1835, Fukuzawa left for Nagasaki in 1854 and moved to Ōsaka a year later to learn Dutch, the only language that allowed access to *rangaku* (蘭學, ‘Dutch learning’ – the contemporaneous Japanese term for Western knowledge and science). After setting up the *Keiō Gijuku* academy for Western Studies in Edo in 1858, Fukuzawa joined the Takenouchi missions to the United States (in 1860) and Europe (in 1862) (Craig, 2009, pp. 8–9). Upon his return, he published *Seiyō jijō* (西洋事情, *Conditions in the West* or *The Situation in Western Countries*) in 1867, the first of many books in which he introduced aspects of Western society, politics, economics and culture to a broad Japanese readership. During the turbulent years marking the end of the Tokugawa period and the onset of the Meiji Restoration, Fukuzawa advanced to one of the major advocates championing Japan’s Westernisation. Together with like-minded Japanese intellectuals, he founded the *Meiōkusha* (明六社, Meiji 6 Society) in 1874 to promote the introduction of elements of western civilisation and enlightenment thought to Japan. In numerous pamphlets and books, Fukuzawa set out his vision of Westernising Japan. Between 1872 and 1876 he published a series of widely circulating essays that later appeared under the title *Gakumon no Susume* (学問のすすめ, *An Encouragement of Learning*) (see Kinmonth, 1978, pp. 678–679). His most influential work *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku* (文明論之概略, *An Outline of a Theory of Civilisation*) appeared in 1875.

Convinced of the vitality and superior development of Western civilisation, Fukuzawa called for a fundamental transformation of Japan in order to survive in the context of predatory Western global expansion. Identifying civilisation with the West, he was convinced that Japan had to reinvent itself as Western if it wanted to secure its national independence. He stressed that Japan’s reinvention had to be profound and that mere coping or the adaptation of superficial aspects of West civilisation would prove insufficient. Backward looking cultures that clung to ancient customs and a system of blind loyalty, he believed, were doomed. Education not lineage, individual merits not inheritance should become the criteria for social advance (Fukuzawa, 2009, p. 84).

Like other liberal Meiji-period intellectuals, Fukuzawa embraced the universalism of the European Enlightenment. Yet the reformists’ appreciation for European thought was never a mere cultural transfer but a conscious juxtaposition of adaptation and modification. The translation of Western works into Japanese often went hand in hand with revisions of the source text, replacing deterministic notions

⁵ In 1933, the editorial was included in the second volume of Fukuzawa’s complete works (*Keiō Gijuku*, 1933). Forensic linguistic analysis has been unable to settle the issue conclusively but produced strong evidence in favour of Fukuzawa’s authorship (see Ida, 2001).

and the claims of Western superiority over the backward rest of humanity with more universalist and inclusive conceptualisations (Aydın, 2007, p. 29). The universal vision of progress for all nations Fukuzawa proposed in *An Outline of the Theory of Civilisation* (1875) is a case in point. While stressing that any reflection of Japan's modernisation had to consider "European civilization as the criterion," he maintained that Europe could never serve as a one-to-one model for Japan. In his eyes, a careful distinction between the "visible exterior" and "inner spirit" of any civilisation had to be drawn. This distinction represented the necessary precondition of successful modernisation avoiding the loss of self-identity (Fukuzawa, 2009, pp. 20–21). Besides underscoring the potential of non-Western societies to attain the highest stages of civilisation, he stressed that Japanese intellectuals were in a superior position to theorise about the conditions and progress of civilisation because, different from their European counterparts, they were familiar with both Western and non-Western thought. Fukuzawa, hence, did not advocate a naïve Westernisation as means to secure Japan's political and cultural independence. He was well aware of the potential threats the West posed to the project of modernisation in Asia.

"Wherever the Europeans touch, the land withers up, as it were; the plants and the trees stop growing. Sometimes even whole populations have been wiped out. As soon as one learns such things and realizes that Japan is also a country in the East, then though we have as yet not been seriously harmed by foreign relations we might well fear the worst is to come."
(Fukuzawa, 2009, p. 249)

Fukuzawa shared the contemporaneous sense of national crisis in Japan engendered by the Western encroachment on the Far East. He was also fully aware that the Western menace had unduly forced an Asian consciousness onto the Japanese. Tying the fate of Japan to that of the rest of 'Asia' signified more than a mere geographic placement. It carried the threat of being made into a potential subject of Western domination. Japan's neighbours were not overrun by Western imperialism because they were located in the East but because they had failed to realise that modernisation and universal Westernisation were a necessary precondition to survive as independent Asian polities. From a Japanese vantage point, Japan's neighbours were 'Asian' in the sense bestowed onto them by Western powers. Rather than dismissing or rejecting the long-established cultural foundations binding together the civilisations of *Tōyō*, Fukuzawa criticised their inability to defend their independence by way of modernisation. In *An Outline of the Theory of Civilisation* he drew sharp distinctions between the development in Japan and that on the mainland. In contrast to China, which had "never once changed," Japan had read the writing on the wall and complemented the traditional model of "theocratic autocracy" with adaptations of Western civilisation (Fukuzawa, 2009, p. 29).

While Fukuzawa lamented the anachronistic state of Japan's neighbours, he dismissed pan-Asian solidarity as a way to overcome it. For him national independence was both the goal of civilisation and its precondition. Safeguarding national independence consequently superseded regional solidarity (Matsumoto, 1967, pp. 165–166). An editorial on Japanese-Korean relations appearing in *Jiji shimpō* on 11 March 1882 is emblematic of his view. Comparing Western encroachment on Asia to a rapidly spreading fire, Fukuzawa expressed his concerns over the conflagration consuming the house next-door (i.e. China). Yet he emphasised that the fire reaching one's own doorstep was a far more horrifying prospect that had to be prevented at all costs.

The conviction that Japan had disentangled itself from the fate of its neighbours by way of further Westernisation in order to survive as an independent entity remains a central notion of Fukuzawa's thinking. It culminated in the above-mentioned 1885 editorial "Datsu-A ron (Leave Asia)." Appearing at the height of the jingoist frenzy in the wake of a failed coup d'état by pro-Japanese reformers in Korea in December 1884 and the defeat of China in the Sino-French War three months earlier, the editorial formed part of an intensifying debate among Japanese intellectuals scrutinising Japan's role in Asia. It is quite possible that Fukuzawa adopted the notion of *Datsu-A* from his London-based associate, Hinohara Shōzō (日原昌造, 1853–1904). In a letter written in September 1884, Hinohara confided into him that he regarded Japan's efforts to revive Asia as futile and that the country should dissociate itself from his "Oriental" (オリエンタル, *Orientalu*) neighbours. In November, Hinohara's reflections in which the slogan "Datsu-A" (脱亜) appeared for the first time were serialised in *Jiji shimpō* under the title "Nihon wa Tōyō-koku taru bekarazu" (日本ハ東洋国タルベカラズ, "Japan must not be an Oriental country"). It is noteworthy, that the wording of the title suggested a more far-ranging agenda than Hinohara actually pursued in his text. Like Fukuzawa a year later, Hinohara propagated Japan's disassociation from 'Asia' but not a detachment from *Tōyō*. The fact that he went to great lengths rejecting the nomenclature of a geographic entity called 'the Orient' stressing that it was the product of the international asymmetry of power that groups "all institutions of man-made society

in a uniquely singular way different from Europe” under a common term provides evidence of this. In a universalist vein similar to that of Fukuzawa, Hinohara emphasised that once the features (the political system, law, religion, science, clothing, food, housing etc.) setting any Eastern entity apart from those in the West had been transformed – that is, Europeanised – they would cease to be considered “Oriental” (Hinohara, 1884; quoted after Zachmann, 2009, p. 19). Hence, he concluded his reflections by posing a rhetorical question to his readers: “Why must we revive Asia and resist Europe?” adding that it was of no relevance to Japan whether the entire Asian continent would “be crushed, shattered or falls into ruins” (quoted after Zachmann, 2011, p. 57). As long as Japan’s independence could be maintained it was irrelevant if the Chinese Empire was taken over by the French or India enslaved by the British.

“In fact, we need not feel obliged by a sense of duty and affinity towards China and India, just because they happen to be our neighbours-in-distress ... Instead of tagging on to *Kō-A kai* [Revive Asia Society], we must establish a *Datsu-A kai* [Leave Asia Society].” (Quoted after Narsimhan, 1999, p. 120)

In the post-war era, the view of Fukuzawa as a precursor of expansionist Japanese pan-Asianism came to dominate scholarly interpretations (Korhonen, 2013, p. 3).⁶ While the paradigm progressive West versus developing East clearly reverberated in Fukuzawa’s writings, it would be misleading if not outright false to reduce it to a simple antagonism of Westernisation and Asianism – the contrast of meta-continental Pan-Asianist imagination and the Eurocentric projects of civilising reforms and structural modernisation (Aydın, 2007, p. 31). Fukuzawa’s “Leave Asia” formed part of an extensive contemporaneous debate among Meiji-era intellectuals keenly aware of the Eurocentric provenance of the concept ‘Asia’ and the implication of the term for Japan. Embracing an idealised, universalist notion of ‘Europe’ and simultaneously rejecting ‘Asia’ became a strategic device to establish and maintain Japan as an independent subject and challenge European attempts to subjugate it by placing it in an externally defined meta-continental framework. Rather than adopting the Eurocentric East/ West dichotomy, the calls for leaving Asia voiced by Meiji-era intellectuals subverted and replaced binary opposites with a dual refracted entanglement constituting Japan as both Western and Asian and yet distinct from them in its place. Viewed in this way, Fukuzawa’s *Datsu-A* highlights the inherent ambiguity of meta-geographic constructions. Rejecting the Western geo-ideational construction of ‘Asia’ as anachronistic space did not necessarily entail ridding Japan of its regional cultural roots and identity.

This very ambiguity of imagined meta-geographic entities was neither unique to late-nineteenth-century Japan nor exclusive to the case of ‘Asia’. The trajectory of the Pan-European movement emerging in the aftermath of World War I is a striking example of the validity of this assessment.

Between Vienna and Tokyo: Pan-Europe looks eastwards

From its genesis to its incremental demise during the 1950s, the Pan-European movement revolved around its founder. Born in Tokyo in 1894 as the son of an Austro-Hungarian diplomat and a Japanese mother, Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi grew up on the family estate in Bohemia in a cosmopolitan climate commingling Asian and European traditions (Conze, 2004, p. 10; Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2012, p. 90). Although exempt from military service on medical grounds, the Great War had a profound impact on his intellectual development. A professed pacifist, Coudenhove-Kalergi condemned the aggressive tendency of nationalism as root cause of the conflagration plunging the entire continent into disarray and destruction. Yet, like many of his contemporaries, he also regarded the war as a brutal yet necessary rupture paving the way towards the unification of the continent. In the face of the fundamental transformation of world politics and driven by the menace of a new World War, Coudenhove-Kalergi became a passionate advocate of and activist for European unification during the inter-war years (see Ziegerhofer, 2004, ch. VI).

⁶ Fukuzawa’s call to leave Asia was interpreted as the expression of a decisive choice between two antagonistic tendencies – “Westernization-cum-imperialism” or utopian anti-Western Asianism (Zachmann, 2007, p. 345). In an attempt to underscore that the fervour to Westernisation called for the revulsion toward traditional Asian intraregional relations, values, and ideas and depict Fukuzawa as its foremost advocate, later interpreters attributed the slogan *Datsu-A nyū-Ō* (脱亜入欧, leaving Asia and entering Europe) to him; a phrase he never employed himself (Sakamoto, 2001; Zachmann, 2007, p. 346).

Initially outlined in a contribution to the Berlin daily *Vossische Zeitung* in November 1922, Coudenhove-Kalergi elaborated on his vision of pan-Europe in book form the following year. Until 1938, the founding manifesto of the pan-European movement went through seven editions and was translated into every major language, including Japanese and Chinese (Villanueva, 2005, p. 68). Following the publication of *Pan-Europa* in 1923, Coudenhove-Kalergi intensified his literary-political campaigning for a united Europe. In 1924, he launched a monthly magazine publishing contributions by contemporary politicians, intellectuals as well as private citizens discussing the need for European unification. Winning over sizeable support by major public figures of his generation, the Pan-European movement became one of the most influential and best-organised interwar forums promoting the unification of the continent (Lipgens, 1982, p. 39). Those publically supporting Coudenhove-Kalergi's movement included the Nobel laureates Albert Einstein, Gerhart Hauptmann, Selma Lageröf and Thomas Mann as well as leading politicians such as Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, Ignaz Seipel, Karl Renner, and Aristide Briand. Across the continent, Pan-European committees were set up and in October 1926, 2,000 delegates from 22 countries assembled in Vienna to attend the First Pan-European Congress (Tchoubarian, 1994, pp. 123–124).

In the tradition of Kant's 1795 essay on perpetual peace, Coudenhove-Kalergi identified Franco-German rapprochement and continental disarmament as essential preconditions on the way towards the creation of a United States of Europe (Orluc, 2007, p. 95). He envisioned the new united Europe to take shape as a politico-economic federation (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1926, p. xv). At first sight, Coudenhove-Kalergi's vision of European unity displays significant affinities to conservative, Occidental thinking. At closer range, however, it becomes apparent that his treatment of the subject does not easily fall into singular categories. Although he embraced the notion of decline and the belief in common European values as a basis for the continent's re-ascendency to global significance, his ideas differ markedly from those of writers like Oswald Spengler or Houston Stewart Chamberlain and other *völkisch* propagandists. In contrast to many of his contemporaries, Coudenhove-Kalergi accepted the notion of declining Occidental culture and embraced the rapid modernisation of other parts of the world (Orluc, 2002, p. 26). Yet he feared that if the continent failed to reunite and overcome the war-induced internal divisions, it would not only forfeit its world hegemony but also its independence (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926, p. 6). He believed that Europe was left with the choice between integration and destruction (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1926, p. 14). The failure to unite the continent would not only spell disaster for Europe but render any future world order impossible. Without a unified, peaceful Europe a new post-war global regime of peaceful coexistence would simply be unsustainable.

Echoing contemporaneous geopolitical thoughts, he enunciated that the Great War had fundamentally altered the global political landscape and balance of power. In the face of waning European global dominance, new powers emerged. In contrast to the rising American, British, Russian and East Asiatic pan-empires, fragmented and disjointed Europe faced doom and gloom (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1926, pp. 14–16). If the moribund nation states of the continent were not to be replaced by a strong and united Pan-Europe, Europe faced the menace of being carved up into spheres of interests by external powers in the fashion of nineteenth-century China (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1926, p. 20). Coudenhove-Kalergi was convinced that once united along political, cultural as well as economic lines, Pan-Europe would serve as a stronghold against the "non-Occidental culture of Bolshevism" (1934, pp. 87–88) on the one hand, and as counterweight of American dominance in global trade, on the other. The unification of Europe for Coudenhove-Kalergi was, thus, part of worldwide transformations, a political, cultural and economic response to the contemporaneous shifts in global power and not simply an end itself. Already in his 1922 editorial, Coudenhove-Kalergi had expressed his conviction that the future world order was to be shaped by meta-geographic blocks. While the United States, over time, would unite the Americas under its leadership, he also predicted the "two Mongolian states," China and Japan to form a unified power block. To remain a significant player in a world system organised along the meta-geographic blocks of Pan-America, Pan-Britannia, Pan-Russia and Pan-Mongolia, the scattered European nation states had to form a matching Pan-Europe (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1922).

It is important to note that Coudenhove-Kalergi did not attribute Europe's decline to the rise of external actors, but identified internal structural features, such as European nationalism, as the real source of the problem. His conceptualisation of Pan-Europe – not unlike the Meiji-era repositioning of Japan – emerged from a juxtaposition of intrinsic and extrinsic perspectives. On the one hand, he stressed the essentialist core of European civilisation as common foundation for his vision. On the other hand, he turned to non-European examples for inspiration. Namely, the developments towards Pan-America appeared to him as a suitable model for the creation of the future United States of Europe (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1926, pp. 75, 83). Coudenhove-Kalergi – along surprisingly similar lines to the ones Fukuzawa had pondered half a century earlier – feared for the continuation of what he regarded as

the core of European civilisation. Like the Japanese Westernisers before him, his search for ways to avoid disintegration led him towards looking beyond the boundaries of the continent he sought to prevent from disarray and destruction. In East Asia, Coudenhove-Kalergi, believed to have found a model suitable to serve his agenda.

Surveying his interwar writings, it becomes apparent that Asia occupied a rather ambiguous place among the emerging meta-geographic blocks, featuring prominently in Coudenhove-Kalergi's global geopolitical considerations. In contrast to his vehemently repeated warnings of a "Russian menace" to Europe (1926, pp. 61, 141), East Asia appears in a much more positive light. While not free of ambivalence, the rendering of Far Eastern socio-political trajectories are remarkably detached from the deep-rooted perspectives long dominant in Western perceptions of Asia expressed in stereotypes of Asiatic despotism, stagnation and the racial paranoia of an alleged Yellow Peril. Neither did Coudenhove-Kalergi see any dangers for a peaceful world-order emerging from the modernisation of Japan and China, nor did he voice any racist anxieties. In his opening address delivered at the First Pan-European Congress in 1926, he stressed the interconnectedness between Europe and the other continents. Geographically, spiritually and politically located in the centre of the world, Coudenhove-Kalergi declared Europe to be "linked to its great mother Asia via the Russian world and with its great daughter America by way of the British world" (quoted after Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1971, p. 185). Despite these interconnections, Europe and the rest of the world stood in stark contrast to each other. While the latter continually renewed itself and had made decisive steps towards joining together in new, innovative ways, Europe remained caught in the nineteenth century. Two years later, Coudenhove-Kalergi returned to this idea when he hailed the Chinese revolution of 1911 as a potential blueprint for his vision of European unity and for rejuvenating the 'old,' war-torn continent.

"Anybody seeking the advancement of mankind must welcome the victory of young China. We witness the rejuvenation of a great nation, long considered senile and ossified. [...] We realise how the touch of European values transformed this oldest continent into the youngest one." (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1928)⁷

His enthusiasm for the development in East Asia, which he regarded as the onset of the future global order of pan-units ultimately blinded him. Coudenhove-Kalergi failed to realise that the rhetoric and politics of early-twentieth-century Japanese pan-Asianism were merely thin veils hiding the country's belligerent ultra-nationalism. His publications displayed a remarkable indifference towards Japan's aggressive expansionism in the Far East. In a pamphlet published three years after the Manchurian crisis, he declared that Asia currently witnessed the "unification of the Mongolian race within a gigantic state-bloc led by Japan" (quoted after Coudenhove-Kalergi, 2006, p. 119). Neither did he condemn the aggressive Japanese expansionism in East Asia nor did he criticise the country's defiance of the League of Nations and its subsequent withdrawal from the organisation. In fact, he stressed, "Europe had no vital interest in preventing the development in East Asia," adding that its political interests were confined to consociating European colonial control over Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. A strong Japan, moreover, did not pose any immediate threat to Europe but could serve as potential ally against the "Bolshevik menace" (quoted after Coudenhove-Kalergi, 2006, p. 121).

The reference to Europe's overseas colonial empires reveals another ambiguity running through Coudenhove-Kalergi's vision of global political order and his perception of Asia. On the one hand, he repeatedly rejected traditional Eurocentrism and hailed the achievements of non-European actors, namely Japan's role in breaking the "ascendency of the White Race" in Asia (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1926, p. 6). On the other hand, his call for a Pan-European colonial management of Africa and parts of South-East Asia entailing their continued synergetic exploitation for the sake of providing Pan-Europe with raw materials, land for settling its population overflow and cheap labour was very much in accordance with mainstream colonialist beliefs of the 1920s (see Hansen & Jonsson, 2015, pp. 25–31).

Concluding reflections: Europe (and) the 'Other'

The above-discussed examples show that the imagined continents 'Asia' and 'Europe' represent dynamic rather than static concepts. Over time, both featured in different, at times, contradictory ways. Contrary to the dominant perception, regional homogenisation is not merely an internal process. The construction of 'Asia' originated in Europe. Likewise, 'Europe' as imaginary entity disseminated not only from the works of European thinkers and statesmen but also from its re-conceptualisations by

⁷ Unless otherwise stated, all translations are those of the author.

Asian intellectuals regarding it as the spatial expression of universal values to be embraced in their quest towards a distinctly non-Western path towards modernity.

In spite of being detached from one another by three generations and different historical as well as cultural contexts, Fukuzawa and Coudenhove-Kalergi represent dialogical voices. Though uttered in different discursive frameworks, their reflections display remarkable similarities. Their reflections revolved around the same conceptual issue of imagining continents as both ideational entities and political spheres. Both thinkers turned their attention to the issue of meta-geographic formation at a moment of crisis brought about by events calling the very foundations of the long-established political order into question (see Barshay, 1988; Ifversen, 2002). In Fukuzawa's case, the humiliation of Asian polities by Western powers during the early decades of the nineteenth century and the subsequent radical transformation of Japan's socio-political order profoundly influenced his conceptualisations of 'Asia.' In a similar vein, World War I triggered Coudenhove-Kalergi's juxtaposition of nostalgic longing for an idealised European civilisation that had found its ultimate death in the trenches of the Great War and his vision of pan-national spheres as foundation of a future of global peaceful coexistence.

In search of models to consolidate continental unity, both Fukuzawa and Coudenhove-Kalergi looked for inspiration beyond their own cultural and geographic frameworks. Both came to realise that the emergence of meta-identities – Asianist or Europeanist – required a constructive entanglement of intrinsic and extrinsic elements. 'Europe' featured as a reflective point of departure in both approaches; it did so in very different guises revealing the complex comingling of intra- and extra-discursive components in the constitution of meta-geographical ideas. Whereas Coudenhove-Kalergi's reflection started out as endogenous trajectory towards reviving European unity, that is the attempt to establish a pan-geographic structure on the basis of pre-existing links and commonalities, 'Europe' for Fukuzawa represented an exogenous ideal type signifying the universalist promises of post-Enlightenment modernity to be appropriated by Japan in seeking acceptance into a 'European' framework regarded as a precondition of escaping discursive placement within 'Asia'. Like Fukuzawa, Coudenhove-Kalergi came to realise that Europe required extra-European models in its trajectory towards unification and rejuvenation.

The competing and contradictory connotations of continental labels highlight the essential instability inherent in the concepts they signify. Both Fukuzawa and Coudenhove-Kalergi struggled to accommodate the conceptual instability of 'Europe' and 'Asia' respectively in their search for a firm foundation of meta-geographical identities. Faced with the dynamics of competing discursive formations producing contradictory images of continental entities, both came to accept that conceptualisations of stable geo-ideational frameworks could not be achieved in isolation. Their reflections underscore that Asianism and Europeanism are not hermetically closed off discursive formations but intertwined dialogical spheres. The 'Other' is simultaneously present and absent in them; it speaks and it is muted. Contrary to perspectives regarding the inscribing of rigid distinctions between Europe and Asia as a necessary precondition for the emergence of homogenised meta-geographic stability, the above discussed examples highlight that the constitution of continental unity and identity does not depend on binary oppositions but on dialogues trespassing discursive demarcations.

Drawing analogies between past and present is to be done with due caution. In order to have an explanatory function, historical reconstruction necessitates compression and the transformation of complexity and confusion into a coherent account. In the course of this process, the historian is constantly facing the challenge of approximating past experiences and interpretations shaped by the knowledge of an ex post facto vantage point. By contrast, contemporary analysis can draw on past trajectories and abstract models in order to identify variables and patterns shaping ongoing processes. Put differently, neither does historical scholarship provide an immediate blueprint for dissecting the complexities of the present nor should the experience of the present be applied retroactively onto the past.

At first sight, the reflections of Fukuzawa and Coudenhove-Kalergi appear distant if not outright anachronistic from the standpoint of the present. The context in which these two thinkers scrutinizing meta-geographic entities and identities appears very different from the sense of a *crise de conscience* felt both in present-day Europe and Japan. The sources of these crises are complex. In the case of Europe, the scaremongering by self-appointed defenders of 'Occidental values' against the menace of alleged Islamisation, the tendencies of re-nationalisation sweeping the continent and the intensifying mentality of a 'fortress Europe' under siege by streams of migrants and refugees arriving at its shores are but some of the most extreme expressions of a new upsurge in essentialism. In envisioning ways to

counter these tendencies and prevent a relapse into binary oppositions and the demonisation of the ‘Other’, the above-discussed de-essentializing strategies can serve as a point of departure and as a reminder to draw lessons from the past.

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Constructing a Ukrainian identity within the European context

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ABSTRACT

The present paper investigates and problematises how the discourse of Ukraine's national identity is being constructed. The transformation of *Homo Sovieticus* into *Homo Europeicus*, which consists in the modification of the old boundaries of Ukraine with the Soviet Union, along with the delimitation of new ones within the European Union, is traced on both the tangible (material) and conscious (psychological) levels. Due to historical, geopolitical and ethnopsychological factors, various material and mental objects, signs, and notions encapsulating and radiating Soviet ideology, are being replaced with new signs and notions restoring a version of the Ukrainian, pre-Russian past, and simultaneously projecting Ukraine's European future.

Keywords: national identity (constructing), (being) European, ideological integration (with European norms), boundaries, delimitation of ideological boundaries, mass-media discourse.

BACKGROUND

In 2014, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was signed within the framework of the implementation of the Eastern Partnership EU project. This EU initiative, aimed at establishing close political and economic relations between the EU, Ukraine and several other post-Soviet states, is a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. According to the Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the Autumn 2013 Summit (2012):

The Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009 at a summit held in Prague, in an effort by the EU and its Eastern European partners to help promote political and economic reforms and assist the countries of the region move closer to the EU. At its basis lies a shared commitment to international law and fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to a market economy, sustainable development and good governance. (p. 2)

The achievement of this goal presupposes certain changes in the day-to-day reality of the societies of neighbouring countries. As far as Ukraine is concerned, those changes were at first mostly of a political and economic character. Ukraine was asked and expected to revise its existing laws and adopt new ones in many spheres. Reforms touched the food and energy markets, customs procedures, the court system, the health care system, education, transport and others. Also of great importance was the adoption of anti-corruption legislation. The implementation of the majority of these new and revised legal acts is currently still on the agenda.

In November 2013, several days before the Vilnius "Eastern Partnership" Summit, where the Association Agreement was planned to be signed, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine took the decision to suspend preparations for signing. The day when the decision was made public, large numbers of people, students chiefly, filled to overflowing the central square of Kyiv (Maidan Nezalezhnosti, 'Independence Square'), where the Orange revolution of 2004 had already taken place. Citizens of Kyiv and other cities joined them in the next days for improvised demonstrations. On the night of November 30, when there were only about 400 people in the square, again mainly students, the authorities decided to retake it by force, an action that resulted in the traumatising of over 70 people. In the next few days the citizens of Kyiv and other cities occupied the square to protest against such violent actions of the government. This Euromaidan protest turned into the Revolution of Dignity. It

lasted until the end of February 2014. The protesters who were killed, comprising about 130 identified individuals, received the name of the Heavenly Hundred.

Due to the impact of globalization processes Ukraine had to make an irreversible existential choice between two transnational identities: European and All-Russian. The bloody tragedy of the Ukrainian people in the Euromaidan protest, along with the subsequent annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and its military intervention to the Eastern regions of Ukraine, acted as a catalyst for the process of abnegation of close relations and any future in common with Russia.

IDENTITY AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE CHOICE

By socializing with others, a person develops his or her own personal identity, but also a collective or social identity, which Tajfel (as cited in Herrmann & Brewer, 2004) describes as “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (p. 6).

Social identity, according to Herrmann & Brewer (2004), is used to distinguish those who are members of a particular social group and to establish where its boundaries are, which attributes, symbols and values the group has, and finally, how networking within the social group is structured (p. 6).

Collective or social identity is the product of a process whereby individuals identify themselves with a particular social group. There are many types of collective/social identities: ethnic, national, gender, professional, religious etc. A person can be a member of one or more groups with this or that identity. A person can shift identities in the course of his/her lifetime, or more casually, depending on his/her communicative situation and communicative purposes (Wodak, 2004, p. 99).

Herrmann & Brewer (2004) have argued that some social identities “have political consequences - identities that lead people to imagine that a group deserves to enjoy substantial sovereignty” (p. 6), the demand for which “has played a key role in the conception of nationalism” (p. 7); at the same time political or national identities are usually distinguished “by shared beliefs about the origin of the group” (p. 7).

National identity comprises elements of ethnic (or cultural) identity (which forms under the influence of ethnocultural factors, such as historical memory, culture, language, religion) and civic identity (which is connected with the political and economic history of a social group and is based on norms of social and political co-existence agreed by the members of a particular group or nation). National identity is a nexus of ideas, values, and notions of culture, which the majority of members of the nation share. However, we have to take into consideration that, while a person cannot change the colour of his/her skin, he/she can relatively easily move to another religion or learn a foreign language. So, neither ethnic identity nor civic identity is inherently stable, and these, being closely connected with political, economic and social factors, are constantly changing in some degree (Huntington, 2004, p. 31).

Diachronically, we can see how “...the substance of national identity is shaped slowly and more fundamentally by a wide variety of long-term, often conflicting social, economic and political trends” (Huntington, 2004, p. 9). The substance, the core of national identity is a traditional national culture, which is preserved through inheritance, the dialogue of generations. But if there is an identity crisis or external changes are too great or too quick, the old national identity may gradually be lost and new and different national identities may develop (Stepyko, 2011, p. 178). At the same time, a national identity may function to universalize the existing order and serve as a means for a society to control individuals (Pelahesha, 2008, p. 38). In this respect identity is understood as a set of culturally available performances sanctioned through power relations, and the discursive construction of identity is typically under the control of the dominant forces in a given society and is therefore often the result of forms of manipulation and even abuse (Wetherell, 2001, p. 187).

Against this background, Ukrainian national identity cannot be easily defined. First, because it is not restricted by the actual state borders of Ukraine and is regarded more as a civic identity. On the other hand, there is a diversity of nations within Ukraine, each with their own ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics, which are not common to all the people who consider themselves Ukrainians, whether in Ukraine or abroad (Kravchenko, 2015, p. 103). Nonetheless, we can still talk about a pan-national Ukrainian identity, as most Ukrainians identify themselves with particular symbols, values, history, territory, and culture.

The formation of this Ukrainian national identity encountered difficulties due to the fact that for a long period of time, up to 1991, Ukraine did not have its own national sovereignty, as the territories of modern Ukraine were, in different periods of history, under the control of various empires and states, and the population of what is now Ukraine was in a continual process of language and cultural assimilation. When a state becomes a part of some larger state, we witness changes in its ranking of values and in its world view, including reconfiguration of the understanding of “self” vs “other” etc. Thus in order to be effectively distinguished, a modern Ukrainian identity has first to be re-constructed, in a form detached from Soviet, Russian elements, but also from earlier Polish and Hungarian ones acquired while under the control of those states (Stepyko, 2011, p. 173).

To its east, Ukraine borders the Russian Federation. Having been part of the Russian empire and a former Soviet republic, Ukraine shares with the Russian Federation much of its history and many traditions. For example, the citizens standardly profess the Orthodox Christian religion, and during Soviet times, all the Soviet republics lived essentially the same daily life – wearing the same clothes, reading only authorized books, listening to the same modern music, watching the same movies, exactly as permitted by the Communist Party. To its west, Ukraine borders member-states of the EU. However, the choice of Ukraine to identify with ‘Europe’ is not geopolitical, but cultural and political, presupposing a long-term strategy of civilisational development for the country (Stepyko, 2011, p. 198). In other words, it is not a choice between the USA and Russia, or between Europe and Asia, but between two types of culture, two types of ‘civilisation’. Stepyko (2011) claims that we are witnessing not a confrontation of two nations, but a cultural and political confrontation of two different visions of nationhood, two radically different worldviews (p. 199).

Already in the 19th century certain Ukrainian philosophers had attempted to conceptualise the cultural differences between Russia and Ukraine, stressing differences in the mentality of Ukrainian and Russian people. The new contemporary will of Ukrainians to distance themselves from Russia induced them to become further established within a European future. On the one hand, they turned to their ‘original’ Ukrainian ethnic culture and traditions, and on the other, they have tried to restore old and establish new ties with the European nations to the west. The Revolution of 2013-2014 developed the democratic ‘substance’ of Ukrainians, and promoted adherence to European principles such as the rule of law, mutual respect, dignity, democracy, freedom, solidarity, equality (including gender equality), inadmissibility of discrimination, tolerance etc. This has served to demonstrate the strength of the European component in the emerging Ukrainian identity (Kharechko, 2016, p. 282). As a result, more and more Ukrainians consider themselves to belong to the European community of nations. Surveys in May 2013, for example, showed that 34% of Ukrainians considered themselves Europeans, while in 2015 that share was already 47% of the adult population.¹

BUILDING TANGIBLE BORDERS WITH RUSSIA

The main instrument for constructing the new European reality, a European narrative of Ukraine, is the delimitation or demarcation of its ‘boundaries’ with the Russian Federation, the main successor state to the Soviet Union. To explore the constructing of the European Ukrainian identity historical, socio-political and linguistic perspectives must be combined (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 2009, p. 9).

The actual delimitation, on the material level, had started already during the Revolution of Dignity with the adoption of external national attributes. From the first day of demonstrations people were displaying the Ukrainian flag along with that of the EU. The national flag was omnipresent, just like in post-September 11 America (Huntington, 2004, p. 3), both to show their protest and to express their will to be a sovereign state independent of Russia. Ukrainians often wore clothes with the colours of the national flag, decorated themselves with a bow tied with blue-and-yellow ribbon and decorated their cars and houses with Ukrainian flags. Commenting on the proliferation of the American flag after September 11, Huntington (2004) suggests that it may “well evidence not only the intensified salience of national identity to Americans but also their uncertainty as to the substance of that identity” (p. 8). This may be true for Ukrainians as well, for whom the national flag became a symbol, a sign, a tangible

¹ The data are presented by the Razumkov Centre, a non-governmental think tank founded in 1994, which carries out research of public policy in various spheres. Retrieved from <http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/socpolls.php>

embodiment of their still uncertain vision of their future. Later in 2015 a law was adopted regarding the banning of symbols of the previous communist totalitarian regime such as, *inter alia*, the Soviet red flag (Law of Ukraine. On the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols 317-VIII, 2015, para. 14-19). Correspondingly, the EU flag can now be found widely displayed, and not only on state institutions. Furthermore, the *vyshyvanka*, a traditional Ukrainian embroidered shirt, along with hair ornaments in the form of a flower chaplet, attained, and still retain, great popularity, testifying to the will of Ukrainians to restore their ties with their pre-Soviet, pre-Russian in general, past. Now the patterns of *vyshyvanka* are also widely used to decorate cars, phones etc.

When the current war began, political, economic and cultural relations with the Russian Federation underwent significant changes. Ukrainians started to boycott goods from Russia following the calls of the civil resistance campaign “Boikotui rosiiske!” [Boycott Russian [goods]!] or “Ne kupui rosiiske!” [Don’t buy Russian [goods]!]. In stores the price labels of goods produced in Russia (regardless of the producer’s origin) continue to bear special labels “Tovary z Rosii” [Goods from Russia / Russian Federation]. And in order to export their goods to Ukraine, transnational corporations have had to change the structure of their production and distribution networks, exporting to Ukraine goods produced in factories situated in countries other than Russia. This barrier to imports from Russia has also contributed to a rise in the production of Ukrainian goods.

Consumer goods are straightforwardly boycotted by citizens, but laws have been adopted by the government in certain other domains. Since autumn 2015 all flights from Russia to Ukraine or from Ukraine to Russia have been cancelled, and no Russian TV channels have been transmitted in Ukraine via cable television. In April 2015 the Parliament of Ukraine adopted some amendments to the Law on Cinematography forbidding public use of any audio-visual material that threatens national security. The ban principally concerns films and series produced since August 1st, 1991 (the Soviet coup d’état attempt which led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union) that fall within the military/security sphere, i.e. that seek to popularise the actions of the police and army of the occupying state and its predatory regime. The ban also includes Russian films of other genres and any broadcasts produced from January 1st, 2014. (Zakon Ukrainy “Pro vnesennia zmin do deiakikh zakoniv Ukrainy shchodo zakhystu informatsiinogo teleradioprostoru Ukrainy” 159-VIII, 2015, para. 29-32). It is furthermore forbidden to broadcast films produced in Russia or the Soviet Union in which certain actors perform. To enable the execution of this Law, the State Security Service of Ukraine provided the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine with the relevant list of artists deemed to threaten national security. On the list are more than 80 Russian and foreign actors, filmmakers, singers and other cultural figures who spoke up in public in support of the actions of the Russian Federation, or who visited Crimea. Goran Bregovic’s concerts, for example, planned for the spring of 2015, were cancelled after it was reported that he had given several concerts there. Since then he has not performed in Ukraine.

Since material things often act as the embodiments of some ideology, changes on the conscious level may be closely connected with the changes on the tangible (material) level. These started with ‘the fall of the Lenins’. During Soviet times the key symbol of the Soviet epoch, a statue of Lenin, was erected in every city, town and village, reminding the citizens that they belonged to the single community of the Soviet Union, and that following the precepts of Lenin was the only true way, the means to bring the Soviet people to their glorious future. There was in addition in each populated place a street named after Lenin. Beginning in 1991, when Ukraine became an independent state, the break with the past was accompanied by the toppling of the statues of Lenin, first in Western Ukraine and later, in the 2000s, in Central Ukraine. This was in each case the decision of the local communities. Accordingly, when the Euromaidan protests started, one of the first steps of the protesters was to pull down the statue of Lenin in the central street of Kyiv. After several attempts success was achieved after the escape of the former (pro-Russian) President, and this marked the beginning of a mass demolition of Soviet monuments within Ukraine. The process became known as “ленінопад”, meaning “Lenin-fall”, coined on the model of “snow-fall” etc. A journalist named Pavlo Podobed (2014) commented on the event:

Millions of Ukrainians have at last realized the manifest truth: the monuments of dictators and torturers are not innocent statues, but one of the elements of constructing a collective consciousness. The cities and villages of Ukraine, which have got rid of the monuments of totalitarianism, have taken the chance to get rid of the mental anchors which were weighing the citizens down into the abyss of the memory of the Soviet Union. (para. 9)

Accordingly, when the idol felt, when this factor anchoring Ukrainian identity to its Soviet Communist past ceased to exist, the cord was cut and Ukrainians took the chance to become free from Russia. The

following was written by the famous Ukrainian writer Y. Andrukhovych in 2011, but still explains the current situation:

Now, almost two decades since we kind of separated, Moscow remains an entity with the greatest impact on everything that is happening to us. But what is remarkable: this does not in fact make our situation feel happy or victorious, rather the contrary.

The final version of our and the Russians' slogan "eternally together" is "chained with one chain". We are half-struggling into a broader world, and they resist. In reality we are anxious to be held by them as tight as possible and they want us to struggle with might and main. Otherwise how can both we and they make sense of our further existence? It is this very chain which comprises our and their singularity. (Andrukhovych, 2011, p. 51)

CONSCIOUS RE-WRITING OF UKRAINIAN HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

It should be mentioned here that Russia itself banned the Soviet Communist Party immediately after the coup attempt of 1991. Indeed the banning of the symbols of the Soviet Union was a very common practice in the former Soviet republics, and in general citizens managed to settle these matters quite soon after the events of 1991. In Ukraine, on the other hand, it took 24 years for the state and its citizens to become more resolute and strict in their treatment of the Soviet past. As already mentioned, only in 2015 was the law banning symbols of the communist totalitarian regime finally adopted, along with the Law on decommunisation.

One of its provisions concerning the narration of a Ukrainian 'Self' was the renaming of streets and settlements. Thus Dnipropetrovsk, originally named after the Bolshevik revolutionary Petrovskii in conjunction with the name of the biggest river of Ukraine (Dnieper), became Dnipro. Former Kirovograd (literally 'the city of Kirov', a Soviet politician) now bears the name of the Ukrainian writer Mark Kropyvnytskyi, who lived in the city.

The decision to rename a street or a settlement has to be agreed by the relevant community. Some names suggested are not beyond exception. This is determined by the fact that citizens of the eastern and western parts of Ukraine perceive the historical past of the country in different ways, according to two versions of national history, Ukrainian and Soviet (Russian). The different historical experience of different regions means that 'Ukrainian identity' incorporates some key distinctions that determine the contemporary vision and perception of the nation and the state. Thus some Ukrainians are proud of the Zaporozhian Kozaks (15-16th centuries), the dissident movement of 1960-70s, the Declaration of Independence of 1991 and the Orange Revolution of 2004, while others are proud of events in Soviet history, especially the victory in the Great Patriotic War (i.e. Second World War), the post-war reconstruction of industry (Stepyko, 2011, p. 204). In this respect we cannot but mention the decision in 2016 to rename Moscow Avenue in Kyiv as Stepan Bandera Avenue, which provoked a lively discussion. Stepan Bandera was a leader of the nationalist and independence movement in Ukraine. At the beginning of World War II he cooperated with the Nazi regime, and later was imprisoned in a concentration camp and assassinated by the KGB. In 2010 the then President of Ukraine awarded him the title of Hero of Ukraine, but the European Parliament, as well as Polish and Jewish organizations, condemned the award, and in 2011 it was annulled by decision of the court. The address of the CEO of the World Jewish Congress, Robert Singer, was characteristic, when he said that this decision to give Stepan Bandera's name to the street in Kiev:

calls into question Ukraine's commitment to an honest confrontation with its own history... It is ironic and perplexing that the Kyiv municipality would decide to honor a man whose followers joined the German death squads in murdering the Jews of Ukraine during the Holocaust, at the very same time that it is planning to build Ukraine's first Holocaust museum. (World Jewish Congress, 2016, para. 2)

Despite the fact that Stepan Bandera to some extent symbolises the struggle of Ukrainians for an independent Ukrainian state, Ukrainian society, taking into account all his deeds, is not altogether positive in its appreciation of his contributions, as the voting statistics confirm. Of those who

participated in the poll regarding the renaming of Moscow Avenue, 3146 people supported it and 2548 declared against it.²

There are other vulnerable points in Ukrainian history, which Ukraine is trying not to discuss too loudly, because beyond the Soviet version of history lies the European one. One example concerns the events in the region of Volyn in Western Ukraine in 1943. Poland calls these a 'massacre', Ukraine 'a tragedy'. When the Polish Seim adopted the relevant law and categorised the events as a genocide of Poles by Ukrainian nationalists, the Ukrainian Parliament in its official statement condemned these actions of the Polish Parliament, considering them a politicisation of tragic events in the history of both nations.

So, on the conscious level, the new boundaries between the Russian Federation and Ukraine are being created through a transition from the Soviet communist context to the European one, principally via significant changes to the various discourses comprising Ukrainian identity, a reexamination of historical events from the 'European' point of view. Reconstruction of the historical narrative of Ukrainian identity presupposes working out a different perception of earlier historical periods, events and figures, even state holidays. Mostly, we are dealing with the rewriting of the myth of a united Soviet people, the deconstruction of a fundamental myth of Eastern Slavic unity, and the creation of a myth of Ukraine as an integral part of European civilisation. For example, due to its close connections with Ancient Greece and Christian Byzantium, the region of Crimea, particularly before it was occupied by the neighbouring Russian state, can plausibly be positioned as a kind of 'cradle of European civilisation'.

One of the most vivid examples of the on-going discursive shift is the decision to celebrate Victory in Europe Day on 8th May instead of Soviet Victory Day on 9th May (when the German military surrender became effective for the Soviet Union). In 2015 the 8th of May was designated as a day of Remembrance and Reconciliation and enhanced by a fresh approach, without military parades and tanks, in stark contrast to the traditional Soviet/Russian celebrations. This one day shift marks a significant transfer from the Soviet ideology of the 'Great Patriotic War' to the European ideology of the 'Second World War', thereby contributing to the making of Ukraine into a self-sufficient member of the wider European community.

The recent decision regarding the day for celebrating Christmas can be seen as one more such shift. The Orthodox Church in both Russia and Ukraine (as a former Soviet republic) follows the Julian calendar and celebrates Christmas on 7th of January. In Moldova and Albania, however, there are two state holidays for the celebration of Christmas, 25th of December, and 7th of January, allowing citizens to choose. In 2016 a draft law was submitted to the Ukrainian Parliament designating 25th of December a state holiday along with 7th of January. This again allows citizens to make their choice, and if they wish, to become closer to the European norm, relegating 7th January to the past Soviet life.

A further subject that has provoked vivid discussion among Ukrainians, and which is clearly positioning Ukraine as an organic part of the European community, is the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the Reformation. In August 2016 the President of Ukraine signed the Decree. At the beginning of the text it is stated that the commemoration recognises the enormous contribution of Protestant churches and organisations to the development of the religious, cultural and social spheres of Ukraine, with regard to their role in Ukrainian history and the establishment of the independent state (Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy 357/2016 "Pro vidznachennia v Ukraini 500-richchia Reformatsii", 2016, para. 1). Ukolov (2016), a member of the Parliament of Ukraine, commented that, with the adoption of this law, Ukraine properly distances itself from Russia, as it recognises at state level a European but fundamentally un-Russian system of belief in God, that also existed in Ukraine for generations (para. 11). In Russia, by contrast, Protestant beliefs were persecuted severely, forcing some communities to leave the country in search of security (e.g. some communities of the so-called Old Ritualists now live in northern and western Ukraine, preserving their Orthodox-Protestant traditions).

² Kyiv Municipal Administration conducts open discussions of various matters, including renaming of streets. The results of the voting in question are retrieved from <http://projects.kievcity.gov.ua/projects/view.php?P=210>.

BUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN UKRAINIAN IDENTITY

Today we are witnessing the process of reconceptualising the national space, a redesigning of the notions of 'self' and 'others'. The means for integrating Ukrainians into the European community are very similar to the means described above for cutting the ties with their previous 'selves'.

Integration of Ukraine into the European community presupposes not only clear border delimitation with Russia (with a broad interpretation of the word "border"), adjustment of its economy and legislation to European standards and a reappraisal of history, but first and foremost the adoption of a European identity. As one of the most natural ways of adopting new knowledge and patterns of behaviour is through personal experience, one of the main instruments of transformation has been the integration of Ukraine into common European educational and scientific projects through programs like Erasmus, Horizon 2020 etc., a process which has intensified significantly since the Revolution.

A European identity, however, is not all that easily identifiable or even comprehensible. From 31st October 2014 the debate "What does it mean to YOU to be "European"?", has been in progress on the platform Debating Europe,³ in partnership with Friends of Europe and Europe's World.

Most contributors have commented directly on this question, but a number of participants have also dwelled on whether they feel themselves Europeans or not. According to the statistics presented in the introduction to the debate, half of the respondents declared that they feel themselves to be both their nationality and European, some that they feel European first and secondly their nationality, while others consider themselves only their nationality. In addition, since there is clearly a difference between being European and being a member of the EU, some contributors considered it necessary to comment on this matter. Other comments are of a rather romantic character, for example: "To be a European is something that is unattainable and yet so highly desirable outside of Europe" or "The feeling of belonging to something great" or "To be part of a common destiny". Grad (2008) referred to this way of approaching the subject as the sense of belonging, the feeling of being European (p. 121). Nevertheless, the majority of those who posted positive comments singled out the main characteristics of what they think being a European means, namely sharing common European values, a common history and culture, freedom and the possibility to move within the EU without borders, exactly as stated in the Treaty of the European Union.

In his video address in the framework of the "Be European" campaign in Ukraine the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pavlo Klimkin, refers consistently to European values, stating that these are the principal common features of all the peoples of Europe. But in distinction to the data mentioned above, according to which Europeans value democracy, freedom and peace, he identifies as important the values of the supremacy of law, democracy and tolerance.⁴

In 2016 Ukrainians were also offered the chance to share their opinions of what it means to be a European by saying what surprised and impressed them in European countries and to write about their lifestyles or anything else that they considered a good example of being European. The "Be European" campaign was launched in April 2016 by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly with the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine and online news source Europeiska Pravda [European Truth]. The campaign aimed to provoke on Twitter and Facebook (the entry #BeEuropean) a broad discussion on the essence of Europeanness, European values, and other important issues related to Ukraine's future EU integration. The two winners were awarded trips to Brussels.

In fact, the discussion can hardly be considered a broad one, since there were only about 200 comments. Some consisted of just one sentence naming one particular aspect. Others were fuller texts presenting some story or fact, or outlining many and various issues simultaneously. Interestingly, there were no comments criticizing the EU, something that might have been expected given the character of the campaign, though censorship clearly cannot be excluded.

Semantic analysis of the comments allows one key notion which they contain to be highlighted, namely "respect". In the comments it functions lexically either as a noun or a verb, expressing a general idea of "politeness, honour, and care shown towards someone or something that is considered important" (Cambridge dictionary, 2017). In particular, the authors of the comments mainly spoke about respect towards the environment and the natural resources of the country. Thus the most frequent feature

³ To date 1167 comments, both positive and negative, have been posted (25.08.2016). Retrieved from <http://www.debatingeurope.eu/2014/10/31/what-does-being-european-mean-to-you/#.WIS1YPKqzIW>

⁴ MFA of Ukraine. (2016). [Video file]. Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/radioec.com.ua/posts/932614313521834>

Ukrainians mentioned in the context of being European was the environmental responsibility of the citizens of Europe (about 25 % of the comments concerned this aspect of life). Very few comments concerned the state's environmental policy. Most touched on the personal sense of environmental responsibility shared by European citizens in contrast to the lack of environmental consciousness on the part of Ukrainians, which is seen as the main reason why entrance halls, streets, park areas and riverbanks etc in Ukraine are often dirty. One of the authors posted a picture of the sign saying: "Be strong! Carry your rubbish to street litter bins!" illustrating a low level of environmental responsibility among Ukrainians. Another author even used the word "piggie": "Prezhde vsego eto ne byt khrushkoi ili parazitom [First of all [being European] is not being a piggie (or parasite)]"⁵ referring to the citizens who do not respect the place where they live and pollute it, throwing rubbish where they will.

In this connection many comments also dwelled on ecologically-friendly transport. A bicycle according to the comments analysed can even be considered a symbol of Europe for Ukrainians. In Kyiv, not to mention the rest of the Ukrainian cities, there is a major problem with lack of cycle lanes, so that it is still difficult, for example, for one who lives on the left bank of the Dnieper river to get to his/her office situated on the right bank.

It is also worth mentioning that the English word "sustainable", which is rather common and widely used lexical unit in the English-speaking world when referring to the environmental awareness of citizens, has no one-word match in Ukrainian or Russian. One of the comments noted that to be European means to be sustainable, with the word used in its original form, a practice that is not common for the Ukrainian or Russian language: "Be sustainable – європейська звичка, яку треба опанувати українцям. Українці вчимося be sustainable! [Being sustainable is a European habit Ukrainians have to master. Ukrainians, let's learn to be sustainable!]"⁶. When the notion this word denotes has to be referred to in a Ukrainian or Russian text, it is normally presented through an extended explanation of what it entails. In fact we often have an explanation of the meaning of the word of the kind that can be found in English dictionaries, like "the idea that goods and services should be produced in ways that do not use resources that cannot be replaced and that do not damage the environment" (Cambridge dictionary, 2017).

About 20% of comments also dwelled specifically on respect towards other people as a recognition and acceptance of the other person as 'the same' as them, as enjoying equal rights. There are many categories of citizens in Ukraine who face problems in their everyday life. The authors of the comments, however, mostly focused on just two of these categories. Firstly, people with reduced capabilities. While in European countries they can live a full, productive life, in Ukraine they not only have restricted physical access to shops, state services, educational institutions/education, transport and so on, due to the lack of special provision and equipment, but are also sometimes perceived antipathetically. The comments which such people made themselves within the framework of the "Be European" campaign were stories about their own struggles with the hostility of "normal" people in Ukraine and the contrast with the willingness to help and the friendly disposition of European society, which provides them with full access to education, to cultural monuments, and to all the goods other people enjoy in European countries. (A further interesting aspect of this campaign is the set of countries the contributors identified as good examples to illustrate their opinions: the absolute winner was Finland, due to its perceived environmental responsibility, its treatment of children, the aged, and other categories of citizen, and its overall lifestyle, though Denmark and Estonia also featured prominently.)

Secondly, a number of contributors in their comments stated that being European means to respect the uniqueness of other people. One more "symbol", so to say, of being European in Ukraine is to have a sympathetic attitude towards the LGBT community. For the moment Ukraine, according to the ratings of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans- and Inter-sex Association in the European region (ILGA-Europe) presented for 2016, occupies 44th position with only 13.3% of individuals showing respect for the equal human rights of those concerned, very far indeed from full equality (in

⁵ Holovnyi yevropeyskyi retsept – ne buty khriushkoiu [The main European recipe is not to be a piggie]. Retrieved from <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/BeEuropean/2016/06/7/7050415/> [In Ukrainian]

⁶ Be sustainable – yevropeiska zvychka, yaku treba opanuvaty ukraintsiam. Ukraintsi vchymosia be sustainable! [Be sustainable is a European habit Ukrainians have to master. Ukrainians, let's learn to be sustainable!]. Retrieved from <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/BeEuropean/2016/05/18/7049407/> [In Ukrainian]

comparison to Malta in 1st position with a score of 88%, or Belgium and the UK in 2nd and 3rd places with approximately 81.5%)⁷. RBK-Ukraine is a Ukrainian information portal which, along with posting news from Ukraine and the world, conducts market research and surveys. Before the annual LGBT pride in Kiev in June 2016 they asked their readers how they like the idea of conducting the pride parade in Kiev. 2346 votes were cast, divided among the 6 options offered by the portal as follows: 27% stated they would be participants, 23% said that they do not belong to the community but support the pride, 16% expressed their dislike towards the community but assured readers that they would not come to fight, 14% supported the idea of equality but considered the pride to be superfluous, 13% spoke out against the pride and declared that they were going to come to stand up for their convictions, 7% said that they were not concerned at all about the LGBT community.⁸

A further set of comments posted within the “Be European” campaign referred to respect towards the motherland, to its history, culture and traditions. The authors noted that one of the characteristics of European citizens is their careful and positive attitude towards their countries, the veneration of their traditions and the promotion of their cultures: *Byt evropeitse, v pervuiu ochered, eto lubit tu stranu, v kotoroi rodilsia i zhyvesh!* [Be European, first of all, means to love the country in which you have been born and live!]⁹, *Buty yevropeitse – to ye buty soboiu ta z hordistiu vidpovidaty na pytannia ‘where are you from?..’* [Be European is to be yourself and to proudly answer the question “Where are you from?..”]¹⁰.

Some authors also considered it necessary to share the opinion that Ukrainians do not differ from Europeans, that Ukraine is a European country not only because of its geographical location, but due to its self-perception.¹¹

One more notion referred to by the writers of the comments is that of “responsibility”. It is manifested lexically as the noun “responsibility” as well as adjectivally within the phrase “to be responsible”. This involves the general idea of control or authority over someone “and the duty of taking care of him or her” (Cambridge dictionary, 2017) not just because of one’s job or position, or because of fear of being blamed if something goes wrong. In the comments, the term was used similarly to mean taking responsibility for one’s own words and deeds, admitting one’s mistakes and not fearing the consequences: “To be European means above all taking responsibility for one’s family, community, and country. You are responsible for everything that is happening around you. With this responsibility comes a certain freedom, especially freedom of choice. This is what we call ‘European Awareness’. This is what ‘Europeanness’ means for me: taking responsibility for what is happening in society instead of waiting for someone else to fix everything”.¹² Logically, this raises the question of whether there is any difference between *#beEuropean* and *#beHuman*¹³. For those for whom there is no difference, being European seems to mean to be a human with capital H.¹⁴

Taking all these comments together we see a bigger picture in which, if Ukraine is to become a ‘true’ European country, i.e. not simply European as a matter of geography, certain changes must take place in people’s consciousness. Being European means to exercise freedom, to think not only about oneself,

⁷ Rainbow Europe. (n.d.) Country ranking. Retrieved from <https://rainbow-europe.org/country-ranking>

⁸ *Opros: podderzhyvaete li vy provedenie Marsha ravenstva v Kieve?* [Survey: Are you receptive to the idea of holding LGBT pride in Kyiv?]. (2016, May 31). *RBK-Ukraine*. Retrieved from <https://styler.rbc.ua/rus/zhizn/opros-nuzhen-gey-parad-kieve-1464703344.html> [In Russian]

⁹ Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/masher.adamova/posts/10204689925527971?pnref=story>

¹⁰ *Z hordistiu vidpovidaty na pytannia ‘where are you from?..’* [To proudly answer the question “Where are you from?..”]. (2016, June 15). Retrieved from <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/BeEuropean/2016/06/15/7050795/> [In Ukrainian]

¹¹ Diachenko, M. (2016, June 10). Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/andreikushnirov/posts/1046750562072657>

¹² Rozskazova, O. (2016, May 9). *Being European means taking responsibility*. EU in Ukraine. Retrieved from <https://euukrainecoop.com/2016/05/09/europeanness/>

¹³ *Shcho take #BeEuropean? Tse prosto #buty Liudynoiu* [What does that mean #BeEuropean? It is simply to #be Human]. (2016, April 25). Retrieved from <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/BeEuropean/2016/04/25/7048338>

¹⁴ *Vchora my dopomagaly Yevropi, sohodni vona dopomozhe nam* [Yesterday we helped Europe, today it will help us]. (2016, May 18). Retrieved from <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/BeEuropean/2016/05/18/7049409/> [In Ukrainian]

but to care about other people, to be open and tolerant, to work in the best interests of one's country, to do real things if one can, to behave with respect towards oneself, towards one's environment, and in general to act with human dignity. Nonetheless, some Ukrainians who posted their comments within the "Be European" campaign also referred to the fact that Ukrainians already have the same history as the other nations populating the European continent and share the same values: "Being European is first of all to share the values which have jelled, taken shape due to many years' experience from the infancy of the European civilisation"¹⁵. But such comments were very few, and Ukrainians were mostly concerned with respect and responsibility, as a reaction both to the long-term contempt of the country's former rulers and to the more recent traumas (it is significant that the events of 2013-2014, the so-called EuroMaidan, are also known as the Dignity Revolution).

This analysis of the argument types found in the comments shows that the contributors in the main were presenting the characteristics of Europeaness *in contrarium*: they identified the main problems of Ukrainian society, those aspects which in their opinion most need to change in order for the country to conform to what are perceived as European norms, if Ukraine is to become as successful and prosperous as the European countries to its west.

The choice made by contemporary Ukraine can be characterized as a choice in favour of the shared values characteristic of Atlantic, i.e. European and American, civilization, as opposed to the fixed political or philosophical ideologies that have characterised many Eurasian civilisations. The former is not itself seen as an ideological system but rather as a flexible set of positive life strategies. Such values are widely interpreted as the result of an 'individualistic corporate' culture, in which personal motives and interests are conceived episodically, but the remaining members of the social group then promote collectively those that are perceived positively. In other words, typical Western values have developed on the basis of the experience of individuals who followed certain strategies and enjoyed forms of individual success that were at first generally admired and then widely sought after. These general values are updatable qualities, which a person chooses and uses to make sense of his/her own life. Among them are individual entrepreneurship, professionalism, corporatisation, a state governed by the rule of law, a dynamic conception of ethics and culture, and so on (Stepyko, 2011, p. 197). By contrast, in many states of the Soviet era, and even after, there was no need to form a value system of this kind, since the entire life of citizens was governed and controlled by the Communist Party, essentially without change or the prospect of change, because the system 'guaranteed' that this was already the best of all possible worlds. Europe as a cultural identity, as a civilisation does stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals (Bruter, 2004, p. 190). But contrary to the argument of Bruter (2004) regarding the Soviet world, European civic identity, which also typically implies some reference to the European Union, does indeed match European cultural identity (p. 190).

CONCLUSION

Becoming a member of a new community always presupposes reconstruction of the pre-existing 'Self'. In the case of Ukraine, we are witnessing a modification of old 'boundaries' along with a delimitation of new ones on a number of different levels that together comprise a unique example of the construction of a new national identity within a very short period of time. Analysis of the narrative and discursive features of Ukrainian and English language mass-media texts (2013-2016) shows that the main points of vulnerability in the narrative of Ukrainian identity are those connected with history (the national self-determination of Ukraine, Ukraine in World War II, etc.), geopolitics (the historical borders of Ukraine, Ukrainian and European standards and values), and ethnopsychology (independence of the Ukrainian culture, language and religion). Nonetheless, the promotion of the features discussed above is resulting in a radical reconfiguration of the narrative of the Ukrainian 'Self'/Ukrainian identity, and the construction of a new, European, 'Self' for the Ukrainian people.

¹⁵ Retrieved from

<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1708925382728344&set=a.1622762891344594.1073741828.10008326963488&type=3&theater>

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Reserving a Discourse of Euro-Identification: Euro-realism?¹

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ABSTRACT

Starting in the post-Maastricht era, there has been a general dissatisfaction with the EU and the way the integration is proceeding. This has led to the death of the permissive consensus, opening the domestic political space to a Europe-wide contestation harboring criticism, protest, and questioning of the EU. The study aims to elucidate a recently emerged Euro-realism and its position within the political spectrum and the way political parties embrace this phenomenon within the framing of Euro-identification. This identification is nested in a questioning—critically as well as constructively—focusing on “change,” “reform,” and “new directions” for Europe. This argument is supported by a case study of two political parties, namely the Law and Justice Party (PiS) (Poland) and Civic Democrat Party (ODS) (Czech Republic). By positively and constructively evaluating manifestos of these parties, it can be established what is non-European and in fact what should not become European.

Keywords: European Identity, Euro-realism, Euroscepticism, Discourse, Party Politics

INTRODUCTION

The EU is dominated by a dynamic development, which is gradually changing the Union’s status. The tendency of this development is evident. Since the Rome Treaties of 1957, the Union has been strengthening its federal elements without becoming a traditional federation. This prompts the discussion on how the European integration shapes the nationhood of the Member States. For instance, Becker (1996) explained how institutions can “generate ‘non-cognitive’ trust, a sense of security about others benevolence and compliance that is not focused on specific people or institutions, nor a matter of conscious strategic choice” (p. 45). This brings the issue of the political response to social change both in the state-government relations, and at the level of mass politics. As the European level becomes a political sphere, it could prompt a discussion on how the integration be furthered in the name of common interactions and interests, as is usually argued by Euro-enthusiasts. Alternatively, it can result in questioning of how future EU trajectories might harm (in a democratic and legitimate sense) the current and future policy debates, as asserted by the Eurosceptics and recently by Euro-realists. While addressing the supporters of the European integration is easy, the picture blurs when the discussion extends to the critics having no heart for the EU. Here, the concept of ‘Euroscepticism’ is addressed from the perspective offered in pertinent literature. Criticizing and questioning the integration, irrespective of its degree or scope, eventually falls under this banner. However, emerging movements and their political stances (like Euro-realism) towards the integration are becoming difficult to locate. Are they anti-system and principled opposition parties, or as currently termed *pro-European realists* (Brown, 2005), *functional Euro-realists* (Riishoj, 2004) or *alter-EU* (Leconte, 2010) parties? It is evident that the emphasis on European ideas has been, and is still changing, leading to a change of both the level and the scope of criticism. As this study aims to elucidate, an emerging concept—Euro-realism—is currently gaining ground in European politics. The term “Euro-realists” mostly applies to the British, and the British Tories in particular. However, Euro-realism also finds ground in Central

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and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), where a number of parties are embracing this term, two of which are analyzed in this study.

It is the goal of the present study to analyze Euro-realists taking a role in European decision and policy-making processes. Euro-realism is a part of the growing political landscape in Europe and, as is argued in this study, is becoming an important emerging block within the European Parliament (EP) as well. As detailed below, some parties are embracing Euro-realism despite actively participating in the European integration, engaging in Euro-party groups, establishing common policies, and trying to pressure the institutions of the EU to pursue initiatives they deem the best and required for the future trajectory of the EU. More importantly, these parties put forth a different dimension of European-ness or Euro-identification by debating and opening up debates on the meanings of Europe/EU. It is clear that the criticism towards the European integration can be related to a wide array of issues, from democracy to sovereignty, from austerity to immigration. However, the work presented here focuses on how Euro-realism pertains to identity and identification. Both the discourse and the rhetoric of any issue declared at national level becomes a European level one because the supranational forces are pressuring the previously national policy areas. In this context, Sweet and Sandholz (1997) argued, “as European rules emerge and are clarified and as European organizations become arenas for politics, what is specifically supranational shapes the context for subsequent interactions” (p. 311). This prompts the question of what is and should be perceived as European for a discussion in the Europe-wide forum. In this study, these arguments are evaluated by analyzing two CEEC parties, namely the Civic Democrat Party and the Law and Justice Party purportedly representing Euro-realism. The analysis includes party documents, working papers, and manifestos to understand how their Euro-realism movement emerged since the accession of their respective countries (Czech Republic and Poland) to the EU.

POLITICAL DIVERSIFICATION: EMERGENCE OF EURO-REALISM

Before exploring Euro-realism and discussing what this emerging concept is offering, it would be helpful to briefly examine Euroscepticism. Since entering the academic as well as the political debate in the 1990s, the concept of Euroscepticism has been widely used when detailing the European popular and party behavior, and the level of criticism towards the European integration. Euroscepticism, according to the typology developed by Taggart and Szczesbiak (2002), mostly implies doubts and reservations towards the future of the integration, especially ‘moving towards an ever closer union,’ named as *soft* Euroscepticism. This is distinct from principled opposition to the EU and any transfer of power to its institutions, referred to as *hard* Euroscepticism. More or less any political party harbors some level of criticism, it is important to question where and how to locate Euro-realism within the political spectrum and its projection on Europe.

Starting with the negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty, the Eurosceptic movement gradually gained momentum, affecting the Member States’ attitudes in a more coherent and Europe-wide manner. As noted above, the Eurosceptic phenomenon can be segregated into *soft* and *hard* forms of backlash, with numerous diverging motivations. Euroscepticism includes both *soft* and *hard* types of backlash, whereby hard Eurosceptics (parties) are characterized by outright rejection of the European integration, advocating for country withdrawal from the Union. Forster (2002) analyzed the Eurosceptics as follows:

[. . .] sceptics did not, until the late 1980s, really take seriously the need to fully understand the technical nature of European integration – their knowledge levels were rather low since they themselves needed little convincing of their own rectitude. There has, however, been an important change particularly since the watershed Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 1993, with serious Eurosceptic groupings now seeking to develop a capacity to provide autonomous analysis of policy-making, decisions and Treaty outcomes (p. 8).

In parallel with the above assertion, besides Euroscepticism, an emerging concept, namely Euro-realism, is shaping policies with regard to European integration. The roots of Euro-realism can be traced to the Convention on the future of Europe, leading to a Draft Constitution, making European integration more questionable than ever before. The Draft Constitution was signed in 2004, immediately after the fifth enlargement of the EU, leading to more diversified views towards the future of Europe. It is evident that European integration in its “various aspects, whether economic, cultural or

political, results in a diversity of forms for different members of the national community” (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2011, pp. 2-3). It is seen that politicians and parties are increasingly distancing themselves from Euroscepticism, while naming or aligning themselves as well as their views with Euro-realism.

Euro-realists put forth the need for a radical reform of the EU, and greater economic liberalization (mostly argued by British Conservatives). Some are also advocating for a more flexible structure of the EU and greater transparency and accountability with regard to the EU institutions. For other parties, the focus should be on equal status, or equitable position in EU affairs, mostly argued for by parties located in the CEECs. It is important to emphasize that Euro-realism and the parties embracing it are becoming more active in European politics, and have become more engaged in the integration. Examples of these initiatives include delivering leaflets during referendums, holding Europe-wide campaigns, organizing meetings, and debating and supporting (in their own way) treaty referendums in different Member States. For that reason, Euro-realist parties at both national and transnational level cannot be avoided and shifted towards a narrow negative and marginal outlook toward the European integration. They are influencing the direction and content of the integration, and in doing so creating awareness in the public about the pertinent issues. Euro-realism is becoming increasingly apparent at the party level, and the MPs and MEPs are often referencing this term in their discourse. Yet, there is no precise definition of Euro-realism. For instance, parties located in the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Group clearly identify as Euro-realists. According to their definition:

We see the EU differently for just one single reason – we want it to reform and therefore succeed. That is why we cannot call ourselves Eurosceptic in the way the media, especially in the UK, use the term to describe destructive secessionists who argue for our countries’ withdrawal from EU membership. (Tannock & Szymanski, 2009, p. 2).

It is clear that MEPs from the British Conservative Party and from the Polish Law and Justice Party distance themselves from the Eurosceptic title. Their argument centers on the destructive–constructive debate. They evaluate Euroscepticism as destructive, and Euro-realism as taking a constructive role in shaping future trajectory of the EU. This reveals an important difference between Euroscepticism and Euro-realism, as the former implies harsh protest and criticism (at some point even rejection), while the latter promotes acceptance of the EU, subject to change and reform. Tannock and Szymanski (2009) further observed:

We nevertheless remain constructively sceptical of many of the ideas and current EU policies being put forward. The more accurate and neutral term we have adopted, and therefore used in our Prague Declaration setting out the main principles of our new European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Group, is Euro realist (p. 2).

The assertion noted above does not convey fear of the EU, but rather concern for its development. It is clear that the MEPs argue for a change in the EU without damaging the entire EU project or removal of their Member States from the EU. A former member of the European parliament Eppink (2015) defined Euro-realism as:

Euro-realism means a reality check. EU should focus on a limited number of tasks in the fields of the economic, monetary and political union and do them well. What doesn’t necessarily need to be done by EU should be done by national governments. With a focus on EU’s core tasks euro-realism is also a response to euro-skepticism which wants to tear EU apart (para. 2).

As the definition given above indicates, Euro-realism primarily focuses on reforming the EU project with the suggestion of which policy fields should become matter of EU and which should remain within the national realm. An important point is that Euro-realism promotes questioning of the ‘more Europe’ thesis. For Eppink (2015), this is about “not to try to do everything but to be specific and focused” (para. 16). In other words, offering rational solutions to problems requiring urgent focus via community method. Eppink further observed, “Euro-realism is also a response to Euro-scepticism” (para. 2), which is an important point of view. At this point, it is evident that Euro-realists are distancing themselves from the Eurosceptics, whom they define as discrediting the EU. The Euro-realists put forth arguments, creating counter discourses urgently required for pluralism at the EU level.

This view, shared among Euro-realists, opens up a space for a Euro-identification nested in a questioning of the EU, in terms of whether it undermines or enriches European values. Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wüest (2010) perceived this process as ‘framing’ of the political parties, stating, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (pp. 498-499). According to the Euro-realists, in its current form, the EU is undermining the European values, which the continent has struggled to settle for centuries. In the EP speech, Klaus (2009) underlines these values as:

The methods and forms of European integration do, on the contrary, have quite a number of possible and legitimate variants just as they proved to have in the last half century. There is no end of history. Claiming that the status quo, the present institutional form of the EU, is a former uncriticizable dogma, is a mistake that has been – unfortunately – rapidly spreading, even though it is in direct contradiction not only with rational thinking, but also with the whole two-thousand year history of European civilization (p. 2).

It is clear that Euro-realist parties pledge critically approaching the European integration, focusing on whether the EU represents as well as respects Europe. In this questioning, the Euro-realist politics place dignity, diversity, and mutuality at the heart of this discussion.

EURO-REALISM AND EURO-IDENTIFICATION

Since the 19th century, people have felt strongly attached to their beloved nation-states. It is clear that, for some foreseeable future, the nation-state will remain the strongest source of identification for most individuals. In Europe, the issue of identification has been deeply questioned due to the increasing European integration. The EU, with a diversity of policy fields, institutions, and policy-making procedures, has penetrated into the lives of citizens of Member States. This has resulted in a marked divergence in expectations and claims. Greater EU integration also prompted the need for respecting the claims of diverse democratic communities, including their distinctive cultural, legal, and constitutional self-understandings. This complex landscape has led to certain resistance, in our case Euro-realism. The political parties embracing Euro-realism describe the European integration in other terms, perceiving the future trajectory of the EU as an integral part of their political existence and strategy. The aim is to take part in shaping this organization that should, in their words, be “a more flexible organization that listens to and respects people in all of its member countries” (ECR Group, Prague Declaration, 2009, para. 2). This opinion, shared by these parties, rests on the values and norms of Europe, such as democratic accountability and transparency. As the Euro-realists argue, the institutional setup of the Union undermines these major principles, as it is becoming overly bureaucratic. In this context, identification of the Euro-realist parties and the way they locate EU and Europe, is important. They do not defy affiliations like European-ness or European; rather, they mostly focus on the changing dynamics of Europe with special reference to European integration, as well as the ways to cope with it. Due to this change and dynamism, they argue for a non-fixed identification of Europe and the EU. It is important to stress that this is a two-dimensional case. Firstly, it is essential to elucidate how each Member State represents the EU, in terms of the way they perceive, value, and think about the EU. It is also important to establish how the EU represents the Member States, through listening, considering, and valuing divergence of expectations. In this due process, Euro-realism has become synonymous with reform and progress, as the EU needs a consensus-based roadmap promoting justice and fairness, as well as equality for all Member States. These terms are not new for the European continent or European thinking, as Europe represents and identifies itself with justice, tolerance and fairness. That is why supporters of Euro-realism emphasize these values in order to bring rational solutions for the future of the EU.

In addition to exploring the sense of belonging to the European community and supporting the integration, it is highly important to focus on the thinking about the integration process. As Immerfall, Boehnke, and Baier (2010) observed, there is a cognitive dimension of identification; “it rests on the thoughts and perceptions, not solely feelings” (p. 335). As argued in this study, the dynamic process of European integration is forcing both party and public level to question and criticize the integration with the emergence of new issues. The Euro-realist parties are opposing federalism and defending as well as justifying their own vision for Europe, which automatically leads criticizing counter positions. That is why, Euro-realism should not be perceived as marginal. There is a need to distinguish between what

Knudsen (2008) calls ‘backward-looking’ vision of Europe that cannot converge the Nation-State and EU goals and ideas, and forward-looking Euroscepticism supporters, who “... take active and constructive part in the daily work over the EU and only in referendums really differ considerably from the line taken by pro-EU parties” (p. 166). In that sense Euro-realism should be explored separately.

Simply put, Euro-realism promotes framing Europe with different perceptions that are based on not only feelings, but also thoughts toward Euro-identification. Identification, in this context, is nested in questioning and critically approaching the integration. This is the main reason behind post-war European integration. In an era marked by skeptic attitudes of European nation-states toward one another and the future of the European continent, it seemed prudent to integrate certain institutional and political mechanisms under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. For that reason, identification with Europe should not be equated with support for the EU or vice versa. As Bruter (2004) argued, “the latter is only one aspect of the former” (p. 23). Indeed, *support* can be attributed to a variety of dimensions within the context of European integration.

However, how do the aforementioned factors determine policy agendas in European politics? There is a need for gaining a better understanding of the party politics and the manner in which the aforementioned approaches can be employed to elucidate their political behavior in this context. In this work, this is achieved by analyzing two political parties, namely the Polish Law and Justice Party and the Czech Civic Democratic Party, both of which claim to be Euro-realists.

CASE STUDY OF THE CIVIC DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND LAW & JUSTICE PARTY

In the Czech Republic, different political groups/parties have differing positions on the evolution of the European integration. However, until late 1990s, there was a consensus among the political elite on the vision of “return to Europe,” which meant joining the EU as soon as possible. After becoming Member State of the EU, the political parties started differing in their stances towards the integration. Although differing in their rhetoric, they still share certain positions (mirroring the perceptions of the Czech community). All major parties in the Czech Republic—the Social Democrats, Civic Democratic Party (ODS), and Christian Democrats (with the exception of the Communists)—consider the Czech Republic a part of Euro-Atlantic civilization and endorse values of democracy and human rights.

In contrast to the Western European Member States, the questioning of EU in the Czech Republic is not driven by the fear of losing traditional culture, language, identity, etc. The major concern for most of the Czechs is related to the view of the EU as a big “external, alien, and bureaucratic organization” (Melich, 2005, pp. 12-13). The Czechs are argued to have the most pragmatic approach towards the EU, as they perceive the EU in economic terms, rather than national-emotional. That is why, apart from the term Eurosceptic, there is a wide use of the term Euro-realist in defining the political class in the Czech Republic. The Civic Democratic Party in particular embraces the term Euro-realist² in defining its vision and policies for Europe. The usage of the term “Euro-realism” dates back to early 2000s, when the Czech Civic Democrats in defining their approach to the European integration, described it as “a realist, not a naïve approach to the integration” (Braun, 2008, p. 52). The Euro-realist affiliation has gained greater prominence when the party signed an agreement with the British Conservative Party in 2006 to leave the EPP-ED Group and form a new European political party in 2009, currently the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. The major shift in this policy is explained in the 2009 European Election Manifesto:

For us integration in itself is not the goal, but rather a means of achieving prosperity for the Czech Republic and its citizens. With neither prejudice nor useless illusions we are seeking ways to achieve this within unified Europe. Thorough analysis and realistic assessment form the basis of professional and effective European policy (ODS European Election Manifesto, 2009, p. 9).

² According to the Civic Democrats, the concept ‘Euro-realism’ refers to a realist concern for the promotion of the Czech national interests. The concept is used by the party members to emphasize the difference between their European policy and what they consider to be the naïve Euro-optimism of the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. Mats Braun, *Modernisation Unchallenged: The Czech Discourse on European Unity*, Published by the Institute of International Relations, Prague, 2008, p. 36.

In light of a unified Europe the party speaks of, it puts forth two possible scenarios for European integration, one of which is building a closed regional bloc, as the party manifesto states, “. . . the greatest possible extent of legal, political and economic units – Europe as a state; and secondly take the path of a flexible, economically open and further expanding unit bringing about the concept of ‘flexible’ or ‘variable’ integration” (p. 11). And, secondly the party regards importance to shared European values without intention to contribute to a non-existent European nation, this, according to the party is an empty illusion (ODS, Party Program, 2017, p.6).

Although supporting the latter way for deeper European integration, the ODS is aware of the importance of closer cooperation. The ODS defines itself as “we have not given in to either pandering or sycophantic Euro-enthusiasm or disdainful and rejectionist Euro-negativism” (ODS, European Election Manifesto, 2009, p. 36). It is evident that the party aims to isolate itself from “Europhobia” feeding Euroscepticism, which has no relation with the party’s vision for Europe. As Mirek Topalanek (former leader of the ODS) noted, “we are offering responsible solutions instead of populism and fear; solutions that in future will help people, not hurt them”. He further observed:

Conversely, we do not doubt that there are areas where the capabilities of individual states are absolutely inadequate and where it will be necessary to deepen integration. Even here we will not hesitate to advance the ‘most European’ approach. A typical example of this is the hitherto underappreciated area of energy policy and security (ODS, European Election Manifesto, 2009, p. 12).

The statement above is important due to the party’s reference of a “deepening integration” when required via “advancing the most European approach” in policy fields Member States cannot tackle alone. For that reason, the party has a constructive and responsible approach towards the European integration. This signifies the party’s stance on integration, which should be built on the will for reaching consensus in the name of further steps. After accession, the Civic Democratic Party put forth certain visions and programmes for future alternative steps to be taken in the name of integration. The Blue Chance programme was an open call to the UK, Ireland, Scandinavia, the Baltic States, and Portugal as natural allies in such a “reform current” (Zahradil, 2004, p. 9). In essence, the programme was a renewal of earlier ODS positions. The most important criticism was directed towards Germany, which was identified as “still viewed as wishing to export its own federal political system to Europe which was presented as the main obstacle to reform” asserting alternative visions for Europe. For Hanley (2008), as a result, the ODS stressed its identity as a standard West European party. However, its Euro-realism left it isolated on the wider European Centre-right, whereby the British Conservatives became its only significant ally on European issues.

The ideas of the party are very close to those of the British Conservatives, especially the views on European conservatism, economic liberalism, and Euro-realism. However, as stated earlier, the party defines itself as Euro-realist, while simultaneously reflecting a changeable political rhetoric. President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus (2004) (founder of the Civic Democrat Party, former Prime Minister) rejected the term Euroscepticism, defining himself as a Euro-realist who “believes that Europe has to be freer, more democratic and more efficient when it comes to productivity” (cf. Riishoj, 2010, p.46). For Klaus (2006), Europeism³ is an ideology “more or less determines all the important current events in Europe through its exceptional strength, its general acceptance and its dangerous simplicity” (para. 1). However, in making this observation, Klaus effectively questions “what is the basic entity of the European integration,” is it the man (the individual) or the state? In both of these directions, process of ‘individualism’ emerges, where the individual becomes free in an environment to choose or not to choose anything and without overstating his or her national/cultural/religious identity. The state level is also of vital importance in this context, as state mechanisms (namely institutions) are becoming insufficient to reflect a common single perspective towards the integration project due to competing perspectives and interests towards the EU and Europe. On these issues, Klaus (2009)

³ Besides *Euro-realism*, Vaclav Klaus uses the term *Europeism* in defining the party position on European issues. In his words Europeism is – in its political-economic dimension – based on: “- the explicit refusal of liberal doctrine of the functioning of the economy (and of society) and - the belief in the government capacity to be “a productive” factor even in the activities which go above its minimal (classic liberal) concept. Europeism doesn’t want to learn a lesson from the tragic episode of communism and other, not less evil variants of centrally administered society and economy (different types of fascist or authoritarian regimes). Nor does it learn any lesson from the experience with the European “civilized corrections of market anarchy”. It interprets it as extraordinary success”. Vaclav Klaus, “What is Europeism?”, 2006, para. 16. Retrieved from: <https://www.klaus.cz/clanky/1326>

further asserted, “we considered (and we still do) the opportunity to actively take part in the European integration process as a chance to take advantage of the already highly integrated Europe and – at the same time – to influence this process according to our views” (p. 1). As the statement approves, the party is not into a complete denial of the integration, but asks for amendments in which Poland can take active role.

According to Klaus (2009), the party supports the EU project and is willing to actively participate in it. The Euro-realism ODS members put forth focuses on the need to reform the EU according to their views, rather than protest. They do not reject EU membership, but rather define belonging as “a tool for achieving the real objectives” (p. 3). The ODS, like all Czech political parties during and after the accession process, engaged in the ‘back to Europe’ project, which reflected a clear Euro-enthusiasm towards greater EU integration. However, the treaty reform (draft Constitutional Treaty) which coincided with the fifth enlargement of the EU, prompted the CEECs to reevaluate their interests and views towards the integration. The ODS, for instance, was against the Constitutional Treaty as well as its successor, the Lisbon Treaty, which were perceived as virtually the same. Thus, the party argued that the Lisbon Treaty deserved the same criticisms. However, the party members did not voice these criticisms during the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.

The party is supported by the majority of the Czech citizens favoring EU (younger, wealthier, educated, etc.) but not by the electorates of the Communists and Republicans. That is why the party’s Euro-realism can be interpreted as a strategic attempt to realign the Czech electorate in order to secure more votes from skeptics on the center and the left (Hanley, 2008), while at the same time questioning the EU due to the Euro-realist views. The Czech public remains mostly positive about the European integration. The main change in the ODS started in the early 2000s, when the party declared its ambitions in the *Manifesto of Czech Euro-realism* introduced in 2001 as:

[. . . an ideal model of European integration, but from the two alternatives described above – the intergovernmental and the supranational model, the Czech Republic should clearly prefer the intergovernmental one. European integration must be a bottom-to-top process; it must come from below, from European nations and citizens of Member States represented by their parliaments and governments, not from the office desks of the European political and bureaucratic elite (Zahradil et. al., 2001, p.5).

As noted above, the ODS is not against the European integration, but is rather critical of the way it is proceeding towards federalism, and the bureaucracy it has so far developed. Still, it is important to address the reference made to the need for a “bottom-up process” directly coming from the Citizens of Europe, which would finally credit the democratic administration in the Union. For this reason, none of these criticisms can be perceived as anti-European. In fact, Kopecek and Sedo (2003) described the politics of the ODS as “pro-European with reservations” (p. 3). The Czech Euro-realism manifesto defines the bottom-up approach, as noted by Zahradil, et. al., (2001):

European integration must be a bottom-to-top process; it must come from below, from European nations and citizens of Member States represented by their parliaments and governments, not from the office desks of the European political and bureaucratic elite. We should reject further unnatural ‘intensification’ of the integration process tending toward a federal state (p. 4).

As implied by the abovementioned citation, the party clearly supports an intergovernmental EU, which should not become a federal state. However, it is important to note that the same document draws attention to the fragmentation the integration is clearly evoking. The Czech Civic Democrats argue for three main forms of confrontation of European integration. The first is defined as “the confrontation of European interests (the common interests of European bureaucracy, European institutions and Member States) with the interests of the world’s other centers” (Zahradil et al., 2001, p. 3). The second form of confrontation is “the clash of interests between the European bureaucracy and individual member states” (p. 3), while the final form on which this study intends to focus, is defined in terms of a “confrontation among the individual regional or local entities and lobbies within each Member State as well as within the EU as a whole” (p. 3). There is a divergence of interests that are dismantling the

society of the Member States, and it is these diverse views that are developing links to the integration process, certainly with different reasons, as a result reflecting a divergence of identifications.

There is a certain level of optimism about the future of the European integration in the Czech community. For instance, when compiling the Eurobarometer Survey 83 (2015), respondents were asked what they think about the image of the EU. In the Czech Republic, 37% of responses were positive, 42% were neutral, and 20% were negative. The same survey also asked whether the EU helps protect its citizens, to which 69% of the respondents answered “totally agree,” 26% selected “disagree,” and 6% responded with “don’t know.” How should these results be interpreted? When it comes to the image of the EU, it is evident that Czech people feel rather ambivalent toward the EU. However, when asked if the EU helps protecting their (citizens’) rights, they perceive the Union positively, and consider its presence fruitful. In line with the Euro-realist party arguments, the Czech citizens also want the EU project to continue, as they perceive its effects on their lives beneficial, and value the improvements in business, free trade, free movement, etc. However, the people remain critical when it comes to the EU image, as they may be unsure of how to define it.

The ODS, being in the middle of this current stratification, does not support withdrawal from the EU. It seeks reformist solutions resting on anti-federalism and a safe environment with strong transatlantic links (e.g., in energy, security, and defense realms). These interests were aptly reflected during the Czech Presidency, when the gas crisis in 2009 was handled in a constructive way. For this reason, Hanley (2008) defined the attitude of the party as:

[. . . whatever its overall ‘hardness’ or ‘softness’, must be seen in terms of opposition to *specific policies* within a multi-faceted and often contradictory EU project encompassing liberalization *and* regulation, selective political integration and enlargement (Hooghe and Marks 1999; Hooghe *et al.* 2002). Party positions, they suggest, are rooted in and given coherence by competing ideologically derived models of European political economy, which respond to a kaleidoscopic, constantly evolving European project (p. 210).

In sum, the Czech Civic Democratic Party presents three main themes when criticizing the integration. These are resisting a technocratically-driven super state, working in the name of securing the rights of smaller Member States, and supporting a “flexible integration” model mainly focusing on the Single Market project or more generally on economic and energy cooperation. The Civic Democratic Party’s attitudes are strategically driven, shaping policies according to the developments of the EU, rather than being solely driven by ideological terms. According to the political environment, and to gain full advantage of the bargaining and/or negotiation process, the party elite benefits from hardening or softening their Euro-realist discourse both at national and supranational levels.

Throughout the 1990s, Poland had a very high level of support for European integration and was willing to take part in it. The country applied for membership in 1994, and the negotiations commenced in 1998. The skepticism became clear in the 2001 general elections in Poland. Two (hard) Eurosceptic parties—Self Defense and League of Polish Families—won 10.2% and 7.87% of the votes, respectively. On the other hand, the other two parties supporting the EU—the Law and Justice Party and the Polish Peasant Party—however critical of the accession negotiations, won 9.5% and 8.98% of the votes, respectively. The Law and Justice Party was the only one of these parties that made progress, reaching 27.0% of votes in 2005, and 29.89% in the 2011 elections. The Law and Justice Party was founded in 2001 by the Kaczynski brothers, when the core of the party split from the Solidarity Electoral Action and Christian Democratic Centre Agreement (both parties dissolved in 2001).

Like the British Tories and the Czech Civic Democratic Party, The Law and Justice Party of Poland is a conservative party; however, it slightly differs in being a social conservative one. Similar to the case of the Czech Republic, the Law and Justice Party, apart from the label Eurosceptic, embraces the term Euro-realist. A former member of the party Artur Zawisza in one of his speeches stated, “a certain scale of sensitivity exists (within the party). Some are more Euro-enthusiastic, others are more Eurosceptical, but the party programme, which everyone accepts, is Euro-realistic” (Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 232). According to the Party Programme (2011), the Law and Justice Party is a supporter of the European project, while being critical in some issues related to the EU. This is mostly due to the Catholic Church remaining in a strong social position in Poland. The influence of the church can be seen in the Law and Justice Party politics focusing on cultural and moral issues and criticizing European integration for

harming these values. The same reason counts for the anti-immigration policy of the party currently accelerating with the refugee crisis in Europe.

The party strongly opposes federalist tendencies and a 'United States of Europe' project. The Law and Justice party calls for the EU to be regulated in a fair and transparent manner, while strongly criticizing domination within the EU (so-called Berlin-triangle. For Cebul (2009), the claims made by the Law and Justice Party are driven by two inconsistent sentiments—concern with EU domination, and expectation to receive aid and benefit from EU membership (cf. Styczynska, 2013, p.161). The party has demonstrated its defense against domination as, "At the European Council meeting in June, we minimized regulations that were harmful to Poland from the rejected Constitutional Treaty" (PiS Programme, 2007, p. 52). This defense stems from the fear of the EU to be dominated by the strongest Member States. The party puts forth that the EU is overly bureaucratic and that is limiting negotiation among Member States, as a result harming pluralism. For EU to succeed, the party believes that counter discourses are required, and a single European vision must not be imposed on the people of Europe.

The Law and Justice Party is a patriotic party that stands up to major EU policies. In doing so, it assumes to give the voters the impression that Polish interests are defended and are not taken for granted. Yet, it is clear that European issues cannot satisfy the entire nation. Divergence of views towards the European debate has fragmented the community. For instance, as a Euro-enthusiast party, the Polish Civic Platform demonstrates:

[. . . the idea that the Polish nation had always been part of the European civilization and that Law and Justice Party had done nothing else but distancing Poland from that cultural zone. The EU membership has to be defended in order to protect the material well-being of the nation and to improve the international standing of the country (Vermeersch, 2009, p. 21).

As argued above, as the party committed to the European integration, it is also able to make reference to the nation, and link its enthusiasm with Polish national interests. In either case, political parties may be favoring or opposing further EU integration for different reasons. However, the "narrative they deploy to make their case, will to some extent have to find resonance within the realm of existing ideas about the relationship between the national state and Europe" (Vermeersch, 2009, p. 8). The Law and Justice Party stands in defense of European diversity against the uniformity of Brussels (Melich, 2005, p. 26). Indeed, the party's programme supports the idea of EU 'solidarity' built on a large EU budget involving substantial regional aid and fiscal transfers from richer to poorer states. The party is in full support of the economic integration of Europe, while retaining the subsidiarity rule reflecting solidarity. One of the MEPs of the PiS underlined the need of solidarity as follows:

[. . . the word 'solidarity' is very often used in the EU. It is a word which attracts other European countries to our Community and, at the same time, obliges us to enlarge the EU further. Unfortunately, in many cases the EU does not show solidarity in its internal relations (MEP Ryszard Antoni Legutko, EP Speech, November 25, 2009).

The Law and Justice Party supports liberalizing the EU internal market, encouraging free movement of labor, and more open and flexible labor markets. However, it opposes moves to harmonize taxes and increase EU social regulation. Another goal of Law and Justice Party is engagement with East European post-Soviet states in order to convince them to become more closely aligned with the Western politics (such as Ukraine) and the development of common EU policies aimed at securing external energy security (Szczerbiak, 2008). In one of his recent speeches at the Krynica Economic Forum, the leader of the Law and Justice Party Kaczynski (2011) stated:

I am a Euro-realist and I support a stronger Europe, especially in the political-military aspect. I want Europe to be a superpower. Europe should have a political centre, but equipped with armed forces this political centre could be an equal partner for the United States and we must not forget India and China. (para. 3).

Evaluating the EU from a global perspective, it is clear that Kaczynski is supportive of a more unified Europe, aiming for the Member States to become better aligned in addressing security and defense issues. As can be seen, Kaczynski, as one of the leading figures promoting Euro-realist stance, advocates for integration in areas where a unified approach is required. Therefore, the European integration is approved by the Euro-realists, albeit in different form and subject to certain revisions. The same views are shared by the public as well. According to the Eurobarometer Survey 72 (2009),

61% of the Polish citizens view Polish membership positively and 74% believe that their EU membership is beneficial to their country. According to Eurobarometer Survey 83 (2015), when asked what they think about the image of the EU, 37% of Polish respondents offered positive views, 42% were neutral, and only 20% were negative. When, as a part of the same survey, responding to the question of whether the EU helps protect its citizens, 69% of the respondents chose “totally agree,” while 26% opted for “disagree” and only 6% responded with “don’t know.” These findings confirm that there is a generally positive view of the EU in Poland. However, as the Euro-realists argue, this does not mean that Polish people are willing to consent to all policies regarding the EU. Illustrating the critical attitude (related to the recent economic crisis), Kaczynski (2011) observed that “the creation of a two-speed Europe is paving the way towards the European Union plunging into another crisis and to this we say an emphatic No” (para. 9). These views of the party are recently directed to the refugee policy of the EU. Poland is standing against the refugee Policy of the EU and is refusing to take in refugees. At this point Kaczynski (2017) argues taking in refugees means a catastrophe, which “would have to completely change our culture and radically lower the level of safety in our country” (para. 12). In making these claims, the party members argue to defend not only the Polish interests but the European. As the interior minister Blaszczak puts forth “it is a straight road to a social catastrophe, with the result that in a few years Warsaw could look like Brussels” (ibid. para. 13). It is important to emphasize that, the party view on the refugee policy, is standing far apart from that of the EU. However, if the Polish government wants to offer rational solutions to the refugee crisis, it has to offer some rational solutions, apart from rejection.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated in this paper, Euro-realism is becoming an important line of vision in EU politics, and its supporters are willing to share and exchange their views without harming the whole EU project. The Euro-realist parties are becoming increasingly important part of the European debate, as they are helping to remove the taboo against critical views towards the integration. As a result of their efforts, the political debates in the EU are improving and focusing on the contents of common policies, making them more transparent for the citizens to understand and make their own free choices on the issues debated. This same intent is shared by the Euro-enthusiasts that, at different levels, support opportunities for political participation in an environment where people can become free, engaged, and autonomous. The European integration has resulted in political, cultural, and economic interests being reproduced at different levels with different motivations for the Member States. As a result, the conditions of solidarity and conflict are constantly reformed, giving birth to new movements. Consequently, whether this is Euro-realism, Euroscepticism, or Euro-enthusiasm, becoming a part of the European project requires all entities to link themselves to the European integration or they would otherwise have no ability to change, reform, or at least negotiate on their aspirations. At this point, as discussed in this work both the Czech Civic Democrats and the Polish Law and Justice Parties aspiration is to reflect or demonstrate that the vacuum caused by the integration must not result in transferring more autonomy to unaccountable institutions or any other technocratic elite in Europe. That is why these parties re-produce new policy agendas and update their stances in order to align them with European and international perspectives.

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Europe, European Union and the Council of Europe: Unidentified identities

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ABSTRACT

Although Europe is the second smallest continent in the world in terms of surface, it is legitimate to say that its diversity in terms of composition is not portrayed accordingly. Fifty one countries comprise Europe with some of them being transcontinental countries, partially located in both Europe and Asia. This by definition influences any possible homogeneity that might be attributed to the continent. This paper seeks to discuss the perplexity of a collective European identity within the geographical frontiers of Europe and the political and social conditions within the European Union and the European Council's structure. The paper adopts the postmodern idea of fluid identity proposing that ethnic and cultural identity in Europe is fluid and multidimensional, rather than fixed because of the continuous social movement not only intra-European but also from Asia and because of the cultural and ethnic identities that the aforementioned organizations attribute to their people.

Keywords: Situational identity, multidimensional, intersection of identities

Introduction

Greek schools in the 1980's taught students that Europe was one of the five continents in the world; Eurasia, Africa, America, Antarctica and Oceania, each one of them represented in the five rings of the Olympic flag. In other parts of the world, Europe and Asia were separated, considering thus six continents on earth. Nowadays, geographers identify seven continents; Asia, Africa, North America, South America, Europe, Australia, and Antarctica. The different separating models adopted around the world signify not that more continents have been discovered since the 80's, when I was a school student in Greece, but that agreements and conventions decide on the perspective that is promoted on topics that are considered by the majority as given and stable, such as the number of continents.

The idea of Europe, according to Guibernau (2004, p. 91), did not begin based on geographical or historical divisions but "emerged as a term connected to a specific cultural and political heritage embodied in Athenian democracy". The geographical boundaries of Europe have undergone dramatic changes throughout time presenting the constantly dynamic character of the European borders. The boundaries of Europe and the European Union, which is often identified with Europe, and in many cases have become practically synonymous, are not fixed. There are currently 51 countries listed in the European continent. Therefore, a shared identity among its member states and its citizens is extremely difficult to define. To complicate the divergent situation even more, the European Union (EU) that was established in 1945, comprises nowadays 28 member countries. Within the European Union, the Council of Europe is a separate organization with 47 member countries. No country has joined the EU without first joining the Council of Europe. That been said, there are European countries that are not members of the European Union yet, but are members of the Council of Europe.

In July of 2015 a referendum was held in Greece to decide whether Greece was to accept the bailout conditions in the country's government-debt crisis, proposed jointly by the European Commission (EC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB). This referendum was interpreted by Eurozone as a vote on Greece's place in Europe and the euro. A naturally occurring question at this point is: Can the European identity be extracted from Europeans?

The European Union

The European Union (EU) that was established in 1958, in the aftermath of the Second World War comprises nowadays 28 member countries. According to the official site of the European Union (The EU in brief, 2017), the basic incentive was to encourage economic cooperation among its countries, hypothesizing that the economic interdependence among countries that trade with each other would remove possibly any potential conflicts. The EU decided to have an institutional framework to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, the interests of its citizens and those of the Member States, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions. The Article 4 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992) stated that the Union's institutions are the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Commission hereinafter referred to as 'the Commission', the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the Court of Auditors.

The European Monetary Union

According to Risse (2003) money plays a significant role in the creation of collective national identities and nation-building efforts. In that light, it is only right to think that the implementation of a common European currency was not only an economic decision but according to the European commission (2013) it was also "part of building a European identity among its citizens alongside the national identities that preserve European diversity," as well as a "political commitment by the EU member states to work together."

The 'united in diversity' nature of the European Union is depicted in the euro coins, with common designs on one side and a country-specific design on the other. Today, euro banknotes and coins are legal tender in 19 of the 28 Member States of the European Union. These countries form the euro area.

The European monetary Union established with the Maastricht Treaty, aimed at eliminating any regulatory barriers to the free flow of capitals, working people and goods within the borders of the European Union. It was created with the anticipation that unemployment would decrease and competitiveness would increase economic benefits for the participating countries.

The Council of Europe

Within the European Union, the Council of Europe is a separate international human rights organization with 47 member countries. This organization was established to promote democracy and protect human rights and the rule of law in Europe. No country has joined the EU without first joining the Council of Europe. That been said, there are European countries that are not members of the European Union yet, but are members of the Council of Europe.

So far, four formations have been presented; Europe, the European Union, the European Monetary Union and the Council of Europe. In these formations states and citizens are included or excluded at times, depending on agreements and treaties signed by European officials. It would be worth considering again the aforementioned numbers that refer to people/citizens residing in countries, in and out of the above mentioned formations, included, or excluded. Therefore, a collective or shared European identity would pertain to people of the 51 countries in the European Continent, 47 countries in the Council of Europe, 28 countries in the European Union or 19 Countries in the Euro Area. Would the identification of a collective European identity be an easy or more challenging task? Following Brubaker and Cooper's (2000, p.1) argument that identity "tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)," this paper tends to support that the answer is neither easy nor hard; it is ambiguous.

Immigration/Migration

To complicate matters even more in the definition of a clear-cut European identity, the immigration or migration factor comes into play. As a result of globalization, relaxation of border controls, free trade and labor mobility there has been exceptional mobility within Europe the past few years. Although the terms migration and immigration are used interchangeably they do not refer to the exact same concepts. Migration is the term referring to any person "who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country" (UNESCO, 2016).

On the other hand, more specifically, in the EU context, the term immigration refers to “the action by which a person from a non-EU country establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of an EU country for a period that is, or is expected to be, at least twelve months” (European Commission, 2016). Immigration as well as migration can challenge the identity of a nation-state. According to the Eurostat report (2015) the number of people who immigrated to one of the 28 EU member states during 2014 were 3,8million. Among these people there were 1.6 million of citizens of non-member countries, 1.3 million people with other EU member citizenship, 870.000 returning national citizens, which means returning nationals or nationals living abroad and 12.400 stateless people. Migration is influenced by a combination of economic, political and social factors: either in a migrant’s country of origin, push factors, or in the country of destination, pull factors. Historically, the relative economic prosperity and political stability of the EU are thought to have exerted a considerable pull effect on immigrants.




Figure 1. Number of Immigration in the EU in 2014

Identity

Identity is a very general term and in that sense it would be very hard to define all the components that constitute a European identity. As seen in Bromley (2001) “from 1964 the European states began to exert a collective identity as a collegial set of nation states”, with the exception of Great Britain, which seems more than natural today, after the Brexit referendum. In 1973, the then 9 members of the European Community drew up a document on the European identity, focusing on a community building and the process of integration within a varying set of European states. Member states have been struggling to maintain their national sovereignty and at the same time to attain a collective European identity. In line with Lave and Wenger’s (1991, p. 53) definition of identity this paper is inclined to support that identities are long-term living relations between persons and their place and participation in communities of practice. However, social and discourse identities are not predetermined but negotiated and in the course of one encounter multiple identities might be invoked, more or less symmetrical or asymmetrical (Holmes et al., 1999).

The belief in shared values and historical heritage is a feature forming the core of old Europe. Interestingly, Hall (1989) points out the significance of the ‘other’ in the formation of one’s identity stating that identity is not fixed but ambivalent and relates to the relationship of the other to oneself. Identity theories insist on the need for “the other” to exist, in opposition to which actors build their own identities. So, in this sense, the European identity is better perceived when regarded in opposition to other continental identities such as the American, Asian or African.

Constructing a shared or collective European identity has been a challenging task, not only for reasons of differences among the people it is attributed to, but also because as Kirloskar et al. (2015) contend “people are unwilling to give up their national allegiances to support the European Union’s vision of a collective identity.” The distinction between the self and the other that was highlighted in Hall’s definition of identity is not rigid, but it is in the state of fluidity. Within the European formations, the self and the other are not static but dynamic. The position of those at the periphery can shift to the centre and the ones at the centre may shift to the periphery. Therefore the centre is also never the same

as it is ever-changing. In that view, the European self being the centre no longer remains valid. In terms of a collective identity, the European identity may have a dual character playing both the roles of the self and the other as one moves in and out of the nation's state. Nevertheless, as Guzzini (2012) states regarding identity, since it is heterogeneous "then almost anything goes." In his words, "Any outcome could be explained by cherry-picking the part of the identity that fits the story, just as with national interest" (Guzzini, 2012, p. 50).

Statelessness

As discussed previously, Europe has been in constant change with the affluent movement of peoples within and outside its borders. Therefore, another factor that one should take into account when referring to a potential European identity is the number of stateless people residing within any of the European aforementioned formations.

The international legal definition of a stateless person according to Article 1 of the United Nations Refugee Agency Convention (1954) is "a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law." In simple terms, this means that a stateless person does not have a nationality of any country. Some people are born stateless, while others become so. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (2016) statelessness can occur for several reasons, including discrimination against people on the basis of their ethnicity of religion, or on the basis of gender, the creation of new countries with changing borders and gaps in nationality laws. For instance, children of unknown parentage living in a country where according to law nationality is acquired based on descent from a national, these children are regarded stateless. Regardless of the reasons why one is defined as stateless, this condition according to the United Nations Refugee agency (2016) "has serious consequences for people in almost every country and in all regions of the world."

The Eurostat report that was discussed earlier on, publicized that the number of stateless people moving into Europe in 2015 were 12,400. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (2016) the total number of stateless people within the borders of Europe is estimated at least 600,000. Moving from the impersonal statistical numbers to a specific case, the example of Leli, a nineteen year old girl from Malaysia, in Southeast Asia, is at least intriguing. Leli had been stateless since birth but according to the 2015 report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, she recently acquired Italian citizenship. Speaking of her difficulties in coming to terms with her new identity as a national Leli stated: "Even though I now have Italian nationality, being stateless stays inside you – like a permanent mark." Hence, this directs one to agree with Breakwell (2004) that unfortunately, EU has "poor definition as a superordinate category and (...) without an agreed-on "portrait" for this identity element derived from EU categorization, there will be great diversity in the ways it is characterized by different people in different countries."

A tangible example of this diversity in the EU categorization is the report of the Flash Eurobarometer survey on the European Union citizenship (2016). This survey was carried out by the TNS Political & Social network in the 28 Member States of the European Union between the 21st and the 23rd of October 2015. There were about 26,555 respondents from different social and demographic groups. The published report following the standard Eurobarometer survey stated that the sense of European citizenship is shared by a majority of respondents in 27 member states. Approximately half of the respondents (52%) participating in the survey stated that they were familiar with the term 'European citizenship' and that they knew its meaning. This percentage represents the highest level that has been recorded and also signifies an improvement from the 46% reported in 2012 as well as an 11 points increase (41%) since 2007. The same report states that over a third of the respondents (35%) declared that they had heard of the term, but they were not sure what it means. Interestingly enough a 13% of the respondents stated that they had never heard of the term 'citizen of the European Union,' which forms the lowest level recorded since 2007 and is declined by six percentage from the 2012 levels. So, this percentage, which is not a mere impersonal statistical number, as mentioned earlier on, refers to citizens residing in one of the countries of the European Union; it shows that there is ignorance, lack of education and lack of understanding on the issue of citizenship.




Figure 2. Acknowledging European citizenship

Conclusion

The present article was titled 'Unidentified identities' referring to the formations of Europe, the European Union, and the Council of Europe. Moving from the general formations to the specific peoples who comprise these institutions and to whom these institutions are addressed to, it becomes challenging to distinguish their identities and even more demanding to ascribe them a static identity. The ever dynamic nature of the personal identity, that is constantly negotiated, along with the changes on the national identities that global and European politics are generating and the technocratic character of the European Union, as it is evolving today, suggest that a solid and static European identity is not possible to be constructed. This study supports the adoption of a multi-dimensional identity that would possibly incorporate national, European as well as global (cosmopolitan) identities that are all strongly embedded in a wider community of practice. In the same way that Europeaness cannot be essentially extracted from a person because of a technocratic decision, the present study suggests that it might also be incompatible to impose it on one. This does not mean that the "cherry-picking" part of the identity portrayed by Guzzini (2012) is adopted, but it is suggested that European identity is in flux, allowing a space for newcomers who wish to adopt the European identity with the specifics that are valid at the time. The discussion about the European identity cannot be a discussion about Institutions' structures as if it was all in a theoretical level. Going back to Leli from Malaysia, who was given the Italian citizenship but still carries inside her the feeling of exclusion, it is compelling to think about what community/communities is the European identity addressing, who the members of this community are and how participation in this is prescribed in a theoretical level without taking the people concerned into consideration. Following the definition of the European Commission policy review (2012, p. 5) "identity has an individual component of active choice coupled with a collective component where individuals orient themselves to one or more aggregate groups or collectivities." Given that each individual/member of the specific community can orient themselves towards multiple collectivities or groups, depending every time on context, the Commission (2012) suggests that it would be more accurate to refer to "a mixture of situation-specific identities rather than explicit identities being nested one within another."

Although this paper presented statistical numbers from published European means, it does not suggest that European identity is about statistics publicized in the European fora reports; it is about people. It is about people adopting common values of democracy and sharing cultural heritage within the borders of the European continent. Only with a continued effort to engage all populations, 'old-timers' and 'newcomers,' in the community of practice that is called European, will the traits of European identity

be strengthened. These traits are not static but they are enriched with the European identity being multi-dimensional and a blend of a situation specific identity. The immigrants, the stateless people, the citizens of states that were not part of the European formations, all these 'newcomers' need an incentive to become part of Europe and adopt the new identity. It is undoubtedly essential to instill in the newcomers a sense of belonging, as well as a sense of accepting in the old-timers. Only then, will a comprehensible European identity be possible and identifiable.

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The Russian Orthodox Church and European Values: Analyzing the Discourse in Russian Media

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ABSTRACT

Today the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is a significant non-governmental entity of the public sphere which holds a privileged status. Since Orthodox Christianity is the predominant religion in Russia, the media regularly covers the activities and statements of the ROC on a wide range of issues, including the issue of Europe and European values. This paper focuses, on the one hand, on media coverage of the ROC in the news programs of two federal television channels “Pervii kanal” and “Rossia” between 2014 and 2015. On the other hand, it examines how the concept of European values is represented in the media discourse and explores the implications of the use of language in media from the perspective of critical discourse analysis (CDA). Therefore, the aim of this study is to investigate the interpretation of European values by the ROC and its position towards Europe: is it a discourse of integration or a discourse of hate?

Keywords: media discourse, religion, Russian Orthodox Church, European values, critical discourse analysis

INTRODUCTION

The term *value* has a wide range of uses in the social sciences. Edel (1953) maintains that studies of values and valuation-evaluation processes touch on all areas of human life (p.198). He supports this thesis by giving different examples:

In political theory, conceptions of public welfare cover a vast valuation structure including, for example, assumptions about the respective merits of public ownership and private enterprise, or what is the desirable distribution of tax burdens. Major decisions of guns or butter, war or peace, stand out as value problems in public consciousness. Legal philosophy has underscored with increasing clarity the role of values in judicial process. It is seen that in finding, interpreting and applying the law, a judge is not engaging in a mechanical process, but in a determination within narrower or wider limits, of desirable social policy. ... Educational theory, for example, has posed the value contrast of stern discipline and personality growth. (Edel, 1953, pp. 198-199)

Cultural groups, societies, and individuals can be characterized through an examination of their values. Moreover, scholars attempt to trace the change of values over time and to explain the motivational bases of attitudes and behavior. Indeed, values are the fundamental building blocks of culture as they define meaning and significance for people within a social system. Values refer to ideas held by human individuals or groups concerning standards that define what is “good” or “bad”, desirable, proper, etc. (Giddens, 2006, p. 1039). From this point of view, it becomes apparent that values have a profound significance for social systems because they significantly influence, control, and regulate them. Generally speaking, values are closely connected to the ideals and beliefs that the members of a community share in common at a particular time.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the similarities and differences in values between Russians and Europeans and to investigate the interpretation of European values by the Russian Orthodox Church and its position towards Europe through an analysis of Russian media discourse.

INTERPRETATIONS OF VALUES

Trying to define the term *value*, Hutcheon (1972) offers diverse interpretations and provides the following examples of its use (pp. 174-177):

- (a) Values as norms: The identification of values with normative rules prevailed until the 1960s at least.
- (b) Values as cultural ideals: Investigating the role of values in public opinion research, Rokeach (1968b) constructs a model which maintains that beliefs, attitudes, and values are all organized together into a functionally integrated, cognitive system. In Rokeach's model, a value is viewed as a single belief which guides actions and judgments across specific situations and beyond immediate goals to more ultimate end-states of existence. The distinction between preferable modes of behavior and preferable end-states of existence implies a differentiation between means and ends, or what Rokeach calls "instrumental" and "terminal" values (Vinson, Munson, & Nakanishi, 1977, para.6). In Hutcheon's (1972) opinion, terminal values (equality, freedom, independent, loving, etc.) could perhaps better be considered as symbolizing cultural ideals (p. 175).
- (c) Values as assessments of action: Hutcheon (1972) illustrates this statement in light of Landis's study (1967), in which he defines values simply as moral judgments or employs moral judgments as indicators of values, without clarifying his procedures (p. 175).
- (d) Values as beliefs: Albrecht (1956) constructs a list of supposed American family-life values (p.723). Hutcheon (1972) notes that the main shortcoming of this research is that it is difficult to infer the exact meaning that Albrecht attributes to the concept of value since a mixture of statements describing behavioral prescriptions, descriptions of the "good" or desirable, and descriptions of the "real" are used in the study (p. 175).
- (e) Values as objects: Hutcheon (1972) considers that Turner first defines values as things that are regarded favorably or unfavorably, and then, while explaining value conflict, seems to imply that these values impinge upon the individual in the form of norms removed to a higher level of generality and inclusiveness (pp. 175-176).
- (f) Values as value orientations: Kluckhohn (1951) defines value orientations as "a generalized and organized conception, influencing behavior, or nature, of man's place in it, of man's relation to man, and of the desirable and nondesirable as they may relate to man-environment and interhuman relations" (p. 411).
- (g) Values as behavior probabilities: Adler (1956) claims that in order for values to qualify as concepts of social science they "cannot be discovered apart from human behavior" (p. 272). He considers values as "learned components of personalities, which can be identified only as probability of particular behavior occurring in a variety of circumstances" (Hutcheon, 1972, p. 176). Adler (1956) concludes that "what people do is all that can be known about their value" (p. 272).
- (h) Values as generalized attitudes: Rokeach (1968a) describes the relationship between values and attitudes, claiming that although values (like attitudes) are predispositions to act, they differ from attitudes in their transcendence of specific objects and situations. (as cited in Hutcheon, 1972, pp. 174-177).

To conclude, values can be defined as:

a person's convictions of the significance (or importance) for him or her personally of some object or phenomenon; and basic values are a person's ultimate, purposeful values based on which the whole set of instrumental (practical, current) values guiding his or her daily life is formed. (Magun & Rudnev, 2012, p. 33)

The psychologist Schwartz (2007, 2012) defines the concept of values and summarizes the main features of them, reflected in the writings of many theorists and researchers, as follows:

- (1) Values are beliefs linked inextricably to affect. When values are activated, they become infused with feeling. People for whom independence is an important value become aroused if their independence is threatened, despair when they are helpless to protect it and happy when they can enjoy it (Schwartz, 2012, p. 3).
- (2) Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action. People, for whom a social order, justice, and helpfulness are important values, are motivated to pursue these goals (Schwartz, 2012, p. 3).
- (3) Values transcend specific actions and situations. For example, such values as obedience and honesty may be relevant in the workplace, in school, in business, in politics, or among friends and strangers. This feature distinguishes values from norms and attitudes that usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations (Schwartz, 2012, p. 4).

(4) Values serve as standards or criteria. Values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events. People decide what is good or bad, justified or illegitimate, worth doing or avoiding, etc. based on possible consequences for their cherished values. However, the impact of values in everyday decisions is rarely conscious. Values enter awareness when the actions or judgments one is considering have conflicting implications for different values one cherishes (Schwartz, 2012, p. 4).

(5) Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. People's values form an ordered system of priorities that characterize them as individuals. For example, do they attribute more importance to achievement or justice? Novelty or tradition? This hierarchical feature also distinguishes values from norms and attitudes (Schwartz, 2012, p. 4).

(6) The relative importance of multiple values guides action. Any attitude or behavior typically has implications for more than one value. For example, attending church might express and promote values of tradition and conformity at the expense of values of self-gratification and stimulation. The tradeoff among relevant, competing values guides attitudes and behaviors. Values influence action when they are relevant in the context (hence likely to be activated) and important to the actor (Schwartz, 2012, p. 4).

The most important function of values is to play the role of the selection criteria of group behavior. Values, being spontaneously implemented and reproduced in socially significant actions of people, can be considered as critical motivators of behaviors and attitudes. Every society has its own distinct culture and concept of values shared by its population.

European Values

What are the values of Europeans? What are the values attributed to the European Union? Is there a common set of values in Europe? The concept of European values is highly debatable. Values differ from place to place, and they are constantly changing. The nature of European values is not easy to fix and distinguish.

First of all, the interplay of European identity and values should be noted. The starting point of the majority of discussions on European identity is the idea that a political community needs a common set of values and references to ensure its coherence, to guide its actions, and to provide these with legitimacy and meaning. Therefore, an explicit goal of EU policy is to form a European identity and citizenship through shared European values. As Tsaliki (2007) states, policy initiatives taken by the EU have successfully managed to bring the "common cultural heritage to the fore" (p. 158).

According to the second article of the 2012 Treaty on the European Union (TEU),

the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (TEU, 2012, article 2).

Every year the Eurobarometer survey, a cross-national longitudinal study, designed to compare and gauge trends within the member states of the European Union, addresses a broad range of topical issues relating to the European Union, including values. According to the Eurobarometer survey conducted in the spring of 2015, an absolute majority of Europeans stated that EU member states are close to each other in their values; 51% of respondents claimed that EU member states are close in their values, whereas 42% said that they are distant (European Commission, 2015, p. 44). The survey shows that the three values that count the most for Europeans are peace, human rights, and respect for human life (European Commission, 2015, p. 54; see Appendix A Figure 1). At the same time, the values that represent the European Union the best are peace, human rights, and democracy. (European Commission, 2015, p. 62; see Appendix A Figure 2).

Human rights are inherent to all human beings' rights regardless of nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, skin color, religion, language, or any other status. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent, and indivisible. It is believed that human rights are based on:

- Freedom: All human beings have the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, press, and opinion that are all protected by human rights.

- Equality: All human beings are equal before the law and are entitled to protection without distinction. This means that there must not be any discrimination regarding race, skin color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social background, wealth, birth, or position. Everyone can rely on the protection against any form of discrimination, including protection of the full equality of men and women.
- Solidarity: All human beings have economic and social rights, e.g. the right to social security, fair remuneration, an adequate life standard, physical health and the right to access education, which is an integral element of the human-rights system. (The definition of the most basic European values, 2010, p.20).

The results of Eurobarometer survey reflect the fact that “Europe” is not only a cultural, but also an ideological-cum-territorial construct that is deeply embedded in contemporary cultural, social, economic, and political discourses (Murphy, 1999, p.60).

How Values Are Understood by Russians and by Europeans: What Are the Differences?

The most remarkable example of the differences in values between Russians and Europeans are the results of the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS is a global research project which is designed to enable a cross-national comparison of values and norms on a wide variety of topics, to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe, and to explore what social and political impact people’s values and beliefs have. It is carried out by a worldwide network of social scientists who, since 1981, have conducted representative national surveys in almost 100 countries.

The researchers are focused on a broad range of topics. Among them are work, personal finances, the economy, politics, allocation of resources, contemporary social issues, technology and its impact on society, and traditional values. For instance, respondents are asked whether the following acts can ever be justified: suicide, cheating on taxes, lying, euthanasia, divorce, and abortion. Moreover, respondents are asked questions about the groups and associations they belong to: which ones they volunteer for, the groups they would not want as neighbors, their general state of health, and whether they feel they had free choice and control over their lives. A wide range of items is included in the meaning and purpose of life, such as respondents’ views on the value of scientific advances, the demarcation of good and evil, and religious behavior and beliefs. Respondents are also queried about their attitude toward religion, morality, politics, sexual freedom, marriage, single parenting, child-rearing, as well as the importance of work, family, politics, and religion in their lives. Questions related to work include financial and social benefits of the most importance to them, whether they are happy with their current job, and their views on owner/state/employee management of business. Respondents’ opinions on various forms of political action, the most important aims for their countries, how confident they are about various civil and governmental institutions, and whether they would fight in a war for their country are also solicited. Demographic information requested in the survey includes family income, the number of people residing in the home, the size of locality, home ownership, a region of residence, the occupation of the head of household, and the respondent’s age, sex, occupation, education, religion, religiosity, political party and union membership, and left-right political self-placement (Inglehart et al., 2000, para 6).

Analysis of WVS data made by the political scientists Inglehart and Welzel (2010) shows that there are two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation in the world:

1. *Traditional values* versus *secular-rational values*;
2. *Survival values* versus *self-expression values*. (Inglehart, Welzel, 2010, para 3)

The global cultural map shows where a number of societies lie along these two dimensions (see Appendix A Figure 3). Moving upward on this map reflects the shift from traditional values to secular-rational while moving rightward reflects the shift from survival values to self-expression values.

Along the vertical axis, *traditional values* emphasize religiosity, respect for authority, obedience, and traditional family values. People who embrace these values also reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. *Secular-rational* values stress the opposite on each of these accounts. These societies place less emphasis on religion, traditional family values, and authority. Divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide are seen as relatively acceptable (WVS Database).

Along the horizontal axis, *survival values* involve prioritizing economic and physical security over liberty, lack of tolerance for homosexuality, abstinence from political action, distrust of outsiders, and a

weak sense of happiness. *Self-expression values* give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance for foreigners, gays and lesbians, and gender equality, as well as asserting the right to participate in decision-making in economic and political life (WVS Database).

Whereas most of the European countries generally adhere to secular-rational values and self-expression values, the Russian Federation generally adheres to traditional values and survival values. From the data, it may be concluded that values and attitudes across the globe are highly correlated with the philosophical, political, and religious ideas that have been historically dominant in that country. In this sense, the Russian case exemplifies the statement that religion creates values. Historically, Orthodox Christianity has essentially been the leading religion in Russia. About 75% of Russians consider themselves Orthodox. In addition, the media regularly covers the activities and statements of the Orthodox Church on a wide range of issues, including the issue of Europe.

METHODS

Critical Discourse Analysis

This paper contains an analysis of news programs from two Russian television channels from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA explores the connection between the use of language and the social and political contexts in which it occurs. CDA aims to help reveal some of the hidden and “out of sight” values, positions, and perspectives. Critical discourse analysts concentrate on “social problems, and especially the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 96). In a similar vein, Fairclough (1995a) defines CDA as such:

discourse analysis . . . aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events, and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony. (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 132)

Titscher (2000), taking the work of Wodak (1996) as a base, summarizes the main principles of CDA as follows:

- CDA is concerned with social problems. It is not concerned with language or language use per se, but with the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures. Accordingly, CDA is essentially interdisciplinary.
- Power-relations have to do with discourse and CDA studies both power in discourse and power over discourse.
- Society and culture are dialectically related to discourse: society and culture are shaped by discourse, and at the same time constitute discourse. Every single instance of language uses reproduces or transforms society and culture, including power relations.
- Language use may be ideological. To determine this, it is necessary to analyze texts to investigate their interpretation, reception, and social effects.
- Discourses are historical and can only be understood in relation to their context. At the metatheoretical level, this corresponds to the approach of Wittgenstein, according to which the meaning of an utterance rests in its usage in a specific situation. Discourses are not only embedded in a particular culture, ideology or history but are also connected intertextually to other discourses.
- The connection between text and society is not direct but is manifest through some intermediary such as the socio-cognitive one advanced in the socio-psychological model of text comprehension (Wodak, 1986).
- Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory. Critical analysis implies a systematic methodology and a relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies, and power-relations. Interpretations are always dynamic and open to new contexts and new information.

- Discourse is a form of social behavior. CDA is understood as a social scientific discipline which makes its interests explicit and prefers to apply its discoveries to practical questions. (Wodak, 1996, pp. 17-20, cited in Titscher et al., 2000, p. 146)

There are several different theories throughout the field. Despite similarities, there are different approaches to CDA in terms of theoretical foundations or methodology. Among them are:

- Fairclough's Dialectical-Relational Approach to CDA
- Van Dijk's Socio-Cognitive Discourse Analysis
- The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) (Wodak and colleagues)
- The Duisburg School (Jäger and Maier).

Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach to CDA is preferable for analyzing media discourse in this study. Fairclough's (1995b) model for CDA consists of three inter-related processes of analysis tied to three inter-related dimensions of discourse (p. 57). These three dimensions are text, discourse practice, and sociocultural practice.

A) Text: The first dimension in the three-dimensional framework is *text*. Analysis of text involves linguistic analysis in terms of vocabulary (e.g. wording, naming, metaphor), the grammar of sentences and smaller units, semantics, the sound system, and cohesion-organization above the sentence level (e.g. conjunction, schemata) (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 57). According to Fairclough, any sentence in a text can be analyzed in terms of the articulation of these functions, which he has labeled *representations*, *relations*, and *identities*:

Particular representations and recontextualizations of social practice (ideational function) – perhaps carrying particular ideologies.

Particular constructions of writer and reader identities (for example, in terms of what is highlighted – whether status and role aspects of identity or individual and personality aspects of identity).

A particular construction of the relationship between the writer and reader (as, for instance, formal or informal, close or distant). (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 58, cited in Sheyholislami, 2001, p.7)

B) Discourse practice:

As Fairclough states (1995b), this dimension has two angles: *institutional processes* (e.g. editorial procedures), and *discourse processes* (changes the text goes through between production and consumption) (pp. 58-59). Phillips and Jorgenson (2002) explain that discursive practices focus on “how authors of texts draw on already existing discourses and genres to create a text and on how receivers of texts also apply available discourses and genres in the consumption and interpretation of the texts” (p. 69).

For Fairclough (1995b), “discourse practice mediates between the textual and the social and cultural, between text and sociocultural practice” (pp. 59-60), as shown in figure 4 (Appendix B).

C) Sociocultural practice: Texts are usually consumed differently according to the social context, and its interpretation depends on the focus of the mode. For Fairclough (1995b), the analysis in this dimension refers to three aspects of the sociocultural context of a communicative event: economic (e.g. economy of the media), political (e.g. power and ideology of the media), and cultural (e.g. values) (p. 62). According to Fairclough (1995b), one does not have to carry out analysis at all levels but at any level that might “be relevant to understanding the particular event” (p. 62).

Each of these dimensions requires a different kind of analysis: text analysis (description), processing analysis (interpretation), social analysis (explanation) (Janks, 1997, p.329).

Sample

Data for the current study was collected from news programs of two federal television channels: “Pervii kanal” and “Rossia.” Both channels were selected for several reasons. First of all, despite the increased proliferation of online news in recent years, television continues to serve as the main news source of news for Russians. Television is the only mass media format that has nationwide reach in the Russian Federation. “Pervii kanal” and “Rossia” are the most influential channels with the largest audience in the Russian Federation. Results of public opinion research obtained by Levada Center, a

well-respected independent pollster, indicated in 2014 that the leading position in the ranking of news channels had been occupied by “Pervii kanal” and “Rossia” for many years (Obshhestvennoe, 2014, p.125; see Appendix B Table 1).

This study analyzes the coverage of the Russian Orthodox Church by “Pervii kanal” and “Rossia” during the time period from January 2014 to December 2015. The stories from newscasts were selected by conducting a search in the online database of Russian press publications “Public.ru” using “ROC,” “Moscow Patriarchate,” “patriarch,” and “Orthodoxy” as the keywords to narrow down the search results. The optimal set of keywords was determined by experimenting with alternative word combinations and their locations in a text structure. After double-checking every “news item” (story) and eliminating the irrelevant ones, this process resulted in 939 news items that referred to the Russian Orthodox Church. Among these stories, 512 were from “Pervii kanal” and 427 were from “Rossia.”

RESULTS

What image of Europe and European values is formed by Russian media? To begin with, it should be noted that the image of Europe (*THEM*) is constructed, primarily, through its contrast to Russia and Orthodoxy (*US*). Most of the news items are dedicated to internal affairs and are aimed at constructing a self-image of Russia in which Orthodoxy is considered to be a cultural factor which determines and sacralizes Russian national identity. In other words, Orthodoxy is represented with a positive evaluation of *US* and the Russian Orthodox Church’s actions are described in positive terms. In Russian media discourse, Orthodoxy is reflected as the basis for the country’s unity and Russian identity. The political importance of Orthodoxy is postulated by Putin who declares that the progress of Russia is not possible without spiritual, cultural, and national identity. Otherwise, the state will not be able to withstand internal and external challenges.

The key idea of all news stories is that Russia is not merely a distinct state, but a distinct civilization, at the forefront of which are spiritual, immaterial assets based on the Orthodox faith and the moral values of Orthodoxy which make Russia dramatically different from Western civilization. For instance, Patriarch Kirill states that “Prince Vladimir was the founder of a new civilization, the ancient Rus, which the Russian people became part of. This civilization has been decorated with the greatest achievements of the human spirit, the human mind and heroic exploit for centuries” (“V Moskve zalozhen pervyj kamen,” 2015).

Accordingly, Orthodoxy is represented in Russian state-owned media as a basis for policy, and the ROC as a source of state ideology. For instance, Patriarch Kirill considers that “Russians should save the unity of the country, created and bequeathed by ancestors. This unity cannot be achieved only by force; its solid foundation should be constituted on the spiritual and moral community of people living in the country, a community of values” (“V hrame hrista,” 2014).

The ROC is represented in the media as a genuine supporter of Russian patriotic and cultural ideas and values. The media’s version of such concepts as tradition, nation, patriotism, and culture is interrelated with the uniqueness and greatness of Orthodoxy. State-owned media describe the ROC as the guardian of Russian tradition and the basis of consolidation in the face of a common enemy. Events in Ukraine and continually broadcasted news about attacks on churches and murders of priests had a significant impact on this understanding. As Patriarch Kirill appealed, “Orthodox children of Holy Russia should pray to the Lord for the pacification of the Ukraine, for the end of violence, and for the reign of peace.” (“V velikuju subbotu,” 2014). He emphasized that “the people of Holy Rus will never be enemies to each other and no one will ever be able to use a holy nation to push them into internecine warfare, weaken their spiritual life – Orthodoxy.” (“V velikuju subbotu,” 2014)

Special attention in Russian media discourse is paid to the topic of abortions. As the church consistently defends the values of motherhood, Patriarch Kirill claimed,

when I hear that we lack in population and we need to [accept] a huge number, millions of people from a different culture, from other countries, so that they work here, I say that if we cut down the number of abortions two or three times, then after a certain time, there will be no need for any visiting guest workers in Russia. (“Patriarh: Rossii ne,” 2014)

At the same time, Patriarch Kirill noted the importance of educating children in the Christian faith: “Then our families will be strong without divorces, and the people will be happy” (“Patriarh: Rossii ne,” 2014).

Obviously, for promoting the image of the ROC as “the guardian of the traditions and the bearer of greatness,” anti-Western rhetoric is required. Patriarch Kirill portrays Russia as the opposite of the rest of the world: “This civilization based on Orthodoxy and moral values of Orthodoxy is unique. For a long time, more than 400 years, it has never been left in peace by those who see a challenge to their own ideological tenets in this peaceful civilization” (“Patriarh Kirill prizval narody Rossi,” 2014).

However, only 10 percent of the news is devoted to Europe. European values are reduced to the issue of sexual minorities. “The Russian Orthodox Church with sorrow states that Christianity is divided not only on theological topics but also on moral issues” (“RPC rassorilas' s francuzskimi i shotlandskimi,” 2015). Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church claim that a serious discussion about how to eliminate homosexuality from society is needed. They have put forward proposals to ban homosexuality, not only in moral standards but in law:

How to resist this vice? How to minimize it? And, even better - to completely eliminate it from public life? This question requires the most serious consideration. Should it only be the norms of morality, or the rule of law, involving the punishment? We should not try to plug up or restrict the debate on this subject. Everyone involved in this discussion, and society as a whole should be able to make a free choice, based on the will of the majority. (“Chaplin hochet provesti,” 2014)

Today, Europe and European values are understood as unspiritual and non-Christian in the Russian mass consciousness. Europe is associated with gay marriage, “sinful tolerance,” and so forth, while Russia is all about the faith. As Patriarch Kirill highlights:

We have gone through suffering, through many troubles, through many colossal ordeals, but we remain not only great and strong country, but we have managed to keep our own essence! We do not dissolve even in the global information space. We have not lost our identity while the great and powerful countries in Europe have lost theirs. (“Rossija – jeto my,” 2015)

The Russian Orthodox Church openly admits that the West is a marginal community that contributes to the destruction of the family and, ultimately, the self-destruction of the nation. Part of the interview of Metropolitan Ilarion in April 2016 exemplifies the difference in interpretation of Russian and European values through the religious prism:

It is surprising that Russian and European civilizations have exchanged their roles nowadays. The Soviet Union was the state of official atheism, whereas the West was perceived as a Christian region. Now we have revived the faith, the Church. We have built new temples, monasteries, and religious educational institutions. At the same time, there is a gradual decline in religiosity in Europe. Temples are closed and sold. Secularism and atheism actually have become the official ideology of Western Europe. Of course, the Church is not persecuted yet. However, the ideology of modern secular Europe virtually eliminates the Church and religion from the public space. Religion is reduced to a hobby. I deeply believe that religious revival, including Christian, will start in Europe. It will be the intoxication of “freedom,” permissiveness... People will understand what it means, and will return to Christian roots. First of all, I am talking about a return to the spiritual foundations on which human life was built for centuries. For example, family. The destruction of family life and family values in Europe is not directed against religion, not against Christianity, but against the person and the fundamental values on which human life is built. (“Mitropolit Volokolamskij Ilarion: Evropa kak,” 2016)

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this paper an attempt has been made to define what European and Russian values are. The differences in values can be best explained using the results of the World Values Survey. Inglehart and Welzel (2010) define the difference: whereas most of the European countries adheres to secular-rational values and self-expression values, the Russian Federation adheres to traditional values and survival values. They conclude that values and attitudes across the globe are highly correlated with the philosophical, political, and religious ideas that have been dominant in that country.

One of the main goals of this study was to attempt to investigate the interpretation of European values by the Russian Orthodox Church and its position towards Europe in the discourse of the media: is it a discourse of integration or a discourse of hate? It has been shown that the Russian Orthodox Church demarcates Russian and European civilization using *US–THEM* constructs. The image of Europe (*THEM*) is composed through its contrast to Russia and Orthodoxy (*US*). When we examined the way

the Russian Orthodox Church and Orthodoxy were defined in Russian media, we identified the media's claimed position: Russia only retains its greatness as a state on the basis of Orthodox spiritual values and the support of Orthodoxy as the traditional religion, whereas, in contrast, secular Europe is losing its Christian roots and, as a result, contributes to the destruction of the family and self-destruction of Europe. The media's version of such concepts as tradition, nation, patriotism, and culture is interrelated with the uniqueness and greatness of Orthodoxy. The Russian Orthodox Church serves as a defender of traditional values: religiosity, respect for authority, obedience, traditional family values, condemnation of divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. On the contrary, European values are reduced to the issue of sexual minorities. To conclude, neither the discourse of integration nor the discourse of hate are represented in Russian media discourse. It can be labeled as a discourse of difference.

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APPENDIX A

Figure 1: The most important values for Europeans (European Commission, 2015, p. 54)




Figure 2: The values that represent the European Union (European Commission, 2015, p. 62)






Figure 3: Inglehart–Welzel Cultural Map (Retrieved from <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings>)



APPENDIX B

Figure 4: Fairclough's three-dimensional model (Retrieved from <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/documents/2421g1.gif>)



- Table 1: Rating of news channels in Russia

Source of information	Aug. 2011	Oct. 2012	March2014
Pervii kanal	71	71	82
Rossija-1	58	64	71
NTV	48	49	48
Kul'tura	6	9	11
5-j kanal	8	12	19
TVC	5	8	12
Rossija-24	10	15	30
REN-TV	13	18	18
other federal	1	10	6
Dozhd'	1	2	2
RBK	1	3	5
other regional	11	11	13
Euronews	2	3	5
other inernational	1	2	1
don't watch	4	7	4

N=1600

Do you watch the TV news, and if yes, what news channels do you watch more or less regularly?
(Obshhestvennoe, 2014, p.125)

What's Happening Elsewhere: Reasoning from a Middle Eastern Case to Europe

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ABSTRACT

Sociological insights from other societies can enlarge our understanding of events and organizations in our own society. This becomes even more important as we are dealing with immigrants from cultural backgrounds which are vastly different than ours, particularly from Muslim societies. Some Western and Islamic voices have come to advocate the narrative of a “clash of civilizations”, of a war on terrorism and jihad respectively. In such polarizing frameworks, behavior of minorities, which previously went unnoticed or was not perceived as a threat to the wider society, suddenly emerges in form of indexical orders which link micro-contextual phenomena to the macro-sociological antagonistic narrative, effectively ascribing the other a hostile attitude. To overcome some false dichotomies, this paper first looks at the West European concept of nested hierarchies of normative systems and then sketches historically, legally and ethnographically the overlapping hierarchy of the polycentric and multinormative society of Jordan as an alternative interpretation framework of the behavior of Muslims in Germany.

Keywords: polycentric multinormativity, intercultural conflict, indexical orders, Ottoman history, Jordan, Germany, immigrants, parallel societies

INTRODUCTION

What could an ethnographic study of a Middle Eastern society possibly contribute to a subject like “Europe in Discourse”? That is a very fair question to ask and it is not surprising that somebody doing ethnographic research in Jordan should delete the call for papers for the above-mentioned conference from his in-box right away, deeming his own research utterly irrelevant for the conference theme. This paper owes its existence to two “encounters” of sorts; two ideas which combined led to the realization that even though it might seem counterintuitive at first there are indeed very important lessons to be extracted from ethnographic data gathered in the Middle East.

The first was a statement from Howard S. Becker's book *What about Mozart? What about Murder? Reasoning from Cases* (2014). In the chapter “What's Happening Elsewhere: Reasoning from a Case to the World” Becker suggests that “[w]hen sociologists look at other countries, they hope to see something different from what they see at home. But they also want to use what they see elsewhere to enlarge their understanding of events and organizations at home” (Becker, 2014, Chapter 2, paragraph 2).

Becker's hint at the value of insights about other countries for understanding our own society prepared the second encounter, which took the shape of a German TV report with the title *Ein Staat - zwei Welten? Einwanderer in Deutschland* (Knobel-Ulrich, 2015), which translates into “One State - Two Worlds? Immigrants in Germany”, tackling the issue of parallel societies. The word *Parallelgesellschaft*, i.e. the German word for parallel societies, was originally introduced by the sociologist Heitmeyer and came to denote an ethnically homogeneous segment of the population which isolates itself spatially, socially and culturally from mainstream society (Belwe, 2006). It has generated a great amount of discussion and is viewed by some, as this TV report so clearly shows, as a fundamental problem for a functioning democracy.

Less than five minutes into the report, the connection which Becker spoke about, the one between “elsewhere,” which is Jordan, where the ethnographic data used for this paper was collected, and the “events and organizations at home,” namely the relationship between the German state and society and some of its Muslim immigrants, suddenly emerged. As a matter of fact, it happened when the TV report showed interview snippets with young German citizens of Turkish and Albanian ethnic

background in which they expressed a deprecating view of certain German laws, specifically regarding gender equality and women's rights. One could tell from the reactions and interjections of the German journalist conducting the interview, that she perceived those views as a contempt of the German constitution and as a quasi-attack on the fundamentals of German society. These young Turks and Albanians with German passports exemplified in the TV report the troublesome reality of parallel societies which allegedly undermine the societal consensus which the German democracy is built upon.

On one hand, having grown up in Germany myself, I can relate to the reasoning behind the German journalist's interpretation and her strong feelings. On the other hand, having spent many hours listening to Jordanians and how they speak about their norms, society and state, I remember how the following shot through my mind as I listened to the young men from Turkey and Albania: "They talk just like my Jordanian interviewees do about their own government. They are not against us, they are just good Ottomans."

To call them "Ottomans" does have some historical legitimacy. Jordanians, Albanians and Turks were all part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries and thus it is not too far-fetched to suspect that one could find some residue of the Ottomans' influence in their habitus. However, it would go far beyond the scope of this short paper to establish a defensible justification to call this relationship indexical in the Peircean sense. An index was for him a sign which is connected to its object by a spatio-temporal relationship of contiguity or of causality (Nöth, 2000, p. 66). The goal here is not to establish a shared historical origin of similar attitudes. For the purpose of this paper it is enough to work out their iconic resemblance in order to show that the reading of the situation presented in the TV report is not as compelling and as conclusive as it might appear. The report gives the impression that immigrants can be either with us or against us. *Tertium non datur*, a third option, is not given.

In a similarly false dichotomy, we are told by others that we are experiencing a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1996) and that this clash is indeed "inevitable" (Hizb al-Tahrir, 2002). Note, that both Western and Islamic voices suggest this narrative. While the jihadists speak of a "holy war", George W. Bush declared a "war on terrorism" ("Text of George Bush's speech," 2001). In such times it is easy to be caught in the middle. Allegiances are questioned and even minor things can give rise to suspicions. Simply speaking a certain language can get you kicked off the airplane, of course, only if you have the "matching" skin and hair color (e.g. Hassan & Shoichet, 2016).

Augsburger, in his book *Conflict Mediation Across Cultures: Pathways and Pattern* (1992), has some very helpful words which help explain what the intention of this paper is:

Conflict is a crisis that forces us to recognize explicitly that we live with multiple realities and must negotiate a common reality; that we bring to each situation differing - frequently contrasting - stories and must create together a single shared story with a role for each and both. (1992, p. 11)

If our goal is to force a certain reality on whoever lives within our countries' borders, then empathy and mutual understanding become meaningless. However, this paper is written with the conviction that we *must* create a shared single story or else be doomed to repeat some darker chapters in our human history. To create together a shared story requires imagination and sometimes, just like in personal conflicts, we are so stuck with our interpretation of a situation that it is virtually impossible for us to imagine an alternative perspective. This paper is trying to inspire the imagination of a European discourse by providing an example from "elsewhere", hoping it will "enlarge" our "understanding of events and organization at home" by doing the following four things.

Firstly, it will have a closer look at the interview snippets presented by the TV report in order to understand what exactly was seen as controversial by the journalist and then briefly point out using some main features of the recent Western European history of norms to show the reason behind the strong emotions. Secondly, the focus will then turn to the Ottoman Empire to give an overview of its multinormative heritage. In the third part will be shown how the local societal circumstances and the political conditions of the 20th century contributed to the fact that until today Jordan not only has kept a system of polycentric multinormativity but even keeps implementing some laws from the Ottoman period. In a fourth step, insights from the ethnographic interviews conducted in Jordan will be presented to substantiate and illustrate the polycentric multinormativity we have been speaking about.

Undermining the constitution or defending basic rights?

A school class, presumably 9th grade, discussed a film about the honor killing of a young woman. Although almost all of the students in that particular class were born and raised in Germany and also held German citizenship, some of them seemed to empathize more with the perpetrator than with the victim. This triggered the journalist Rita Knobel-Ulrich's curiosity and she decided to visit the class and conduct some interviews (Knobel-Ulrich, 2015).

The interviews, which were obviously edited and shortened, were recorded in a classroom with other students present. The class consisted of male and female students and was also ethnically mixed, composed of students with and without a migratory background. The report showed only snippets with multiple cuts from an interview conducted by Rita Knobel-Ulrich (RKU). Starting at 3:07 min until 4:49 min, the TV report shows three young men who probably are around 15 or 16 years old. Baran Cantirt (BC) with Turkish background, Arton Muslin (AM) with Albanian background and Ali Kayamaz (AK) whose ethnic background was not explicitly mentioned but according to his name probably also is of Turkish decent. What follows is a transcript which I translated from German.

Translated Transcript

1. BC: I have a sister, she is 16 and I, I myself go ballistic if she goes out with a guy or so.
2. RKU: We are living in Germany. Here girls are allowed to dance, to go out and to decide for themselves with whom they want to be friends.
3. BC (chuckling): No. She's not allowed.
4. RKU: You wouldn't allow that?
5. BC: No.
6. RKU: But you're German! You're born here. You've got a German passport.
7. BC: One has to preserve the honor of one's sister.
8. RKU: But your sister has the same rights like you. After all we do have a constitution. Good grief!
9. BC: Yes, sure, but I don't accept it.
10. Speaker: The classmates listen interestedly. Now others raise their hands.
11. AM: I'm also born here, yeah.
12. RKU: You're German.
13. AM: Yeah, that's right.
14. RKU: And would you marry a German woman? A Christian, for example? Lena, Laura, Lisa?
15. AM: Well, marrying? Dating, maybe yes, but not marrying. With us it is that we have to marry a compatriot, an Albanian. I'm Albanian. She needs to be Albanian. And a Muslima. Yeah.
16. RKU: Does she have to obey you?
17. AM: Yes, of course. It's like Baran already said... if she hangs out with guys or even sleeps with them then one maybe even has to use violence.
18. RKU: In the constitution it says: men and women have equal rights.
19. AM: OK, but...
20. RKU interrupts him: That you don't accept.
21. AM: No, I don't accept it.
22. RKU: But it's our constitution.
23. AM going silent, looking down at the desk and muttering: Well... (silence for some seconds)
24. RKU: So the family is more important than the constitution
25. AM: Yeah, actually it is.

26. Camera moves to AK sitting next to him. AK: It's the father who usually sets down the law at home and we have to obey him.

Observations

Before presenting several observations, it seems appropriate to point out that these interview snippets do not necessarily represent the actual *modus operandi* of these young men in their real lives. We are dealing here not with how these interviewees actually behave, but how they describe they would behave. To use Cicourel's insight, we are dealing with "accounts" of specific situations which can be seen as "representational devices for communicating their experiences and their claims to knowledge" (Cicourel, 1974, p. 9). In addition to this qualification, it is important to recognize the edited nature of their statements. This transcript tells us not so much about the real social reality but about how these young men talk about their reality and how Knobel-Ulrich uses their statements in presenting them according to her own perception.

Keeping this in mind, there are some observations worth mentioning. The first one is about how being German is defined. Knobel-Ulrich defines that being born in Germany (paras. 6 & 12) and carrying a German passport (para. 6) means to be German. Furthermore, it also entails unwavering loyalty to the German constitution, including full support of gender equality as is defined in the *Grundgesetz*, i.e. the constitution, which is to be seen as the highest normative authority (paras. 6, 8, 18 & 22).

Her "German" interlocutors with migratory backgrounds certainly did not seem to agree with her entirely. None of them uses "German" when referring to themselves. After Arton Muslin concedes that he is born in Germany (there is obviously a question which preceded his utterance which is not part of the report but was cut off while editing the interview), Knobel-Ulrich deduces that he is German, which he then acknowledges by a "yeah, that's right" (paras. 11 - 13). However, he does identify himself readily as Albanian and refers to his Albanian identity three times in his next response (para. 15).

Another difference between the journalist and the interviewees is the fact that she keeps referencing the German law and constitution, while the young men do not seem to refer to any state or government whatsoever, neither to German nor to the Turkish or the Albanian state, constitution or laws. Rather, they invoke other kinds of normative authorities, namely customs (paras. 3, 7 & 15), religion (para. 15) and authoritative figures from the family (paras. 1, 9, 17 & 26).

For Knobel-Ulrich the questions regarding equal rights of men and women seem to be indexical in the sense of Michael Silverstein's concept of indexical orders which describes "how semiotic agents access macro-sociological plane categories and concepts as values in the indexable realm of the micro-contextual" (Silverstein, 2003, p. 193). Concrete actions, features or artifacts become linked to ideas or values on a higher level of abstraction. The previously mentioned phenomenon of people being deplaned for speaking Arabic can be explained with such indexical orders. Due to such indexical orders, the parents or grandparents of some US-American friends with German origin stopped speaking German during WWII because speaking German became a sign of ambiguous loyalties.

Therefore, openly denying equal rights to females, as Baran Cantirt does (paras. 1 & 3), does not just mean to disagree with a specific part of the German legal system but it points to and indexes a certain kind of attitude which is irreconcilable with living in Germany (para. 2) and incompatible with being a German (para. 6). It does not seem important in this context to inquire if members of these alleged parallel societies otherwise live a law-abiding life, e.g. if they obey the traffic rules, send their children to school, comply with all the regulations in their businesses and pay their taxes.

Some indexical orders bestow prestige on their users and are used to mark a certain societal standing or the claim to it. Silverstein calls this "identity-by-visible-consumption" (Silverstein, 2003). When somebody talks about a wine like an expert, a connoisseur, then according to Silverstein this *oinoglossia*, wine talk, might be more than just talking about wine but also about dropping some cues for others on a micro-sociological plane to link herself to a certain macro-sociological elite identity. Obviously, this can be done by many things, e.g. other kind of talk, like semiotics talk, certain clothes or artefacts, taking part in certain events like tasting, etc., but it is important that there exists an indexical order, shared by the other sign users, in which the index can unfold its appeal. Obviously, such prestige conferring indexicals are not equally accessible throughout the population. There are also those indexicals which have bad connotations and are not desirable, at least in certain circles, and therefore are avoided, like a certain accent which makes me sound uneducated or listening to certain musical styles.

Silverstein also maps out how these orders come into being and how lower-order indexicality develops into higher-order indexicality. In other words, how certain phenomena which were there without people being aware of them, first start being noticed and then acquire certain meanings and eventually develop into rather stable associations between concrete and visible, i.e. micro-sociological, phenomena and concepts, categories or values on a macro-sociological plane.

Knobel-Ulrich's TV report, I argue, does in fact, knowingly or not, work towards developing such a negative indexical order using attitudes espoused by certain Muslim immigrants in regard to women and gender equality as the micro-sociological representamen indexing a macro-sociological interpretant by which she effectively is driving this group into a corner to coerce them into assimilation.

Since this is ethically questionable and sociologically counterproductive, this paper attempts a deconstruction of the TV report's reading. In the next section, I will try to answer on what logical basis her arguments work.

The supremacy of the state in the normative hierarchy in Germany

The persuasiveness of Knobel-Ulrich's argument is connected to the history of norms in societies like France, Germany or the Netherlands where the state with its legal norms came to assume a dominant and unique position in the hierarchy of normative systems, at least on the national scale, one might add. Bourdieu views the state as "the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital" which even creates some sort of "metacapital granting power over other species of capital and over their holders" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 41).

According to Weber, Germany and other European societies went through a process of secularization and *Entzauberung*, i.e. disenchantment. Aron points out that "[i]n a material and disenchanted world, religion can only withdraw into the privacy of the conscience or vanish toward the beyond of a transcendent God or of an individual destiny after earthly existence" (Aron, 1967, p. 224). Thus, it is not surprising that some European states, including Germany, experienced what has come to be known as *Kulturkampf*, culture struggle, in the second half of the 19th century during which questions about the role and authority of religion in the modern state, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, were settled in favor of the power of the secular state (Kent, 1978).

These processes contributed to the concentration of capital of the state leading to the point that the state became something "which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and *symbolic* violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 40, emphasis in original) and thus created a **nested** hierarchy of norms. Like Russian matryoshka dolls, where one doll is encompassed by the next bigger in size and the biggest contains them all, the state contains and claims precedence over all other normative codes. Other examples of a nested hierarchy would be biological taxonomies or the military command structure, where the commands from a higher level always trump the lower level commands and the military in its entirety has to submit to one commander-in-chief.

In such a neatly and stringently organized, or at least imagined, hierarchy, Knobel-Ulrich's argument decrying the categorical refusal of certain German laws is understandable. Nevertheless, even in such a stringently organized hierarchy there is normative pluralism and polycentricity. In fact, the very existence of different normative systems and centers of authority require the paradigm of nested hierarchies to be assigned unambiguous positions within such a hierarchical structure. However as we shall see in the next section, there are other ways to regulate the different competing competencies and jurisdictions. They are different not only in terms of who is on top but the whole structure looks less like a triangle but shows more peaks, is more polymorphic with changing jurisdictions depending on different factors. Generally, in such an **overlapping** hierarchy, relationships are more ambiguous.

Polycentric Multinormativity as Alternative Model

The Ottoman Inheritance

Unlike the development in France, Germany and other European states which lead to a unique position of the state endowing the state with a normative authority which supersedes other normative authorities and codes, be it religious, tribal or any other societal code, the intercodal relations in the Ottoman Empire took a very different shape.

The Empire's beginnings lay in the end of the 13th century and at one point it controlled much of Southeastern Europe, Western Asia, the Caucasus, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. Needless to say this entailed a plethora of different languages, cultures, religions and ethnic groups who all needed to be governed and to integrated to a certain degree, at least administratively, into the Empire (Kia, 2008).

In 1516-17 the area, which is now roughly the western and most populated part of Jordan, was conquered by the Ottomans and remained in the Empire for 400 years (Irvine, Abu Jaber, & As'hab, 2016; Shaw & Yapp, 2016). However, the Ottomans never seem to have found it worth their effort to get a tight grip on this area. The population living on the territory before the foundation of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921 is usually "described as highly 'divided,' 'lawless,' having no 'central' authority'" and, as Massad points out, even the British concluded that "[d]ue to the inability and disinterest of the Ottoman state to administer (what became) Transjordan effectively, the 'population' (...) was unaccustomed to obedience to central authority" (Massad, 2001, p. 26).

However, even apart from the challenges which this particular region posed to a centralized government, the Ottoman Empire generally was not really interested in a strong centralization of its dominion until rather late in its history. Originally it was "built on the principle of dividing the population of the empire into separate and distinct religious communities" (Kia, 2008, p. 105) which eventually led to the millet system. The millet system enabled the Ottomans on one hand to allow their subjects to carry on their lives according to their own religious, cultural, and ethnic traditions and on the other hand to incorporate them into the Ottoman system on the administrative, economic and political level (Karpát, 1982, p. 142).

While the debate regarding specific questions about the origin and dissemination of the millet system is ongoing (see Braude, 1982 for a critical review), what modern scholarship has been able to establish is that understanding the idea of the millet system, as such, is essential for understanding the process of nation formation in the area "not only in order to understand the dichotomy between nation and state, but also in order to evaluate, in depth, the socio-cultural characteristics of the national states in the Balkans and the Middle East born out of the millet matrix" (Karpát, 1982, p. 141).

For our purposes it is particularly noteworthy that the millets became "intermediate bodies between the individual and the State" which "were recognized as having jurisdiction over their own community not only in religious affairs, but also in civil and penal matters" and even "were responsible for the collection of taxes" (Pacini, 1998, p. 5). Even those Christian communities who were not recognized as millets (at least before the 19th century) – viz. the Maronites, Nestorians and Syrian Orthodox – "for all practical purposes (...) functioned as autonomous religious communities under their own leaders" (Kia, 2008, p. 3).

Thus, for the longest part of its history, the Ottoman Empire did not enforce a centralized and unified legal system but generally preferred that all of their subjects, and not just some minorities, would rule themselves in domains which were not relevant to running the Empire.

In the second half of the 18th and through the 19th century the pressure from the rising European powers grew for the Ottomans to modernize and centralize their system in order to become more competitive, particularly in the military domain. This phase of continuous reformations is known as the *Tanzimat* and one important outcome was the creation of the *Mejalla*, which was "a comprehensive compendium of Hanafi fiqh to be administered in the new civil (Nizamiye) courts" (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 74). It was the first legal system in Ottoman history which was applicable to all subjects, no matter what ethnic or religious background (Onar, 1955).

However even in this unifying legal codex, and this is of crucial importance, did the Ottomans not embark on regulating the entirety of life of their subjects but only that "which was essential to modernizing the Ottoman Empire versus that which maintained its 'traditional' cultural identity" (Massad, 2001, p. 51). The regulation of family law and inheritance law remained with the religious courts. Nota bene, in a society where religion and family are pivotal values and constitute the core of identity, these domains and the norms regulating them are anything but peripheral or secondary. As central as these matters were for the different groups and the individuals, the Empire did not see this self-ruling space as something that was threatening the state's interest.

The *Majalla* had great influence on the Middle East far beyond the existence of the Ottoman Empire. After all, it

served as the civil code in a number of successor states (e.g., in Iraq until 1951, and in Jordan until 1952), and as a major source for the composition of a civil code in others (e.g., by the renowned jurist 'Abd al-Razzq Amad al-Sanhr in Egypt in 1949, in Syria in 1949, and in Iraq in 1951, as well as in Israel, where several of its statutes are still in effect). It has even inspired the civil codes of several nonsuccessor states, such as Afghanistan and Malaysia. (Hanioglu, 2008, p. 74)

In summary it can be said that the Ottoman Empire basically operated in a polycentric and multinormative mode where the state accepted that other normative authorities regiment core domains of the everyday life of their subjects. The state did not expect that all of its subjects should live under the same law, at least in some domains, and it did not view its role as interfering in those domains. This basic attitude was handed down to some of its successor states, including Transjordan.

Jordan's legal system

When the Ottoman Empire was disassembled, Transjordan was given to Abdullah I, who inherited the difficult task to do the opposite of what was happening in so many other places of the former Ottoman Empire. Greece and Serbia, for example, were created on the basis of a Serbian and Greek nation which started to claim the right to its own independent statehood. The construct of Transjordan, out of which the modern state of Jordan would eventually evolve, was a complete novelty; an entity with these borders had never existed before. In other words, there was no such thing as a Transjordanian (or Jordanian) nation to start with, but rather a group of tribes inhabiting the territory which became Transjordan (Fathi, 1994).

Whereas usually "the autonomy and relative power of tribes is inversely related to the strength and authority of a centralized, bureaucratic state," the Jordanian case constitutes an interesting exception for the simple reason that "at its inception the state built its base on the allegiance of the tribes" (Fathi, 1994, p. 49). Obviously, this gave the tribes, including their norms, a strong position.

In Turkey, Atatürk decided to pursue a rather strong secularist route what would later become known as Kemalism. In Transjordan, such a course of action probably would have been neither feasible because the population had not been exposed to the same ideas as Turkey over the 18th and the early 19th century. Nor was it the Hashemites' dream to rule a secular state. Quite the opposite in fact, they were aspiring to reestablish the caliphate (Paris, 2003).

Thus while Turkey itself abandoned the Majallah as early as 1926, from the point of view of the Hashemites, the Ottoman legal system fit their immediate needs rather well. Consequently the Majallah remained in effect until 1952. As a matter of fact, in some parts it is still effective today (Hayajneh, 2012) and until this day the religious courts "have jurisdiction over all matters of 'personal status'" which includes "most family law matters such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and adoption or guardianship," including "all inheritance matters" (U.S. Embassy in Jordan, n.d.).

From these short remarks it is already abundantly clear that in Transjordan the state acknowledged two other normative forces - tribes and religion - which were older and more primordial than itself. Also, the role of influence of religion seems to be rather well-established. The state's constitution stipulates that Islam is the religion of the State ("Constitution," n.d., article 2) and it delegates important areas of its citizens to the religious courts (article 104). In a sense even legitimacy of the Hashemites to rule the country is, at least partly, based on the "Hashemites' ancestral ties to the Prophet Muhammed," which presupposes an Islamic framework to be seen as valid (Brinch, 2015, p. 2).

What about the role and influence of tribal authority and norms, though? It is true that the law of tribal courts from 1936 was officially abolished in 1976. Nevertheless, tribal norms, tribal reconciliation and dispute resolution are still a vital part of the Jordanian culture and customs (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). The tribal norms strongly emphasize concepts such as hospitality, generosity, group loyalty and protection of family honor (Antoun, 2000). The avoidance of shame and its removal are very central and strongly connected to questions of female chastity and the reputation of sexual purity of the female members of the tribe and family. Violations of tribal norms which result in loss of face and shame often require either revenge or so-called honor-killings (Augsburger, 1992).

There are several laws which still refer to tribal code, but there are two things particularly which have been functioning as loopholes through which the tribal norms and procedures still can function. Firstly, as Furr and Al-Serhan explain, when it comes to criminal matters, the Jordanian legal system recognizes a public and a personal right. These rights acknowledge the interconnection of the state and tribal law. If a person is convicted in the state system the public right is satisfied. If the victim's family

agrees, usually through the tribally recognized procedures and the payment of “blood money” to relinquish its private right, the court can reduce the sentence to the minimum required by the state. The courts can reduce capital cases to imprisonment under this system. (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008, p. 23).

Secondly, article 98 of the penal code “excuses what can be termed ‘crime of passion’ because the person committing it is not acting rationally” (Sonbol, 2003, p. 323). It is important to understand that although the law is an import from French criminal codes, it does not share the French definition of a crime of passion. In France a person who e.g. discovers that his wife is cheating on him, catching her with her lover *in flagrante delicto*, and kills her out of rage, might go free. If he left the room to look for a weapon then the “crime under passion” plea would be refused by the judge. In Jordan, however, “a person could go a month before killing his victim and still be considered ‘out of his mind’” (Sonbol, 2003, p. 324). Similarly, article 340 gives a “reduced sentence to just about any member of a clan who kills or harms a female relative for what he considers to be sexual misconduct” (Sonbol, 2003, p. 321).

Although there are more instances of the Jordanian law accommodating tribal norms and customs, these examples shall suffice to show that in Jordan people live in a real polycentric multinormativity without the state law superseding all other codes in the form of a nested hierarchy. In fact in early 2016, Daoud Kuttab (2016) described the handling of a murder case in the Jordan Times which illustrates the overlapping hierarchy of norms. It is a case where tribal law blatantly replaced civil law through an *atwa*, a tribal agreement:

The agreement, signed by Minister Mohammad Thneibat, declares without trial the guilt of the suspected killer, decides capital punishment for him and vows not to pursue any effort for clemency for him.

Furthermore, the tribal agreement includes a decision to deport all the relatives of the suspected killer, including decedents “up to his fifth grandfather”. The *jalweh*, or deportation, applies to tens of Jordanian families that must leave their homes and towns for three months.

In return for this harsh and unconstitutional punishment, the families of the killed agree not to take revenge against the other tribe. (Kuttab, 2016)

By putting his signature under an agreement which spells complete disregard of civil law and human rights (United Nations, n.d., e.g. articles 3, 10 & 13), the state, as represented by the minister, bowed to the tribal authorities and their customary laws. It also shows that, firstly, tribal law and civil law are not always compatible or smoothly complementing each other but often stand in direct contradiction to each other and, secondly, that it is not clear which one comes out on top.

Jordan's everyday life

We have traced the roots of Jordan’s polycentric multinormativity through historical and legal literature. It is time now to gain a direct impression from the everyday life of Jordanians today. So how is the situation presently in the Jordanian society regarding tribal and religious norms in relation to governmental norms and laws?

Research

For the purpose of my inquiry I use a sociolinguistic approach and focus on the three words, ‘*ayb*’ (عيب), *ḥarām* (حرام), and *mamnū* (ممنوع). At the beginning of my time in Jordan, as I started studying Arabic, I remember mixing these words up because for me they all denoted something “forbidden”. As a matter of fact, all three words can be categorized as metapragmatic qualifiers denoting violations of injunctive norms. Injunctive norms are norms which people are expected to comply with as opposed to merely descriptive norms (Christensen, Rothgerber, Wood, & Matz, 2004). Gradually, I came to understand why my interlocutors looked so puzzled when I called something *ḥarām* even though it had nothing to do with religion. These words - particularly ‘*ayb*’ and *ḥarām* - are neither synonyms nor are they related in degree, for example hot and warm, and Jordanians have a rather keen sense of their distinct meanings and use them meticulously for certain domains and the respective norms. I learned that

1. ‘*ayb*’ is used to categorize something as shame or shameful
2. *ḥarām* pertains to things forbidden by religion
3. *mamnū* is derived from *mana* (to forbid) and literally means “forbidden”

The data used for this paper were collected during the first out of two rounds of interviews for a dissertation project which was motivated by the question how norms function, develop and change in the Jordanian society and started off with the hypothesis that each of the three metapragmatic qualifiers stand in a substantially well-defined relation to one of the three different normative codes mentioned earlier, viz. *mamnū* 'being mapped onto the legal code, *ḥarām* on the religious code, and 'ayb invoking the tribal or social codes, which I will henceforth call customary code.

From March 25 until June 23, 2015, altogether 31 Jordanian citizens were interviewed, 14 men and 17 women ranging from age 16 to 74, out of whom 4 were of Christian and the remainder of Muslim background. Roughly half, viz. 16, live in Amman. Two live in a small village close to Ajloun, two in the rural area North of Irbid, five in a small town in the Northern Jordan valley, four in a town in Ghor Safi, one from Aqaba and one from Kerak. The level of education of the interviewees varied between PHD (linguistics and economics) and elementary school education.

The interviews were conducted in spoken local Arabic as semi-structured ethnographic interviews in the private homes of the interviewees, the homes of their friends or relatives or their workplaces. The bulk of interviews is ranged in length from 20 minutes to one hour.

Except in four cases, all the other interviewees were asked in the first part of the interview to talk about their personal background and their upbringing and then to describe a normal day in their everyday life. The second part of the interview focused on the three words 'ayb, ḥarām and mamnū', inquiring what the difference between them is and how they relate to each other, if there are gender-related differences, and how the interviewees felt about those differences.

Findings from the research data

Hypothesis confirmed regarding 'ayb and ḥarām

The collected data partly confirmed the hypothesized correlations between the three words and the different sets of norms. 'ayb was clearly linked to customary norms and ḥarām invoked exclusively religious norms. The only exception regarding ḥarām was the exclamation "ya ḥarām!" which is an expression of sympathy and pity and could be translated as "Poor thing!" or "Have some mercy!" Apart from this exception, interviewees consistently claimed that both terms were unequivocally related to customary traditions or religion, respectively. Although ḥarām is seen as Islamic in origin, the interviewees agreed that it was also widely used by Christians.

Ḥarām more "real" than 'ayb

Compared to 'ayb, ḥarām was seen as being more "real". This came back to me recently when I listened to a Jordanian friend reasoning about the ubiquitous nuisance of cutting-in-line and telling me that he realized that it *was* ḥarām. Humans discover if things are ḥarām or not, they do not decide if they should be or not because God is the authority and He decided what is ḥarām and ḥalāl (the opposite of ḥarām, i.e. allowed). 'ayb, on the other hand, is built on what people think, on customs and traditions. These can vary from family to family, from place to place and over time.

Mamnū' with more complex pattern of codal relations

The word mamnū' showed a much more complex pattern of dissemination over the three different codes with a conspicuous difference between Amman and the rest of the country. As mentioned previously, it means literally "forbidden" and as such it can be used to talk about something forbidden by any of the three different normative codes. Interviewees sometimes said something was mamnū' because it was 'ayb or ḥarām. However, when interviewees were asked if there is a difference between mamnū' and the other two words it became clear that many things which are neither ḥarām nor 'ayb could nevertheless be mamnū', indicating that there are normative authorities besides the religion and the customs.

Mamnū' invokes the idea of an authority which has the power to declare rules. This could be either private rules of a family, e.g. set down by the father or other authoritative figures, or the "rules" of the government, viz. the state laws. Crossing a red light or violating some building regulation would be seen as mamnū' but has nothing to do with 'ayb or ḥarām.

However, mamnū' is not simply an umbrella term comprising all normative codes. Although, it can be used to refer to violations of the religious and the customary code, it is also used frequently in an

exclusively legal sense – in opposition to ‘ayb and ḥarām. Certain things, like e.g. smoking in front of one's father, are not mamnū‘, i.e. it is not forbidden by law, but they are nevertheless ‘ayb. Thus, mamnū‘ can be used as a general term referring to any violation of injunctive norms no matter which kind or as referring to a specific normative code, usually the legal code or family rules, as opposed to the other codes.

Mamnū‘ in Amman and mamnū‘ outside Amman are not the same

Often interviewees were asked what the basis or the authority for the different words were. ‘ayb and ḥarām were always easy to answer, as already mentioned. In Amman, mamnū‘ frequently was associated with the “law” (kānūn). Interestingly, this relation cannot be established from the data gathered outside Amman even though some of the interviewees had worked for the government, either as teachers or as military personnel. The state with its laws seems to be virtually non-existent in the thinking of people living outside Amman because, except for one Christian man around Kerak, nobody used kānūn to explain the word mamnū‘.

Central role of ‘ayb and customary code

One important question of the research – one which is also very central for our present discussion – is about the relation between the different normative codes and implicitly the normative authorities and sources behind them. In this regard, it was most interesting to watch some of the reactions when people were asked the question “Is there a difference between ‘ayb, ḥarām and mamnū‘? And if so, what is it?”

One of the interviewees, M023, was a Christian man in his late 50s, born and raised in a village close to Kerak, who has been living and working in Amman for decades. As he hears the question about ‘ayb, ḥarām and mamnū‘ his face breaks into a transfigured smile like somebody who was shown a picture from his childhood and says: “‘ayb, ḥarām, mamnū‘. [Short pause.] When I hear these words I remember that I'm a Jordanian,” and continues to explain how children in Jordan are raised on the concept of ‘ayb. Later during the interview, when asked which of the three concepts he believes to be the strongest (‘aqwa) in the society, he responds without any hesitation and full conviction by exclaiming: “‘ayb!” He then goes on to give single-handedly what could be considered the summary of all the data in a nutshell regarding this question:

The mamnū‘, that is maybe something from daddy or mommy or there is mamnū‘ in the laws. But the ‘ayb that is something in the society. Never mind if you do wrong things at home, maybe you get punished; they beat you. But if you do something ‘ayb, that brings the ‘ayb to the whole family, to all the families. Dishonor! And it brings the dishonor to the whole family and that's the disaster because where should we turn our face from the [scornful] looks? And what's the appearance in front of the people because the important thing is what people say about us. It's the most important! So, the ‘ayb is the biggest. If you are very religious, then the ḥarām is stronger. But in the society the ‘ayb is the strongest because the ‘ayb pertains to the whole society and therefore it disfigures the face of a person or of the family in front of all the people. The mamnū‘, since it is different from house to house, there is no disgrace in the mamnū‘, there is punishment. The ḥarām is an offence against God and if you are religious that is also a disaster. (M023, para. 15)

He is not the only one who smiled when he heard the question. A Muslim man in his early 30s from Mafraq who also has been living in Amman for several years, smiled when I asked him the question. “Why do you smile?” I ask. “I'm smiling,” he responds, “because these three words, they use them a lot in our culture.” And shortly later stresses particularly the frequent usage of ‘ayb: “The word ‘ayb, in each house we hear it tens of times, ‘ayb, ‘ayb...” (M011, para. 84 & 86).

‘ayb – feared but not loved

The dominance of ‘ayb and the customary code was not seen necessarily as something positive or desirable by many, if not most of the interviewees. While the religious code underlying ḥarām was generally seen as just and good, even by secular people who obviously did not comply with conservative norms. Only very few people, mostly such who had converted to Christianity, dared to criticize Islam. However, the majority of people were ready to admit that they were less than fully

supportive of the customary code. In fact, for some it was something which should be done away with and replaced either by religion or secular laws and norms.

Women disadvantaged in the customary code and 'ayb

The greatest problem people had with 'ayb and the customary code had to do with the fact that it places vastly different restrictions on males and females. It focuses on the value of family and tribal honor and the avoidance of shame. As the family honor is directly tied to the chastity and reputation of the female members, everything becomes 'ayb that could endanger the reputation of the girl, and consequently the honor of the family. More often than not the question about what is 'ayb lead the conversation directly to gender related issues and sexual norms for women. This was not just connected to Jordanian-Bedouin tribal culture, as the definition of 'ayb by a middle-aged Palestinian city dweller with a PHD in educational linguistics clearly shows: "If we are talking about 'ayb, then mostly this is connected to moral issues with an immediate connection to sexual relations" (M013, para. 46).

Obviously, there are also norms which apply to men but a Muslim couple in their late 40s (F001 & M002), taught me two sayings early on in the process which resonated deeply with anybody I happened to quote them to: "The man is not shamed by shame" (al-zalama ma bi3ibu il-3ayb) and "A women is like glass" (al-mara zay il-qazaz), meaning that a man can basically do whatever he wants and he will still be able to remedy his honor, but for women the damage is permanent – like a broken glass (M002.1b). The consequences could be tragic as the continuous occurrence of honor killings in Jordan clearly indicates. Although, it is only a few families who take such measures to remedy their honor, usually the girl and also her siblings will have a permanently damaged reputation which is very disadvantageous when looking for a marital partner.

Needless to say, it is particularly women who are dissatisfied with the 'ayb code. Interestingly, though, many of them do not turn to secularism or an Islamic form of feminism but insist that the dominance of 'ayb is a sign of jahiliyya, i.e. the state of ignorance before the divine revelation arrived, and that introducing and enforcing the sharia – particularly through educating women about Islam, would remedy the problem.

Concluding remarks on polycentric multinormativity in everyday life of Jordan

As the insights from the interviews have so clearly shown, Jordanians live their lives in the rich tapestry of the overlapping hierarchy of norms with multiple normative codes and also multiple authoritative centers defining those codes. Some of these norms, particularly customary norms and to a certain degree religious norms, are more central to their lives and their identity than e.g. legal norms. The customary norms happen to focus a lot on gender relations and family roles and the state does not have an important role in this domain.

Conclusion

This short survey dealt mainly with institutionalized forms of Jordan's multinormativity and showed that, unlike the German case it is spread out over different kinds of institutional centers, including those which do not even pertain to the realm of the state. In fact although the Europeans spread the Westphalian system during colonial times and with it its distinctly European concept of state, the colonized people, for the most part, never adopted the European state idea entirely but developed hybrid versions, integrating different elements from both backgrounds (Bacik, 2008). In Germany the development favored to absorb most of these institutional centers into the orbit of the state and to allocate them in a nested hierarchy. That gave the state the prime position to influence all other norms according to its own core narrative or at least to render those norms as inconsequential which were incompatible with its own. The historical circumstances in Jordan, together with its Ottoman past and the distinctly tribal texture of its society, led to the polycentric multinormativity as described in the previous section. What countries like Germany are facing now is the re-importing of those hybridized institutional cultures, which in some ways are similar to theirs, but at the same time also espouse distinctly different notions of public and private domains and corresponding norms.

Baran, Arton and Ali, the three young men from the TV report, surely know something about the friction between different cultures as they try to negotiate coexisting and conflicting norms in specific chronotopic units of their everyday lives. There is no need, however, to frame these frictions as instances of an ideological battle over abstract values. Having read all the information from the

previous section, one only needs to imagine for a moment what it would be like for a Jordanian family to live in a country like Germany. Even if all the family members tried hard to integrate, without giving up on their own identity altogether, and if they all adopted the German state as their new legitimate patron and gave it the same loyalty as they would back in Jordan, they might very well end up talking the same way the young men from Albania and Turkey, not because they are against us or our state, but just because they are good “Ottomans”.

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Section 3: Linguistic Aspects of European Identity

A Multimodal Comparative Approach to Linguistic Discourse Analysis: Sketch of a Project about Football Rivalry Discourses in the Southern European Discourse Communities of Portuguese, Spanish and Greek

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ABSTRACT

The following article outlines a future project in comparative linguistic discourse analysis in Modern Greek and Romance languages. It is a contribution to less developed comparative theories and methods of linguistic discourse analysis and to less analyzed entanglement of verbal and visual text in the multimodality of public space. It deals with the linguistic analysis of discursive constructions of collective identities in the context of Southern European football rivalries. This way, discourses of conflict and power between the rival supporting groups, and the national sports media, in the discourse communities of Spain, Portugal and Greece are to be analyzed.

Keywords: comparative linguistic discourse analysis, multimodality, visual linguistics, Romance languages, Modern Greek, Southern European football, rivalry, linguistics of media

1. INTRODUCTION: FOOTBALL AS A KEY TO THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIETY

In the field of social sciences, it has long been assumed that sports are one key used to analyze underlying central ideas within a culture (Behringer, 2012, p. 15-16). This main idea is based on the anthropological works by Geertz (1973); on the basis of cockfights in Bali, he tried to conclude the social values of the population. Furthermore, like Geertz (1973), however, from a more sociological and political point of view, Guttman (1988) and Mandelbaum (2004) advocate this theory by linking baseball as representative of the US American pioneering spirit (Guttman 1988), and various American sports to the structures of US American society (Mandelbaum, 2004). For this reason, it is no surprise that European football has developed into differentiated field of society (Ziem, 2010, p. 227). No longer is football considered a regular kind of sports; in fact, it has become a social phenomenon. In the context of discourse analysis, this development leads Ziem (2010) to his attribution of a key internal function to football.

Thus, it is suggested to consider football as a subject for research within the framework of discourse analysis.

Consequently, this article covers linguistic analysis of discursive constructions of collective identities in the context of Southern European football clubs. Nevertheless, it only provides an initial insight into the theoretical foundations and methodologies of the main research project. Hence, on the basis of a rather small and exemplary analysis, it is sought to analyze discourses of rivalry, conflict, and power of rival fans in the discourse communities of Spain, Portugal, and Greece. However, the focus of this contribution lies in the emphasis of theoretical-methodological foundations. Only the conduction of a profound analysis using the following will make it possible to practically focus on the aim of the study: determining the rivalry discourse on a more theoretical level. Consequently, at a later stage in this work, the theoretical objective is to define the concept of rivalry discourse. With reference to Simmel's (1995) sociological theory claiming that conflicts constitute societies, and to Collins (2012) who argues that conflicts encourage group formations, the focus will be on further answering these research

questions, which are the basis of this project: what linguistic devices are used by rivalries of football, which again are produced in a medial-discursive way, to create potential for conflict; do conflicts on a top-down basis evoke a social division among the discursive spaces of Spanish, Portuguese, and Greek; and can there be found divergences and/or convergences in the rivalry discourse between the discourse communities that are reflected upon? Similar discourses in the individual discourse communities would, indeed, suggest a coherent discursive space in the context of football rivalry down “south” (Schenk/Winkler (eds.), 2007).

So far, in Modern Greek language and Romance studies, cross-linguistic discourse analyses have barely begun development. Therefore, in this contribution, the cross-linguistic discourse analysis of the language groups named before, which will be approached in a theoretical way. Apart from that, the reasoning behind the suitability of the three discourse communities of Spain, Portugal, and Greece in regards to a comparative discourse analysis in the context of football rivalry will be investigated. In the following steps, the commonly neglected aspect of multimodality of linguistic discourse analysis will be outlined in a theoretical-methodological way. Additionally, the methodical approaches to this project will be included. In conclusion, an exemplary, multimodal analysis will be conducted and it will refer to further methods of proceeding in this project.

2. COMPARATIVE LINGUISTIC DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

By means of text analyses, linguistic discourse analysis is directed at capturing the collective knowledge of a certain discourse community about a specific topic at a certain time. Initially, linguistic discourse analysis comes into being by the term of discourse semantics in the German studies during the 1990s (Busse/Teubert, 1994); just as linguists were starting to settle text comprehensive questions. In this context, it is more or less strongly referring to Foucault’s discourse theory (Foucault, 1971), which leads to the simplified eponym of *Foucauldian discourse analysis* (cf. Fairclough 1992, p. 40; Danler 2016, p. 238). Especially in recent years, the discourse analysis in his different critical (Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 1995; Jäger 2015) and more descriptively forms (Busse 1987; Busse/Teubert 1994; Hermanns 1995) experience a boom in linguistics. This phenomenon is sustained in the German field of linguistic discourse analysis by theoretical-methodical handbooks. For example, by Spitzmüller/Warneke (2011), Spieß (2013), Niehr (2014) or Bendel Larcher (2015) just as the anthologies and essay collections (Warneke (ed.), 2007; Warneke/Spitzmüller (eds.), 2008).

The contrastive linguistic discourse analysis, which is being dealt with in this contribution, is a continuation of the linguistic discourse analysis, including a cross-linguistic and/or cross-cultural component. A comparative discourse analysis is capable of comparing discourses both from an *intranational* and *international* perspective. In the context of German studies, this fairly recent form of discourse analysis was used for international comparisons of varieties of the German spoken in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland (Böke et al., 2000; Niehr, 2004) as well as international comparisons of discourses among the German and Polish media discourse (Czachur, 2011). However, in the context of south European discourse spaces of Spain, Portugal, and Greece comparative works can barely be found. The reason being that comparative linguistic discourse analyses are still rare in Romance studies even to date (Pietrini, 2014; Schafroth, 2015), the comparative linguistic discourse analysis of Modern Greek is a desideratum.¹ As a result, the project presented here is able to explore the field of comparative discourse analysis that had hardly been addressed until now. Despite existing approaches to an extended method within the linguistic discourse analysis for particular languages (Spitzmüller/Warneke, 2011; Spieß, 2013), and notwithstanding the first approaches to the comparative discourse analysis of non-extended language families (Böke et al., 2000; Schafroth, 2015), for an examination based on extensive language families and space, there is a need to design a theoretical and methodical basis. Following programmatic ideas by Böke et al. (2000, p. 13), thematically related discourses that have been conducted in several countries simultaneously will be analyzed as well. In this process, the mutual topic of football rivalry ensures the comparability of national discourses.

¹ There are many works in discourse analysis about the Greek language (Pavlidou, 2014) as well as cross-linguistic works on pragmatics, for example the Politeness in Greece and Turkey (Bayraktaroglu/Sifianou, 2001). Nonetheless, a comparative linguistic discourse analysis with special focus on Greek discourse community is still to come.

3. FOOTBALL RIVALRY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE: THE CASE OF SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND GREECE

Valuable insight about the comparison of rivalry discourses in Spain, Portugal, and Greece has the possibility of exceeding monolingual representations, provided that space-creating and trans-regional discourses can be demonstrated in terms of Southern European communicative space. Since Modern Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese partly belong to different language groups, this fact, again, would indicate that there are common discourses within different discourse communities of diverse language groups. Another aim of this research project is to find out whether there is a regional Southern European discursive space that comprises different language groups; is there a common Southern European discursive space given for various language groups?

The Southern European region as a common space represents a rather recent approach to researches in liberal arts. Even though the Mediterranean space in liberal arts, for example, has been explored as a coherent space for quite some time (Braudel, 1949; Schenk/Winkler (eds.), 2007; Abulafia, 2011) and, during the course of the economic and financial crisis, all of Southern Europe – the non-Mediterranean neighbor Portugal included – it is described in a philosophical way (Schoepp, 2014). The *South* was and is frequently a value-encumbered category from the perspective of Northern Europeans, whether in a positive sense as the birthplace of European civilization, or in a negative sense as an economic problem case of the euro zone (cf. Schenk/Winkler, 2007, p. 12). As it intends to linguistically look at the heterogeneous language families of Southern Europe in a coherent communicative space, the approach to this project, however, can be considered innovative. Thus, presented the first time, is the underlying hypothesis of this work, that the south of Europe forms a common community of discourse and communication in which rivalries on a local and super-regional basis are created medial-discursively.

The Portuguese, Spanish, and Greek discourse communities are especially suitable for a comparative linguistic discourse analysis because in a possibly divided Southern European space, they have been going through comparable political, social, and economic developments since the ending of the countries' dictatorships. The democratization that followed in the 1970s, and the joining of the European Union in the 1980s lead to an economic boom that was suddenly interrupted by the continuous economic and financial crisis in Europe, which again has a strong impact on the discourse communities. Furthermore, football rivalries among the three most successful clubs can be observed in all of the three countries. Such examples are: *Real Madrid*², *FC Barcelona*³ and *Atlético de Madrid*⁴ in

² Real Madrid is the record-holder of Spanish championships and the football team with most titles in the European Champions League. Therefore, Real Madrid was crowned as the best football team in the 20th century by FIFA. The role of the club under the dictatorship of Franco (1939-1975) is still controversial: the adherents of FC Barcelona, in particular, criticize a supposed proximity to the regime, resulting in advantages. The white jerseys lead to the nicknames *merengues* (meringues) or *blancos* (whites) for players and supporters of Madrid. Real Madrid plays in the *Estadio Santiago Bernabéu*, in the relatively richer northern center of the Spanish capital. The stadium is named after a former club president who, as general in the Spanish Civil War, has conquered parts of Catalonia for the nationalists.

³ FC Barcelona is the record-holder as Spanish Cup winner and the main sign for Catalan regionalism (Harjus, 2010, p. 80). The association was founded by the Swiss Hans Gamper in 1899 and was extremely successful especially at the national and European level since the 1990s. The club colors blue and pomegranate red lead to the Catalan nickname *blaugranas*. Also the vulgar form for bottom - *culés* - is often used. The reason: before the construction of a large stadium, many trailers sat with the back to the street (Cáceres, 2006, 41). Today, the team plays in the largest stadium in Europe, the *Camp Nou*.

⁴ The Club Atlético de Madrid was founded in 1903, but after the Spanish Civil War it was newly founded as an air force sport club under the name of Atlético Aviación. In 1946 the club was renamed back in Atlético de Madrid. Atlético is the third team in the eternal table of Spain's *Primera División* and have won national and even European titles despite the two overly powerful opponents of FC Barcelona and Real Madrid. However, the football club has also had bad luck in many final games and is therefore called *el pupas* (walking disaster). Since the 2016/17 season, Atlético has no longer played their home games in the *Estadio Vicente Calderón* in the poorer South of Madrid, but in the Olympic Stadium of Madrid.

Spain; *SL Benfica* from Lisbon⁵, *FC Porto*⁶ and *Sporting Clube*⁷ from Lisbon in Portugal as well as *Olympiakós*⁸ from Piraeus, *Panathinaikós*⁹ from Athens and *PAOK*¹⁰ from Thessaloniki, Greece. The only other commonality between these clubs is that two are from the capital city and one is from the second biggest city. The case of Greece in particular as *Olympiakós* comes from Piraeus, and therefore, does not come from the capital. But Athens and its harbor town Piraeus are so closely intertwined that, like the German Ruhr area, hardly any urban divide between Athens and Piraeus can be perceived. Furthermore, the city of Piraeus and Athens belong both to the *periferia* of Attica and the so-called conurbation of Athens-Piraeus. Hypothetically, this condition involves social, economic, and political potential for conflict that might be expressed in inter-discourses.

With increasing frequency, football is the object of research in liberal arts (Gehrmann (ed.), 1999) since the boundaries of sheer sports are often exceeded and the overlapped with other social research sections. Considering the interconnection of the Franco-dictatorship and the regional identities of Catalonia, or rather the Basque region, Spanish football in particular has already been looked extensively (Lühr, 1999; Colomé, 1999; González Aja, 1999; Ackermann, 2011). In addition to that, genuine linguistic analyses have begun to refer to football more frequently (Müller, 2007; Lavric et al., (eds.), 2008; Ziem (ed.), 2010). In this respect, this comes to no surprises seeing that football represents a large social and economic factor both in Europe and other broad parts of the world. One aspect that is particularly interesting for linguistic research is the correlation of football clubs and regional identities in many contexts (Kuhn, 2008; Schiering, 2008; Schiering, 2010; Ackermann, 2011). Consequently, the emphasis of this project is placed on the hypothesis claiming that not only medially processed conflicts of sports between the most successful clubs of each country are constructed discursively, but that they are also broadened to cultural, social, economic, and political balance of power top-down by discourses of media. A unique and common characteristic of all the countries mentioned before is the bias of their press landscape focusing on sports (Antonopoulou, 2008; Lopes Martins, 2008; Schulze-Schneider, 2012; Panagiotopoulou, 2013). As Theodoropoulou (2008) depicts from the Greek sports press: „[...] there were examples of this register mainly in newspapers that support a specific team (e.g. *Sportime* and *Derby* for Panathinaikos, *Protathlitis* [= ‚The Champion‘] for Olympiakos, *Score Live* for AEK) [...]“ (p. 337).¹¹

⁵ SL Benfica is the Portuguese record champion and, after FC Bayern Munich, the sporting club with most members in the world. Especially in the 1960s, great international successes were recorded for the so-called *águias* (eagles). Since the dismissal of the then coach Béla Guttmann, however, the so-called Guttmann-flight weighs on to Benfica, which has not won any European title since that date. Benfica, traditionally playing in red jerseys and founded in 1904, plays his home matches in the *Estádio da Luz*.

⁶ FC Porto was already established in 1893 and is the second club in the eternal Portuguese league table. Matching to his nickname dragons, FC Porto plays its home games at *Estádio do Dragão*. In the 1980s and 2000s the team that plays in blue and white jerseys, won some European titles.

⁷ Sporting Clube de Portugal is a football club based in Lisbon. Due to the colors of the flag of the club that plays in green and white jerseys, players and supporters are called *leões* (lions). Sporting Clube is one of the three most successful clubs in Portugal thanks to many national league trophies. The *Estádio José Alvalade* is the home of the club, which won an European Cup in 1964.

⁸ Olympiakós is at a great distance the most successful football team in Greece. The *Giórgios Karaískákis* stadium is the home of the club, founded in 1925. The red and white dressed players and followers are called *gávroi* (sardines) because of the proximity of Piraeus to the sea. Lately, there have been strong corruption allegations against Olympiakós and the Greek federation, which is said to have greatly favored the club in the last decades.

⁹ Panathinaikós from the Greek capital Athens was equal in numbers of titles to Olympiakós until the 1980s, but lost a lot of ground in the 1990ies, despite winning the only European title by a Greek team. The Athenians, traditionally playing in green (*prásino*), play mostly in the unified *Apostólos Nikolaidis* Stadium, and are homophobically insulted by Greek opponents as *bazéles* (petroleum jellies).

¹⁰ PAOK is a special case among the teams considered here: the team, which plays its home games in the *Toumba* stadium, was founded in Thessaloniki in 1926 by Greek refugees from Constantinople (Istanbul). The club color black as well as the wing-lam, sad, janus-eagle on the coat testifies the ongoing Greek Diaspora and the Byzantine heritage. The club has rarely been able to break through the phalanx of the great Athenian clubs, but still won 6 national titles.

¹¹ The biased sports press landscape of Portugal, Spain, and Greece is a clear contrast to the impartial sporting news market in the UK, Germany, and France. The situation in Italy is somewhat more complicated: the biggest daily sporting newspaper *Gazzetta dello Sport* is non-partisan. However, the national market with the house sheet of Juventus, *Tuttosport* from Turin, and the now insolvent *Il Romanista* from Rome also knows biased sports sheets. Due to the outstanding position of the non-partisan *Gazzetta dello Sport*, however, the Italian discourse community is not suitable for the study presented here.

While *Marca* writes for fans of Real Madrid, *Mundo Atlético* for fans of Atlético de Madrid and *Sport* for supporters of FC Barcelona as well as *A Bola* writes for Benfica Lisbon, *Record* for Sporting and *O Jogo* for FC Porto in Portugal, *I Prásini* publishes for fans of Panathinaikós, *Metrosport* for PAOK and *O Gavrós* for supporters of Olympiakós in Greece. All of the newspapers listed above are published on a daily basis, both as print media and online editions in the World Wide Web.

The rivalries, conflicts, and balance of power that are created in a top-down medial-discursive way are received by competing supporters of daily print media as well as websites owned by the publishers. The value of daily sports newspaper in Southern European discourse communities is depicted by the Spanish magazine *Marca*. This newspaper, based only on sports, publishes 400.000 copies of a daily edition (Schulze Schneider, 2012, p. 402) and, for many years, it had been the strongest high-circulation print media of Spain, even before the left-wing quality newspaper *El País* (Castellani, 2004, p. 662). Both the Greek and Portuguese sports gazettes (Lopes Martins, 2008, p. 99; Antonopoulou, 2008, p. 5) are as successful as the Spanish papers, at least they were before the advent of the economic crisis and the extension of online media.

The rivalries that are constructed in both print magazines and online media are further developed into various social media platforms on a bottom-up basis. This further development is especially true for World Wide Web platforms that are owned by publishers of print media but can also be found on posters, transparent objects, or graffiti in or around the football stadiums affected. This, again, leads to some sort of public discourse (Konerding, 2007, p. 108) that is dealt with in this research project by analyzing the Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish discourse community. The methodological and methodical approaches to this project will be explained in the following step.

4. METHODOLOGICAL AND METHODICAL CONCEPTION OF THE PROJECT

The linguistic discourse analysis makes particular use of qualitative methods. Following Jäger (2015), this research project about discourse linguistic also assumes that only a few texts are sufficient in order to conclude the main aspects of a social discourse. In terms of a triangulation of methods (Flick, 2011) however, there will be occurring quantitative analyses of a corpus based on the texts as well. This applies to the analysis of certain phrases and lexical fields by programs of concordance, namely MaxQDA.

A corpus based on a text is only to show an exemplary excerpt of the reality produced in a discursive way. Following Busch (2007), one can distinguish between three kinds of corpora (p. 150): first, the imaginary corpus that is based on any comment on football expressed in Southern European discourse communities; second, a virtual corpus that includes any texts regarding the topic; and lastly, a concrete corpus containing mainly those texts that are made of four different texts will be developed. Only the limitation of certain, accessible types of standardized texts enables a comparative analysis (Böke et al., 2000, p. 15):

- The first sub-corpus is based on covers of sports newspapers published on a daily basis such as (*A bola*, *O jogo*, *Record*, *Marca*, *Sport*, *Mundo Atleti*, *I Prásini*, *Metrosport* und *O Gavrós*) which are available both as print and online editions. The cover holds a special position as it represents the first page of a determined newspaper and it is visible to anyone. Consequently, not only are the consumers aware of the cover, but the range is remarkably higher than the figure of buyers can ever verify. When front pages started to be digitalized back in 2010, covers of each publication have been saved per screenshot on the day before and two days after every match day between 2 of the three historically most successful football clubs of strong discourse communities.
- The second sub-corpus consists of each editorials of the daily sports newspapers published since 2010, which must be collected in the prevailing newspaper archives. Several of those articles are available online as well, and are saved the same way as the covers: on the day before and two days after the match between 2 of the three historically most successful football clubs of Spain, Portugal, and Greece.
- The third part of the corpus is marked by online platform entries. Those entries are comments on covers and editorials that are posted by supporters of each national club in the prevailing

discourse communities. The websites of each newspaper support the function called *web 2.0*, which enables users to leave comments about the covers and editorials. Once again, those online discussions, which can be found on homepages owned by the print producers, have been saved per screenshot since 2010.

- In the fourth sub-corpus, current linguistic landscapes¹² in and around the stadiums will be analyzed in order to point out the way discourses of rivalry, conflict, and power of rivals of football are received *top-down* and the way that they are continued by supporters in a bottom-up way.

Whereas the text analyzed in the third sub-corpus is exclusively verbal – here, one can fall back on examinations of the intra-, actor- and trans-level of the specific discourses with the *Diskurslinguistischen Mehr-Ebenen-Analyse* (Spitzmüller/Warneke, 2011, p. 201). All the total-texts of the first, second, and third sub-corpora have to be examined multimodal¹³. Hence, in these parts do we not only analyze the pure *verbal* text but also the *visual* text. This analysis is conducted on the theoretical basis of semiotics, which always comprises verbal and non-verbal (Nöth, 2000). The concept of visual linguistics (*Bildlinguistik*) used for this procedure is a rather recent approach to linguistics and, until now, it has only been applied in the Anglophone and German language area (Fix/Wellmann (eds.), 2000; Stöckl, 2004; Schmitz, 2005; Krees/Van Leeuwen, 2006; Diekmannshenke/Klemm/Stöckl (eds.), 2011; Große, 2011). Nevertheless, this new research approach of visual linguistics is still far from its consolidation phase (Klemm/Stöckl, 2011, p. 14). Particularly, visual communication in analyses of discourse linguistics has not been considered explicitly so far (Steinseifer, 2005; Kress/Van Leeuwen, 2006; Meier, 2008). Due to the strong visual aspects on covers of Southern European sports newspapers and the linguistic landscapes in stadium-spheres, this project is able to make a significant contribution to systemizing the examination of image-text references in discourse linguistics. The following exemplary analysis of title pages and *linguistic landscapes* is supposed to enhance the potential of the multimodal-comparative approach.

5. EXEMPLARY ANALYSIS OF SPORTS MEDIA FRONT PAGES IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

By focusing on the cover page of each sports newspaper published within the three different discursive spaces, the lexical field of the battle in the verbal text and the reflection of it in the visual part will be examined in an exemplary manner and on an intra-textual basis, following exemplary analyses of the *Bildlinguistik* (Diekmannshenke, 2011; Große, 2011; Klemm, 2011; Kress/Van Leeuwen, 2006; Stöckl, 2004; Stöckl, 2011). After the analysis of the image-text references of title pages, the individual results will be compared in a language comparative manner. In the final step of the analysis of the rivalry discourse in a potential common discursive space, there will be a brief analysis for the discursive space of Greece conducted on a trans-textual basis. For this procedure, a visual text of the *linguistic landscapes* surrounding Greek stadiums will be analyzed and used as an example of medial-discursive rivalries that are created top-down.

5.1 A case from Portugal: *A bola*

The first text to be analyzed is taken from the title page of the Portuguese daily sports newspaper *A bola* published 11 February 2016.¹⁴ That night, *SL Benfica* welcomed *FC Porto* in their local *Estádio da Luz*.

Despite the awareness of more news headlines and captions on the title page of the newspaper, here, the main focus is on the image-text reference of the title page, which shows a close-up of two football players. Due to a side view, the illustration seems dynamic. The player, who wears a red jersey conveys

¹² „Investigation of the written language used on signs in public space, including non-commercial and official signage, go under the name of ‚Linguistic Landscape‘ studies“ (Gorter, 2012, p. 9).

¹³ In linguistics, multimodality refers to the interconnection of several sense-channels for the transmission of communicative information. For more information, see Kress (2010).

¹⁴ <http://foradejogo08.blogspot.co.at/2016/02/capas-jonas-v-casillas-mistica-do.html> (last access: 2016-12-21).

the image of approaching the reader, which is portrayed by the extension of his leg. The other player, on the contrary, is dressed in a yellow-blue hoodie, gloves, and leggings under the shorts, while trying to hurl himself onto the ball that is shown in the picture as well. Through the coat of arms and the color of the jerseys, one can conclude which team each player belongs to. Whereas the forward Jonas metonymically stands for the club from *Benfica*, the goalkeeper Iker Casillas metonymically stands for the *FC Porto*. When interpreting the image, the players' positions are very significant. In the image, *Benfica's* Jonas holds a higher and upright position; while Jonas' right leg appears to be directed toward Casillas, who, at the same time, is falling and thus underneath Jonas. Jonas' position underlines his superiority over the goalkeeper Casillas. On one side, Jonas' extended leg fulfills a connective function between himself and his opponent, on the other side it could symbolize a weapon that is targeted at the goalkeeper. In this context, Casillas is obviously more heavily garnished to cover his body. This implies that Casillas' clothes are meant to protect him from the opponent.

As a result, the verbal text supports the visual text and simplifies its interpretation. The heading "classic duel" (*duelo clásico*) evokes the thought of a threatening encounter between two rivals with the probability of a mortal ending. The lexical field of war and violence is further underlined by the lead "face to face" (*frente a frente*). Consequently, the verbal and the visual text of the Portuguese newspaper *A bola* outline a duel between two players, metonymic for a duel between two teams, in which the visual text enhances the potential winner Jonas, or rather *Benfica*. Apart from that, the order of the second and third lead demonstrates Jonas' superiority, as the verbal description of his abilities is visually placed above Casillas' strengths. Supporting the visual text, the verbal text addresses that the forward has the "best score accuracy" (*melhor marcador*).

5.2 A case from Spain: *Marca*

The second text to be analyzed is taken from the title page of the Spanish *Marca*, published 4 April 2016¹⁵; thus, two days after a narrow victory of Real Madrid at FC Barcelona.

The visual text – except for the ads, the short headlines, and the banner of the newspaper – can be divided into a half-length portrait in the center, and into three smaller illustrations in the upper third of the cover. The central position of the portrait highlights its significance: a young, smiling guy dressed in everyday clothes looks into the camera and gesticulates with his thumbs up. He is wearing light clothes and jewelry on his left hand. In the three smaller illustrations; one is aware of the same person wearing a white jersey, competing for a ball with a second man wearing a blue and red striped jersey. At the same time, the limbs of other players damage him. Unlike the static half-length portrait, those rather small illustrations are dynamic, even though the players wearing blue and red jerseys are always at a higher position than the player dressed in white. However, the one player is still interpreted as closer to the ball. The white, blue, and red jerseys are visual indications of the competing teams *Real Madrid* and *FC Barcelona*. The verbal text is no indication of the match. Nevertheless, the verbal indication "Casemiro" points to the player portrayed on the cover. Casemiro's light colored outfit matches the colors of his club Real Madrid.

The elements of the lexical field 'war'¹⁶ of the verbal text – "the tank" (*el tanque*) and "the protective wall" (*el baluarte*) – are somehow semantically convergent to the visual text of the title page. The player of *Real Madrid* is used as bulwark against Suárez, Neymar, and Messi – the three most famous players from *Barcelona* that are depicted as metaphoric figures of *Barcelona's* attempts to attack their opponent. However, the verbal text and large portrait are semantically divergent as the young man's kind smile conveys the opposite of the topic of war, and he does not correspond to the concept of tank. Nevertheless, the portrait demonstrates a victory pose with an imaginary trophy: his thumbs are up that, allegorically, stands for the trophy won after the conquest of the enemy's stadium. In this context, the verbal text becomes semantically convergent again as it says "conquest" (*conquista*). Considering the historical relations between Madrid, the capital city of Spain, and Barcelona, the capital city of the Catalan autonomy, the term conquest becomes enormously meaningful. It refers to a territorial occupation that evokes associations of subjugations during a war, which is also increased by Catalonia's current attempts to become an independent state, and by a reflection of the conflicting relation between Castile and Catalonia. This way, it becomes clear that only the visual text on the title

¹⁵ <https://grup14.com/story/daily-covers-04-04-16> (last access 2016-12-21).

¹⁶ Gil (1998) points out metaphors links to war in the Spanish and French Sportspress.

page of the *Marca* refers to a football match, and that the lexical field of the verbal text is only slightly diminished by the visual effects.

5.3 A case from Greece: *O gávros*

The third text to be analyzed is taken from the cover page of the Greek newspaper *o gávros* published 3 November 2013.¹⁷ This edition was published on the very day that *Olympiakós* won against *Panathinaikós* in Athens in the final minute of the match.

At the top and bottom, several smaller captions can be obscured that won't be a part of this analysis. The visual text being analyzed is placed in the center of the cover page, even though the verbal text is covering most of the images. The largest illustration is a half-length portray from a side perspective of a man in a dark blue jersey. On its sleeves, the jersey is printed with the Greek flag. The young man makes a gesture with both of his arms as he stretches them and brings his right hand to his left forearm. This gesture functions as a "vector" (Kress/Van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 71) to two smaller illustrations at the edge: the image depicts a man dressed in white, in a crouching position, and holding his hands in front of his face. Furthermore, there are two men dressed in green. The person wearing a green jacket is giving the man wearing a green-and-white jersey a hug. Based on the shirt color, the smaller illustrations show the players of *Panathinaikós* who seem to be saddened by defeat. Mítroglou, a player from *Olympiakós* and a metonymic figure for the winning team from Piraeus, is aiming at something with a virtual weapon. His gesture allows the interpretation that the players from *Panathinaikós*, in a metaphorical sense, have suffered from pain and sorrow caused by the forward. The fact that the player from *Olympiakós* is depicted in a bigger dimension underlines his importance and superiority over the players from *Panathinaikós* who even submit to Mítroglou. The Greek flag on Mítroglou's arm, which symbolizes last year's champion, demonstrates *Olympiakós* superiority over *Panathinaikós* and a supposed Hellenism of the red-whites.

The verbal text is semantically convergent to the visual text depicted here. The focus of the verbal text lays on the players', or their supporters' sorrow (*Και όλο κλαίνε τα βαζελάκια* = "And all the little petroleum jellies are crying") and pain (*ΕΤΣΙ ΠΟΝΑΕΙ ΠΙΟ ΠΟΛΥ* = "so it hurts much more"). The diminutive {-άκια} is a verbal reflection of the visual tininess of the *Panathinaikós* players. Metonymically for *Olympiakós*, Mítroglou is presented as torturer of the enemy both in the visual text and the verbal text: "Mítroglou distributed much pain" (*ο Μήτρογλου που μοίπασε πολύ πόνο*). The emotional gesture that is reminiscent of a gun targeted at an enemy is repeated in the verbal text when Mítroglou is metaphorically described as *ΠΙΣΤΟΛΕΡΟ* (from Spanish *pistolero* = "gunfighter") and "tank" (*Ταγκ*). By enriching the lexical field of war with further expressions (*ΘΥΜΑΤΑ* = "victims"), the actual sports do barely appear in the verbal text.

5.4 An example for a trans-textual development of rivalry: a case from Greece

The further development of rivalry discourses among supporters will be shown on the trans-textual level of the Greek discourse space. The visual text is taken from the linguistic landscapes that surround the *Panathinaikós* stadium in Athens.¹⁸ There are two creatures in the graffiti. The bigger creature on the left-hand side is wearing a green t-shirt and long, green hair hanging loose. With clenching teeth, this creature is pulling the other one that is dressed in red-white. The smaller creature wearing a helmet is shedding tears. The crying creature's antique safety helmet and its red-white jersey are a symbol of *Olympiakós*. Apart from that, the red-white jersey is printed with a symbol of the European common currency Euro (€), which refers to *Olympiakós*' wealth and affairs of corruption. The green shirt embroidered with a cloverleaf indicates that the bigger creature is a supporter of *Panathinaikós*. The verbal text held in green and called "Gate 13" refers to a *Panathinaikós* football hooligan. The text „Θορά 17“ that is verbalized on the helmet indicates an *Olympiakós* ultra supporter group. In the visual text priority is given to the crying and fearful rival, which again is convergent to the Greek title page analyzed before. Thus, within the context of Greek rivalry discourse of football, causing sorrow, as aspect of war created by the media, seems to be further developed from the bottom-up. This explicitness and *Emotionalisierung* of visual violence within the rivalry seems to be a more distinctive aspect for the Greek discourse rather than for the prevailing Ibero-Romance discourse communities.

¹⁷ <http://www.gazzetta.gr/protoselida/athlitikes-efimerides/gauros/03-11-2013> (last access 2016-12-21).

¹⁸ <http://s413.photobucket.com/user/Dimitri10thebest/media/Gate13graffiti.jpg.html> (last access 2016-12-21).

However, it is an interesting aspect that there are similarities between the visual texts from the *linguistic landscapes* surrounding the Greek stadium and the visual text from the Portuguese *A bola* and the Greek *o gávros*: the opponent is shown in protective clothing. The size differences to illustrate the own strength are reflected in the visual texts of all the newspaper and are analyzed here as well. Indeed, this aspect points out a common discursive space in Southern Europe, even if it is a cross-linguistic one.

6. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER PROSPECTS

By comparing the languages, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that both the visual and the verbal texts of Southern European sports newspapers and the short example of a linguistic landscape depict football like a military conflict. In this context, the verbal text explicitly refers to expressions of the lexical field of war in all three languages (“duel”, “conquest”, “tank”, “gunfighter”). On a pragma-semantic level, those words become cognate in all of the three title pages. In Spanish as well as in Greek, “tank” is used for the same process of conquering a foreign territory. The use of metonymies for individual players as icons of rival teams runs through the verbal and visual text of all three papers. One significant difference between the Ibero-Romance texts and the Greek texts, however, is the accentuation of the match results. Whereas the conquest of the opponent stadium is celebrated and the contentedness on the day after is clearly depicted in Spanish texts, in Greek texts, the pleasure at the opponent’s sorrow and pain is a predominant aspect. In this context, the visual texts of the Greek newspaper do not even clarify that it is dealing with a football match. In Ibero-Romance newspapers, this function is fulfilled by visual texts.

In the near future, this project will be aimed at a further extension of analyses for all of the four corpora sections in Spanish, Portuguese, and Greek discourse communities. In this study, the rivalry discourse needs to be examined in a more profound and broad linguistic way on both the intra-textual level and, consequently, the trans-textual level as the most important aspect of discourse linguistic. Especially the texts of the second and third sub-corpus are especially vital, that having not been a main focus in the past, and will be analyzed verbally more profoundly and by means of the DIMEAN model. In order to achieve a meaningful result in the comparative research method of discourse linguistics for football rivalries in the multilingual communication space of Southern Europe, the examination of the visual texts is sought to be systemized more strictly as well. This way, the research project will not only be able to establish comparative discourse linguistics within the discourse communities mentioned before, but also contribute to its further theoretical and methodical development in general.

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Plurilingualism in Europe: promoting language and cultural diversity

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ABSTRACT

The main aim of this paper is to describe the effects of language education policies on linguistic and cultural integration of migrants and foreign students thanks to the implementation of school curricula based on the paradigm of plurilingual and intercultural education. Data were collected through the results of an action-research project that was carried out in the last five school years in Italy. Its theoretical framework was constituted by studies and researches of the Language Policy Union of the Council of Europe. The analysis of its outcomes pointed out how the application of those policies engaged teachers to use plurilingual and intercultural education in multilingual classrooms and showed their positive effects on pupils' behavior towards tolerance and acceptance of diversity. They underlined the importance of bottom-up approaches in education in order to foster sociocultural changes and the fundamental role that education systems, schools, school curricula and language policies can play for the realization of the European Project.

Keywords: diversity, plurilingualism, intercultural education, identity, integration, action-research, bottom-up approach, autobiographical narrative, human rights, whole-community approach

INTRODUCTION

“Diversity” is one of the most contradictory terms that characterizes multilingual and multicultural societies. According to its etymology, it has always had a various and multi-faceted meaning. It comes from the Latin word “*diversitas*”, a neologism that had more a negative than a positive meaning at that time. During the Middle Ages it meant “contrariety”, “disagreement”, “difference” and could also imply other shades of meaning (“oddness”, “wickedness”, “perversity” also conceived as “evil”, “mischief”). More in general, it addressed the condition of “being diverse” or “varied”.

The meaning of the word “diversity” in a positive sense is a concept that comes from the rise of modern democracies in the XIX century. From the first decades of the XX century it was used with a specific focus on “cultural diversity” or “cultural pluralism” with the meaning of “toleration of diversity within a society or state”, as an opposite to monolithic countries characterized by the absence of “variation” (from Latin “*variatio*”) and “change”.

Over the last decades Europe has become a highly multicultural society characterized by new and old forms of migrations and linguistic diversities – historical multilingualism, dialect diversity, linguistic minorities, etc – which underlines the importance of linguistic and cultural pluralism we can observe particularly in urban landscapes.

From this point of view, Pennycook and Otsuji (2015) have introduced the term “metrolingualism” to describe the complexity of urban spaces where the boundaries between languages and cultures are constantly negotiated and transformed:

“By metrolingualism, then, we refer not so much to state-centric descriptions of diversity, but rather to local accounts of multiplicity, grounded accounts of language users, where multilingualism is not merely a plurality of languages but rather a creative space of language making, where rules and boundaries are crossed and changed” (p. 16).

According to this definition, the term diversity should not be considered as a static “container” of social and cultural norms, rather it should be interpreted as a dynamic process of negotiation of social values and principles.

From this perspective, Piller (2016) encourages to think about linguistic and cultural diversity from a positive point of view and underlines that it is not the exception but rather the norm for human groups and communities. In order to highlight the high complexity of post-modern societies produced by phenomena such as globalization and strong waves of migration, she introduces the term “superdiversity”:

“The term “super – diversity” was coined in 2007 by the anthropologist Steven Vertovec to underscore the fact that over the past twenty years globally more people have moved from more places to more places; wholly new and increasingly complex social formation have ensued. The result is said to be a level and kind of complexity surpassing anything previously experienced in a particular society”. According to Piller, “it is not the level and complexity of diversity per se that has increased but the perception of that diversity” which people experience daily as a form of “subjective diversity” (p. 22).

In fact, diversity, migrations, as well as linguistic and cultural contacts can be considered as a constant trait of the European culture. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, the greatest Roman historian, in his masterpiece *Germania* (98 AD) described the different nature of tribes, kingdoms and populations that lived in Germany:

“Germany is separated from the Galli, the Rhæti, and Pannoni, by the rivers Rhine and Pannonii, by the rivers Rhine and Danube; mountain ranges, or the fear which each feels for the other, divide it from the Sarmatæ and Daci. Elsewhere ocean girds it, embracing broad peninsulas and islands of unexplored extent, where certain tribes and kingdoms are newly known to us, revealed by war. [...] The Germans themselves I should regard as aboriginal, and not mixed at all with other races through immigration or intercourse. For, in former times, it was not by land but on shipboard that those who sought to emigrate would arrive” (para 1 - 2).

According to the description of Tacitus, multiculturalism, otherness, and migrations are not the exception but rather the norm in Europe. Nowadays the term diversity should be conceptualized not only as a structural part of globalization originated by new waves of migration that are deeply transforming the face of post-modern societies, but also as a fundamental component of everyday interactions between different languages and cultures.

The main aim of this article is to show how the implementation of appropriate language education policies through the use of action – research can foster the implementation of proactive social changes, developing new forms of inclusion based on the ethical values and principles of the Council of Europe through the recognition of the fundamental role that human and linguistic rights can play in multilingual societies.

“Diversity” and language policies in Europe

One of the first official European documents the term diversity is used in a positive meaning is the *European Cultural Convention* (1954) of the Council of Europe. In that text the word diversity is not mentioned in an explicit way, though its meaning is evoked through the concept of “otherness” and its variations (“others”, “other”, “(one) another”). Furthermore, Article 2 of the *Convention* stresses the importance of “encouraging the study [...] of the languages, history and civilization of the other Contracting Parties and grant facilities to those Parties to promote such studies in its territory” in order to guarantee “a greater understanding of one another among the peoples of Europe”.

Tolerance and acceptance of diversity play a fundamental role in the *European Cultural Convention* since these concepts imply mutual understanding and democratic will of learning traditional aspects, languages and cultures of other European countries especially in the face of the tragic episodes of the Second World War, with the aim to achieve a greater unity among member states and protect the European cultural heritage. The *Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society* (2005) of the Council of Europe evokes those topics and underlines that “the role of cultural heritage in the construction of a peaceful and democratic society, and in the processes of sustainable development and the promotion of cultural diversity” (Article 1).

The positive meaning of the word diversity is even more evident in Recommendation (69) 2, in which the recognition of the communicative aim of foreign languages is seen as a fundamental step towards mutual respect of cultural and linguistic diversity. The introduction of this term and the official recognition of its positive meaning in the context of multilingual and multicultural societies, can be seen as an important step towards the experimentation and development of new teaching methods in

foreign language learning based on new paradigms in education devoted to plurilingualism and pluriculturality.

In the Preamble to Recommendation R (82) 18, which contains an explicit message to member states for fostering a general reform of modern-language teaching and learning, the importance of mutual enrichment through exposure to a continuing linguistic and cultural diversity is underlined and considered as an asset in the European social context:

“Considering that the rich heritage of diverse languages and culture in Europe is a valuable common resource to be protected and developed, and that a major educational effort is needed to convert that diversity from a barrier to communication into a source of mutual enrichment and understanding;

Considering that it is only through a better knowledge of European modern languages that it will be possible to facilitate communication and interaction among Europeans of different mother tongues in order to promote European mobility, mutual understanding and co-operation, and overcome prejudice and discrimination.”

As we can observe, in the Preamble to the cited Recommendation one can identify preliminary formulations of concepts that culminated in the further development of plurilingual policies based on the recognition of the importance of language learning both at school level and in a lifelong perspective.

Furthermore, specifically in relation to secondary school, Sections B and E underline how the main objective of education in Europe is “to encourage the teaching of at least one European language other than the national language [...] mak[ing] provision for the diversification of language study in schools” in order “to use the language effectively for communication with other speakers of that language [...] on the basis of mutual understanding of, and respect for, the cultural identity of others”.

Tolerance and acceptance for linguistic and cultural diversity through intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding can be considered one of the main principles of the Council of Europe and can be reached, according to this Recommendation, also through international mobility and mutual co-operation among member states. It is not a coincidence that language policies of the Council of Europe are starting to move towards a communicative approach to language teaching and learning.

Moreover, in this document a specific session (Section D) is devoted to the integration of migrants students whose linguistic diversity is not perceived as a negative factor but as a form of cultural heritage that should be fostered in all European countries with exchange programs between the country of origin and the migrant community. One of the main aims of their language policies should be to “develop their mother tongues both as educational and cultural instrument and in order to maintain and improve their links with their culture of origin”

Starting with the early 90s, multilingualism became one of the main topics in the European agenda on education in relation to the reform of education systems and school curricula. The *Treaty of Maastricht* (1992) ushered a new era of mutual cooperation in education at international level particularly through the teaching of the official languages of the other European countries “while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity” (Article 126).

The *White paper on education and training. Teaching and learning. Towards the learning society* (1995) underlines the necessity to develop multilingualism in order to foster Europe’s economic competitiveness, people’s mobility and employability in a globalized world. From this point of view it is underlined how the fundamental role played by education with a particular focus on language education is seen as a priority for the economic and cultural development of the European Union. In order to take active part in the so-called “learning society”, every European citizen have to master two other languages in addition to the mother tongue.

According to Article 5 of the *Universal Declaration on Linguistic rights* (1996), “the rights of all language communities are equal and independent of the legal or political status of their languages as official, regional or minority languages”. The principle of equality implies that all language communities have the same linguistic rights in terms of social cohesion and inclusion, cultural identification and preservation of their language of origin, democratic participation and civic engagement. Even if their idiom is different from the official national language spoken in a specific member state, their linguistic rights should be officially recognized by local, national and international laws. According to Article 16, since all languages are equal, its members should have the right “to interrelate with and receive attention from the public authorities in their own language”.

A new step towards an effective recognition of the European linguistic and cultural diversity is the *Declaration and Programme on Education for Democratic Citizenship* (1999). In this document the Committee of Ministers underlines that the preservation of European linguistic diversity plays a fundamental role for the rise of a more tolerant society based on solidarity, common values and a cultural heritage enriched by its diversity.

Plurilingual skills in the exercise of democratic citizenship are seen as a way to participate actively in the political and public life in Europe, and not only that of the country of origin, thanks to the ability to interact effectively and appropriately in different social context.

The *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU*, that was adopted in 2000, places an obligation on the European countries to respect linguistic, religious and cultural diversity (Article 22) and prohibits any kind of discrimination on the grounds of language, sex, race, colour or religion (Article 21). From this moment onward, multilingualism is seen as a way to promote social cohesion and intercultural dialogue fostering openness towards ethnic diversity considered as a fundamental value of the European Union.

The publication of the CEFR, *Common European Framework of Reference for Languages* (2001), one of the most important pedagogical and political documents produced by the Language Policy Unit of the Council of Europe in the last decades, can be seen as a cornerstone in language and intercultural education both in Europe and in non-European countries (Byram, Parmenter, 2012, p. 283).

Its adoption implies the development of education policies based on the ethical principles and values promoted by the Council of Europe. In this document, which has both a pedagogical and a political nature, socio-cultural and linguistic diversities are seen as fundamental components in the development of an individual's identity. Education systems, educators, teachers have the strategic task of harmonizing in a positive way individuals' experiences for the construction of the self, enriching the vital core of the learner's identity with the recognition of the value of diversity and otherness:

“As a social agent, each individual forms relationships with a widening cluster of overlapping social groups, which together define identity. In an intercultural approach, it is a central objective of language education to promote the favourable development of the learner's whole personality and sense of identity in response to the enriching experience of otherness in language and culture. It must be left to teachers and the learners themselves to reintegrate the many parts into a healthily developing whole” (CEFR, 2001, p.1).

Obviously national school curricula play a fundamental role for the proactive promotion of education policies based on tolerance and acceptance of otherness and mutual recognition of linguistic and cultural diversity. From this point of view, educational institutions can become powerful instruments for the rise of more resilient and harmonious societies, founding their pedagogical paradigms on the value of diversity.

Diversity and social inequalities

Nowadays the word diversity is often associated with the fundamental values and ethical principles of the European society and of the European Union. Terms such as “multilingualism”, “diversity”, “pluralism”, “mutual understanding”, “inclusion” constitute the pillars of education policies in many member states and can be considered also as key topics in many documents, studies and researches of the Council of Europe. On the one hand, the official recognition of linguistic and cultural diversity in Europe may provide new forms of language learning opportunities and international mobility of adults and students. On the other hand, it can paradoxically reinforce social, cultural and gender stereotypes as we can read on the webpage of a popular airline:

“London is generally a safe place to travel, however precautions are needed when entering areas mainly populated by Indians, Pakistanis and black people. We advise tourists not to go out alone at night, and females always to be accompanied by another person”.

Particularly newspaper and media reports show that it is not simple to get rid of this kind of stereotypes and cultural barriers towards cultural and linguistic diversity. Due to growing waves of xenophobia and racism, new mental and physical walls are hindering the integration process of migrants, refugees and other minority groups, since “linguistic diversity is associated with a range of social ills and seen as something that needs to be contained, possibly even something to be fearful of” (Piller, 2016, p. 2).

As a reaction to Brexit vote, a newspaper article reported a scene of modern Britain played out on a rail replacement bus service in Newport:

“A woman wearing a niqab was chatting to her son in another language. After five minutes, a man suddenly snapped: “If you are in the UK, you should speak English”. At this, another passenger turned round and explained: “We’re in Wales. And she’s speaking Welsh”.

Unfortunately, we can’t find such forms of social and human solidarity everywhere. Segregation, marginalization, exclusion of minority groups or communities as well as social, cultural linguistic inequalities based on ethnic principles can be observed everywhere in Europe.

Analyzing the contents of integration policies of many European countries, we can easily observe they are still characterized by forms of latent racism. The word diversity, that should summarize from a positive point of view one of the main features of the European society, has still negative semantics connotations since it means something that diverges from the standard situation.

In many European member states minority groups, linguistic communities, Roma are discriminated and isolated. They live in slums, in ghettos or in socio - cultural isolation. They speak and interact only with members of their community using exclusively their home language. Moreover, in many geographical areas their languages and cultures are not officially recognized by local or national authorities.

Furthermore, assimilation policies of foreign citizens, migrants and refugees imply not only that their languages and cultures of origin are rejected but also that children with migrant backgrounds must learn the language and culture of the host society removing fundamental parts of their social and psychological identity. In more general terms, the loss of languages is due to the ideology of linguistically dominant groups towards minority languages and cultures that are still perceived as less important in relation to the official language of the member state.

Due to negative social messages received by children from migrant backgrounds in or outside the school in relation to their home language or their plurilingual competences, they often choose not to pursue the language learning. In this way they forget many words and expressions of their mother tongue and, at the same time, they aren’t integrated in the classroom since their language and communicative skills in the language of schooling are very low.

In relation to language policies in education, it’s easy to observe that English is normally the first foreign language in many school curricula of European countries. Moreover, this language has a dominant role in post – modern societies since it is spoken as the main lingua franca in international contexts. Other foreign languages - as well as minority languages or languages of minority groups - are perceived as less important and are often taught only at secondary school level. At the same time, English, that according to Abram de Swaan’s “global language pyramid” can be defined as a “hyper-central language”, has been deprived of its cultural contents and it’s used just as a mere communication tool (Piller, 2016, p. 15).

Risager (2005) uses the concept of “languaculture” to “theorize deconnections and reconnections between language and culture as a result of migration and other processes of globalisation” (p. 190). Moreover, Risager underlines that languaculture has not only a social but also a psychological connotation: the individual languaculture cannot be separated by personal life history and identity:

“The acquisition process is in any case socially differentiated, and all human beings develop their personal linguistic and cultural repertoires with which they express themselves and interpret the world. Therefore language and culture are always different from individual to individual, characterized by a specific emotional and cognitive constitution, a specific perspective and a specific horizon of understanding. For example, the meaning of such notions as ‘work’ and ‘leisure’ may be quite different even within the same professional group or the same family” (p. 192)

Therefore, it’s necessary to reflect not only on the meaning of the word diversity - and on the implication of its interpretation in language teaching and learning - but also on the relative disconnect between the content of official European documents and the role of many languages that don’t belong to the dominant ideology of a nation - state. As we have already said, these forms of linguistic hierarchy imply social and cultural isolation of many migrants or foreign citizens whose mother tongue is different from the official national language of the host country.

As mentioned above, main aim of this article is to show how the implementation of appropriate language education policies through the use of action – research can foster cultural innovation and proactive social changes thanks to new forms of inclusion based on the recognition of the fundamental role that human and linguistic rights can play in multilingual societies.

Language and intercultural education in Italy

The *Constitution of the Italian Republic* recognizes the right of all citizens to “be equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, personal and social conditions” since “all citizens have equal social dignity”. Moreover, it is seen as a duty of the Republic “to remove those obstacles of an economic and social nature which in fact limit the freedom and equality of citizens, impede the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organization of the country” (Article 3). According to the Italian law, all citizens that live regularly in Italy have the same rights independently of their economic or social status.

In Italy immigration, social and linguistic integration of migrants and foreign citizens can be considered as a new problem emerged only in the last decades. On the other hand, in the context of these deep sociocultural changes, intercultural education has always had a fundamental role in the Italian school system. At the same time, the development of specific language skills in migrants or foreign students in the language of schooling (Italian as a foreign language) has been always considered as a secondary aspect.

Language education is still characterized by the use of traditional teaching methods. The compulsory adoption of CLIL (Content and Integrated Language Learning) only at the end of the second cycle of instruction and the lack of attention towards early language education has been often criticized. It's easy to observe that language learning is still compartmentalized and there is a lack of coherence and convergence both at vertical and at horizontal level in school curricula. They should be based on a greater systemic approach to language education unifying its aims across the whole curriculum. Moreover, the importance of all languages (language(s) of schooling, foreign languages, minority languages, languages of origin, etc) should be highlighted at institutional level and considered as its fundamental core.

Even if the *Common European Framework for Languages* (CEFR) of the Council of Europe has been officially adopted by national authorities, the concept of plurilingualism plays only a marginal role in official documents and in national language policies. The introduction of a new holistic approach to languages could contrast the lack of debate on plurilingualism and on its positive social value, fostering cross-curricular policies in language education.

The dominant role of the main language(s) of schooling (Italian or one of the minority languages officially recognized by Law 482/1999) and of English as a foreign language implies that other languages (home languages, community languages, languages of Roma, etc) are perceived as less important. On the contrary, implicit and explicit forms of validation of children's home language and culture of origin could provide an important foundation for all students to take a conscious involvement and an active participation as democratic citizens in post-modern societies.

Initial teacher education is currently under reform and in the medium term positive results could be expected. According to Law 107/2015, from school year 2015 – 2016 in service teacher training is permanent and mandatory for all teachers working in Italian public schools. Unfortunately, initial and in-service teacher training takes normally place through top-down procedures that imply an almost passive role of teachers and a limited effect on their teaching methods.

In the last two decade, thanks to the introduction of the autonomy of schools (Presidential Decree 275/1999), many experimental initiatives have been developed by schools or school networks for furthering integration of children and students with migrant backgrounds. All things considered, we believe there is now a need to move from a period of experimentation to a more coherent and systemic approach to language education in order to foster social integration of all students.

Context of the action research project

Equality and equity in education can be seen as a fundamental step towards social justice and democratic citizenship, through the construction of anti-discriminative social spaces and the promotion of inclusive practices of different linguistic groups and social communities. Language education can play a fundamental role in fostering linguistic and cultural self – expression, developing harmonious relations between social groups through the valorization of diversity and otherness as a proactive social device.

The fundamental importance of these topics was underlined during the Intergovernmental Policy Forum of the Council of Europe, *The rights of learners to quality and equity in education – the role of*

language and intercultural skills, which was organized by the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Education (CDIP) and the Language Policy Division of the Council of Europe. The main aim of this Forum, which took place in Geneva in November 2010, was to underline the role of intercultural and plurilingual education for furthering the right to quality and equity in education for all pupils, implementing the long term Project “Languages in Education. Languages for Education” in all member states.

This Project had been officially launched during the International Conference, *Towards a Common European Framework of Reference for Languages of School Education?*, that had been held at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków in April 2006, for the promotion of school curricula reforms in members states through the recognition of linguistic and cultural diversity in Europe and the development of plurilingualism and intercultural education. Furthermore, this Conference had been seen as the first step towards a *Common European Framework of Reference for Languages of School Education* through the implementation of a new holistic approach to language education embracing all languages of schooling (national language, foreign languages, minority languages, home languages of migrants, etc).

The proactive participation of Italy in this Project started after the end of the Intergovernmental Policy Forum of Geneva, through the implementation of the action-research project, *Languages of schooling. Plurilingualism and intercultural education*, devoted to the construction of plurilingual and intercultural school curricula in Italian primary and lower secondary schools.

The implementation of this long term action-research project was possible thanks to the recognition of the didactic autonomy of schools that, according to Decree 275/1999, can promote innovative learning paths through the constitution of school networks in which universities and research centers can be also involved. Schools and school networks played a key role in the achievement of the main aims of the project that implied the use of a bottom-up approach to education, fostering the proactive and collaborative participation of teachers in the co-construction of plurilingual and intercultural school curricula. In contrast to traditional teacher training models, action-research had a deeper impact on their professional development and on their teaching styles.

They can now work in an appropriate way in multilingual and multicultural classrooms furthering social, linguistic and cultural integration of all children. In fact it's important for all teachers to share a common positive attitude to various kinds of diversity including different languages and cultures, and to seek to develop in learners the same positive attitude.

In this paper a particular attention has been focused, due to the importance of its outcomes that can be considered as representative data of the whole project, on the didactic path that was developed during the first year of primary school concerning the oral co-construction of children's cultural and linguistic autobiography.

If official documents of the Council of Europe concerning plurilingualism and intercultural education constitute the main framework of the whole project, Jerome Bruner's theories on constructivism can be considered as the theoretical basis of this didactic path.

Plurilingualism and intercultural education

Multilingualism and plurilingualism are often used as synonyms even if they have a different meaning in language education. According to the *Common European Framework of Reference for Languages*, multilingualism implies the knowledge of a number of languages or the co-existence of different languages in the same geographical space.

On the contrary, plurilingualism implies an interaction process among languages and cultures that aren't considered as isolated monads anymore:

“[...] the plurilingual approach emphasizes the fact that as an individual person's experience of language in its cultural contexts expands, from the language of the home to that of society at large and then to the languages of other peoples (whether learnt at school or college, or by direct experience), he or she does not keep these languages and cultures in strictly separated mental compartments, but rather builds up a communicative competence to which all knowledge and experience of language contributes and in which languages interrelate and interact” (CEFR, 2001, p. 4)

From this point of view, plurilingualism can be defined as a complex competence that implies both linguistic and cultural aspects: a plurilingual person is able to interact in an appropriate way in a specific socio – cultural context in more than one language. Moreover, he or she possesses a

communicative competence based on the knowledge of a number of languages which are interconnected with implicit meta-cognitive “bridges”, that can be developed through the transfer of meta-linguistic skills from one language to another language.

According to Byram, plurilingualism and intercultural education can foster the development of a specific socio-cultural and linguistic competence – the so-called intercultural communicative competence (Byram, 1997, p. 71) – that speakers use for interacting in multilingual contexts in an appropriate way, respecting and accepting the cultural and linguistic background of people whose mother tongue is different from the official national language.

At the same time, plurilingualism and pluriculturalism can be fostered by promoting and comparing cultural and linguistic diversity considered as a typical feature of post-modern societies characterized by fluid human relationship and uncertain cultural boundaries.

Autobiographical narratives

The oral construction of children’s linguistic and cultural autobiography, which is also one of the main parts of the *European Language Portfolio* of the Council of Europe, can be seen as a way to share and validate the main features of the language and culture of origin and, at the same time, to reflect on similarities and differences between different cultures through an implicit meta-reflexive process.

As the psychologist Jerome Bruner argues (1990), this meta-reflexive process implies a continuing interpretation and reinterpretation of existential experiences through a set of mental procedures of life making. From a constructivist point of view, “world making” through stories is the principal function of the mind: narratives and self-narratives do not happen in the real world but, rather, are constructed in people’s heads. From this perspective, autobiographies are never authentic records of what happened, but rather a product of the human mind whose contents continuously change in relation to the social and cultural environment that surround us (pp. 99 - 138).

Bruner’s theories have been confirmed by further researches on the implementation of language (auto)biographies in multilingual learning settings: in those contexts they can be used as a way to release the mind from cultural prejudices or stereotypes through a process of “unlearning”, by fostering a process of linguistic awareness and cognitive self-consciousness (Bush, Jardine, Tjoutuku, 2008, p. 64).

Therefore, if we can consider autobiography as a particular form of narrative and narrative as an imitation of life, we can also affirm that autobiography is a particular construction of the human imagination. The sensitive nature of this creative process makes life stories highly susceptible to social, cultural and linguistic influences that can have profound effects on human mind and can produce deep changes in a person’s life narrative.

Bruner’s theories underline implicitly the importance of the impact with the culture and the official language of the host country since it can determine the level of social and linguistic integration of migrants. A negative experience can often imply a spontaneous form of linguistic isolation and social exclusion as well as the refusal of cultural values and traditions of the host country. Such negative dynamics on a person’s life narrative can have a deep influence also on children’s acquisition of the language of schooling, since language learning is based on motivation and positive attitudes towards a specific language and culture.

It is no coincidence, therefore, that during the action – research project the implicit validation of children’s cultures and languages of origin through a sharing process of self – told life narratives (or autobiographies) had a positive impact on their self – esteem, self-confidence, curiosity and motivation in learning the main language of schooling. They developed a broader knowledge of linguistic and cultural diversity as well as meta-linguistic awareness and sensitivity to sounds. Activities such as visualization of words, drawings, expressions, songs in different languages, the spontaneous participation of their parents in the project, were perceived as proactive forms of validation of their home language. Moreover, Italian children learned to appreciate the importance of cultural and linguistic diversity.

All in all, this didactic path was a useful way to develop metalinguistic and intercultural competences in all pupils through the comparison of terms or sentences in different mother tongues. It implied the use, in relation to the global language pyramid, of the so-called “peripheral languages” (languages of local communities, minority groups, minority languages, etc), that is “the languages of conversation and narratives rather than reading and writing, of memory and remembrance rather than record” (Piller,

2016, pp. 15 – 16). In this way children's cultural and psychological identity was reinforced and particularly foreign children were more motivated in learning not only the language of schooling but also the culture of the host country.

Furthermore, writing dual-language or multi-language versions of words or expressions enabled pupils with a minimal knowledge of Italian to participate fully in the project since they could use their home language(s) or prior language knowledge as a cognitive tool to introject the language of schooling. Moreover, the implicit validation of their mother tongue within the mainstream classroom increased their motivation to develop both languages.

The oral construction of autobiographies was therefore a way to promote authentic intercultural encounters, social integration and inclusion of all pupils through mutual respect and acceptance of linguistic and cultural diversity.

According to the main outcomes of the project, home language(s) of students with migrant backgrounds have to be considered as a resource for learning the language(s) of schooling and affirming students' identities in classroom interactions. This consideration implies that an effective linguistic integration is based on the development and expansion of migrant's linguistic identity since "the language of origin remains the one reflecting the migrants identity, but the receiving society's language(s) also start(s) to be part of the migrant's identity" (Beacco, 2014, p.14). Therefore, ethnic diversity in education shouldn't be perceived as a negative factor anymore. On the contrary, it should be seen as an added value of multilingual classrooms if they are considered as social and educational entities in which social changes can be governed and amortized.

The implicit use of a whole-community approach implied the spontaneous participation of parents in the didactic activities of the project. On the one hand, it had a positive influence on the way in which families with migrant backgrounds are now perceived by local communities; on the other hand, those families show more openness towards the language and culture of the host country.

Therefore, integration of diversity always implies mutual acceptance of cultural differences and concerns all actors involved in this process. Surely the receiving society plays a fundamental role taking into consideration the individual linguistic and cultural repertoires without causing alienation, isolation and loss of identity.

Conclusions

This paper offered a number of reflections on the ontology of diversity in a globalized world characterized by strong waves of migration and multilingual social contexts. Nowadays diversity can be surely seen as a positive social value since it is a fundamental ingredient in the construction of more resilient human communities (or groups) in relation to the intrinsic complexity of an era of deep social and cultural changes (De Florio, 2015, pp. 34 - 38).

On the one hand, it highlighted the importance of autobiographical narratives in multilingual classrooms for the positive co-construction of the self. On the other hand, it underlined how schools can foster cultural integration and social innovation through the use of a bottom-up approach to education thanks to the pro-active participation of local 'actors' (teachers, parents, etc) in language policy-making.

The outcomes of the action-research project demonstrates that an holistic approach to language education constitutes not only a key factor for improving children's communication skills, but also a good practice for integrating them in school life. A proper language education should always start with pupils' linguistic and cultural background through the valorization and validation of their culture and language of origin. On this way, it becomes possible to boost their self-confidence and self-esteem in second language learning.

If language education is to be effective, it must take into consideration the linguistic heritage that many children and new-comers bring to school encouraging them to use not only the language(s) of schooling but also their mother tongue. Therefore, a better linguistic and cultural integration of migrants can be fostered on the basis of a new positive behavior towards diversity with the implementation of metalinguistic learning processes.

Furthermore, the outcomes of the project show the positive effects of action – research in teacher training programs and underline that quality in education can be considered not only as a fundamental

indicator of pedagogical experimentation, social innovation and cultural changes, but also as a powerful weapon against globalization of language policies thanks to a process of “localization” (Byram, Parmenter, 2012, p. 259).

It is fundamental for all teachers to share a common positive attitude to various kinds of diversity including different languages and cultures, and to seek to develop in learners the same positive attitude. It's necessary, therefore, to look at classroom methods not with a view to imposing the best approach but to recognise how different methods may be appropriate.

Ethical values and principles of the *Constitution of the Italian Republic* and school autonomy were the fundamental premises for the development of the whole project. Its positive outcomes could constitute the pillars for the development of national language policies based on the main features of plurilingual and intercultural education, in order to guarantee equal rights for all pupils in terms of linguistic and cultural integration and democratic participation in social life.

All in all, it is now necessary to develop, in contrast to the monolingual habitus of formal education in Italy, national school curricula that can foster a greater pedagogical coherence and convergence in the learning of different languages (language(s) of schooling, foreign languages, minority languages, languages of origin, etc). At the same time, all subjects should be involved in this process of curricula reform in order to improve linguistic competences and the academic language of all students.

Surely it is an educational and political priority in Europe as well as in Italy to pay attention to vulnerable groups – children and adolescents from migrant or disadvantaged backgrounds, Roma, refugees, etc – for safeguarding the rights of all learners to quality and equity in education from a lifelong learning perspective. In so doing, it would be possible to achieve full democratic citizenship, social cohesion, linguistic and cultural integration in all European countries in order to create the premises to face the challenges of the XXI century.

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The Relationship between Language Learning and European Identity from a Global Perspective: Languages as Keys and Cultures as Treasures between the Continent and the World

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the relationship between learning many European languages and developing a corresponding European identity and wider cosmopolitan cultural identity. Conceptually, cosmopolitanism is understood in the Classical Greek sense of “world citizenship” yet in contemporary form and practice, such as straddling the global and local spheres. Empirically, the paper shows how a group of highly multilingual international students revealed themselves, in in-depth interviews, in terms of their cosmopolitan and European cultural identities. This allowed the analysis and synthesis of three new ideal types of cosmopolitans beyond the literature. Thus the paper contributes to 1) language learning and mastery, 2) cosmopolitanism or world citizenship, 3) European identity, and 4) cultural identity of multilingual persons. Future research agendas include foci on: 1) causal relationships between language mastery and global or European identity revelations, 2) languages other than European ones, 3) more quantitative methods, and 4) highly multilingual individuals from beyond Europe.

Keywords: European identity, multilingualism, language learning, cosmopolitanism, world citizenship

INTRODUCTION

This paper relates the learning and mastery of many European languages to specific forms and aspects of European identity, but especially to cosmopolitan cultural identity. Languages are thereby seen as tools or keys, and countries or cultures as treasures between the European continent and the world. Focusing on contemporary forms of European and cosmopolitan cultural identity, historical-cultural aspects will be drawn upon inasmuch as they support current notions and revelations of identities, especially in the empirical part. That part investigates highly successful foreign language learners and revelations of their personal cultural identity within a context and in a form that can be useful for students, teachers, professionals, travelers, and aspiring European or world citizens.

The relationship between European and cosmopolitan cultural identity will be clarified first. It will be shown that with the current state of discussion on European identity, this notion can benefit greatly from cosmopolitan cultural identity, as the latter not only originated in Europe historically, but offers, as a contemporary mindset, freedom from several geographical, political and social constraints or uncertainties which European identity continues to labor under.

Consequently, by embracing and including the notion of European-ness, the wider remit of cosmopolitan identity in the form of global cultural citizenship can contribute to and enrich continental discussions and personal or even institutional considerations, by linking its development to the learning and mastery of a range of languages, whether of European origin or beyond.

Language Learning and European Identity

Legally, according to the Consolidated Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Union “shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity” (Art. 22 TEU). Connecting language and culture, the Union also “shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced” (Art. 3 para. 3). All this should be accomplished “while fully

respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity” (Art. 165 para. 1 TEU). As the Treaty leaves it to nations and institutions to substantiate its linguistic and cultural diversity, it is all the more left to individuals to find personal meaning and value in the dynamic interactions and dimensions of cultures, languages, identity, the European continent and the wider world.

Geographically, European identity is recognized to be limited to the continent, often negatively by excluding those who are supposedly not European (Ifversen, 2002, p. 9; Schlesinger, 2002, p. 194). Models of multiple identities are still seen as rather an ideal, without widespread popular support (Morgan, 2001, p. 44). By contrast, while some characterize cosmopolitanism as a rather Western idea and concept (Barker, 2000, p. 113-114, citing Hebdige), others reject a Western or European stranglehold on it (Mignolo, 2002, pp. 162ff.; Papastephanou, 2002, p. 75).

Politically, the literature has traditionally depicted European identity as a specific cultural-political notion, limited or at least largely defined by its goal of further integration, or “ever closer union” (as for instance the title of Desmond Dinan’s widely used 2010 book, by now in its 4th edition). More recently, there are even widespread opinions that “European identity is still not firmly formed” or that even “within Europe, European identity is not marked” (Byram, 2008, p. 118).

Linguistically, multilingualism (even if not defined more closely) was sometimes seen as a theoretical or practical aspect of European language policy (Castells, 2002, p. 238). However, until the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, the literature held that “in much of the writing on European integration the question of language is simply not raised”, or that “at no point, is the plurilingual nature of the entity even mentioned” (Wright, 2000, p. 120), or even that “the evidence from Europe suggests that linguistic differences remain an obstacle to the development of a genuine ‘public opinion’” (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 214).

Identity-wise, for several decades, European policy documents and research have tried to link the learning of European languages to a widening or an intensification of a European identity. The Council of Europe, in its *Final Report of the Project ‘Language Learning for European Citizenship’* lists in its chapter 6 (“The Specification of Language Learning Objectives”) several “threshold level descriptions” for several European national and regional languages (Council of Europe, 1998, p. 38).

Correspondingly, the literature points out that such efforts are “conceived by the EU with a rather narrow focus on acquiring linguistic competence rather than intercultural competence” (Byram, 2008, p. 140 and that there is merely “an assumption of a causal relationship between language learning and identity/citizenship” (Byram, 2008, p. 198).

Two quotes from the British sociologist Gerard Delanty summarize the dilemma in which the development of a European identity finds itself regarding the continent’s nations and languages: “European integration lacks a cultural dimension comparable to that of nation-states...Language is the main stumbling block...An ethos cannot be constructed on the basis of a polyglot elite” (Delanty, 2000, p. 114). Another of his statements compares European identity to cosmopolitan identity: “There is little to suggest that Europe is committed to world community in the sense of a cosmopolitan ethic of global citizenship...[due to a] strong emphasis on exclusion and the building of a ‘fortress’ mentality” (Delanty, 2000, p. 121).

Rarely, and only in recent literature, are the issues of language, identity and a global context put together, and then only loosely and literally with several question mark at the end: “More often than ever before can statements such as ‘I am a European’ or ‘I am a citizen of the World’ be heard. However, what does it mean to be European, what identity stands behind it?...Can there be talk of European identity and European culture?” (Klimczak-Pawlak, 2014, p. 3).

This paper will connect these issues by linking multilingualism and the identity of multilingual persons with the concept of cosmopolitanism and empirical research exploring the revelations of multilingual students with respect to their cosmopolitan cultural identity. Just before that, the European Union’s view on “languages as keys” shall be explored.

Languages as Keys

The European Union and several authors comment on the relationship between language learning and cultural learning, specifically, that language learning provides a key to other cultures. This key function is conceptualised using a variety of terms, the most relevant for us being “keys” (European Commission, 1996, p. 67) or “doors” (European Commission, 1999, p. 24; King, 2000, p. 3 and 2001, p. 21). The 1996 European Commission’s *White Paper on Education and Training: Teaching and*

Learning; Towards the Learning Society (1996, p. 67) states: “Languages are also the key to knowing other people. Proficiency in languages helps to build up the feeling of being European with all its cultural wealth and diversity and of understanding between the citizens of Europe... Learning languages... opens the mind, stimulates intellectual agility and... expands people’s cultural horizon. Multilingualism is part and parcel of both European identity/citizenship and the learning society”.

Besides, that White Paper also stipulates the mastery of altogether three European languages, without however clarifying whether this is a minimum or ideal requirement: “It is becoming necessary for everyone, irrespective of training and education routes chosen, to be able to acquire and keep up their ability to communicate in at least two Community languages in addition to their mother tongue” (European Commission, 1996, p. 67).

As therefore the concepts and the exact meanings of the terms and expressions “multilingualism”, “being European”, “opening the mind” and “European identity/citizenship” go mostly demanded but not defined, this paper will provide those definitions and then explore their link them in meaningful ways that comprise the linguistic, identity, European and global dimensions.

European Multilingualism and Global English

According to some authors, English continues to prevail as the “European lingua franca” (Jenkins, 2003, p. 42; Laitin, 2001, p. 95). Yet most reconcile the dominance of English with the wish for multilingualism, referring also to the European Union’s language policy: “It is perhaps not surprising to see European support these days for multilingualism, given that the European Union has affirmed the national language principle in its affairs” (Crystal, 2000, p. 134; similarly Ifversen, 2002, p. 10).

The Definition of Multilingualism

Whether within a European framework or more globally, multilingualism needs to be defined clearly and operationally. As for the quantity (number) and the quality (mastery) of the languages that individuals are required to speak (in a wide sense), a definition that goes beyond “trilingualism” requires the mastery of “at least three foreign languages” (Apeltauer, 1993, p. 275). As for quality, the literature maintains that for multilinguals “it is inappropriate to expect near-native speaker competence” (Morgan, 2001, p. 46). In practice, I required of each research participant “advanced knowledge” if possible, but at least “good working knowledge” across the spectrum of skills (reading, listening, speaking, and writing) in at least three foreign languages beyond the mother tongue.

The Identity of Multilingual Persons

The literature on the identity of multilingual persons is mostly unrelated to European identity or cosmopolitan cultural identity. The respective authors, analyzing themselves, merely find that they are “acquiring a different cultural identity in every language that I speak” (Kotchemidova, 2000, p. 130), or claim that multilingual individuals “have a richer repertoire of linguistic and cultural choices and could fine-tune their behavior to a greater variety of cultural contexts” (Stroińska, 2003, p. 97). Only two writers try to describe their linguistic identities in plastic terms, such as “strata” or “layers of a cake” or of “an onion” (Bassnett, 2000, p. 66-71; Steiner, 1998, p. 12-127), even if both these voices do so only in a brief and basic manner. Hence unsurprisingly, in view of this scarcity of voices, the literature agrees that much more research is needed on the personal and cultural identity of multilingual persons. (Aronin and Ó Laoire, 2004, p. 12; Gunesch, 2008, p. 74-81).

Conceptual Link between Cosmopolitanism and Multilingualism

It is only the French writer and philosopher Pascal Bruckner who, in his article “The edge of Babel” (1996), closely links his notion of individual cosmopolitanism to personal linguistic development. Bruckner gives examples of historic and contemporary writers and poets (such as Vladimir Nabokov) who learned and prominently used foreign languages in their works. However, he more or less takes for granted, without deeper conceptualization or empirical evidence, that the cosmopolitan model he proposes, even if very sketchy, has a lot to do with languages and language learning.

The Concept of Cosmopolitanism

Historic complexity and disciplinary variety

This paper focuses on a contemporary understanding of cosmopolitanism. Yet for a sound historical basis, two millennia can be summed up in that cosmopolitanism has been especially intensely debated during three periods: firstly, in the time of the Greek Stoics of the 1st and 2nd century BC; secondly, in the seventeenth/eighteenth century; and thirdly, as of the early 1990s (see Appiah, 2006, p. xiii-xv; Carter, 2005, p. 15-28; Grovogui, 2005, p. 103; Mazlish, 2005, p. 101). The literature recognizes cosmopolitanism as a concept of multiple possible definitions across various disciplines, which in addition have changed over the course of those historical periods (Trepanier and Habib, 2011, p. 5; Brennan, 2001, p. 76; Pollock et al. 2002, p. 1; Mehta, 2000, p. 620; Dharwadker, 2001, p. 1).

To make sense of this complexity and variety, our following definition of cosmopolitanism is not just a literature review, but a literature synthesis in form of a topics matrix that has further been enriched by considerable critical thinking. Its comprehensiveness and robustness will enable us in the end not only to describe a contemporary cultural individual identity form relevant for today's students, but also to operationalize it for the empirical part of the research, and to investigate how a group of students revealed themselves against it. An additional advantage is that since it encompasses European identity, it can be used not to replace the latter, but to complement and contribute to it.

Feeling at home in the world

To begin with, and on a broad level, cosmopolitanism comprises a “feeling at home in the world” (exemplified by the title of Brennan's 1997 book, *At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now*), or more specifically, as we will see below, an interest in or engagement with cultural diversity by straddling the global and the local spheres in terms of personal identity (meaning having one foot in each sphere, and finding a balance in which the global is decisive without necessarily dominating all the time). As “in the world” necessarily includes Europe, this is a first example of the usefulness of the global remit for continental considerations and applications.

The global-local continuum

While individual people that we typically see as “locals” may not be interested in cultural diversity, “cosmopolitans” consciously value, seek out and try to access local cultural diversity (Hannerz, 1990, p. 237, 249-250; Pollock, 2002, p. 17). This could be visualized as a continuum along which the cosmopolitan can advance, and which also serves to distinguish between different cosmopolitans with respect to their local competences, as well as between different degrees of competence (from one local culture to another) within the same cosmopolitan person. Since both the world as well as the European continent offer arguably more cultural and linguistic diversity than any individual could hope to cover and exhaust in a lifetime, both global and local can be understood as ideals and guidelines for identification and identity.

Openness and engagement

A subjective characteristic of cosmopolitanism is “a willingness to engage with the Other, an...openness toward divergent cultural experiences” (Hannerz, 1992, p. 252; similarly Papastephanou, 2002, p. 69-70). This willingness to engage could even include individual dislike of what or who (a culture or a person) is open-mindedly engaged with. That is, the individual cosmopolitan, while able to engage with a local culture, is free but not obliged, through that engagement, to endorse that culture positively, either in its entirety or with respect to components of it. Cultural-politically, recent European and EU discussions of compatibility with other cultures, whether from within (key words: “Brexit”, or security issues) or from beyond (key words: immigration, religion, or “fortress Europe”), make this an especially relevant feature.

Effort and elitism

Cosmopolitanism might, for some, require considerable personal effort. Bruckner calls it “finding joy and strength in overcoming habitual limits” (1996, p. 247), and gives examples of poets and writers struggling with the process of acquisition of or expression via their foreign language. One could see a cosmopolitan effort as requiring all the personal resources of the individual aspiring to substantiate and personalize as many elements as possible of the cosmopolitan matrix.

As for elitism, Brennan puts forward “the unalloyed goodness of the ‘cosmopolitan’” and argues that “in the English language, its connotations have been relentlessly positive: ‘free from provincial prejudices’, ‘not limited to one part of the world’, ‘sophisticated, urbane, worldly’” (1997, p. 19). Bruckner’s goes so far as to maintain that “it will always remain the exclusive realm of a small number” (1996, p. 248). Finally, some characterize cosmopolitans as “people with credentials, decontextualised cultural capital” (Hannerz, 1990, p. 246 and 1996, p. 108), while some see “intellectuals” as typical examples of cosmopolitans and in turn naming intellectuals at the same time as the typical example of transnational professionals (Robbins 1998, p. 254). In the end, this issue does not need to be finally settled here. Our empirical target group of multilingual students may in itself be seen as an elite. However, this characteristic was the key aspect for their selection. It will be seen below whether and to what extent they reveal elitist notions with respect to their acquired multilingualism and their cosmopolitan cultural identity.

Traveling and tourism

Cosmopolitan traveling is indispensable for first-hand experiences of cultural diversity (Beck, 2000, p. 96; Clifford, 1992, p. 103), yet insufficient unless done with “connaissance” (connoisseurship) and an attitude of cultural engagement that would differentiate it from mere tourism (Hannerz, 1996, p. 105; Robbins, 1998a, p. 254). Especially “typical tourism” is often limited to holiday stereotypes and cultural clichés with respect to the target culture (Bruckner, 1996, p. 247-249; Carter, 2001, p. 77). The traveling aspect could thus likewise be seen as a continuum, showing individuals developing from (stages of) tourism to (stages of) cosmopolitanism. The well-known European joke about heaven and hell involving policemen, bus drivers, cooks and lovers and the nationalities of Germans, British, French and Italian highlights levels of cultural diversity that need to be expertly known in order to be appreciate. In our empirical research, one group of our investigated multilingual individuals helped to create and define an intermediate category of “advanced tourism” on such a continuum.

The question of home

The cosmopolitan’s variety of accessed and accessible cultures as well as his or her acquired multicultural perspectives might mean that “home” is not necessarily the “home culture” any more. Home could thus take on an entirely new meaning, formed from the multicultural perspective of the cosmopolitan individual (Hannerz, 1990, p. 240, 248; Hannerz 1992, p. 253-254; Hannerz 1996, p. 110), or it could combine several locations or perceptions of home. Probably the only limitation to endless locational or cultural variations is that logically and logistically, home cannot be just about “everywhere.” The European and especially the EU achievements of free movement of persons across borders have politically and physically facilitated the setting up of several homes within Europe, which could have implications for corresponding European identity developments. Our empirical part below will also shed new light on the wide array of possible homes for the cosmopolitan, specially mediated by the linguistic abilities of the interviewees who experienced and expressed them.

The relationship with the nation-state

Part of the literature is mindful of the etymological classical Greek origin of the word “cosmopolitan,” namely *kosmou politês*, meaning “citizen of the world” (Appiah, 2006, p. xiv; Carter, 2005, p. 21; Kemp, 2011, p. 23; Werbner, 2008, p. 2). Consequently, some reject any attachments or loyalties of a cosmopolitan person if they are beneath an all-encompassing global level of humanity as a whole. Others, more conciliatory, put forward the notion of a “rooted cosmopolitanism, or...cosmopolitan patriotism” (Appiah, 1998, p. 91), which stresses the feasibility and necessity of having loyalties and ties to smaller geographical or cultural entities, such as nation-states, local communities, or families. This matrix issue is of course at the core of many deliberations within the EU since its inception, and seems to have lost nothing of its currency. Rather, we have witnessed increasing discussions and even rifts between proponents of “ever closer Union”, whether institutionally or personally, and more isolationist efforts, for instance at the level of European regionalism such as the cases of Catalonia or Scotland.

The relationship to internationalism

If we take the nation-state discussion to the global level, it is helpful to differentiate cosmopolitanism from “internationalism.” While often seen as synonyms, already etymologically the concept of internationalism (as “between and among nations”) cannot easily explain (as can the cosmopolitan’s

“feeling at home in the world”) why a person’s home might actually be *outside* his or her own nation-state, or in several parts of the world. For the same reason, cultural issues that are below or above the nation-state remit (for instance interest in small-scale local cultural diversity, like regions or cities, or an overarching identity dimension covering the whole world) are easier to capture with cosmopolitanism. Here again, cosmopolitanism can complement European identity given its inclusive nature, so that for instance a EU citizen now has additional choices to his or her national, European, or trans-European affiliation and identity.

The relationship to globalization

Globalization is associated with cultural uniformity (Sifakis and Sougari, 2003, p. 60) just as much as with cultural diversity (Scholte, 2000, p. 23), while cosmopolitanism mainly seeks out and focuses on diversity. Also, globalization started to be debated only in the 20th century (Nicholson, 1999, p. 24; Scholte, 2000, p. 16), while cosmopolitanism’s historical roots, as shown above, are much longer. The “European ideal” also much predates the concept of globalization, having been discussed in various forms long before the 20th-century institutionalization of the European Community (EC) with the 1957 Treaties of Rome, the European Union (EU) as of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 2007 Consolidated Treaty on European Union (TEU).

Literature Summary

According to the synthesized literature, the following are the ten main areas of personal concern or engagement for a cosmopolitan person. They can serve as a catalog summary and reference for the empirical investigation below, but also as a dynamic and personally adaptable guideline for a student or teacher who wishes to combine his or her their foreign language learning or teaching activities in transnational higher education with a possible cosmopolitan cultural identity as citizens of the world.

Correspondingly, the last item enables and includes European identity affiliations, in a non-competitive but inclusive, compatible and encompassing manner, characterizing the relationship between European and cosmopolitan cultural identity. It is also the conceptual answer to the literature of how to combine continental and wider-ranging affiliations and identities. It will be empirically substantiated below by our interviewees who link their identity dimensions to their linguistic ability and development:

1. A straddling of the “global” and the “local” spheres as a world citizen;
2. A “connaissance” (connoisseurship) with respect to local cultural diversity;
3. A general willingness and openness towards that cultural diversity;
4. A possible sense of personal effort or elitism as achieving a cosmopolitan cultural identity;
5. The mobility to travel, as long as not just with a “typical tourist” attitude;
6. A notion of “home” that can be extremely varied, even if not everywhere;
7. A nation-state attitude between “rooted” and “unrooted” identity;
8. An internationalism beyond its nation-state limitations;
9. A globalization attitude embracing cultural diversity rather than uniformity; and finally,
10. A general compatibility and complementarity with cultural, political and individual notions of European affinity and cultural identity.

METHOD

Methodology

Out of an overall sample of forty-eight international, post-graduate students at the University of Bath in England, pre-selected for their multi-linguistic ability and competence, I further selected the eleven most multilingual ones by means of a self-assessment questionnaire to each individual’s language learning history and ability, determined along the quantitative and qualitative criteria outlined earlier (namely requiring advanced working knowledge in at least three foreign languages beyond the mother tongue). Hence at the time of the empirical investigation, all of the interviewees already mastered at least three and up to five foreign languages on an advanced working knowledge level in all four skills of reading, writing, listening and speaking. Those languages happened to be mostly of European origin, thereby strengthening the link between European and cosmopolitan cultural identity.

With this narrower and more focused sample of eleven students, the relationship between cosmopolitanism and multilingualism was then explored qualitatively from their perspective as multilingual persons, namely how they revealed themselves in terms of cosmopolitan cultural identity against the conceptual background, the matrix of cosmopolitanism. This included a section of questions on their European identity affiliations, an area which was especially followed up throughout the interviews.

The interviews were exploratory and in-depth in terms of methodology, and semi-structured and open-ended in terms of form, as well as covert in design. Covert means here that the topic of “the relationship between multilingualism and cosmopolitanism” was not given away to them, not even in a second-stage of follow-up interviews, until a third-stage of interviews held in form of focus groups with all of the participants brainstorming, contributing to, and enriching each other’s expressions of personal cultural identity. This was done so that the relationship between multilingualism and cosmopolitanism could be explored and expressed in a completely non-guiding manner to ensure that any established links would enjoy full validity.

Empirical Analysis

The student interviewees thus expressed themselves freely about their language background and attitude, answering to questions that explored those linguistic elements covertly against the background of the cosmopolitan literature matrix categories (the theoretical framework of what constitutes a cosmopolitan person). Since these matrix-generated categories were treated as interpretive and flexible tools rather than fixed and immutable categories, it was possible for a pattern of three broad ideal types of (multilingual) interviewee profiles to emerge, which I called “The Advanced Tourist,” “The Transitional Cosmopolitan,” and “The Interactive Cosmopolitan.”

1. Type 1, labeled Advanced Tourist, is not the “simple tourist” defined by the literature (as a counter-example to the cosmopolitan) any more. However, some interviewees revealed or maintained mere functional mastery concerns, consumerist “taking” attitudes, and/or national identities to varying degrees, which limited their willingness to engage with the diversity of target cultures.
2. Type 2, labeled Transitional Cosmopolitan, is located somewhere between the tourist and the cosmopolitan on the continuum, but developing over the matrix categories towards the third type, namely the interactive cosmopolitan.
3. Type 3, labeled Interactive Cosmopolitan, reveals on the whole rather (or even very) advanced forms of interactive and integrative behavior and mindset, as would befit the already ideal-typical literature requirements for a cosmopolitan individual, especially by displaying an open-minded, flexible, self-critical, as well as giving or sharing attitude.

Empirical Synthesis

These three ideal profile types were then compared to each other by means of an empirical *synthesis*. To show both the elements of the empirical analysis and of the empirical synthesis, each of the below quotes, separated from each other as paragraphs, corresponds to a statement made by one individual interviewee; where several of them are assembled under an ideal type and under a specific aspect, it is done to highlight the nature and process of the empirical synthesis. Quotation marks have been maintained to stress the “spoken and spontaneous” character of these statements, and to set off more clearly one interviewee from another in statements that follow each other within one ideal type.

DISCUSSION

The Advanced Tourist

The advanced tourist’s identity dimensions centre on the local, regional, or national. While rational stances are adopted, such as in declarations of being an open and worldly person, the emotional inner world reveals rather parochial or local limits with respect to the matrix issues of “identity dimensions” as well as “home.” Interestingly, this type also reveals European identity affiliations not having been very much developed yet; which further underlines the close embeddedness of European and cosmopolitan cultural identity.

“First of all I’m Basque, and afterwards a European. I don’t know; my European feelings haven’t been very developed yet.”

Specifically with respect to language, the advanced tourist stresses more than the other two ideal types the *professional usefulness* of language learning, which suggest that the advanced tourist is a prototype of the literature concept of “*transnational occupational cultures*” (Hannerz, 1990, p. 243, 246 and 1996, p. 108; similarly Robbins, 1998, p. 254):

“I think why I chose Spanish is especially because...Latin America is for Political Scientists a very interesting field of study...This was more utilitarian, to have more possibilities afterwards with the language...to find a job, in the now uniting Europe or in a job market that is getting more international every time.”

The Transitional Cosmopolitan

Transitional cosmopolitans move along the continuum between the advanced tourist and the interactive cosmopolitan. Accordingly, they might for instance have a profile more of an advanced tourist regarding certain matrix issues, such as the question of home, where national and even local attachments prevail, with wider attachments only established exceptionally:

“I tend to live wherever I go...It’s where you are brought up, where you had your first friends, and where you live, where your parents’ house is...But then, you have other parts of the world where you feel very comfortable as well...Madrid...became my second home...It usually doesn’t happen...but when it happens, it’s something exceptional.”

On the other hand, transitional cosmopolitans have a very cosmopolitan attitude towards their (native) nation-state, with their expressions of sympathy for cultures abroad triggering criticism from compatriots. Interestingly, here the example of another European linguistic and cultural group might exemplify and symbolize a certain limitation regarding the continent, whereas below, the ideal type of Interactive Cosmopolitan transcends this cultural-geographical limitation with personal examples from beyond Europe:

“The nation-state makes you homogeneous, and makes you patriotic, and gives you myths, gives you symbols, and gives you a whole set of ideas which are not very helpful if you want to live as a global person, and not as an ethnocentric person.”

“I have been treated as a xenomaniac by my friends sometimes... The fact that I can criticise Greece, it means that for them [the Greeks] I am a little bit of a foreigner.”

The Interactive Cosmopolitan

The interactive cosmopolitan reveals the most open-minded, flexible, holistic and giving attitude of the three ideal types, substantiating and contributing to core literature on cosmopolitanism. This type also has the most widespread and intensive linguistic mediation of (vital) matrix-generated categories. This means that for interactive cosmopolitans’ identities, languages are much more pervasive and important. For instance, they substantiate and personalize the link between multilingualism and cosmopolitanism by rephrasing and substantiating the key aspect of “effort” in one of the most advanced literary concepts of cosmopolitanism, namely Bruckner’s “finding joy and strength in overcoming habitual limits” (1996, p. 247) in linguistic terms, namely when it comes to overcoming linguistic insecurities and learning stages. Also, besides European cultural and linguistic references and experiences, this is the only one of the three ideal types who clearly refers to and reveals personal meaning from people and places beyond Europe (Morocco, Egyptian souks, or the Arabic language), which might both strengthen the relationship between European and cosmopolitan identity as well as highlight the usefulness of the latter as a model that both embraces and encompasses the former:

“[Learning and keeping up Dutch] was always kind of like a struggle, it was always hard to maintain, somehow. But...I could find out something that was beyond my limits...Through improving your language...you always go a step further.”

“I would really look forward to that [being in a culturally completely unfamiliar environment], if I could. When I went to Morocco...I was just so amazed...that...it was just totally different...a bit uncomfortable, but because I couldn’t speak the language.”

“I would be curious [in that culturally unfamiliar environment], nosy, would like to get to know...and would look for the keys...Keys being...language as a main source...Of course it’s also again feeling

insecure, feeling incapable...but I think the feeling, or the eagerness of wanting to cope would be higher, or weigh more."

For the interactive cosmopolitan, language mastery allows for highly open and interactive two-way cultural access and engagement. Reflexivity about the link between language and culture as altered by the linguistic-cultural experience culminates in critical self-reflection about one's own country and culture. This enables a highly interactive travel with a "giving" element:

"[Languages] mean the opportunity of learning...Not only learning about people...It also would inspire your personal view of things. It makes you more open...It makes me feel more that I know where I'm going, and getting to know people better."

"If I travel, I like to talk with people, and to learn something about their country and to learn then something about mine...Language learning...it's a way of education, it's a way of learning not only more about other cultures but also about yourself...You can anticipate to give something."

The more interactive a person is, the more he or she sees the professional and the private aspects of learning and using foreign languages are indissolubly intertwined. The reasons for such persons' learning and use are also in development, from function or profession to mind-set, worldview, and up to aesthetics. Experiences and references beyond Europe are clearly contrasted but at the same time integrated with continental ones:

"In contrast with European languages, you see that there are other systems, other ways of indicating things. For instance...my first inclination [of interest in the Arabic language] was because of the artistic way of writing. It's really like a piece of art...It's a beautiful language."

In terms of identity shifts related to languages, interactive cosmopolitans concede a "foreign identity" but refuse to substantiate it linguistically. In a more developed version, they would be taken into "another sphere" when using certain languages. This is almost on a par with the "strata," "layers" or "onions" dimensions described by just two authors on the identity of multilingual persons (Bassnett, 2000, p. 66-67 and Steiner, 1998, p. 120-125):

"I act differently when I speak Spanish. I'm more in the Spanish way of life. A bit more open, I'm more eager to say personal things...Maybe because values, education, family, and so on, brought with them, aren't established in my Spanish identity. Spanish identity, of course is an exaggeration, but when I speak Spanish...Of course I have several identities, but you can't stick to the languages."

"Speaking with a Dutch person carries me into another sphere. So kind of this cake [of my identity dimensions] changes and shifts, like from context to context...But a piece of it is definitely always Dutch...It's another way of seeing, of perceiving, I think...of being aware of yourself and of other people."

For an interactive cosmopolitan, language knowledge is not a causal, but an essential and indispensable factor for feeling at home. It is a matter of global identity, where languages serve as a passport or qualifier to access and cope in foreign environments:

"Knowing the language well doesn't make you feel at home. But you cannot feel at home unless you know the language."

"The language that is necessary to cope in the [everyday] situations is a basic factor of feeling [at] home."

Finally, the interactive cosmopolitan picture of "home" is highly differentiated, multi-dimensional and complex, strikingly reflecting two of Hannerz's alternatives, namely of "a privileged site of nostalgia," or "a comfortable place of familiar faces, where...there is some risk of boredom" (1990, p. 248; 1996, p. 110). "Home" can also be seen on different context-dependent geographical levels, triggering a complex diversity of dynamic interactions, and be embraced with an open attitude, besides involving multi-sensory perceptions:

"[Home:] How boring, at first. But of course, it's more than that...The word 'home' is 'stick to the same place', and I would like to move a lot...I would like to say that it is an uninteresting concept, but I still have some nostalgia towards home."

"It [home] means people I relate to...But it's not something where you're born. It is also where you're born, but other home places accumulate... It captures all of your senses, it's what you see, it's also what you smell...Then again it depends on the context...I would say that "a home" is a place where I can live any mood, a range of different situations."

CONCLUSION

This paper has shown how foreign language learning can be seen, perceived, and used in transnational higher education, by studying multilingual students' revelations of their individual cosmopolitan cultural identity, who have proven themselves as citizens of the world. The implications of this paper range from personal language learning efforts to societal or institutional considerations and applications of what the mastery and competence in foreign languages can mean beyond the mere linguistic skill.

The paper can thus be understood and utilized on several levels: as a motivation, prescription or recommendation for individual educational efforts, or for more wide-ranging, coordinated considerations, on various educational levels, nationally and internationally. This especially in view of its limitations, such as sample size, exploratory nature of the research, or number of languages investigated empirically. All of these criteria are open to being furthered in research projects (such as widening the sample size or the cultural origins of the research participants, adding quantitative elements, or including languages spoken by the interviewees other than those of European origin).

In more detail, and taking up the above differentiation between cosmopolitanism and internationalism, especially institutional efforts or frameworks at any kind of "international education" or "international mindedness" have always been defined, but also limited, by the conceptual and practical precondition of inter-*nationalism*. Cosmopolitanism has been shown to be able to embrace that notion, but to also easily transcend it, thereby being able to enrich it, and with it all national and institutional efforts at creating more "international" or "European" spirit, understanding or identity.

Further, it can help to personalize and individualize those institutional, national or international efforts, whether within or beyond Europe. As a notion that is a priori more tailored towards individual substantiation and realization, it might also be a considerable motivational boon and empowerment, which is an especially salient consideration given the much-debated "political fatigue" that seems to have the European continent (and its political institutions) in a lamentable grip for quite some time already, culminating in recent decisions about staying within or leaving the common European framework that were made for entire countries, sometimes deeply dividing them in the process.

Additionally, the model of cosmopolitan cultural identity can enrich both European as well as international efforts and considerations via its inherent flexibility and adaptability, as it is neither narrowly prescriptive regarding educational experiences or curricula, nor ideologically predicated on any specific educational programme. On the contrary: certain educational objectives that have long since been idealized yet rarely accomplished in either European or world citizenship education might be easier reached with the cosmopolitan principles of cultural diversity paired up with engagement and knowledge. For that reason, again, it might benefit European and international educational, political and social pursuits, by avoiding unnecessary conceptual or practical entanglements and offering personalized and manageable choices.

Also, the freshly developed and here displayed idea of cosmopolitan cultural identity *continua* would allow for multiple geographical, political, social or economic agendas to suit a wide range of interested parties or players, from private persons to educational institutions over political parties up to national, international and supra-national organizations or movements. Identifying and moving oneself on one of these continua would be a concrete, measurable and therefore motivational opportunity, substantiating the often fuzzy calls for more European thinking and acting, but also giving not only a point but also a developmental pathway for well-known mottos such as "think globally, act locally": now we could even graphically show *to what extent* we (are improving) in thinking or doing so.

Linguistically and culturally, the European continent alone, especially with ever more political widening, encompassing by now over twenty nation-states, is probably more material to learn and leverage than most of us can ever hope to master satisfactorily in a lifetime, let alone the diversity of those features in the wider world. However, if we believe in mankind's potential, maybe not unlimited but at least not to be limited in ways already known to us, we could conceive of, and maybe call it a "working union" between European and cosmopolitan cultural identity, based on a correspondingly sufficient (even if never complete and perfect) linguistic and cultural mastery of European and/or beyond-European languages and cultures.

This union and mastery in turn might open doors for us, within the global context of the one world we all share, or provide us with some tools or keys that enable us to consider other countries and cultures, and their inhabitants, as treasures that we share between this our European continent and that wider world. The students in this research who revealed themselves as interactive cosmopolitans felt and

expressed this union, and the role and importance of languages for their identity, strongly and deeply. While not everyone might be as enthusiastic about language learning than they, their youth means that many of us could do even better, both in terms of linguistic and of cultural experience, given enough time and resources.

Historical experience is all but on our side: language knowledge has been “en vogue” in Europe at least since the Greco-Roman period, and never fell out of fashion since. In today’s cultural-political debates about the “state of the (European) union”, the future of European culture, or the relationship of its citizens to those from outside, taking inspiration from personal mastery of many European or beyond-European languages might be one way of adding to the traditional treasures of our continent, with a view to sharing them for the benefit and enrichment of all peoples in the world.

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Our common terminology: the linguistic passport for a united Europe

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ABSTRACT

The European Union produces the most important part, in some domains up to 80% of the national legislation of its 28 Member States. The legal acts of the EU are drafted by the EC, decided in a co-decision procedure with the Council and the final vote takes place in the European Parliament, which - after the Treaty of Lisbon - is the final legislator. Following these rigorous processes they become laws of the member states after being voted in the national parliaments. These legal acts are translated in the European Union in 24 languages by some 5000 translators spread in 10 Institutions and have in every language the same legal force, the validity of an original text since they can be used by the citizens in national and in the European Court. Multilingualism, as legal and cultural right of the 28 peoples of the European Family, is a crucial element for the functioning of the European Union, but also a means to achieve a common identity. The full equivalence of the laws is ensured by a common terminology database called IATE which is public and contains 8.5 million terms from the 110 domains of the European legislation in 24 languages. It constitutes the largest multilingual database and is consulted by 3500 users per hour worldwide. The linguistic equivalence of the common concepts that represent the common principles and the common rules created by the European Family 60 years now is the common passport to live together in a space without walls and borders. It is the common denominator to build a common identity respecting the cultural specificity of each people that gives to it a unique character, a unique richness that can and must guarantee the spirit of an efficient and well-functioning society based on common principles also ensuring openness to the principles of mobility and communication in a global context.

Keywords: Common Legislation, Multilingualism, Communication, Cultural Diversity, Terminology

When I was asked some years ago to create a new terminology service for the European Parliament, the related tasks and objectives were considered to be of a highly technical nature. In fact, the management, and coordination among translation units, of terminology matters had until then merely been an auxiliary task of the IT service of the Directorate-General for Translation.

Moreover, all other EU institutions – which had recently begun to collaborate in the management of the Inter-Active Terminology for Europe (IATE), a new, interactive terminology database containing multilingual entries for all European terms available in the ten official languages current at the time – regarded terminology as simply the task of maintaining the IATE tool in order to improve the consistency of translations and ease the work of the numerous translators, thereby saving time and money, just as the use of the Euramis translation memory permitted the reuse of already translated sentences.

As I saw it, however, coordinating terminology among the languages of the European Union was not just a technical issue, nor simply a means of contributing to the quality of translations, but something much more. It posed a real challenge, of great political impact, of addressing what is at heart a cultural issue: the very inspiring adventure of seeking to bridge, by means of the languages used in EU legislation, the very disparity in culture that accounts for the diversity of our European family.

One of the first issues that this family had to face when it came together was multilingualism. The use of all the languages of the Member States was the first concern of the European Union, and the objective of its very first legislative act. Regulation No 1 of 15 April 1958 recognises the languages of the Member States as official languages of the whole European Community, stipulating that they are of equal standing in all activities. One can see a symbolic meaning in the fact that Regulation No 1 remains in force after more than 50 years, its list of officially recognised languages gradually extended each time one or more countries joined the European family. Multilingualism in the European Union,

now numbering 28 Member States and 24 official languages, has become a very complex issue, with many aspects. It presents a daily challenge in all activities of the European Union, where a constant effort needs to be made to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, the wish to respect, and profit from, the cultural asset of linguistic diversity and, on the other hand, the need to ease communication in a common entity.

Multilingualism in the European Union raises many questions. Each language represents a different culture. The European Union allows its citizens to interact by guaranteeing, as a cultural right, the use of the 24 officially recognised languages of the Member States. However, more than 24 languages are spoken in the Member States, and some of these have official status in the countries in which they are spoken. This creates a second dilemma: how many cultures are represented by how many languages within the borders of the European Union? How can administrative and political criteria determine the importance of a language? By what standard can one language be considered more important than another, thereby negating the linguistic and cultural criteria that characterise a distinct language? Should not the European Union provide for the protection of all languages spoken by its citizens, in recognition of their worth – on equal terms – as cultural assets, in order to preserve the rich cultural diversity underpinning its primary claim to be something more than just a political or financial association of national and regional entities?

There is indeed great cultural diversity in the 28 Member States. Reflecting Europe's long history, each presents a wealth of different cultures, often expressed in different languages. We need to speak about languages here, not dialects, though the distinction is subject to uncertain criteria reflecting regional and political interests evolving over time. In addition to the 24 official languages of the EU, there are other European languages that, it can convincingly be argued, are no less deserving of recognition as milestones of European culture. The most commonly cited example is Catalan, in reflection of the very important Catalan independence movement in Spain. Spoken by some 11 million European citizens, taught in schools to more than seven million pupils, used as main language in universities and spoken in the regions of four countries, it has a rich literature and is even the official language of a European state, Andorra. There are several European languages listed on UNESCO's map of endangered languages where no distinction is made between language and dialect. Another interesting example is Luxembourgish, which in 1984 became the official language of one of the six founding members of the European Union, but which did not become an official language of the EU for the simple reason that the Government of Luxembourg did not ask for it. In linguistic terms, Luxembourgish can be regarded a variant of German, spoken as well in some German regions. Interestingly, it is also spoken in regions of Belgium and of France. Having become the official language of Luxembourg, it is the main language of instruction in the first years of primary school in that country and one of the languages used in the University of Luxembourg. The EU even allows that proficiency in Luxembourgish serve as a criterion for access to certain faculties at that university and to certain professions in Luxembourg.

There are several other important languages in Member States that represent very old cultures with sometimes very distinct identities. These include Breton and Greek-Cypriot, languages that partly have an origin in, or that have a relation to, another European language, but which are the means of communication of a totally separate cultural group.

Of course, the European Union was not conceived as a cultural organisation, but as a community of states aiming to create common legislation in most fields of everyday life. This legislation becomes national legislation in all Member State and, in keeping with Regulation No 1, in all official languages of the Union. When you take in consideration the fact that 80 % of the Member States' national legislation consists of EU legislation translated into each respective language, you grasp the challenge and difficulty of the terminology undertaking.

In this context, the cultural right to protect and preserve the languages spoken by the citizens translates into their civic or democratic right to plead in their own language when they appear before national or European courts.

In order to ensure this right, the European Union operates the world's largest translation service, with some 5000 translators and interpreters working in more than ten EU institutions. Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force, which conferred to it the role of final legislator, some 1.8 million pages are translated every year at the European Parliament. This activity is coupled to a huge effort in the fields of computer-assisted translation and machine translation. The EU translation services have created the biggest multilingual legislation repository (EurLex), an enormous translation memory (Euramis), and the largest terminology database, containing some 11 million terms (IATE).

With the 24 current official EU languages, the number of linguistic combinations for translation and interpretation is 552. Every additional language would add a considerable number of combinations. This may happen soon if the referendum for the reunification of Cyprus to be held in the spring of 2016 opens the way for Turkish EU membership. It could also happen if Luxembourg decided to make Luxembourgish an official EU language, or if Spain acknowledges Galician, Basque and Catalan as official languages.

So many combinations cannot always be covered, especially if very tight deadlines are to be respected, as is most often the case. This means that it would be inconceivable that all languages spoken in Europe could become official EU languages. It would simply be impossible to implement the rules of multilingualism. Even now the system is under strain, such that – to ensure timely translation of all documents – English, French and German are used as ‘pivot’ languages, whereby translations first made into these languages are then used for translations into all other languages. In some situations Spanish, Polish and Italian are also used. Such a multilingual community, with staff from 28 different countries working closely together, also needs a common *lingua franca*. This is most often English, especially since 2003 when ten new countries joined the EU.

However, even though the European Union is not the ideal structure for ensuring, as a matter of cultural rights, the survival of each and every language and culture of its Member States, it nevertheless needs to provide common legislation that encompasses all the cultures sustaining the 24 official languages. The cultural aspect, and the diversity of our European family, has to be taken into account. This is a challenge that makes any administrative or political task, such as the production of legislation, a unique field of cooperation, a meeting point, a syncretism between so many approaches, traditions and sensibilities.

In order to be able to implement this common legislation, in all its territory and in all areas of its exclusive and subsidiary competence, one of the main tasks of the European Union is to provide a common terminology that ensures that every citizen has the same understanding of the concepts used, independently of what language the document is in. This is because regardless of the official language it is presented in, each legislative act is considered and recognised as an original act in the international legal and judicial system. This makes the coherence of the terminology used one of the most important means of bringing all these cultures together.

Following the same rules, and having the same rights and obligations, is a way of living together that allows for cooperation in every field of activity. For communicating basic needs a common *lingua franca* can be used, but for cooperation to be possible in every activity, and in such a wide range of specific fields, the participants need to be able use their native languages, and the possibility of doing so is the unique gift that multilingualism offers all citizens of the European Union.

Today technology offers many means of online collaboration and communication. There are many types of collaborative platforms for interactive teamwork that allow actors in institutions, academia and industry to collaborate in the collection and discussion of terminology. Using these possibilities to enhance the interoperability of resources saves time and avoids duplication of work, and leads to more consolidated results that ensure the quality of the translations. This can be combined with specialised software permitting term extraction, as well as metasearch functions encompassing several databases. Cloud technology allows for easy storage and consultation of term data. All this data, together with huge translation memories, are uploaded into the memories of computer-assisted translation tools and, gradually, machine translation programmes, step by step transforming the terminology used in all languages into a much more easily usable linguistic element, ensuring the consistency and quality of translated legislation.

Terminology is now everywhere. In today’s globalised and multilingual world, every company, every academic research centre and, of course, every international institution needs a glossary, or a larger database, to enable understanding and cooperation without the obstacle that the use of more than one language poses. This is why universities are increasingly treating terminology as a separate discipline, of interest not only to linguistic departments but also to other faculties, in recognition of the range of intellectual and technical issue it raises. Now that tagging and indexing of terminology data, and its interrelation in the different fields through ontologies in the semantic web, make of it not just a lexical collection of terms but a real source of knowledge, covering all fields of activity, a targeted search in a database allows the users to find any information they are looking for, such as job offers or other kinds of services.

In collecting, storing and managing the multilingual terminology in IATE, the translators working in different languages to feed this huge database are confronted every day with a range of issues pertaining to the cultural diversity of such a multicultural and multilingual community of nations.

It is obvious that for a database containing the terminology of EU legislation, the ideal would be a normative tool that provides a translator seeking a specific term with one and only one solution. This can be very difficult, especially for languages that are spoken in more than one country, where the respective national administrations concerned sometimes use different terms for the same concept. The best example for this is German, used in five Member States (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy) as well as in Switzerland and Liechtenstein which, since they are in close cooperation with the EU, apply EU legislation in many areas. For a given concept, the term used in one country may be different from the one used in another, and since both appear in national legal texts – that is, in reliable sources for the European terminology database – they must both be listed as variants in the same IATE entry. This means that translators must make a choice, with implications for the wording of future legislative acts. Another interesting example is Greek, in which terminology usage in Greece and Cyprus sometimes differ. Here we have the factor of time: Cyprus joined the EU 20 years after Greece, during which time Cypriot Greek terminology in certain fields has evolved independently of usage in Greek-language versions of EU legislative acts. When these acts are transposed into national law, they introduce wording that on occasion differs from that of pre-existing laws, resulting in two equally valid variants of the same term that both have to be listed in the corresponding database entry.

Such differences in terms used by administrations in different countries, whether throughout their respective territories or in specific regions sharing the same language with other countries or regions, depend very much on cultural differences among their populations.

This raises another question. Should the terminology of the European Union be regarded as prescriptive or descriptive? In other words, should the European institutions impose on the citizens of the 28 Member States a terminology determined by their translation services – a European jargon – or should these services collect the terms used in national administrations and enter them in the terminology database as valid terms for use in European legislative acts? A prescriptive approach would very much ease the work of the translation services, but it would also create a linguistic gap between the language used by EU technocrats, which often is not clearly understood by the citizens, and the everyday language used in each country.

Not all European institutions managing the database IATE adopted the same attitude on this issue. While the Commission and the Council – the two institutions producing most of the terminology used in drafts of European legislation acts – mostly create their own terminology, other institutions, such as the Court of Justice and the European Central Bank (as well as the Translation Centre that manages the terminology for the numerous EU agencies), work more on a bilingual basis for each concept and collect the terminology used by the respective national authorities. For example, the Court of Justice collects terminology from national case law, while the European Central Bank cooperates with Member States' central banks and compiles very reliable bilingual glossaries of banking and financial terminology used by companies and citizens in daily commercial and financial activities in the Member States.

As in every terminology database, you have in IATE the option marking any one variant as 'preferred', but here a problem arises. What criterion should be used for making the selection? You can say that the term used in the European act must be the one marked as 'preferred', but then you don't follow the descriptive approach, and you can hardly oblige the national Cypriot administration to abandon a term used for years in national legal texts in favour of a term used by the Greek administration and therefore present in IATE and EurLex.

Unity in diversity has always been, and will always remain, the main challenge for the European Union. The effort to stick to the principle of multilingualism, notwithstanding the administrative difficulties and cultural challenges, is the best proof of this. Consistency in terminology is the tool to achieve the implementation of the rules and principles governing our common European society.

European Identity: a Multimodal Perspective

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ABSTRACT

This study carries out a synchronic intralinguistic multimodal analysis of selected audiovisual advertisements from the 2014 European Parliament (EP) election campaign. As dealing with audiovisual political advertising, this study employs lexico-grammatical analysis and Systemic Functional-Multimodal Discourse Analysis (SF-MDA) as research tools. This research aims to further contribute to the growing debate on European identity by explaining how European institutions discursively construct European identity in official discourse. Being that academic and official accounts largely rely on the quantitative analysis of data from Eurobarometer surveys and national opinion polls, the case study presented in this paper provides an in-depth analysis of EU discourses and practices, that is to say not only from a socio-political perspective, but also from a discursive one, with a view to finding meanings behind symbols and myths.

Keywords: European Identity, European Parliament elections, Systemic Functional-Multimodal Discourse Analysis, Lexico-Grammatical Analysis.

1. Introduction

The question of European *cultural* identity has become of increasing interest in recent years for several reasons. One is that “the political union set out by the Maastricht Treaty [...] was not met with enthusiasm by the European peoples, especially the pace of which European integration took place” (Bruhagen, 2006, p. 18). During the last decades, indeed, the European Union has struggled with an increasing ‘democratic deficit’. The democratic deficit of the EU has often been described by observers as a limited popular participation in the process of EU decision-making (*ibidem*) which is largely measured through electoral turnout at European Parliament elections. Turnout at EP elections has fallen consecutively at each election since 1979, and has been under 50% since 1999. In the attempt to increase the popularity of the European Union among its citizens, the EU has adopted a wide range of political instruments, what is generally referred to as ‘European identity politics’.¹ The European identity politics focuses particularly on some “European integrational factors [such as] culture, symbols and myths” (Bruhagen, 2006, p. 38). These elements are generally identified as “the cornerstones in identity-building” (*ibidem*) which actually is the articulation of democratic legitimacy. Therefore, issues of European *identity* and *culture* have gradually replaced those of citizenship and political legitimacy in the official and academic debate.

A growing body of scholarly literature on the emergence of a European identity has increasingly focused on two main dimensions of European identity: a *civic* dimension, which refers to “the degree to which [people] feel that they are citizens of a European political system, whose rules, laws, and rights have an influence on their daily life’s “perception of being citizens of a European political system” (Bruter, 2003, p. 1155); and a *cultural* one, where people’s sense of identification with Europe relies mainly on “individuals’ perceptions that fellow Europeans are closer to them than non-Europeans [...] regardless of the nature of the political system” (*ibidem*, pp. 1155-1156). Consequently, as he himself also notes, this component of identity is mostly driven by shared symbols and images of Europe. Accordingly, there are two contrasting models for the ways in which “a sense of identification with Europe and fellow Europeans” (European Commission, 2012, p. 36) is fostered:

[...] a “culturalist” model in which [...] identification with Europe takes place “top down” or in which identity is internalised and comes about through the exposure to influential discourses and symbols [i.e.

¹ To cite some among the most significant: university exchange programmes, the introduction of Euro-symbols such as the flag, anthem, the ‘Day of Europe’, a common design for national passports, and the European City of Culture.

through] persuasion and indoctrination; and a “structuralist” model in which [...] identification with Europe takes place “from the bottom up” [or] in which an orientation to Europe derives fundamentally from association with other Europeans. (*ibidem*)

Until recently, the “culturalist” model was dominant in research on European identity, and findings from several empirical studies (Bruter, 2003, pp. 1148-1173; 2008, pp. 273-285) have shown that consistent exposure to symbols and influential discourse has a decisive influence on increasing the levels of people’s sense of belonging to Europe, particularly in terms of cultural identification. In this respect, a growing body of scholarly literature (particularly Steinbeck, 1995; Shore, 2000; Farrell et al., 2002; Pantel, 2005; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Inglis and Ott, 2005; Psychogiopoulou, 2007; Sassatelli, 2009; McNamara, 2015) has increasingly focused on the official EU rhetoric and practice of identity-building, and there is general agreement in identifying the common rhetoric of *unity in diversity* as the key to European identity.

The European narrative of *unity in diversity* is an evolving notion, whose significance has changed in the course of time. Today, the *unity in diversity* rhetoric has generally gained positive connotations, no longer representing diversity – intended as the plurality of historical and cultural traditions which make up the EU – as an obstacle to any further development towards the creation of feelings of belonging and identity to the EU, but as a constitutive element of its own nature. Indeed, as Sassatelli (2009) points out, the *unity in diversity* rhetoric has come to be the dominant institutional and academic representation of Europe, as a discursive and symbolic solution to the perceived conflict of having to create a new ‘layer’ of identity without overcoming, but rather building on, material already solidly appropriated by other such layers, the national one first of all. (Sassatelli, 2009, p. 2)

However, some authors critically observe “how the motto ‘unity in diversity’ simply reveals a rhetorical escamotage” (Shore, 2000, p. 24; cited in Sassatelli, 2009, p. 7), by which EU institutions promote “a Eurocentric, functionalist, elite definition of culture [as well as] oversimplified, consensual models of culture and identity” (Sassatelli, 2009, p. 7). In this regard, academic and official accounts – which largely rely on the quantitative analysis of data from Eurobarometer surveys and national opinion polls – generally converge on the idea that the EU rhetoric of *unity in diversity* “is becoming less of a smokescreen and more of an asset” in terms of both “explicitness and publicness” to the extent that, for an increasing number of Europeans, “the constructed character of European narratives” (Sassatelli, 2009, p. 193) appears self-evident. However, as it would seem from the case study presented in this paper, when analysing the EU rhetoric at a deeper level of meaning, other more complex and controversial issues appear.

In order to understand how EU rhetoric works to create a common feeling of belonging to Europe, EU discourses and practices will be analysed from within, that is to say not only from a socio-political perspective, but also from a discursive one with a view to finding meanings behind symbols and myths. This study is a synchronic intralinguistic multimodal analysis of selected audiovisual advertisements from the 2014 European Parliament (EP) election campaign that employs lexico-grammatical analysis and Systemic Functional-Multimodal Discourse Analysis (SF-MDA) as research tools. It focuses on the 2014 EP audiovisual election campaign for two main reasons. First, EP elections represent a “symbolic matrix” that connects both levels of people’s feeling of belonging to Europe – the *civic* and the *cultural* – to the extent that elections measure citizens’ attitudes in an electoral context, but they affect people’s European identity more deeply as a result of the political communication carried out during the election campaign. Secondly, given that political communication is grounded in the power of language – both verbal and nonverbal – to produce and communicate significant symbols that have a crucial effect on cultural identity, it follows that investigating symbols and values of the 2014 EP audiovisual election campaign can substantially contribute to explaining how European institutions discursively construct European identity in official discourse. More specifically, my research is based on the following assumptions:

- (i) in a Faircloughian sense, language is a social practice determined by historically and ideologically grown social structures – i.e. language as discourse (Fairclough, 1989, p. 17);
- (ii) structure and practices have a dialectic relationship to the extent that these sets of historically and ideologically determined conventions which make up language have effects upon social interactions, “and so contributes to social continuity and social change” (*ibidem*);
- (iii) at a deeper level, languages and using language – i.e. speech acts – shape social or cultural identities – what Butler refers to as language *performativity* (Butler, 1997);

(iv) language and identity have a dialectic relationship, to the extent that language “manifest ‘who we are’, and we define reality partly through our language and linguistic behaviour” (Wodak, 2011, p. 216).

Furthermore, the research model of this study is inspired by Baldry and Thibault’s Systemic Functional-Multimodal Discourse Analysis (2009) and Sinclair’s lexico-grammatical approach (1991); these are employed to show the extent of the EU’s orientation towards the emergence of a European identity and to illustrate the discursive manifestations underlining this orientation. This article illustrates the first case study taken from an original research paper,² that is to say the first audiovisual commercial developed by the EP for the 2014 electoral campaign.

2. The corpus and main methodology

Since 2004, the EP Secretary-General has on each occasion mandated the services of the European Parliament to develop a mass information and awareness campaign for forthcoming European elections. As with the previous elections, also for the 2014 European elections the Bureau developed an institutional communications campaign, whose slogan was *This time it’s different*.

One way in which the 2014 campaign was certainly different from previous campaigns is that for the 2014 EP elections campaign the European Parliament made use of a wide range of flexible communication tools including social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. According to the research conducted in 2014 by the European Parliamentary Research Services on “Social media in election campaigning”, the use of social media in political campaigns across Europe has significantly increased in recent years. While the ultimate effect of this usage remains unclear, many observers stress the key role of social media in increasing levels of citizens political engagement – particularly among young people, who are the most detached from politics and voting – to the extent that individuals’ connectivity facilitates the reception of (political) messages at any location, at any time, also encouraging citizens to communicate directly with candidates. This is all achieved “for a fraction of the cost of conventional communication and at much greater speed” (European Parliamentary Research Services, 2014, p. 5). Among the wide range of social media channels employed during the electoral period, we have focused on the EP YouTube channel as a focal source of data giving access to the full set of promotional videos conceived and diffused for the 2014 EP electoral campaign.

The 2014 EP audiovisual advertising campaign as stored on the EP official YouTube channel consists of 6 main collections of videos or playlists: (i) *Act. React. Impact*. (ii) *What we do*; (iii) *Towards the elections*; (iv) *Election night*; (v) *After elections*; (vi) *Share your opinion*. The original research paper focused on 8 videos, which have been selected on the basis of a set of common internal and external criteria. To be more precise, as Sinclair (1994) points out:

[m]any corpus linguists distinguish between two categories of criteria for the classification of texts in corpora. These categories are 1) external criteria which concern the participants, the communicative function, the occasion and the social setting and 2) internal criteria which concern the recurrence of language patterns within the piece of language. (Sinclair 1994, cited in Pearson, 1998, p. 52)

In this research, external criteria refer to the predominant conative-exhortative function of texts under investigation, whereas internal criteria concern the recurrence of on/off-screen verbatim transcriptions of the verbal component.

As stated above, this study illustrates the first audiovisual commercial broadcast by the EP for the 2014 EP audiovisual electoral campaign. Major findings and some theoretical reflections will then be drawn together in the conclusion.

The main technique used for analysing our audiovisual corpus is Multimodal Discourse Analysis (henceforth MDA) “which extends the study of language per se to the study of language in

² Picciuolo, M. (2015) *In Search of a European Identity: a Multimodal Discourse Analysis of the 2014 European Parliament Election Campaign*. Unpublished Master’s thesis. Bologna, Italy: University of Bologna. The original paper examines how European institutions construct European identity in official discourse through the analysis of a sample of institutional data – eight out of thirty-nine audiovisual commercials developed by the EP for the 2014 EP electoral campaign.

combination with other resources" (O'Halloran, 2011, p. 121), such as text, image, music, gesture and space. More particularly this analysis adopts Baldry and Thibault (2009) Systemic Functional approach to MDA (SF-MDA) which combines multimodal text analysis and multimodal transcription. There are two main reasons for choosing this methodology. First, in dealing with TV advertisements, Baldry and Thibault are among the few that have approached dynamic texts from a multimodal perspective. As such, they offer an analytical methodological framework based on the use of matrices in which each column corresponds to the selected communicative modes – i.e. visual frame p/s, visual image, kinesic action and soundtrack – whereas the elements that occur simultaneously are displayed horizontally. They then proceed with the transcription of the selected modes through the use of glossa, providing, for each visual frame, a metafunctional interpretation of phases and subphases. In Halliday's terms, metafunctions relate to "certain basic functions of language" (Halliday, 1970, p. 142) that allow language users to accomplish their social ends. These "certain basic functions of language" correspond to three aspects of linguistic meaning: the *experiential* (or ideational) meaning refers to the semiotic choices made in order to represent people/places/things in the world; the *interpersonal* (or orientational) meaning refers to the semiotic resources employed in discourse aiming to create relationship between participants; the *textual* (or organizational) meaning refers to the way in which these meanings are organised in a text. However, as Baldry and Thibault (2006) suggest, metafunctional analysis can be applied to modes other than verbal language. For example, gaze can function as a deictic (e.g. a character looking straight at the viewer), used interpersonally to engage the interlocutor. But gaze can also express "textual meaning, serving, in particular, to create phoric (indexical) links to relevant objects in the perceptual purview of interlocutors, either alone or in conjunction with other resources" (Baldry and Thibault, 2006, p. 167).

Furthermore, in Baldry and Thibault's methodology – which combines Halliday's systemic functional linguistics with Hjelmslev's theory of the sign-relation (Hjelmslev, 1953) and Gregory's phasal analysis of literary texts (Gregory, 2002, cited in Baldry and Thibault, 2006, p. 184) – each multimodal text is treated as a "stratified system" (Baldry and Thibault, 2006, p. 236) in which small-scale units and larger-scale units are related to each other "in the given hierarchy of semiotic relations" (*ibidem*, p. 144), and all participate in the meaning and the function of the text. Their phasal analysis focuses, on six "scalar levels" – visual transitivity frame, shot, subphase, phase, macrophases and whole text – which function on different "meaning levels" (*ibidem*). As a result, Baldry and Thibault focus on all aspects multimodal data – temporal progression, visual image, kinesic action, verbal components and soundtrack – as facets of a single phenomenon.

However, one of the key objections made to Baldry and Thibault's analysis centres on the greater emphasis they place on the visual dimension rather than on the simultaneous enactment of "multiple resources (e.g. language, image, audio resources, embodied action and 3 dimensional objects) which combine to create meaning" (O'Halloran et al., 2014, p. 271) in multimodal phenomena. As Jewitt has pointed out, this is partly justified by their attempt to tackle the unfortunate trend in discourse analysis of treating the verbal component as more significant than the other modes (Jewitt, 2009, p. 35). Nevertheless, Baldry and Thibault's visual focus analysis "necessarily has limitations with regards to capturing [...] the inter-semiotic (or 'inter-modal') relations which give rise to semantic expansions in multimodal phenomena" (O'Halloran et al., 2014, p. 272).

Consequently, we intend to provide a further integration to their micro-analytical model by referring, for the analysis of verbal texts, to Sinclair's (1991) lexicogrammatical approach. In a very similar way to Baldry and Thibault's phasal analysis, according to Sinclair, meaning-making in a text is mostly phrasal, to the extent that "the lexical items that recur within and across different texts cumulatively impact text and intertextual meaning" (Flowerdew and Mahlberg, 2009, p. 66). Therefore, assuming that language has always a communicative purpose, by analysing its internal organization we intend to "observe the ways in which the meaning potential of lexis is actually activated in discourse in attempts to do things to hearers/readers" (Partington et al., 2013, p. 5). As a result, "four types of co-occurrence relations in extended lexico-semantic units" (Stubbs, 2001, p. 64) are investigated: collocation, colligation, semantic preference and semantic prosody. Before proceeding, however, it is important to stress that when dealing with very short texts, statistically significant co-occurrences of node-words are hard to obtain. More specific attention must be dedicated, therefore, to the lexical, syntactical and semantic relationship between words within each text.

To sum up, the methodological path of this study is as follows. As a general framework, we refer to Fairclough's three-stage model of CDA (Fairclough, 1989), comprising description – focusing on the formal properties of the text – interpretation – looking at the relationship between the text and the other semiotic resources co-occurring within the same text – and explanation – focusing on how identities are

constructed in discourse. More particularly, the descriptive stage involves two steps: first, each video will be transcribed making use of the technique adopted by Baldry and Thibault (2006) in their SF-MDA; secondly, the verbal component will be investigated separately from a lexical-grammatical perspective. In the interpretative stage, previous results will be combined from a macro-analytical and multifunctional perspective. Finally – the explanation stage – our main findings and theoretical reflections will be drawn together in the conclusion.

3. Act. React. Impact.

3.1 Multimodal transcription

This section includes key findings from the multimodal transcription of the *Act. React. Impact.* commercial, as shown in the Appendix.

3.2 Lexico-grammatical analysis

Through a close reading of the *Act. React. Impact.* text, we can distinguish 2 main parts composed of 5 sentences, as illustrated in the following table.

Table 3.2.1 Verbal component in the *Act. React. Impact* commercial

Part 1	Sentence 1	Clause 1	Begin. End. // Win. Lose. // Hold on. Move on. // Think global. Think local. // Dream. Wake up. // Agree. Disagree. // Think big. Think small. // Change. Never change. // Love. Hate. // Forgive. Never forget. // Look back. Look ahead.
	Sentence 2	Clause 2	We all face many choices and many issues.
		Clause 3	We all have our own views // but, in Europe, every opinion gets a fair chance.
	Sentence 3	Clause 4	The decisions of the European Parliament are driven by everything that matters to you.
		Clause 5	You have the power to decide.
Part 2	Sentence 4	Clause 6	European Parliament.
		Clause 7	Act. React. Impact.
	Sentence 5	Clause 8	[The European Parliament and You: www.europarl.eu #ep2014]

Sentence 1 consists of 11 antonymic pairs of imperatives which belong to two main groups: there are stative verbs – particularly mind verbs, expressing mental states (“think”, “agree”, “disagree”, “forgive”) and feelings (“love”, “hate”) – and action verbs (“begin”, “end”, “win”, “lose”, “hold on”, “move on”, “look”, “wake up”). *Sentence 2* is composed of two clauses – an independent clause (*Clause 1*), and a complex one (*Clause 2*) – both starting with the inclusive phrasing “we all”. Similarly, in *Sentence 3* there are 2 clauses – a complex one and an independent clause – both characterised by the use of the pronoun “you”. In *Sentence 4* there are 2 phrases in which the

“European Parliament” first appears together with the slogan for the electoral campaign. Finally, *Sentence 5* consists of non-spoken text.

This sub-categorization shows that the whole text is structured as a funnel, whereby each sentence proceeds with the focalization of the subject – from subject-less imperatives to the pronouns “we” and “you”. Moreover, the *Act. React. Impact.* text has a parallel structure, consisting of two main parts: in *Part 1*, *Sentence 1* and *2* provide a series of lexical, syntactical and semantic antonymic oppositions; these oppositions are then resolved in *Part 2*, particularly in *Clause 3* – through the adversative clause – as well as through the co-occurrence of “European Parliament” and the audience “you”, from *Sentence 3* to the end of the text.

This parallel structure became visible through the collocational choices and their accompanying semantic prosodies. More precisely, as noted above, antonymic oppositions in *Part 1* are expressed by the use of imperatives co-occurring in antonymic pairs in *Clause 1* as well as by the co-occurrence of lexical patterns (“choices” and “issues”, and “own [views]” and “every [opinion]”) in *Clause 2* and *3* which deliver an opposite emotional connotation, although they share the same semantic field. In this respect, there are three key aspects to be considered. First, advertising often makes use of imperatives to prompt an agentive reading since “imperatives have an urgent tonality” and their main function “is to express a call or a prohibition for an action” (Janoschka, 2004, p. 136). It is no coincidence, in fact, that the same title of the electoral campaign baseline consists of three verbs in the imperative – “Act. React. Impact.”.

Secondly, as Janoschka points out (*ibidem*), in web advertising imperatives usually express actions rather than states of mind. In this text, on the contrary, both verbs and nouns mainly refer to thoughts, beliefs and ideas (“matters”, “decide”, “face”, “driven”, “choices”, “issues”, “views”, “opinions”,). This choice seems to provide recognition of the influence affective and cognitive attitudes towards Europe have on Europeans’ behaviour in the EP elections. Moreover, given that EP electoral advertisements have been shown and translated in all EU countries, – although official subtitles are in English – the use of antonyms seems to be an effective discursive strategy, to the extent that “the distinction between contrasting and non-contrasting semantic relations is the most general distinction made by language users” (Murphy, 2003, pp. 175-6, cited in Davies, 2013, p. 20). In other words, as Davies suggests, “[t]he archetypicality of opposites seems to be found in all languages and hence, as a lexical relation, seems to be universal, although the specific nature of these relations varies across cultures” (Davies, 2013, p. 20).

Contrasting conditions and states of mind expressed in *Part 1* through lexical and verbal oppositions are resolved in *Part 2*. To express this in greater detail, the subordinate clause in *Sentence 3* marks a transition point: the adversative conjunction “but” followed by the locative prepositional phrase “in Europe” suggests that within the amalgam of diverse attitudes described in *Part 1* – through the rapid succession of antonymic subject-less verbs, then ascribed to a collective entity referred to through the plural pronoun ‘we’ – individuality (“every opinion”) finds its place in Europe. Moreover, the passive construction in *Clause 4* – “are driven by” – suggests a subordination of the decision-making process of the EU to the audience “you”. The object pronoun “you” in *Clause 4* becomes the subject in *Clause 5* and it co-occurs with semantically dense lexical items like “power” and “decide” that further enhance the agency of the audience. Finally, in *Sentence 4* “European Parliament” is followed by three imperatives which make up the slogan of the campaign, whereas in *Sentence 5* it is connected to the audience “you” through the conjunction “and” to suggest the idea of an equal cooperation between European institutions and European citizens.

In the next section we investigate how the verbal component combines with other simultaneously co-occurring semiotic patterns in the text to create multimodal meaningful relationships.

3.3 Multifunctional interpretation

In this section we integrate micro-analytical findings from the lexico-grammatical analysis of the verbal component in the *Act. React. Impact.* commercial into a comprehensive multifunctional interpretation of the same text. As stated previously, our attention focuses only on various semiotic features, according to their relevance to the main purposes of this study.

As shown in Table 3.1, the *Act. React. Impact.* text consists of 3 main phases: *Phase 1* consists of 22 frames, each one depicting a different scenario, although shots are lexically and thematically interrelated, as is shown below; frame 22 marks the first transition point to *Phase 2*, in which almost all actors in *Phase 1* stand in the foreground looking straight at the camera; frame 32 gradually fades out

and gives way to *Phase 3* which consists of 3 subphases reporting the slogans of the campaign in different ways, as will be described later.

From a general perspective, the *Act. React. Impact.* text is dominated by a *naturalistic* coding orientation: camera position is generally handheld, providing a high sense of realism, while medium close shots (MCS), generally frontal horizontal perspective (HP) and median vertical perspective (VP), encourages involvement and empathy among viewers, bringing the audience close to the action and putting them on an equal footing with the actors. Moreover, this case study provides a naturalistic auditory modality, making available to the viewer the real sound of things (a cry, seagulls singing, a harbour siren, voices, water noise, etc.). Natural elements are represented in their real colours, suggesting that the text intends to reflect the real world in which the elections will take place. This naturalistic orientation is further confirmed by looking at the main themes developed.

Act. React. Impact. revolves around three main topics – living conditions, the economy and the environment: they are visually represented through shots depicting *private* situations – except for frames 2, 7 and 20 concerning archive images from the fall of the Berlin wall, the Stock Exchange and WWII – that strengthen the viewer's empathy with the depicted scenes. As Biocca suggests (Biocca, 2014), viewers' identification with the depicted world of the advertisement "results in the activation of semantic links (feature set) through a process known as *semantic priming* [...] a kind of excitatory impulse fanning out from concept and variously activating links to whole networks of related concepts" (Biocca, 2014, p. 67). Characters in the *Act. React. Impact.* case study represent a broad sample of the EU population since they differ in race, sex, age group, and living conditions. In addition, *naturalistic* signs of clothing, gestures, background, sounds and so on, further strengthen in the viewers' mind a feeling of familiarity with the depicted world of the commercial. This intimate climate is further enhanced by the soundtrack employed. In *Phase 1* the soundtrack consists of three main components: the voice-over of the male speaker, the instrumental synthesised music playing in the background, and the real sounds of things, as noted above. With regard to the voice-over, the male narrator speaks softly and slowly, providing a somewhat mystical mood in *Phase 1*. Moreover, the fast rhythm of syllable succession makes his voice assertive without being aggressive, but leads the viewer's perception of the images depicted according to the emotions conveyed by his mystical voice – i.e. slow paced, assertive, and monologic. His voice overlaps with the synthesised solo piano playing in *Phase 1* and with naturalistic sounds heard in the background. Though auditory isochronism prevails in this case study – i.e. speech, music and sound co-occur simultaneously – the voice-over is more prominent and instrumental music together with naturalistic sounds merely play a supporting role, thus reinforcing textual cohesion. As a result, *Phase 1* serves interpersonally to make the viewer feel like a member of the depicted world of shared values.

Moreover, in *Phase 1* this world is textually mediated through the co-occurrence of oppositional pairs of antonymic concepts, expressed both visually and verbally. In greater detail, *Phase 1* consists of 22 frames which co-occur in pairs – at an equal pace with the voice-over – to represent contrasting attitudes towards Europe. According to Biocca (2014, pp. 68-9), oppositional linkage is fairly common in discourse, particularly in political discourse, so much so that "an opposition is rhetorically framed *as if* one concept logically necessitated the negation of the other (e.g. communism vs. democracy)".

To some extent, this observation confirms findings from our earlier lexico-grammatical analysis, for two main reasons. First, as noted in section 3.2, the co-occurrence of oppositional links in *Part 1* as well as in *Phase 1* is rhetorically framed in order to represent the full range of contrasting attitudes towards the EU. This promotes viewers' identification with them, to the extent that a wide range of issues concerning the EU are represented. However, more archetypical and abstract oppositional linkages – such as "begin", "end" – are combined with more effectively connoted and contemporary ones – such as "think global", "think local" – in order to strengthen the perception of incompatibility between different attitudes in Europe. This "lost in diversity" is dissolved within the EU, as emphasised in *Part 2* as well as in *Phase 1* by the prominence given by the voice-over to the accented rhythmic units "in Europe" as well as by the co-occurrence of "Europe" with positively connoted words such as "fair" and "chance".

Frame 22 marks a transition point: nearly all the actors appearing in *Phase 1* return in *Phase 2*, standing in front of the camera looking straight at the viewer. Indeed, in *Phase 2* prominence is given to the agent's body rather than to overall actions and particularly to his *gaze*. The actor's gaze provides here a strong intertextual coherence, to the extent that all the characters that appeared previously in different and separate scenarios are brought closer in a rapid succession of frames, in which each one stands in front of the camera looking straight at it. Moreover, contrary to *Phase 1*, where the agent's gaze served as indexes to orient the viewer to other relevant aspects of the physical environment, in

Phase 2 his/her gaze interpersonally functions as an exhortation towards viewers. This visual exhortation culminates in frame 32 when the speaker gives extra prominence to the word “you” and then pauses slightly before pronouncing the rest of the clause. Moreover, the simultaneous entry of drums at the beginning of *Phase 2* marks a shift in the emotional orientation of the text: from a lonely and introspective orientation in *Phase 1* to a more powerful and exhortative one in *Phase 2*. The narrator speaks normally here and his voice is slightly faster, providing a feeling of confidence and assertiveness. The falling melody, the end of the intonational phase and the image slowly fading out in frame 32, signal the end of *Phase 2*.

Phase 3 consists of 3 subphases: in the first one, frame 33 slowly fades in, revealing the image of the European continent at night, upon which the logo of the 2014 EP elections is written. The three nodal words of the electoral slogan appear singly at different times, accompanied by the voice of the speaker who pronounces them; when frame 33 fades out, the blurry image of the MEPs voting at the EP appears in the background, giving prominence to the non-spoken text, which reports a further slogan – “The European Parliament and You” – accompanied by references to the EP official website and to the key topic of the 2014 EP elections on Twitter. It is interesting to note here that the image in frame 34 textually functions as a verb in the phrase “The European Parliament and You”, suggesting agency. When the image in the background gradually fades out, only the written text in white fonts on a black background remains. In addition, in this last subphase, the complete absence of music maximizes the verbal component.

3.4 Summary of findings

Our SF-MDA of this case study has deconstructed the *Act. React. Impact.* commercial into its constituent subsets revealing that “the intersemiotic synergism” (Royce, 1998, p. 25) between several semiotic features co-occurring together within the text – particularly talk, music and sounds – contributes to the configuration of emotive and conative dimensions that are combined in specific discourse patterns. Indeed, it has been shown that both from lexical-grammatical and SF-multimodal perspectives, verbal patterns and imagery are mainly related to the cognitive and affective sphere with a high rate of stative verbs describing state-of-mind and shots mainly depicting “choices” and “issues” of everyday life.

A second fundamental result of our study concerns the way in which the EU legitimizes itself. As described above, the *Act. React. Impact.* case study has a parallel antonymic structure in which major issues in *Phase 1* are resolved in *Phase 2*. More precisely, *Phase 1* provides a sample of the most common feelings and attitudes towards the EU, thus strengthening viewers’ identification. Conversely, in *Phase 2* lexical and syntactical choices emphasize the decisive role played by the EU. Indeed, from a lexical-grammatical perspective, “Europe” co-occurs with positively connoted lexical items enhancing individuality – “every opinion” – and opportunity – “fair chance” – whereas the “European Parliament” appears in a passive construction thus emphasising the active role played by the audience – “you” – in the decision-making process within the EU. The prominence given to individuality in *Phase 2* is further enhanced by isochronous images depicting actors singly looking straight into the camera; the actors’ gaze, in point of fact, has a deep interpersonal meaning, directly exhorting viewers and prompting their agency (Baldry and Thibault, 2006, p. 167).

To conclude, *Act. React. Impact.* mainly revolves around three key issues: first, the *cultural* (affective) dimension of European identity, to the extent that EU is represented more in terms of shared values and contrasting attitudes rather than of political achievements and goals; secondly, the fear of the loss of *individual agency* in a collectivity – although there is no explicit reference in this case study to national interests; and lastly, a deficit in the legitimacy of the EU, since, as noted above, *Act. React. Impact.* rhetorically emphasizes the safeguarding role of the EU.

4. Conclusion

The case study presented in this research consistently show that the EU rhetoric of *unity in diversity* is discursively performed by constantly shuttling between two different and dichotomous symbolic spaces. On the one hand, unity mainly refers to the “affective” domain of identity; indeed, Europeans are positioned as belonging to a constructed world of shared values and personal issues that is less and less phrased in terms of common national, limited cultures, and increasingly as unity within an ideal human community bound together by a sense of common destiny. According to Kevin Robins (2006), this “has made it possible to expand mental and imaginative horizons beyond ethnic categorization, to

include other kinds of difference (such as gender, age or sexual orientation)” (Robins, 2006, p. 255; cited in Sassatelli, 2009, p. 194) thus working “towards the de-ethnicization of difference” (Robins, 2006, p. 255). As shown from the analysis carried out in this paper, indeed, no local particularity is shown in our audiovisual corpus insofar as case studies do not provide us with any visual evidence that different European countries are portrayed. Indeed, neither indoor nor outdoor spaces reproduce any stereotypical images of geographical places or local cultures. Similarly, shots represent common people and the activities of daily life, neither of which can be attributed to any particular European country, but belong rather to a commonly shared contemporary Western world of values. As a result, shots mainly recontextualize social practices in an abstract universe that enhances familiarity with the universe in the commercials and strengthens commonality among Europeans. Furthermore, imagery as well as verbal patterns are mainly related to the affective-emotional sphere with a high rate of stative verbs describing state-of-mind and shots mainly depicting “choices” and “issues” of everyday life. Consequently, the exhortative force of texts considered in this research mainly lies in viewers’ empathetic identification with the world of shared values depicted in the commercials.

However, individuals’ contrasting feelings and attitudes towards EU are expressed both verbally and visually through antonymic pairs of semantic concepts in order to suggest the irreconcilability between these sets of value, thereby conveying a message of ‘lost in diversity’. The “de-ethnicization” of diversity within the EU rhetoric has, indeed, two important consequences. On the one hand, it contributes to reducing the tension between national and European identities – which is considered to be the primary cause impeding the emergence of a European identity. As a result, the enhancement of diversity in terms of exaltation of individuals’ freedom of expression – of ideas, of attitudes, of belief – suggests that prominence is given to individuality within EU, despite the widespread fear that the normative pressure of a supranational collectivity might curtail individual autonomy. On the other hand, the “de-ethnicization” of diversity and the subsequent enhancement of individuality contribute to further strengthen the perception of incompatibility between different attitudes in Europe. In other words, diversity is assumed not to rely on a great but limited number of local cultural traditions, but rather on millions of Europeans, each with his/her own opinions. This, in turn, rhetorically suggests that there can be no choice between a ‘frightening’ anarchy and the government of the EU, thereby promoting its legitimacy. Indeed, by integrating lexico-grammatical analysis to the SF-MDA of case studies in this research, we found evidence that, from a macro-syntactic perspective, commercials mainly have a parallel antonymic structure in which major issues (both lexically and visually related to individualism) are solved within the “European Union” – which co-occurs with positively connoted lexical patterns suggesting fair government.

Moreover, in terms of method, integrating lexico-grammatical analysis into SF-MDA has proved to be an effective research method for the analysis of case studies in this research. Indeed, in audiovisual advertising, emotional strategies enhance the psychological attraction of the product for the target audience mainly by stimulating two senses – sound and sight (Lindstrom, 2005). This in turn implies that feelings, values and beliefs conveyed by images and sounds have the most influence on the target audience’s purchasing decisions. An in-depth analysis of the verbal content, as well as of the combination of the full set of semiotic features co-occurring within a text, therefore, allowed us to better identify meanings behind symbols and myths.

However, multimodal interpretation always presupposes a process of making assumptions about the meaning of a text that, while facilitating the identification of the most salient “foregrounded copatterning of selections” (Halliday and Hasan, 1985, p. 26), nevertheless affects findings in terms of subjectivity. Nonetheless, given that text is a meaning-based interactive event, in Halliday and Hasan’s terms (*ibidem*), and that a multimodal analyst is also a participant observer, it is precisely his/her subjective interpretation that actually activates functional meanings in discourse.

This leads us to a final consideration. Although qualitative researchers are participant observers, thereby observing phenomena as well as participating in that phenomena, they are nevertheless ‘privileged’ participants, since their scientific approach allows them to evaluate data from a higher critical perspective. In contrast, people embedded in society are particularly vulnerable when they are faced with the rhetoric of official institutions and, more generally, with “the fabric of popular consciousness” (Shore, 2000, p. 20). We should like, therefore, the instruments and findings presented in this paper to contribute to increasing awareness among the audience, thereby encouraging their active reception of official discourses and propaganda. We believe, indeed, that at a time in which the EU asks us to “Act. React. Impact.” critical thinking underlies independent and interdependent decision

making. Only when this is achieved can we move forward with the work of shaping our society and our future.

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T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
1 (5,57)		<p>CP: handheld HP: oblique VP: median D: MCS VC: interior of a delivery room, midwives, a newborn child, and his mother VS: newborn child CO: naturalistic VF: near; midwives' supervisory gaze directed to newborn; mother's directed to son; son's directed to his mother</p>	<p>In a delivery room, midwives bring the newborn to his mother.</p>	<p>{RG} [the cry of an infant. V: f]; SI [synthesizer keyboard piano. V: p]; SI *begin V: p; SI Tempo: M</p>	<p>PHASE 1 EXP: Actors; actions. A mother gives birth to her son. INT: The viewer is positioned as belonging to the depicted world and its shared values. The instrumental music creates an introspective mood, and contrasts the assertiveness of the voice over. TEX: hyperthematic function. The gaze is <i>phoric</i> (indexical), and links to other relevant aspects of the physical/ abstract perceptual purview of the audience.</p>



T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
2 (3,30)		CP: handheld HP: frontal/oblique VP: median D: MCS VC: a wall dismantled, people, the German flag VS: the wall CO: naturalistic VF: median; people's gaze directed to the wall and to those dismantling it	People dismantle the Berlin wall.	{RG} [people voices. V: p] [synthesizer keyboard piano. V: p] *end. V: p Tempo: M	People dismantle the Berlin wall.
3 (3,33)		CP: panning HP: oblique/frontal VP: median/low D: MLS/ MCS VC: a gym, young girls gymnasts, a little girl gymnast VS: a little girl gymnast CO: naturalistic VF: median; a little girl gymnast looking forward CR: red	Young girl gymnasts train in a gym in the background, while a little gymnast performs an exercise closer to the camera.	{RG} [hand and foot noise. V: pp] [synthesizer keyboard piano. V: p] *win. V: p Tempo: M	A young gymnast performs an exercise.



T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
4 (3,77)		<p>CP: stationary HP: oblique/slightly oblique VP: median D: MLS/MCS VC: a man and a young boy, indices of poor living conditions (an open luggage full of things, a car parked at a peripheral lot), a toothbrush, a tie VS: a distinguished man and his young son living in poor conditions CO: naturalistic VF: median; father's gaze directed to son; son gazing into emptiness</p>	<p>A distinguished middle-aged man wakes up his young son. He takes his son out of their car, parked in a periphery of the shot, and then helps him brush his teeth.</p>	<p>{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano. V: p] <i>*loose</i>. V: p Tempo: M</p>	<p>A father cares for his young child in spite of the adverse life conditions they face.</p>



T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
5 (3,10)		CP: dolly HP: oblique/frontal VP: median D: VCS/MLS VC: a horse, two old people, a horse-drawn farm wagon, the open countryside VS: two old people ride in a horse-drawn farm wagon in the open countryside CO: naturalistic VF: median; old men looking at the horse	Two old people ride a fast, horse-drawn farm wagon in the open countryside.	{RG} [horse cantering. V: pp] [synthesizer keyboard piano. V: p] *hold on. V: p Tempo: S	Two old people ride a horse-drawn farm wagon in the open countryside.
6 (2)		CP: dolly HP: slightly oblique VP: median D: MCS VC: a four-wheeled vehicle drives swiftly on an empty road VS: a futuristic four-wheeled vehicle CO: slightly surreal VF: median	A four-wheeled futuristic vehicle drives swiftly on an empty road.	{RG} [wheels on the road. V: pp] [synthesizer keyboard piano. V: p] *move on. V: p Tempo: M	A four-wheeled futuristic vehicle drives swiftly on an empty road.



T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
7 (1,76)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: high D: MLS VC: a number of men wearing suits and identification tags, an electronic box with green printing, the Stock Exchange VS: hands and arms movements, screaming voices CO: naturalistic VF: far; people looking at each other	A number of men wearing suits and identification tags have business dealings at the Stock Exchange. They speak loudly and move their hands and arms with frenzy.	{RG} [screaming voices in the background. V: pp] [synthesizer keyboard piano. V: p] <i>*think global.</i> V: p Tempo: M	The speculators work at the stock market.
8 (2)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: indices of local traditions (an open-air market, people selling fruit and vegetables, an old woman, simple clothes, a hen) VS: an old woman, simple clothes, a hen CO: naturalistic VF: median; viewer	People work at an open-air market, selling fruit and vegetables in the background, while an old woman in simple clothes holds a hen and says something.	{RG} [voices in the background. V: pp] [synthesizer keyboard piano. V: p] <i>*think local.</i> V: p Tempo: S	An old woman works at the open-air local market.



T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
9 (3,77)		CP: handheld/stationary HP: oblique VP: median D: VCS to MLS VC: indices of desperations (black refugees, a boat sailing the open sea at twilight) VS: a boat in the open sea CO: naturalistic VF: far; black men look at the horizon	A number of black people are sailing the open sea at twilight. Some of them dive into the sea still wearing their clothes.	{RG} [seagull singing; wind and water noise in the background. V: pp] [synthesizer keyboard piano. V: p] *dream. V: p Tempo: S	Migrants seek a way of salvation and throw themselves overboard.
10 (2,20)		CP: handheld/stationary HP: back VP: median D: CS VC: a young man, a cap and a backpack, mountains in the background VS: a blue sky, distant mountains, a cap CO: naturalistic VF: far; background	A young man with a cap and a pink backpack looks towards the distant mountains and the blue sky.	{RG} [birds singing. V: pp] [synthesizer keyboard piano. V: p] *dream. V: p Tempo: M	A young man observes the breathtaking view.


T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
11 (3,10)		CP: handheld/stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MLS/CS VC: a wedding hall, guests sitting at the tables, a white bride and a black bridegroom dancing CO: naturalistic VS: a white bride and a black bridegroom VF: median/near; guest's gaze directed to the couple; the couple getting married look at each other	In a wedding hall, guests are sitting at the tables looking at the couple getting married. They dance and look at each other. She is red-haired and white, while he is black.	{RG} [applauses in the background. V: pp] [synthesizer keyboard piano. V: p] *agree. V: p Tempo: M	A couple gets married in spite of their ethnic differences.
12 (4)		CP: handheld HP: oblique VP: median D: VCS/MCS VC: a street, armed police, demonstrators, fire CO: naturalistic VS: the fight between demonstrators and the police VF: near; policeman's gaze directed to the demonstrators; the demonstrators look at the policeman	At night, the armed police and robust demonstrators confront each other in the street.	{RG} [a burst and voices in the background. V: pp] [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] *disagree. V: p Tempo: S	The police and the demonstrators fight in the street.


T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
13 (2,43)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MLS VC: a tanker, the quiet and open sea, the dawn CO: naturalistic VS: the tanker VF: median	A tanker sails the quiet and open sea at dawn.	{RG} [harbor siren. V: p] [keyboard. V: p] <i>*think big.</i> V: p Tempo: M	A great tanker sails.
14 (2,44)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: a port's quay full of equipment, the city in the background, a sunny day, a young and an old man, a big, freshly caught fish CO: naturalistic VS: the two men and the big fish VF: median; viewer	In a sunny day, a young man and an older one are at the port's quay bringing a big, freshly caught fish in together.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*think small.</i> V: p Tempo: M	Two man proudly display the fish caught at the local fishing harbor.



T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
15 (4,93)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MLS VC: seagulls, a landfill site, a crane, a middle-aged man in suit, a sunny day CO: naturalistic VS: the waste mountain and the flock of seagulls VF: median; the middle-aged man looking around him	A sunny day. Seagulls sing and fly around a landfill site while a middle-aged man in suit looks around. In the background, a crane moves on the site.	{RG} [seagulls singing. V: p] [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] *change. V: p Tempo: M	A man walks in the middle of a landfill site full of waste.
16 (2,20)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MLS VC: a flock of sheep, a young men with a shepherd baton, earphones, a road that runs along a plain, a little house, a grey sky CO: naturalistic VS: a young men guiding a flock of sheep VF: median; the shepherd's gaze directed to the flock of sheep	A young man, dressed like many young people today, guides a flock of sheep on an empty road which runs along a plain.	{RG} [sheep bleating. V: p] [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] *never change. V: p Tempo: M	A contemporary young man guides a flock of sheep.



T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
17 (3,34)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: the bright sunlight, a couple of young lovers covered in mud, green trees CO: naturalistic VS: a couple of young lovers covered in mud VF: median; lovers' eyes are closed while kissing	The sun is high. A couple of young lovers covered in mud kiss, keeping their eyes closed. Green trees are in the background.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*love</i> . V: p Tempo: M	Two young lovers kiss outdoor.
18 (3,56)		CP: panning HP: slightly oblique/oblique VP: median D: MCS/MLS VC: a young boy, a rifle, rubble. CO: naturalistic VS: the armed and screaming young boy VF: median; boy's gaze directed forward	At dawn, a bare-chested young boy with a rifle screams and shoots, walking forward in an indefinitely closed space, full of rubble.	{RG} [the young boy screaming. V: f] [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*hate</i> . V: p Tempo: M	An angry bare-chested young boy shoots in an indefinitely closed space full of rubble.



T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
19 (1,54)		CP: handheld/stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: an old man in a suit, a stick, a military cap, military decorations and medals on the chest, a kitchen CO: naturalistic VS: the old man VF: median; viewer	An old man in a suit, sits down at the table in his kitchen holding a stick. He wears a military cap and a number of military decorations on his chest. He looks towards the viewer.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*forgive</i> . V: p Tempo: M	An old man wearing military decorations sits down quietly in his kitchen.
20 (1,73)		CP: handheld/stationary HP: back VP: low D: MLS VC: armed troops, a trench CO: naturalistic VS: the troop VF: median	Armed troops straddle the trench. The camera lies behind them.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*never forget</i> . V: p Tempo: M	Soldiers of World War II straddle the trench.



T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
21 (3)		<p>CP: handheld/stationary HP: oblique/back VP: low D: CS/MCS VC: Two old men, an old factory, green trees, a blue sky. CO: naturalistic VS: two men look at the old factory VF: median; men's gaze directed to the old factory</p>	<p>On a sunny day, two old men in the street look towards an old factory. The camera lies behind them.</p>	<p>{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*look back.</i> V: p Tempo: M</p>	<p>Two old men look back at their old local factory, now dismantled.</p>



T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
22 (3)	<p><i>Transition frame</i></p> 	<p>CP: handheld/stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: a hospital corridor, a woman, an infant, patient gowns CO: naturalistic VS: a mother and her newborn child VF: median; mother's gaze directed to her child first; then she looks at the viewer</p>	<p>A woman wears a patient gown and stands in the hospital corridor keeping her newborn child in her arms. She looks at him first; then she turns her gaze towards the camera.</p>	<p>{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. <u>Change in rhythm.</u> V: p] *look ahead. V: p Tempo: M</p>	<p>PHASE 2 A mother holds her baby, looking ahead to the camera. EXP: actors' gaze. The attention seems to be focused on viewers' agency. INT: exhortative function of gaze. The viewer is directly mobilised. Assertive mood of voiceover. Dynamic and powerful mood of drums. TEX: Gaze as <i>deictic</i> engaging the interlocutor. The gaze is a covariate and cohesive tie across shots.</p>


T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
23 (1)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: an empty wedding hall, a couple getting married CO: naturalistic VS: a couple getting married (she is white while her husband is black) VF: median; viewer	In an empty wedding hall, a couple getting married looks straight into the camera. He is black and she is white.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*we all faces.</i> V: f Tempo: M	The newly married couple stands in an empty hall and looks straight into the camera.
24 (2)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: police, demonstrators, fire, batons, a barefaced young men, a bandana CO: naturalistic VS: a barefaced young man, with a bandana lets down his chin, looks ahead VF: median; viewer	In a street, police and demonstrators fight in the background. In the forefront, a young, tattooed man lowers his bandana to show his face, and looks straight into the camera.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>* many choices.</i> V: f Tempo: M	A barefaced demonstrator looks straight at the camera, while the police and other demonstrators still fight.


T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
25 (2)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: a car parked in a street, a father in suit and his young son CO: naturalistic VS: a father and his son sit in their car luggage VF: median; viewer	A father and his son sit in their car with luggage, and look straight at the camera.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*and many issues.</i> V: f Tempo: M	A father and his young boy sit in their car/home and look straight at the camera.
26 (1)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: a girl covered in mud, a waterway and green trees in the background CO: naturalistic VS: a girl covered in mud VF: median; viewer	A girl covered in mud looks at the camera. A waterway and green trees are in the background.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*we all have our own views.</i> V: f Tempo: M	A young girl covered in mud looks straight at the viewer.


T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
27 (1,77)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: a young man casually dressed with earphones and a shepherd baton in his hands, a plain, a flock of sheep CO: naturalistic VS: a young man and a flock of sheep VF: median; viewer	A young man with earphones, casually dressed, stands in front of the camera and looks at the viewer, with a flock of sheep running behind him on the plains.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*but (#) in Europe (#).</i> V: f Tempo: M	A young man looks straight at the camera, keeping his earphones and a shepherd baton, while a flock of sheep grazes behind him. His gaze is directed to the viewer.
28 (2,77)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: indices of a career woman (a well-dressed woman wearing glasses, skyscrapers in the background) CO: naturalistic VS: a well-dressed woman VF: median; viewer	A career woman stands in front of the camera, looking at the viewer. Skyscrapers are in the background.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*every opinion gets a fair chance.</i> V: f Tempo: M	A well-dressed woman looks straight at the camera. Skyscrapers in the background.

T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
29 (2)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: an old man, old buildings CO: naturalistic VS: an old man looking disappointed (the corners of his mouth are directed downwards) VF: median; viewer	An old man stands in front of the camera. He looks disappointed as the corners of his mouth are directed downwards. There is an old building behind him, but the image is unfocused.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*The decisions of the European Parliament</i> V: f Tempo: M	An old man looks straight at the camera. He stands before the old local factory.
30 (2)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MLS VC: indices of a large family (youths from different ages stand one beside the other; there is only one older woman), a beautiful red house, a sunny day CO: naturalistic VS: a large family VF: median; viewer	On a sunny day, a group of youths of different ages stand before their beautiful red home.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*are driven by everything that.</i> V: f Tempo: M	A large young family stands before their home. They hug one another and look straight into the camera.

T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
31 (I)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: a young man with beard, wearing a cap and a backpack, mountains, a sunny day CO: naturalistic VS: a young man, mountains VF: median; viewer	On a sunny day, a young man with beard, wearing a shirt, a cap and a backpack, stands before a plateau and looks straight into the camera.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. V: p] <i>*matters to you (*)</i> . V: f Tempo: M	A young man on the summit of a plain looks straight at the camera.
32 (3,73)		CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: a little girl gymnast, a gym CO: naturalistic VS: a young girl gymnast VF: median; viewer	A little girl gymnast stands in front of the camera looking straight at the viewer. There is an empty gym in the background.	{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano and drums. Music fades out. V: p] <i>*You (*) have the power to decide</i> . V: f Tempo: M	A little girl is in her gym looking straight at the viewer.

<p>33</p> <p>(6,64)</p>	<p><i>Transition frame</i></p> 	<p>CP: stationary</p> <p>HP: frontal</p> <p>VP: median</p> <p>D: MCS</p> <p>VC: the word at night, the logo of the 2014 EP elections including a European flag and “European Parliament” written out in full , the electoral slogan</p> <p>CO: sensory</p> <p>VS: the European side of the world, the logo</p> <p>VF: median</p>	<p>The world is shown at night. The European side of the world appears in the foreground. The electoral logo and slogan appear gradually as the speaker pronounces it in words.</p>	<p>{RG}</p> <p>[synthesizer keyboard piano solo. V: p]</p> <p><i>*European Parliament. Act. React. Impact.</i> V: f</p> <p>Tempo: M</p>	<p>PHASE 3a</p> <p>The world is shown at night. The European continent appears in the foreground. The 2014 EP elections logo gradually fades in, accompanied by the voice of the narrator.</p> <p>EXP: EP electoral logo.</p> <p>INT: the use of imperatives prompts viewers’ agency. Moreover, the image of the European side of the world serves as a deictic, enhancing visual and affective proximity with the respondent.</p> <p>TEX: the music fading out and the assertiveness of the voice over signal the end of the commercial.</p>
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T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
34 (3,97)		<p>CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MLS VC: the European Parliament in the background, MEPs voting with arms lifted, a slogan, web references CO: informative VS: references to the website and EP 2014 elections key topic on Twitter VF: median</p>	<p>A low detailed image in the background portrays MEPs while voting, with their harms lifted. A slogan then appears, followed by two references to the EP official website, and the EP topic on Twitter.</p>	<p>{RG} [synthesizer keyboard piano solo. V: pp] Tempo: S</p>	<p>PHASE 3b</p> <p>The MEPs vote at the EP in the background. A slogan gradually appears, together with references to the EP official websites and EP elections key topic on Twitter.</p> <p>EXP: MEPs, further slogan, web references.</p> <p>INT: deictic “you” in written text mobilizes the interlocutor.</p> <p>TEX: condensation of the main message of the video.</p> <p>The image functions as a verb, thereby suggesting agency.</p>

T	Visual Frame	Visual Image	Kinesic Action	Soundtrack	Metafunctional interpretation Phases and subphases
35 (10,44)		<p>CP: stationary HP: frontal VP: median D: MCS VC: a black background, a slogan, references to the EP official website and EP 2014 elections key topic on Twitter CO: informative VS: references to the EP official website and Twitter hashtag VF: median CR: black and white</p>	<p>The previous image in the background fades out and is replaced by a black background. It has a high contrast with the white fonts used to write the final slogan and references to the EP official website and Twitter key topic.</p>	<p>{RG} [silence] *WT: <i>The European Parliament and you:</i> <i>www.EUROPARL.EU</i> <i>#EP2014</i> Tempo: S</p>	<p>PHASE 3c The background of the previous frame gradually fades-out. It remains only a black background which contrasts with the white fonts of the writing. EXP: black background, white fonts. INT: as above. TEX: condensation of the main message of the commercial.</p>

Recovering European identity in educational discourse or what do we mean when we discuss European identity as a language course subject?

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ABSTRACT

Educational emergence of European identity is not only of significant institutional and state policy importance but of political importance as well, as it conveys one aspect of the future citizenship in Europe. In this paper the textual construction of European identity is analyzed as a linguistic construction in the language textbook at the final grade of the Greek Lyceum. Using critical discourse analysis and Systemic Functional Linguistics, European identity is discussed not only as a special subject within a language course, closely connected to Greece's national identity and cultural direction, but as a linguistic clarification and reinforcement of both national and European identity (Fairclough, 2010; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Martin, 2000; Wodak, 2013; van Leeuwen, 2008). European identity includes national identity and vice versa. A projection of Greece into Europe and of Europe into Greece is educationally conveyed reflecting a historically driven identification of national identity with Europe.

Keywords: educational discourse, language learning discourse, European identity, textual construction.

INTRODUCTION

Identity construction is a process of doing and communicating subjects' participation in social contexts. It is therefore an order of acts and discourses out of many culturally situated options that make identity visible at a certain time and space (Giddens, 1991, p. 5; Ivanic, 1998; Wodak, Rudolf, & Martin, 2009, p. 9).

Educational contextualization of identity processes sheds light to these constructions framing and privileging or not various aspects of future citizenship as well as ideological dimensions of subjects' social participation (Karolewski, 2010, p. 40). These dimensions of identity politics construction are most obvious and subject to reflection and negotiation within language learning course. It is in language learning course that subjects focus on communicative discursive construction of identity of the who, what, when, how and why of the identity construction.

European identification is a collective identification process connected to language learning discourse in which European membership is textually constructed. Immersion and reflection on the processes involved in discursively conceptualizing European identity can enhance critical thinking and critical literacy aspects of language education and future citizenship.

1. Educational discourse

Educational discourses are embedded into the genre network of literate activities within schooling processes (Fairclough, 2005; Martin & Rose, 2008). They constitute multiple textual ways, *textual events* (Barton, Hamilton, & Ivanic, 2000) of meaning making, of goal setting of value inscriptions about education in learning contexts, ascribed in texts.

Text as a multi semiotic space and unit of linguistic analysis (Fairclough, 2012; Kress & Knapp, 1992) reveals the articulation of communicational practices and acts between subjects, their dialogues within educational settings thus inscribing their ideological meaning making imprint. Therefore, texts are the apparent educational material reality of educational discourses.

Educational discourses encompass a variety of texts and genres such as state policy texts, administrative texts, classroom dialogues, textbooks, other texts circulating in classroom, students and teachers' texts, the very act of teaching. Overall, they are related to all semiotic resources and subjects that make education possible at a given time and place, within a sociocultural context (Ivanic, 1998, p. 17).

Although educational discourses point at reality, they set a particular discourse of and on reality. What is of importance for their ideological aspect and construction is that educational discourses address even reality aspects not experienced by learners, closely framing their ideological dimensions of non-lived experiences and thus having powerful effects on learners' social representations and identities.

In describing, analyzing and reflecting on educational discourses we not only gain an internal perspective of the what, who and how of education and of learning processes but of their function and ideological implications into the sociocultural contexts in which these discourses occur as well (Pennycook, 2001, p. 81). As such, frames of both educational and social analysis are constructed, discussed and researched making critical discourse analysis a fruitful approach.

Moreover, in new critical literacy frames, educational discourse move further and challenge its sociocultural contexts reflecting subjects' negotiation processes with already existing sociocultural contexts, through which their social membership changes (Gee, 2008; Rogers & Mosley Wetzel, 2012).

1.1. Educational discourse and identity

Educational discourse conveys aspects of identity construction which transcend different fields both of life experience and scientific knowledge. Educational discourse is driven by a variety of identities, both life and academically already situated and potentially contested and negotiated within the institutional frame where educational discourse is deployed. Identities are, in that sense, not only ascribed into educational discourse and constructed by it reproducing social roles, actors, voices and positions but redesigning them as well. Within critical literacy, education is considered an area of dialogical interpretation, discussion and critique of identity construction, a discursive space of reflective dialogues on the laminations, interpretations, functions and ideological perspectives of identities.

Text, seen as a multi semiotic surface and unit of linguistic analysis (Fairclough, 2012; Kress & Knapp, 1992) embodies the articulation of practices and acts of these dialogues between subjects within educational settings as well as their broad sociocultural contexts.

Textual instantiation offers us an internal aspect of educational discourse as subjects position themselves on different disciplines as learning and knowledgeable individuals. In reading or producing a text, either oral or written, a person reflects on hers/ his educational, literate and sociocultural identity constructing and textually ascribing his/hers voice and position into the educational community of practice in which she/he is a member and at the same time broadening hers/his choices of social membership.

Selection of texts that circulate into classroom is first of all an ideological step of significant educational and political importance for state policy makers that addresses the educational reflections of future citizenship. In choosing texts and writers one chooses the projection of ideologies and identities that are considered educational valid and legitimate. Curriculum design is in situ an ideological textual and identity design, a constellation of the texts and identities to be read and produced in educational settings (Cammarata, 2016; Olssen, Codd, & O' Neil, 2004, p. 71).

More specifically, textbooks are aligned to state policy, they constitute the educational realization of learning along with a scientific grounding of the kind of social identity and citizenship a state currently addresses and is directed to. Respectively, textbooks overtly address aspects of national identity embedded in scientific knowledge and culture that a state considers educationally valid and legitimate (Curdt-Christiansen & Weninger, 2015; Mponidis, 2004; Olssen, Codd & O'Neil, 2004).

Textbooks are a comprehensive part of the official discourse of the state on the practices of education, scientifically framing learning contexts and socially accepted and prized identities and as such, textbooks are of significant research interest for education and learning and the relevant identities construction. Selection of texts and assignments tasks in textbooks reflect scientifically informed, discipline grounded knowledge, ideologically recontextualized into learning educational practices.

Within educational communities of practice subjects align or differentiate themselves from the available educational and social identities partially constructing their own identity as social actors (Sachinidou, 2016, pp. 364-366). Available educational and social identities are made more or less transparent and are subject to some kind of negotiation into their textual construction. In educational communities of practice, every text is the educational lens of the world and reflects the ways its producer engages himself/herself to the subject under discussion and presents hers/his discursive self (Ivanic, 1998, p. 25). As such, within educational communities of practice, individuality and social agency are textually constructed and can be critically negotiated as a result of subjects' available resources and choices (Jaffe, 2009).

Educational recontextualization of texts offers a new, different contextual framework from their initial communicational function. They are projections of life communication practices into educational ones. They move in a continuum between their initial communicational function and their educational one. Likewise, writer identities inscribe both the communicational function they aimed at, at the time of text production and their educational recontextualization. In reading a text in school one is rewriting its writer's construction in re-contextualizing the communicative situation. When a text is educationally re-used, its writer's identity is more or less a mentor identity, an official discourse identity for the subject under consideration, a powerful discourse which educationally shapes the reference horizon of the topic under negotiation (Howard, 1999).

Furthermore, educational recontextualization of texts is gradually throughout schooling, a move from experiential reality to an abstract reality construction, a mental reality far away from personal experiences, closely aligned with science. Hence, educational recontextualization of texts is a cognitively demanding and highly ideological recontextualization which presupposes critical analysis approaches to be fully educationally exploited.


1.2. Language learning discourse

Language learning is a special genre within educational discourses and in that sense, a special educational discourse (Sachinidou, 2016, pp. 80-82). It is a discourse with language for language and on how language shapes knowledge and communication. Language learning genre addresses reflective aspects of language communication offering us the discursive educational space for critical thinking on language as a basic, shared channel of intersubjective meaning making in sociocultural contexts. As such, it is the most apparent genre within a curriculum design where processes of communication and meaning making and consequent ideologies and identities are made more transparent and activate discussions on them (Curdt-Christiansen & Weninger, 2015).

Language learning genre transcends two interacted levels of language communication and relative contexts, laminations of the ecology of each textual instantiation (Barton, 2007) : a) the physical, where language communication occurs and b) the educational, where language communication reappears and is the subject of language education and practice. This kind of recontextualization, although also existing in other school courses, is a prerequisite in language learning genre, addressing communicational authenticity and language functionality aspects in language communication (Figure 1).

Interlocutors in language education practice language communication in light of both its communicational reality and context and its educational re-context, actively foregrounding its already existing intertextual dimensions (Sachinidou, 2016). Language apprenticeship conveys language communication in its communicational reality function and its educational redesign in which language is both a subject and a channel for a subject and gradually, a more cognitively and linguistically demanding redesign of abstract frames of scientific knowledge on various disciplines and topics (Grabe & Kaplan, 1996)

Figure 1. Language learning genre



Language learning discourses draw from a variety of orders of discourse genres, and identities, variety being an inherent characteristic of current language education. Apart from language communicational authenticity, language variation draws on communicational settings and experiences for which language learners have little or even no knowledge and experience. Thus, language learning discourses stimulate the already existing language communicational repertoires of learning subjects and enhance their communicational experience and knowledge (Gutierrez & Rogoff, 2003) possibly having subsequent implications on their meaning making strategies, ideology, values and participation in sociocultural contexts.

Participants in language learning contexts constantly negotiate, elaborate and collaborate in them and alter the apparently unified space of language learning genre. By distributing meanings in language learning genre they define, interpret and present themselves as language literate subjects and members of language community of practice and of the present sociocultural setting as well their envision of their future social membership (Sachinidou, 2016, pp. 387-388; van Dijk, 2006, p. 163).

1.2.1. Identity in language learning discourse

As subjects' participation changes the apparently unified space of language learning genre, issues of discursive construction identity arose as important foci of language education.

Identity construction is related to both its discursive production and interpretation by the recipient (Ivanic, 2005, pp. 391-392; Ivanic, 1998, pp. 10-11). It is a product and a process of *identification* according to Fairclough (Fairclough, 2003). This process is discursively constructed dynamically "inventing" and reinventing a community¹ of shared values, ideologies and literacy practices (Gee, 1996, p. 142). Identity is thus a socialization process, a process of a reflective membership and construction into the relevant community where discursive practices are deployed (Giddens, 1991, p. 3) and into the cognitively² constructed community of shared values, ideologies.

Within community of language practice, subjects textually position themselves and choose their textual self, negotiating their membership to a variety of available identities by aligning or dis aligning themselves and even dismantling ways of language use, of thought, of emotions, of beliefs, values and acts (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005, p. 596; Sachinidou, 2016, pp. 364-366). Every such use is culturally connected to a sociocultural context in which it takes meaning from (Wertsch, 1991, p. 140).

Therefore, to understand textual identity construction process is to understand the relevant discursive processes and the sociocultural context in and with which identity became into being. Moreover, by aligning or dis aligning from a textual identity, one is aligning or dis aligning from the interacting

¹ Following the idea of community invention of Bartholomae (Bartholomae, 1986: 4-5)

² The term cognitively constructed community instead of imaginative community refers to the cognitive construction of a reality through meaning making.

subjects (Brooke, 1988, p.34)³ the discursual processes and the sociocultural context in and with which identity became into being.

As such, in language learning genre, textual identity construction moves in two directions: a) the physical communicational reality and relevant discursual processes, interacting subjects and context within which texts are produced and b) the educational context within which texts are recontextualized for language learning.

Textual identity in language learning genre, as all textual identities, is a multilayered and multi-voiced process. It interweaves many layers of social membership, experienced or not by learners, simultaneously intermingling in a text within an educational context, not always transparent, to construct a communicational and an educational effective identity.

In the community of language practice, textual identities are projections of real life identities into an educational context mapping the shared values, ideologies, the educational and learning culture and the available negotiation moves which a subject can draw in constructing his/hers textual identity. Conversely, textual identities in language learning genre are acts of community building in both school and communicational context enhancing subjects' social participation and communicational and sociocultural repertoires.

These identities' spaces point to the desired social membership and relevant construction of social and discursual identity, language learning genre is directed to.

2. Research

2.1. Research questions

- i. How is European identity textually constructed in educational discourse as a language learning subject?
- ii. How is the relationship of European and Greek identities textually constructed in educational discourse as a language learning subject?
- iii. What linguistic means are they deployed?
- iv. What strategies are they employed in constructing the relationship between European and Greek national identity?

2.2. Material

A section of the textbook for the language course at the final grade of the senior high school (Lyceum) in Greece was chosen due to its thematic relevance to European Union.

The teaching section refers to persuasion in political discourse as a part of different forms of persuasion according to Aristotle whose theory on persuasion covers the first out of three chapters of the language textbook.

The first part of the section includes an excerpt from the speech that Konstantinos Karamanlis gave on the occasion of Greece's integration in European Community in 1979, followed by assignment tasks, thematically relevant to the text in question and expanding the subject under discussion on European educational programs.

2.3. Methodology

The subject of the study, the discursive construction of European identity actively introduced methods of transdisciplinary analysis from critical discourse studies, systemic functional linguistics and sociolinguistics.

Texts being the main focus of analysis, four frameworks that represent different concerns about discourse according to Bhatia (2004) were taken into consideration to construct an analysis protocol. Discourse as text, discourse as genre, discourse as professional practice and discourse as a social practice. In combination with Wodak's, Rudolf's and Martin's (2009) triangulation of context (Wodak, Rudolf, & Martin, 2009, p. 9) and dimensions of national identity analysis, analysis followed a bottom

³ Brooke (1988) supports the idea that a subject relates to another subject not to a text (Brooke, 1988: 34).

up and a bottom down analysis from linguistic utterances to contextual framing of discursive practices and vice versa.

Three dimensions were analyzed: a) content, b) strategies, and c) means and forms of realization.

Within means and forms of realization the consecutive categories were formed and analyzed: 1. lexical references to the concept of Europe and Greece, 2. grammatical category of lexical references, 3. processes, according to systemic functional grammar as described by Halliday and Matthiessen (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004), 4. person markers in the co-text of Europe's and Greece's lexical references, and 5. intensification system in lexical references to the concept of Europe and Greece.

Processes are connected to the linguistic marking of the ways something functions. Person markers are relevant to grammatical encoding of agency and positioning construction (Ahearn, 2012, pp. 28-39; Ahearn, 2001; Bamberg, 2010). Intensification system is related to evaluation system (Martin & White, 2005, pp. 64).

Frequency tables of the above categories were constructed to reveal and interpret attention and enhancement to preferred meanings and memorization attempts in ongoing persuasion (Allen, 1991; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Johnstone, 1994; Van Dijk, 1997, p. 35).

2.4 Data analysis

The teaching section, discourse as educational, professional practice, discourse as genre The teaching section of the language textbook in which Europe is a language learning topic is that of political discourses within the frame of persuasion according to Aristotle.

Six text excerpts are included in this section on political discourse, each with relevant task assignments: two political speeches, an excerpt from a political book, a political interview published in a journal and an excerpt from an academic book (Language textbook, Expression Essay Senior High School, part, C, 2011, pp. 68-83).

The focus text of analysis in the present paper is the second text, a political speech given by the prime minister of Greece, on the occasion of Greece's integration in European Community in 1979.

Introduction sketches some characteristics on political discourse: the desire for persuasion towards a decision or an act, its receptor as both an individual and social actor, logical and emotional aspects of argumentation, political discourses' connection to power and consequently fallacy and fear of receptors so as to exclude critical thinking by apparent concepts or words of moral dimension and thus its result to propaganda.

Educational discourse is projected to political discourse thus illustrating one professional discourse and practice into and through another and moreover reflecting language learning genre continuum contexts and language communication authenticity.

2.4.1. The text

The communicational context and genre are clearly stated before the text.

The integration of Greece in European Community was accomplished in 1979. More specifically, on the 28th of May, the Treaty on the integration of Greece in European Economic Community and in the European Community of Atomic Energy was signed at the Zappo Mansion. After the sign and in the presence of head of states, prime ministers, and foreign ministers of the nine other members of the Community, the prime minister of Greece at the time, Konstantinos Karamanlis gave the consequent *political speech* (Language textbook, Expression Essay, Senior High School, part, C, 2011, p. 72). Time, 1979, space, Zappo Mansion, field, a political deal, a Treaty, participants, head of states, prime ministers, and foreign ministers of the nine other members of the Community, the prime minister of Greece at the time, Konstantinos Karamanlis, topic, the integration of Greece in European Community, clearly design the textual context, set the frame for the reception of the text and support its communicational authenticity.

2.4.2.1. Content

The content of the text is comprised by the following claims:

1. Greece's integration in European community is a political, historical, fact, the end of a long and difficult process.

2. The importance of the political fact is further supported as a result of a long longed, personal, political vision.
3. Relation of Greece and Europe. Europe as hyperonymy of Greece (ευρώς). Linguistic relation on etymological grounds is stated as a projection of culture relation.
4. European identity as a supranational identity and a synthesis of spirits: Greek, Roman, Christian. Thus Greece is in inclusion to Europe.
5. Common civilization, the ground for the construction of New Europe.
6. European unification, the greatest political fact in the history of the continent and the course of humanity because a) balance of Forces b) independence of Europe c) enhancement of world order and peace.
7. Benefits of Greece's projection as to its inclusion in Europe: a) *enhancement* of national independence b) democratic freedoms c) accomplishment of economic development d) social and e) economic growth.
8. Presuppositions in order to participate in this effort: a) operate the constructive alterations b) institutional synchronization.
9. Conditions for the above: a) motivation and b) continuous activation of all c) understanding from our partners.
10. *Contribution of our country* (has the ambition to contribute within the limit of its potentials) *in the accomplishment of the idea of United Europe.*
11. *Potential contributions of Greece's integration to Europe: a). broader work distribution on the grounds of: 1. geographical position 2.political past 3.cultural status, (conditions for the development of broader economic and cultural relations with the Balkanic and Mediterranean area) 4.human resource spread in all continents 5. nautical power 6.contribution to the projection of European Idea*
12. European unification *progresses*. Difficult but categorical process and fact. *European unification is a point of no return*, appeal to opinion differences on issues of European unification.
13. Universal appeal of European Union. Negatively charged realities are altered by European unity. Reasons: a) peace guarantee, b) stabilization and rescue of democratic institutions, c) cultural, humanistic and ideological implications of European unification d) humanistic interpretation of economy.
14. Unification in contrast to isolationism and self-sufficiency is the solution to problems. There is need for a supranational construction.

2.4.2.2. Strategies

A deductive process is deployed from the fact, the sign of a treaty, on the occasion of which the speech was given, to Greek national and Europe supranational identity and finally to humanistic identity. During this logical process, Greek national identity is identified as a process of a historical, ongoing dialogue with European identity, a hyperonymy construction of national identity. Greece was and is in inclusion of Europe and vice versa. Europe's attribution as an intimate and broader linguistic (ευρώς) space for Greece is a linguistic projection and reflection of broader culture relations while inclusion of Greece's *fates* into Europe enhances present and future directions of these collective identities.

European cultural identity is presented as a synthesis of different ideological identities, thus constructing cultural community as a nexus of niches/beehives of ideological identities. Despite its final projection to humanistic identity, European identity is recognized as a synthesis of Greek, Roman, Christian spirit, thus excluding other cultural laminations.

Standpoints are of deductive attributive nature, that is, they are related to attributions on collective identities which are then analyzed to causal, temporal and conditional relations through categorical statements.

The writer starts with the fact of European Unity and ends his speech with it, designing a rhetorical circle, repeating the main idea of Greece's national identity in inclusion to Europe's supranational identity and thus designing a cognitive, mnemonic imprint for the receptors of his speech.

2.4.2.3. Means and forms of realization

Lexical references to the concept of Europe and of Greece *Europe is mainly constructed as a collective nominalised identity under the words Europe, Community, Common market (table 1).*

Table 1. Frequency of lexical references to Europe

Europe	Community	European	Communal	Partners	Common market	Europeans
32	5	15	1	1	1	2

The word *Europe* is in an inclusive sense to national identity as well as a spatial and cultural reference. *Community* projects commonality of elements as well as under the capital C, the political frame for European Union. *Common market* reflects the economical aspect of European Union. Emphasis is given to a hyponymy construction of Europe, inclusive of diverse aspects of a supranational collective identity, contextualized in the genre of political speech on the occasion of the sign of a treaty between nations.

Use of adjectives is of attributive value. It applies the european characterization in elements synthesing Europe and therefore further enhancing collectivity and content of European identity. *Communal idea*, *european idea*, *european space*, *european parliament*, *european union* are the nodes of european identity construction.

Subjective reference of community participation is inscribed to *Partners* and *Europeans*, projecting another aspect of collectivity, that of human participation and of a new citizenship within a new political frame, that of European Union.

Noun use is of higher frequency than adjective use (table 2).

Table 2. Frequency of grammatical categories in lexical references to Europe

Nouns	Adjectives
41 (70,69%)	17 (29,31%)

Table 3. Frequency of lexical references to Greece

Greek people	Greeks	Greece	My country	Our country	greek	Classical Hellenism	Total references
3	3	8	2	1	2	1	19

National identities are mainly constructed as inclusive nation noun identities (Greece). Subjective reference is of second frequency significance. Three subjective references are directed by political implications of citizenship (Greek People), three are followed by spatial geographical references individually related by possessive markers either in singular or in plural (my/our country) and three are of exclusively personified reference (Greeks). Only one direct historical reference to *greekness* is observed.

Table 4. Frequency of person markers in the co-text of lexical references to Europe and Greece

a singular	a plural
25	21

Person markers in the co-text of lexical references to Europe and Greece privilege the use of first singular (54, 35%) to first plural (45, 65%) (table 4). Despite its singularity, a' singular reflects a representation of an inclusion, that of a political role and status, the prime minister of Greece addressing state issues in a political event, that of integration of Greece into Europe (Fahnestock, 2011). Thus, although grammatico- syntactical in singular, relative person markers reflect a collective inclusive identity, that of the political representation of a national group (table 4, 5).

Table 5. Person markers in a' plural in the co-text of lexical references to Europe and Greece

<u>national inclusive</u>	<u>A' plural european inclusive</u>	<u>humanistic inclusive</u>
13	6	2

A' plural refers to three layers of collective identities: a) national inclusive, european inclusive, humanistic inclusive. Emphasis is given to national inclusive a' plural (61, 91%), followed by european inclusive (28, 57%) and humanistic inclusive (9,52%) plural.

Table 6. Frequency of processes in the co-text of Europe's references

Material Behavioral Mental Verbal Relational Existential Processes

7 3 34 2 14 0 58

Europe is mainly constructed through mental processes, a cognitive projection of subject's vision for Europe (table 6). Given the fact that Greece is in process of integration, dominance of mental processes is interpreted as a conditional projection of its integration. Relational processes are of evaluative nature. Attribution of characteristics implicitly evaluates Europe through categorical statements as reflections of reality. Material processes inscribe in metaphorical discourse the anthropomorphological aspect of the working steps for Europe's development. Greece and Europe are the inclusive nouns for subjects' action s towards Greece's integration to Europe.

Table7. Frequency of processes in the co-text of Greece's references

Material Behavioral Mental Verbal Relational Existential Processes

1 0 26 0 7 0 34

Greece is also mainly constructed through mental processes, a cognitive projection of subject's vision for Greece (table 7). Dominance of mental processes in lexical references for Greece, enhance the hypothesis already mentioned above that it can be interpreted as a conditional projection of Greece's integration to Europe. Relational processes are of evaluative nature. Attribution of characteristics implicitly evaluates Greece through categorical statements as reflections of reality.

Table 8. Intensification system

Intensification		Quality		Process	
101		66		35	
Quantification	number	mass/presence		proximity	diversity
13	3	0		7	3

Intensification system refers mainly to quality and secondly to process (table 8). Categorical statement of qualities inscribes more apparently than processes evaluation attitudes and products while constructing clear, positive standpoints (Martin & White, 2005). Greece's integration to Europe is clearly projected as a positive act.

Intensification in processes is less frequent. Volume is downsized when processes are stated. Steps to actions are less intensified than qualities.

Quantification relates first to proximity, secondly to number and thirdly to diversity. Proximity refers to both time and space. European unification and community construction are emphasized as present and future, close political orientations for both Europe and Greece.

2.4.2.4. Assignment tasks

Through the twenty assignments related to text, Europe is the main concept and referred thirty one times, under thirteen different wordings constructing its significance for the teaching section (table 10). Since Europe is the main textual topic in which assignments refer to, the above lexical frequency is expected. Europe is further emphasized as a unification process of community construction, a supranational identity closely related to new, positive dimensions in national education.

Table 9. Linguistic activities in assignment tasks

<u>Comprehension</u>	<u>Genre related</u>	<u>Linguistic functions</u>	<u>Discourse production</u>
5	4	7	4

Linguistic activities are text related. They enhance text understanding and writer's meaning making strategies and means. Indexicalization cues cross all dimensions of language function. They are explicitly stated and are open to negotiation, by guiding and constructing conceptual frames for learners' and teachers reflective understanding. Consequently, preceding textual construction of European and Greek identity can be educationally negotiated and reflected upon. Language learning context negotiates communicational context of speech within a critical pedagogy lens.

Table 10. Variety and frequency of lexical references to Europe in assignment tasks

1. United Europe	4
2. European Community	5
3. European civilization	3
4. European unification	1
5. Europe	4
6. European idea	2
7. European borders	1
8. Common Market	1
9. European Union	1
10. European dimension in education	1
11. European educational program	6
12. European Economic Community	1
13. European citizen	1

Frequency of lexical references to Europe indicates its thematic significance for the language learning section and explicitly states its discursive construction % (table 10).

Adjectives dominate lexical references to Europe (67, 74%) while nouns constitute 32, 29% (table 11). Broad referencing nouns are conceptually altered through their connection to a european adjective. Europe is constructed as the hyperonymy of social, economic, educational, political and cultural concepts.

Table 11. Nouns and adjectives in lexical references to Europe

Nouns	Adjectives
10	21

3. Discussion

Textual construction of European identity within educational discourse draws a nexus, a framework of learning and interpreting possibilities, attitudes and positions activating and stimulating subjects' knowledge and experience of identity textual construction. The subsequent question is what routes of meaning and identity construction subjects activate within educational settings.

In the Greek language textbook of senior high school, Europe is educationally constructed as a political discourse issue. Its contextual framing in the subchapter of political discourse within the language course book directs its genre perception by both teachers and learners.

Further, Europe as a thematic issue is related to political persuasion and relevant genres. Persuasion in political discourse is negatively charged within educational discourse. Rhetorical deception, emotional, misguided appeals, exercise of power through logical and linguistic deceptions and fallacies, and in that way distortion of critical thinking for its receptors are the characteristics of political discourse which are stated in the beginning of the chapter on political persuasion.

European identity is textually constructed in the political speech given by the prime minister of Greece on the occasion of the sign of the treaty, on the integration of Greece in European Community in 1979. Context is clearly stated before the text framing its teaching and learning exploitations and supporting communicational authenticity.

Textual analysis showed that:

Greek, European and Humanistic identities are in inclusion and co-construction to one another.

Europe is mainly constructed as a collective noun identity as well as an adjective formation of its synthesis elements.

Greece and Europe are mainly projected as anthropological, metaphorical conceptions of collective, social individuality.

Emphasis is given to institutional aspects in process of unification, of community, participation and synthesis, contextually embedded in the course of relevant actions to the signed treaty. Institutional aspects of individual actions are emphasized further accentuating democratic beliefs and attitudes within a supranational political, economic, social and cultural space, that of Europe.

Processes indicate that Greece and Europe are mainly mental and relational constructs of cognitive and attributive identities and certain aspects of citizenship through categorical statements.

Collective identities are culturally reinforced through an inductive projection to humanistic and universal identity. Hence, plurality of collective identities gives place to an inclusive grammaticosyntactic singularity of a collective, universal identity reflecting layers and niches of different collective identities as both a process and a product construction.

Intensification of products and quantification of proximity reinforce standpoints on Greece's integration to Europe and their inclusion to one another. End of actions, results involved in the unification processes arise as important standpoints in the argumentation for the benefits of Europe's unification process. Proximity both in time and space re accentuate Europe's unification benefits. Both past and present as well as geographical and cultural space enhance/support proximity of time and space as an explicit or implicit warrant of writer's argumentation strategies (Wodak, Rudolf, & Martin, 2009, p. 43).

Evaluation is strongly but implicitly stated through assertive expressions linguistically supporting factuality and objective truth (Fairclough, 1995, p. 3; Martin & White, 2005).

Assignment tasks are text oriented. They encourage educational exploitation of critical thinking and metaknowledge strategies on textual construction of Europe stimulating and supporting critical literacy. Furthermore, educational enhancement and exploitation of Europe in connection to education arise as a strategic ideological construct transcending and connecting thematic content (Europe) of textbook section to context of professional discourse (education) and to social discourse (political discourse).

Educational exploitation of Europe as a discursive construct in the language course textbook draws a framework of possibilities and negotiation moves for learners and teachers to exploit. As "Europe has no sense per se, but is a discursive construct" (Strath & Wodak, 2009, p. 15) it's textual construction in language textbooks activates contextualization cues for learning and teaching subjects to negotiate, to align or not with them, thus directing a significant activation for its ideological dimensions and language learning within educational settings.

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Appendix: Text

Karamanlis speech (excerpt)

Mister President,

Dear Prime Ministers,

President of the Commission

Presidents of the European Communities,

Ministers,

Ladies and gentlemen,

I wish to express my sincere joy, which is joy of the Greek People for your presence in my country, which is as of today and your country. A presence that honors Greece and testifies the importance you attach to our membership in the Community.

At this historic moment that the end of a process is marked, and the identification of our destinies with Europe is surrounded with a festive way, I wish to thank first the political leaders of the Nine countries of the Community. Thanks to its understanding and prompt interventions diverse difficulties have been overcome and the signed agreement has been achieved.

It was thus confirmed once again that the European Community is neither nor it wishes to become an exclusive club of the rich.

I also consider my duty to highlight the contribution of the Commission. Both the Commission and the administrative and technical staff worked to this end with a scientific conscientiousness, objectivity and sincere dedication to Community Idea.

Finally, I feel the duty to pay tribute to the ultimate and the closer pioneers of the European idea.

Personally I feel at this moment deeply moved. A stable vision and an unwavering belief in the necessity of a United Europe and European destiny of my country find today, after 18 years, their vindication.

The entrance of Greece in the European Community, although a momentous historical event, it does not, however, mean climate change for my country. Europe with its Greek name is a familiar space, since its culture is a synthesis of the Greek, Roman and Christian spirit. A composition in which, as I have already said before, the Greek spirit contributed the idea of freedom, truth and beauty, the Roman spirit the idea of the state and law and Christianity faith and love.

On this common culture we are called on to build the new Europe.

I believe that the unification of Europe will be the biggest political event in the history of our Continent. It is an event that will affect not only the fate of Europe, but also the course of humanity. That is because it would balance the Power relationships in the world; it will ensure the independence of Europe and will contribute to the consolidation of world order and peace.

Greece is coming to Europe with the certainty that in the context of European solidarity national independence for all parts is embedded, democratic freedoms are enshrined, economic growth is achieved and social and economic progress is made a common fruit with the cooperation of all.

And to participate in this effort, we have decided to try the structural changes and the institutional modernizations, which will facilitate our progress. We are conscious of the difficulties. But we are optimistic that with the motivation of all, the constant vigilance, and understanding on behalf of our Partners, we will overcome the difficulties. We have learned from Classic Hellenism that "The good are difficult".

At the same time our country aspires to contribute, within its abilities, to the realization of the idea of a united Europe, in which deeply believes. Hellas believes that we can offer the possibility of a wider project distribution, based on comparative advantages. Its geographical position, its political past and its cultural level offer the conditions of development of broader economic and cultural relations with the Balkans and the Mediterranean region.

Hellas is the gate keeper of the European borders and the Mediterranean balcony of the Common Market. With its installed workforce in all continents and its maritime power, it can contribute to the promotion of the European idea.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The unifying Europe process advances irreversible. We are at the point where of no return. It took a lot of blood and a lot of time for the Europeans to realize their identity, their common roots and their common mission. Consolidation, although slow, moves with a deterministic character. Despite the difference of opinions regarding the pace, the form and extent of consolidation, the logic of history made Union a categorical imperative.

United Europe will constitute, as I said, a point of great significance in the world history of peace, of freedom and spirit. Its human resources and its cultural heritage guarantee the above.

Above all, European Union will stand as a decisive factor for world peace. That is because with its validity and strength European Union will decisively affect international developments, starting from its own space. European area has always been the theater and the source of major conflicts. If the Balkans were once considered the powder keg of Europe, Europe was the powder keg of the world. The mere fact that under the current phase of cooperation national prejudices were abandoned, historical hatreds were eliminated and lasting conflicts were bridged, all the above would be enough to justify the idea of European unity.

It will stabilize and, I would say, will rescue our democratic institutions, surpassing today undoubtful crisis. That is because only in the major European region it will be possible to create a broader base for the reform of the Republic and the adjustment to the conditions of our time. It is obvious that despite the huge progress within the technical and scientific fields, the political thought of human remains stagnant. If one studies Plato and Thucydides, he will find out that the civic and political problems of our time are the same as the problems of their time. With the modernization of the Republic it may again be reduced as a primary value the virtue of the citizen, that "who knows to rule and to be ruled" according to Aristotle. And the basic principles of freedom and justice will be founded on the basis of civic responsibility which restricts the abuse of freedom and guarantees the proper functioning of democratic institutions.

With unification, European culture will also be rescued and subsequently it will be promoted. It is obvious that this culture is facing the risk of decline. The mankind passes today a critical transition period, which is characterized by deep, universal concern. Concern manifested in various forms, from stress to violence. That is because the man of our time wants to move from a way of life and is looking for a new one. And this change only Europe can offer....[....]

The confusion of ideas, the eudemonism with the cruel rationalism, which tends to ignore the man as object of social cohabitation, they contort the cultural paradigm of Europe.

The challenge of the survival of our civilization can only be addressed by the reform of institutions and the reconnection of rationality with emotion, that is of Apollo with Dionysus. It is time the European Faust attempts a new journey in the country of moderation and balance, so as to bring forth Eforiona again. Europe, which gave birth to all ideas, is the only way to refresh and humanize them again. It only remains not to have as a primary objective of European Union material prosperity....[...]

Ladies and gentlemen,

With all already said, I tried to give the image that I have for the future Europe. An image that could be, in my opinion, the ideal of the new generation...[....]

But this will have to take a certain and definitive form to gain the time lost. Assuming that the return to the previous situation is unthinkable, we have no other option but to move forward with determination and courage. Stagnancy is the worst solution. If we solve the basic problem of the form that we will give Europe in the future, the procedures for its implementation will be simplified automatically. And in this effort the Greek people claim the honor and responsibility to participate. Greece as of today has finally accepted the historic challenge and its European fait. Maintaining our national identity, we have confidence in Europe and in Greece. We decided that we are all Europeans, as Churchill would say, and all Greeks, as we Shelley would have said. For, as Isocrates wrote, "Greeks are not the ones who were born in Greece, but all those who have adopted the spirit of the classic".

Section 4: Greek Aspects of European Identity

The dominant political narrative for Europe through Greek political speeches (1975-2015): the hope-despair vision of the European Union.

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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to depict aspects of the dominant political narrative for Europe as it is traced in paradigmatically selected Greek political speeches on crucial moments in the latest history of Greece and specifically throughout the post-1974 regime change period (Metapolitefsi). Using comparatively the method of discourse analysis, we intend to examine how the European ideal is represented in parallel with the ethnic and European identity of Greek people correlating this with the political reality (existing and created) and the historical context in the country and abroad. In such a framework, the emphasis is given on three representative speeches, announced by three, elected by the Greek people, prime ministers, (right-wing party Karamanlis, socialist Simitis, left-wing party Tsipras) corresponded also to the three main phases of the relationship of Greece with the European Union (the accession of Greece to EEC in 1979, the accession of Greece to EMU in 2000, Plenary Session of European Parliament in July 2015).

Keywords: political narrative, comparative discourse analysis, crisis, identity, vision, political reality.

THREE SPEECHES: THREE CRUCIAL MOMENTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF GREECE WITH EUROPE

This paper attempts to depict a picture of the evolving European identity of the Greek people during the post-regime change (after junta) period (1974-2015), that means during 40 years after, which is involved -as it will become vividly clear through the following comparative discourse analysis- with their national conscience and self conception. Thus, analyzing the discourse of three speeches of three Greek prime ministers, paradigmatically selected on three crucial moments of the relationship of Greece with Europe, we trace in a way, through the symbolic weight of the words, the choice of rhetoric devices and the macrostructure of the discourse, the substantial and significant character that this relation has been having for the Greek people, and that the participation in the European organization was a pivotal part of their collective fantasy and of the shaping of their national identity, constantly from the historical context of Cold War to the globalized context of Eurozone crisis since 2010.

Given that a discourse analysis of a political speech reveals the relation “with the political context, the political process, and the political system at large” (van Dijk, 1997, p. 44) in parallel with that “the political language doesn’t stem from its descriptions of a real world but rather from its reconstructions of the past, and its evocation of unobservable in the present, and of potentiality in the future” (Edelman, 1985, p. 392) and therefore “the usage of language is strategic” (Edelman, 1985, p. 392), these speeches could indicate the considered as dominant political direction of the Greek parties as for Europe with one common point: Diachronically the Greek political governmental parts move towards Europe and not against or away from it with significant differentiations of course between them as for the nature of this though unnegotiable relationship with Europe.

According to Yannis Voulgaris (2013, p. 438) the orientation of Greece from the very first of the Greek state is permanently towards the civilized West, a will that is constant and consists a substantial part of the Greek national identity and of the Greek international political choices. Moreover, it is being

developed a continuous conversation about the reasons which hold every time Greece back and away from this national desideratum.

It is also characteristic that the well known and extremely educated scholar Konstantinos Pop (1854), the introducer of the literary genre of neohellenic *chronografima*¹ in newborn Greece of 1848 writes in his column “Erga kai Imere” (“Works and Days”) in the popular magazine *Eyterpi* of the era: The Greek is by nature friend of the West, though he is not western (p.19).

The liberal Karamanlis’ narrative for Europe

The rebirth of a democratic Greece in 1974, with European institutional characteristics at least, is connected with the European vision that is promoted first and foremost by Konstantinos Karamanlis (1907-1998), the first elected prime minister, founder of the right wing party of New Democracy, in this new democratic era.² So on 28th May 1979 the Accession Deed is signed in Athens and after the ratification by the Greek Parliament of Greece one month later Greece on 28 June 1979 became the tenth member of the European Economic Community, a gradually enlarged community from then till nowadays, but also tending to a reduction and to a conflict as the stability of Eurozone is threatening from time to time of an -exit, either the ongoing Brexit, the Italexit or the thrilling Grexit. On the one hand, the coexistence of the people of the Old Continent in the cadre of EEC then, European Union now, raises automatically questions of political government, intercultural respect and economical issues. On the other hand, Karamanlis believes vividly that the Greek multidimensional progress will be materialized through the accession to the European Community.

*We belong to the West*³ is a monumental phrase of Konstantinos Karamanlis that expresses clearly this strategical political dogma that implies a forceful desire for Greece to be an equal European state. In the speech of Konstantinos Karamanlis (1979) on the crucial moment of the accession of Greece in this community we can trace basically a positive vision for Europe, realistic but in the meantime full of idealistic and romantic hope, an optimistic icon for a Europe of the future, that could be the ideal of the next generations, as he underlines. Karamanlis makes his speech in three parts, projecting firstly the value of solidarity expressing his gratitude to all the participants of the European Union for their help to integrate Greece in their union because of their sympathy and their in-time interventions, that means their substantial help to overcome the various obstacles.⁴ Nevertheless, he looks like he is deeply afraid of a negative perspective saying that Europe is not and it wouldn’t like to be a club and more over a club of rich. He is moved vividly because 18 years after, his initial vision of the European Greece comes true. The axis of all his speech is constructed on European idea, for which he personally had struggled and therefore he uses the first singular person without hesitation while, and against his political opponents who were hostile to Europe in that period, he considers the Greek integration to European Community natural for reasons that are exposed in the second part of the speech. He refers to New Europe that is going to be constructed on the base of the cultural community that interconnects European countries.

Thus, the principal argument of Karamanlis for the support of European idea is founded on the above described Europe, whose name, as he denotes, is derived from Greek language, underlying in a semiotic way the Greek historical roots of Europe. Therefore, Europe is the natural cultural environment for Greece as its civilization is, according to Karamanlis, the synthesis of ancient Greek, Latin and Christian spirit (the common religion) with the contribution respectively of different but equally significant values, which means: the Greek with the value of classical spirit, the virtues of truth

¹ Neohellenic *chronografima* is a literary genre born exclusively in the environment of Press. Through irony the writer depicts in a flash literature text the history of the minute and the second, as Pavlos Nirvanas, a great writer of the genre, wrote in 1928, (as cited in Vroutsi, 2015), representing by his microscope the everyday life of common people conducting the reader to a macroscopic philosophical view with the device of irony (Vroutsi, 2015)

² Karamanlis, born in Macedoine, was democratically elected prime minister of Greece in the post-regime change phase for two governmental periods (1974-1980) and two more periods President of Greek Republic. He found the conservative party of New Democracy in 1974. His contribution is mainly the reconstitution of democratic institutions in the inner and his decisive politics as for Europe.

³ This phrase said by Karamanlis in 1976 in the Greek Parliament provoked the ironic reaction of Andreas Papandreou, who was at the beginning Eurosceptic.

⁴ Apparently, Karamanlis here refers to the negotiation for the integration of Greece in European Union. The solidarity of course has been based on the criterion of the reinforcement of the newborn Greek Democracy in the context of the Cold War, something of which Karamanlis took advantage perfectly. So, though the economic terms were not fulfilled, finally Greece was accepted mainly for geopolitical reasons.

and harmony, the Latin with the values of state and law and the Christian with faith and love. All these constitute the palimpsest, we could say, of the common civilization of Europe which is the foundation of the whole European structure. So, the arguments of Karamanlis, of a European visionary leader, are cultural and historical, not economic. The economic element is not but the background of this movement of communication and unification of the European people and this cannot set obstacles, as he declares. Nevertheless, the fear of this leader for such an evolution has not been eclipsed out and he tries to send away such a possibility from the very first of his speech, as it is presented above. Such a view is derived from the fact that Karamanlis didn't base the argumentation of the application of Greece on technical elements but on the emergent need the new born Greek Democracy to be supported by the European Union in the cadre of the Cold War of his era (Karamouzi, 2014).

The central moral value in Karamanlis speech, that is referred again, is the so well known nowadays solidarity, that according to Karamanlis is the one and only that ensures the national independency, the democracy, the economic development and in general accomplishes firstly the social and secondly the economic progress of all the European members.

So in 1979 Karamanlis envisions a European Greece that makes her best to be better, to make radical, structural changes willingly through institutional modernization, having faith in the honest effort and simultaneously devoted to the European ideal, believing in its particularities, and its comparative advantages, which are according to him its geographical site, its political history and its cultural glory developing a communication-net with Balkans and Mediterranean people, that consists its unique contribution to the European community invoking one more time the classical thought with the ancient Greek maxim: the good things are difficult. Ironically and to our disappointment the same arguments in Tsipras speech (2015), not optimistically but somehow desperately, project the contemporary bitter reality that Karamanlis was afraid of thirty to forty years ago. Karamanlis refers to New Europe meaning the United Europe of equal member-states with respect to their particularities and emphasizes on it using a vivid metaphorical discourse. Thus in such a context he represents the triple European Identity of Greece as the Acritan for European borders, (how true is proved nowadays this enunciation), with a clear connotation of Byzantine Empire, and the Mediterranean balcony of the Common Market, that implies a perspective of view communication to the East and the South, giving simultaneously the international character of this identity projecting the Greek human resources having spread all over the world as well as its unique naval power, to conclude that such a portrait makes Greece with no doubt an authentic defender of the European idea.

Karamanlis multiplies the significance of all these above referred saying that the European unification is deterministic, inevitable despite the various problems and he visions a Europe as a contributor to the global peace and a decisive factor in the international affairs depicting it as the gunpowder store of the Whole World as respectively Balkans are for Europe.

Simultaneously, Europe will be according to Karamanlis the framework in which democracy, another Key-value in his speech, should be substantially reborn. Karamanlis constructs a common ideal of Europe and Greece which should be based on the model of the democratic citizen. Evoking Plato and the realism of the ancient historian Thucydides underlines the major value of the virtuous citizen, who, evoking Aristotle this time, knows to govern and to be governed projecting the concept of citizen's responsibility that is the guarantee of the function of the democratic institutions and investing in the Europe of citizen.⁵

He also denotes, almost forty years earlier, the declining character of European civilization and that the unification under such terms should redefine the model of European Civilization, that struggles for its survival (since then). Karamanlis suggests two solutions to this problem.

On the one hand, the first one realistic and rational: the modernization of the institutions. On the other hand, the other solution metaphorically enounced, that shows by the way how inspective was the first leader of the post-regime change period was, is expressed through the ancient Greek mythology and the spirit of Faust of German Goethe. It sounds a bit prophetic for the crucial relationship between the two countries and their people nowadays. Moreover, it alludes the real support of Germany, and not of France, to the integration of Greece and especially of Helmut Smith (Karamouzi, 2014). The second suggestion of Karamanlis is to be reconnected the rationalism with the emotionalism, the Apollo with

⁵ Karamanlis did nothing more but to follow the diachronic Greek concept about the national and in the meantime European identity of Greek people, that means grace to Ancient Greece, the Greek State belongs naturally to Europe (Voulgaris, 2013, p.p.439-440).

Bacchus.⁶ Its time, he continues, the European Faust to travel again to the land of measure and equilibration to reborn Euphorion, who is known as the symbol of the combination of classic spirit and Christianity. Karamanlis denotes that the most important condition of all these wealth is not to be set as the main target of European community. No doubt as for him the economic unification of Europe is deterministically imposed but for the basic purpose of human progress and development. Characteristically he underlines: the economy around people and not people around economy and he talks about a multi-dimension development that will ensure firstly the quality of life and will promote all over the world the idea of economic justice in favor of the less developed states, as was Greece of course. As if the right-wing party leader, but not sustainer of the new liberalist politics, as his successors, knew what would happen. In contrast, he rejects expressively the isolationism, the bulwarks of protectionism and the unachievable self-sufficiency introducing the liberal suggestion for the future of Europe.

Karamanlis in his speech underlines that is crucial to clarify what kind of Europe we want, all the members of the European Union (It still remains the crucial point) and he thinks that if that happens, everything will be much easier. Karamanlis, having already quoted Plato and Aristotle reminding the Greek roots of Europe, finished his speech defining the double Greek European identity interlacing three quotations in such a way: Conserving our national identity, we have faith as much in Europe, so much in Greece. We have decided to be all Europeans, as Churchill would say, but equally all Greeks, as Shelley would say. Because, as Isocrates wrote, Greeks are not those who are born in Greece, but all those who adopted the classic spirit. Thus, with these quotations of three great personalities of Europe, an English politician, a great contributor to the freedom of Europe in the Second World War, an English romantic poet and philhellene, and finally a Greek ancient orator Isocrates who introduced the idea of PanHellenism (and by connotation of Pan Europeanism). So, this evocation to the luminaries of the common culture of Greece and Europe in the end, his logical but also emotional argumentation, the invocation of the moral of Greek people, who are represented by him as a prime minister, and of the historical itinerary of Europe consist an admirable balanced argumentation with humanist orientation that reflects the values that are promoted during the negotiations.

The liberal Tsipras' narrative for Europe

At that point, it is appropriate to present the speech of the young (without memories of civil war and born just on the year of the beginning of post-regime change period, 1974) left wing party Prime Minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras (2015) because we could say that he closed in contrast with a hopeful despair towards European Union the circle that Konstantinos Karamanlis opened with a desperate hope for integration of Greece in the European Union. In the dipole hope-fear, fear is in Tsipras' speech nowadays eminent; by contrast with the speech of Karamanlis the hope is dominant and fear and despair is referred just as a, of course not negligible, possibility. Tsipras tries just after the referendum (July 2015) by almost the same means, logical and sentimental arguments to persuade European partners but with a different intonation. He emphasized in an urgent manner the value of dialogue as the substantial characteristic of a democratic Europe. He calls for logic and nominates the European parliament through a metaphor as the temple of Democracy where arguments are heard and arguments are criticized opening roads for a solution. In such a cadre, he alludes that the proposal should not have the form of a telegram-blackmail as it happened in July of 2015, just after the referendum. Reinforcing his opinion with the phrase of Greek ancient Themistocles (*Smite me, but first listen to me*)⁷ connects on the one hand the classical spirit of ancient Greece though in a negative environment of conflict and quarrel and this "smite me" connotes violence and absence of coordination and reminds the threat of Grexit. Naturally the initial references of Tsipras to the democratic character of the Union sounds a bit ironic given the cruel reality of politics of rigidity. Tsipras without denying his personal political responsibility, though obviously not giving prominence to this element as it is enounced in media of the paragraph (I have fully the responsibility of the five months' government) but he ensures and more for the black era in the daily life of Greek citizens. So, the culture of Greece comes back desperately in an anemic way, not with the dignity and pride way in

⁶ See how Alexis Tsipras in his speech tries to suggest in a desperate way somehow the Karamanlis view as a solution to Greek crisis, and simultaneously European crisis according to him. The two leaders try in parallel to construct a new Europe in such a way under different historical conditions of course.

⁷ This phrase is said by Themistocles to Euriviades just before the naval battle of Salamis (480 BC)

the speech of Karamanlis (1979), to reinforce the logical argumentation of the Prime Minister. In his narrative, he insists on the idealistic of the European Union using metaphorical devices. He defines emotionally Europe as our common home but instead of the optimism of Karamanlis here it is presented the full of despair conditions of life of Greek people while that is depicted through a cynical metaphor, such an experimental lab of rigidity.⁸ As we can contest comparatively in the recently published book of Karamouzi Irini (2014), the application of Greece also was accepted by the other member-states as the experimental paradigm of the integration of countries of South Europe.

The whole picture of the situation is full of dark colors through a chain of negative terms of impossible and vain: inflation, poverty, social margination, itinerary, constant rigidity, vicious circle, continuous and deep depression, unbelievable pressure, rescue programs, unbelievable effort of adaptation, programs of cruel rigidity, great unfair, dead end and the only light referred is that is expected to be seen at the end of the tunnel. Tsipras describes the situation logically with a number of references, statistics and concrete suggestions (development, sustainability of the Greek debt) because *sine qua non*, the emotional argumentation with which he begins and closes his speech indicating that the priority is the humanist face of Europe, couldn't be sufficient to persuade anybody. And though in case of Karamanlis Europe ignored the technical data prioritizing the political and geopolitical factors, in our globalized world the economic reality is the crucial criterium of political decisions. The pragmatic approach that Tsipras basically chooses is framed by this obvious sentimental mood throughout his speech as also the right-wing Karamanlis did, defending in the meantime the care of himself and his government for the social coherence in Greece something that it is expectable because of his left ideology. He presents a European environment of familiarity in the cadre of which it goes without saying solidarity. He points out a Europe of society and not of economy as many years ago Konstantinos Karamanlis described it. His left view on the socioeconomic cannot leave out the vision for Europe identifying with conservative Karamanlis and showing that only a Europe of values could be sustainable. Taboos cannot exist among us criticizing the hypocritical attitude of the members of European Union reminding the presuppositions of a real dialogue that searches a solution based on truth and honesty. According to Tsipras everything could be the talking point of a discussion in a democratic Europe in order the suitable solution to be found, independently of the problem every time.

Nevertheless, Tsipras speech reflects a negotiation between the winner and the loser and not between equally members of the European Union. Trying to be a rational analyst, insisting on the democratic values, Tsipras keeps in parallel warm (toward a somehow and partially hostile audience) the emotion, as Karamanlis had suggested. The crucial moment of the Greek state and the Greek people is connected absolutely with Europe. The Greece crisis mirrors not only its interior problems, that are referred by Tsipras honestly in the third part of his speech, confessing that the institutional modernization, that was suggested firstly in Karamanlis speech, has never realized in Greece. This crisis is connected by Tsipras in the end of his speech absolutely with the fate of Europe: Europe is on crucial crossroad. What we call Greek crisis is not but the whole weakness of Euro zone to find a definitive solution in a self-feeding crisis of debt. It is a European and not exclusively Greek problem. And to a European problem is demanded a European solution.

It is obvious that in Tsipras speech sentimental phrases are restricted and are rarely embedded. In contrast to the Karamanlis speech logic and emotion are connected harmonically. It is characteristic also that Tsipras doesn't use at all expressively the word solidarity, implying that the problem it's not just to give help to Greece but to rebuilt the European Union on its basic values of democracy and dialogue. So, the New Europe of Karamanlis apparently had never been an existing political reality, only created through the political speeches and Tsipras closing his speech reminds us desperately the history of European Union: The European history, is a history of conflicts but in the end of the day of compromise. But also, it is a history of converges and enlargements. A history of unity and not division projecting so a new vision for a sustainable Europe.

There is no enthusiasm for Europe in this speech, though there is a struggling faith in the European ideal, or exactly in a hidden vision of Europe, similar to Karamanlis, who emphasizes on that there is no other way for the European people but to coexist. The ancient Greek myth of Europe cannot inspire and persuade any more. The European dream in Tsipras speech is a hard reality of poverty, unemployment of millions, despotic financial system that means the absolute refutation of Europe of Simitis (2000) and his dominant political narrative and a tragic confirmation of the fears of Karamanlis and is given through a depressing picture, using also statistics, of a declined modern Greece: Greece

⁸ The acceptance of Greece in the European Union in 1979 was also experimental for the integration in general of the Southern states.

has reached the bailout because for too many years the Greek governments made the state a nepotistic realm, enhanced the corruption, tolerated or reinforced the transaction of political with economic power. He rejects responsibilities to the ex-governments that didn't want to realize these radical transformations pointing out: This is the real truth, implying not constructed by him, denoting that these transformations are the main aim of his government. And in the meantime, a reality made of daily blood from terrorist attacks of Muslim extremists sets in doubt the values system of western civilization. Finally, Tsipras tries to save the European perspective and encourages all the partners to be sincere. Because crisis means a chance to transform, to adapt without losing your identity.⁹ Tsipras, after the criticism for the responsibilities of Greek leaders and political parties for all this situation declares that he intends through radical changes to go decisively against to the established logic and mentality that sinks Greece and Europe equally.

The realistic Simitis' narrative

Kostas Simitis selected speech concerning the integration of Greece in Economic and Monetary Union in 2000, which means in the middle almost of the European itinerary of Greece, is constructed in four parts.

In the first part of the speech Simitis considers that the integration into EMU initiates for Greece a new era of safety and stability, development and wealth (1) in contrast to the image of a little and insecure Greece (1) that was in the margin of the great international evolutions (1).

The adjective "new" is repeated many times throughout the speech: new circle of development, dynamism and progress (4), new environment (5), new international position of the country (5), new perspectives (6), new level of stability and certainty (8) and in the end of the speech: For the people and the human, a new course of Greece in Europe, is the message of the new historical era (9). Consequently, in the second part of his speech, he presents all the profits for the Greek citizens that flow out from this new perspective and he underlines the new economic status of Greece constructing the image of the powerful Greece (8) having the vital economic, social and national interest fully reassured in the cadre of EMU and every citizen will have better chances and possibilities (3). The Greek people are presented as the main factor of this success thanks to their hard work (2), efforts (2), sacrifices (2) and therefore they are rewarded with this day of vindication and pride (2).

In the second part, Simitis reminds us of the historical action of two top Greek politicians, Konstantinos Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou, underlying in such a way the historical orientation of Greece to Europe and the whole previous historical circle of the 25 years till 2000.

In the third and the forth, and more extended part of the speech, full of economic terms, Simitis presents the benefits from the integration of Greece into EMU and the adoption of a coin with international valid and range (4), that compass the economic power of the other 11 partners (4). He gives with details the new characteristics of Greek economy with the perspective of long stability with increased grade of sureness in the field of economic politics (4). As he insists on, the transactional risks, the cost of the high interest rates, the uncertainty of the personal saving or business environment (4) are decreased. The healthy surplus (5) is going to be used for the extension of the social politics for the coherence and the solidarity (5). The pivots of governmental actions were the Stabilization (5), the Development (5), the Social Justice (5) and the triple, difficult (5) as he denotes, aim of their socialistic politics since 1996: nominative convergence, real convergence and social convergence (5). Finally, he ensures and more that the greatest benefit of this strategical politics of development will have the weaker citizens being he himself and his party consistent with the socialistic ideology.

The usage of metaphorical devices is rare in the cadre of realistic view of Simitis. Its notable to find these cases:

The first one is the phrase: Inside the EMU we have a shield of protection from the quakes of globalization (5) that projects vividly the major interest for Greece of this integration given the unstable international environment.

The second one emphasizes the real character of the emerging European Union that Simitis accepts without any skepticism, we could say. The most important phrase in the middle (actually at a not

⁹ According to Voulgaris (2013) is not always possible to transform crisis into chance for development, and especially in case of Greece that certainly a lot of time will be required with uncertain results.

featured point) of his speech is a phrase that reveals that Europe was not a place of democracy but a place of cruel rivalry and not of peaceful development and equal cooperation. Simitis says: In a Europe that has been transformed so quickly, Greece is in EMU, **in the hardcore of the first speed of Europe** (emphasized by me). And we should stay there (5) concluding that “a new itinerary of Greece in Europe” is beginning.

In the last part of his speech repeats again that his government is presenting today the powerful Greece, as an equal member **at the first speed** (emphasized by me) of European Union (8) hoping that in the future all Greeks will conduct Greece even higher, even farther (9).

So, Simitis in his speech accepts the de facto, we could say, division of Europe into rich and poor. So, on the one hand though Simitis refers to the benefits for the citizens of Greece of this economical integration and as a socialist, cares in the meantime about the social conditions in his country, on the other hand he accepts that Europe is already divided into the center of the hard core and the weak periphery. And he accepted this characteristic with realism without even thinking to change this Europe, without denouncing but just being proud of the fact that Greece succeeded not to be the pariah of Europe as other countries, without any reference to the values on which European edifice was founded. He is not grateful to the other members of European Union, he does not depict Europe as our common home, but in contrast as a place of competitive survival. So, in Simitis speech has already been emerged lightly what is Europe nowadays, a Europe of different speeds,¹⁰ emphasizing on the economic values, setting people around economy and not economy around people, as Karamanlis (1979) had wished.

Comparing and interpreting...

In sum, we could denote

as for Karamanlis' speech:

- The leader creates the ideal of New Europe presenting it despite his fears as an Eutopia.
- He reconstructs as a liberalist the reality projecting the soft means: the cultural, naval and geopolitical comparative benefits of Greece to underline the contribution of the latter to the European Union.
- He creates also the ideal of the triple identity of Greeks as an equal member (Greek, European, international).
- The rich intertextuality of his speech (maxims of classic antiquity and of European culture) implies an environment open, under changing, a cadre of dialogue between European members.
- He makes perfect use of the ancient Greek mythology and its symbolic significance.
- Humanist approach in general is dominant in his speech.
- The past is represented as the roots of all Europe, the present could become productive to form the new Europe.
- Vivid metaphorical devices and figures are used.

as for Simitis' speech:

- Plenty of economic data composes the argumentation of the orator.

¹⁰ As Heywood (2013) underlines the failure of Eurozone conducts to many speeds in European Union (p.p. 810-811).

- The lack of sentimentalism is obvious, though there are references to “human” as the center of the socialist politics.
- The lack of cultural references (Greek, European, international) is absolute.
- Realistic approach is adopted with no (explicit or allusive) intention of the orator to transform the reality of the Europe of two speeds.
- No myth for Europe is emerged from this speech.¹¹
- A descriptive representation of the new economic era is the main axis of the speech.
- The contrast between the unsafe past of little Greece and the dynamic present of its integration in EMU that creates positive perspectives for the future of the country in Europe of two (or maybe even more) speeds.
- The dominant thought centered on economy imposes the lack of intertextuality depriving the speech from a multidimension view of “dialogue” and the lack of vivid metaphorical devices from the emotional depth, characteristics that could inspire the audience.

as for Tsipras’ speech:

- A liberal approach emphasizes the democratic and humanist character of European Union.
- A struggle for the survival of the European ideal is clearly transfusing a moral character into the speech.
- A tone that denounces the negative points inside and outside the country is interlaced with the tone of apology.
- Dark icons of Greek crisis in present based on the sinful past of Greek politics and also of European strategies are represented by vivid metaphorical devices invoking the emotion of the audience. Nevertheless, the usage of metaphorical discourse is rare reinforcing the realistic approach of the orator.
- A constant willing to reform Europe exists throughout the speech indicating the hopeful orientation to the future.
- The restricted intertextuality depicts the lack of sentimental community of the members of the European Union, that after all restricts the horizon and sets obstacles and borders between its people against the European values.
- In general, restricted usage of metaphorical devices, lack of myth’s creation.
- There are no references to the Greek ancient heritage. It’s obvious that the new European identity of Greeks cannot be based any more on their well Known all over the world ancestors. They need a new myth of themselves based on their own creative productivity far away from parochial conceptions.

Epilogue

It is notable to end this approach with the speech of Manolis Glezos (2015), the overage combatant of Greek National Resistance who reciting on the one hand the ancient Greek language of Euripides in the European Parliament on the 7th of July 2015 and on the other hand the Latin Maxime of Thomas Aquinas makes an obvious allusion to the democratic lack of European Union reminding to

¹¹ According to Voulgaris (2013), Simitis and the ideology of modernization failed to produce a sui generis political discourse and to create a myth that could touch the collective fantasy of a society that was feeling unsafe (p.152).

everybody the Greek roots of Europe, but also the triple common cultural background of the Old Continent that had pointed out Karamanlis in his speech. Thus, the dominant political narrative in Greece for Europe in the post-regime change period through these significant speeches is in favor of Europe, that is always in a way the permanent ideal of Greeks. This ideal, substantial in the formation of the national identity, starts from the Greece of desperate hope vision of right-wing party Karamanlis and the Europe of creativity and solidarity, of the future and the next generations, through the Greece of the first speed realism of the socialist Simitis and the divided Europe of cruel antagonism, to the Greece of the tragic but also hopeful and faithful despair for Europe of left-wing party Tsipras, in a Europe of Grexit and Brexit, of refugees and terrorism, in the cadre of an economic but above all moral crisis. The myth of Europe is fading.

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That's not my democracy!

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ABSTRACT

Aristotle argued that what defines the members of a specific state is their shared perception of good and evil, just and unjust, useful and harmful. Through the power of speech those perceptions can be constructed and then preserved or altered through time. Politicians, being skillful speakers, can shape ideas, influence unsuspecting minds and persuade the public about a specific course of action. In the present paper, two political speeches by the Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, are the focus of discussion. They were both addressed to the Greek Parliament, the former before the referendum of July 5, 2015 and the latter after the referendum. Through the analysis, the various discursive strategies employed and the linguistic means used will be closely examined in pursuit of an understanding of how the concept of a Greek national identity is realized.

Keywords: debt crisis, referendum, democracy, identity, Greece

INTRODUCTION

In a broader sociopolitical and economic context of the European financial crisis and the recently elected Greek government its majority consisting of the left-wing party SYRIZA, on July 5, 2015, a referendum was held in Greece so that the Greek citizens could vote in favor of or against additional austerity measures proposed by their European partners. Prior to that, on June 28, the Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, delivered a speech at the Greek Parliament in order to convince the Members of Parliament to approve of the proposed referendum and give him authorization for the plebiscite. In the voting following the speech, the majority of the Greek MPs voted in favor with 178 votes while 120 voted against. In the referendum of July 5, 61% of the Greek people voted against austerity. However, shortly afterwards, on July 11, 2015, Alexis Tsipras addressed the Greek Parliament once again, discussing the loan agreement and the need for further negotiations with the creditors and consequently a third bailout program. Since the Prime Minister's argumentation strategies were effective enough to bring him the approval he wanted, it is worth looking at the linguistic means he used in order to achieve this result.

Data

The two speeches by the Greek Prime Minister mentioned in the previous section which were given before and after the referendum, on June 28 and July 11 comprise the data for this paper. The different points that are made in the analysis that follows are illustrated with examples taken from these two speeches, the relevant parts of which can be found in the Appendix.

Method

Following the model of the Vienna School of Discourse Analysis and more specifically in the theoretical framework of Discourse Historical Approach, three dimensions are going to be discussed in the analysis that follows: The contents or topics which are spoken about, the discursive strategies employed and the linguistic means used for the realization of both topics and strategies. (Wodak, 2011, p.38).

Analysis and Discussion

Topics

Five broad topics have been identified in the data:

- Historical significance of the moment to be remembered in the future.
- The narration of a common cultural and political past as a Greek nation where democracy was first established but also as a European member state with a long tradition of democracy.
- The narration of a common, political present during which the Greek people have been suffering by harsh austerity programs.
- The linguistic construction of an ethical, heroic and democratic government which has been trying for the past five months to negotiate with tough creditors.
- The linguistic construction of a common political future where democracy will be respected and Greece will continue to be a European Union member.

According to Kolakowski, (1995, as cited in Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl, Liebhart, 2009) five elements need to be employed in the construction of national identity: a) national spirit as an abstract quality manifested in ways of behaving, especially in critical times, b) historical memory, similar to Maurice Halbwachs's (1985) notion of collective memory, which by "recalling specific elements from the archive of historical memory" manages to maintain historical continuity (De Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak, 1999, p.155), c) anticipation and future orientation, d) the notion of national body and e) a nameable beginning, which functions as the starting point of historical time in people's consciousness.

Alexis Tsipras appeals to national spirit by referring to past generations that know how to fight at times of crises:

Example 1. "The Greek people-the previous generations –have gone through great difficulties, much worse than today's. In the course of our modern history, our people have persevered. The Greek people know how to defy fear and resist it".

This could be a reference to the people who fought in the First and Second World Wars and since many Greek people have lost an ancestor in those wars, their patriotic feelings are rekindled during such narrations.

By defining Greece as the home of democracy, Tsipras links the present to the past and relates contemporary Greece to ancient times connecting the ancient Greek philosophers and politicians who were the founding fathers of democracy with the present times. In this way, the continuum of 2,500 years which is unfolded manages not only to achieve historical continuity but at the same time mark the beginning of historical time in the listeners' perception:

Example 2. "We do not have the right, with our choice and our signature, to put an end to democracy in this region, where democracy has been alive for 2,500 years".

Continuity is also maintained by the reference to the historical significance of the time and the accountability to future generations:

Example 3. "I am confident that the Greek people will rise to the historical occasion" and "We are accountable to those proud struggles, to history, to the future, to the future of our people who deserve to live with a prospect, with hope".

Emphasis is placed on timelessness, a long-standing tradition of democracy and continuity between the past, the present and the future. The national body is also conceptualized as having "the sovereign right to determine the affairs of its territory and future".

Linguistic Strategies

In their study, De Cillia et al. (1999) distinguish between four types of linguistic strategies in the discursive construction of national identity: constructive strategies, perpetuation strategies, transformation strategies and dismantling or destructive strategies.

Alexis Tsipras employs constructive strategies when he appeals to the gravity of the situation and the need for all political parties to make a unanimous decision and vote in favor of the referendum. In this way, he promotes the idea of a nation whose members will stand unified in the name of democracy:

Example 4. “But now is not the time to fight. We must create conditions of accord, for the widest social and political consensus to defend democracy”.

Example 5. “Irrespective of everyone’s political beliefs, all of us will be called upon to fight the battle for democracy, dignity and hope”.

Perpetuation strategies are also employed to “maintain and reproduce” (Wodak et al., 2009, p.33) the idea of a nation (an identity) that is under threat and needs protection. Thus, in addition to the sense of continuity and tradition which are mentally constructed, the decisions which need to be taken are justified and legitimized:

Example 6. “I am confident that the Greek people will rise to the historical occasion and will reject the ultimatum. In past instances, when an ultimatum was presented to the Greek people, they responded accordingly. It will send a message of democracy and dignity throughout Europe”.

An attempt is also being made to justify the delay in negotiations between Greece and its creditors during the five-month period after the elections. The Prime Minister appeals to ethos by talking about a newly elected government with sincere intentions, which was seeking an honest and mutually beneficial agreement:

Example 7. “For five months, from our first days in office, we have been waging a tough and sincere fight on behalf of our people and our country, to end austerity and change Eurozone policy. We negotiated with our cards on the table and with the desire for sincere cooperation, seeking a fair compromise. I want to assure you that during these months, I personally did everything I could to attain this”.

Transformation and dismantling strategies are present when Tsipras refers to his electoral success of January 2015 as an opportunity for Greece to become a model nation that will affect the future of Europe by setting a good example and respecting the moral responsibility towards other European nations. In this way, Greece is being transformed into a nation whose decisions become critical on an international level as well. The referendum will give Greece the power to become a free country once again instead of a debt colony (this element of the national identity being dismantled) and contribute towards a transformation of Europe from a Europe of punishment, blackmail and harsh memoranda to a Europe of principles and democracy:

Example 8. “The crucial choice of the Greek people today concerns the future of Europe, as well as the future of Greece. I am certain that the Greek people will not be distracted by threats, blackmail, scaremongering, and provocations, and that next Sunday, they will choose bravely, with courage and virtue exactly how they define the conditions of their freedom. They will seize this moment in history and will send a strong message across Europe, a strong message of dignity worldwide. In these hours, Europe is looking to Greece. It is awaiting the “No” vote that upholds the dignity of the Greek people, and we have a strong responsibility to not disappoint these hopes”.

Example 9. “We have no right to disappoint the hopes and expectations of the Greek people that our country not be condemned to being a debt colony for decades to come”.

Linguistic Means

Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 34) mention that personification is a general category of metaphors that can help people make sense of what happens in the world around them in human terms. Through the trope of personification, Greece is constructed as the mother of democracy and the Troika as the adversary who kills democracy. The metaphor of Greece as a female entity trying to save her children from the enemy justifies the need for the referendum, the result of which will be a proud “No”. The personification of “No” as a proud person is a reference to the Greek dictator Ioannis Metaxas on October 28, 1940. He had been given an ultimatum to allow the Italian army to enter and occupy the country or face the consequences. Metaxas rejected the ultimatum and soon afterwards Italian troops invaded Greece. This refusal is a part of history that is taught in Greek schools and commemorated as a National Holiday as “Ohi Day” (No Day). Pride because of this heroic and historic refusal is deeply ingrained in contemporary Greek people’s habitus which has successfully been cultivated and

maintained through the school and the educational system. The “proud No” therefore, is a very powerful metaphor as it evokes feelings of solidarity and uniqueness and discursively constructs a nation of proud people, who have faced similar situations in the past.

Since the concept of identity encompasses not only the idea of sameness but also the idea of distinctiveness (Wodak, 2011), inclusion and exclusion mechanisms have been used to construct an in-group of Greek people who are also members of the European Union and an out-group of creditors. The difference between “us” and “them” can be detected clearly: the Greek people referred to as “the Greek government”, “our country”, and the creditors referred to as “our partners”, and “the institutions”. The “others” are portrayed as trying to asphyxiate Greece, taking aim at Greek democracy and the Greek people, trying to deregulate Greek economy, violating fundamental rights to work, equality, dignity, interested in humiliating and punishing the Greek people, and threatening the future of European integration. There are also metaphors about Europe such as “Europe is the common home”, “Europe without identity and compass”, “in Europe there are no owners and guests”, “Europe is the home of all its people”. Through them, the need for Greece to remain in Europe is highlighted, and a message is sent to the “others”, who are already talking about Grexit. There is clearly a contrast between democracy, dignity and sovereignty on the one hand, and uncertainty, inequality, humiliation, authoritarianism, ultimatum, on the other.

Alexis Tsipras talks about a “war” against an “enemy”, “who threatens the sovereignty and democratic existence of the country”. He presents himself and his government as soldiers fighting against the financial enemies of Greece, whose only goal is to destroy and humiliate the Greek people financially, morally and socially. The war metaphor has been used extensively to construct a way of perceiving reality similarly to being at war but also “constitute a license for policy change and political and economic action” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p.156).

Alexis Tsipras adopts an “inclusive nationalism” (Thomas Risse, 2010 as cited in Wodak and Boukala, 2015, p.90) approach when he talks about the need for the referendum to be approved. This will be an opportunity for Greece to defend not only its national independence but also the democratic tradition of Europe, the principles and values of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution. He talks about the Great European leaders who built those democratic principles and in this way, a secondary European identity emerges, which has to be safeguarded:

Example 10. “Greece is neither a visitor nor a guest in the European project. We are equals among equals. No one has the right, not even institutionally according to the European Treaties that we all signed, to show us the door to exit from our common home. We do not intend to concede this right to anyone for any reason whatsoever”.

The use of the pronoun “we” along with “Greece” serves as a “national we” (De Cillia et al., 1999, p.161). The Prime Minister presupposes intra-national sameness although there is a number of Greek people who are in favor of the idea of Greece exiting the Eurozone. This national “we” is also employed when he refers to Greece as a peaceful but fearless nation who will fight when the situation demands so:

Example 11. “We are a nation that loves peace. But when war is declared on us, we know how to fight and we know how to win”.

Reisigl (2008, p. 99) suggests that when analyzing political speeches we also need to look at the way “the social actors are linguistically constructed by being named” (nomination) and the positive and negative characteristics and qualities that are attributed to the social actors (predication). In these two speeches, various nomination and predication strategies have been used to refer to the out-group of creditors. They are “the memorandum forces, the credit rating agencies, technocratic institutions, organizations with no accountability” and namely “Troika, the Eurogroup, and IMF”. The creditors are explicitly presented as blackmailers, killers of democracy, intent on dividing Europe. The metonymy “controller for controlled” is used in “we will not ask Mr. Schäuble’s or Mr. Dijsselbloem’s permission to allow the Greek people to voice their opinion”. Lakoff and Johnson, (1980, p.38) mention that this type of metonymy makes us associate specific actions with specific people and holding them responsible for these actions. In this way, the creditors stop being an abstract entity but are materialized and conceptualized as real people in the listeners’ perception.

Topoi are defined by Reisigl and Wodak (2001, as cited in Wodak, 2011, p. 42) as “parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory premises of an argument, whether explicit or tacit. Topoi are the content related warrants or conclusion rules which connect the argument or arguments with the

conclusion or the central claim". A number of *topoi* can be identified in Alexis Tsipras' argumentation strategies:

The *topos* of authority is used when referring to the fact that the Greek Finance Minister, Yannis Varoufakis had been earlier excluded from that day's Eurogroup, in this way accusing the European partners of misconduct and questioning their right to do so:

Example 12. "Our country is a full member, and was excluded from a key process-something that no one has the right to do".

In example 10 given previously, one can also see how the *topos* of authority is used to argue that the referendum is in no way related with Greece's status in the European Union as there is no intention of Grexit on the agenda of the Greek government. In this way, the out-group of "memorandum supporters" is constructed as those who would like to see Greece exiting European Union.

The *topos* of history is employed numerous times throughout the speech. Firstly, there is a reference to Greece as the place where democracy began and has been alive for 2,500 years. This constructs Greece as a democratic country which can exercise its democratic right of holding a referendum the way other democratic European countries have done in the past. There is also the *topos* of comparison applied in the argument that Greece is facing an unprecedented reaction regarding the referendum whereas in the past, when other European countries did the same there was no such reaction. The out-group is here constructed as those who are trying to distort the real question of the referendum and blackmail Greece:

Example 13. "Did anyone attempt to sway French citizens when they were deciding on a fundamental European Union issue against holding a referendum? Did anyone attempt to dictate what the referendum's question would be? Did anyone tell them that if they voted "No" on the European Constitution, they would essentially be voting in favor of their withdrawal from the European Union? So, why are some people today so afraid of the verdict of the Greek people and why are they trying to use blackmail to prevent a referendum?"

The pronoun "they" is used in contrast with "us" (the in-group) to construct the image of two adversaries. The American President Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous phrase in his first Inaugural Address in 1933: "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself" is recontextualized and in a way a parallel is drawn between Greece today and America back then, at the time of economic depression. One can suggest that the *topos* of history is employed again to promote fearlessness but also to depict the out-group as the ones who blackmail and spread fear and panic:

Example 14. "Yesterday, they were blackmailing us with liquidity; today they are blackmailing us with the banks, fear, panic and scaremongering...I would like to remind you today of a great phrase by a politician from the New Deal era in the United States who had stated that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself. The only thing that the Greek people have to fear today, after so many years of being pillaged, is fear itself".

Tsipras uses the *topos* of threat to present a threatening future scenario in which European countries are no longer supporting each other and instead of solidarity and cohesion what prevails is blackmail and punishment:

Example 15. "If we do not challenge this doctrine now, then we are putting an end to hope. The people's vision comes to an end, as well as our vision for a Europe of solidarity and social cohesion. We would have to accept, to admit that we have, and will have, a Europe of punishment, a Europe of blackmail, a Europe of ultimatums that its people will not love, but will remain by compulsion and not by choice".

Towards the end of the first speech, the Prime Minister highlights the need for positive political continuity, solidarity and national autonomy inviting all the members of Parliament to join forces and vote in favor of the referendum. The *topos* of history is used again to construct Greece as a model country which will set an example to the whole of Europe and the rest of the world. The use of personal pronouns along with spatial references aims at making everyone present feel included and united for a common cause against the creditors who are threatening national sovereignty. Furthermore, many deontic expressions and the *topos* of favorable time are employed in this part to highlight the significance of the moment in order to honor the past as well as the future and promote a sense of being infinitely:

Example 16. "For every citizen of this country, this is a choice to move forward. We have no right to go backwards. The choice lies with all of us. We owe it to our children; we owe it to the future

generations. We are accountable to history, to the future, to the future of our people who deserve to live with a prospect, with hope”.

The referendum speech is strengthened by the use of intense language such as: “extortionate ultimatum, harsh austerity, unjust and brutal austerity programs, critical times, unprecedented extortion and financial asphyxiation, exacerbating social inequalities, unbearable weight”. In general, the emphasis is placed on the issues that brought suffering to the people and the challenges that need to be faced. The tone is emotional with a lot of historical references to the glorious Greek past but also the honorable future that lies ahead.

In the second speech, however, the tone is more apologetic and condescending. The Prime Minister is constructed as an honorable leader who fought heroically despite the political cost trying to achieve the best possible outcome for the Greek people. There is an appeal to ethos, one of Aristotle’s means of persuasion by referring to sincere intentions and transparency. This makes the speech seem more like a personal confession and an apology:

Example 17. “Since being elected Prime Minister – in these times that are even more critical than those of the country’s post-dictatorship history – I’ve been guided solely by my conscience, to defend our people’s just demands and national interests... I’ve taken risks, I did not give up, I did not consider the political cost, I did not opt for hasty compromises simply to ensure staying in power”.

Example 18. “Today, I want to be fully transparent with you, to tell the truth – at least as I understand it. Everyone, but especially the Greek people who are watching, can be the judge—and they can assess what I’m saying, calmly and with composure”.

The period of the last six months that the government has been in power is again referred to as a war period. Previous decisions are legitimized given the seriousness of the situation and now the polemic language gives way to more reasonable arguments, with logos, another Aristotelian means of persuasion more evident as can be seen in the following examples:

Example 19. “I am not here to mask reality with excessive rhetoric. The loan agreement that will be presented to the Eurogroup on Saturday includes several measures that differ considerably from our pre-election commitments and policy statements”.

Example 20. “We must be honest, though, that the reform program that we are requesting to implement is a difficult program, with better terms on certain points-several points- than those of the ultimatum a fortnight ago, but a difficult program, nonetheless.

Towards the end of the second speech, the Prime Minister appeals to the integrity of his character and the need to honor his promises in order to rationalize the decision to be made. The topos of history is employed again by drawing a parallel between contemporary and post-dictatorship Greece when the country was again a unifying force all over Europe. His closing argument uses the strategy of continuation with Greece as an “equal European partner with dignity and pride, paving the way for the other peoples of Europe as well”

Conclusion

In the current paper, even though the analysis of the different linguistic strategies and means employed has not been exhaustive, it has been demonstrated how an in-group of an honest, democratic, fearless and above all proud nation has been successfully constructed as opposed to an out-group of creditors who are blackmailers with no electoral authority and violators of democratic processes by interfering into national sovereignty matters.

As a final thought, it is interesting to see how “No” is presented in the two speeches. The Prime Minister talks about a proud “No” to subjugation and indignity. The proud “No” that was given to the Persians, to the Ottoman Turks, to the Italians, to the Germans, and to anyone else who attempted to invade the country has to be the answer again. The “No” vote will be “a strong message of dignity worldwide” and a democratic right of a nation who has always fought bravely. However, only a few days later, the “No” vote is projected somewhat differently. It is no longer a strong message of virtue and hope around the world but only “a vote of confidence and a mandate for a better solution, for a better deal”. The Prime Minister tries to convince the Greek people of his innocence and sincerity by assuring them that he is only going to do what he promised but without “beautifying reality”. Is this

what he was doing then, just a few days ago when he was talking about defending democracy? Is this the same democracy that was going to transform Europe into a “Europe of solidarity and social cohesion”? How is democracy understood and what does it really mean? Could it just be a conveniently arbitrary notion, “an essentially contested concept” (Galley, 1956, as cited in Collin, 2013), another gimmick in the game of politics?

These are all questions that will be answered in the course of time with the benefit of hindsight. What is certain is that the Prime Minister managed to persuade his audience by appealing to history and democracy. Even though he assured the Greek people that their expectations will not be betrayed, it remains to be seen whether the government will manage to keep those promises or it will be the one killing the Greek people’s hopes.

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APPENDIX

Extracts from Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’ speech to Parliament regarding the July 5th referendum

June 28, 2015

Ladies and gentlemen Members of Parliament,

In the birthplace of democracy, we will not ask Mr. Schäuble’s or Mr. Dijsselbloem’s permission to allow the Greek people to voice their opinion! We will not ask Mr. Schäuble’s and Mr. Dijsselbloem’s permission to protect and safeguard democracy. The referendum, which allows the sovereign Greek people to decide on their future, will take place as scheduled next Sunday, whether our partners agree or not.

The Greek people will sovereignly decide—and we will respect their verdict—whatever it may be. Above all, it is our duty to defend the Greek constitution, popular sovereignty and the national independence of our country. We have a sacred duty to honor the struggles and sacrifices of the Greek people. We will defend democracy. We will defend popular sovereignty, but we will also defend Europe's founding principles. And Europe has a long tradition of democracy, which was neither created by the Eurogroup nor the International Monetary Fund—who seem more intent on dividing Europe.

This tradition was built by the great European leaders: Konrad Adenauer, Helmut Schmidt, Willy Brandt, François Mitterrand, Altiero Spinelli, Enrico Berlinguer. This tradition was built through the people's struggles. This tradition is Europe's undisputed democratic acquis.

The expression of the people's will through the use of referendums is not a new phenomenon in Europe. Referendums took place in several countries on the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon and the European Constitution. So, why is a Greek referendum eliciting such a reaction?

Did anyone attempt to sway French citizens when they were deciding on a fundamental European Union issue – what can be more fundamental than the actual European Constitution, which they voted against – against holding a referendum? Did anyone attempt to dictate what the referendum's question would be? Did anyone tell them that if they voted “No” on the European Constitution, they would essentially be voting in favor of their withdrawal from the European Union? So, why are some people today so afraid of the verdict of the Greek people, and why are they trying to use blackmail to prevent a referendum? They should consider that blackmail sometimes has the exact opposite effect. And I say this, because some people think that the issue of Greece is a game.

The dignity of a people, however, is not a game, ladies and gentlemen, a people that have been pillaged for five years now by unjust and brutal austerity programs. One and a half million unemployed, three million poor, thousands of padlocks, unemployment, young people leaving the country en masse. These circumstances did not come about during the last five months of intense and real negotiation. These occurred during the past five years of the Memorandum, which imposed harsh austerity – a tragedy that must finally be ended. With the verdict of the Greek people on January 25th, and with new verdict of the Greek people this coming Sunday, the stifling policies of the Memoranda must end once and for all.

We should be aware, however, that the greater the extent of the upheaval, of the reactions, or the blackmail, the greater the problem which cannot be hidden, or neatly explained away by the other side.

Yesterday they were blackmailing us with liquidity, today they are blackmailing us with the banks, fear, panic and scaremongering. Eventually, however, even blackmail attempts fail. I would like to remind you today of a great phrase by a politician from the New Deal era in the United States who had stated that “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” The only thing that the Greek people have to fear today, after so many years of being pillaged, is fear itself. And I bring this up because already an incredible propaganda campaign of fear was launched—just last night—that will only escalate in the coming days, as Sunday approaches.

But they should know that sometimes, when the attempts to terrorize are so blatant, the end result is often the opposite of what was desired. People stand their ground. The Greek people – the previous generations – have gone through great difficulties, much worse than today's. In the course of our modern history, our people have persevered: the Greek people know how to defy fear and resist it. We are a nation that loves peace. But when war is declared on us, we know how to fight and we know how to win.

Ladies and gentlemen Members of Parliament,

For five months, from our first days in office, we have been waging a tough and sincere fight on behalf of our people and our country, to end austerity and change Eurozone policy. We negotiated despite conditions of unprecedented extortion and financial asphyxiation, in order to implement the mandate that we were given.

Despite these conditions, every citizen of this country knows just how hard Greece has tried during these months, and that the Greek Government has made an honest and real effort to negotiate with determination, with dignity.

Ladies and gentlemen Members of Parliament,

Now is not the time for petty arguments between the parties, although I understand that perhaps our stance has surprised you. You were certain that we would surrender. Despite the obvious contradiction, you've been saying that we'll lead the country to destruction if we don't sign an agreement, but if we

do sign, then we'll be condemning the country to another memorandum. You've stated this repeatedly. You were certain that we would cave. There may even be a little envy deep inside some of you because we did what you didn't dare to do—even though you might have wanted to: to resist!

But now is not the time to fight. We must create conditions of accord, for the widest social and political consensus to defend Democracy and the right of a people to be rid of austerity after five consecutive years. The entire political leadership of the country must, above all, protect the right of our people to be the masters of their decisions and to determine the course of the country. The day following the democratic choice, and a proud 'No' to subjugation and to indignity, our country will have a much stronger negotiating position, and it will be the moment of truth for the creditors. They will finally understand that Greece is not going to surrender, that Greece is not a game that is over.

I want to make it absolutely clear that our decision that the Greek people express their will sovereignly is in no way a decision to break with Europe. It is a decision to put an end to extortion and coercion, practices that have become all too common in Europe. It is a decision to return to Europe's founding values, of respect for the European *acquis*, a decision to return to the Europe of principles and democracy. And it's a decision of dignity against practices of raw economic blackmail.

I hear a lot of people saying, both in this room and among hardliners in Berlin, that Europe represents the harsh memoranda, that Europe is equivalent to the constant subjugation to austerity, austerity without a future. Should we accept this? Shouldn't this be disputed? We have an enormous responsibility both to our people and to all the citizens of Europe who saw the political change in Greece with great hope, hope for the necessary change and transformation of Europe.

If we do not challenge this doctrine now, then we are putting an end to hope. We are putting an end to hope for the necessary transformation of Europe. The peoples' vision comes to an end, as well as our vision for a Europe of solidarity and social cohesion. We would have to accept, to admit that we have, and will have, a Europe of punishment, a Europe of blackmail, a Europe of ultimatums that its people will not love, but will remain by compulsion and not by choice.

Ladies and gentlemen Members of Parliament,

I am confident that the Greek people will rise to the historical occasion and will reject the ultimatum. In past instances, when an ultimatum was presented to the Greek people, they responded accordingly. It will send a message of democracy and dignity throughout Europe. Because a 'No' is at the same time a big 'yes'; a big 'yes' to the Greek Government's decision to reject an offensive ultimatum.

It offends not only the Greek people, but also the democratic tradition of Europe, the principles and values of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution. It offends the post-war democratic tradition, whereby the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats – not the Left, as it wasn't in power – cooperated to help build the European welfare state, which until yesterday, this European welfare state was a global standard and a feature of Europe's political diversity. It is these principles and values that we are defending: democracy, equality, solidarity, mutual respect, human dignity and social rights.

We are defending – and will continue to do so at any cost – the right of every European citizen to choose their governments, to make crucial strategic choices concerning their future, to choose their governments regardless of whether they are liked by the bureaucratic elites that unfortunately rule Europe today and have led it to these impasses. For this reason, I ask of the Parliament now to approve yesterday's Cabinet decision to hold a referendum on Sunday, July 5th, while assuring the Greek people once again that this government will not betray their expectations, it will not kill their hope.

Irrespective of everyone's political beliefs, all of us will be called upon to fight the battle for democracy, dignity and hope. We pledge that from Monday 6th July, with the strength of the popular verdict, we will continue our efforts.

And of course – perhaps I do not need to repeat this – all of us remain absolutely committed to democracy. The results of the democratic choice of our people will be respected, whatever their choice may be. But I want to make this clear: Any attempt for this referendum to be converted from a referendum to reject the new Memorandum to a referendum on the country's currency serves to undermine the democratic process itself, and reveals the hidden and underlying aspirations of the Memorandum supporters.

This is exactly what the most extreme and conservative memorandum forces want—those who are mainly outside the country, as well as those who blindly repeat their views here. I want to reiterate that

it is neither the intention nor the decision of the government or of the Greek people to equate the memorandum with our country's membership in the European Union.

Greece is neither a visitor nor a guest in the European project. We are equals among equals. No one has the right, not even institutionally according to the European Treaties that we all signed, to show us the door to exit from our common home. We do not intend to concede this right to anyone for any reason whatsoever.

Ladies and gentlemen Members of Parliament,

The political change and the popular mandate of January 25th actually provided Europe with an opportunity to change course. Let's not give up on this. It provided the Troika with an opportunity to transform, to become institutions that will respect the democratic acquis. They did not embrace this. They chose to remain the Troika, which kills democracy in Europe.

The crucial choice of the Greek people today concerns the future of Europe, as well as the future of Greece. I am certain that the Greek people will not be distracted by threats, blackmail, scaremongering, and provocations, and that next Sunday, they will choose bravely, with courage and virtue—exactly how they define the conditions of their freedom. They will seize this moment in history and will send a strong message across Europe, a strong message of dignity worldwide.

In these hours, Europe is looking to Greece. It is awaiting the “No” vote that upholds the dignity of the Greek people, and we have a strong responsibility to not disappoint these hopes.

Finally, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to say that the Parliament today must support sovereign choice regarding a democratic process. For every citizen of this country, this is a choice to move forward. We have no right to go backwards. We have no right to disappoint the hopes and expectations of the Greek people that our country not be condemned to being a debt colony for decades to come.

We do not have the right, with our choice and our signature, to put an end to democracy in this region, where democracy has been alive for 2,500 years. We do not have the right to afford the opportunity to technocratic institutions, to organizations with no accountability and that have not been elected by European citizens, to prohibit a sovereign people from having the sovereign right to determine the affairs of its territory and future.

The choice lies with all of us, and it is mainly a choice of hope, dignity and democracy. We owe it to our children, we owe it to the future generations, we owe to the struggles and sacrifices of the Greek people so that this country can be sovereign, its people free, so that it can be a country with democracy, popular sovereignty and pride. We are accountable to those proud struggles, to history, to the future, to the future of our people who deserve to live with a prospect, with hope.

Be well.

Extracts from Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' speech in the Greek Parliament concerning the mandate to conclude the negotiation

July 11, 2015

Ladies and Gentlemen Members of Parliament,

We have reached a critical juncture and, perhaps, you will allow me to take a more personal tone today. Since being elected Prime Minister – in these times that are even more critical than those of the country's post-dictatorship history – I've been guided solely by my conscience, to defend our people's just demands and national interests.

For the last six months I have done everything that was humanly possible, under difficult circumstances, with threats and blackmail ever-present. However—and I think that no one can dispute this, neither friends nor opponents—in these circumstances and difficult times, I've taken risks, I did not give up, I did not consider the political cost, I did not opt for hasty compromises simply to ensure staying in power. Many will say, perhaps, that what I've achieved has exceeded expectations. And I've done so while always honoring the truth, as I've understood and understand it—all with the generous support of the majority of the Greek people during this difficult fight.

Today, I want to be fully transparent with you, to tell the truth – at least as understand it. Everyone, but especially the Greek people who are watching, can be the judge—and they can assess what I'm saying, calmly and with composure.

There can be no doubt that for the last six months we have been at war, we have faced tough battles with difficult odds, we've had losses, but we've also gained ground, as well. We've accomplished much more

than anyone could have imagined. Now, however, I feel that we have reached a very critical moment: From this point onwards, we're facing a minefield—a fact that I can't ignore and that should not be hidden from the Greek people.

During these past months, we have been strenuously fighting to obtain the best possible outcome despite the unprecedented economic asphyxiation. When I've been asked whether we have made mistakes during the course of the five-month negotiation, the only honest answer is, yes. Yes, we made mistakes. No one is infallible. I believe, however, that there is no precedent in modern European history of a country that is practically on the brink of bankruptcy, to negotiate with such persistence and dignity. To negotiate as an equal among equals, to restore the lost political parity between Greece and the other Eurozone countries.

We decided, therefore, to proceed with the responsibility and gravity necessary under the current circumstances, to prevent a political Grexit with an economic pretext.

I am not here to mask reality with excessive rhetoric. The loan agreement that will be presented to the Eurogroup on Saturday includes several measures that differ considerably from our pre-election commitments and policy statements, from what we believe is necessary for the recovery of the Greek economy. However, we must compare the alternatives before us – and here, nothing is a given, the negotiation is ongoing – the current proposal versus the one that we received fifteen days ago.

And I never hid my intentions or the truth from the Greek people. I did not ask for a “No” vote as a mandate to leave the euro, but as a mandate that would strengthen our negotiating position. I even personally pledged, prior to the referendum, to do everything in my power to pursue a better deal as soon as possible, even within the first forty-eight hours. The Greek people voted with these terms in mind last Sunday, and I am not here today to do something other than what I promised. And I am doing what I promised.

I did not deceive the Greek people nor the Council of the political Leaders, which I had asked to be convened immediately after the referendum, when I requested – and indeed we all committed ourselves to – a specific framework for a viable agreement, a necessary step to move beyond divisions – such is the nature of a referendum – to political and national unity.

To me, the “No” vote represented a mandate for a better solution, for a better deal, for the dignity of a large portion of the Greek people – for the thousands of people who have experienced poverty and indignity all these years. I also perceived the “No” vote as a vote of confidence, as well, in the Government and its efforts. And the time has arrived to take stock.

We must be honest, though, that the reform program that we are requesting to implement is a difficult program, with better terms on certain points – several points – than those of the ultimatum a fortnight ago, but a difficult program, nonetheless.

But for the first time in six months we have on the table– and I repeat, we cannot be certain of the outcome– the chance for an agreement that can put a definitive end to talk of a Grexit, and hence, provide a fully positive signal to the markets and to investors, that with guaranteed long-term financing and debt reduction, they can once again trust the Greek economy. This will give us the chance, the opportunity, to offset the possible recessionary effects of the tough measures.

Ladies and Gentlemen Members of Parliament,

I want to reiterate that the purpose of my speech today is not to beautify reality. The purpose is to speak truthfully, in keeping with my responsibility to Parliament and the Greek people, to clearly set out the choices before us.

We are reaching, I hope, the end of a very difficult battle—perhaps the most difficult we've had in the country's history, post-dictatorship. We negotiated arduously on behalf of Greece and also, to change Europe's course. Today, based on the results, this might not seem possible—and we have to admit so. However, I am certain that sooner or later, these seeds of democracy and dignity that we sowed will bear fruit for other peoples in Europe.

We shifted the demand for an immediate end to austerity to the center of public discourse across Europe, and around the world. We negotiated so that “mutual respect” be a guiding principle, i.e. respect for the rules governing the European Union, as well as the respect for popular sovereignty and democracy.

We triggered a pan-European solidarity movement in support of the Greek people who are suffering—which we haven't seen the likes of since the fall of the dictatorship: The last time there were solidarity demonstrations where the squares of European cities were filled with Greek flags, was during the seven-year dictatorship.

We fought for those who receive low wages and meager pensions, we fought for labor rights, to avoid collective redundancies. We fought for what we perceived to be the just demands of the Greek people. I am certain that this fight will not be all for naught.

Ladies and Gentlemen Members of Parliament,

Authorizing the Minister of Finance at such a critical moment is not simply an ordinary matter requiring a vote. It is a vote of conscience of high political importance, because it concerns our future. And obviously it is a choice of conscience, but also of high national responsibility.

Now, our national duty is to support our people to be able to continue fighting with pride for justice, and to continue fighting with perseverance for progress and prosperity. Our national duty calls for making difficult decisions. I am sure that we will live up to this responsibility and we will succeed. I am confident that our people's perseverance, passion for life, for dignity, will be our guide in the following days, in the coming years.

We will succeed! We will not only manage to stay in Europe, but to live as an equal partner with dignity and pride, seeking justice in Europe, paving the way for the other peoples of Europe, as well.

Thank you.

Is the Greek Diaspora a historic diaspora from a small country at the Southeastern tip of Europe, super-diverse and globalized?

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ABSTRACT

During a period which spanned nearly a century (from 1890 to 1970), hundreds of thousands of migrants left Greece, mainly to work and live abroad. Two periods of major emigration took place in the 20th century –one at the century’s start and the other in the post-World War II years. By the 1970s, Greece was transformed into a migrant-receiving country and the migrant communities abroad came to think of themselves as global citizens rather than marginalized immigrants. The Greek experience was expressed in Greek literary production, reflecting the victim, labor, trade and cultural diasporic facets of this diverse global group. Within the context of the present economic crisis, hundreds of thousands recent Greek ‘brain-drain’ migrants are now a constituent of a greater diasporic community. This paper explores the present-day Greek Diaspora as a result of varying factors throughout its turbulent history.

Keywords: Greek Diaspora, globalization, diaspora typology, migrant literature, brain drain

Two recent publications echo the historical importance and potential of the Greek Diaspora. The first was an article by renowned Greek journalist Alexis Papahelas in the Sunday edition of *Kathimerini* newspaper dating September 18, 2016. The article was titled: “The rebirth will come from abroad” and in it, Papahelas concludes that “a critical role in the rebirth of the country will be played by the hundreds of thousands of Greeks that have left Greece”, in other words by the new Greek diaspora. Papahelas reminds his readers that the Diaspora was a protagonist in the founding of the modern Greek state, but also whenever the country needed to be rebuilt from its ashes (Papahelas, 2016, p. 18).

So, what is this global Greek Diaspora and how relevant is it today? Let it firstly be pointed out that the word ‘global’, which is a very catchy term these days, is a bit different from the word ‘international’ or ‘universal’. The word *global* implies a much higher level of connectivity and networking.

As for the word “diaspora”, it first appeared when the Hebrew Bible was translated into Greek, referring to a diaspora created as a result of exile and mentioned in the phrase: ἔσῃ ἐν διασπορᾷ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς βασιλείαις τῆς γῆς [*esē en diaspora en pasais tais basileiais tēs gēs*, i.e. “you shall be a dispersion in all kingdoms of the earth”]. In essence, this term was used primarily in reference to the Jewish Diaspora and this correlation is still evident in older dictionaries. The term “diaspora” became more widely assimilated into [English](#) by the mid-1950s. More recently, an academic field, [Diaspora Studies](#), has emerged. The term always carries the sense of [displacement](#) and the hope, or at least a desire, of return to the homeland, if that “homeland” still exists in any meaningful sense.

In the first 1997 edition of the classic text by Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas*, Cohen dedicates whole chapters to five principal types of diaspora, namely victim, labor, imperial, trade, and cultural diasporas, their distinctions being quite evident by the terminology. Cohen makes only two brief references to the Greek Diaspora; both refer to the ancient Greeks (Cohen, 1997, p. 2, 83). In 1997, *The Penguin Atlas of Diasporas* was also published with separate chapters on the Jewish, Lebanese, Palestinian Vietnamese, Korean, Armenian, Greek, Gypsy, Black, Chinese, Indian and Irish diasporas (Chaliand & Rageau, 1997).

Today, it has come to the point when almost everybody can have a diaspora. Wikipedia's list of Diasporas is quite extensive, though it should be said that not all 193 member states of the United Nations, like the US, New Zealand and Libya, are listed; other stateless nations, such as the Kurds, various Native American groups and the Welsh are¹.

Cohen lists five main types of Diaspora (victim, labor, imperial, trade and cultural) and one is tempted to ask the question of which type best represents the Greek Diaspora. The short answer to this question would be that actually none of types could be used to describe the Greek case. A more comprehensive answer would start by going back to the ancient Greek colonies: Though it cannot be claimed that there are remnants of these colonies today, it is fair to say that more recent migrations (like to Southern Italy in the 15th century and to the North shores of the Black Sea through the early 20th century) were established or supported by a pre-existing Greek presence, even if that was a distant nostalgic memory. Consequently, the Greek experience includes the memory of an imperial diaspora. What follows is a brief review of the various other types of Greek Diaspora.

Victim Diaspora

The Greeks fled their homeland following persecutions on several occasions, the largest such recent migratory waves being those following the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922), the Greek Civil War and the Invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974.

Table 1: The Greek Diaspora as a result of forced migrations in modern times

Historical Event	Period	Population Migration	Destination
Russian-Turkish Wars (1769-1774, 1828-29); Crimean War (1853-56); Young Turk movement.	Late 18 th century and 19 th century through 1922	Creation of a large Pontian Greek diaspora, dispersed along the whole coast of the Black Sea as a result of mass migration from the north-eastern Ottoman Empire.	Coastal Georgia, southern Russia, Ukraine.
The Massacre of Chios	1822	The island numbered more than 100.000. Nearly half were brutally slaughtered; women and children were sold as slaves. Near 20.000 managed to flee.	Syros island, Egypt, Marseille, London, Trieste, Livorno.
Asia Minor Catastrophe: the destruction of Smyrna	1922	Tens of thousands of refugees with Ottoman passports migrate, including Aristotle Onassis and Elia Kazan.	U.S.A., Egypt, Australia, Latin America
Greek Civil War	1946-49	Mass exodus of political refugees, including many young children. A small number of scholars and intelligentsia escape to France.	Former Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.
Dictatorship in Greece	1967-74	Scholars, professors, students and intelligentsia flee to the West.	France, Canada, U.S.A., U.K., Sweden
Turkish invasion of the island of Cyprus	1974	Greek Cypriots refugees flee the island, as Turkish troops occupy 37% of the island.	Great Britain, U.S.A., Australia, Republic of South Africa.

¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diasporas (September 10th, 2016).

Labor Diaspora

The first large migratory wave from Greece was recorded between 1900-1924, when close to 500.000 Greeks (7% of the total population) crossed the Atlantic Ocean and settled in the United States. Over 60% of them were workers. Following WWII, bilateral labor agreements were signed between Greece and countries like France (1954), Belgium (1957), Germany (1960) and Holland (1966); these countries aimed to attract foreign labor in order to achieve economic reconstruction. Between 1955 and 1977, over 1.236.000 Greeks left Greece, half of those settling in Germany as *gastarbeiters* (or guest workers). Large Greek communities were also established in Australia, where the diaspora today numbers approximately 500.000 and Canada with about 300.000².

Trade Diaspora

I have been told that a Hungarian word for “merchant” is also the word for “Greek”. This might come as a surprise to those who probably are not aware of the many Greek merchant communities that existed throughout the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and Central Europe from the 17th century onwards. Of particular interest is the merchant community of Greeks originating from the island of Chios, an island situated very close to the Asia Minor coastline, in the northeastern Aegean. The Chioties had been a strong naval power in antiquity; their prosperity reached new heights during Ottoman Rule largely, but not exclusively, due to the production of the rare mastic gum, produced nowhere else in the world but on the southern parts of the island. Thus, Chios enjoyed many privileges and was exempt from paying taxes, as opposed to almost all of the rest of Greece. Chiote merchant families soon developed networks extending from Odessa to Calcutta, and London to New Orleans. They intermarried to maintain control their financial empires and though they were scattered throughout the world, they preserved their Greek Orthodox faith and distinct cultural identity.

This brings me to the second recent event relevant to this paper. Phillip Mansel (2016), a British historian, published a book on *Aleppo, The Rise and Fall of Syria's Great Merchant City*. This, of course, is not a book about the Greek Diaspora, despite the city's former multicultural character. However, one of the 14 photos included in the book (number 7) shows a very exquisite interior and the caption reads:



² Greek National Statistics and General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad (www.ggae.gr).

“Salon Marcopoli, circa 1900. The Marcopolis were among the wealthiest families in Aleppo. They arrived from Chios after the massacres there in 1822, established themselves in commerce and banking and served until the 1980s as consuls for different European states” (Mansel, 2016, p. 112). Continuing in this tradition, the Chiotes as well as other Greeks, can still pride in owning the largest merchant fleet in the world which represents about 20% of the global shipping industry.

Cultural Diaspora

There is a bit of ambiguity when referring to this type of Diaspora. Cohen cites the Caribbean people as an example of cultural Diaspora, demonstrating how their music, language and food creates a Diaspora composed of peoples from various countries of a wider region, the Caribbean. The Greeks have their language and religion, but these may not persist into subsequent migrant generations, whereas other cultural markers like family-ties, Greek dancing and the Greek cuisine could help form a case for cultural endurance. There is substantial evidence in Greek communities worldwide that Greek culture is a strong factor for creating a Greek diasporic identity. When referring to the Greek cultural Diaspora, one may include a unique group of people known as Philhellenes, -scholars and academics- whose love of Hellenic values (Excellence, Fair Play, Olympic Ideals, Meritocracy and Democracy) allows for the creation of close ties to both Greece itself, but also the Greek communities around the world.

Consequently, it can easily be concluded that the Greek Diaspora is super-diverse, as its various sub-groups arose due to different causes. This diversity is quite evident in Greek cultural production. To start, there are countless novels, short stories, poems and plays and screenplays written within the context of the Greek victim Diaspora. Elia Kazan's *America, America* and Nicholas Gage's *Eleni* are among the best known.

Greek folk poetry in the tradition of songs of migration, known as *ta tragoudia tis xenitias*, evolved into the form of popular songs, sung by some of Greece's most famous singers, like those lamenting the workers in Belgian coal mines and German train stations sung by Stelios Kazantzides. These songs and poems relate the profound sense of loss, loneliness and anonymity in a foreign place and refer to the home forcibly left behind with great intensity.

The considerable Chiote merchant diasporic sub-group is clearly evident in a short novella published in 1879. *Loukis Laras*, written by Demetrios Vikelas. Actually, the story itself is about Loukis Laras, a semi-fictional character most probably based on the Greek merchant in London named Loukas Tzifos. Merchant diasporic Greek communities are the backbone of more recent novels, like *Drifting Cities*, by Stratis Tsirkas, *Alexandrian Days* by Dimitris Stefanakis and *The Pencil Factory* by Soti Triantafyllou.

The transition from migrant to global is perhaps most evident in the work by Greek Australian Christos Tsiolkas, whose first novel, *Loaded*, is an angry personal memoir where the word “Greek” appears in almost every paragraph (Tsiolkas, 1995). In his highly-acclaimed later work *The Slap* (his 4th novel), there is a shift from “migrant Greek” to “transnational and cosmopolitan”. The narrative is presented through the viewpoints of eight individual characters dissecting identities and personal relationships in a multicultural society. The following excerpt reflects on hybrid identities through the mixing of different cuisines, namely traditional Greek and Indian:

“It was a feast. Charred lamb chops and juicy fillet steak. There was a stew of eggplant and tomato, drizzled with lumps of creamy melted feta. There was black bean dahl and oven-baked spinach pilaf. There was coleslaw and a bowl of Greek salad with plump cherry tomatoes and thick slices of feta; a potato and coriander salad and a bowl of juicy king prawns. Hector had been completely unaware of the industry in the kitchen. His mother had brought pasticcio, Aisha had made a lamb in a thick cardamom-infused curry, and together they had prepared two roast chickens and lemon-scented roast potatoes. There was tzatziki and onion chutney; there was pink fragrant taramosalata and a platter of grilled red capsicum, the skins delicately removed, swimming in olive oil and balsamic vinegar” (Tsiolkas, 2004, p. 36).

The global Greek Diaspora was created by migrations that took place from the mid-19th century through most of the twentieth century. However, the number of Greeks leaving Greece in search of a better future declined dramatically in the mid-1970s. When Greece entered the European Union in 1981, it really seemed that emigration had become a phenomenon of bygone days; strangely, the country actually became a *host* to the many labor migrants and refugees from Eastern Europe, Africa

and the Middle East. Recently, however, there is vast evidence that Greece will once again be faced with the threat of involuntary migration *from* Greece: The collapse of the economy over the past few years and a soaring unemployment rate (with the young and educated being the hardest hit segment of the population) means that many Greeks are once again being forced to leave their country. Advertisements seeking doctors and other professionals to work in Sweden or Germany are commonplace in the Greek press. What is now being evidenced is another type of Diaspora, that of the “brain-drain” Diaspora with about 400,000 young educated Greeks having left their homeland since 2010.

The new migration waves will inevitably lead to a revival of the dwindling Greek communities, especially within the European Union, as most Greek professionals choose Europe as their destination. This presents vast opportunities for Greece and the Greek government that need to move away from simply appealing to patriotism as a tool of mobilizing the Diaspora. Re-thinking the Greek Diaspora in the present-day context of a globalized world can forge new ties and support initiatives that will significantly contribute to the country’s economic recovery. As Papahelas noted in his article, “the rebirth will come from abroad”.

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The Chicken Game Strategy in the European Discourse The Case of the Euro-group negotiations for Greece

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the way in which the representatives of Greece and Germany employed game theory rhetorically and transformed the game of chicken into a rhetorical strategy sending messages that aimed at the construction of specific perceptions about the otherness, to frame the negotiation process. The rhetorical strategies that were used by the Ministers of Economy of Greece and Germany (Drs. Yanis Varoufakis and Wolfgang Schäuble respectively) during the heated negotiation of Greece and Europe, are considered part of a general strategic communication plan to build perceptions, images and alliances within the Eurogroup and the Eurozone and lead the process to a desired outcome. In the framework of the campaign mode of the two parties, game theoretic tools were employed as a means of strategic communication to prime certain aspects of conflict and become part of the general strategy. The main research hypothesis is that the employment of the rhetorical strategies (such as risk, threat, values, fear appeal, fearmongering, attack and defense) may construct the concept of the strategies followed in the game of chicken through the use of strategic communication tools.

Keywords: strategic communications, rhetoric, game theory, chicken game, negotiations, financial crisis.

1. INTRODUCTION

During the first semester of 2015, the newly established government of Greece re-initiated the negotiations with the troika (ECB, European Commission, IMF) to win better conditions on the Memorandum and reach a new agreement that would lead the country away from economic stagnation and recession (According to Prime Minister winning address of 25th January 2015). The government of the left-wing party of SYRIZA and the right-wing ANEL party, made the negotiations the primary governmental objective and acted through heated rhetoric in terms of campaigning in the domestic field. The negotiations took place in the Euro-group and the main representative of Greece was the Minister of Economics, Dr. Yanis Varoufakis. With his unique temperament, he managed to personalize the negotiation and domesticate the image that the government wanted to present at that moment in Europe (Aspriadis & Samaras, 2016). Minister Varoufakis' attitude dominated the news and the Greek negotiation became the first topic in many international media for a remarkable period (ibid).

However, negative events have the capacity to make particular topics or aspects of these topics more accessible to the audience (Iyengar, 1991). In this case, the conflict constitutes a negative event that makes it newsworthy. The negotiation quickly transformed into a personal conflict between the two men. The individual image attributes were strategically mobilized during the negotiations between Greece and Germany to enhance the image of change of the SYRIZA administration. Processes of institutional image enhancement by transferring of image attributes from individuals holding position in the institution (country, government or party) automatically mobilized a degradation process of the image of these people by their opponents (Aspriadis & Samaras, 2016).

Subsequently, the negotiating positions were domesticated and represented by the two personalities, transforming the debate into a personal case. As the debate was escalated and the stakes of the negotiation were raised, game theoretic concepts were employed by the two parties, through the media and their discourse. This paper explores how both parties tried to transform the negotiations process into a constructed social reality of a zero-sum game, like the game of chicken, which was transformed

into a strategy employed through the strategic communication of the parties. The aim of both parties was to construct specific perceptions and images about the enemy-other, in order to frame the negotiation process and build alliances within the Euro-group and the Eurozone that would lead to a desired outcome. However, the media played an important role in constructing the frame of the game of chicken and contributing to the spreading of this constructed reality.

Taking these facts into consideration, leads the investigation to the main research question (RQ0): Is the game of chicken being constructed through the rhetoric of the leading actors of the Euro-group negotiations, Ministers Varoufakis and Schäuble? Based on this question the main hypothesis (RH1) may be formed as: The two parties (Ministers Varoufakis and Schäuble) are acting in campaign mode, employing rhetorical strategies to construct the game chicken narrative, increasing the pressure on the other side. This hypothesis implies that the chicken game narrative has been constructed rhetorically in terms of the strategic communication of the parties to enhance their strategy and gains in the negotiation process. To examine the verification of this hypothesis, the exact rhetorical strategy of both parties will be investigated. Although game theory is a decision analysis tool, in this case it has been used as a strategy. To analyze the strategic use of game theory and examine the rhetorical construction of the game of chicken, basic concepts of the chicken game were compared with already known rhetorical strategies constructing criteria that could be examined with qualitative analysis. This leads to the secondary research hypothesis (RH2) which states that the employment of the rhetorical strategies (such as risk, threat, values, fear appeal, attack and defense) constructs the chicken game model as a strategy.

Other more specific Research Questions arise:

RQ1: Are the protagonists constructing a social reality of conflict using strategic communication to achieve their negotiation objectives?

RQ2: Which game theoretic model may be applied to explain the negotiation process?

RQ3: What is the relation between the chicken game as a strategy, and specific rhetorical strategies like fear, appeal, attack or the blame games?

The methodology is the structured qualitative content analysis with the use of the observation code sheet. A corpus is composed by press releases, speeches, positions of the protagonists and interviews on the subject. The present study is an interdisciplinary work of the fields of Strategic Communication and Game Theory and tries to identify how game theoretical models may be applied into rhetorical strategy and used for evoking certain emotions and constructing social representations and realities.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Theoretical framework of the paper is constructed drawing on two disciplinary fields. On the one hand, this work employs Game Theory, which analyzes the strategic moves of a player in relation to the strategic moves of another, and is used in negotiation processes to anticipate the strategies of the opponents. On the other hand, this work draws on the campaign mode from the field of strategic communication, which will be analyzed through the rhetorical analysis of the official discourse of the two leading actors (Varoufakis and Schäuble).

The methodology used is the qualitative content and discourse analysis with the help of an Observation Code Sheet, which organized and quantified the results. The study period begins from the end of January 2015, after the end of the national elections in Greece, until the beginning of July 2015, when the negotiation period officially ended with the outcome of the Greek Referendum.

2.1. Game Theory in the Greek memorandum negotiation

Game Theory constitutes a convenient tool for the analysis of strategic interaction in the negotiations that typically take place in the global political arena. The application of game theoretic concepts in international relations was attempted for the first time by Schelling (1980), and has also been applied in daily life (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991; Dixit & Nalebuff, 2008) and business (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996).

As discussed by Paravantis (2016), while Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) laid the foundations for the application of game theory in economics, it was Schelling (1980), a Nobel Prize winner that

first showed how game theory may be used as a tool for the analysis of conflict in international relations. The prisoner's dilemma, a game of simultaneous (or hidden) moves, is the best-known game theoretic model of transnational interactions. The original scenario goes like this (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Axelrod, 1985): two suspects, who are not allowed to communicate, may either keep their mouth shut or confess their crime and give their partner away. If both manage to keep their mouth shut, they are put in prison for a very short time. If only one confesses (snitch) while the other keeps his mouth shut, the snitch is released while the other goes to jail for a very long time. Finally, if they both snitch, they go to jail for a moderately long time. Such is the structure of this remarkable dilemma, that a powerful outcome emerges in which they both choose to confess, each one in the naïve hope of being released; since they both snitch on one another, they are both punished by going to prison for a moderately long time. An analyst may be confident that they will both select to confess (i.e. snitch) because this is a dominant strategy, and the unfortunate outcome of both snitching on one another is a dominant strategy equilibrium, the strongest solution concept in game theory. This game belongs to the class of social dilemmas (McCain, 2004), which are characterized by the existence of a cooperative solution (e.g. both keeping their mouth shut) that is distinct from the game equilibrium (e.g. both snitching on one another).

The Cuban missile crisis that transpired in October 1962, is perhaps the international crisis that has been analyzed with game theoretic concepts more than any other crisis in world politics. The governments of John Kennedy (from the side of the Americans) and Nikita Khrushchev (on the part of the Soviets) came into conflict for thirteen days, which brought the world close to nuclear disaster. In their classical analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, Allison and Zelikow (1999) considered three conceptual policy analysis models for understanding the events: (1) a rational actor model, often encountered in the analysis of public policy; (2) an organizational behavior model, which emphasizes the interplay of complex organizational clusters; and (3) a governmental policy model that places emphasis on procedures. The authors suggested that all three models are jointly necessary to explain the behavior of the two rival superpowers in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Their innovation lies in the fact that decision making models are applied to a foreign policy crisis. An elaborate game theoretic analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis done by Dixit and Skeath (2004), included a simple-threat model, a model with hard-liner Soviets and a final model with unknown Soviet payoffs. The latter game theoretic model, which was essentially a real-time chicken game (Brams, 2005), used Kennedy's estimate that the chances of the blockade leading to war varied from one out of three (0.33) to even (0.5), and used these to calculate the conditions for successful brinkmanship, i.e. a gradual escalation of the risk of mutual harm on behalf of the Americans, rendering a deeper understanding of the crisis and the strategic manipulation of the risk it entailed.

Brams (2005) analyzed several cases of national and global politics as bargaining games: the Geneva Conference on Indochina (1954) highlighted the privileged position of the status quo (Zagare, 1979); the aforementioned Cuban Missile Crisis, which was regarded as a game of chicken (Dixit & Skeath, 2004); the Watergate scandal (1973-74) which led to the resignation of President Nixon; the strategy of President Carter at the Camp David negotiations between Israelis and Arabs (September 1978); the role of Kissinger as an arbitrator between Israelis and Arabs during the Yom Kippur war (October 1978); and the role of threats in the conflict between the Solidarity trade union of Lech Walesa and the Government of the Polish Communist Party (1980-1981). Worthy of note is that Noll (2011) favors the use of professional mediation practices in many different types of international conflict. Game theory has also been used to investigate terrorism (Sandler & Arce M., 2003). Finally, Brams and Kilgour (1988) used game theoretic tools to analyze national security problems, e.g. the arms race (again as a chicken game) or the Star Wars initiative of President Reagan.

Robinson and Goforth (2005) constructed a topological framework of 144 distinct 2×2 games, synthesizing the state of the art into a "New Periodic Table" (NPT) that facilitates the development of insight into the nature of simultaneous move games. Based on this NPT, DeCanio and Fremstad (2013) examined in depth 22 such games that covered different cases of preferences and strategic interactions and were deemed to be appropriate for negotiations pertaining to the diplomacy of the international efforts to abate climate change. The coordination game, the chicken game and the prisoner's dilemma were among the game theoretic models that were analyzed. These three, along with the battle of the sexes, are referred to as atomic games by Stevens (2008) and are building blocks essential in constructing any game theoretic model of international relations, which (like business) are characterized by cooptation, i.e. the coexistence of cooperation and competition (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996).

These four atomic games are considered to be positioned along a continuum of escalating conflict:

- The coordination game, the less conflictual of the four, is appropriate for modeling situations of cooperative negotiations, where the parties involved have similar preferences and (as rational actors) are likely to select the same outcome, even if more than one satisfactory solutions are available.
- Next comes the battle of the sexes, in which both parties (like a man and a woman on a date) would benefit from an agreement, but each party has different priorities on its agenda and would ideally like to drive the other party to the outcome most favorable to them (like the man who would rather go to a sporting event as opposed to the woman who would prefer to go to the ballet). The battle of the sexes is a game theoretic model appropriate for global negotiations that are characterized by different preferences, but a common desire to reach an agreement.
- In the chicken game, the two players are in direct conflict, as they achieve their highest payoffs only when the other party flinches and gives up competing. Like two cars speeding towards one another, the one that brakes first loses; if none applies the break, they collide head on, in an outcome as catastrophic for all as the possibility of an all-out nuclear war during the Cold War years. In a way, the chicken game is the most conflictual of the four atomic games, characterizing situations where international actors try to outbully one another, while secretly hoping that none is willing to insist until the bitter end.
- Finally, the prisoner's dilemma game, which was described previously, may be used to model situations where the participating actors would ideally dupe the other party into the outcome that is best for them, but end up in an inferior outcome as they both attempt to fool one another. The cooperative solution, a non-equilibrium outcome, would be best for the community of actors, but it may not be achieved due to the structure of this devious game. The prisoner's dilemma produces free riders, i.e. states that attempt to exploit international agreements by hoping that all other actors abide by, while they (secretly) take advantage of their noncompliance; pollution havens, countries with lax environmental regulations designed to attract polluting foreign investments, are such an example. Compared to the chicken game, the prisoner's dilemma is not as openly conflictual, but makes achieving an enforceable agreement almost impossible.

2.2. The Rhetoric of Game Theory: The Chicken Game as Rhetorical Construction

This study argues that the theoretical model of the game of chicken may be analyzed through the communication strategy and rhetoric the leading actors used during the negotiation. Their intention was to build a social reality, maximize the gains, and put pressure on the negotiation process domestically and internationally.

Although game theory (and the chicken game in particular) is more of a decision analysis tool, it may also be constructed rhetorically in a strategic context, in order to pressure the opposite side and drag them into a constructed social reality where actions are directed by the players. In other words, the chicken game as strategy is a constructed crisis with zero-sum gains.

When a crisis is constructed rhetorically, the main objective is to drag public opinion into a social reality of high stakes and limited time frames by evoking the emotions of fear, anxiety and pressure (Aspriadis et.al. 2014). This way, public opinion gets into the state of panic and puts pressure to the government and political elite to reach a decision quickly. By doing so, the domestic front may collapse and the government loses the support for its handling of the negotiations.

Through strategic communication, the main actors (government, political elite, organizations etc.) are trying to influence public opinion abroad and domestically. In this capacity, the government's messaging aims at breaking the enemy front and, at the same time, maintaining the unity of its own home front. Governments or political elites, in this capacity, are acting in terms of campaign mode.

Campaign mode is defined as the function that combined the focus on the election victory with the continued use of strategic thinking (Burton & Shea 2003). Campaign mode is a vital part under which strategic communication takes place and is organized. The messaging under these circumstances is usually target-oriented and aims to influence or construct a specific social reality that will produce specific emotions and behavior. Rhetorical strategies are part of the strategic communication process and are incorporated into the messages in order to achieve the specific objectives.

In election campaigns, the pursuit of media attention drives candidates to attack to get media coverage (Goidel & Langley, 1996; Hetherington, 1996; Patterson, 1996; Krebs et al., 2007). The practice of election campaigns is being incorporated in the political discourse when strategic communication is implemented using campaign mode (Samaras & Papathanassopoulos, 2006). The political rhetoric when addressing international issues is usually being constructed to address both domestic and international audiences (Aspriadis, 2013). In this case study, the rhetorical strategies built a highly conflictual environment between the opponents which constructed a zero-sum game for the actors. The following mix of strategies are being used by the main actors and may compose a typology that is closely related to the chicken game.

Attack (against the opponent): The attack is a very common use in political communication (Samaras & Papathanassopoulos, 2008). The actor may attack the opponent to blame him, accuse him, deconstruct his ethos/credibility, and demonize him. In addition, it may also be used to maximize the payoffs in advance by deconstructing the image of the opponent. Although an attack can take many forms and be expressed through different kinds of rhetorical strategies (ad hominem attacks, negativity, etc.), in this study, it is examined in general terms.

Attribution of blame (or blame shifting): This strategy is used in order to shift the blame for a deed to someone else. If the accused indicates who is to blame, then the responsibility is transferred (shifting the blame). This way, someone else gets the responsibility who may be unable to react, becoming a scapegoat (Benoit 1995).

Threat appeal: Threat is a productive cause of fear (Rogers, 1975; Neuman & Levy, 2003; Janis, 1975). Threat transforms the pervasive fear for the unknown into specific and palpable fear (Siegel, 2005). It is the message that produces fear, and may be approached in two ways: as a subjective experience in the light of psychological theories, and as an objective structure in the light of strategic communication (Goussios et al., 2014). To construct a crisis situation, the strategic use of threat or a rhetorically increased threat is a powerful tool to embrace fear in the audience to mobilize public opinion towards a specific direction. In addition, per its strategic use, threat appeal can also construct the strategy of chicken game and work in the direction of embracing fear on the opponent, making him abort the game. This can maximize the payoffs for a player.

Fearmongering (or fear appeal): The rhetorical fear appeal, as a persuasion tactic, is an attempt to influence the attitude and behavior through the projection of all those destructive consequences that will bring incompliance with the proposed solutions (Goussios et al., 2014). The rhetorical fear appeal distracts the public from a careful evaluation of the stakes or the problem (Pratkanis & Aronson: 2001). In doing so, it constructs a new social reality under which the public acts and reacts in term of anxiety. In game-theoretic terms, fearmongering sets the stakes for the opponent and calls him to withdraw or to succumb to the terms. In addition, if the message is powerful, it may attack the enemy public opinion and destroy the home front.

Demonization: This is a process of constructing the enemy image with very negative attributes and images, to make him hateful in the public opinion. Examples of rhetorical demonization can be drawn from the rhetoric of the Bush administrations against Saddam Hussein in 1991 and 2003, where he was identified with Hitler, murderers and hateful actions. Likewise, Osama Bin Laden was demonized to destroy his image in the international public opinion and turn him into a hated person (Samaras 2002).

Bolstering: This refers to the self-praise of the orator (player), that in strategic terms builds his credibility and enhances the positive or good image. Through this strategy, the players construct the image of themselves and enhance their leadership image, which helps them face attacks on their credibility. Although bolstering could be used as a defensive strategy, it also helps build a strong image in advance, present a positive image to the opponent, and get the trust of the enemy public opinion. Bolstering may be achieved by highlighting previous positive images and attitudes (Len-Rios, 2010) or present positive views of someone's actions. The first sub-strategy refers to the intention of the defender to bolster his image and his credibility towards the public by highlighting previous positive images and attitudes (Len-Rios, 2010). This strategy may prove more effective if the positive experiences outlined show a relevance to the present situation (Benoit, 1995).

The next section presents the findings of the qualitative content and discourse analysis in the case study of the Eurogroup negotiations through the discourse of the two leading actors, Ministers of Economy, Drs. Varoufakis and Schäuble.

3. FINDINGS

3.1. Strategic Discourse of Yanis Varoufakis

The Greek Minister of Economy Yanis Varoufakis, from the very beginning framed the negotiation process by trying to project specific personal image attributes to his counterparts. In addition, he used a specific combination of strategies that demonstrated the change in the government's attitude and purpose towards the lenders and the other European countries.

The new image of the government represented aggressiveness, determination and lack of consensual attitude. These image attributes should be broadcasted at every level and through the rhetoric of the main members of the government. Dr. Varoufakis, due to his duties as minister of the economy, became the main spokesperson of the government during the negotiation process. Therefore, the media focused on his rhetoric, his image and his behavior. Soon, Dr. Varoufakis, became the spokesperson of Greece on the international scene.

Varoufakis' rhetoric used a mix of attack against the opponent, blame shifting, bolstering, demonization, attribution of blame, threat and fear appeal. The amount of these strategies that were used in his speeches show us whether he built on the strategy of the chicken game. In Figure 1, it may be seen that he used mostly the attack against the opponent strategy and, to a lesser but almost equal extent, blame shifting and bolstering/ self-praise. Demonization, attribution of blame and provocation were less used than the other strategies.




Figure 1. Rhetorical strategies of Dr. Yanis Varoufakis

This mix of strategies shows that he aimed at shifting the blame for the situation of Greece and for the policies Troika used all these years and during the negotiations. To achieve that, he attacked his opponents, Eurogroup and the Troika, constructing a zero-sum game at the same time. At the same time, he praised Greece, his government and himself for doing the right thing, in an effort to enhance his own image and appear strong and certain for his moves and attitudes during the negotiation process. The other strategies he used as support to his main strategic choices, enhanced his aim to deconstruct the image of Germany and the Troika and to develop a one-way road towards his goals.

In effect, in every occasion, Varoufakis made clear that he and his government will not comply with the rules that were laid thus far, and that they will seek change for Europe and Greece as far as the austerity politics is concerned. By doing so, Varoufakis set his limits on the outcome of the negotiation process. During the six months, he stayed strong defending this position forging dead ends to the discussions and making his points clear.

“What is the percentage of the memorandum that we accept? Exactly zero percent! We will not agree to any single term that enhances the maelstrom of the crisis, which magnifies the percentage of the debt etc.”¹

This way, Varoufakis tried to construct the framework of his negotiating position and to put pressure on his opponents by setting a chicken game. He made clear that the Government of Greece had specific red lines that would not be crossed. By doing so, Varoufakis showed decisiveness and that he was committed to follow his position to the end, no matter what. This strategy embraces fear to the opponents that the other side will not hesitate to collide.

“Faithful to the principle that I have no right to bluff, my answer is: The lines that we have presented as red will not be crossed. Otherwise, they would not be truly red, but merely a bluff.”²

At the same time, Varoufakis, tries to show a more consensual attitude if his demands will be met. This carrot and stick strategy built the personal image of Varoufakis as a reasonable party, willing to negotiate under specific circumstances and only if his conditions are met.

“Our proposal is this: We will not rip the current program, neither will you demand a blind implementation. As serious companies do with contracts, when the circumstances change, they agree to have an interim period between the contracts in order to gain vital time to renegotiate a new mutually beneficial agreement.”³

Indirectly, he threatened the other side that Greece would stop the negotiations if the agreement was not mutually beneficial. By doing so, Varoufakis aimed to stick to his positions and show determination.

As the minister of Greece, Varoufakis was, in effect, the first who challenged the German side and initiated a new negotiation process. After the national elections of Greece, the central argument of the newly established Greek government was to bring change and put an end to the memorandums. In this context, Varoufakis travelled to Brussels to meet his counterparts and renegotiate the deal. However, he tried to frame the context of the negotiation and initiate a conflict between the other members of the Euro-zone against Germany. To achieve that and to get maximum gains from the negotiation, Varoufakis tried to show determination on his goals threatening with Grexit (an exit of Greece from the Eurozone), which would bring instability to Europe’s financial system.

Varoufakis tried to construct a social reality of conflict between Greece and Germany for two more reasons:

- a) To rally the Greek people around the government (which succeeded thanks to the governmental rhetoric and raised the public approval ratings to over 60% in February of 2015).
- b) To internationalize the conflict and rally the south against the north.

The strategy of the chicken game was employed by Varoufakis and the Greek government, in an attempt to build a social reality of fear and insecurity between the other member states and maximize his gains. This was achieved through the constant use of the threat of not taking the deal and breaking the relationship with Europe.

During the negotiations, this was the main destructive argument he used to build on the chicken game and lead the negotiations towards his aims. However, to get credibility and convince the other member states of his campaign, he used specific strategies that would construct the social reality required to highlight the dead ends of the chicken game.

The Strategy he used the most was the attack against the opponent strategy (22% in total). Varoufakis incorporated this strategy in his discourse to provoke his opponent (Schäuble) and blame him and Germany directly for the economic crisis and the policies that had been implemented thus far in Greece. Varoufakis strongly disagreed with the policies that had been followed during the last five years by the Troika and so did the coalition government of SYRIZA and ANEL.

¹ Hellenic Parliament, 10.02.2015

² New York Times, 16.02.2015

³ Hellenic Parliament, 09.02.2015

⁴ <http://www.efsyn.gr/arthro/nea-dimoskopisi-emfanizei-ypsila-pososta-apodohis-tis-kyvernisis>, <http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/916282/dimoskopisi-to-606-antimetopizei-thetika-tin-kubernisi> and <http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/921203/probadisma-syriza-me-238-monades-enanti-tis-nd>

The heated rhetoric that had been used during the election campaign would now be put into action. In this framework, the government blamed Germany for the economic recession and for the measures that were ineffective so far. The German minister of economy had been demonized throughout the elections campaign to construct the enemy other, and rally the domestic audience.

This carefully chosen communications strategy by SYRIZA aimed at creating a reality of conflict and aggressiveness to maximize the domestic gains through the enhancement of the patriotic emotion of the Greeks; at the same time, it aimed at projecting a new diversified image to the European audience and the Eurogroup counterparts.

The Strategy of attack was Varoufakis' most used strategy during his speeches on the negotiation process. This strategy was aimed against the policies that were agreed by the former government of Greece and the lenders of the Troika and the Eurogroup. His objective was to deconstruct the policies of the Eurogroup and Troika in the eyes of the European audience, in order to achieve a better deal at the negotiations.

"An outside observer during the Eurogroup gatherings would conclude that it is a strange forum, not well equipped for taking the right decisions at a time that Europe needs them the most."

While attacking the Eurogroup, Varoufakis avoided attacking its member states directly. This meant that the incapability of the institution was not the fault of its member states. This strategy aimed at minimizing the negativity of the attacks towards the Europeans while trying to find consensus and cooperation even when pushing towards his objectives. Using this kind of language in his official statements, Varoufakis aimed at minimizing the provocation of the government and the attacks he used against Germany. Besides, he needed the support of the other member states.

Varoufakis tried to internationalize the problem of Greece and transform it into a European problem. To achieve that, he used the strategy of blame shifting against Germany.

"The irresponsible Greek borrowers and the irresponsible German lenders should suffer the consequences. Today, the formal Europe asks us to sign a deal to make the right thing in order to avoid bankruptcy. This is what happened in 2010! They ask me to do the same – and act as if the crisis has been solved. No thank you! We were not elected to do the same thing."

Varoufakis differentiated between now and then, in the agreed deals. He characterized both the Greeks and the German representatives that signed the previous deals, as irresponsible. He clarified that he would not take such deals. This differentiation, apart from shifting the blame to the previous negotiating parties, tried to deconstruct the ethos and credibility of the previous governments, so far as the Greek side was concerned. On the other hand, the German side had not changed since 2010. Therefore, he did refer directly to Schäuble but minimized the effect by using a more general characterization like lenders and formal Europe.

As the negotiations moved on, Varoufakis blamed the Eurogroup and its members officially for misbehavior during the process. In taking it to the media, he aimed to deconstruct the image of the ally and highlight the strong competitive environment and hostility against Greece. He wanted also to deconstruct the dead-end strategy used by Schäuble, blaming him again indirectly.

"It wasn't allowed to me to exchange our written proposals with any other Finance Minister."

He also blamed Schäuble for the chicken game he played and the destruction that would come for Greece and for Europe. By doing so, he raised the stakes for his opponent, trying to force him to withdraw from the race.

"The last Eurogroup will be recorded in history as a lost opportunity to achieve an already delayed accord between Greece and its lenders."

Varoufakis blamed the nature of the memorandum using carefully chosen words that aimed at deconstructing the image of the memorandum for the Europeans.

"The Memorandum is very toxic and disastrous. And the worst thing is that the doctor knows it. But he is determined to continue giving it."

The strategy of demonization was used to deconstruct the practice of the other members of the Eurogroup for their choices and persistence on the same policy.

"A toxic fantasy that would lead Greece into difficult years."

To build his personal image and reputation, Varoufakis used the strategy of bolstering. Through this strategy, he tried to strengthen his image in the interior and gain support for his actions. By enhancing the image of being right, he managed to continue the way he negotiated while, at the same time, be perceived as the good guy in the eyes of the Greeks. In the meantime, he constructed a positive image of SYRIZA despite the rhetoric of conflict with Europe.

“This is the reason, ladies and gentlemen, why we returned the smile to the face of Greeks. Why we invented the break...”

The aim was to present SYRIZA as a party of change that had the power to change Europe. However, most of his rhetoric aimed at the interior, to enhance the rally around the flag effect and present a strong image of national unity abroad. This strategy showed that the negotiations were perceived as a conflict with Europe and the moves of the leading actors were perceived as acts of war.

“Ladies and Gentlemen, this government is the first that comes standing in the Eurogroup and not bowed from the beginning...”

Varoufakis bolstered the image of the Greek Government by presenting the image of innovation. The government was presented as bringing something new to both Greece and the world. Furthermore, he highlighted the image of determination, no matter the consequences. This point did not only refer to the domestic level but also to the Europeans, to show that the Greek side would not be the one to withdraw from the negotiations and consent to something that was not good.

“Against such cynicism, the new Greek government will innovate. We shall desist, whatever the consequences, from deals that are wrong for Greece and wrong for Europe.”

3.2. Strategies in the discourse of Wolfgang Schäuble

On the other side of the aisle, the Minister of Economy of Germany, Dr. Schäuble, played along using a similar combination of rhetorical strategies to win the chicken game. Throughout the negotiation process, Dr. Schäuble tried to build a stable image for himself and his country.

“Oh, you know, I do not have the intention when other people behave badly to change my own habits. And if you have the responsibility of a finance minister, personal sensitivities are not really important. That's not what it is about. It's all about essence. I feel sorry for the Greeks. They have chosen a government that is quite irresponsible at the moment.”

A stable image projection translates into credibility, which is very important during negotiations and conflicts. When a country is a credible actor in the international system, its threats, its attitudes and its power projections have more weight than others (Waltz, 2011). Germany wanted to cultivate this image to be considered a major power in Europe.

During the negotiations, Schäuble aimed at winning the international audience and the members of the Eurogroup. He did not want to address the argumentation of the Greek side directly, but tried to keep the stability of the environment of the previous years, mainly by presenting all the positive things that his policies had brought, using the strategy of bolstering.

“The goals were met sufficiently last year, but now it has been destroyed quite a bit by these revisions of the new government.”

Playing the credibility card helped him be considered someone that knew exactly what needed to be done not only for Greece but also for the European Union.

Furthermore, Schäuble managed to victimize himself and Germany, in the hands of a government that did not want to follow the rules for ideological reasons.

“... instead, you insult those who have helped Greece in recent years.”

This way, Schäuble aimed to deconstruct the personal image of Varoufakis and Greece by presenting him as non-credible and enforce fear and uncertainty on his counterparts.

“Either Greece shows a way on how it will get somebody's credit in the future, or nothing will be done. The Greek colleague (Varoufakis) said that the problem was that Greece was helped too much. This is not the best prerequisite to say, now you need to help more.”

To achieve this, his strategic communication efforts were more coherent and carefully chosen with the only aim to deconstruct Varoufakis and his governments' rhetoric.

"I said, 'Yes, of course, we have great respect for the electorate of the Greeks'. But my respect for the German electorate and the electorate of voters in all other member countries is just as great. And you have to find a way. But it is not that easy to say: Well, we do not stick to what we have agreed on – but now we need money."

Schäuble repeated the same arguments again and again, building on the image of stability. This gave him credibility and build the image of one that can manage the crisis.

The mix of strategies he used may be characterized as very offensive, and it seems that he was investing more into the chicken game strategy. As may be seen in Figure 2, Schäuble used the 'attack against the opponent' strategy the most (24%).

"Greece has long lived beyond its own capacity until the outbreak of this crisis ..."




Figure 2. Rhetorical strategies of Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble

His attacks were not only directed at the new government or his counterpart, Minister Varoufakis. They also attacked the image of Greece. In doing so, Dr. Schäuble aimed to return the blame to Greece and present the financial crisis as a problem embedded in Greek politics rather than of the European or global situation. His objectives were to gain supporters in the Eurogroup and minimize the impact of Varoufakis.

In addition, Schäuble attacked the image of the government in the negotiations to present them as something temporal and illogical. This way, he also deconstructed the main argument of his counterpart that the Varoufakis' power came from the people they voted for renegotiations (as explained in the previous section).

"I suspect that it is also a great poker game of this new government, which has indeed had a lot of success with a very special election campaign in Greece. But of course, you can always do that. You can always easily promise people, blame others, [when] others have pay. And when people are not getting good, they let themselves be seduced, but that does not help in the long run."

The German Minister of Economy used blame shifting (19%) to blame Greece for the crisis and its management. This helped him win support for his stance and made the other member states to be distrustful of the Greek argumentation. Germany was being presented as the helper of Greece so this constructed a positive image, enhancing the dichotomy between the two sides.

"And then I said that the leaders (of Greece) during all those decades in Greece are responsible."

By blaming an endemic system failure for the situation, the blame affected the problems of the entire system (Brändström, Kuipers & Daléus, 2005) and not just circumstantial or external factors. This way, Schäuble deconstructed the argument used by Varoufakis that the growth of the deficit was Germany's fault for the continuation of lending.

"Now you say (ref. to Varoufakis) we should not give you so much credit. You have to find a way where other lenders can trust Greece. This is the way."

Schäuble also blamed Greece for living beyond its own means all those years, with outside economic assistance. He implied that this was the main difference between Greece and other countries in financial difficulties, presenting Greece as a worthy victim (Iordanidou & Samaras, 2014). This made Greece unsympathetic in the eyes of the other member states.

"This is not easy for Greece, but it is not easy for other countries either. One cannot live permanently over its own capacity."

The other focus of Schäuble was the rhetoric used by Varoufakis. Schäuble emphasized the fact that the relations between Germany and Greece or even the other member states, deteriorated because of the heated rhetoric of the new government.

"Greece really needs to know: if they want tools, they have to stick to what they have agreed upon. Greece has recently made its own situation difficult through its rhetoric, which is difficult to understand from the perspective of outside Greece"

Even in this case however, he emphasized the fact that Germany was willing to help, highlighting again a good image for his country.

"But it would be helpful if the government in Greece did not speak in such a way that it would be difficult for us to convince other Europeans to convince our populations."

In addition, Schäuble presented Germany as a victim of Greece's new foreign policy, demonizing Greece and presenting it as pushing things to the limits through blackmailing.

"We want solidarity, but not blackmail. Nobody has imposed the aid program on the Greeks. It is therefore entirely in the hands of the government in Athens."

Again, the image of the victim for Germany is obvious. This way Schäuble's objective was to counter the argument of Varoufakis that the Greeks were the victims of Germany, and that they were pushed into signing the previous deals.

"It is a completely unbelievable demagogic polemic, when one says: They force the Greeks into something..."

Finally, to enhance his rhetoric, credibility and image, Schäuble used the strategy of bolstering and self-praise (12%). In doing so, he aimed to enhance his image and argumentation and also project the previous success in a way that would make the new government of Greece sound unrealistic.

"They (Greece) have made great progress. We have a good chance that unemployment will be the first time this year. They have again economic growth. They are better than expected two years ago."

Bolstering was used to support the other strategies and maximize the impact of the argumentation. This strategy enhanced the image of Schäuble and his policies, with the objective of presenting Germany in a more positive context. In other words, this way Schäuble defended his positions and their impact for Greece through the projection of the positive outcomes. In the background, through this strategy, Dr. Schäuble tried to present the Greek government as a destructor of all the good policy outcomes throughout the last years.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The negotiations of Greece for the new deal with the Troika ended up in a personal conflict between the two representatives of Greece and Germany. For the Greek side, Germany was to blame for the situation in the country and long lasting economic crisis. The images of Varoufakis and Schäuble and were deeply identified with the image of the country. The rhetoric, the words and the strategies they used, were perceived as those of their country.

This way, the moves they made were seen as the foreign policy moves of the country. Thus, the conflict between the two men was perceived as a zero-sum game between Greece and Germany, conforming well to the game-theoretic model of chicken. Both players used a high amount of the rhetorical strategies of attack, bolstering, demonization and blame shifting, which constructed credibility and provoked the opponent.

Both actors tried to bully one another, while secretly hoping that one of them would not hold to the bitter end. Schäuble exaggerated in the use of offensive strategies. This points out that he tried to make more use of the chicken game and put dead ends in the negotiation process, while blaming the other side.

Through the strategies they used, it becomes obvious that both parties wanted to construct a social reality of conflict, using strategic communication to achieve their negotiation objectives. By doing so, the pressure would be maximized, as both parties aimed at gaining the outside support they needed to force the other side to withdraw.

The issue was not obtaining an agreement from the Eurogroup, but making the other side resign and consent to the proposals. This target was what transformed the negotiations into a game of chicken. To achieve that, both parties needed to execute a very carefully constructed strategic communication plan.

The high expectations of the Greek government and the insurgent tactics it used, brought the battle outside the closed doors of the Eurogroup, to the European audience. Therefore, at the tactical level, the rhetorical strategies like attack, blame shifting, bolstering, demonization etc. were the tools to deconstruct the rhetoric of the opponent. The differences in the amount of rhetorical strategies used were very small, which shows that both parties tried to construct the same reality for their part and influence the audience in a similar way. This illustrates the game of chicken, where the means are the same and both parties try to make the other withdraw.

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The representation of the refugees and the immigrants in the Greek press: A corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis approach.

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ABSTRACT

The present paper investigates how refugees and immigrants are presented by five Greek newspapers that represent all the ideological positions. Corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis are combined and data are analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. More specifically, the newspapers' electronic archives are used as corpora, in order to discover how refugees and immigrants are presented and in what context. Additionally, collocations found are cross-checked against general language corpora. Emphasis is laid on whether or not their representation differs significantly from one newspaper to the other. The data collected come from the year 2015, when the continuing war in Syria and the atrocities of ISIS have resulted in the arrival of many refugees and immigrants at the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean Sea. Especially studied are the collocations and the contexts of the texts on the citizenship law voted this year and the words 'illegal' and 'irregular' that describe their legal status.

Keywords: corpus linguistics, critical discourse analysis, press, refugees, immigrants, citizenship law, illegal, irregular

1. INTRODUCTION and METHODOLOGY

In this paper the results of a research on the representation of refugees and immigrants in the Greek press during 2015 are presented. This particular year is very crucial because the continuing war in Syria and the atrocities of ISIS have resulted in the arrival by boats of thousands of refugees and immigrants on the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean sea, most of all in Lesbos, Chios and Samos, which are very close to the Turkish coast. More specifically, according to data provided by the port police¹, during 2015 (until the 21st of December) 804.465 migrants and refugees arrived in Greece (whose population at 2015 was 10.977.697 inhabitants). More than half of the incomers (457.149) were refugees from Syria.

According to the annual report for 2015 of the Network for registration of violent incidents (which was set up by the National Committee for the human rights and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for the refugees in Greece)², because of the criminal prosecution of the leaders of the far right party Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn) for the assassination of a citizen (Pavlos Fyssas), its "Attack Battalions" were withdrawn from the streets and, thus, racist violence diminished in comparison with 2014. (This trial started on 20 April 2015). In the same report the abovementioned network states that in the Greek society from the one side we can see solidarity which is demonstrated in practice from a large part of the population in the framework of the refugee crisis, while, on the other side, we observe racist violence from another part of the population.

In the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) the relation between power and language is of particular interest. "For CDA, language is not powerful on its own – it gains power by the use powerful people make of it. This explains why CDA often chooses the perspective of those who suffer, and critically analyzes the language use of those in power, who are responsible for the existence of

¹ See <http://www.iefimerida.gr/news/242582/2015-mpikan-stin-ellada-804465-metanastes-apo-poies-hores-irthan-lista#ixzz4WhiAioEs>

² See this report at http://rvrn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Report_2015gr.pdf.

inequalities and who also have the means and the opportunity to improve conditions” (Wodak, n.d.). In this perspective the role of the press is crucial, since it contributes to the reproduction of racism (Van Dijk, 2012).

Thus, the theoretical framework of this study combines corpus linguistics with elements of CDA, particularly the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA). This synergy gives the opportunity to analyze data both quantitatively and qualitatively (see Baker et al., 2008). Corpus research permits to “go beyond single texts and conveniently explore quantitative patterns of ideological meaning in a large number of texts” (O’Halloran, 2010, p.565) making “reliable generalizations” (Orpin, 2005, p.38). On the other hand, following the principles of DHA, in order to interpret our data, the ideology of the studied newspapers was taken into account, as well as the extra-linguistic, social variables of the subjects of the texts (see Wodak, 2001). Apart from collocations³, the broader context where specific words appeared was taken into consideration when it was connected to a subject of particular interest (e.g. the law about the conferral of citizenship) and the discourse was analyzed using the tools of critical discourse analysis.

The data come from the newspapers’ electronic archives which were used as corpora in order to investigate the clusters, the collocations and the context in which the key words *refugee* and *immigrant* appear. The research questions were:

- how are the refugees and the immigrants linguistically presented?
- what are the frequent topics of discourses relating to them?
- to what degree does their image differ from newspaper to newspaper and how can this be explained according to the newspapers’ ideological background?

Five newspapers that represent different ideological positions were investigated⁴:

- a) ‘Rizospastis’, a daily newspaper, which is the tool of the Greek communist party,
- b) ‘Avgi’, a daily newspaper, which is the tool of the left party SYRIZA, that was governing the country in 2015,
- c) ‘To Vima’, which favored the socialist party PASOK during the last decades, but during the last years supports the opposition neoliberal party New Democracy. The newspaper has a printed Sunday edition, while the rest of the days it is published electronically. Our research concerns both editions.
- d) ‘I Kathimerini’, which is considered to be the main conservative newspaper, but allows other voices to be heard too. The newspaper is published every day and it has a special Sunday edition too. Our research concerns all the editions.
- and e) ‘Chrisi Avgi’, a weekly newspaper, which is the tool of the far right party of ‘Chrisi Avgi’ (Golden Dawn). Unlike the others, which, in general, adopt a more or less formal style, ‘Chrisi Avgi’ is a populist newspaper that adopts an informal language and often an ironic and insulting tone with the intention to “cross the boundaries” (Archakis and Tsakona, 2010, p. 913) and approach its public.

We must keep in mind that the qualitative distinction between broadsheets and tabloids does not apply in the Greek press⁵.

³ The definition of *collocation* adopted here is the above-chance frequent co-occurrence of two words, usually within five words on either side of the word under investigation (the *node*) (see Sinclair, 1991).

⁴ The year 2015 has been an election year: elections occurred twice, in January and in September. The remark of Komninou (1996) still applies twenty years later: “(t)he political affiliation of (greek) newspapers is always manifest in periods of intense political contention, especially election periods” (cited in Papatthanassopoulos 2001a, p. 508).

⁵ As Papatthanassopoulos (2001b) notes: “In some countries the tabloid press is the ‘yellow’ or ‘sensational’ press, whereas the broadsheet press is seen as the ‘respectable’ press. Yet in others the tabloid press is associated with the physical size of a newspaper rather than the content, and some of these newspapers offer readers very serious journalism (Spain, Italy, and Greece). Few would identify TA NEA (Greece), El Pais (Spain) and La Repubblica (Italy) as sensational newspapers because of their tabloid format” (p.113).

The newspapers ‘I Kathimerini’, ‘To Vima’ and ‘Rizospastis’ offer well designed electronic platforms for research. They permit to look for words in a specific time interval. ‘To Vima’ and ‘Rizospastis’ offer the possibility to look for collocations, but not ‘I Kathimerini’, because the results its platform provides may contain either of the collocation’s words. In these newspapers the searched words appear highlighted.

The platform of ‘Chrisi Avgi’ does not permit a chronological research. It presents a number of articles in a chronological order (so it is quite easy to find the dates searched), but the words searched are not highlighted and if somebody looks for a cluster of two words there is a possibility that the words appear in the article separated: for ex. if one looks for *λαθρομεταναστευτική πολιτική* (clandestine-migration policy), a neologism appearing in this newspaper, one can find the different expression *λαθρομεταναστευτική κρίση* (clandestine-migration crisis) and elsewhere in the same article the word *πολιτική* (policy).

The platform of ‘Avgi’ does not permit a chronological research either. It presents a number of pages each containing 9 articles with their various dates (each page may contain articles from different years) and this makes the research problematic. The words searched appear highlighted. When one looks for two consecutive words (for ex. *μεταναστευτική κρίση* – migration crisis) the platform shows the texts containing these two words together, but also the texts where either of the words appear (so out of the texts containing the word *crisis*, some are irrelevant to our research).

Each newspaper’s archive, with all the kinds of texts appearing in it, was used as a distinct corpus; this approach allows for making comparisons between them. The results of the search were compared, when deemed necessary, with the reference corpus SEK (Corpus of Greek Texts, www.sek.edu.gr) which was chosen since it is open access, it is presented in concordances and it gives access to the larger context. SEK “represents a well-defined collection of texts from a variety of genres that are central in Greek contexts of communication” (Goutsos, 2010, p. 31) (academic, popularised, law-administration, private, literature, news, opinion articles, interview, public speech, conversation, miscellaneous) and are taken from different media: radio, television, live, book, telephone, newspaper, magazine, electronic etc. (Goutsos, 2010).

The key words of the study were *refugee* and *migrant*. The search was carried out by using the word stems *προσφυγ-* (refug-) and *μεταναστ-* (μετανάστης: immigr-/ migr-) (the Greek language does not differentiate between migrant, immigrant and emigrant); the words found also contained their derivatives (*μεταναστευτικός*-migratory, *προσφυγικός*-of refugee) and their compound words (*λαθρομετανάστης*- clandestine migrant). Then the collocations of these words were searched in their immediate context; and when there was a need to find out the exact subject of the text, the wider context was also searched.

‘Rizospastis’ platform proposes only 300 texts for each word searched (thus 600 texts in total) and mentions that there are too many texts to be displayed containing this particular word. In ‘Avgi’ 12.862 texts were found; in ‘To Vima’ 3.767 texts; in ‘I Kathimerini’ 3.016 texts and in ‘Chrisi Avgi’ 4.806 texts. (Of course, because the texts were found after looking for the two lexical stems ‘refug-’ and ‘immigr-’, there is a possibility of some overlapping because of texts containing both words and thus appearing twice; so the texts may be fewer than that, but this fact does not really affect our research⁶).

For the newspapers that the searched words were highlighted (their context was examined in order to find out their collocations).

For those where the searched words were not high lightened the AntCom software for corpus compilation was used in order to find the words in the texts and their concordances.

The research was done during the academic year 2015-6 by the post-graduate students Anastasios Athanasiadis, Elpida Charalambidou, Sophia Liakou, Christina Tsolopani, Eleni Vavila and Maria-Nikoleta Mintza of the department of Primary Education, University of Western Macedonia, in the framework of my course entitled “Introduction to critical literacy”. Its purpose was to give to the students the opportunity to study the language of the press concerning the immigrants and the refugees

⁶ Because there are texts appearing more than once and because all the texts found were not downsized to AntCom, there is no possibility to count the words of our corpus.

and discover the ways they are presented. In this way they were urged not only to find the stereotypes of the newspapers, but also to reconsider their own stereotypes. Of course their results were examined and completed by me, in order to produce this paper.

Because the articles were too many, Sinclair's recommendation (1999) was followed: after examining thoroughly the first 100 lines and found existing collocations, 30 lines were examined at random from the subsequent 100 lines and another 30 lines thereafter until nothing new was found. The same was done for the entire texts. All the collocations found in the first 100 texts were noted and then those found in 30 texts from the next hundred of texts and so on.

The close collocations but also the more remote ones appearing in the larger context were examined. Here the collocations that occur in a percentage equal or bigger than 3% are presented.

It is worth noting that the words *refugee* and *immigrant* and their derivatives and compound words occur with greater statistical salience in all the examined newspapers than in the reference corpus.

2. THE REFUGEES AND THE IMMIGRANTS AS A "PROBLEM"⁷

By all the newspapers the massive arrival of refugees and immigrants is considered as a great problem, first of all for Greece which cannot cope with it, and secondly for themselves who do not receive what they should (this second aspect, of course, does not concern the newspaper 'Chrisi Avgi'). This problem is named *migration/ refugee problem* (προσφυγικό/ μεταναστευτικό πρόβλημα) or *question* (ζήτηση) or even *crisis* (κρίση). The far right 'Chrisi Avgi' characterizes this problem as *clandestine-migratory* (λαθρομεταναστευτικό), using the prefix *λαθρο-* (*clandestine*) it always uses to characterize migrants (see below).

This problem is first of all connected to their number: quantification is one of the principle ways that refugees are presented in all the examined newspapers. This finding corresponds with that of Baker 2006. Refugees and immigrants are *thousands* (χιλιάδες), *hundreds* (εκατοντάδες), *dozens* (δεκάδες), *many* (πολλοί), *groups* (ομάδες) and they are presented in terms of the water metaphor as *waves* (κύματα) *refugee/immigrant flows* (ροές). Some instances of the word *ρεύμα* (which is also translated as *flow*) were also found in the two left wing newspapers. These words in the reference corpus combine with water, money or electrical energy and they seem to be translational loans from other European languages, especially English. When they are presented this way "they are dehumanized and something that requires control in order to prevent disaster to others (e.g. non refugees)" (Baker, 2006, p. 81). But we must also stress the presence of the word *εισροή* in smaller percentages in the left newspapers 'Rizospastis' and 'Avgi'. This word, which in English is translated with *influx* again, is used in the science of demography to describe population movements. Therefore we interpret its presence as an effort to describe the arrival of the refugees and the immigrants in a neutral way.

The far right 'Chrisi Avgi' presents them also as *hordes* (ορδές) and *invaders* (εισβολείς), which in the reference corpus always combine with violent enemies. This newspaper also writes about '*uncontrollable clandestine migration*' (ανεξέλεγκτη λαθρομετανάστευση). As an aspect of the problem, it presents "*Greece turned into a warehouse of clandestine migrants*" (η Ελλάδα αποθήκη λαθρομεταναστών). Thus the migrants/refugees are portrayed as an immediate threat.

For all the newspapers this problem must be addressed through a consistent *refugee/migration policy* (προσφυγική/μεταναστευτική πολιτική). The communist newspaper 'Rizospastis' also uses the collocation *anti-migration policy* (αντιμεταναστευτική πολιτική) with reference to the European Union (EU) policy towards the migrants (these words correlate almost exclusively with the collocation *European Union*).

The newspapers either propose solutions or they criticize the government's attitude (all but 'Avgi') or praise it ('Avgi'). The far right 'Chrisi Avgi' finds the solution in the denial of access to these people. All the other newspapers suggest that the EU must permit them to go to whichever country they choose

⁷ This finding corresponds to that of Polymeneas (2010) who examines the general reference corpus SEK.

(for ex. In 'Rizospastis': *We fight for the direct transportation of the migrants – refugees to the countries of their final destination, under the responsibility of the UN and the EU*, 19.12.2015).

The communist 'Rizospastis' stresses the value of *solidarity* (αλληλεγγύη) towards the refugees/immigrants, while the left wing 'Avgi' stresses the contribution and the constant need for *volunteers* (εθελοντές) as a means of helping both the Greek state and the refugees/immigrants (cf. *The unsung heroes of Lesbos: Οι αφανείς ήρωες της Λέσβου*, 15.10.2015)

The positions of the far right 'Chrisi Avgi' in the one hand and of the left wing 'Avgi' and 'Rizospastis' on the other hand are based on their representations of the morality of the migrants and refugees. 'Chrisi Avgi' presents them as criminals:

Morals and customs of «refugees»: a 28-year-old refugee forced into prostitution his... 14-year-old wife! (Ηθη και έθιμα “προσφύγων”: 28χρονος εξέδιδε στην Σάμο την... 14χρονη σύζυγό του!, 13.12.2015)

or

They brought slaughters into Greece. (Έφεραν τις σφαγές στην Ελλάδα, 18.12.15)

On the contrary, 'Avgi' presents their positive actions:

“The impeccable behavior of the refugees that embark in the airport “Eleftherios Venizelos” praised captain Andreas Gasparatos (16.9.2015).

3. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE REFUGEES/IMMIGRANTS

3.1. The terminology concerning the legal status of the migrants

This is a question that seems to prevail in our data and it is very important because it constructs the migrants' identity and place them “within an unequal position in relation to those seen to be legitimate” within the country (Burroughs, 2015, p. 168). During the year 2015 the compound word *clandestine-migrant* (λαθρομετανάστης) seems to be in conflict with the word *illegal* (παράνομος) or *irregular* (παράτυπος) *immigrant*. In one of its articles the newspaper 'I Kathimerini' (28.8.2015) refers to the 'war of words':

In parallel with the national rivalries between the European states for the handling of the migrant question, the undeclared “war of the words” is raging. Anything else other than innocent, the distinctions between “economic migrants” and “refugees”, as well as between “illegal”, “irregular” and “legal” migrants, acquire a political burden electrifying the public debates between the member-states of the EU. (Παράλληλα με τους εθνικούς ανταγωνισμούς μεταξύ των ευρωπαϊκών κρατών για τη διαχείριση του μεταναστευτικού ζητήματος, μαίνεται ο ακήρυκτος «πόλεμος των λέξεων». Οτιδήποτε άλλο παρά αθώες, οι διακρίσεις ανάμεσα σε «οικονομικούς μετανάστες» και «πρόσφυγες», όπως και μεταξύ «παράνομων», «παράτυπων» και «νόμιμων» μεταναστών αποκτούν πολιτικό φορτίο, ηλεκτρίζοντας τις δημόσιες αντιπαράθεσεις σε όλα τα κράτη-μέλη της Ε.Ε).

The same controversy over the words to be used in order to characterize the legal status of the migrants takes place in the examined newspapers. The far right 'Chrisi Avgi' always refers to *clandestine-migrants* (λαθρομετανάστες), a compound word with the prefix λαθρο- which means “in an inconspicuous way, illegal”. (Another common word beginning with λαθρο- is λαθροθήρας (illegal hunter). This word is very common in the reference corpus and, as I found out by searching in the archives of the investigated newspapers, it was used by all of them in a smaller or greater degree before the year 2015. But, as revealed in the article of 'I Kathimerini', a war of words was declared in Europe: in 2013 the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) publishes a paper entitled “Why ‘undocumented’ or ‘irregular’” in which it proposes the use of these words as more appropriate while offering their translation in all the European languages; in 2015 The International Organization for Migration proposes a list of Key Migration Terms (www.iom.int/key-

migration-terms) in which the only term characterizing the legal status of migrants is *irregular*. In a Google search for the English language the collocation *irregular immigrants* appears 41.200 times and the collocation *irregular migrants* 256.000 times (mid-September 2016); both of them are mainly found in official papers of the Unesco, Universities, Ministries, Amnesty International and officials of the EU. On the contrary, the collocation *illegal immigrants* appears 6.880.000 times and in mid-September 2016 473.000 times. It is obvious that *irregular* is a new term which is not widely adopted.

This shift in terminology is first noticed in the Greek press in the newspaper 'Avgi' which almost excludes the word *λαθρομετανάστης* and declares it *racist and humiliating* (*όρος ρατσιστικός και υποτιμητικός*, 17.4.2015, 1.11.2015). Instead of it, the newspaper introduces the word *irregular* (*παράτυπος*). 'Rizospastis' follows the same path and gradually excludes this word from its vocabulary. 'To Vima' and 'I Kathimerini' in 2015 still use the word *λαθρομετανάστης* (*clandestine immigrant*) but tend to replace it: 'To Vima' uses more the word *illegal* (*παράνομος*) than the word *irregular*, while 'I Kathimerini', vice versa, uses more times the word *irregular* than *illegal*. The instances of the word *irregular* in the 'Chrisi Avgi' are there only to refer to the term used by other newspaper; 'Chrisi Avgi' making clear that it does not adopt it. It should be noted that in all the examined newspapers, except 'Chrisi Avgi', the above collocations are used only when the legal status of the people should be mentioned. On the contrary, 'Chrisi Avgi' always stresses this status and refers to *clandestine immigrants*. It rarely uses the word *refugee* (*πρόσφυγας*) and if it does it usually puts it in quotation marks and adopts an ironic tone. The phrase *the happiness to be a "refugee"* (*η ευτυχία να είσαι «πρόσφυγας»*, 14.12.2015) (because of the EU's decision to subsidize their rent) is a very good example of the newspaper's sarcastic tone and propaganda against the refugees.

Looking for *irregular* in the reference corpus we find that, unlike *illegal*, it never co-occurs with humans; it usually co-occurs with procedures and actions. The word *irregular* in our newspapers' corpora seems to acquire a new meaning that allows its users to be politically correct.

Another term describing the reasons the immigrants leave their country is *economic immigrant* (*οικονομικός μετανάστης*). Again it is a term introduced in Greek from the English language and widely used by 'I Kathimerini', 'To Vima' and 'Avgi'. This word, as suggested in the extract of 'I Kathimerini' cited above, is sometimes in conflict with the characterization *refugee*. It is argued that those called *economic immigrants* must sometimes be considered as refugees, because in their country of origin they lack the necessary revenue to survive. Following this point of view 'Rizospastis', although it uses it sometimes, considers it a pretext in order to refuse asylum to people in need of it, as in the following example:

It is certain that those who are considered to originate from "secure" countries, as "economic immigrants" will take the road of deportation. (Το βέβαιο είναι ότι όσοι θα θεωρούνται ότι προέρχονται από «ασφαλείς» χώρες, ως «οικονομικοί μετανάστες» θα παίρνουν το δρόμο της απέλασης) ('Rizospastis', 7.11.2015).

The collocation *economic immigrant* is not used by 'Chrisi Avgi', because, for this newspaper, all immigrants are clandestine and no reason for their migration is taken into consideration. (In quotation marks it was used ironically only three times in previous years).

A frequent collocation concerning the immigrants' status and found exclusively in the communist 'Rizospastis' is *immigrant workers* (*μετανάστες εργαζόμενοι*). Whenever it is used, the context refers to the rights of the migrant workers, their working conditions, their wages or their unemployment. According to its communist ideology, 'Rizospastis' considers these workers to be members of the country's working class and is interested in supporting their rights. It also places Greek and foreign migrants together:

On the occasion of the International migrants' day, the Communist Party of Greece addresses warm greetings to the thousands Greek migrants who live in foreign countries, especially the young people who were obliged to migrate during the last years of the capitalistic economic crisis, to the dozens of hundreds economic migrants who live in our country. (Με αφορμή την Παγκόσμια Μέρα Μεταναστών, το ΚΚΕ απευθύνει θερμό χαιρετισμό στους χιλιάδες Έλληνες μετανάστες που ζουν σε χώρες του εξωτερικού, ειδικά τους

νέους μετανάστες που αναγκάστηκαν να ζενιτευτούν τα τελευταία χρόνια της καπιταλιστικής οικονομικής κρίσης, στους δεκάδες χιλιάδες οικονομικούς μετανάστες που ζουν στη χώρα μας) (19.12.2015).

3.2. The citizenship law⁸

The solution to the migration problem is also connected to other aspects of the political scene of the country. A great paradigm is the case of the law giving citizenship to the children of migrants born in Greece and going to school there. This right was attributed to these children by a law voted at 2010 by the government of the socialist PASOK, but it was annulated by the Greek State Council at 2012. Before its defeat in January 2015, the government of New Democracy had prepared a new version of the law. Finally a new citizenship law was voted by the SYRIZA government in July 2015. Meanwhile, as it was obvious in the pre-electoral speech of its president Antonis Samaras, the leadership of New Democracy changed their minds concerning this problem, and finally did not vote for this law.

The law about citizenship is presented in the press as interconnected to the migration problem. The approach towards this law shows the different ideological positions the newspapers adopt.

In ‘Avgi’ the most frequent collocation concerning this law is: “*we or let us give citizenship to the migrants’ children*” (δίνουμε/ας δώσουμε ιθαγένεια). When the law is voted by the parliament in July 2015, the newspaper exults: *We transform the migrants from subjects to citizens* (Μετατρέπουμε τους μετανάστες από υπηκόους σε πολίτες, 9.7.2015). What we must emphasize here is the use of the first person plural that is used in the context of this law in order to unite the newspaper’s public and make it feel as a participant to the act of granting the citizenship.

On the contrary, in ‘Chrisi Avgi’ the most frequent collocation is the “nation-killing citizenship law” (For example ‘Chrisi Avgi’ demands: “Immediate withdrawal of the nation-killing citizenship law” (Άμεση απόσυρση του εθνοκτόνου νομοσχεδίου για την ιθαγένεια, 8.7.2015)) and also “(they) give citizenship”.

‘Rizospastis’, although it supports the citizenship right of the migrants’ children, it criticizes the law finding it insufficient and adopts an anti-government position: *Law about citizenship: It is voted today; reactionary ordinances are preserved* (Νομοσχέδιο για ιθαγένεια: ψηφίζεται σήμερα, διατηρούνται αντιδραστικές διατάξεις, 9.7.2015) or *Law about citizenship: inequity remains* (Νομοσχέδιο για την ιθαγένεια: παραμένει η ανισοτιμία, 11.6.2015).

The newspapers ‘To Vima’ and ‘I Kathimerini’ present the following collocations concerning the law: *granting of citizenship* (απόδοση/χορήγηση ιθαγένειας), *that (s)he gets the citizenship* (να λάβει ιθαγένεια), *acquisition of citizenship* (απόκτηση/κήση ιθαγένειας) and *citizenship to migrants’ children* (ιθαγένεια σε παιδιά μεταναστών). These collocations, which are common to these two newspapers, do not enlighten us about their ideological position towards this subject. This is why we proceed to a qualitative analysis of the discourse of their permanent journalists using the CDA tools.

We will start with a text of Giannis Marinos in ‘To Vima’. Marinos is one of the most ancient journalists working for DOL, the newspaper group where ‘To Vima’ belongs. He has studied law and he was the director of the economic journal ‘Economikos Taxidromos’ (*Economic Postman*). In 2006, when the right party New Democracy was governing, he participated in the ‘Commission of structural reforms’ (ΕΔΙΜΕΤ) at the Ministry of Finance⁹. The extract of his discourse that we focus on is the following:

⁸ The Greek word *ιθαγένεια* which was used for this law belongs to the national legal terminology and “it overlaps (or is confused) with the term ‘citizenship’... In the international legal practice the term ‘ιθαγένεια’ is correctly translated as ‘indigenouness’, although ‘historically all the citizens of a state are not indigenous (Michail and Bantekas 2010, p. 13). In this paper the term ‘ιθαγένεια’ is translated by ‘citizenship’, which is widely used internationally.

⁹ The biographical information for Marinos come from Wikipedia (https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Γιάννης_Μαρίνος).

All the above result, except from the shrinking of the Greek race, in the danger of de-hellenisation of the country (especially if the SYRIZA announcements for citizenship granting to foreigner migrants are applied), and the collapse of the insurance system, which already is in an economic impasse. (Όλα τα προαναφερθέντα συνεπάγονται εκτός από τη συρρίκνωση του γένους των Ελλήνων και τον κίνδυνο του αφελληνισμού της χώρας (ιδιαίτερα μάλιστα αν ισχύσουν οι εξαγγελίες του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ για χορήγηση ιθαγένειας στους αλλοδαπούς μετανάστες), και την κατάρρευση του ασφαλιστικού συστήματος, που ήδη βρίσκεται σε οικονομικό αδιέξοδο. 'To Vima', 15.2.15).

In this particular part of his article, which was written after the January elections of 2015, Marinos uses the far right rhetoric about the Greek race and raises the fear of de-hellenisation which he immediately relates with the citizenship granting. The use of the adjective 'foreigner' for the migrants stresses their otherness and directly opposes them to the Greek 'us'. The writer is not exact when he writes that the citizenship would be given to the migrants because the proposed law concerned their children who were born and/or educated here. Finally, it is interesting to note that he relates the fear of de-hellenisation with the collapse of the insurance system, although the migrants' children who, being 'without papers', generally work illegally, are expected to work legally when they will acquire the citizenship and thus contribute to the consolidation of the insurance system. Considering that, his rationale seems to be an oxymoron.

Let us now proceed to a text of Xenia Kounalaki in 'I Kathimerini'. Kounalaki, born herself in Germany, has studied journalism and is responsible for the foreign news of 'Kathimerini'. The extract of her article that we will analyze is the following:

"SYRIZA will make Greeks 300.000 clandestine-migrants", the representative of New Democracy Kostas Karagounis warned yesterday. Whoever thought that the old fashioned strategy of 'law and order' was defeated in the last elections is proved completely wrong. New Democracy came back yesterday with scaremongering, mixing Amigdaleza and the irregular migrants, who it insists on calling "clandestine-migrants", with citizenship... It is probable that 100.000 migrants' children are eligible for the citizenship. They are children who deliver the well known patriotic songs every 25 March and look at the icon of the Holy Mary every day when they get into their classrooms. We owe them the citizenship, even as a compensation for the multiannual brainwashing they have undergone in the Greek schools. («Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ θα ελληνοποιήσει 300.000 λαθρομετανάστες», προειδοποίησε χθες ο εκπρόσωπος Τύπου της Ν.Δ., Κώστας Καραγκούννης. 'Όποιος θεωρούσε ότι η παρωχημένη προεκλογική στρατηγική του νόμου και της τάξης καταψηφίστηκε στην τελευταία αναμέτρηση πλανάται πλάνην οικτράν. Η Ν.Δ. επανήλθε χθες με έναν κινδυνολογικό αχταρμά, μπλέκοντας την Αμυγδαλέζα και τους παράτυπους μετανάστες, τους οποίους επιμένει να αποκαλεί «λαθρομετανάστες» με την ιθαγένεια.... ενδέχεται περίπου 100.000 παιδιά μεταναστών να δικαιούνται την ελληνική ιθαγένεια. Είναι παιδιά που απαγγέλλουν τα γνωστά πατριωτικά τραγουδάκια κάθε 25η Μαρτίου και κοιτούν την εικόνα της Παναγίας κάθε μέρα που μπαίνουν στις τάξεις τους. Τους χρωστάμε την ιθαγένεια, έστω ως αποζημίωση για την πολυετή πλύση εγκεφάλου που έχουν υποστεί στα ελληνικά σχολεία. 'I Kathimerini', 26.2.2016)

In this article Kounalaki strongly supports granting the Greek citizenship to the migrants' children. She attacks New Democracy for trying to confuse people over the citizenship law because it does not clarify that the law concerns children and not first generation migrants. (It is recalled that this confusing position was echoed also by Marinos in the previously analyzed article). She also refers to New Democracy as trying to raise the fear of trouble to people who believe in the old fashioned, as she calls it ironically, strategy of 'law and order'; that is why she states Amigdaleza, which is a migrants' camp near Athens where trouble often occurs and is usually referred to as a problem. She also finds unacceptable for New Democracy to speak of 'clandestine-migrants' and not of 'irregular' migrants. She writes that probably 100.000 children are eligible for the citizenship and she opposes this number to the exaggerated one of 300.000 given by the representative of the New Democracy. She finally attacks the doctrine "God and country" on which she considers the Greek education to be based (cf. the icon of the Holy Mary, the patriotic songs) and she adopts the opinion that these children should be

given the citizenship as a compensation for the brainwashing they have undergone in the Greek educational system.

‘To Vima’ is trying to be considered neutral concerning this law and twice it presents the positive views too: it publishes an article of the University Professor Dimitris Christopoulos who supports that “Citizenship is a matter of democracy” (*Δημήτρης Χριστόπουλος: Η ιθαγένεια είναι θέμα δημοκρατίας*, 07.6.2015) and another one by Petros Makris entitled *Racist superficialities* (*Πέτρος Μακρής, Ρατσιστικές επιπολαιότητες*, 26.6.2015) where New Democracy’s attitude is criticized. In the rest of the articles the journalists just present the politicians views pro or against the law, without commenting on them. Given the fact that the newspaper clearly supports New Democracy even when its politicians are positioned against the law (cf. the article entitled “*New Democracy: The law about citizenship is an open invitation to clandestine immigrants*” (*ΝΔ: Ανοιχτή πρόσκληση σε λαθρομετανάστες το ν/σ για την ιθαγένεια*, 15/05/2015), and considering Marinos’s views cited above, we conclude that ‘To Vima’ is positioned against attributing citizenship to the migrants’ children.

‘I Kathimerini’ supports also New Democracy, but we can see that its attitude is much more independent. Considering the analysis of the discourse of Kounalaki above, the view of the permanent contributor Boukalas who is also in favor of the law (and claims that “the Greek state does what it must do. By recognizing the right to citizenship to the children who were born here, go to school... it does not do any favors” (14.6.2015)), the fact that it often hosts the articles of Syrigos and Christopoulos, who are both in favor of the law, and it even publishes a dialogue between them, about how the law should be formulated (cf. the article of Tania Georgiopolou entitled “When citizenship must be granted?”, 11.4.2015), as well as the fact that twice the personal stories of young people who were born and educated in Greece and were left with no citizenship are presented (cf. the articles of Giannis Papadopoulos “*Thousands migrants’ children are still ‘in the air’*” 3.1.2015 and of Tania Georgiopolou “*They have lost again the “battle” for citizenship*”, 13.9.2015), we come to the conclusion that ‘I Kathimerini’ distances itself from New Democracy in this matter and is positioned in favor of the citizenship law.

4. CONCLUSION

It must be noted that the number of texts concerning immigrants and refugees in ‘Chrisi Avgi’, exceeds the number of texts concerning the same subject in ‘I Kathimerini’ and ‘To Vima’, although these are daily ones and ‘Chrisi Avgi’ is weekly. This demonstrates the crucial character this subject has for the far right which views its public as the reverse image of the migrant/ refugee “others” who are to blame for “our” problems and become the scapegoats (see Wodak, 2015). The number of texts containing these words must also be stressed as far as the left ‘Avgi’ is concerned; this number is triple than that found in ‘I Kathimerini’ and ‘To Vima’. It is clear that this newspaper aims at making the subject predominant and, as it was shown above, it urges its readers to an attitude of solidarity towards the refugees and the immigrants.

All the examined newspapers view refugees and migrants as a problem that needs to be resolved. The type of solution suggested by each one differs. ‘Chrisi Avgi’ proposes to deny them access to the country. The rest of the newspapers propose to send them to the countries they want to go. ‘Chrisi Avgi’ not only reproduces inequalities in relation to migrants and refugees but also presents them as criminals that threaten the Greeks. On the contrary, ‘Avgi’ presents the positive, human characteristics of the migrants and the refugees, while ‘Rizospastis’ stresses their rights as workers or potential workers. Both ‘Avgi’ and ‘Rizospastis’ stress the need for solidarity.

The principal finding concerns the shift in terminology about the legal status of the refugees/migrants. This shift starts to spread in the English language migration policy texts principally since 2013 and consists in the replacement of the word *illegal* by *irregular*. This replacement is initially adopted by the left newspaper ‘Avgi’, which was followed by the communist ‘Rizospastis’. The word *irregular*, imposed as politically correct, is gradually also adopted by the central-right newspapers ‘To Vima’ and ‘I Kathimerini’, though a search in the reference corpus proves that it does not collocate with humans.

The newspapers' attitude towards the citizenship law, which grants the Greek citizenship to migrants' children, is representative of their ideologies and their political positioning. 'Avgi' supports the law as well as 'Rizospastis' which, in an oppositional disposition, finds it insufficient. 'Chrisi Avgi', on the other hand, finds it "nation killing". Corpus linguistics was not enough to help us find out whether 'To Vima' and 'I Kathimerini' were pro or against the law. Therefore we proceeded to critically analyze the discourse of their permanent contributors. These analyses, along with a closer examination of the texts these newspapers have published on the subject, have shown that 'To Vima', following strictly the conservative party New Democracy, is positioned against the law, contrary to 'I Kathimerini' which adopts a more independent, humanitarian attitude and is in favor of the law, although it also generally supports New Democracy.

In this paper, minor discourses found in all the newspapers except 'Chrisi Avgi' and presenting personal stories of migrants and refugees are not included. Their plight, their arrival journey, the difficulties they face in Greece is another great subject that cannot be analyzed here due to lack of space, but could be the subject of another paper.

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Representations of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in the Greek press (2010-2016): a critical corpus-driven study

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to analyse the variation of main descriptors and qualifiers, and to present the discourse topics identified in Greek mainstream media with regard to refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants. The underlying hypothesis is that how the issue of migration is presented by the media reflects and/or triggers social attitudes and mainstream stances, in terms of solidarity and/or racism, and that such attitudes and stances may be subject to marked shifts, or changes, consistent with the development and escalation of the migrant crisis. To the extent that they can be observed, such variations merit attention and critical analysis, considering both the importance and the scale of the crisis, on a national, regional and European level. The critical explanatory frame used in this study draws on detailed corpus-driven findings.

Keywords: immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, migration crisis, corpus linguistics, critical discourse analysis

INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

The examination of discursive representations of refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants and migrants in various genres has long attracted research interest. Seminal work in the field is by van Dijk (1991) on racism in the press, and by Reisigl & Wodak (2001) on discourse and discrimination. Such studies are underpinned by a critical, discourse-driven understanding of the “various structures and strategies of the different levels of text and talk” (van Dijk, 2008, qt. in Baker et al., 2008, p. 280), are informed “by social theory and view discursive and linguistic data as a social practice, both reflecting and producing ideologies in society” (Baker et al., *ibid.*). Even though it has long been suggested that CDA approaches to language would benefit significantly from corpus-driven approaches (Stubbs, 1994), traditionally “CDA studies making use of corpora have, in general, tended to avoid carrying out quantitative analysis, preferring to employ concordance analysis” (Baker et al., 2008, p. 275). A pioneering empirical study in the field, combining corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis, is the ESRC RAS project¹ (see Baker et al., 2008; Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008), which contrastively examines, both synchronically and diachronically, the linguistic definitions and constructions of RASIM², the frequent topics raised in articles relating to RASIM, and the attitudes towards RASIM that emerge from the body of UK newspapers as a whole (Baker et al., 2008, p. 276). This study has been methodologically replicated by Taylor (2009), who examines the representation of RASIM in the Italian press. A more recent corpus-based study on the discourse of migration is that by the Migration Observatory of the University of Oxford, which aimed at developing “a clearer understanding of the language that [Britain’s national newspapers] use to discuss migrants and migration” (Allen & Blinder, 2013, p. 2)³.

Arguably, an analysis of this type stems from and is catalysed by sensitive social and political issues, and the traits of such discursive representations are reasonably expected to be modulated by multiple conjunctural facts and events. As posited already, during the last decades, Greece, together with Italy

¹ *Discourses of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK press 1996-2006*.

² RASIM: Acronym used in Baker et al. (2008) to collectively designate ‘Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Immigrants and Migrants’. This acronym has been used also in our paper.

³ Note that this report has recently been updated to include data until 2016 (Allen, 2016).

and Spain “have progressively seen large irregular immigration flows from non-European states, as [these] countries are key entry-points to Europe” (Mouka et al., 2015, p. 43). In addition, Europe’s recent (and still rampant) migration crisis, in other words the inflow of refugees into EU territory, mostly from Turkey and mainly as a result of the war in Syria and the turbulence in the Middle East, has radically changed the backdrop of perceptions and stance-taking vis-à-vis RASIM. Even though in 2013, non-European RASIM in Greece represented 5.96 percent of the total population⁴ and the 2015–2016 RASIM inflows are not expected to significantly change this proportion, considering that until now Greece is only an interim station for the vast majority of RASIM who ultimately find their way to other EU countries⁵. Therefore, what is of particular interest here, is not a perception of the living conditions and social inclusion of RASIM (as is mostly the case in previous studies), but how the migration crisis progressively changes the perceptions of and about RASIM. What is more, the migration crisis has coincided with a “radical” political change in Greece, a country already amidst a rampant economic crisis. In January 2015, a coalition government was formed by the leftist SYRIZA⁶ and the populist right-wing ANEL⁷, replacing the two parties⁸ that had interchangeably been in power since 1974 and in a coalition government from May 2012 to January 2015. This marked also a radical change in Greece’s migration policy, and the abolishment of the dogma of “closed borders” and of “minimal tolerance” to “illegal” and “clandestine” immigrants. What is more, this change of attitude and the concurrent surge of RASIM flows from Turkey into Greece and then into other EU countries, has boosted the “blame game” in Greek politics: opposition parties are blaming the new coalition government for opening Greece’s sea borders and thus tolerating illegal immigration as well as for inadequately treating those that are really in need of humanitarian support. On the other hand, SYRIZA and government officials are accusing former governments (of New Democracy and PASOK) for blind-eyeing of the Syrian war and the refugee crisis, and EU institutions (as well as other EU countries, especially in the Balkan peninsula) for creating “Fortress Europe” and violating international humanitarian law and principles.

Such changes and stances are arguably expected to cause marked shifts in related discourse patterns. Indicatively, *Al Jazeera* devoted an article on why the use of the words ‘migrant’ and ‘migrant crisis’ are not fit for describing the current situation and the persons involved: “For reasons of accuracy, the director of news at Al Jazeera English, Salah Negm, has decided that we will no longer use the word migrant in this context. We will instead, where appropriate, say refugee”⁹. Also, in April 2015, the then President of the Greek Parliament, Zoe Konstantopoulou, “banned” the use in parliament of the term *λαθρομετανάστης* ‘clandestine immigrant’, for being racist and derogatory¹⁰. It is noted that international organisations and fora (e.g., the Council of Europe¹¹, the EU¹², the IOM¹³, the European Commission¹⁴) have long opted for, as well as recommended, the use of the qualifier ‘irregular’ in lieu of ‘illegal’ when referring to migrants.

With this in mind, a diachronic study of the linguistic variation of the representations of RASIM in the Greek press is a research topic that merits special attention. In this context and more in particular, this study exploits the “useful synergy” of corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis (Baker et al., 2008), in order to tentatively investigate:

- (a) the diachronic variation in the linguistic definitions and constructions of RASIM in the Greek press, before and during the crisis;
- (b) the frequent topics raised in relation to RASIM during the crisis; and

⁴ See: Eurostat 2014 data <<http://goo.gl/hbouLx>>. For a detailed analysis also Afouxenidis et al., 2012.

⁵ Based on recent estimates by the Greek Ministry for the Interior (31 January 2017), the number of (migrant crisis) RASIM currently staying in Greece, i.e. hosted in accommodation camps, is 62,401; see: <<https://goo.gl/eIQByx>>. Note that the total number of RASIM arrivals in Greece during the 2015–2016 migrant crisis is estimated to more than one million. See UNHCR data: <<https://goo.gl/zkGW59>>.

⁶ “Coalition of the Radical Left”.

⁷ “Independent Greeks”.

⁸ The conservative New Democracy and the centre-left PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement].

⁹ See: <<https://goo.gl/byBhZf>>.

¹⁰ See: <<https://goo.gl/O7v7SD>>.

¹¹ See Resolution 1509 (2006) of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.

¹² See the definition of “illegal stay”, in article 3 of Directive 2008/115/EC (the “Return Directive”).

¹³ See the IOM Glossary on Migration, 2nd ed. 2011 <<https://goo.gl/mnpMxE>>.

¹⁴ See the European Migration Network (EMN) Glossary on Asylum and Migration (version 3, October 2014), esp. 172.

- (c) the stances taken by the Greek press vis-à-vis RASIM, also during the crisis.

What is noteworthy (and challenging) about this study in relation to previous work in the field is that it attempts to grasp and evaluate linguistic and behavioural change during the development of the social and political phenomenon, in other words to investigate the issue at hand as it develops.

This paper therefore reports on the first findings of our on-going research effort, which more specifically has been articulated as follows:

(a) Manual compilation of a corpus of thematically selected “opinion articles” from mainstream Greek newspapers (*Kathimerini*, *To Vima* and *Efimerida ton Syntakton*). The study corpus size is 2,110 articles (1,208,389 tokens) and spans a period from 2010 to date¹⁵, and the sampling frame practically includes all relevant articles published in the three newspapers, which represent the entire political/ideological spectrum. This corpus has been cautiously divided into subcorpora, so as to adequately correspond to social and political milestones that (may) point to change and variation.

(b) “Triangulated” investigation¹⁶ of the semantics and prosodies of key discourse elements (lexemes), i.e. combining two different, yet complementary approaches to corpus data: one that is based on the quantitative analysis and critical examination of the linguistic variation of pre-selected key lexemes (sections 0 and 0), and one that focuses on a “three-dimensional” analysis of collocation, being also both statistical and qualitative, by using state-of-the art corpus linguistics tools and analytical methods (section 0). Corpus findings are then critically linked to milestones and analysed in the relevant sections, to the extent permitted by the length of this paper. Where appropriate, and considering also space limitations, such a discussion is exemplified by resorting to salient concordances from the newspaper corpus.

KEY LEXICAL FINDINGS AND STATISTICS

In terms of the sheer number and time distribution of the articles culled, it is clear the migration crisis has triggered significant attention from the media, in a pattern consistent with its escalation. This is schematically depicted (per year) in Fig. 1 below (for *Kathimerini* and *To Vima*) and in Fig. 2, representing the total number of articles in relation to the number of migrant arrivals (per sub-period). The peaks of all newspaper trends coincide with the peak of RASIM arrivals, i.e. somewhere around September and October 2015. Following this, the marked drop of arrivals, starting in late October 2015 after the first meeting between the German Chancellor and Turkey’s President in Ankara (18 October) and continuing consistently until the end of the study period, i.e. approximately when the EU-Turkey statement on the migrant crisis was issued (18 March 2016), is followed, until the end of 2015, by an analogous drop in the number of related articles. However, this correlation is reversed in early 2016: this can perhaps be attributed to an increase of focus on the medium- and long-term effects of the closure of the Balkan route and on the consequent “entrapment” of RASIM on Greek territory, and therefore to the realisation that the migrant crisis would soon become an acute problem, one of permanent social integration of RASIM, and not just a simple matter of “management” of RASIM flows¹⁷.

¹⁵ For *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, corpus data includes texts dating from the second semester of 2014, when the newspaper was first published online. This is shown in more detail in the plots and tables that follow.

¹⁶ On the concept of methodological triangulation in corpus linguistics, see: Baker & Levon, 2015, p. 3-5; Baker & Egbert, 2016 [1]; Saridakis, 2016, p. 226.

¹⁷ This is of course a tentative finding, pointing to the need for a more extensive and deeper lexico-semantic analysis. Such an analysis is however beyond the focus of this paper.




Fig. 1. Total number of articles (*Kathimerini*, *To Vima*), 2010-2015.




Fig. 2. Newspaper articles vs RASIM arrivals (sourced and adapted from the UNHCR¹⁸).

Between 2010 and 2014, the total content of articles related to migration (represented as total article word counts) varies somewhat insignificantly, while after 2015, it surges: e.g., in 2010, in the two mainstream newspapers analysed, the total word count of articles was 14,881, while in 2015, this figure rises to 350,712 words, for *Kathimerini* and *To Vima* and to 622,766 words, including also *Efimerida ton Syntakton*. This is shown in Fig. 3 below.

¹⁸ See UNHCR 2016. This is practically the only reliable source of data on RASIM arrivals, yet sometimes internally inconsistent because of frequent revisions (made based on primary data provided by the Greek authorities).




Fig. 3. Article content (word count, distributed by newspaper and by subcorpus).

Of the three newspapers analysed, the articles of *Efimerida ton Syntakton* are consistently lengthier (see Fig. 4): this finding is indicative of the newspaper's preference for more opinionated articles, and is corroborated by its overtly "humanistic" approach, in terms of the special topics related to the migrant crisis (see section 0 below).




Fig. 4. Average article length (word count), distributed by newspaper and by subcorpus.

ANALYSIS OF KEY LEXEMES

Lexically-wise, our primary aim was to determine the corpus distribution and variation of key lexemes related to RASIM. In other words, we purport to determine the referential/nomination categories that are used as "discursive constructions" (Wodak, 2015, p. 8) of the outgroups, in this case case non-Greeks living or arriving on Greek territory. For van Leeuwen (1996, p. 52, emphasis in the original) "social actors can be represented either in terms of their unique identity, by being *nominated*, or in terms of identities and functions they share with others (*categorisation*)". Hence, we analyse the most significant descriptors used as categorisations of the outgroups. Even though this approach is only a starting point of research, such general categories are more than insignificant: "because of the descriptive quality of such referential categorisations, linguistic identification is already related to strategic predication and thus very often involves evaluation" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 46).

Our focus is, therefore, on lexical differentiations and variations through time and by newspaper. Such phenomena point to changing stances and, hence, to specific social and political approaches vis-à-vis RASIM and migration in general. The key lexemes (lemmatised tokens) selected for quantitative analysis and presentation, as discourse elements with an evaluative load, are:

- μετανάστης ‘immigrant’, together with its common qualifiers (παράνομος ‘illegal’, παράτυπος ‘irregular’ οικονομικός ‘economic’, χωρίς χαρτιά/έγγραφα ‘without papers/documents’) and the compound term λαθρομετανάστης ‘clandestine immigrant’, a term with a now marked negative semantic stress¹⁹;
- πρόσφυγας ‘refugee’;
- αλλοδαπός ‘foreigner’;
- αιτών άσυλο ‘asylum seeker’.

Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of RASIM descriptors. Other frequently occurring relevant lexemes include prosodically neutral designators of ethnicity or origin (e.g. ‘Syrian’, ‘Afghan’, etc.). Other descriptors attested are *άνθρωποι* ‘people/humans’ and *άτομα* ‘persons’. Macroscopically, these two “categorisations” point to a more neutral perception of these individuals, in other words are a referential strategy that is not based on the individuals’ status as RASIM, but rather on their status as human beings. The actual use of these descriptors is examined in more detail in the “Topics” section (0).

RASIM descriptors and qualifiers

Kathimerini

Analysis of the KATH corpus affords the following distributions:




Fig. 5. Distribution and variation of RASIM descriptors (*Kathimerini*).

In *Kathimerini*, references to refugees exceed references to immigrants as the humanitarian crisis escalates. In addition, ‘immigrant’ is used without significant variation during the study period. In other words, the newspaper tends to adopt a more “humanitarian” stance vis-à-vis RASIM, as Greek society starts to associate the migration crisis with the Syrian civil war. Actually, the point of quantitative convergence of the two lexemes coincides with the peak of the crisis, i.e. during the summer of 2015. In early 2016, i.e. after the start of the EU-Turkey talks on an agreement to mitigate and contain the crisis, the similar upwards trend of the two curves (respectively for ‘immigrants’ and ‘refugees’) is a clear indication of the newspaper’s “alignment” with the stance of the conservative party of New Democracy, when it comes to clearly distinguishing between the two “categories” of RASIM and applying international law in terms of asylum, deportation, resettlement and relocation policies²⁰. The paratactic relation, i.e. the clustering of the two terms in discourse is clearly a relation of categorisation: both *πρόσφυγες και μετανάστες* ‘refugees and immigrants’ and *μετανάστες και πρόσφυγες* ‘immigrants and refugees’ are purposefully distinctive/classificatory devices and it is therefore appropriate to depict

¹⁹ Note that in Greek, in relation to RASIM, a single term, *μετανάστης*, corresponds to the English terms ‘migrant’, ‘immigrant’, ‘emigrant’.

²⁰ See, e.g., the statement of the opposition leader, K. Mitsotakis on 15 March 2016 <<https://goo.gl/CVXJ19>>.

their co-occurrence in the texts with the two principal descriptors ('immigrant' and 'refugee'). The rising trend in the use of these clusters after 2015 is indicative of the newspaper's gradually adopted stance, i.e. the need to clearly distinguish between the two, as the crisis escalates and it becomes gradually clear that dealing with migration will remain high on the Greek and European political agendas. Remarkably, at the end of the study period (i.e. during the two last intervals), the use of 'refugee' is almost double that of the use of 'immigrant' (TPT: 12.06 vs 6.38). Almost half of the later period uses of the lemma 'immigrant' account for the clustered use ('refugees and immigrants', 'immigrants and refugees') (TPT: 2.90). Compared to the start of the study period (2010-2011), this picture is totally reversed (TPT: 0.52 vs 9.44).




Fig. 6. Co-occurrence of 'immigrants' and 'refugees' (*Kathimerini*).

In sum, in *Kathimerini* the cumulative (and distinctive) use of the two descriptors vs. their single uses, at the start and at the end of the study period, is as follows:

<i>Kathimerini</i>	Single uses 'refugee'		Single uses 'immigrant'		Clustered uses 'refugees and immigrants'	
Data	TPT avg.	%	TPT avg.	%	TPT avg.	%
2010-2011	0.52	5.22	9.44	94.78	0	0
2016	9.16	58.94	3.48	22.39	2.90	18.67

Table 3. Clustered and single uses of RASIM descriptors (*Kathimerini*).

Last but not least, corpus findings show a marked use of the otherwise "distant" or "neutral" term 'foreigners' (or 'aliens'), especially in 2012 (Fig. 5). During that time, Greece was governed by a coalition of the conservative New Democracy and the centre-left PASOK, and the issue of tackling with irregular migration, mostly from Iraq and Afghanistan via Greece's land border with Turkey²¹, was high on the political agenda. The construction of a 12 km fence was then decided, perhaps also in light of the electoral "threat" of Golden Dawn, an extreme right organisation for which foreigners were among the principal ones to blame for Greece's crisis and decline (see Saridakis, 2017). In the KATH_2012 subcorpus, 'foreigners' are mostly foreign students, deported immigrants, or imprisoned individuals. In most concordances, 'foreigners' seems to be adopted in lieu of 'illegal immigrants', as a more distant or neutral term.

The variation of the qualifiers of 'immigrants', in clusters with adjectives (*παράνομος* 'illegal', *παράτυπος* 'irregular', *οικονομικός* 'economic'), in the compound *λαθρομετανάστης* 'clandestine immigrant' or in the phrasal variant *χωρίς χαρτιά/έγγραφα* 'without papers/documents' is presented below in Fig. 7.

²¹ See, e.g., a report on "the Eastern Mediterranean route" by Frontex <<https://goo.gl/pMNzu1>>.




Fig. 7. Common RASIM qualifiers in *Kathimerini*.

No single qualifier presents a stable frequency of usage during the study period. This obviously points to a varying stance of the newspaper, perhaps one that tries to adapt to conjunctural reasoning, including both the perceptions of RASIM on the part of society, and the attitude of EU bodies on the issue of migration. More specifically, the first descriptor that stands out is ‘clandestine immigrant’, during 2011. However, all 2011 occurrences of the descriptor are distributed in a single opinion article related to the US concerns about migration, and its instantiations are mostly translations that are used rather as synonyms of ‘illegal’. This can be clearly seen in the concordances²² below.

(1) (kath_old014, 2011) «Μόνο εκείνη τη χρονιά πάνω από 11.000 λαθρομετανάστες είχαν μπει στην Ελλάδα και το υπουργείο του χρειαζόταν βοήθεια», γράφει ο επιτετραμμένος της πρεσβείας Τόμας Κάντριμαν’.

“During only that year, more than 11,000 clandestine immigrants had arrived in Greece, and the country’s Ministry for the Marine needed help”, wrote the attaché of the embassy Thomas Countryman.

Indeed, after 2011, the descriptor reappears very rarely. Interestingly, in a 2015 article, the descriptor is somewhat defended by contrasting it to ‘irregular’ and ‘refugee’, in order to criticise the migration policy of the governing SYRIZA:

(2) (kath074, 2015) ‘Δεύτερον, απαγόρευσε τον όρο «λαθρομετανάστης». Τους μετονόμασε σε «παράτυπους» μετανάστες και «πρόσφυγες» και τους επέτρεψε να κάνουν ηλιοθεραπεία στην πλατεία Βικτωρίας. Άτυχη δήλωση, όπως ομολόγησε η ίδια. Άτυχη σίγουρα, αν και ενδεικτική της νοοτροπίας μιας Αριστεράς που έμαθε να κάνει πολιτική βαπτίζοντας την τρόικα «θεσμούς», κοινώς παίζοντας με τις λέξεις.

Second, [the Ministry for Migration Policy] has banned the use of the term “clandestine immigrant”. It renamed them “irregular” immigrants and “refugees” and left them sunbathe on Victoria sq. [in central Athens]. It was an unfortunate statement [by the Minister], and still, it is indicative of the attitude of a Left for which policy making is renaming the troika as “institutions”, in other words it just plays with words.

However, despite this initial criticism, the newspaper seems to gradually vary its perception: until around the end of 2014, the most common descriptor is ‘illegal’, and then ‘irregular’, until the peak of the migrant crisis (mid-2015). For example, in a 2013 article entitled “The identification card... of the legal immigrant” the newspaper distinguishes between legal and illegal migration²³:

(3) (kath_old037, 2013) ‘Ο αριθμός των παράνομων μεταναστών στην Ελλάδα είναι άγνωστος. Μόνον εκτιμήσεις και (αυθαίρετοι) υπολογισμοί που μιλούν από 500.000 έως και 2 εκατ. άτομα. Τουλάχιστον, και σύμφωνα με τα τελευταία επίσημα στοιχεία του υπ. Εσωτερικών, γνωρίζουμε πόσοι είναι οι νόμιμοι μετανάστες από χώρες εκτός Ε.Ε.’

The number of illegal immigrants in Greece is unknown. There are only estimates and (arbitrary) calculations, speaking of something in-between 500,000 and 2 million persons. At least we know the

²² Fairclough (1992, p. 196) rightly objects to the use of translated texts for performing discourse analysis. Despite some added difficulty for readers (and some extra article space), our analysis has been performed on the original Greek data (in terms of lexemes, concordances and collocates), and English translations have been included where appropriate for the sake of clarity and reference.

²³ NB: This was then, the official distinction made by Greek authorities, as attested also in our corpus data.

number of legal immigrants from non-EU countries, based on the latest official figures of the Ministry for the Interior.

This is evidence of a gradual move towards adapting more “politically correct” descriptors, in line with EU recommendations and policies (see e.g. European Commission, 2015), however sometimes in a confusing way. E.g., in example 4 (2015), the descriptors ‘irregular immigrants’ and ‘refugees’ are used interchangeably, in a single argument:

(4) (kath033, 2015) ‘Αποδίδουν την όξυνση του φαινομένου στη συνεχιζόμενη συριακή κρίση και προβλέπουν ότι οι συλλήψεις παράτυπων μεταναστών στα θαλάσσια σύνορα Ελλάδας - Τουρκίας θα ανέλθουν το 2015 σε 60.000 αντί 40.000 πέρυσι. Προσθέτουν, μάλιστα, πως υπάρχουν πληροφορίες σύμφωνα με τις οποίες στα απέναντι τουρκικά παράλια υπάρχουν συγκεντρωμένοι 2,5 εκατομμύρια πρόσφυγες οι οποίοι περιμένουν να μουν παράτυπα στην Ελλάδα και στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση’.
[Coastguard officers] attribute the escalation of the phenomenon to the continuing Syrian crisis and estimate that the arrests of irregular immigrants on the sea borders between Greece and Turkey will rise to 60,000 in 2015, from 40,000 last year. Indeed, they add that there is information that on the Turkish shores, 2,5 million refugees have been gathered, and are waiting to enter Greece and the EU irregularly.

After the peak of the migration crisis, all qualifiers of RASIM are virtually eliminated. In sum, no single qualifier can be considered a consistent collocate (c-collocate; see Baker et al., 2008, p. 286).

To Vima

To Vima, a centre-left mainstream newspaper, presents a similar pattern of variation, yet somewhat steeper, compared to *Kathimerini*. The use of ‘immigrant’ peaks around the same period, i.e. March-April 2015, and drops sharply thereafter, being replaced by ‘refugee’. In early 2015, the newspaper seems somewhat hesitant to use the descriptor ‘refugee’. However, this changes radically thereafter, and, especially after 2015, the trend of the use of ‘immigrants’ is almost a straight line with relatively low values. Compared to *Kathimerini*, the overall use of the term ‘immigrant’ is much lower. Finally, the neutral designator of RASIM as ‘foreigners’ is almost null after September 2015.




Fig. 8. Distribution and variation of RASIM descriptors (*To Vima*).

In *To Vima*, as is also the case with *Kathimerini*, the two descriptors co-occur, albeit less frequently. Here, too, clustering the two descriptors means in fact distinguishing between them. However, especially after September-October 2015, RASIM are described mostly as ‘refugees’.




Fig. 9. Co-occurrence of ‘immigrants’ and ‘refugees’ (*To Vima*).

The cumulative (and distinctive) use of the two descriptors vs. their single uses in *To Vima*, respectively at the start and at the end of the study period, is as follows:

<i>To Vima</i>	Single uses ‘refugee’		Single uses ‘immigrant’		Clustered uses ‘refugees and immigrants’	
Data	TPT avg.	%	TPT avg.	%	TPT avg.	%
2010-2011	1.58	18.39	7.01	81.61	0	0
2016	9.67	73.15	2.18	16.49	1.37	10.36

Table 4. Clustered and single uses of RASIM descriptors (*To Vima*).

The variation of the qualifiers of RASIM is as follows:




Fig. 10. Common RASIM qualifiers in *To Vima*.

In *To Vima*, contrary to *Kathimerini*, the descriptors ‘illegal’ and ‘clandestine’ fluctuate together and are used simultaneously, until 2013. In addition, these descriptors can be considered c-collocates during this period. A closer examination of their concordances (i.e. by focusing on the possible prosodic differentiations of their occurrences) shows that they are used mostly as synonyms, particularly during 2012 (an electoral year), when the issue of “illegal immigration” and the need to distinguish between new migrants and old ones, i.e. those who had already been integrated socially, was high on the Greek political agenda. This partly explains also the high occurrence of the two descriptors during 2012. Immigration is seen as a problem that must be addressed, with (some) urgency at times.

(5) (vima_old036, 2012) ‘Συνεπώς το κυβερνητικό σχέδιο αυτή τη φορά δεν μπορεί να αποτύχει. Και για να μην αποτύχει, το κυβερνητικό σχέδιο προβλέπει να χτυπηθεί το πρόβλημα στη ρίζα του. Πρώτον, για να μειωθεί άμεσα ο αριθμός των παράνομων μεταναστών στην Ελλάδα και, δεύτερον, για να δοθεί ένα ισχυρό μήνυμα που θα αποτρέψει νέους λαθρομετανάστες να εισέλθουν στη χώρα.’

Consequently, the government’s plan should not fail this time. And in order for it not to fail, the plan

aims to address the problem at its root. Firstly, so as to immediately reduce the number of illegal immigrants in Greece and, secondly, so as to send a strong message deterring new clandestine immigrants from entering the country.

(6) (vima_old109, 2013) *‘Επιτέλους κάποια στιγμή πρέπει να ξεκαθαρίσουμε ότι άλλο είναι το πρόβλημα με τους παράνομους μετανάστες και άλλο με αυτούς που αποδεδειγμένα έχουν ενσωματωθεί στην ελληνική κοινωνία και νοιώθουν τη χώρα μας ως τη μοναδική τους πατρίδα...’*

We should finally make clear, that we are addressing two different problems: one related to illegal immigrants, and one related to the ones that have demonstrably been integrated into Greek society and perceive our country as their only homeland...

Throughout 2014 and until April 2015, the most common c-collocate is ‘illegal’. During March-April 2015, ‘irregular’ appears also as a significant qualifier (13 occurrences, in 4 texts), but still lags behind ‘illegal’ in terms of distribution in the subcorpus of 29 texts (i.e. the number of articles where the term is identified - frequency: 20; distribution: 7). This finding is similar to the pattern identified in *Kathimerini*, and reflects the newspaper’s effort to partially adapt to the “official” language, as recommended by the European Commission (2015). However, this effort is not consistent: the use of ‘irregular’ is negligible thereafter, and until the end of the study period: practically all qualifiers disappear, as in *Kathimerini*, yet somewhat earlier, in May-June 2015.

Efimerida ton Syntakton

The leftist *Efimerida ton Syntakton* consistently prefers to use ‘refugees’ throughout the study period. In early 2016 the frequency gap between the two descriptors (‘refugees’ and ‘immigrants’) maximises, and indeed is the widest of all the three newspapers analysed. Thus, the main concern for *Efimerida ton Syntakton* is the situation in relation to ‘refugees’, not ‘immigrants’. The use of ‘foreigner’ is almost null, throughout the study period.




Fig. 11. Distribution and variation of RASIM descriptors (*Efimerida ton Syntakton*).

Further, by examining the relative co-occurrence of the two descriptors, a remarkable finding is that towards the end of the study period (i.e. in early 2016), the relative frequency of the descriptor ‘immigrant’ is almost equal to the frequency of co-occurrence of the two terms, while the ‘refugee’-to-‘immigrant’ ratio is almost seven to one (6.67).




Fig. 12. Co-occurrence of ‘immigrants’ and ‘refugees’ (*Efimerida ton Syntakton*).

The cumulative (and distinctive) use of the two descriptors vs. their single uses in *Efimerida ton Syntakton* is as follows:

<i>Efimerida ton Syntakton</i>	Single uses ‘refugee’		Single uses ‘immigrant’		Clustered uses ‘refugees and immigrants’	
Data	TPT avg.	%	TPT avg.	%	TPT avg.	%
2016	11.34	77.68	1.70	11.64	1.56	10.68

Table 5. Clustered and single uses of RASIM descriptors (*Efimerida ton Syntakton*).

The variation of the qualifiers of immigrants in *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, is as follows:




Fig. 13. Common RASIM qualifiers in *Efimerida ton Syntakton*.

Considering that, in *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, the overall use of ‘immigrants’ is the lowest of all the three newspapers scrutinised (cmp. the data in Tables 1, 2 and 3 above), it is not surprising that the cumulative use of RASIM qualifiers is very low. Among the qualifiers used, the neutral variant ‘without papers/documents’ has a relatively high frequency at the start of the study period (January-February 2015). However, with only 4 hits in only 3 texts, this does not designate a significant pattern. The only qualifier that the newspaper seems to consider acceptable is ‘economic’ and, to a lesser extent ‘irregular’.

(7) (efsyn_339, 2015) ‘Στον καταυλισμό, σύμφωνα με τα τελευταία επίσημα στοιχεία, βρίσκονταν το πρωί του Σαββάτου 3.825 πρόσφυγες, ενώ σε περίπου 1.200 οικονομικούς μετανάστες δεν επιτράπη η είσοδος στην ΠΓΔΜ, καθώς δεν είναι Σύροι, Αφγανοί και Ιρακινοί, για τους οποίους η διέλευση συνεχίζεται κανονικά’.

According to the latest official data, on Saturday morning, the camp hosted 3,825 refugees, while approximately 1,200 economic immigrants were denied entrance into FYROM, because they are not Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis: for them, passage continues normally.

On the other hand, the frequent occurrences of ‘illegal’ and ‘clandestine’, especially in March-April 2015, are all meta-discoursal uses with a marked ideological focus or are negatively criticised citations by politicians.

(8) (efsyn_201, 2015) ‘Από τις πρώτες κιόλας σειρές του άρθρου είναι εμφανής η ιδεολογική συσχέτιση ρύπων και προσφύγων. Οι όροι “παράνομοι μετανάστες” και “απορρίμματα” με φωτογραφίες πλαστικών βαρκών στην ακτή προσοικονομούν το ερευνητικό ιδεολογικό πλαίσιο. Η ύπαρξη των προσφύγων γίνεται αντιληπτή με όρους μιαιρότητας και αντινομίας, οι ζωές αυτές είναι μη κανονικές και λεκιάζουν’.

Starting with the first lines of the article, there is a clear ideological correlation between pollutants and refugees. The terms “illegal immigrants” and “waste”, together with photos of plastic boats on the shore, prejudice the research ideological context. The existence of refugees is perceived in terms of filthiness and lawlessness: these lives are abnormal and staining.

(9) (efsyn_259, 2015) ‘Κανένας άνθρωπος δεν είναι λαθραίος. Ο όρος «λαθρομετανάστες» είναι ρατσιστικός, αποπροσανατολιστικός και δεν αντιστοιχεί στις ιδέες και τις αξίες της Αριστεράς. Επιβλήθηκε και χρησιμοποιείται επικοινωνιακά (δυστυχώς και με ευθύνη μεγάλης μερίδας των ΜΜΕ), προκειμένου να στοχοποιηθούν άνθρωποι που έφυγαν από τους τόπους καταγωγής τους κυνηγημένοι, είτε από άγριους περιφερειακούς πολέμους είτε από ακραία φτώχεια’.

No human being is clandestine. The term “illegal immigrants” is racist and disorienting, while it does not correspond to the ideas and values of the Left. It has been imposed and is used as a communicative device (unfortunately, with the responsibility of a large part of the mass media), so as to target people who left their homes, hunted either by wild regional wars or by extreme poverty.


(10) (efsyn_481, 2016) ‘Η ξενοφοβία που έχει επιδείξει ο κ. Γεωργιάδης ως βουλευτής της Ν.Δ. είναι μνημιώδης -ειδικά τη λέξη «λαθρομετανάστης» τη χρησιμοποιεί αφειδώς- και ειλικρινά δεν ξέρουμε πόσο συνάδει με ένα φιλοευρωπαϊκό κόμμα [...]’

The xenophobia of Mr. Georgiadis²⁴, as MP of New Democracy, is monumental –more specifically, he uses the word “clandestine immigrant” profusely– and, honestly, we do not know how this complies with a pro-European political party [...]

Summary of findings

Shift of stance (descriptors)

Summarising the above data on the use of key RASIM descriptors in the three newspapers, it is clear that *Kathimerini* presents the sharpest shift of stance from the start to the end of the study period, to the extent that RASIM descriptors can be considered pertinent indicators of the newspaper’s attitude vis-à-vis RASIM. On the other hand, at the end of the study period, the centre-left *To Vima* is actually placed quite close to the leftist *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, as regards the use of ‘refugee’ and the clustered use of ‘refugee’ with ‘immigrant’. Finally, it is placed in the middle of the scale, between *Kathimerini* and *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, as regards the use of ‘immigrant’.



²⁴ N.B.: New Democracy’s vice-president.

Fig. 14. Variation of key descriptors, at the start and at the end of the study period.

As the refugee crisis develops, all qualifiers of ‘immigrants’ practically disappear in all three newspapers, and the only distinction made is between ‘immigrants’ and ‘refugees’. Of the three newspapers, *Kathimerini* focuses more consistently on this distinction.

‘Asylum seekers’




Fig. 15. Variation of ‘asylum (seekers)’ in the newspaper corpus.

In the entire corpus, ‘asylum seeker’ is used rather neutrally and in a non-opinionated manner. Quite expectedly, the term ‘asylum’ is used mostly in an administrative sense, and refers to asylum seekers directly or indirectly, when relating to refugees and/or immigrants applying for asylum. The relative frequency of the descriptor is low during the study period (with the exception of *To Vima*, during 2011), when comparing its TPT values with the corresponding values of ‘refugees’ and ‘immigrants’.

Kathimerini and *To Vima* address ‘asylum seekers’ mostly neutrally, by mentioning facts and policies decided by the Greek authorities and the EU, and by gradually focusing on the long-term challenges for tackling the “stated problem”:

(11) (kath_370, 2015) ‘Από τις αρχές του Ιανουαρίου ως τα τέλη Δεκεμβρίου η Γερμανία υποδέχθηκε «1,09 εκατ. πρόσφυγες», αναφέρει η εφημερίδα της Δρέσδης. Ο αριθμός αυτός είναι πενταπλάσιος εκείνου του 2014, όταν η χώρα είχε καταγράψει λίγο περισσότερους από 200.000 αιτούντες άσυλο’. From early January, until the end of December, Germany welcomed “1.09 million refugees”, writes the Dresden newspaper. This is five times more compared to 2016, when the country had registered a bit more than 200,000 asylum seekers.

(12) (kath_414, 2015) ‘Αναζητούνται άμεσα επιδοτούμενα διαμερίσματα για να στεγαστούν οι αιτούντες άσυλο και οι προς μετεγκατάσταση πρόσφυγες που θα παραμείνουν στην Ελλάδα, καθώς κλείνουν τα σύνορα προς την Ευρώπη’.

Effort is being made so as to urgently accommodate in subsidised apartments, both asylum seekers and refugees who will stay in Greece, considering that the borders to Europe are being closed.

(13) (vima_129, 2015) ‘Στο hot spot θα γίνεται η εγγραφή, η ταυτοποίηση, η δακτυλοσκόπηση και η ενημέρωση των εισερχομένων, ο διαχωρισμός τους σε πρόσφυγες και μετανάστες, καθώς και σε αιτούντες άσυλο’.

At the hot spots, the registration, identification and fingerprinting of those arriving will take place, as well as the provision of information to them, together with the determination of their status as refugees or immigrants, as well as asylum seekers.

(14) (vima_326, 2016) ‘Οι αιτούντες άσυλο δεν έχουν το δικαίωμα να επιλέγουν το κράτος μέλος στο οποίο θα ζητούν άσυλο’.

Asylum seekers are not entitled to select the member-state where they will apply for asylum.

Finally, compared to *Kathimerini* and *To Vima*, *Efimerida ton Syntakton* focuses more on the inefficiency of asylum services, both in Greece and in other EU countries:

(15) (efsyn_475, 2016) ‘Για να αφήσουμε στην άκρη την απουσία της όποιας παροχής της αναγκαίας νομικής υποστήριξης του αιτήματος για άσυλο, με δεδομένη την οικονομική αδυναμία της συντριπτικής πλειονότητας των μεταναστών, που εξαναγκάζονται να ζητήσουν άσυλο στη Ελλάδα, να χρησιμοποιήσουν ιδιωτικά δικηγόρο’.

Let us not discuss the lack of any provision for the necessary legal support for asylum applications, considering the financial insufficiency of the vast majority of immigrants to resort to the services of a private lawyer, and that are thus forced to apply for asylum in Greece.

(16) (efsyn_535, 2016) ‘Από τους 66.400 αιτούντες-άσυλο για τους οποίους υπήρχε δέσμευση να μεταγκατασταθούν από την Ελλάδα τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2015, μόνο 615 έχουν μεταφερθεί σε άλλα κράτη-μέλη της ΕΕ, σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες που δημοσιεύτηκαν από την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή στις 12 Απριλίου’.

From a total of 66,400 asylum seekers, for whom the relocation from Greece had been resolved for September 2015, only 615 have been transferred to other EU member-states, based on information published by the European Commission on April 12.

Categorisation and focus of topics

Two-way collocation analysis, i.e. the examination of a lexical node’s “company”; *sensu* Firth (1957, p. 11) has been traditionally used for semantically profiling and prosodically evaluating the traits of *co-selection*, i.e. the use of words in context, so as to gain “insight into the opinions and beliefs of the text producer” (see Morley & Partington, 2009, p. 141). This is done by measuring the strength of association between words (e.g. Stubbs, 1995). More recently, the introduction “of concepts from graph theory into corpus analysis of collocation [permits] a more sophisticated understanding of the company that words keep” (Baker, 2016, p. 139), so as to explore “lexical networks” (Phillips, 1983) into more depth. Essentially, this understanding means tracing the semantic and prosodic affinity of key lexemes in a corpus, starting from an elaborate quantitative approach, particularly when it may be difficult to manually examine all concordance lines of a given node when dealing with large amounts of data (cf. Taylor, 2009, p. 8), as in this scenario. Such an approach allows for a deeper, and more CDA-oriented analysis of lexical and textual patterns, so as to better identify and evaluate the *topics* that a corpus (or a part of it) relates to.

In this study, we have used *GraphColl* (Brezina et al., 2015)²⁵, by plotting multiple collocational networks between such “key keywords”, in this case *πρόσφυγας* ‘refugee’ and *μετανάστης* ‘immigrant’ in all three subcorpora, from May 2015, i.e. from the start of the current migration crisis (see Fig. 2), to the end of study period, when the distinctive use of the two key lemmas tends to be more stabilised (see Figs. 5, 8 and 11). The statistical measure used here is MI3 (statistic value: 12, collocation frequency: 5; Daille, 1995 in Brezina et al., 2015, p. 159). Subsequently, the lexical (or content word) collocates were filtered (i.e. by leaving out grammar and function words) and their interrelations in the corpus were grouped manually into “topics” or areas of focus. As in Baker et al. (2008, p. 286), the categorisation of prominent collocates was carried out by resorting also to concordance analysis and was refined further to take account of the CDA notions of *topoi* and *topics* (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; cf. also the discussion of these notions in Saridakis et al., 2016, p. 130-131). The way each newspaper perceives and presents the migration crisis is then critically presented, by comparing such *topics*.

Indicatively, the collocation graph for *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, adapted from the *GraphColl* output, is shown in Fig. 16. This is the most complex of the three plots analysed.

²⁵ Tool available in *LancsBox* (University of Lancaster), <<http://corpora.lancs.ac.uk/lancsbox/>>.

Topics	Prominent collocates ‘immigrant’	Prominent collocates ‘refugee’	Prominent common collocates
“The ‘wave’ of RASIM”	<i>τουλάχιστον</i> ‘at least’ <i>μεγάλος</i> (<i>αριθμός</i>) ‘large number of’, <i>εισροή</i> ‘inflow’	<i>κύμα</i> ‘wave’, <i>συνολικά</i> ‘in total’, <i>μαζικός</i> ‘massive’, <i>εκατομμύριο</i> ‘million’, <i>φέτος</i> ‘this year’; and numerical references, e.g. 10,000	<i>καθημερινά</i> ‘daily’, <i>αριθμός</i> ‘number of’, <i>περισσότεροι</i> ‘more than’, <i>περίπου</i> ‘almost’, <i>αφίξεις</i> ‘arrivals’, <i>ροή</i> ‘flow’, <i>δεκάδες</i> ‘dozens’, <i>εκατοντάδες</i> ‘hundreds’, <i>χιλιάδες</i> ‘thousands’; and numerical references, e.g. 1,000, 2,000
“RASIM are...” (qualifiers of RASIM)	<i>παράτυποι</i> ‘irregular’, <i>παράνομοι</i> ‘illegal’, <i>οικονομικοί</i> ‘economic’	(<i>από τη</i>) <i>Συρία</i> ‘(from) Syria’, <i>Σύριοι</i> ‘Syrians’, (<i>αιτούντες</i>) <i>άσυλο</i> ‘asylum seekers’	-
“Passage and routes of RASIM”	<i>Ιταλία</i> ‘Italy’, <i>πλοίο</i> ‘ship’, <i>εντοπίζονται</i> ‘are found’, <i>επιβαίνουν</i> ‘are transported on’, <i>πλατεία Βικτωρίας</i> ‘Victoria square’, <i>παραμένουν</i> ‘remain at’	<i>περνούν</i> ‘cross’, <i>σύνορα</i> ‘borders’, <i>διέλευση</i> ‘passage’, <i>Ειδωμένη</i> ‘Eidomeni’, <i>Τουρκία</i> ‘Turkey’	<i>φθάνουν</i> ‘arrive’, <i>μεταφορά</i> ‘transportation’, <i>βρίσκονται</i> ‘are located at’, <i>λιμάνι</i> ‘port’, <i>Πειραιάς</i> ‘Piraeus’, <i>Αθήνα</i> ‘Athens’, <i>ελληνικά</i> <i>νησιά</i> ‘Greek islands’, <i>Λέσβος</i> ‘Lesvos’, <i>Μυτιλήνη</i> ‘Mytilene’, <i>είσοδος</i> ‘entry’, <i>χώρες</i> ‘countries’, <i>Ελλάδα</i> ‘Greece’

Topics	Prominent collocates 'immigrant'	Prominent collocates 'refugee'	Prominent common collocates
"Reception, treatment and relocation of RASIM"	καταγραφή 'registration', σίτιση 'feeding'	υποδοχή 'reception', προσωρινή 'temporary', φιλοξενία 'accommodation', παραμονή 'stay', μετεγκατάσταση 'relocation', αρμοστέία 'UNHCR', ΟΗΕ 'UN', Ευρώπη/ΕΕ 'Europe/EU', Βερολίνο 'Berlin', Γερμανία 'Germany'	κέντρο φιλοξενίας 'accommodation centre', φιλοξενούμαι 'to be hosted'
"Migration is a humanitarian problem"	-	συνθήκες 'conditions', εγκλωβίζονται 'are entrapped', βοήθεια 'aid'	-

Table 6. Collocates grouped by topic in *Kathimerini*.

Topics	Prominent collocates 'immigrant'	Prominent collocates 'refugee'	Prominent common collocates
"The 'wave' of RASIM"	-	κύμα 'wave', μαζικός 'massive', καθημερινά 'daily', συνολικά 'in total', σχεδόν 'almost', πάνω/περισσότεροι (από) 'more than', δεκάδες 'dozens (of)'; and numerical references, e.g. 200, 3,000, 50,000	αριθμός 'number of', εκατοντάδες 'hundreds', χιλιάδες 'thousands', περισσότεροι 'more (than)', 2,000
"RASIM are..." (qualifiers of RASIM)	δεύτερης γενιάς 'second generation', παράτυποι 'irregular', παράνομοι 'illegal', οικονομικοί 'economic'	(από τη) Συρία '(from) Syria', Σύριοι 'Syrians'	(αιτούντες) άσυλο 'asylum seekers'
"Passage and routes of RASIM"	Κως 'Kos', νησί 'island'	περνούν (τα σύνορα) 'cross (the border)', Τουρκία 'Turkey', Ειδωμένη 'Eidomeni', σύνορα 'borders', Λέσβος 'Lesvos', Πειραιάς 'Piraeus', πλοίο 'ship', μεταφέρω 'to transport'	Μυτιλήνη 'Mytilene', νησιά 'islands', λεωφορεία 'buses', λιμάνι 'port', μεταφορά 'transportation', φθάνουν 'arrive' είσοδος 'entry', εισροή 'inflow'
"Reception, treatment and relocation of RASIM"	επανεισδοχή 'readmission'	προσωρινός 'temporary', στέγαση 'housing', hot spot, καταγραφή 'registration', υποδοχή 'reception', κέντρο 'centre', καταυλισμός 'camp', εγκατάσταση 'settlement', μετεγκατάσταση 'relocation', Ελλάδα 'Greece', χώρες 'countries', Ευρώπη/ΕΕ 'Europe/EU', κατανομή 'distribution', ΟΗΕ 'UN', έδαφος 'territory'	φιλοξενία 'accommodation', διαμένουν 'stay (at)'

Topics	Prominent collocates 'immigrant'	Prominent collocates 'refugee'	Prominent common collocates
"Migration is a humanitarian problem"	-	οικογένειες 'families', εγκλωβισμένοι 'entrapped', συνθήκες 'conditions'	παιδιά 'children'

Table 7. Collocates grouped by topic in *To Vima*.

Topics	Prominent collocates 'immigrant'	Prominent collocates 'refugee'	Prominent common collocates
"The 'wave' of RASIM"	-	κύμα 'wave', ροή 'flow', αφίξεις 'arrivals', είσοδος 'entry', καθημερινά 'daily', ανέρχονται (σε) 'amount to' συνολικά 'in total', ομάδα 'group of', δεκάδες 'dozens', εκατομμύρια 'millions'; and numerical references, e.g. 100, 2,500, 160,000	εισροή 'inflow', αριθμός 'number (of)', εκατοντάδες 'hundreds', χιλιάδες 'thousands', περισσότεροι (από) 'more than'
"RASIM are..." (qualifiers of RASIM)	παράτυποι 'irregular', οικονομικοί 'economic', παράνομοι 'illegal', (χωρίς) χαρτιά '(without papers/documents'	(από τη) Συρία '(from) Syria', Σύριοι 'Syrians', Αφγανοί 'Afghans' (από το) Αφγανιστάν 'from Afghanistan'	(αιτούντες) άσυλο 'asylum seekers'
"Passage and routes of RASIM"	Μεσόγειος 'Mediterranean', Μόρια 'Moria', πλοίο 'ship'	Ειδωμένη 'Eidomeni', ΠΓΔΜ 'FYROM', Ελαιώνας 'Elaionas', σύνορα 'borders', μεταφέρω 'to transport', Πειραιάς 'Piraeus', λεωφορεία 'buses', σταθμός 'station', Λέσβος 'Lesvos', Μυτιλήνη 'Mytilene', Χίος 'Chios', Κως 'Kos', Αιγαίο 'Aegean (sea)', διέλευση 'passage', ακτές 'shores', βάρκα 'boat', περνούν 'cross', φθάνουν/καταφθάνουν 'arrive', Ουγγαρία 'Hungary'	νησί 'island', θάλασσα 'sea', μεταφορά 'transportation', λιμάνι 'port', Τουρκία 'Turkey', Ελλάδα 'Greece', χώρα 'country'

Topics	Prominent collocates 'immigrant'	Prominent collocates 'refugee'	Prominent common collocates
"Reception, treatment and relocation of RASIM"	κράτηση 'detention'	στέγαση 'housing', υποδοχή 'reception', ταυτοποίηση 'identification', (προσωρινή) φιλοξενία '(temporary) accommodation', φιλοξενώ 'to host', χώρος 'area', κέντρο 'centre', καταυλισμός/στρατόπεδο 'camp', εγκατάσταση 'settlement', επανεγκατάσταση 'resettlement', μετεγκατάσταση 'relocation', σκηνές 'tents', αστυνομία 'police', αρμοστέα 'UNHCR', Ευρώπη/ΕΕ 'Europe/EU', Γερμανία 'Germany', κατανομή 'distribution', επικράτεια 'territory'	διαμένουν 'stay at', φιλοξενία 'accommodation', διάσωση/διασώζω 'rescue/to rescue'
"Migration is a humanitarian problem"	-	νεκροί 'dead', πόλεμος 'war', προστασία 'protection', μαρτυρία 'testimony', είδη πρώτης ανάγκης 'basic necessities', αλληλεγγύη 'solidarity', δικαίωμα 'right', δράμα 'tragedy', βοήθεια 'aid', ζω 'to live', συνθήκες 'conditions', άνθρωποι 'humans', ζωή 'life', εγκλωβισμένοι 'entrapped', περιστατικό 'incident', περιμένω 'wait for', αντιμετωπίζω 'to confront', οικογένειες 'families', παιδιά 'children'	-

Table 8. Collocates grouped by topic in *Efimerida ton Syntakton*.

A detailed analysis of the prominent collocates brings to surface some common patterns for the three newspapers. However, there are also significant differences. These, too, are indicative of the stance of each newspaper and corroborate the findings from the analysis of RASIM descriptors and qualifiers (sections 0 and 0).

A salient common feature is that all newspapers put emphasis on the numbers of immigrants and refugees, using many relevant collocates. What is more, the collocate 'wave' is prominent in all three newspapers. Most such numerical references aim to present the numbers of daily arrivals of RASIM in Greece, reported on the basis of police and asylum services data during the migrant crisis, or are official estimates about the possible number of future arrivals. In addition, this stress, i.e. what Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 74-75) call *the topos of numbers*, is an indirect indicator of lack of control, perhaps suggesting that specific action should be taken to address the situation (cf. Taylor, 2009, p. 16). All newspapers identify refugees as 'Syrians', while *Efimerida ton Syntakton* adds the designation 'Afghans' as well. In relation to the migration routes and passages, all newspapers focus on events and facts within the Greek territory. There are numerous references to Greek islands, i.e. to the main entry points for RASIM during the crisis ('Kos', 'Lesvos', 'Chios', etc.) and to the central port of Piraeus as an interim station. Also, there are many references to Greece's borders, especially 'Eidomeni', which RASIM would wish to be their last point of stay in Greece. References to other countries, or migration routes, are scarce. Focus is placed on the "fate" of RASIM while on Greek territory. In other words, the migration crisis is presented from a rather "Greek-centred" perspective. The only other countries

involved in the discursive constructions of RASIM are Turkey, Germany, and, only in *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, Hungary and FYROM. These countries are seen as catalysts in tackling the problem. More in particular, in relation to refugees, the newspapers refer to their accommodation, resettlement and relocation, stressing the temporary character of conditions of stay of RASIM in Greece.

On the other hand, significant differences are attested between the three newspapers in the number and in the prosodic load of collocates that designate migration as a humanitarian crisis. Aiming to profile the semantic prosody of RASIM qualifiers (in addition to the more “fossilised” qualifiers analysed in sections 0 and 0), we managed to identify very few emotionally-loaded collocates in *Kathimerini* and *To Vima*. What is more, no such collocate was found in these two newspapers for ‘immigrants’. More in particular, *Kathimerini* refers only to the living conditions of ‘refugees’, and to the need to support them. Also, ‘refugees’ collocate with the verb ‘(to be) entrapped’. In *To Vima*, on the other hand, frequent collocates are ‘families’ and ‘children’, while there are also mentions to the living conditions of ‘refugees’, as well as to the fact that they remain entrapped in Greece. In *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, the pattern is quite different, taking account of the sheer number of ‘refugee’ collocates (e.g. ‘war’, ‘testimony’, ‘tragedy’, ‘life’, ‘protection’, ‘solidarity’, ‘rights’ etc.). This finding clearly suggests this newspaper’s differentiation, as well as more “humanistic” approach, to the problem: all these lexemes point directly to history, to experiences and to the rights and needs of RASIM as ‘humans’.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has aimed to critically present, diachronically, the main discursive representations of RASIM and the topics raised by mainstream Greek newspapers, in the light of the still rampant migration crisis. Our study has combined corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis methodologies, and is triangulated in the sense that the corpus data has been approached from two different, yet complementary, perspectives: lexico-semantic analysis of key descriptors and qualifiers for the entire corpus, and network analysis of their prominent collocates in the 2015-2016 subcorpora of the three newspapers. The statistical findings have been presented in detail and key findings have been critically summarised and linked to the social and political context, by resorting also to concordance analysis.

In a nutshell, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. On the lexical level and as regards the representations of RASIM, there are many similarities as well as significant differences between the three newspapers: the centre-right *Kathimerini* and the centre-left *To Vima* gradually yet belatedly adapt their RASIM descriptors and qualifiers to official and thus more “politically correct” discourses and recommendations. The two newspapers’ lexical variation plots are therefore witness of a marked shift of stance during the study period. As evidenced from UNHCR data (UNHCR, 2016), the ethnic composition of RASIM arriving in Greece is practically stable after 2014. For the two newspapers, until mid-2015, the most mentioned RASIM group is that of ‘immigrants’. Thereafter, focus is mostly on ‘refugees’. On the other hand, (more recent) corpus data from *Efimerida ton Syntakton* suggests a more stable and thus “fixed” perception of RASIM: these are mostly ‘refugees’, while ‘clandestine’ and ‘illegal’ immigrants (and hence ‘clandestine’ and ‘illegal’ immigration) are used mostly meta-discoursally and their use by others is explicitly criticised. As the crisis escalates, all common qualifiers for ‘immigrants’ practically disappear, and a clear distinction is made only between ‘refugees’ and ‘immigrants’, i.e. those deserving international and humanitarian protection and all “others”.
2. There are many similarities and differences between the three newspapers, also on the level of *topics*, which have been examined with a focus on 2015-2016 corpus data: all newspapers resort to the *topos of numbers*, by stressing the ‘wave’ of migrants and by also using many numerical collocates. ‘Refugees’ are Syrians for *Kathimerini* and *To Vima*, and Syrians and Afghans for *Efimerida ton Syntakton*. Other prevalent topics, yet with a more-than-insignificant lexical variation between the three newspapers, relate to the passages and routes of RASIM, and to their accommodation and stay in Greece. In other words, and quite expectedly given the severity of the “stated problem”, the stance of all newspapers seems to be Greek-centred. Finally, *Efimerida ton Syntakton* persistently emphasises “migration as a humanitarian problem”.

In all, the newspapers are foregrounding different “realities”, and their stance seems to concur to the political “blame game” between the opposition (*Kathimerini* and *To Vima*) and the coalition government (*Efimerida ton Syntakton*), yet from a relative distance. Finally, all the newspapers seem to

critically adapt their discourses on RASIM to the long-term requirements and challenges raised by the “stated problem”.

The work reported in this paper is by no means exhaustive, since only three newspapers have so far been included in the study corpus. Moreover, our findings are mostly macroscopic and can by no means cover all significant aspects of such a sensitive socio-political issue. Considering that our effort has been on investigating a phenomenon while it is still developing, it would be very interesting to continue tracking RASIM-related discursive shifts until after the end of the migration crisis, by also critically linking them to political and social events, both in Greece and in the EU.

Therefore, future work aims (a) to expand the current newspaper corpus (treating it as a “monitor corpus”), by including also data from other newspapers and online social networks; and (b) to investigate more thoroughly the patterns observed in concordances and in more extended units of meaning, by exploring also clausal, supra-clausal and textual semantics.

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A Sample of Student Discourses of Civic Engagement and Global Citizenship in a Time of Crisis in Greece

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Abstract

This empirical study explored undergraduate student (N=9) and teaching faculty (N=15) perceptions of the concept of “Global Citizenship”, through participation (or not) in the Global Citizen Seminars (GCS) in a college campus in Athens, Greece. Information gathered aimed to also explore students’ experiences in the *Politis Program of Civic Engagement*, a required co-curricular component of undergraduate education aimed at fostering social and civic responsibility, as experiences transcend the current economic crisis. Mixed methods utilizing focus group feedback were completed in Spring 2015. Data collected from self-rankings for selected value rubrics of the U.S. Association of American Colleges and Universities (AAC&U) indicate that students and faculty perceive they are at the “milestone” level of development regarding their experiences in both GCS and/or the university’s undergraduate general education program. Select AAC&U rubrics show a significant difference in rankings among students who were required to participate in the GCS as compared to those who were not ($p<0.05$). Participants provided discourse on how they see civic engagement, the identity of the global citizen, and the initial data indicate an overall positive experience of both GCS and the overall undergraduate general education program.

Keywords: global citizenship, civic engagement, volunteerism, economic crisis, mixed methods study

In the age of ‘globalization’ we find that there are many definitions and concepts of global citizenship (Jackson, 2014). Morais and Ogden (2011) devised a concept model of global citizenship (see *Figure 1*, Appendix) which may be useful in assessment or descriptive strategies such as those that this study is embarking on. Fairclough (2003) explains that the concept of ‘globalization’ is contentious (hence the quotations) and that one needs to examine the process of ‘re-scaling’ relations between global, regional, national, and local and that this process in turn affects discourse and the particular mix of genres. Changes in genres connect and reflect the changes in the relationships of social organization and “the restructuring and rescaling of social life in new capitalism” (Fairclough, p.34). This empirical study explored student and teaching faculty’s perceptions of the concept of “Global Citizen”, through participation (or not) in an undergraduate academic program series of Global Citizen Seminars (GCS – *Figure 2*, Appendix) in Hellenic American University (referred to as “HAUniv” or Hellenic American College [HAEC] in Athens).

HAUniv Athens campus, by virtue of its location belongs to Europe while facing the East, Africa, and the Balkans – a mixture of cultures and sub-cultures of people whose thoughts and ideas are expressed through words, symbols, or images. Torricelli indicates that the modern culture of Europe and European vision is a mixture of cultural ideas coming from ancient Greek philosophy, the Roman Empire and the German barbaric reigns, through the medieval age and the modern renaissance (2013, p. 2). Professor Torricelli writes how we can better understand the globalized world through linguistic communication, emphasizing that we can understand the world’s cultural vision through the psychodynamic “need to belong” and that we must understand this before planning any communication strategy (2013). McCarthy, Giardina, Harewood, and Park (2003) discuss identity and curriculum dilemmas in the age of globalization, post-colonialism and multiplicity, expressing that the “critical issues of cultural identity and the organization of knowledge in schooling is pivotal in a time in which there are deepening patterns of cultural balkanization and disciplinary insulation in educational institutions” (p. 454).

HAUniv's mission aims to help build students' intercultural communication through a range of classes, primarily through the General Education track and includes language requirements, and the GCS. Intercultural communication and language are reflected in daily interaction and within the global workplace, and further discourse analysis reflects dimensions of cultural difference or value orientation (Jackson, 2014). The GCS curriculum of HAUniv, includes both interdisciplinary and intercultural components centering on the themes of intercultural competence, social & personal responsibility, integrated learning from global, cultural, historical and political perspectives. From local to global, students review and discuss issues of diversity, civic and democratic engagement, cyber-citizenship, corporate social responsibility, and intercultural communication, as expressed both in verbal and written forms. Information gathered aims also to explore students' experiences in the *Politis Program of Civic Engagement* (<http://www.hauniv.edu/?i=hau-uni.en.politis-program>) referred to as "*Politis*" hereon in, a required co-curricular component of undergraduate education aimed at fostering social and civic responsibility.

Through *Politis*, students experience first-hand issues relating to the current economic crisis by working with the impoverished, immigrants, as well as other vulnerable populations, becoming thus, practically aware of the notion and benefits of social responsibility (Young, 2004). The economic crisis in Greece starting in 2009-2010 has hit across lines and restrictive policies mainly relating to economics but extending further in the social sphere have affected the country's citizens with negative consequences (Kentikelenis, Karanikolos, Papanicolas, Basu, McKee & Stuckler, 2011; Kondilis, Giannakopoulos, Gavana, Ierodiakonou, Waitzkin, & Benos, 2013).

Methods

Mixed methods were utilized including website information, surveys, artifacts (poems, self-reflection sheets among others) and focus group feedback from fifteen teaching faculty, and nine students (these students completed these focus groups in Spring 2015).

Participants

The study involved two general focus groups: undergraduate students in their second or third year of study at HAUniv, and faculty teaching for GCS. The two undergraduates included those enrolled in GCS versus those who were not required to take these seminars, mainly in their last years of studies. Out of the students contacted, there were nine total participants; four (44% of student participants) ultimately participated in Group A (no GCS requirement – two women and two men), five (56%) participated in Group B (completed GCS – two women and three men), and were a mixture of academic majors at the undergraduate level. The average age of students was 25 years and 67% have lived in another country outside their birthplace, and most speak two languages.

Regarding the faculty focus group participants – though not the main focus of this paper -- included the researcher (teaching faculty and Coordinator of all GCS), the GCS faculty teaching during the last two or three years that the GCS have been running, for a total of fifteen participants. The three faculty focus groups were interviewed composed of the total 15 participants had an average age of 43 years (12 females and three males) all of whom have lived outside their birthplace country and speak an average of three languages. Regarding faculty's educational background most were mainly educated in institutions of higher education in European institutions including Greece and other, mainly the United Kingdom, three were also educated in the United States of America.

Procedure

Student participants received a pre-survey, faculty participants received a post-survey in collecting additional demographic data, general data relating to global citizen or general education questions, and general impressions about the focus group participation. Students and faculty provided further feedback in the focus groups on concepts of civic engagement and global citizenship by reflecting on the Morais & Ogden concept model (2011). Six selected value rubrics (out of 15) developed by the American Association of Colleges and Universities (AAC&U) relating to specific competencies were selected to provide a baseline of comparison among the participating groups; the specific chart of the rubrics was made available to participants and included a blank form reflective of each category for documenting

participant rankings. Statistical data frequencies and averages were calculated using Excel for Windows while specific comparisons of the sample groups were done in the statistical package SPSS (version 20) for selected variables. The non-parametric test Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test was used to test whether the two student groups differ from each other and from the faculty group on the ranked scores for AAC&U rubrics.

Results

Students indicated that they enjoyed having faculty perspectives from various disciplines teaching the GCS, and positive comments specific to assignments given (e.g. SWOT analysis for Global II, the Ebola Corporate Social Responsibility case study for Global III). The majority of weaknesses or changes evolved around the issue of the Politis program and the hours required, and general comments about the schedule for accommodating working students. Specific quotes from students (anonymous) from each of the GCS about their voluntary experiences and the seminars themselves follow:

Global I: “We need to be the change that we want to see in the world”; “Thanks to this course I start paying more attention to volunteering and civic and democratic engagement”

Global II: “I would recommend this course because through all the wide variety of stuff that you learn you become a global citizen!”

Global III: “Getting more professors and faculty involved to support, advocate, and collaborate. Building a stronger community within HAU.”

Both group members believe that the university accomplishes its mission in helping build global citizens and members of Group A added that the diverse make-up of students and the variety of classes contribute to students’ understanding of themselves and others which is different from most mainstream Greek universities. Regarding global citizenship, Group A referred to one’s being able to adapt outside their own culture or country to a new country and understand ‘their’ beliefs, backgrounds, customs, respect others. Group B addressed both the local of where one lives or goes to school to the more global community.

Table 1

Student Groups Feedback about Global Citizenship

Topic	Responses/ Excerpts
<i>Group A</i> (Non-GCS)	Excerpt 1, Group A, <i>Lines 2-6</i> : S4: A person who can travel around virtually in any place in the world without having any severe cultural setbacks. Has basic concepts and understanding people's cultures and knows how to assimilate and live for an X amount of time. S3: A person who is able to adapt in different cultures because he or she has the background or knowledge.
<i>Group B</i> (GCS)	Excerpt 2, Group B, <i>Lines 8-16</i> : S4: I think global citizenship has to do with the idea of one growing beyond his traditional cultural background, transcending beyond a certain level, having global knowledge of things and being able to live above certain restrictions like cultural differences, linguistic differences, I mean general lifestyle. You grow beyond being restricted to a certain background, you live above the limits of that restriction.

Topic	Responses/ Excerpts
	S2: Going on that as far as being able to transcend your own cultural background and identities and be able to ...learn and discover and know your place in the world and where you stand and how your actions, how your everyday actions affect other people around the world whether you are aware of it or not.

During the focus group discourse, students referred to individual versus group “identity” as this student from Group A, expressed:

1. **Excerpt 1**, Group A, *Lines 57-63*:

2. **S3:** Can I add something? I have to say that for me at least... was more impressive the thing of how I dealt with people from different economic statuses. Because I do believe we have extreme differences among students rather than nationalities because at the beginning I thought "Okay they are rich" and I don't have common things to share I see that they have another mentality than mine but I respect this mentality because I put myself in their place and say what if I have this socio-economic status...

3. Study self-representations emerge in establishing connections between identities and actions and as De Fina (2006) indicates, “such connections, if reproduced in different stories, may point to schemata about identity that are shared by members of a community and form the basis for ideologies about self and others” (p. 374). Though this study offered glimpses into the perceived group identity of the institution, nevertheless, this is an area that may be of interest for further exploration in future focus groups.

Regarding the six selected value rubrics (out of 15) by the AAC&U, they fall under general categories as designated by the AAC&U including “personal and social responsibility,” “intellectual and practical skills,” and “integrative and practical skills.” The six specific value rubrics covered in this study are: civic engagement, intercultural knowledge and competence, lifelong-learning, critical thinking, teamwork, and integrative learning (see *Table 2*, Appendix). Data collected from self-rankings for the selected value rubrics of AAC&U indicate that students and faculty perceive they are at the “milestone” level of development regarding their experiences in both GCS and/or the university’s undergraduate general education program.

The participating students ranked their experience higher than that of the participating faculty ($p < 0.005$) while there was a significant difference in rankings among students who were required to participate in the GCS as compared to those who were not required to take the GCS ($p < 0.05$), see *Table 2*, Appendix. Concepts expressed by students and faculty reflect their definition of “what is a global citizen?” and how this reflects (or not) the university’s mission. Further the participants provided discourse on how they see civic engagement (via *Politis*) enhancing further the identity of the global citizen. Students in both groups indicated that the conceptual model by Morais & Ogden was a “starting point” or baseline for looking at some of the concepts of global citizenship more closely, and three students suggested specific additions to the model itself to be adapted to the HAUniv experience.

Discussion

The qualitative and quantitative data sources collected allowed for data triangulation for a more complete picture of the study process and program evaluation of the GCS in context of the overall general education program. Faculty tended to be harder on themselves as compared to students’ responses about the effectiveness of GCS as a whole. Students in both groups were able to define the concept of global citizen though the Group B included more details of the local and global connection. The data indicates that there may be some gaps in “connecting the dots” but overall students taking the GCS indicated that they experienced positive effects. Group B members indicated being more active in volunteering though the survey results cannot distinguish if this was a result of the requirement for *Politis*, or if all students do so on their own accord. This can be addressed in further follow-up studies

and comparing variables of attitude towards volunteering and social action to actual action as expressed through self-reflection material or interviews. In the area of volunteering or civic engagement faculty appear to “practice what they teach” by indicating on average they do volunteer and reasons given for volunteering less may be due to conflicting obligations with work and family though the survey did not ask for information on marital or family status.

The students participating in GCS group B of the study may have been more positive in their responses about GCS in what Dörnyei terms as “social desirability bias” (p. 54). This however seemed to be countered by evidence from both the anonymous course evaluation data and the data from the non-GCS group A. The opportunity for both student groups to express their opinions about the GCS and the general education program, the concept model, and possible changes to the curriculum allowed them to be “co-constructors” in change for future curriculum and encouraging continued learning within and outside of the classroom.

Focus group data indicate an overall positive experience of both GCS and the overall undergraduate general education program, though this cannot be generalized as this was a small study sample. Faculty continue working towards unified messages about global citizenship concepts and indicate the need for further support from senior administration in ensuring effectiveness and successful program implementation in the future. Further research in tracking progress and change in knowledge or attitudes as well as developing a community concept model may be useful in helping both faculty and students better understand and increase their awareness of global citizenship concepts and actions. Students in both groups indicated that the conceptual model by Morais & Ogden was a good baseline or “starting point” for looking at some of the concepts of global citizenship more closely and seeing how the model can be adapted for the HAUniv experience. The multiple sources of data used for this study’s purpose may be further utilized in more statistical analyses, showcasing a Venn-type diagram to represent how the researcher/analyst sees the various perspectives uncovered from this study’s data sets starting from the institutional mission to the global citizen concept overall.

Further examination of this concept will be explored via student groups who will complete the newly devised Global Citizenship course starting in Fall 2016. Tracking the progress, change in knowledge or attitudes and perceptions, as well as developing a community concept model may be useful in helping both faculty and students better understand and increase their awareness of global citizenship concepts and actions. Gaining support by senior administration in the delivery of similar seminars or courses focused on global citizenship, and continuing to track comparative pre and post-data in identifying patterns of program effectiveness will likely aid in more successful and similar general education programs and their implementation in the future. Communication of the current study’s results both within the university itself and to other institutions conducting similar research will allow for furthering the understanding of the concept of global citizenship and its related constructs.

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End-notes

This paper reflects data collected in 2015 though the study continues in the form of focus groups with students who completed the GCS and students taking the course “Developing the Global Citizen” starting Fall 2016, since the GCS in their original format are no longer required as of the Academic Year 2016-2017 for undergraduate students.

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Appendix

Figure 1. Morais & Ogden (2011) Concept model of global citizenship




Figure 2. Global Citizen Seminar Themes & Program, HAUniv/HAEC

Seminar: "Global Citizen I, II, III"

(3 credits total – 15 hours per year for the first 3 years)

This is a required seminar for **all undergraduate students matriculating Fall 2012 & beyond**

The sessions are offered on Fridays, FIVE in total of three hours each

→ **post-test** at the conclusion of each seminar, session material and worksheets in Blackboard

Seminars to include the following components (not inclusive of all faculty teaching):

THEMATIC CLUSTER 1 (GE100) – Social & Personal Responsibility

- Intro (pre-test) & Intercultural communication I (D. Vladimirov w/ support from E. Hoesly)
- Civic & democratic engagement I (D. Apostolidis)
- Service (volunteerism) (T. Stathopoulou) & **Politis Program** of Civic Engagement (B. Kondilis, others)
- Special topics in personal/social responsibility (B. Kondilis, Psych Dept.)

THEMATIC CLUSTER 2 (GE101) – Applied Skills

- Intro (pre-test) & Review of **Politis Program Planning** (B. Kondilis, A. Nikolaou)
- Research fundamentals I – writing, library research, etc. (R. Theodorou, V. Kourbani, M. Panopoulou)
- Research fundamentals II (D. Konstantas, G. Spiliopoulos)
- Professionalism across languages and cultures (A. Nikolaou, I. Kopsiafti, M. Panopoulou)
- Career planning skills (L. Siachou, B. Kondilis, M. Panopoulou, S. Protopapa)

THEMATIC CLUSTER 3 (GE102) – Integrated Skills: Global, historical, & political perspectives

- Intercultural communication II (E. Hoesly w/ support from D. Vladimirov)
- International relations (D. Apostolidis)
- Civic & democratic engagement II (D. Apostolidis, L. Bachmann)
- Diversity issues (B. Kondilis, others)
- Social issue awareness in the global context (J. Garman-Karakosta)

Table 2

AAC&U Rankings by Group

VALUE RUBRICS	Student Group A [no GCS] (N=4)	Student Group B [GCS] (N=5)	Faculty (N=3)	Average for All (N=11)
Civic Engagement	2.8	3.3	2.2	3.0
Intercultural Knowledge & Competence	3.2	3.4	2.4	3.2
Lifelong Learning	3.1	3.3	2.2	3.1
Critical Thinking	3.3	3.6	2.5	3.3
Teamwork	2.9	3.4	2.1	3.1
Integrative Learning	3.2	3.4	2.2	3.2
ALL VALUES	3.1*	3.4*	2.3**	3.1

Note. Likert scale is designated by AAC&U as “1” Benchmark, “2” and “3” Milestones, and “4” Capstone level. In the “Average for All” one set of data by a faculty member was dismissed as an outlier. The statistical test (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test) showed a difference between Student Group A and Student Group B *significant at $p < 0.05$, and a difference between both student groups and faculty **significant at $p < 0$

The “OXI” [ohee] (NO) of the Greek people in the English, German, and Greek Press

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how the language used in the Greek referendum of July 05, 2015 was used by the Greek media in a form that totally altered the meaning of the referendum. The author critically analyzes the language used in the discourse about the question of the referendum as published in the Greek printed media. In turn, the findings are compared to articles on the same subject in the English- and German-speaking press of other European nations. Furthermore, the findings uncover how the question of the referendum, which was about whether the Greek public agrees with the terms of the applied financial measures, was presented in a way that altered the meaning of the question and made a large portion of the general public believe that the question was about whether Greece wants to stay in the European Union (EU) and in the European Monetary Union (EMU).

Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis, Media Discourse Analysis, Media Politics, Politics

INTRODUCTION

In his famous book “1984”, George Orwell states that “if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.” The key word here, of course, is corrupt and – while there are many definitions of the word – it is interesting to examine the mechanics of how thought can corrupt language and vice versa. In the case study examined here, if one takes a critical look at newspaper reports and considers common practices in journalism – such as “twisting”, “spinning”, and “isolating” facts – one realizes what Orwell might have been referring to.

This paper focuses on the linguistic aspects of the discourse around the question posed to the Greek people in the referendum of July 05, 2015. In doing so, it necessarily also has to take into consideration the political implications of this discourse.

In the media, this discourse was intense and reached far beyond the national borders of Greece. This is interesting, especially when considering that Greece’s financial, political, legislative role in the European Union is not influential. Thus, one has to wonder: Why was this referendum so important? Why did everyone state that the referendum was about whether Greece wants to stay in the EU and the EMU when it clearly was not? What was the European dimension of this referendum?

The Question of the Referendum

Before we analyze the language of the question, we ought to have a look at the text as it appeared on the voting ballot of the referendum and at the translation thereof. A transliteration of the question, as well as a phonetic guide, can be found in the appendix of this paper. The language used in the question of the referendum regarding the continuation of the financial stability program, as proposed by the institutions, was the following:

1	ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΑΠΟΔΕΚΤΟ ΤΟ ΣΧΕΔΙΟ	ΔΕΝ ΕΓΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ/ΟΧΙ
2	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑΣ, ΤΟ ΟΠΟΙΟ ΚΑΤΕΘΕΣΑΝ	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ, Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ	
4	ΚΕΝΤΡΙΚΗ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΔΙΕΘΝΕΣ	
5	ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΟ ΤΑΜΕΙΟ ΣΤΟ EUROGROUP	
6	ΤΗΣ 25.06.2015 ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΤΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΔΥΟ	
7	ΜΕΡΗ, ΤΑ ΟΠΟΙΑ ΣΥΓΚΡΟΤΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ	ΕΓΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ/ΝΑΙ
8	ΕΝΙΑΙΑ ΠΡΟΤΑΣΗ ΤΟΥΣ;	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟ ΕΓΓΡΑΦΟ ΤΙΤΛΟΦΟΡΕΙΤΑΙ	
10	«REFORMS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE	
11	CURRENT PROGRAM AND BEYOND»	
12	(«ΜΕΤΑΡΡΥΘΜΙΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΩΣΗ	
13	ΤΟΥ ΤΡΕΧΟΝΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ	
14	ΠΕΡΑΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ») ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟ	
15	«PRELIMINARY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY	
16	ANALYSIS» («ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΡΚΤΙΚΗ ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ	
17	ΒΙΩΣΙΜΟΤΗΤΑΣ ΧΡΕΟΥΣ»)	

Since the original lexical, grammatical, and syntactical form of the question will literally and metaphorically look “Greek” to most readers, they will not be able to understand it. I will, thus, use the official translation for the purposes of this paper. However, before reading and analyzing the official translation, I would like to offer a form of translation of the question, which aims at conveying the confusion caused by the relatively complex syntax of the referendum question, and the use of references with English titles, despite the fact that there was a translation of the titles. Taking all this complexity and the confusion it may have caused into consideration, the question in English would look like this:

1	SHOULD THE DRAFT AGREEMENT,	NOT APPROVED/
NO		
2	WHICH WAS SUBMITTED BY	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN	
4	CENTRAL BANK, AND THE INTERNATIONAL	
5	MONETARY FUND AT THE ΕΥΡΩΜΑΔΑ	
6	OF JUNE 25 TH , 2015 AND CONSISTS OF	
7	TWO PARTS, WHICH MAKE UP	APPROVED/YES
8	THEIR JOINT PROPOSAL, BE ACCEPTED?	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	THE FIRST DOCUMENT IS ENTITLED	
10	“ΜΕΤΑΡΡΥΘΜΙΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΩΣΗ	
13	ΤΟΥ ΤΡΕΧΟΝΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ	
14	ΠΕΡΑΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ” (REFORMS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE	
11	CURRENT PROGRAM AND BEYOND) AND THE	
12	SECOND “ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΡΚΤΙΚΗ ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ	

17 ΒΙΩΣΙΜΟΤΗΤΑΣ ΧΡΕΟΥΣ” (PRELIMINARY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 13 ANALYSIS).

Besides the widely debated issue of the complexity of the sentence structure, another debated issue was the fact that the No option was placed above the Yes option. Some analysts interpreted this fact as a suggestion to vote no. Let us now have a look at the official translation of the text of the referendum of July 05, 2015 in order to understand what the people of Greece were asked to vote on.

The official translation of the text of the referendum

1	SHOULD THE DRAFT AGREEMENT,	NOT APPROVED/ NO
2	WHICH WAS SUBMITTED BY	
3	THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	CENTRAL BANK, AND THE INTERNATIONAL	
5	MONETARY FUND AT THE EUROGROUP	
6	OF JUNE 25 TH , 2015 AND CONSISTS OF	
7	TWO PARTS, WHICH MAKE UP	APPROVED/YES
8	THEIR JOINT PROPOSAL, BE ACCEPTED?	
9	THE FIRST DOCUMENT IS ENTITLED	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	“REFORMS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE	
11	CURRENT PROGRAM AND BEYOND” AND THE	
12	SECOND “PRELIMINARY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY	
13	ANALYSIS”.	

When reading the text, one can see that in the first part of the referendum, the question asks *whether the Greek people wanted to accept the draft agreement* – as it had been submitted by the three institutions, which had become known as the “Troika”; that is the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. In the second part, there is a reference to two documents which compose the submitted agreement; that is *the document entitled “Reforms for the Completion of the Current Program and Beyond”* and the document bearing the title *“Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis”*. What is important to note here is that the average voter was obliged to have read two documents that were part of the government’s negotiations and, thus, had rather complicated and specialized terms, which required specialized knowledge in order to be understood correctly.

A more focused question, would have been stronger and clearer if the text of the referendum would have been worded in a way similar to this:

1	SHOULD THE DRAFT AGREEMENT,	NOT APPROVED/ NO
2	WHICH WAS SUBMITTED BY	
3	THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	CENTRAL BANK, AND THE INTERNATIONAL	
5	MONETARY FUND AT THE EUROGROUP	
6	OF JUNE 25TH, 2015 AND CONSISTS OF	
7	TWO PARTS, WHICH MAKE UP	APPROVED/YES
8	THEIR JOINT PROPOSAL, BE ACCEPTED?	
9	THE FIRST DOCUMENT IS ENTITLED	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	“REFORMS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE	
11	CURRENT PROGRAM AND BEYOND” AND THE	

12 SECOND “PRELIMINARY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 13 ANALYSIS”.

However, even in this simplified form, it is unclear what the draft agreement is and exactly which terms it contains. Thus, the question on what exactly it was the Greek people were asked to vote on remains a mystery for the average citizen.

While the complexity of the sentence structure is obvious and the location of the “No” box above and, thus, before the “Yes” box is indeed unusual, one has to focus on the fact that the Greek people were asked to *accept the draft agreement with a “Yes” vote, or reject the draft agreement with a “No” vote.*

GREEK NEWSPAPER REPORTS

Let us now have a look at some of the characteristic reports on the text of the referendum the people of Greece were asked to vote on 05 July 2015, as they were published before that date.

In the Greek press, on 27 June, 2015 the newspaper “Eleftheros Typos” published a title page article that stated: “*Tsipras gambles the future of Greece. Referendum of Bankruptcy*”.



When one reads the main article one can read that a “*Startled, Europe directly questions whether Greece should remain within the common currency*”¹ although – in the referendum – there is not even an inference to the common currency; let alone whether Greece wants to stay in it. I disregard the claim of the article that “Europe directly questions whether Greece should remain within the common currency” since there is no provision by EU treaties and laws for any procedure with which a member can be forced to leave. A member state can leave the European Monetary Union only by its own will and that matter was clearly not the subject of the referendum we analyze here.


On June 28, 2015, the newspaper “Prin” published a front-page article entitled “A National ‘NO’ to the EU and to submission”.

¹ <http://www.eleftherostypos.gr/thesi/17164-to-dimopsifisma-tis-xreokopias/>



The relevant article, on the front page of this newspaper, emphasizes the fact that IMF Director of Communications, Mr. Gerry Rice, had stated that IMF had spoken of ‘payment default and not of bankruptcy’. Furthermore, he characterized any statements saying that Greece would have to declare bankruptcy in the case of payment default ‘an unfounded speculation’²

On the same day, the newspaper “Efimerida ton Syntakton” had – on its front page – a caricature of a man holding a banner that had just one word: “Axioprepia”, which means dignity.



Under the caricature, one can read what the parties involved would vote according to the newspaper:

- The government of Greece would vote “No” to the humiliation of the Greek people with a new memorandum of understanding. It waits for new proposals from the three institutions.
- The three main opposition parties “New Democracy (ND) – POTAMI – PASOK” would vote “Yes” for an agreement with the creditors. They are portrayed to report the “Lobby of the Drachma” and they are shown to state that the referendum is a mistake.
- The institutions are shown to have a “Eurogroup” that threatens and blackmails. They speak of having been surprised and give a final notice until Tuesday.

Also on June 28, 2015, the newspaper “Eleftheros Typos” also devoted all of its front page to issue the referendum vote just a week before it was to be held. Spread over a third of the title page, the dominating report states that “Tsipras failed and he gambles the future of the country” as a lead in to the main title that spans across the front page and says “National Tragedy” with the subtitle stating: “He deceived the people, he leads Greece out of Europe.”

² Newspaper “Prin”, Year 26, Publication 1241, 28 June 2015.



The article then goes on to say how Tsipras sharply had criticized George Papandreou's plans to hold a referendum in 2011. In the same page and just under the aforementioned dominating headline, on the lower left hand corner there are pictures of the three heads of the opposition parties New Democracy (ND), Potami, and PASOK, which are portrayed to compose a "European Front" followed by the statement: "The real question is Europe or Drachma"; clearly and bluntly misinterpreting the question of the referendum, as shown above, which does not pose such a dilemma at any point. Right next to the box of that statement, there is a box in which one can see the picture of the former Prime Minister of Greece and former Head of the ND party, who appears to be stating: "We should insist on staying in the heart of Europe; not on mindless choices."³

One day later, on 29 June, 2015 in the front page of the English edition of "Kathimerini" one could read the title "Referendum with closed Banks".



³ Eleftheros Typos; 28 June 2015; Copy Nr. 293


The closing of the Banks and the outcome of the referendum are directly linked in the relevant article which states that “If the result of the referendum is “No”, Greece will be put on a track to exit the euro zone with unforeseeable consequences for the economy and the nation.”⁴ If that is not attempt to blackmail the voters to vote ‘YES’ rather than ‘NO’, then what is?

Just four days before the referendum, that is on 01 July, 2015, one of the top newspapers in Greece, “To VIMA”, also connected the ‘YES’ vote to the common currency, the Euro. In its title page, the Words “YES to Greece YES to the Euro” were larger than the newspaper’s logo; clearly implying that a “NO” vote would mean NO to Greece and NO to the Euro.



What is particularly interesting here is that when one reads the entire article – instead of just reading the front page title – one realizes that the article simply refers to a proclamation of 85 well known actors, athletes, and other publically well known people who stated as a common trait of love for Greece and their anxiety about the future. That was the reason why they stated that they support a “Commission of YES ‘YES to Greece YES to the Euro’”.⁵

Just two days before the referendum, on 03 July, 2015, another major Greek newspaper “To Ethnos” had as its main title on the title page the message



The relevant article of this newspaper title page stated that there is a “Thrusting YES for the euro in Greece by 74% and derby in the referendum with a slight edge of YES, but with a clear upward trend, recording the poll.”⁶ Again, linking the vote of the people to the common currency without having any factual base to do so.

⁴ <http://www.kathimerini.gr/821342/article/epikairothta/politikh/kleistis-trapezes-kai-epivolph-periorismwn>

⁵ <http://www.tovima.gr/PrintArticle/?aid=718705>

⁶ http://www.ethnos.gr/politiki/arthro/nai_sto_euro_ntermpi_sto_dimopsifisma-64212642/

Finally, on the day of the referendum, on 05 July, 2016, the title page of the newspaper “Real News” had as its main title “Save the Nation.”



Naturally, one wonders how one can save the nation and the answer is that according to the relevant article one has to vote yes because it is “urgent and imperative to reach a new agreement with the EU partners.”⁷ Because the Greek referendum was portrayed to be of importance for the whole European Union and in order to have a point of comparison, I will now mention what the main characteristics of German and English publications was.

GERMAN NEWSPAPER REPORTS

In the German Press, the publications mainly focused on a claim that the German tax payers paid for the Greek debt and that Greece’s voters were about to decide about the future of the European Union.

The online edition of the very prestigious and globally read newspaper “Die Zeit” (the Time) announced that the Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, plans on having the Greek people decide on their destiny in a Referendum vote about the proposals in the austerity program that the creditors want to impose on them.



⁷ <http://www.real.gr/DefaultArthro.aspx?page=arthro&id=429891&catID=11>

In this article, the Prime Minister of Greece is quoted to say that "The partners have prompted us to accept even more austerity." The newspaper adds that these measures would only result in further weakening of the Greek economy.

On 29 June, 2015, the newspaper "die Tageszeitung", for example, the main title of the front page reads: "Democracy or Madness" while the subtitle poses the questions: "What should the Greeks vote actually still next Sunday? About a loan which will cease to exist by then? About the Euro, and its continued use in Athens, which becomes uncertain day by day?"



The interesting fact in this publication is that as the eye follows the title and reads the following question it falls on a group of people holding little pieces of papers, which have the word "OXI" written on it; thus connecting the word "madness" with the "NO" vote.⁸

The well established and globally read magazine "Stern" had as its title page on 02 July, 2015, a torn flag of Europe with the title: "Final Game about Europe" with the subtitle saying "The week of the decision: Will the Greeks Tear us all into Chaos? What does the Euro Thriller mean for our Future?"⁹



⁸ <http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/digitaz/artikel/?ressort=a1&dig=2015%2F06%2F29%2Fa0001&cHash=58804aaa3d29f24d9b3caf858a0e1124>

⁹ Stern, Nr. 28 - 2.7.2015 / "ENDSPIEL UM EUROPA"

Here, the referendum is presented as a vote of European dimensions. The world is being told that the referendum vote in Greece – in which the people of Greece are asked whether they want to accept a draft loan agreement – is a vote that will decide about the future of the European Union.

On 03 July, 2015, the widely read German tabloid “Bild” chooses to publish a mock referendum on its front page:



In this mock referendum, the readers of Bild are informed that “On Sunday, Greeks will vote whether they will accept the austerity measures for their country”. That is why Bild deemed it to be appropriate to ask its readers whether the German people should continue supporting Greece with tax billions. In doing so, however, the very concept is undermined instead of being strengthened... which might have a particular weight when considering the possibility of a political Union of the EU.

Finally, the equally well established and widely read magazine “Der Spiegel” published on 04 July, 2015, a title page, which shows the Prime Minister of Germany, Ms. Angela Merkel, sitting on fallen columns of an ancient Greek temple. In their article titled “What exactly do the Greeks vote on?”



The correspondents of the magazine in Athens, Mr. Giorgos Christides und Mr. Hasnain Kazim, rightly reported that the vote was about the future stance of Greece toward the austerity measures imposed on it by the EU.” They also correctly predicted the dominance of the “No” vote. However, the fact that this article appears in an issue with a title page that shows the German Prime Minister, Ms. Angela Merkel, on demolished columns of an ancient Greek Temple has very specific inferences...¹⁰

In the online edition of the renowned newspaper “Die Welt” an article entitled “Tsipras confuses now his own People” was published on 02 July, 2015.



The lead in paragraph of this article is of particular interest since it does not follow the usual trend to talk about a not existing dilemma of the Greek people to choose between EU and not EU, or Euro and Drachma, and such. Instead the article speaks of a confusing referendum question and an uncertainty of the Greek people what they are really asked to answer. Furthermore, the article states that one needs to be a financial expert, in order to completely understand the question. This fact, in addition to the banks having closed down shortly before the Referendum vote, are the two reasons the article cites in order to predict a slight advance of the yes vote.

ENGLISH NEWSPAPER REPORTS

In the newspapers published in English, the English edition of the Greek newspaper “Kathimerini” published on June 28, 2015 an article about the fact that Greece’s referendum would take place with the Banks closed; that a day before the same article appeared in the Greek edition of the same newspaper.

¹⁰ <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/griechenland-was-man-zum-referendum-wissen-muss-a-1042087.html>

In wake of MPs approving plebiscite, coalition agrees to emergency measures after ECB decides not to lift limit on liquidity for lenders

Cross to death is a referendum on the state of affairs in the country, with the banks close to collapse, capital controls in place after the Hong Kong Central Bank decided not to further increase the exchange liquidity it must have to avoid default.

The decision to impose the extended loan holiday was taken during a meeting of Greece's Economic Stability Council, which included Finance Minister Yannis Varoufakis and Bank of Greece Governor

The official announcement had not been made at the time of going to press but sources said that ATM withdrawal would be limited to 60 euros per day per account and that limits would remain in effect at least the next six working days, including the day after the referendum on the introduction of the euro to Greece. Visitors to Greece will be able to withdraw cash from the Greek and

request for a short extension of the program was an unpardonable act by the republican candidate, questioning the right of a sovereign people to decide," Thompson said in televised address to the nation yesterday.

This decision led the ECB today to limit the liquidity available to closed banks and the EU central banks suggest a bank holiday and restrictions on withdrawals.

Talpiashvili had the letter a new request for an extension of Gromov's banlist - which expires on June 30 - to leaders of extremist countries and the heads of the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the WTO, the UN and the

"I am awaiting their immediate response to a fundamentally democratic request," he said, adding that such a move could prevent the ECJ from on the battlefield in years.

text has enough support from its own party, he also did create a national unity administration with the participation of opposition parties.

"Our country needs to remain in the South Europe and in the end, Mr. Tapan must convince the population," he also said. "If he can't do that by himself, he should set up a big national congress."

Developments in Greece also drew the attention of the American government yesterday. US Treasury Secretary Jack F. Lew told top European finance ministers and the International Monetary Fund he continued working to get to the bottom of "speculation" affecting the markets in Greece.

Some spoke to others with new strategies, often on Saturday, including the finance ministers of Germany and France, and IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde, according to a source familiar with the proceedings.



The Guardian reported on the 28th June, 2015, in a title page article that “Jean Claude Juncker, the commission president, said: “It’s the moment of truth ... I’d like to ask the Greek people to vote yes ... No would mean that Greece is saying no to Europe.”



On June 30, 2015, the Financial Times had on the title page the warning that prevailed the press reports regarding the referendum vote in Greece: that is that a “No” would mean “No” to Europe.

¹¹ <http://www.ekathimerini.com/198510/article/ekathimerini/news/closed-banks-and-capital-controls-until-referendum>

¹² <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/29/greek-crisis-referendum-eurozone-vote-germany-france-italy>

FINANCIAL TIMES
WORLD BUSINESS NEWSPAPER

Ready for takeoff
The case for a third runway at Heathrow — JAMES SPURGEON, PAGE 16

Just like the others
How a young Tunisian breakdancer turned into a jihadist killer — PAGE 17

C-suite smarts
Do big brains make good bosses? — JESSICA WATTS, PAGE 12

Greek voters warned that bailout rejection would spell 'No to Europe'
• EU leaders say decision is on euro membership • Tremors across continent's markets

Back to the drachmas?
Greek 10-year bond ends the week

Europe's future in Greece's hands

Start digging at Heathrow
Why Indians go hungry
Obama's Amazing Grace
Uber jobs and the modern worker
Shale's fractured finances

Finally, just a day before the referendum; on Jul 4th 2015, in an article entitled “Europe’s future in Greece’s hands”, the Economist reported that “plans for a referendum that may hasten Greece’s ejection from the single currency, and the beggary of the people. Were the stakes not so high, all those emergency summits and last-minute demands would count as farce.”

The Economist
2015 JUN 27 • \$10.99

Europe's future in Greece's hands

Start digging at Heathrow
Why Indians go hungry
Obama's Amazing Grace
Uber jobs and the modern worker
Shale's fractured finances

It is of particular interest to note that the article continued this unsubstantiated threat by asking the readers to “Look beyond Greece, and the threat of further conflict within the euro is all but inevitable. Although Greece’s departure would prove the euro is not irrevocable, nobody would know what rule-breaking would lead to expulsion.”¹³

¹³ <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21656662-whatever-its-outcome-greek-crisis-will-change-eu-ever-europes-future-greeces>

CONCLUSION

The linguistically and politically interesting fact regarding the referendum vote the Greek people were to ask is that the actual and legally binding question of the referendum – that is *if the citizens of Greece wanted to accept the terms of the financial credit Greece was about to receive, as they were proposed by the three creditors* – was altered by the political and financial interests involved in such a way that this question had an unclear and ambiguous meaning by the time the actual referendum vote took place. Therefore, the results of this vote are doomed to have different interpretations although it is rather clear what the vote itself imposed on the political leadership. With the exception of a few newspaper reports, the image emerging from the published articles of newspapers and magazines is that if the people of Greece would have voted ‘NO’, Greece would have had to leave the EU and the Eurozone while if they would have voted ‘YES’, Greece could stay in the EU and the Eurozone and enjoy all the relevant benefits.

Taking into consideration that Greece is a relatively small in size EU member state with relatively insignificant financial contributions to the EU, one has to wonder about the large international attention given to the Greek referendum. The key indicators for understanding the unusual international attention given to this referendum might be found in the words: “**submitted by**” in line 2, and the words “**their**” and “**accepted**” in line 8, as well as in the text of the documents the question refers to in lines 10-13 of the translation. The choice of these words indicates and highlights a discourse that can be found extensively – but not exclusively – in the British and German press, as well as in records of discussions in the European Parliament. This discourse suggests that a large part of the national legislations and/or fiscal policies of the EU member states are essentially formed by directives given by the European Commission. In many cases, these legislations are just direct translations of these directives, which are simply presented to, and approved by, the national governments of the EU member states.

From this perspective, the referendum I have examined in this paper – in which the Greek people were indirectly asked whether they accept the measures which would shape their future as imposed on them by authorities they did not elect – seems to be indeed a deviation from the standard procedure in the European Union, in which policies seem to be imposed on people by authorities that are not directly elected by these people. A deviation, which – if adopted by a number of nations – undermines the role and the power of the European Commission to control and instruct democratically elected governments through directives without having been elected by the people, and without having to give an account to the people, who are subject to the imposed policies; a fact that is – of course – anything but democratic, social, or just.

From this perspective the referendum of Greece becomes a case study of international interest in which the people of an EU member state are essentially asked whether they accept to be governed by supranational institutions, which are not elected by the people and, thus, certainly do not represent the interest of the people, nor policies for the people. This issue is, of course, important not only for the Greek people but for all people of any sovereign nation on earth since it questions the role, authority, and accountability of nationally elected governments of states that are members of supranational unions.

I believe the international attention was on whether a government of an EU member state actually dared to question the authority of the Commission, since it seems that – within the EU mechanisms – it is common practice that national parliaments legalize policies drafted by the Commission; that is by people and institutions that have not been elected by the citizens of a nation and, thus, have no authorized power to shape a given nation’s policies. This makes the decision of the government of Greece to ask the people whether they agree with the proposal, as stated in the mentioned documents – instead of simply push it through parliament – an “audacity”.

As seen in the Presidential Decree legalizing the referendum and the question thereof, however, there is no reference at all on exiting or staying in the EU or the Eurozone. In the vast majority of the media all over Europe, the question of the referendum was not presented as being about the proposed measures; it was presented as a question about staying in the European Union or not; a question about wanting the Euro or not; a question about obeying to the orders (directives) of the European Commission or not but that has never been the question.

The perspective of the issue of the referendum held in Greece being one about democracy and national sovereignty, rather than one of economy and finance, has also been expressed by two leading Nobel-price winning economists, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz. Paul Krugman stated directly that

“voting ‘yes’ on such a ballot would have the effect of undermining Greece’s popularly elected government” and suggested that “the troika clearly did a reverse Corleone — they made [Greek Prime Minister Alexis] Tsipras an offer he can’t accept, and presumably did this knowingly. So the ultimatum was, in effect, a move to replace the Greek government. And even if you don’t like Syriza, that has to be disturbing for anyone who believes in European ideals.”¹⁴ Joseph Stiglitz, on the other hand, tells us about the Greek “crisis” that “it’s not about the money. It’s about using ‘deadlines’ to force Greece to knuckle under, and to accept the unacceptable – not only austerity measures, but other regressive and punitive policies.” Furthermore, Stiglitz offers us a political interpretation of the vote the Greek people cast on 5 July, 2015 saying that “a no vote would at least open the possibility that Greece, with its strong democratic tradition, might grasp its destiny in its own hands. Greeks might gain the opportunity to shape a future that, though perhaps not as prosperous as the past, is far more hopeful than the unconscionable torture of the present”.¹⁵

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¹⁴ Huffington Post; Kaufman, Alexander C.; 03.07.2015.

¹⁵ The Irish Times, Stiglitz, Joseph, Jun 30, 2015

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APPENDIX

A. REFERENDUM VOTING BALLOT of 5th July, 2015


ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ
ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟ ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ
ΚΑΙ ΔΙΟΙΚΗΤΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΑΣΥΓΚΡΟΤΗΣΗΣ

ΔΗΜΟΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ
της 5ης Ιουλίου 2015

<p>ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΑΠΟΔΕΚΤΟ ΤΟ ΣΧΕΔΙΟ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑΣ, ΤΟ ΟΠΟΙΟ ΚΑΤΕΘΕΣΑΝ Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ, Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΚΕΝΤΡΙΚΗ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΔΙΕΘΝΕΣ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΟ ΤΑΜΕΙΟ ΣΤΟ EUROGROUP ΤΗΣ 25.06.2015 ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΤΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΔΥΟ ΜΕΡΗ, ΤΑ ΟΠΟΙΑ ΣΥΓΚΡΟΤΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΝΙΑΙΑ ΠΡΟΤΑΣΗ ΤΟΥΣ:</p> <p>ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟ ΕΓΓΡΑΦΟ ΤΙΤΛΟΦΟΡΕΙΤΑΙ «REFORMS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE CURRENT PROGRAM AND BEYOND» («ΜΕΤΑΡΡΥΘΜΙΣΕΙΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΩΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΤΡΕΧΟΝΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΑΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ») ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟ «PRELIMINARY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS» («ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΡΚΤΙΚΗ ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ ΒΙΩΣΙΜΟΤΗΤΑΣ ΧΡΕΟΥΣ»).</p>	<p>ΔΕΝ ΕΓΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ/ ΟΧΙ</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>ΕΓΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ/ ΝΑΙ</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><input type="checkbox"/></p>
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B. TRANSLITERATION OF THE REFERENDUM

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>1 ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΓΙΝΕΙ ΑΠΟΔΕΚΤΟ ΤΟ ΣΧΕΔΙΟ
 <u>prepē nah gēnē apodekto to shedēo</u>
 The draft plan must become acceptable
 Should the draft</p> | <p>ΔΕΝ ΕΓΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ/ΟΧΙ
 <u>den eggrēnete/ohē</u>
 not approved/no
 NOT APPROVED/NO</p> |
| <p>2 ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑΣ, ΤΟ ΟΠΟΙΟ ΚΑΤΕΘΕΣΑΝ
 <u>symfonēas to opēo katethesan</u>
 agreement which was submitted
 agreement, which was submitted by</p> |  |
| <p>3 Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ, Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ
 <u>i evropaēkē epētropē, ē evropaēkē</u>
 the european comission, the European
 the European Commission, the European</p> | |
| <p>4 ΚΕΝΤΡΙΚΗ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΔΙΕΘΝΕΣ
 <u>kentrēkē trapeza kai to dēethnes</u>
 central bank and the international
 Central Bank, and the International</p> | |
| <p>5 ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΟ ΤΑΜΕΙΟ ΣΤΟ EUROGROUP
 <u>nomēsmatēko tamio sto eurogroup</u>
 monetary fund at the eurogroup
 Monetary Fund at the Eurogroup</p> | |
| <p>6 ΤΗΣ 25.06.2015 ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΤΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΔΥΟ
 <u>tēs 25.06.2015 ke apotelēte apo dēo</u>
 of 25.06.2015 and is comprised of two
 of June 25th, 2015, and consists of two</p> | |
| <p>7 ΜΕΡΗ, ΤΑ ΟΠΟΙΑ ΣΥΓΚΡΟΤΟΥΝ ΤΗΝ
 <u>merē, ta opēa sygkrotun tin</u>
 parts , the which compose the
 parts, which make up</p> | <p>ΕΓΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ/ΝΑΙ
 <u>eggrēnete/neh</u>
 approved/Yes
 APPROVED/YES</p> |
| <p>8 ΕΝΙΑΙΑ ΠΡΟΤΑΣΗ ΤΟΥΣ;
 <u>enēea protasē tus</u>
 unified unified proposal theirs?
 their joint proposal, be accepted?</p> |  |
| <p>9 ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟ ΕΓΓΡΑΦΟ ΤΙΤΛΟΦΟΡΕΙΤΑΙ
 <u>to proto eggrafo tētloforēteh</u>
 the first document wears the title
 The first document is entitled</p> | |
| <p>10 «REFORMS FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE
 <u>“Reforms for the Completion of the</u>
 <u>“Reforms for the Completion of the</u>
 “Reforms for the Completion of the</p> | |

- 11 CURRENT PROGRAM AND BEYOND»
 Current Program and Beyond”
 Current Program and Beyond”
 Current Program and Beyond

- 12 («METAPPYΘMISEIS GIA THNOLOKΛHPΩΣH
 (“Metarēthmēsēs gēa tēn olōklērosē
 (“Reforms for the Completion
 (“Reforms for the Completion

- 13 TOY TPEXONTOS ΠPOΓPAMMATOΣ KAI
 tou trehondos programmatos keh
 of the Current Program
 of the Current Program

- 14 ΠEPAN AYTOY») KAI TO ΔEYTEPO
 peran aytou”) keh to deftero
 and Beyond of it”) and the second
 and Beyond') and the second

- 15 «PRELIMINARY DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
 “Preliminary Debt Sustainability
 “Preliminary Debt Sustainability
 “Preliminary Debt Sustainability

- 16 ANALYSIS» («ΠOKATAPKTIKH ANAΛYΣH
 Analysis” (“Prokatarktēkē Analysē
 Analysis” (“Preliminary Analysis
 Analysis." (Preliminary Debt

- 17 BΙΩCIMOΤHTAC XPEOYΣ»).
 Bēosēmōtētas Hreous”).
 Sustainability of Debt”).
 Sustainability Analysis.

Section 5: Borders and Spatially Determined Identities of the EU

Documentation of the Spatial Identity of Native European Populations Shaped through the Discourse of their Oral Histories and Traditions: a case study of the Arvanites.

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the spatial identity of underrepresented rural communities and particularly those without a codified language by examining pastoral themes in their oral traditions and histories having shaped European cultural heritage and identity for ages. The results of a field study being carried out with the last speakers of the endangered language of Arvanitic in the small agro-pastoral community of Zarakas in Laconia, Greece are reported. Texts collected through ethnographic research in the framework of documentary linguistics are analyzed via discourse analysis for pastoral themes and specifically those rooted in the cultural landscape; subsistence economy; ethnobiological knowledge systems; and spatial mobility. It is argued that the intrinsic value of language documentation, apart from the linguistic record, is to gain the traditional knowledge stored within. Pastoral discourse provides the groundwork for political dialogue to support the preservation and revival of rural communities which serve as viable models for EU sustainable development.

Keywords: pastoral discourse, oral tradition, endangered language, rural spatial identity, sustainable development

INTRODUCTION

European cultural heritage and identity has been partly shaped by the oral histories and traditions of its native populations which have served as markers of historical and cultural continuity. The origins of these populations are rooted in early agricultural societies that have evolved over millennia as evidenced by their linguistic, archaeological and genetic record. The documentation of the spatial identity of underrepresented rural populations throughout the European periphery who have managed to preserve this way of life is important as their sole reliance on the land for subsistence makes them models of autonomy, solidarity and sustainable development. Of particular concern are those rural populations whose languages have not yet been codified. These serve as special case studies as these languages which have been the vehicles of transmission of ancestral knowledge, beliefs and values through socio-spatial spheres intrinsically tied to the land need to be recorded before they disappear. One such community and the subject of study in this paper is the small agro-pastoral community of Zarakas in Laconia, Greece where the endangered language of Arvanitic is still spoken by its last speakers in the area. This study documents the spatial identity of this population at its grassroots while creating an invaluable record of the language at the same time. In the framework of documentary linguistics, texts were collected through ethnographic research and examined via discourse analysis for pastoral themes rooted in the cultural landscape, subsistence economy, ethnobiological knowledge systems and spatial mobility of the population. It is argued that the documentation of 'pro-pastoral' themes in rural discourse creates a basis for political dialogue towards the preservation and revival of these and similar communities throughout the European periphery along with their languages. At the same time, these communities provide viable models upon which to set the European agenda for policymaking towards sustainable development goals at the micro and macro level.

EUROPEAN CULTURAL IDENTITY

Early Agricultural Societies

A study of European identity would not be complete without examining its early agricultural societies whose genetic, archaeological and linguistic record is interwoven in its oral history. Evidence shows that European ancestry is made up of Paleo-Mesolithic hunter-gatherers and early farmers (Hervella et al, 2015; Lazaridis et al, 2014; Skoglund et al, 2012; Szecsenyi-Nagy et al, 2015). The transition from a Paleolithic, hunter-gatherer, subsistence economy to a Neolithic, agro-pastoral producing society had a huge impact on human lifestyle with profound cultural changes (Bellwood, 2004). Neolithic society developed from the domestication of plants and animals which marked the beginning of sedentism. This led to the secondary products revolution involving the use of milk, wool, traction, riding and pack transport which in turn supported population growth. This age also marked the beginning of “drastic changes to the social structure and residence patterns, shifting from bilocality to patrilocality in farming societies, which guaranteed the intergenerational transfer of status, wealth and territory” (Brandt, Szecsenyi-Nagy, Roth, Alt & Hauk, 2014, p. 79). Gradually, the cultural development of pottery use emerged which also gives us testament to the oldest documented farming culture in Europe to date known as the Seiko culture of Northern Greece (Tomkins, 2010). The adoption and spread of agriculture led to population and language dispersal which has come to be called the “early farming dispersal hypothesis” (Bellwood, 2004). The early farming dispersal hypothesis has been supported by paleogenetic research which examines the DNA of ancient fossils to unravel the genetic ancestral stands that form today’s populations (see Brandt et al, 2014 for literature review). Linguistic evidence also supports the farming and language dispersal theories and shows that Proto-Indo-European speakers, circa 3000 BC, were agriculturalists and not hunter-gatherers (Buckley et al, 2012; Diamond & Bellwood, 2003; Haak & Lazaridis et al, 2015). This in turn resulted in the language families, economic systems and races as we know them today even though the events that were their cause have been erased from memory. To the known record come the latest genomic studies which provide evidence of genetic affinities between early European farmer communities and modern populations from Cyprus and Crete (Fernandez et al, 2014; Hofmanova et al, 2015). This would support a primary route of the first Neolithic farmers into Europe through the Aegean due to pioneer seafaring colonization. Bellwood (2004) claims that “the significance of agriculture in history is that it has served as the ultimate economic foundation for the past 10,000 years of population growth amongst the human population, indeed for the phenomenon of civilization as we know it” (p. 18). We now turn to European oral history to see if we can find traces of this record in ancient sources.

First Pastoral Record in European Oral History

Through oral history, often based on mythology interwoven with a historical base, we learn of the roots of pastoral life in ancient times. Most scholars agree that a product of European oral tradition and history are Homer’s epic poems, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (Parry, 1932; Lord, 2000; Nagy, 2001) which are central to the Western canon and mark the beginning known record of European literature to date. These epic poems contain oral formulas which serve as a vehicle for the transmission of ancestral knowledge, beliefs and values across many different generations. Apart from their inherent pedagogical function, these works stand as an important source of information for ethnographic study of agricultural societies in Europe in ancient times (Mlekuž, 2005, 2007). Homer is the first to make mention of a seafaring people in the Aegean known as the Pelasgians that would support the genetic record mentioned above. Cosmopoulos (1999) says that:

The ancient sources agree unanimously that Pelasgian economy was based entirely on agriculture: the Pelasgoi were the first to establish permanent settlements, to cultivate cereals, to improve nutrition and to invent new agricultural techniques (there is no information about stock raising). They manufactured clothing and invented spinning and weaving. They were not associated with trade or technology, and there is no indication that they used metals. Their social organization shows no differentiation according to wealth, sex, or professional status and no indication of craft specialization. The core of the Pelasgian society appears to have been the family. Although there is no real evidence, it is possible that their social institutions included the Indo-European custom of marriage by capture. The religious institutions of the Pelasgoi seem to have undergone a long development. At the beginning, they are said to have worshipped gods with no individual names; later, they gave names to their gods. A principal

deity seems to have been a goddess of agriculture and fertility, and the Pelasgoi are associated with the cult of a goddess that was later identified with Demeter. (p. 252)

Apart from oral tradition and history, very little is known of the Pelasgians. However, they do provide the subject of one of the earliest written records of agricultural life in the ancient world. If they were the first farmers in Europe remains to be proved by archaeological and genetic evidence. Further research on this early agricultural society would shed more light on European ancestry and civilization.

Pastoral Poetry

Another product of oral tradition in Europe and a testament to one of the oldest occupations of mankind is pastoral poetry (Mustard, 1915; Pearce, 1993). This was influenced by the songs which made up the oral tradition of primitive shepherds composed while keeping their flocks which expressed their loves and woes inspired through nature and grounded in realism. The subject of their songs consisted of their flocks, the landscape, the seasons, the herders' distinct caste system as well as rustic chores such as milking, cheese making, and herding (Pearce, 1993). Their free spirit and tranquil lifestyle afforded them the leisure to compose the verses they sang to console and divert themselves in their long hours of solitude while flocking their sheep. Father of the pastoral genre was Theocritus who was the last Greek poet to write in the Doric dialect and who wrote the *Idylls* (circa 300 BC). Theocritus borrowed aspects of the shepherds' lives to lend "verisimilitude" to his poems characterized by simple, laconic use of language not of an elevated style but which expressed an elevated virtue. Pearce (1993) explains Theocritus' choice of Doric by saying that "it seems only natural then that he would use the very dialect of the shepherds about whom he writes, that is to say, those of Sicily, south Italy, and the area around Arcadia. The dialect of all these regions is Doric" which is not considered a literary dialect, but "perhaps it was for this very reason that Theocritus felt it to be especially appropriate for his non-literate shepherds" (p. 62). Pearce (1993) goes further by saying that he borrowed from their oral songs if not actual wording, topics and motifs characteristic of the tradition (p. 85). Mustard (1915) explains that "the commonest subjects of his Idyls [sic] are, first, the love-song, whether of courtship or complaint, second, the dirge or lament over a dead shepherd, and, third, the singing-match between two herdsmen, where each stakes a prize and an umpire is called in to decide between them" (p. 161). The use of the "amoebaeon singing exchanges" which is the literary form of the singing-matches became a hallmark of bucolic poetry. Remnants of the tradition of these 'singing-matches' are still found in areas of Greece and southern Italy today. Pearce is tempted to think that Theocritus' use of the dactylic hexameter, the metrical form of the Homeric epic and lyric poetry of Greece, may have been influenced by its use in the shepherd's songs. He draws some conclusions by saying "that shepherds may have been familiar with the language of rhapsodes" and "an acquaintance on the part of shepherds with Homeric recitations or perhaps even with oral compositional techniques, could possibly have led them to make a general association between oral, spontaneous composition and the hexameter verse form" (p. 63). Therefore, influenced by the oral tradition of shepherds, Theocritus' poetry provides one of the earliest written records of pastoral life in the ancient world.

The pastoral genre influenced European literature and civilization throughout the ages with "such names as Bion and Moschus among the Greeks, the Romans Virgil, Calpurnius, and Nemesianus, the Italians Boccaccio and Petrarch, and such English poets as Spenser, Milton, Shelley, and Arnold" (Pearce, 1993, pp. 59-60). Unlike Theocritus' *Idylls* which placed his shepherds in Sicily, Virgil's *Eclogues*, otherwise known as *Bucolics*, locates them back in Arcadia, the Greek province which dates to antiquity, which became a poetic shaped space and symbol of pastoralism and harmony with unspoiled nature, similar to a 'Utopia'. Arcadia symbolizes the innate goodness and purity of humanity, that of the 'noble savage', that is close to nature and not affected by the greed and pride that came with the corruption of civilization. However, we must keep in mind that Theocritus wrote with an idealized view of the countryside for an urban audience's nostalgia of an older and simpler way of life. Even though he borrowed aspects of pastoral life into his poetry this was far remote from the realities of actual rural life and discourse. We can gain a better understanding of agricultural societies by examining the real life discourse of pastoral communities today through their oral histories and traditions as compared to those found in the traditional pastoral genre. This will shed light on how one aspect of European cultural and historical identity has been shaped at the grassroots—an identity which we will see below is of utmost importance and relevance today.

A REVIEW OF PASTORAL THEMES IN ARVANITIC ORAL TRADITION

One of Europe's oldest native populations are the Arvanites whose transhumant pastoral lifestyle since ancient times has led to a transnational population today situated mainly in southern Greece, southern Italy, southern Albania and parts of the Balkans. Even though the Arvanitic language has not yet been officially codified, its long oral history has left a written record in the form of ecclesiastical and pastoral texts, the latter of which is the subject of this study¹. Arvanitic pastoral texts recorded to date mainly consist of songs (Moraitis, 2002), fairy tales (Karantis, 2001) and prose (Giochalias, 2011)². We will now briefly examine the evolution of the traditional pastoral genre characterized using pastoral, anti-pastoral and recently post-pastoral themes as a framework for comparing real pastoral discourse represented in Arvanitic texts to gain insight into the historical and cultural identity of this specific population (Gifford, 1999, 2012).

Pastoral Themes

There are similar pastoral themes running through Arvanitic texts as compared to those in the ancient literature and in particular the motifs they both share. First, in Arvanitic songs the major motifs in order of importance are love, singing and dancing, feasts, shepherding, poverty and lament (Moraitis, 2002). The majority of songs are by far the love songs. Theocritus' use of amoebae exchanges as a literary device is mostly seen in this motif. Also, in Arvanitic prose there are significant similar pastoral elements with motifs that revolve around agro-pastoralist life (Giochalias, 2011). It is through these similar motifs we can draw conclusions of the cultural and historical continuity of this oral tradition since ancient times. However, the main difference in Arvanitic texts compared to those of the traditional genre is that they do not follow Theocritus' model with the use of idealized, theoretical and philosophical language with an elite audience in mind. On the contrary, Arvanitic texts are characterized by language that is simple, laconic, authentic, and practical and whose aim is to represent life as it is and not a perfect or better reality. For example, in the traditional genre, pastoral themes are characterized by the idealization of nature and the portrayal of an "unproblematic" life depicting "order, stability and agreed values" (Gifford, 2012, p.12). However, an analysis of Arvanitic texts does not provide evidence of idealized or elevated language to describe nature. The only elevated language used is in Arvanitic love songs for women who are the objects of longing but sometimes also of violence. Idealized language is seen only in the references made to their natural beauty via analogy to flowers, fruit, trees and birds. Therefore, whereas Theocritus uses literary devices in order to lend verisimilitude to his pastoral texts, the essence of authentic, pastoralist texts is the real world. Also, even though in the fairy tales we see the use of the common archetype of rags to riches concept where virtue, fate and God's providence are the main axioms, they do so with the use of pastoral elements and in a language which are down to earth and true to life (Karantis, 2001).

Anti-Pastoral Themes

The pastoral genre developed with the introduction of anti-pastoral themes in the literature as a response by some writers who "wanted to correct the idealization of the pastoral by presenting counter evidence that emphasizes the opposite features in a gritty 'realism'" (Gifford, 2012, p.18). Therefore, the features of anti-pastoral literature can be summed up as the opposite of those of the pastoral described above. It is characterized by an "unidealized" reality of nature by depicting its harsh and unattractive side. It emphasizes 'realism' and portrays life as "problematic" by showing its tensions, disorder and inequalities as well as "demythologizing" Arcadia (p.18). Anti-pastoral themes in Arvanitic texts can be seen via references to poverty. However, poverty in Arvanitic texts has a different quality than that of gritty realism. Poverty in Arvanitic texts is a romanticized symbol of virtue and fate. Instead of representing negative notions of social inequality, poverty is the social equalizer in Arvanitic texts. Another example of an anti-pastoral theme is the use of course language which is typical of the 'peasant' described in *The Characters of Theophrastus*³. Both of these anti-pastoral elements can be found in all three types of Arvanitic texts be it the songs, fairy tales or prose.

¹ See Kritikos (2015) for historical review of the documentation of Arvanitic.

² For Giochalias' other publications see (<http://www.worldcat.org/identities/lccn-n86-91524/>).

³ (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0225%3Achapter%3D4>)

Post-Pastoral Themes

The new term “post-pastoral” was introduced in the literature in response to the need of a holistic approach in light of modern science and eco-ethics emphasizing “the urgent need for responsibility” (Gifford, 1999, p.149, 2012). Post-pastoral texts are concerned with some of the most crucial questions of our time which involve our obligation to and relationship with our planet. Post-pastoral themes address the “creative-destructive forces of nature; awareness of the culturally loaded language we use about the country; accepting responsibility for our relationship with nature and its dilemmas; recognition that the exploitation of nature is often accompanied by the exploitation of the less powerful people who work with it, visit it or less obviously depend upon its resources” (Gifford, 2012, p.6). These basic features of post-pastoral literature are also echoed in another modern frame called ‘ecocriticism’ which takes an ethical stand and stresses “its commitment to the natural world as an important thing rather than simply as an object of thematic study and, secondly, by its commitment to making connections” (Estok, 2005, p. 16-17). The first post-pastoral themes in Arvanitic texts are recorded in Arvanitic prose collected through the documentation of the language for the intrinsic value of the knowledge systems of the Arvanitic speaking population (Giochallas, 2011). These include knowledge systems that revolve around agro-pastoralist life such as: shepherding, farming, animal husbandry, dairying, viticulture, bread making, weaving, natural remedies and gathering of wild edibles to name but a few.

Motivated by ecocriticism, this paper proposes to add a new term to the whole pastoral genre to include “pro-pastoral”. This would involve research to collect texts that would not only address the moral obligation to reexamine our relationship with the environment but also be a basis for action by reintroducing pastoral discourse in political dialogue. This discourse along with its values was lost due to urbanization, industrialization and alienation from the earth. The collection of texts with pro-pastoral themes would not only provide a valuable record of these communities along with their language that are in danger of disappearing but also provide viable models to be used in educational, social and political spheres in support of their preservation and revival.

PRO-PASTORAL THEMES IN RURAL DISCOURSE: A CASE STUDY.

The Agro-pastoral Community of Zarakas

The small, rural community of Zarakas in southern Laconia, Greece is one of the last communities in Greece where Arvanitic⁴ is still spoken. Due to the fact that it was isolated, remote and endocentric and therefore not affected by modernization until recently it has also managed to preserve its old way of life characterized by transhumant pastoralism.⁵ In regard to the language question in Zarakas, “‘language’ and ‘identity’ are not necessarily linked phenomena” (Bastardas-Boada, 2012, p. 103). It has been documented that the speakers of Arvanitic in Zarakas were from all over Greece from Epirus all the way down to Crete and clearly of Greek ethnicity and therefore it cannot be considered a marker neither of origin nor of a distinct ethnicity (Alexakis, 2012). What it has been is “a marker of traditional character, authenticity, village roots, and community life” (Hart, 1992, p.49). Also, generalizations to the greater population in Greece cannot be made based on this sample alone as not all people who speak Arvanitic in Greece are transhumant pastoralists. It has been well documented that speakers of Arvanitic have also been seafarers and city dwellers and many have been part of mainstream society through the ages to the present (Biris, 1960; Kollias, 1983). The intrinsic value of the language’s documentation apart from its linguistic record is the traditional knowledge which is stored within. A record of the spatial identity of this population at its grassroots will shed light on the values and beliefs which are intrinsically and inextricably tied to the land’s characteristics, functions

⁴ See Kritikos (2015) for report.

⁵ “Transhumant pastoralism is a traditional economic activity practiced in particular in mountain regions involving the seasonal movement of domestic herds between altitudinally differentiated and complementary pastures. Pastoralism is the predominant activity in the economy but there is a varying emphasis on agriculture as a supplementary activity” (Arnold &Haskel, 2006a ,p. 244).

and symbols in this community. Texts collected through ethnographic research in the framework of documentary linguistics are analyzed via discourse analysis. Texts included interviews, dialogs, narratives, descriptions, songs and poems collected both through field work and library and archival research. I argue that the cultural identity of this particular community is intimately based in spatial values produced and transmitted through interaction in socio-spatial spheres, and rooted in the cultural landscape; subsistence economy; ethnobiological knowledge systems; land based rituals, activities, sequences and rhythms of life; and a history of spatial mobility. These form the context of the pro-pastoral themes to be discussed below which need to be introduced in political discourse to support the preservation and revival of the cultural identity of this community as well as similar others throughout the European periphery.

Cultural Landscape

Zarakas has been inhabited since ancient times as witnessed by its archaeological and historical record of which the earliest yet known dates the area to circa 1100 BC (Alexaki, 1985). It is an area almost impenetrable with steep cliffs leading to the sea, gorges, very few valleys and lack of running water. It is for this very reason it was most suitable for those seeking refuge against invasions in the area throughout the ages. Continuity from the distant past is discerned in the landscape, with its ancient olive trees, donkey trails, terraced foothills, orchards, vineyards and fields plotted by low stone walls as well as ruins from all periods in history. All these make up the cultural landscape reminding the inhabitants that they too are just one link in a long succession of ancestors who have walked on the same paths, tilled the same land and weathered the same elements as those before them for millennia. The locals' subsistence up until recently was strictly and intimately tied to the land uniting history in an unbroken sequence of survival (Kolen and Renes, 2015).

The settlement pattern in Zarakas is characteristic of the "eleftherochoria" or "free villages" which were the perfect refuges in the Greek territory during Ottoman rule which intensified during the revolution of 1821 (Alexaki, 1985). Initially settling in the highlands, Zarakas' inhabitants came from all over Greece; in and around Laconia, the islands of Hydra, Spetses and Crete as well as populations from Epirus. The revolution and the creation of the Greek state marked the beginning of the economic and cultural decline of the mountain territories in Greece. The first signs of descent from the highlands to the lowlands are of the transhumant pastoralists who begin to permanently settle into their winter pasturelands. Characteristic of these hamlets is the fact that the graveyard church lies outside their perimeter. The first houses were primitive huts called 'tourles' initially used as temporary makeshift homes. Initially, these homes shared space with the animals with a single entrance for both. Later they separated the animals with a separate entrance as well as further divisions to separate the functions of family life with those of agricultural activity. These homes developed into neighborhoods signifying the family clans of the village, "an agnatic clustering of households" called the "soi" (Hart, 1985, p. 182). Historically, Zarakas consists of twelve villages each still with a strong sense of local identity and pride (Hart, 1992, p. 21). Even though in the local discourse the land is associated with an arduous life with the mountains being called "impassable", "bitter", "barren" and so on, it is also invoked in more romantic terms as the source of a strong character and a purity based on closeness to the birds and animals, exposure to wind and rain and proximity to the sky. Apart from refuge, the mountains provide fodder for the sheep and goats and are the source of wild greens that are an important element in the locals' diet.

However, modernization has led to a decrease in agro-pastoral activity as discerned in the cultural landscape. There are fewer and fewer shepherds with their flocks and watchdogs as well as their goat folds and temporary huts visible in the region. Large areas are now overgrown with shrubs which cover the old donkey trails and footpaths that once were trodden. This makes it almost impossible to reach agricultural zones which were utilized in the past. As a result, many olive groves and fields are deserted and having grown wild now lay in waste. These characteristics are all components of a landscape sought both by tourists as well as the residents. Hidden in the landscape are sites of historical and environmental importance embedded in the local knowledge. This knowledge which has been passed down across and within generations while herding and foraging needs to be recorded through community-based mapping schemes before it is lost forever. - The European Landscape Convention (ELC) which came into force in 2004 is an initiative whose aim is to raise the awareness of the value of cultural landscape along with the socio-spatial factors which support it. It is a convention with which

policymakers need to engage in order to support the protection, management and planning of all cultural landscapes in Europe. Those in settings such as Zarakas are of particular importance for future rural sustainable development.

Spatial Mobility

Spatial mobility in the rural community of Zarakas is dependent on temporal and socio-spatial factors which include for example geographic knowledge, access to land, livestock mobility, availability of natural resources and social contacts. The portion of the population traveling with the domestic herds are limited to the men and older boys in each household while the women and girls remain in the village to tend to all other chores such as farming, foraging and housework. The pattern of movement basically consists of one village that acts as a base and a collection of transient settlements both for long and short distance movements. The transhumant migrations involve horizontal long-distance journeys in the winter months to escape the harsh cold winter in the highlands and up back again to the village in the summer to escape high temperatures and provide sufficient water and pasturage. There are also vertical, short distance journeys outside of the village throughout the year. However, in the past when the population of the area increased, herds had to be moved even farther away from settlements in order to find sufficient forage that many times reached all the way down to the Vatika, today known as Neapolis, in the southern tip of Laconia.

Historically, due to the rough, impregnable terrain of Zarakas, the shepherds were forced to graze their herds through mountain trails on foot. Because there was no other transportation system in the area until recently a lot of the traditional ecological knowledge⁶ (TEK) which would have been lost otherwise has been retained by the older generation. However, transhumance by foot has seen a decline as the footpaths began to be replaced by road systems. They are not being used as much not only due to the modernization of transportation which has led to the abandonment of transhumance on foot but also in general due to the decline of pastoralism in the area⁷. To make matters worse, donkeys which once helped keep up the old trails have all but disappeared and due to their low supply would now involve a major reinvestment for the revival of their use. Therefore, the footpaths and donkey trails are slowly being overgrown by shrub and disappearing together with the biodiversity and TEK that go along with these routes. Apart from their ecological importance, there are also economic incentives to continue using these routes. Walking the drove is an efficient way to reduce transportation costs and feeding expenses. For these reasons, the continuity of socio-spatial practices and traditional modes of mobility in these small, rural communities is vital for their sustainable development.

Pro-pastoral discourse that includes notions of space, flows, mobility, land access, transportation infrastructure and polycentric development must be addressed in rural spatial planning policies in order to protect the continuity of spatial mobility in these areas. The community's socio-spatial knowledge needs to be recorded through participatory mapping schemes to become both "a field of action and ... a basis for action" (Jensen & Richardson, 2004, p. 43). This includes knowledge not only of land routes and boundaries but also traditional natural resource management practices as well as environmental hazards. The protection of rural spatial mobility is in line with the goals of EU spatial planning as stated through the Leipzig principles⁸. These principles are summed up as "a policy triangle of economic and social cohesion, sustainable development and balanced competitiveness". This entails "a new urban-rural partnership "based on a "balanced and polycentric" system while "securing parity of access to infrastructure and knowledge" and ensuring "prudent management and protection of nature and cultural heritage" (p. 72).

Ethnobiological Knowledge Systems

Zarakas has been chosen as a Site of Community Importance and has been designated as a Special Area of Conservation under the Directive on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora of Natura 2000⁹ which is a network of [nature protection areas in](#) the territory of the [European](#)

⁶ "The cumulative body of knowledge, practices, and beliefs regarding the relationships of living things to their environment that evolves by adaptive processes and is handed down through generations" (Oteros-Rozas, 2013).

⁷ See Oteros-Rozas (2013) for a comparative study in Spain.

⁸ Established by the ESDP (European Spatial Development Perspective in Leipzig, (CSD, 1994).

⁹ (<http://natura2000.eea.europa.eu/#> [29.08.2016])

[Union](#) (Bousbouras, 2007). Primary linguistic research in the area would assist in the collection of data of local ethnobiological knowledge systems encoded in the language, customs and practices of the locals. This record is essential not only for its preservation for future generations but also to raise the awareness of the ecological importance of pastoral systems along with the valued landscapes and biodiversity they maintain (Kerven & Behnke, 2011).

Agro-pastoralists' special ethnobiological knowledge comes from their close connection to the land and reliance upon numerous ecosystems for their survival. This involves the knowledge of agriculture, nutrition, health, diet properties of different foods, food preparation, medicinal plants, horticulture, natural resource management and biodiversity all of which have been passed down orally from generation to generation. As "Article 31" of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states¹⁰:

Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures ... They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions. (p. 11)

Therefore, it is important that the community take an active role in documentation with the assistance of experts in order to create community databases that they will own, access and manage themselves for their own interest and benefit ensuring that the knowledge is passed down to future generations. This would support the efforts of the EU Biodiversity Strategy¹¹ which aims to prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services in the EU by 2020.

Socio-spatial Spheres

Agro-pastoral, kinship-based communities such as Zarakas have their own socio-spatial spheres where tradition, oral history and knowledge are passed down from generation to generation. The main socio-spatial sphere is the family which usually consists of grandparents and sometimes even great grandparents who are the primary caregivers and play an important role in the passing down of values and traditions as well as acting as role models and mentors. The children are active from a young age in all spheres of family life working as one unit. This involves learning about livestock, natural resource management as well traditional ecological knowledge. Another important socio-spatial sphere is nature itself with which children interact at a young age, that is, with the flora, fauna and the elements which shape their experience and perception of the world. Contact with nature is important in a child's healthy physical, psychological and cognitive growth and development as they gain knowledge and appreciation of the natural world in order to become environmentally responsible adults. The socialization of children through contact with nature but also watching older people in contact with nature as role models helps them build an identity which is not separate from nature. This helps develop environmental values as well as increasing their empathy, respect and a positive attitude towards nature in general. These socio-spatial spheres are being dislocated due to the abandonment of the land and changing family dynamics which has led to a whole generation lost in this life chain. It is necessary to bridge the gaps created to ensure that the transfer of knowledge and values is passed down to the next generation. Documentation of these spheres is also important as they provide viable models for replication in other social spheres such as education and community development.

Subsistence Economy and Sustainable Development

The agro-pastoral economy of Zarakas is based on a domestic mode of production where the basic economic group is the autonomous, self-sufficient household and labor is predominantly divided by gender. Economic activity revolves around the annual agricultural cycle which is integrated with the ritual calendar made up of religious observances, fasts and feasts. Land based rituals, activities, sequences and rhythms of life have been organized around this ritual calendar since ancient times. Hart (1992) explains that "the annual production cycles of agricultural work (sowing, harvesting, pruning,

¹⁰ (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf)

¹¹ http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/strategy/index_en.htm

vintaging, gathering of fruits) and stockbreeding activities (shearing, breeding, milking, pasturing) [compose] an economic calendar” that is “integrated with the Christian pantheon and narratives” (p.228).

Traditionally, the predominant economic activity in Zarakas has been transhumant pastoralism supplemented by small scale farming. Transhumance involves the seasonal movement of livestock between cool highland pastures in the summer and warmer lowland valleys in the winter to exploit the seasonal availability of grazelands. It is not only an efficient livelihood strategy as it “encourages exploitation of minimally utilized highland zones less suited for agriculture” but an essential component in High Nature Value (HNV) farmland for which Zarakas has been identified (Arnold and Greenfield, 2006, p. 243). HNV farmland involves low-intensity farming systems and traditional practices intimately linked with the wildlife and habitats that have developed alongside them for thousands of years making pastoralism an activity of the highest ecological importance. It is a concept developed from the growing recognition that the conservation of biodiversity in mountain eco-systems depends on the continuation of both pastoralism and sustainable agriculture (Dimalexis et al, 2013).

However, the agro-pastoralists of Zarakas face many difficulties that have put their lifestyle in jeopardy. The difficult working conditions along with the negative perceptions accompanying this work as being solitary and poverty stricken deters the younger generation to continue this way of life. Since the land is not suitable for more intensive farming, with the abandonment of pastoralism comes the total abandonment of the land. This leads to the loss of the land’s high nature value as shrub overgrowth and eventually reforestation leads to the loss of biodiversity made up of fragile flora and fauna in the area. Also, modernization combined with higher levels of education led to language shift from Arvanitic to Modern Greek which has resulted in the former language’s total loss. Bastardas-Boada (2012) explains that a positive cultural identity associated with a language is vital for its survival. He says that this “will lead the person to identify with given cultural, symbolic and behavioral models that will acquire pre-eminence, and which s/he will aspire to conserve and develop” which is a phenomenon in reverse in the present case (p. 21). Therefore, along with the lifestyle has come the end of the language whose revival, in the case of Zarakas, is unrealistic as there are fewer than ten speakers left in the area. The desertion of the village in order to seek a better life in the city and even abroad has led to depopulation of the area which “has produced a surplus of land which cannot be worked by the remaining population” (Hart, 1992, p.68). If not supported by all the family members the work is much too strenuous for only one or two members of the family to do. Many times there is no room to hire outside help usually in the form of foreign labor in order to support the continuation of agro-pastoral activity. All these factors have contributed to the loss of the socio-spatial spheres discussed above and particularly the last two generations who, having abandoned this lifestyle or even having cut ties to the village altogether, are not passing this knowledge down to the next generation.

Despite these difficulties, the economic crisis in Greece may provide an opportunity for a rural renaissance. Pro-pastoralist discourse needs to be reintroduced in policymaking not only to support and promote this lifestyle but also to motivate migration back to the village. Even though it is important to preserve traditional farming practices for the reasons mentioned above, this should not mean a return to a medieval world of subsistence farming. Agro-pastoral productivity needs to be improved through increased investment in sustainable models of rural development. This involves integrating local traditional knowledge with biotechnology research and the development of rural infrastructure combined with decentralized and transparent funding and trade policies. Even though pastoralism is actively supported in the EU with funds distributed to farmers through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) there has been a lot of criticism that the greater part of the funds go to a small number of large industrial farming conglomerates and fewer to small scale farmers who represent the majority of the agricultural sector.

A bottom-up strategy is needed to empower small scale subsistence farmers to manage their own land and resources to ensure food security and future sustainability as they have done so for centuries as dictated by local rules and customs. With the right support, subsistence farming has the potential to lead to upscale commercial farming meeting local and/or domestic demand as well as for export where there is a competitive advantage. Agro-pastoral activity is vital not only for sustainable development but provides added value to the community through complementary and supplementary activities that contribute to the growth of the local economy and ultimately to the gross domestic product. Agro-pastoralism is intrinsically tied to the cultural landscape and traditional knowledge systems which draws eco-tourism. This provides a market for local crafts, products, cultural activities and accommodation (Kerven & Behnke, 2011). A record of local traditional subsistence systems such as

Zarakas is essential in order to develop models to meet some of the economic, social and environmental goals of rural sustainable development addressed in the European agenda today.

CONCLUSION

Agro-pastoralism has been the root of European culture and identity for millennia. This is not only attested through the genetic, archaeological and linguistic record but also through pastoral themes running through the oral traditions and histories of its native populations and which have influenced European civilization for ages. Its special contribution to the economy, environment, culture and society need to be recognized by policymakers to ensure its preservation. Documentation of the spatial identity of underrepresented rural communities throughout the European periphery provides the context for planning and policy. This framework is also useful for documentary linguists conducting research with rural populations without a codified language through which valuable local knowledge, values and beliefs have been transmitted across and within generations. This discourse along with its values is being lost due to modernization and alienation from the earth. One such example is Zarakas which provides an important case study of a socially, economically and politically marginalized community in the EU periphery whose linguistic, cultural and spatial identity is disappearing. It is argued that even though viable models of sustainable development should not imply a return to archaic farming practices, it is vital that agro-pastoral activity is modernized without losing its traditional form. These very traditional communities at the edge of society are central to a common cultural and historical European identity with which we need to reconnect to address some of the global challenges humanity faces today.

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Discursive and Visual Construction of Internal Borders. Analysis of advertisement samples from Italy, Greece and the UK in the framework of the EU Project RADAR

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ABSTRACT

For centuries the word “race” as a biological notion, has been applied to human beings, creating borders and barriers between continents and countries. Even though this notion has been declared as scientifically incorrect, the idea itself still continues to exist as a social construction dividing humanity into superior and inferior beings. This idea eventually led to the phenomenon of racism (in the 1920’s), a phenomenon which is of extreme importance at the moment in which the EU is facing the challenge of continuous immigration accompanied by racist (re)actions. While there is extensive literature on racist ideologies and beliefs, further scientific reflection is necessary concerning how racism and xenophobia are communicatively constructed through mass media devices such as advertisements. We are showing this through three samples of advertisement pictures (one from the UK, one from Greece, one from Italy) and two advertisement videos (one from Greece and one from Italy).

Keywords: racism, hate communication, advertisement, hate-oriented communication practices, hate-producing communication practices, hidden messages, anti-racist training tools

INTRODUCTION

For centuries the word “race” as a biological notion, has been applied to human beings, creating borders and barriers between continents and countries. In this meaning the term is used for the first time in 1684 by the French physician, philosopher and traveller François Bernier. In 1735, Carl von Linné, a Swedish botanist and physician uses the term to divide humans into different “races” based on their colour of skin distinguishing between white (Europeans), red (Americans), yellow (Asians) and black (Africans) (Goodman, Moses, & Jones, 2012, p. 42). Even though this notion has been declared as scientifically incorrect¹, the idea itself still continues to exist as a social construction dividing humanity into superior and inferior beings. In the 1920’s, this idea eventually led to the phenomenon of racism, a phenomenon which is of extreme importance at the moment in which the EU is facing the challenge of continuous immigration accompanied by racist (re)actions. While there is extensive literature on racist ideologies and beliefs, further scientific reflection is necessary concerning how racism and xenophobia are communicatively constructed through mass media devices such as advertisements.

How do advertisement videos and pictures convey, directly or indirectly, prejudice, racism and xenophobia? Which sociological, political, economic and cultural attitudes are reflected? What possible impact can they have in culture and society? These questions are at the focus of the RADAR “Regulating AntiDiscrimination and AntiRacism” EU Justice project (JUST/2013/FRAC/AG/6271).

The present contribution concentrates on advertisements as a valuable primary source for gathering information about practices, values and beliefs of a certain society², since “In public opinion and in the

¹ See the latest publication on this issue in Italy: *Addio alla razza* (2016).

² Berger (2015)

mass media there is still a tendency to argue and judge in racist terms.”³ The aim is to present training tools⁴ for their analysis intended to overcome racism and develop an anti-racist attitude through the acquisition of an anti-racist communication competence (cf. Dossou & Klein, 2016b; Klein, 2016). Three samples of advertisement pictures (one from the UK, one from Greece, one from Italy) and two advertisement videos (one from Greece and one from Italy) are here presented to exemplify these tools and their analysis will ultimately lead to identify how hate, xenophobia and racism are supported and even constructed by verbal messages (words and discourses), paraverbal messages (voice), non-verbal messages (body language) and visual messages (images) (Dossou, Klein & Ravenda, 2016; Heller, 1997).

In each of the different communication processes we can distinguish between communication technique, procedure and strategy, based on a distinction made in Conversation Analysis (see Klein, 2006, pp. 225-226 & 343). These three concepts can be also transferred to a wider communicational activity, highlighting different aspects of the same identified communication object. Technique means the implementation of a communication phenomenon, made by the communicator (what is used: a word, a sentence, a picture, a particular tone of voice, a gesture, a gaze, a symbol, an image etc.); the definition of procedure, in this broader sense, highlights the method of implementation of a technique in its sequential and contextual development (how, where and when the technique is used); the term strategy highlights the method of reaching a specific communicative purpose (why the technique is used).

ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISEMENT PICTURES

The present section provides an analysis of three pictures of commercial advertisement from the UK (advertisement picture 1⁵), Greece (advertisement picture 2⁶) and Italy (advertisement picture 3 analysed by⁷).⁸

³ “Nell’opinione pubblica e nei mass media persiste la propensione a ragionare e giudicare in termini razzisti.” (http://www.parlarecivile.it/argomenti/immigrazione/razza.aspx#_ftn3)

⁴http://lnx.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/htdocs/radar.communicationproject.eu/home/dokeos/main/document/document.php?cidReq=RAD01&curdirpath=%2FANALYTICAL_TOOLS

⁵ Analysed by Eloisa Monteoliva with the contribution of Katerina Strani:

http://lnx.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/htdocs/radar.communicationproject.eu/home/dokeos/main/document/document.php?cidReq=RAD01&action=download&id=%2FCOMMUNICATION_PRACTICES%2FADVERTISEMENT_PICTURES%2FRADAR_ANALYSING_AD_PICTURES_UK.pdf (registration required)

⁶ Analysed by Maria Fountana with the contribution of Stavroula Sokoli, Kelly Bibiri, Frank Diahou, Koffi Dossou and Gabriella B. Klein:

http://lnx.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/htdocs/radar.communicationproject.eu/home/dokeos/main/document/document.php?cidReq=RAD01&action=download&id=%2FCOMMUNICATION_PRACTICES%2FADVERTISEMENT_PICTURES%2FRADAR_ANALYSING_AD_PICTURES_GR.pdf (registration required)

⁷ Analysed by Koffi M. Dossou with the contribution of Franck Diahou and Gabriella B. Klein:

http://lnx.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/htdocs/radar.communicationproject.eu/home/dokeos/main/document/document.php?cidReq=RAD01&action=download&id=%2FCOMMUNICATION_PRACTICES%2FADVERTISEMENT_PICTURES%2FRADAR_ANALYSING_AD_PICTURES_IT.pdf (registration required)

⁸ For more examples see:

http://lnx.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/htdocs/radar.communicationproject.eu/home/dokeos/main/document/document.php?cidReq=RAD01&curdirpath=%2FCOMMUNICATION_PRACTICES%2FADVERTISEMENT_PICTURES (registration required)

Some Notting Hill folk were born to dance – Others to sell flats

In *urban75 blog* the comment to this ad reads: “Looking like something straight out of the 1970s is the offensive piece of advertising by estate agents Strutt & Parker, as seen on the London Underground today. Apparently, in Notting Hill, black people are ‘born to dance’, whereas white people – particularly those with the name Jeremy Montagu-Williams – are born to ‘sell flats’.”

Notting Hill estate agents Strutt & Parker posted in London⁹



In the present picture we may note a process of denigration. The denigration process is made up of the following technique, procedure and strategy.

Through the technique “some are born to dance and some others to sell flats” a deterministic relationship is established between some ability and a specific ethnic group.

The procedure consists of the advertisement claim dividing clearly the two different worlds of dancers and real estate sellers, evidenced by a dividing line in the middle of the picture (Dossou & Klein, 2016a, p. 41).

The strategy of this ad is to reduce the subjectivity of each person in a generalisation on the basis of ethno-cultural or national backgrounds.

For a more detailed analysis, we apply here a specific model of learning path implemented with the objective of guiding the observer through a step-by-step analysis to uncover the hidden messages and to get a deeper understanding of how such communication mechanisms work. Based on decades of training experience in visual communication, Dossou, K.M.¹⁰ has designed this model for the RADAR project aimed at the communication product of advertisement pictures (Dossou & Klein, 2016b, 18-19).

Analysis of Advertisement Picture 1

PRODUCT, SERVICE OR EVENT	
(1) What does the picture advertise?	This is an advertisement of Strutt&Parker, an Estate Agency based in Notting-Hill/London (England). The goal of this campaign was to reflect the diversity and vibrancy of the Notting Hill area.

⁹ <http://www.urban75.org/blog/utterly-moronic-racist-nonsense-advertising-by-notting-hill-estate-agents-strutt-parker/>

¹⁰ Some of the categorial questions Dossou adopted are taken from Berger © 2015, Used with Permission. Some different categorial questions have been elaborated for other communication products, such as advertisement videos, propaganda pictures and propaganda videos, social media posts, and talk shows (see Dossou & Klein, 2016b).

(2) List the information the advertisement provides. Describe what you see.	<p>The advertising is visually divided into two sections.</p> <p>On the left, a man with a darker skin colour dancing, dressed in a casual way, and a text beside says: "Some Notting Hill folks were born to dance."</p> <p>On the right, another man with a lighter skin colour, dressed in a formal suit and standing straight, with a text beside him saying: "Others to sell flats."</p>
ADVERTISING STRATEGY	
(3) Does it essentially provide information or does it try to generate some kind of emotional response? Or both?	<p>Even though it might not have been the aim of the campaign, it generates more emotional than informative responses. Having a closer look at it, the first reaction it provides is that it is about a racist stereotype, and technically speaking, it creates a feeling of isolation, separation, through its layout structure.</p>
(4) How does the advertisement attempt to get your attention or try to convince you?	<p>The advertisement draws one's attention immediately to diversity discrimination and is not convincing either to trust this estate agency or to live at Notting-Hill.</p>
DESIGN	
(5) What is the general atmosphere of the advertisement?	<p>The advertisement has a calm ambience with a little focus on the right of the poster, due to the red rectangle giving a certain weight and stability to the right side of the poster.</p>
(6) What mood does it create? How does it do this?	<p>It can create a mood of anger through the way it is visually communicating with the position of the two subjects which conveys an emotion of isolation and categorization.</p>
(7) What action is taking place in the advertisement? What does it mean?	<p>We notice two different postures from the only two actors of the advert: on one hand, one energetically dancing and, on the other hand, one very calm with a relaxed posture.</p>
(8) Observe the way colour or lack of colour is used in the advert. Describe the effect different colours in the advertisement can have.	<p>Observing the advert, one can notice a quiet mood given by the use of colours.</p> <p>An empty background with the brand colour (red) which is little used on the poster. The use of this colour on the advert was purposely done to draw attention to the right side of the poster, where the logo is placed. The seller's tie has the same colour of the logo.</p>
(9) Observe the form of the images in the picture. Whether an image has clearly defined lines and boundaries representing a real object or has no defined shape, can communicate very different ideas and emotions. Address the reasons why the	<p>There is no external border, which means openness toward the external world, but the picture is divided by a line, thus dividing two different worlds.</p>

image has or does not have clearly defined shapes.	
(10) What does the background tell us? Where are actions taking place and/or components located and what significance does this background have?	This advert is very straightforward because of the white background, to draw focus on the content.
(11) How is space used in the advertisement? Is there a lot of 'white space' or is it full of graphic and written elements?	It is airy with the white space and background, making the message to convey accessible to everybody.
(12) How are the basic components or elements arranged?	The advert highlights especially two people with different origins, professions, moods.
(13) What is the relationship between pictorial elements and written material and what does this tell you?	The typeface used and the positions reveal the straightforwardness of the message.
(14) What techniques are used by the copywriter (humour, definitions of life, comparisons, sexual innuendo, and so on)?	The copywriter used comparisons; the picture defines two different lifestyles.
(15) What typefaces are used and what impressions do they convey?	It is a combination of an elegant serif font (playfair display) and a sans-serif font (helvetica narrow-light). These awaken the feeling of tranquillity above all with the elegant serif font, giving a sense of royalty and wellness.
(16) If there are figures (men, women, children, animals), what are they like?	Two men are shown but they are dressed differently with different poses; while the man on the left is joyfully posing in sporty dress, the other is standing straight, dressed in a formal suit.
(17) What signs and symbols do you find? What role do they play in the advertisement's impact?	One can notice that the one on the left is a professional dancer and the one on the right is an estate agent.
(18) What can be said about their facial expressions, poses, hairstyle, age, sex, hair colour, ethnicity, education, occupation, relationships (of one to the other)?	Both are smiling, no relationship between the two men.
ADVERTISING STRATEGY	
(19) Take note of your gut reaction to the picture after your thorough analysis. Address how the various elements came together to help form your initial impressions and how your analysis either strengthened or weakened your initial impressions.	One can notice an ambiguity from the general theme of the advertising picture. In fact, here are two distinct situations: an informal and a formal one; the informal setting is characterised by a casually-dressed man in a dancing posture, whereas the formal setting is characterised by a formally-suited man in an immobile posture (which is a social model nowadays). The structure of the layout leads the viewer's eye from left to right, giving a sort of a chronological judgement from first step to final step, thus showing the better setting on the right.

(20) What theme or themes do you find in the advertisement? What is it about?	It is about selling houses and flats. It thematises the division between different ethnic and professional groups, in particular between black dancers and white real estate sellers.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS	
(21) Does the advertisement directly or indirectly, reflect racism, prejudice, sexism, alienation, stereotyped thinking, conformity, generational conflict, loneliness, or elitism?	The advertisement reflects directly a racist elitism regarding people of darker skin colour.
(22) What role can the advertisement play in the country's culture and society?	This advertisement can awaken hate in the society and divide people.
(23) What sociological, political, economic or cultural attitudes are indirectly reflected in the advertisement?	'Black' people are accepted if rich and famous.
(24) And how can this create hate? Do you find it intensive or moderate?	It creates hate based on this marginalisation message it is conveying.
(25) What would you change about the advertisement?	It would have been better if there were more than two people showing different somatic traits referring typically to different ethno-cultural or national backgrounds and they were not separated on the poster layout.

Chocolate Factory and Chocolate Museum at Maroussi

Here you can see two pictures from an online article advertising the opening of a chocolate factory and Museum in Athens, Greece.

It seems to be rare for Greek products to be advertised by actors from countries of Asia or Africa. However, this is not the case in the chocolate factory. Normally, this would not draw any attention, since it seems absolutely normal for chocolate to be advertised by people from the countries of cocoa's origins. However, could there be a stereotype? We may see a connection between chocolate and the colour of the skin. Yet, if this is the case, is this insulting in some way or even racist? Furthermore, what about the fact that the woman is the worker and the man the entertainer?

Opening of the Chocolate Factory and Chocolate Museum at Maroussi¹¹



From a deeper analysis we can notice a process of patronisation:

The technique used lies in showing a woman with over-emphasised African traits wearing a work dress, standing behind a male musician with 'typical' European traits, and looking up to him.

¹¹ <http://news.in.gr/culture/article/?aid=1500037019>

The procedure consists of the picture advertising a chocolate museum.

The strategy is to trigger a subordination process of a 'black' woman towards a 'white' man (Dossou, & Klein, 2016a, p. 51).

Analysis of Advertisement Picture 2

PRODUCT, SERVICE OR EVENT	
(1) What does the picture advertise?	The opening of the chocolate factory and chocolate museum at Maroussi.
(2) List the information the advertisement provides. Describe what you see.	A huge chocolate bar with information about the company that produces it, a woman who wears a costume which probably makes her a member of the staff of the museum, or maybe part of a theatrical activity – acting as a cook / pastry maker – and a man playing music, who is a TV personality starring in cooking shows.
ADVERTISING STRATEGY	
(3) Does it essentially provide information or does it try to generate some kind of emotional response? Or both?	Both: Information is provided about chocolate and its origins. It also creates a happy atmosphere.
(4) How does the advertisement attempt to get your attention or try to convince you?	Bright colours, huge chocolate bar as a delicacy, nice people looking happy and enjoying themselves through some musical event.
DESIGN	
(5) What is the general atmosphere of the advertisement?	Happiness, entertainment, joy.
(6) What mood does it create? How does it do this?	It aims to cause joy and relaxation. By the bright scene set up with joyful dominant colours (yellow, pink and red) and the ambience felt by their gestures and facial expression.
(7) What action is taking place in the advertisement? What does it mean?	One European-looking man plays music and probably sings and one African-looking woman wears a costume as if she is having a break from her chocolate factory duties. She participates in the event by playing some music herself or by just enjoying the event.
(8) Observe the way colour or lack of colour is used in the advert. Describe the effect different colours in the advertisement can have.	This is a picture from the actual chocolate factory so the colours shown in the picture are the actual colours of the place where the picture was taken. We can notice in these pictures bright and joyful colours (yellow and pink) which are the dominant colours on the scene and have a psychological effect on the viewer, communicating happiness. The dim lights also give a sense of relaxation.
(9) Observe the form of the images in the picture. Whether an image has clearly defined lines and	One picture includes an oversized replica of an actual chocolate product. The pictures have

boundaries representing a real object or has no defined shape, can communicate very different ideas and emotions. Address the reasons why the image has or does not have clearly defined shapes.	clearly defined shapes that represent real objects such as musical instruments and a chocolate bar. The images are vivid to highlight the meaning of the advert message.
(10) What does the background tell us? Where are actions taking place and/or components located and what significance does this background have?	The action takes place within the chocolate factory and museum.
(11) How is space used in the advertisement? Is there a lot of 'white space' or is it full of graphic and written elements?	Not applicable.
(12) How are the basic components or elements arranged?	The white man is on the left in both pictures and in one of the two pictures he sits on top of a counter, therefore higher than the black woman.
(13) What is the relationship between pictorial elements and written material and what does this tell you?	Not applicable.
(14) What techniques are used by the copywriter (humour, definitions of life, comparisons, sexual innuendo, and so on)?	Not applicable
(15) What typefaces are used and what impressions do they convey?	Not applicable
(16) If there are figures (men, women, children, animals), what are they like?	Answer summarised in next question.
(17) What signs and symbols do you find? What role do they play in the advertisement's impact?	<p>- The cook: the African-looking woman occupies the secondary position in terms of professions. She is clearly on the scene but she does not appear as the main subject even though she is the main agent of the chocolate production.</p> <p>- The musician: In both ads the musician appears as a leader, from his physical position to his non-verbal communication conveying an attitude of delight and amusement. Thus the juxtaposition of the worker and the boss (the boss vs. the slave). This is also confirmed by the woman's gaze (upwards) towards the man.</p>
(18) What can be said about their facial expressions, poses, hairstyle, age, sex, hair colour, ethnicity, education, occupation, relationships (of one to the other)?	Answer summarised in previous question.
ADVERTISING STRATEGY	
(19) Take note of your gut reaction to the picture after your thorough analysis. Address how the various elements came together to help form your initial impressions and how your analysis	This is exactly the subliminal trap: there would be nothing wrong with it but if we see it in a wider socio-anthropological context, we have to notice that stereotypes are here confirmed.

either strengthened or weakened your initial impressions.	
(20) What theme or themes do you find in the advertisement? What is it about?	It advertises chocolate but also confirms stereotypes.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS	
(21) Does the advertisement directly or indirectly reflect racism, prejudice, sexism, alienation, stereotyped thinking, conformism, generational conflict, loneliness, or elitism?	It is stereotyped thinking because chocolate is barely used in Africa by Africans. It is a product that is consumed much more in Western countries. Therefore, as illustrated in the ad, the woman made-up as a worker and the man as a satisfied and happy leader actually emphasises the real situation of the producer of chocolate (Africans) who satisfies the consumers' pleasure (Europeans).
(22) What role can the advertisement play in the country's culture and society?	It confirms a stereotype unconsciously.
(23) What sociological, political, economic or cultural attitudes are indirectly reflected in the advertisement?	The boss-versus-slave stereotype seems to simmer under the surface.
(24) And how can this create hate? Do you find it intensive or moderate?	The picture does not create hate. It confirms stereotypes.
(25) What would you change about the advertisement?	We would either present both actors as factory workers under equal terms or both as entertainers.

Scamorze di razza

From a related blog we can read this comment: "Zappalà also shows a predilection for racist and sexist references, which leave little to the imagination. But we are dealing with specialists, [...]"¹²

Zappalà - "Scamorze di razza. Bianca o Abbronzata"¹³



¹² "Anche Zappalà mostra una certa predilezione per i riferimenti razzisti e sessisti, nemmeno tanto celati. Ci troviamo però di fronte a degli specialisti, [...]" <http://www.dissapore.com/grande-notizia/cibo-sesso-pubblicita/>

¹³ http://www.dissapore.com/grande-notizia/cibo-sesso-pubblicita/?sro_p=0&sro_q=24544

Here we have a physiognomisation process associated with a racialisation process.

The technique lies in associating systematically specific physical features with specific groups of people representing “scamorze di razza” (literally “cheese of race”, meaning in Italian “cheese of top quality”).

The procedure consists of the claim placed on top of the advertisement picture.

The strategy is to set a separation between people according to skin colour (Dossou, & Klein, 2016a, pp. 52 & 54).

The deeper step-by-step analysis shows the following result reported below.

Analysis of Advertisement Picture 3

PRODUCT, SERVICE OR EVENT	
(1) What does the picture advertise?	This picture is advertising a typical Italian cheese brand called “Zappalà”.
(2) List the information the advertisement provides. Describe what you see.	We can see two women, on the right a young darker skinned woman and on the left a younger lighter skinned woman. Above are the words “Scamorze di razza” with the products below.
ADVERTISING STRATEGY	
(3) Does it essentially provide information or does it try to generate some kind of emotional response? Or both?	It informs us about a typical kind of Italian cheese (scamorza) which can be fresh (“fresco”) or smoked (“affumicato”); it also gives an emotional response.
(4) How does the advertisement attempt to get your attention or try to convince you?	It tries to convince from the way it associates the product with these healthy, good-looking young women.
DESIGN	
(5) What is the general atmosphere of the advertisement?	Casual
(6) What mood does it create? How does it do this?	Tranquillity, serenity from the dominant colours (blue and green)
(7) What action is taking place in the advertisement? What does it mean?	No action is taking place.
(8) Observe the way colour or lack of colour is used in the advert. Describe the effect different colours in the advertisement can have.	The dominant colour here is blue; it is one of the brand colours, It has been used to convey a message of softness of the product.
(9) Observe the form of the images in the picture. Whether an image has clearly defined lines and boundaries representing a real object or has no defined shape, can communicate very different ideas and emotions. Address the reasons why the image has or does not have clearly defined shapes.	It has clearly defined shapes; all elements in the pictures are obvious. This sharpness of content is done purposely in order to give a clear message of the product.

(10) What does the background tell us? Where are actions taking place and/or components located and what significance does this background have?	For the purpose of this advertisement the space is well used; it is very airy with the focus on the subjects and the message of the advertising. The dominant white evokes purity, originality and enhances the strength of the text.
(11) How is space used in the advertisement? Is there a lot of 'white space' or is it full of graphic and written elements?	It is well balanced in all its components: space, images, typography and graphics.
(12) How are the basic components or elements arranged?	The main product is in the centre and above the tagline with subjects on the sides.
(13) What is the relationship between pictorial elements and written material and what does this tell you?	It produces the same ambience: the colours used, the subjects' facial expressions and the layout composition.
(14) What techniques are used by the copywriter (humour, definitions of life, comparisons, sexual innuendo, and so on)?	comparisons
(15) What typefaces are used and what impressions do they convey?	Sans-serif futura is bold and regular. This font face has a neutral effect along with its colour, giving a sense of restfulness.
(16) If there are figures (men, women, children, animals), what are they like?	Two women, on the right a young black woman with black hair and on the left a blonde haired white woman who seems a bit younger.
(17) What signs and symbols do you find? What role do they play in the advertisement's impact?	The skin colour symbolises different "races". It enhances the false idea of the human race being divided into distinct "races".
(18) What can be said about their facial expressions, poses, hairstyle, age, sex, hair colour, ethnicity, education, occupation, relationships (of one to the other)?	We notice the relaxed posture and the happy facial expressions. The woman with lighter skin colour has a more innocent and juvenile smile, whereas the woman with darker skin colour has a more mature and provocative smile and posture. These two faces create a certain contrast found on the products: from plain to glamorous; from classic to modern.
ADVERTISING STRATEGY	
(19) Take note of your gut reaction to the picture after your thorough analysis. Address how the various elements came together to help form your initial impressions and how your analysis either strengthened or weakened your initial impressions.	The very first glance on the advert doesn't provide a strong emotional response, but after a thorough analysis one can say that the two products are associated with the women in the picture.
(20) What theme or themes do you find in the advertisement? What is it about?	The product is compared to the two women, which suggests the idea of women as an object to be consumed.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS	

(21) Does the advertisement directly or indirectly, reflect racism, prejudice, sexism, alienation, stereotyped thinking, conformism, generational conflict, loneliness, or elitism?	It reflects racism, prejudice, sexist and stereotyped thinking.
(22) What role can the advertisement play in the country's culture and society?	It will always create a division between Europeans and Africans.
(23) What sociological, political, economic or cultural attitudes are indirectly reflected in the advertisement?	It sets a separation between people according to physical appearance and cultural background.
(24) And how can this create hate? Do you find it intensive or moderate?	This advert forces the viewer to choose, not the product but an ethnicity.
(25) What would you change about the advertisement?	We would take out the women to showcase the products only.

ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISEMENT VIDEOS

The section shows an analysis of two videos of commercial advertisement from Greece (Advertisement Video 1¹⁴) and Italy (Advertisement Video 2¹⁵). Likewise for the analysis of advertisement pictures, Dossou, K.M. (see footnote vi) has designed a model of learning path for the analysis of advertisement videos (Dossou & Klein, 2016b, 20-21), for a deeper understanding of subtle communication mechanisms.¹⁶

‘Fix’ dark beer advertising campaign

In the 21-second long video, a black rooster is behaving as an aggressive or sexually passionate animal with a white duck which seems to want to avoid the rooster. However, after experiencing contact with him she wants more. The slogan reads as follows: “The dark surprise. When you try it, you want more.”

“Fix” Dark Beer Advertising campaign¹⁷

¹⁴ Analysed by Maria Fountana and Eleni-Kalliopi Bimpiri with the contribution of Stavroula Sokoli: http://lnx.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/htdocs/radar.communicationproject.eu/home/dokeos/main/document/document.php?cidReq=RAD01&action=download&id=%2FCOMMUNICATION_PRACTICES%2FADVERTISEMENT_VIDEOS%2FRADAR_ANALYSING_AD_VIDEOS_GR.pdf (registration required)

¹⁵ Analysed by Koffi M. Dossou with the contribution of Franck Diahou: http://lnx.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/htdocs/radar.communicationproject.eu/home/dokeos/main/document/document.php?cidReq=RAD01&action=download&id=%2FCOMMUNICATION_PRACTICES%2FADVERTISEMENT_VIDEOS%2FRADAR_ANALYSING_AD_VIDEOS_IT.pdf (registration required)

¹⁶ For more examples see: http://lnx.radar.communicationproject.eu/web/htdocs/radar.communicationproject.eu/home/dokeos/main/document/document.php?cidReq=RAD01&curdirpath=%2FCOMMUNICATION_PRACTICES%2FADVERTISEMENT_VIDEOS (registration required)

¹⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w68hkz0Qnb0>

This video is based on a sexualisation process.

The technique consists of the claim “The dark surprise. When you try it, you want more”. It lies in contraposing dark/male and white/female; sexuality is represented by means of animals.

The procedure lies in the video of a Greek beer represented by a black rooster behaving as an aggressive or sexually passionate animal with a white duck, which seems to want to avoid the rooster. However, after experiencing contact with him she wants more.

The strategy is to objectify black masculinity conveying the idea of aggressive and animal sexuality (Dossou & Klein, 2016a, p. 59).

Analysis of Advertisement Video 1



PRODUCT, SERVICE OR EVENT	
(1) What are the main issues addressed in the video?	A product is being advertised: a dark beer named “Fix”.
(2) Describe the context and situation in which the interaction takes place between the parties (people).	The situation takes place in the countryside between a black rooster and a white duck.
DESIGN	
(3) Observe images and photography in the video: which of the colours appears dominant?	The colour that appears dominant is black.
(4) How does the dominant colour influence the interaction?	It makes a connection to the branding of the product advertised.
ADVERTISING STRATEGY	
(5) What strikes you the most, catches your attention and/or impresses you about the video?	<p>What strikes most is the sexist part of the ad. The message in Greek, inside the ad, reads: “The dark surprise, as soon as you try it, you want more”. It is definitely sexist in that the female falls in love with the male who violates her (there is a saying: “If you cannot avoid it, you might as well enjoy it” and this seems to apply to what is happening between the two birds).</p> <p>There is also an alternative video for the same product: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YVRsQxEN</p>

	<p>L7w. Again, the slogan is “the dark surprise”. There are no negative comments among the few ones attached to these videos on youtube. They are actually considered to be smart and funny by the people who commented.</p> <p>What we mostly see at first in these videos is that black is sexier than white and this is a common stereotype in Greece (black men are better lovers than white men etc.).</p>
(6) What type of relationship exists between images of the video and the issues addressed? Is it straightforward, subliminal, subject to different interpretations, ambiguous, or other?	Ambiguous content, subject to different interpretations.
(7) What emotions, matters and considerations does the video raise?	The specific video is part of a whole campaign which could be considered somehow cute. However, this specific video raises feelings initially against sexism: the video shows the dominance of the male.
(8) What are the techniques implemented by copywriters in terms of language use? (Consider aspects such as mood, lifestyle, differences, sexual innuendo, or other).	The key word is “the dark surprise”. Maybe you would not expect a dark beer to be so tasty. Then the whole issue is connected to sex. Maybe you would not be expecting to experience pleasure under these circumstances but “surprisingly” you will.
(9) Are there people or animals in the video who strike you and/or people, you like more than others?	The commercial shows only animals, a black rooster and a white duck.
(10) What signs and meanings emerge as more or less explicit after watching the video? Pay attention to verbal, paraverbal (voice: silence, pause, volume, speed, intonation) and non- verbal elements (gestures, postures, gaze.)	<p>The tension from the selected music, the sounds of the birds, and the final instance with the duck rubbing its neck on the rooster are signs which reinforce the following meanings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - if you drink dark beer you get sexually strong, and the female will become willing (sexual passion) - the black rooster violates the white duck (black men are aggressive towards white women).
CRITICAL ANALYSIS	
(11) Does the video, directly or indirectly, convey racism, prejudice, sexual discrimination, alienation, stereotypes, conformity, generational conflicts, isolation, or elitism?	<p>The video conveys indirectly racism, prejudice, stereotypes and sexism.</p> <p>Apart from the fact that the colours black and white and symbols (the black rooster) of the brand are used, the black rooster on the video is caricatured as an outsider, an invader who disturbs but at the same time makes an appreciated disturbance. This ambiguous theme treated in this campaign portrays African natives in the western world, categorised and appreciated for their physical performances (physical activities) but socially rejected.</p>
(12) What impact can the video have in the country's culture and society?	It reinforces sexism, racism and stereotyping

(13) What are the attitudes portrayed –either directly or indirectly- with regard to social, political and economic matters?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Black men are better lovers. - Black men may become sexually aggressive - Black men are invaders who disturb, but in some cases they make an appreciated disturbance.
(14) What would you change in the video? Consider image, design, use of colours, spatial arrangements or other aspects addressed in the previous questions.	Suggestions: No contrast between black and white represented here by the animals; no innuendo concerning sexual intercourse.

Coloreria Italiana - Coloured is better

A white woman who puts a white man in white underwear into the washing machine with the “Coloreria Italiana” washing powder obtains a black man. The video plays with the contrast between a white non-sexy-looking man without muscles, and a black sexy-looking man with muscles, suggesting the stereotype of black = sexy.

Coloreria Italiana - Coloured is better¹⁸



The same sexualisation process can be noticed in this Italian video of a commercial advertisement.

The technique used consists of contraposing black/man and white/woman.

The procedure activated in the video of “Coloreria” Italian washing powder lies in representing sexuality by means of a half-naked white man, not very sexy-looking, who once washed in the washing machine turns into a sexy-looking black man; the name of the Italian product suggests this transformation, also due to the fact that dark skinned African people in Italian are called “di colore” (literally “of colour” but semantically meaning “coloured”).

The strategy pursued is to objectify black masculinity conveying the idea of sub-Saharan Africans being sexually more attractive than Italians.

Analysis of Advertisement Video 2

PRODUCT, SERVICE OR EVENT

¹⁸ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFgxK0ciBNI>

(1) What are the main issues addressed in the video?	It's a campaign about a laundry product, called "Coloreria Italiana", that changes the initial colour of your clothes.
(2) Describe the context and situation in which the interaction takes place between the parties (people).	A woman preparing the laundry is followed by her husband walking in with a macho attitude. Her first reaction is negative through her look and her paraverbal response. Then as soon as the husband approaches closer, she seizes him and pushes him into the washing machine, then switches it on. She sits on the machine to prevent his coming out. Afterward, when she opens the machine she happily finds a younger muscular African-looking man coming out of the washing machine.
DESIGN	
(3) Observe images and photography in the video: which of the colours appears as dominant?	The whole footage uses lighter colours such as: beige, white and light-blue.
(4) How does the dominant colour influence the interaction?	The dominant colours highlight the sense of cleanliness in contrast with the black man at the end of the video.
ADVERTISING STRATEGY	
(5) What strikes you the most, catches your attention and/or impresses you about the video?	The reaction of the woman at the beginning and at the end. Her paraverbal behaviour (voice: silence, pause, intonation) has completely changed.
(6) What type of relationship exists between images of the video and the issues addressed? Is it straightforward, subliminal, subject to different interpretations, ambiguous, or other?	Subliminal and ambiguous.
(7) What emotions, matters and considerations does the video raise?	The video raises in a certain way the stereotype that Africans are physically and sexually more attractive .
(8) What are the techniques implemented by copywriters in terms of language use? (Consider aspects such as mood, lifestyle, differences, sexual innuendo, or other).	The ad copy says: "Coloreria Italiana, Coloured is better". Analysing the video, it brings more the mood of comparison between two different populations, Europeans and Africans, especially displaying the Africans as merchandise.
(9) Are there people or animals in the video who strike you and/or people, you like more than others?	The woman, because she expresses the stereotype of the black man for his physique.
(10) What signs and meanings emerge as more or less explicit after watching the video? Pay attention to verbal, paraverbal (voice: silence, pause, volume, speed, intonation) and non- verbal elements (gestures, postures, gaze.)	The sign of arrogance in the attitudes of the husband and the sign of satisfaction by the woman.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS	
(11) Does the video, directly or indirectly, convey racism, prejudice, sexual discrimination, alienation, stereotypes, conformism, generational conflicts, isolation, or elitism?	The video conveys sexual discrimination. The communication is based on a representation offensive for human dignity, which is associating the person of African background with the product advertised, causing the “coloured” man to become a product of desire which you can buy.
(12) What impact can the video have in the country's culture and society?	An advertising video of this kind may be and has already been a subject of hate, creating marginalisation of Africans.
(13) What are the attitudes portrayed –either directly or indirectly- with regard to social, political and economic matters?	This is dangerous product marketing, because from the content portrayed, it encourages hate toward people of African origins.
(14) What would you change in the video? Consider image, design, use of colours, spatial arrangements or other aspects addressed in the previous questions.	The use of colours in the video to express cleanliness is very good but the storyboard is wrong. We would completely change the story of the advertising.

FINAL RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Among 360 communication items analysed taken from different media as well as social media, we identified 25 hate-oriented communication processes (this list is not exhaustive; Dossou, & Klein, 2016a, p. 35):

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Animalisation • Banalisation • Criminalisation • Dehumanisation • Demonisation • Denigration • Ethnisation • Exclusion from citizenship • Humiliation • Infantilisation • Intimidation • Minimalisation • Missionisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Militarisation • Nationalisation • Patronisation • Physiognomisation • Polarisation • Racialisation • Reification • Religionisation • Ridiculation • Sensationalisation • Sexualisation • Victimisation
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The resulting crucial recommendation in particular for marketing agencies concerns the establishment of a code of ethics for advertising, wherever this does not exist. It is often the case, particularly in advertisements, that minority groups are portrayed in stereotypical and offensive ways. Stereotypes often lead to the afore-mentioned 25 hate-communication processes. For this reason, we recommend that it be compulsory to include or at least consult members of the groups portrayed in the advertisement before its release. These groups can express their views and make suggestions for changes to the advertisement. If it contains hate communication, it should not be released as is. All groups included in the marketing should be respected; otherwise a hateful stereotypic image will continue to be perpetuated.

Sometimes, when advertisers aim to portray a country or geographical area, they use stereotypical people or ideas. Instead of repeating these stereotypes, realistic images of the places should be used.

The lack of pictures of minority groups in important positions is a reality. One can rarely see pictures of minorities pictured in various leadership positions. Instead, they are usually used portraying certain (unskilled) jobs and roles (victim, worker, helper etc.). It would be interesting, for example, to see

images of black businesswomen, or Muslim doctors. Individuals who are part of certain groups are absent from powerful positions like politicians, news anchors, artists and volunteers. Seeing minorities in such roles will have a positive impact on public perceptions.

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Relationality in practice: Doing spatial categorization at the German-Polish border

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ABSTRACT

Discussions about borders and spatiality in Europe often refer to borders being both separating and connecting, whereas a situational understanding of borders' relationality is obviously a challenge. I will show that an ethnomethodologically informed sociology of knowledge resources which people apply to make sense of spaces of the border, may help out here. I will refer to a case study devoted to border knowledge in the German-Polish cross-border field of security. Membership Categorization Analysis is deployed to investigate categorial spatial reasoning. The example of an interview with security company owners in the border town Frankfurt (Oder) – establishing an understanding of *work area* using the border as an implicit resource –, accompanied by references to a broader data collection, highlights four aspects of relationality-in-practice: the use of spatial categorization devices, the importance of standardized relational pairs, the invocation of categories' liminality and the tracing of commonsense topographies.

Keywords: relationality, borders, commonsense topography, membership categorization analysis, Europe, liminality, security

INTRODUCTION

In recent times, Europe's borders remain under increased observation. The importance of borders in discussing Europe as well as the manifold phenomena that can be investigated in this regard culminate in what has been widely portrayed as a confrontation of two opposing processes – that of “de-bordering and re-bordering of the European territory” (Nelles, Walther, 2011, p. 2). Whereas de-bordering points to processes of (institutional) cooperation which are said to have a destabilizing and softening effect on European borders, re-bordering describes the strengthening and securitization of borders, for example in the context of migration flows. Consequently, much attention has been paid to the somehow ambiguous concept of border-regions (Anderson, O'Dowd, 1999) as these are said to be the places that reflect both the barriers and opportunities of crossing borders. Against this background, I will follow the argument that these descriptions of contemporary borders and spaces in Europe refer to the fundamental principle of borders being both separating and connecting. Furthermore, from a processual point of view, this ambiguous quality has to be considered a matter of relationality.

Thinking borders relationally has been widely claimed and proven to be immensely fruitful – and this holds true both for socio-symbolic boundaries (Lamont, Molnár, 2002) and political-territorial borders (Paasi, Zimmerbauer, 2016). Following Michèle Lamont and Virág Molnár (2002) we can state: „If the notion of boundaries has become one of our most fertile thinking tools, it is in part because it captures a fundamental social process, that of relationality“ (p. 169). Relational thinking positions itself against essentialism (Emirbayer, 1997) and thus highlights a processual view that takes the open-endedness and ongoing character of relating as well as the situational stabilization of ties and boundaries (Tilly, 2004) seriously. In doing so, the situations, interactions and actors involved are in the focus of interest, as acts of relating have to be understood as basic sense-making procedures (Abbott, 1995).

In general, this relational view reflects and can be traced back to one of the fundamental characteristics of borders, that is, their double quality as being both separating and connecting. According to Christophe Sohn (2015), the border is „both a separation between an inside and an outside and an interface between adjacent socio-spatial systems or categories. On one side, the border engenders a production and a differentiated occupancy of space, to which it associates dichotomous notions such as inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, we/them. On the other, the border is also an invitation to passing,

transgression and unfamiliarity“ (p. 4). Many similar conceptual pairs can be found to grasp this paradox bivalent character of borders, just as a variety of concepts has been established to gain an understanding of this relational potential of borders. For example, borders may be seen as coupling and decoupling networks (Karafillidis, 2009), they otherwise may be understood as interfaces (van Houtum, 2012), where connection and separation become channeled (Paasi, 2009). Accordingly, what becomes separated or connected may come under scrutiny. Martínez (1994) distinguishes modes of borderlands according to their level of integration, understanding borderlands as liminal zones of communication within territorial vicinity. In contrast, Cooper and Rumford (2013) highlight their cosmopolitan or global connectivity.

Summing up, these questions concerning the scalar organization of what borders separate and/or connect as well as how they do it lead to the basic assumption about borders that has been stressed a lot lately: that of its basic complexity (e.g. Andersen et al., 2016). While this complexity of borders has to be considered a multidimensional phenomenon (Bossong et al., 2017; Haselsberger, 2014), which spans across the social, spatial and temporal dimension (Schiffauer et al., 2013), in this paper I want to focus (primarily) on the spatial dimension.

Spatiality has been considered a prior dimension of borders for a long time (Wilson, Donnan, 2012). On the one hand, this brought us a broad understanding of intertwining processes of (state-)territorialization (Anderson, O'Dowd, 1999), multi-scalar spatial interrelations (Laine, 2016), relational geographies (Jones, 2009) as well as emerging new spatialities (Wille, 2013) beyond the “territorial/relational devide” (Paasi, 2012). On the other hand, this dominance of spatial thinking is currently severely – and with good reason – criticized by a growing number of scholars (e.g. Brambilla, 2014). However, it should be recognized that the spatiality of borders does not cease to exist just because the social and temporal dimension of borders respectively matters of mobility, technology or materiality are increasingly focused. In fact, this situation should rise awareness for the necessity to carefully investigate the role that spatiality plays in people's bordering practices resulting in complex border arrangements.

Concluding these initial remarks, in this paper I will argue not to take the spatial relationality of European borders for granted. Instead, the analysis should show how situational understandings of borders build upon relationality-in-practice. Therefore, in the next part I will briefly introduce the German-Polish field of security which serves as the empirical basis of my considerations. Secondly, I will explain the methodological background which culminates in an ethnomethodologically informed sociology of knowledge, interested in the resources people use to make sense of borders. Continuing in this vein, I will introduce Membership Categorization Analysis as a specific analytic perspective that guides me through my analysis. I will discuss data taken from an interview with security company owners in the border town Frankfurt (Oder) establishing an understanding of *work area* using the border as an implicit resource. Accompanied by references to a broader data collection, I want to highlight four aspects of relationality-in-practice: the use of spatial categorization devices, the importance of standardized relational pairs, the invocation of categories' liminality and the tracing of commonsense topographies. I will conclude with opting for a careful generalization of methods that are used to address borders – and in this way to perform borderwork in everyday conversations.

THE GERMAN-POLISH FIELD OF SECURITY

As case studies within border(land) studies as well as methodological considerations concerning a context-sensitive border-analytical perspective (Gerst, Krämer, in press) suggest, one has to start with empirical data to focusing on the singularity of a case to come to an understanding of the unique qualities and processes that constitute a border as well as the relational potential it enables. In the following, I will concentrate on the German-Polish border, namely the border twin-towns Frankfurt (Oder) and Ślubice and the cross-border security field in particular.

As a comparatively young Inner-European border, the German-Polish border has shown a great dynamic in the past decades. Installed as the so called “Oder-Neisse Line”, representing a post World-War scenario of flight and expulsion, it later on became known as the “gate between East and West”, separating ideologies. After the end of the Cold War, it quickly turned into a symbol of European integration, epitomized in the phrase of “the laboratory of Europe” and the development of manifold cross-border activities.

The consequences of these processes are especially discernable in the German-Polish field of security – a domain that comprises a variety of different actors such as police, customs offices, civil protection, fire brigades, municipalities, security companies etc. This field permanently receives public attention for a variety of reasons. In general, security plays a crucial role as matters of cross-border crime remain the subject of heated debate. Statistics show the ambivalent situation that crime rates continuously decline while numbers still remain higher in areas close to the border¹. Accordingly, not only discussions about border controls and public visibility of border guards go on but actual diverse control practices can be observed (Laube, 2013). In the context of two major events², in July 2016 Poland relaunched border controls for four weeks. While the Schengen agreement permits this in exceptional situations, on the contrary, the German police established daily sporadic controls “near the border”. Obviously, situational definitions of space play a crucial role here as controls near the border are particularly envisaged to differ from controls “at the border” (Gerst, Krämer, in press).

Besides these examples – showing that the German-Polish border is still seen as a durable border that has to be somehow secured –, a dynamic process of increasing cross-border cooperation since the 1990s is also going on (Schwell, 2008). Activities such as joint bike patrols in the cities of Frankfurt (Oder) and Ślubice and joint water patrols across the river Oder are performed. Furthermore, joint German and Polish language teaching of firefighters, policewomen and -men takes place as well as joint disaster control exercises, for example at the motorway A12/A2 that connects Germany and Poland. Again, detailed analyses of these examples show how this permeability of borders is also connected to matters of space as they go hand in hand with changing ways to locate and to stretch the border as well as changing spatialities of cross-border work areas and areas of competence.

Finally, a closer look at security matters at the German-Polish border offers insights into phenomena exploiting what may be called the liminal potential of borders. In this regard, the border is a place where innovation takes place, undermining a clear bivalent separation or connection. For example, the installation of the German-Polish cooperation center in Świecko, where police officials from both sides and a variety of authorities work together, breaks new ground as it transcends former legal and practical routines. Accordingly, the liminal border marks a constant state of transition as evolving practices such as cross-border immediate pursuit suggest. Here the phenomenon of crossing borders is extended as for the time of pursuit, a unique socio-spatial area emerges.

This concurrence of a durable, permeable and liminal character of the border – through the lens of the cross border security field – briefly sketches out the historically developed complexity of relations which constitute the German-Polish border and which is visible for example in the border twin-towns Frankfurt (Oder) and Ślubice. In the next part, I will introduce methodological considerations which aim at doing justice to the borders’ relational complexity.

METHODOLOGY: SPATIALITY AS AN ONGOING ACCOMPLISHMENT

The main questions deriving from the discussion above are as follows: How do people establish relations in order to make sense of borders? What kind of knowledge do they draw on to come to terms about borders’ spatiality? To approach these questions, I want to suggest a perspective describable as an ethnomethodologically informed sociology of knowledge. Such a view aims at investigating the methods and knowledge resources people refer to in order to make sense of the world. Doing borders and doing space, then, has to be considered an “ongoing accomplishment” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 4), a process of practical “borderwork” (Rumford, 2008) via “spatial reasoning” (Byrne, Johnson-Laird, 1989; Luck, 2012). Thereby – under the auspices of a radical perspective, that of taking member’s own views seriously – “ethnomethodology rejects the standard social scientific conception of reasoning as some kind of abstract apparatus, and emphasizes instead the fundamentally situated and contingent character of reasoning as a practical matter” (Hester, Francis, 2007, p. 4). Applied to matters of borders’ relationality respectively their connectivity and separability, this view suggests a careful investigation of the sense-making procedures and ways in which people draw on the connecting, separating as well as liminal potential of the border *in situ*, instead of deciding a priori which quality may be relevant.

¹ <https://polizei.brandenburg.de/pressemeldung/zahl-der-straftaten-in-brandenburg-sinkt/207956>

² Border controls took place between July 4th and August 2nd. Reasons according to the Polish state police were the NATO summit in Warsaw as well as the pope’s visit of the World Youth Day in Krakow.

With the aim of explicating spatial knowledge in action, the following analysis draws on Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA), an ethnomethodological, conversation-analytical approach to categorial work in talk-in-interaction (Sacks, 1995). MCA may be best described not as a method or coherent methodology but a “collection of observations”, rooted in a radical “analytic mentality” (Housley, Fitzgerald, 2015, p. 4-6) that is devoted to investigate phenomena first and foremost as “member’s phenomena” (Fitzgerald, Rintel, 2016). MCA is interested in the ways interlocutors use categories not only to produce discourse but to locally make sense of the world under praxeological conditions. Established within Conversation Analysis and thus showing a strong connection to the research of the sequential fabrication of interaction (Watson, 1997), MCA points to the importance of examining the categorial flow to fully understand talk-in-interaction. Thereby, the classical sociological question of how order is possible is transformed into the question of how order gets done. The basic strategy of the researcher is to “problematize” categorizations that are produced by speakers. That is, categories are considered to be the outcome of a “selection process” and the aim of the researcher is to describe this process of “categorial ordering work” (Hester, Eglin, 1997, p. 3).

While most of previous MCA studies focus on membership, that is, social categorization (Housley, Fitzgerald, 2015), there are only very few studies that approach spatial categorization. In his classical examination of place formulations, Schegloff (1972) poses the question how speakers find the “right” formulation out of “a set of terms each of which [...] is a correct way to refer to it” (p. 81). He shows that people’s search procedures consist of a threefold analysis of the own (and the co-interlocutors) location, of the hearer’s (and the speaker’s) membership as well as the conversational topic or activity interlocutors are engaged in. Furthermore, he points to a differentiation between geographical (G) and relational-to-members (Rm) formulations: While the former refer to commonsense knowledge about geography, e.g. street addresses, the latter require knowledge about the speakers’ relationship. Taking up Schegloff’s initial observations, Myers points to the changing relevancies of place and space formulations within conversations as they refer to what has been previously said and/or offer possibilities to open up new topical directions (cf. Myers, 2006, p. 334). This is especially interesting in cases of re-definitions of spatiality, which indicate both the possible variability in accounting for the “same” spaces as well as changing (topical) dynamics within the conversation. Connecting these elaborations with the growing literature on membership categorization, Housley and Smith (2011) establish an understanding of “spatial categorization devices” (cf. also “membership categorization devices”: Sacks, 1972b), these devices comprise a collection of spatial categories and rules of application. Finally, Smith (2013) suggests the concept of “commonsense topography” to highlight that accounting for space does not necessarily refer to specific stocks of knowledge. Topography, in this rather praxeological sense, “is intended to indicate a concern with the way in which a particular setting comes to be defined, described, and delineated in accordance with routine and situated (ethno)methods of doing so. These methods are, in turn, signature practices of social organization displaying lines of membership, belonging, and the situated accomplishment of spatial matters and mutual understanding” (p. 44).

DATA AND ANALYSIS

The following analysis shows how the two owners (BM and IF) of a security company, located in the border town Frankfurt (Oder), accomplish categorial ordering work in an interview situation – and in doing so refer to specific space-related knowledge resources. In order to account for a spatial characterization of *work area*, the interviewees have to deal with the “borderiness” of the work area and do so in specific ways. The data discussed below stem from a broader empirical research of border knowledge within the German-Polish cross-border field of security. The corpus comprises about 30 hours of talk-in-interaction across different settings and situations: interviews with security professionals, panel discussions and conferences as well as debriefing sessions and media coverage. All recordings have been made within or in vicinity to the border towns Frankfurt (Oder) and Ślubice.

The excerpt is taken from an interview which follows the interviewer’s (DG) strategy not to pose the border as a topic of conversation. One of the main questions to the interview data is when, how and why interviewees would – implicitly or explicitly – talk about “the border”. Carolyn Baker (2004), amongst others, has shown how interviews can be analyzed as “interactional events”, treating responses as “accounts” of the world. Thus, analysis seeks to “identify the speakers’ methods of using categories and activities in accounts” aiming at “identifying cultural knowledge and logic in *use*” (Baker, 2004, p. 163, emphasis in the original). Following the stepwise unfolding of the interviewees’ response, the example demonstrates four aspects of relationality-in-practice: (1) how a spatial categorization device

is found, (2) how the deployment of standardized relational pairs contributes to the sense-making of the multi-scalar spatial organization at the border; (3) how the invocation as well as neglecting of categories' liminality contributes to an understanding of connection respectively separation, (4) how the tracing of a relational commonsense topography contributes to a categories' disambiguation. All in all, the extract shows how these aspects facilitate an account of *work area* based on the implicitness of border reference. To show that the context-sensitive methods identified are crucial not only in the interview at hand, but refer to recurrent ways of accounting for cross-border spatiality, cursory examples from the overall conversational data are integrated.

Berlin-Brandenburg as a merged spatial categorization device

Data 9a: Interview with two security company owners

- 01 DG: Sie hatten ja schon ein bisschen von ihrem Arbeitsfeld gesprochen,
You already talked a bit about your work area,
 02 können Sie das so ein bisschen auch geografisch nennen,
could you state that a bit geographically,
 03 also wo Sie dann direkt im Einsatz sind, wie weit reicht das?
thus where are you operating, how far does it reach?
 04 BM: Brandenburgweit.
Brandenburg-wide.
 05 DG: Brandenburgweit.
Brandenburg-wide.
 06 BM: Hm (1,2s) Berlin halt mit eingeschlossen nicht, Berlin Brandenburg.
Well, Berlin just including right, Berlin Brandenburg.
 07 DG: Mhm.
Mhm.
 08 IF: Ja.
Yes.

This extract starts with DG tying his two-part question to what has been previously said by asking for a possible geographical understanding – in terms of localization and/or scope – of the previously introduced category *work area* (1.01). In this way, he makes use of what Harold Garfinkel and Harvey Sacks (1970) called the et-cetera-problem: based on the fundamental indexicality of all description, meaning is basically indefinite and thus a reassessment of categories is made possible through invoking an alternative contextualization. BM immediately answers with deploying the category *Brandenburg-wide* (1.04), which becomes accepted by DG through repetition. BM then – after a pause – complements his account by advancing the category to *Berlin-Brandenburg* (1.06), whereas the attribution *Berlin* being *included* implicitly refers to a twofold principle of categorial merging: On the one hand, the spatial arrangement is elaborated by referring to a specific category-bound predicate (Reynolds, Fitzgerald, 2015; Watson, 1983), that of *Berlin* being “surrounded” by *Brandenburg*. On the other hand, the relationship of the two spatial categories as candidates of the same class are refined. In this way, the spatial categorization device “federal state” becomes – for the practical purpose the question/answer sequence requires in the here and now – elaborated concerning the ability to internal partitioning according to spatial adjacency. Thus, the possibility to relate *Berlin* to *Brandenburg* is based on spatial knowledge which makes possible the relation of specific categories forming a subclass of the device federal states which may be called “adjacent states”.

Achieving a cross-border relationship through standardized relational pairs

Even though the given answer could have come to an end here as both DG as well as IF demonstrate acceptance, in the following, BM elaborates his understanding of the spatial arrangement of the *work area* by giving a more detailed explanation of his initial answer:

Data 1b: Interview with two security company owners

- 09 BM: Das ist ja auch ein Problem unserer Struktur hier,
That is also a problem of our structure here,
 10 wir haben ja, Frankfurt Oder ist ja eine Stadt mit nur einem halben Umland,
we have, Frankfurt Oder is indeed a city with just half of a surrounding area,
 11 DG: Mhm.
Mhm,

- 12 BM: nicht, also muss, konzentriert man sich in die andere Richtung.
Right, so you have, one has to concentrate on the other direction.
- 13 DG: Ja.
Yes.
- 14 BM: Ja wir haben zwar auch hin und wieder mal Aufträge in Polen aber;
Yes we have now and then orders in Poland but;
- 15 DG: Hm.
Hm.
- 16 IF: [Selten]
[Rarely.]
- 17 BM: [davon kann man halt nicht] leben.
[Of that you cannot] live,
- 18 DG: [Mhm okay]
[Mhm okay]
- 19 IF: [Hm na ist aber auch] seltener.
[Well but it is also] rare.
- 20 BM: Ist schon selten ja.
It is rare yes.

BM continues by retrospectively marking his initial answer as anticipating a *problem of our structure* (1.09), framing the following explanation as a moral account (Dillon, 2011; Jayyusi, 1984). The self-localizing category *Frankfurt (Oder)* alongside the category-bound predicate having *half of a surrounding area* (1.10) is introduced, whereas the importance of the spatial specification by referring to the city is highlighted through self-repair (Schegloff, Jefferson, Sacks, 1977). That is, the reference to the city's name is established as a substitute for *we* (1.10) – in this way, a spatial category is prioritized instead of a membership category to demonstrate the interviewees stance to be first of all a spatial one. Furthermore, the category specifies the aforementioned category *Berlin-Brandenburg* in the sense that in relation to *Frankfurt (Oder)*, it appears now under the aspect of spatial expansion. This relation is located in *the other direction* (1.12). Thereby, BM implicitly refers to the one direction which marks the missing half of the duplicative organized *surrounding area* and which is not part of *Berlin-Brandenburg*. This counterpart then is categorized as *Poland* (1.14), explicitly establishing a relation that is constitutive for “standardized relational pairs” (SRP). This notion has been introduced to describe membership category pairings that “go together” due to a characteristic connection based on a relationship of rights and obligations such as mother-child, doctor-patient etc. (Hester, Eglin, 1997, p. 4; Sacks, 1972a). When it comes to spatiality, as it is the case in this extract, my data show a significant importance to achieve a cross-border relationship using this kind of pairings. Also consider the following extracts:

Data 10: Security-conference

- 01 State police official: Zum anderen gibt es durchaus,
On the other hand there are quite,
- 02 und das Wohlstandsgefälle ist ja angesprochen worden,
and the prosperity gap has been mentioned already,
- 03 schon in Polen auch Kriminelle genau wie in Deutschland,
in Poland there are also criminals like in Germany,
- 04 und in Polen muss man auch dazu sagen
and in Poland you have to say
- 05 sind die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse einfach etwas schwieriger,
the economic conditions are just a bit harder,
- 06 das muss man ja auch sehen,
you have to see this,
- 07 und sagen wir mal der Tatanreiz
and let us say the appeal to then commit crime
- 08 auch in Deutschland dann Straftaten zu begehen ist sicherlich da.
also in Germany is surely present.

Data 11: panel discussion “border crime”

- 01 State politician: Und was wir auch tun ist zum Beispiel in Polen gezielt zu werben,
And what we also do for example is to recruit in Poland,
- 02 junge Menschen aus Polen

- 03 *young people from Poland*
in den Brandenburger Polizeidienst zu übernehmen.
taking in police service in Brandenburg,
04 Und das ist durchaus ein erfolgsversprechender Weg
And that is definitely a promising way
05 und es hat durchaus auch da erste Erfolge gegeben;
and there have definitely been first successes;
06 es gibt junge Menschen aus Polen,
there are young people from Poland
07 die in Deutschland in Brandenburg
who want to become in Germany in Brandenburg
08 zukünftig Polizeibeamtinnen oder Beamte werden wollen.
policewomen or -men in the future.

In the second data, the SRP *Poland-Germany* is introduced. In general, this SRP is a resource to establish a cross-border relationship as it draws on a symmetric categorization of a class neighboring territories. Two attributes are made relevant here – one that connects and one that separates the categories: On the one hand, *Poland* and *Germany* are bound via the shared basis having *criminals* (2.03). On the other hand, the relationship is transformed into an asymmetric one via the differentiating criterion *economic conditions* (2.05), which results in one directional cross-border crime based on a stimulus-response concept of *appeal to crime* (2.07). The third extract then shows that the establishment of a SRP has to be considered a question of scalar spatial knowledge – while it should be clear that instead of assuming a fixed a priori scalar ordering of spatial categories, this has to be considered situational ordering work. The SRP *Poland-Brandenburg* is established here in terms of recruitment of *young people from Poland* (3.02) to work for the police in *Brandenburg*. In the context of this institutional setting and in contrary to the first example, the SRP is not based on neighboring territoriality but on neighboring competence. This step is made explicit in the course of the spatial specification *in Germany in Brandenburg* (3.08) via repair, alongside the introduction of the membership category *becoming policewomen and -men* (3.07). Furthermore, this shows – in accordance with the general outcome of my research – that the aforementioned SRP *Poland-Germany* is particularly applicable as an “omni-relevant device” (Rintel, 2015; Fitzgerald, Housley, Butler, 2009). “Omnirelevant devices are those that are composed of collections of categories that are always potentially applicable, and that, when invoked, have priority in terms of organising action within – and only in – situated interaction.” (Fitzgerald, Housley, Butler, 2009, p. 48). The additional specification *in Brandenburg* is thus not necessary to make this utterance accountable. Drawing on the crucial relationship of conversation topic and context of articulation, the omni-relevant device offers the potential to serve for an irreducible description based on a common spatial understanding.

Coming back to the interview with the two security company owners, the SRP deployed here establishes a scalar asymmetric cross-border relationship by connecting a merged category of the class “federal state” and a category of the class “state”. This difference in spatial differentiation refers both to divergent frames of spatial administrative units as well as cultural closure processes which lead to a higher degree of internal differentiation accompanied by external homogenization (Tajfel, 1981). The categorial difference of *Poland* and *Berlin-Brandenburg* then is achieved by transforming the category *work area* into the economically motivated class “areas of receiving orders”. The difference then is bound to the order situation, which concerning *Poland* is characterized economically – *of that you cannot live* (1.17) – as well as temporally – *but it is also rare* (1.19) – different. In this way, the specific asymmetric relation constitutive for the situational SRP is established.

Categories’ liminality

The response sequence proceeds as BM delves further into the economic situation related to the spatial reasoning:

Data 1c: Interview with two security company owners

- 21 BM: Und Frankfurt selbst als Stadt (1,8s) bietet eben nicht so viel Arbeit,
And Frankfurt as a city (1,8s) does not offer enough work,
22 dass ein Unternehmen unserer Größe hier akzeptieren kann,
so that a company of our size could accept,
23 DG: Mhm.
Mhm.

- 24 BM: überhaupt nicht, nicht.
Not at all right.
- 25 DG: (1,2s) Hm
(1,2s) *Hm.*
- 26 BM: Wir arbeiten im Prinzip zu neunzig Prozent auch für gewerbliche Kunden,
In principle, ninety percent of our work is for business customers,
- 27 DG: Ja.
Yes.
- 28 BM: ja (1,4s) und da muss man halt doch das Umland suchen nach ((lachend)) Arbeit,
Yes (1,4s) and so you have to search for the surrounding area to ((laughing)) work,

BM comes back to the central category *Frankfurt* (1.21), explicitly marking it as a city's name. Taking up the moral accounting of the spatial arrangement is achieved by self-ascribing to the membership category *company of our size* (1.22) and accordingly predicating *Frankfurt* with the attribute *does not offer enough work* (1.21). In this way, going beyond the city area first is made implicitly reasonable – by establishing an understanding of an adequate order situation in relation to the spatial unit city – before making it explicit, initiated by invoking the membership category *business customers* (1.26). Thus, the identified insufficiencies of providing work is linked to the explanation that work, now understandable as orders from business customers, has to be found in the *surrounding area* (1.28). In this way, concluding the aforementioned search for an adequate order situation, *(half) surrounding area* is transformed from a city-related category-bound predicate to a category itself, thereby neglecting its potential as what can be described as a categories' liminality. With this notion I want to describe the potential of single categories – instead of category-pairs like SRP's – that carry the paradox of borders being both separating and connecting. In this way, the liminal use of categories goes beyond the bivalent here/there relationship by either offering a third possibility, or highlighting a transitional character. Consider the following extracts from my data, where the category *border region* is deployed:

Data 12: panel discussion “border crime”

- 01 Local police official: Wir haben in der nächsten Woche hier ganz in der Nähe
We have next week a few steps from here
- 02 unsere fünfte Grenztagung mittlerweile,
our fifth border-meeting by now,
- 03 das hat sich zu einer Fachtagung herausgebildet
that developed into a specialist conference
- 04 wo wirklich sämtliche Behörden vertreten sind
where really all authorities are represented
- 05 die bei der Grenzregion sowohl auf der polnischen Seite
who in the border region on either the Polish side
- 06 als auch auf der deutschen Seite Verantwortung tragen.
or the German side are responsible.

Data 13: security-conference

- 01 Public prosecutor: das heißt wenn sie in einer Grenzregion leben
that means if you live in a border region
- 02 in der ein Wohlstandsgefälle zu den Nachbarn sich auszeichnet,
which features a prosperity gap with the neighbours,
- 03 werden sie auch mit einer gewissen
you will have to live with a certain
- 04 stärkeren Kriminalitätsbelastung leben müssen,
a higher level of crime,
- 05 das ist die nüchterne Wahrheit aus meiner Sicht.
that is the humbling truth in my opinion.

In the fourth extract, *border region* (4.05) serves as a liminal category as it explicitly assembles two parts: *the Polish side* (4.05) and *the German side* (4.06). In this way, *border region* includes a cross-border area that may not be reduced to one side of the border. But keeping the basic ambiguity of all category use in mind, liminality may not be understood as a specific kind of categories but a way of using them. In the fifth extract, the same category *border region* (5.01) implicitly describes an area alongside a border – and thus does not serve as a liminal category. In contrary to the first example, the

membership category *neighbours* (5.02) is not introduced as a differentiating principle keeping the separated together – like *side* in the first example – but as a category describing the excluded.

In a similar but slightly different vein, liminality may be used to highlight a transitory understanding of relations. Consider the following extracts showing the use of the category-bound-predicate *transit state*:

Data 14: security-conference

- | | | |
|----|--------------------|--|
| 01 | Public prosecutor: | Wir sind gekennzeichnet dadurch dass wir sehr |
| 02 | | <i>characteristic about us is that we have to</i> |
| 03 | | international arbeiten müssen; |
| 04 | | <i>work very internationally;</i> |
| 05 | | die Delikte die bei mir in dieser Schwerpunktabteilung |
| 06 | | <i>the crimes that are in my department</i> |
| 07 | | also grenzüberschreitende Eigentumskriminalität, |
| 08 | | <i>namely cross-border crimes against property,</i> |
| 09 | | sind zu drei Vierteln Delikte |
| 10 | | <i>three quarters of them</i> |
| 11 | | die Diebstähle eher auf dem Bundesgebiet betreffen, |
| 12 | | <i>are crimes more likely concerning robberies on federal territory,</i> |
| 13 | | aber auch ein Viertel ganz Europa. |
| | | <i>but also one quarter whole Europe.</i> |
| | | Brandenburg ist halt Transitland |
| | | <i>Brandenburg is rather a transit state</i> |
| | | sie wissen wie die Autobahn gestrickt ist |
| | | <i>you know how the motorway is knitted</i> |
| | | und das führt eben dazu ne, |
| | | <i>well, and that leads to</i> |
| | | dass wir also eben auch zum Beispiel KFZ und LKW Diebstähle |
| | | <i>that we have also for example motor vehicle and truck robberies</i> |
| | | ne ja aus Belgien und (xx xxx) Großbritannien |
| | | <i>right from Belgium and (xx xxx) Great Britain</i> |
| | | na eben ganz häufig auch haben. |
| | | <i>right, quite frequently.</i> |

Data 15: televised interview

- | | | |
|----|---------|---|
| 01 | Lawyer: | Polen ist kein Schurkenstaat und ein Land voller Kriminellen |
| 02 | | <i>Poland is no rogue state and a country full of criminals</i> |
| 03 | | wird aber als Transitland missbraucht, |
| 04 | | <i>but is misused as a transit state,</i> |
| | | das muss man ganz deutlich sagen |
| | | <i>you have to say that very clearly</i> |
| | | und hier müssen deutsche und polnische Teams zusammenarbeiten. |
| | | <i>and here German and Polish teams have to work together.</i> |

In both extracts, speakers talk about a phenomenon commonly glossed organized transit crime. Interestingly, the transitory character is introduced as an attribute to a spatial category in both cases – namely *Brandenburg* (6.08) and *Poland* (7.01). As it is partially explicated in the sixth extract and made visible in the further context of the seventh extract, both attributions seek to highlight the in-between-ness of the respective category. Whereas in the first example *Brandenburg* is introduced as a transit state that is used by criminals to transfer stolen vehicles from *Belgium* and *Great Britain* (6.12) eastbound, in the second example *Poland* is used by criminals in the same vein. So, contrary to the liminal use of the category *border region*, this attribution does not seek to give insights in the internal partitioning of the category, but in its transient location in a wider, three-figure relationship.

Coming back to the interview, a similarity compared to the neglecting of the liminal character of *border region* may be highlighted. On the one hand, the liminal potential of the category *surrounding area* (1.28) is first admitted by pointing to its being generally divided into two parts – also glossed in terms of *directions* – which are implicitly located either side of the border. On the other hand, this bivalent potential is then not exploited by BM, for example by using it to establish a vision of “cross-

border work area". Rather, he codifies the restricting character of the border by excluding *Poland* from the *work area*.

Tracing a commonsense topography

After elaborating the initial equation of *work area* and *Berlin-Brandenburg*, which is based on reasoning regarding the spatial arrangement on the one hand and membership related spatialized insufficiencies on the other, BM closes his answer by explaining the *boundedness* of the category *surrounding area*:

Data 1d: Interview with two security company owners

- 29 BM: (4s) zumal ja es ist ja auch alles ein bisschen begrenzt,
(4s) *particularly yes everything is a bit bounded,*
30 ich meine wenn man jetzt Frankfurt Oder sieht,
I mean if you look at Frankfurt Oder,
31 wenn man jetzt südlich bis (1s) bis Cottbus ist auch nichts,
if you look south till Cottbus there is nothing,
32 Guben ist nichts das ist alles ja [bis Cottbus] ist nichts,
Guben is nothing that is all yes [till Cottbus] is nothing,
33 DG: [ja]
[Yes]
34 BM: bis nach Schwedt hoch ja das ist auch nichts.
up to Schwedt that is also nothing.
35 (1,7s) Und dann hat man im Prinzip hier den Speckgürtel
(1,7s) And then in principle you have the suburbs
36 rund rum hier weiß ich Luckenwalde und [oder dann]
all around I know Luckenwalde and [or then]
37 DG: [Mh]
[Mh.]
38 BM: nach, hier hoch Barnim oder so,
to, here up to Barnim or so,
39 [das sind dann so] die ECKEN ne, [hm.]
[these are] the corners right, [hm.]
40 DG: [ja] [okay] (2,1s) interessant.
[Yes] [okay] (2,1s) interesting.

Based on the centrality of *Frankfurt* (1.30), the *surrounding area* is described as *bounded* in a dual way regarding the order situation (*there is nothing*) as well as the spatial expansion. The latter is achieved by tracing the commonsense topography of this category by naming the *corners* (1.39) of this area, a class of city names including *Cottbus*, *Guben*, *Schwedt*, *Luckenwalde* and *Barnim*. Here, BM makes use of *surrounding area* being a category "relational-to-members" (Schegloff, 1972), which means that the understanding of this category may not be inferred via common geographical knowledge but knowledge about the conversationalists' membership and conversational topic. Whereas geographical localizations may be unquestionable as they rely on a common vision of the spatial world, relational-to-members localizations offer the potential to open up further elaboration or topical progression as they make the relationality of localization, persons, topics and contexts observable and thus questionable (cf. Myers, 2006, p. 340). Finally, by defining the spatial framework of the category *surrounding area*, again going beyond this area is made implicitly reasonable, which directly refers to the initial categorization *Berlin-Brandenburg*, which in contrary to *Frankfurt (Oder)* and the *surrounding area* meets all requirements to serve as a *work area*.

CONCLUSION

This paper argues for a praxeological understanding of the relationality of borders. Borders as complex phenomena embrace manifold meanings, functions, relational potentialities and constraints that make necessary a detailed investigation of the daily relational-work that actors perform. Based on examples which show instances of categorial spatial reasoning in the context of the cross-border security field at the German-Polish border, the aim was to demonstrate how people create and make sense of "spaces of the border" (Wille, 2013) within talk. Against the background of this situational understanding, territoriality and relationality thus cannot be seen as opposite characteristics of borders. Rather – to use

the words of Paasi (2009) – „[b]oundedness and territory are thus important *processes* embedded in the production and reproduction of social relations on various scales [...]“ (p. 215, emphasis in the original). In the analysis, four recurrent methods of deploying spatial knowledge-in-action with reference to the border were spelled out: first, how a spatial categorization device is found; second, how the deployment of standardized relational pairs contributes to the sense-making of the multi-scalar spatial organization of the border; third, how invoking as well as neglecting of a categories' liminality contributes to an understanding of cross-border relationships; and finally how the tracing of a relational commonsense topography contributes to a categories' disambiguation. Thereby, a first step of a “systematic analysis” of category use (Stokoe, 2012) has been taken. Such careful generalization based on single instances should rise awareness of how people orient to the relational characteristics of borders *in situ* and thus use borders as a resource.

In the context of borders in Europe, which are often reduced to a basic principle of de- or re-bordering, such a view especially shows the fine grained variety of ways in which borders may be addressed, not only with reference to the spatial, but also to the social and temporal dimension of borders. Following a border-analytic indifference helps us not to decide in advance whether borders connect or separate. In fact, it is both qualities that are not only available for people to address borders within talk, but are connectable and may change within the same conversational sequence. Thus, if we aim at understanding the importance of space and its role in the European edifice, a view that carefully investigates the practical and methodic achievement of space in the face of borders' separating and connecting characteristics may go beyond a classical geopolitical stance. In the end, we cannot think of borders in Europe, without actors doing borders in their daily conversational interaction.

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